Grab 8ag NC

l value [ust|ce deflned as glvlng each morally raLlonal belng hls or her due
C1 ueflnlLlonal Analysls
kequ|res wlll be deflned as Lo creaLe a mandaLe or lnvlolable need for
"1o ca|| for or exact as ob||gatory"

k|ghts wlll be deflned as Lhe lnvlolable proLecLlons of enLlLles' needs Lo be proLecLed by
whaLever form of a sLaLe Lhey are a parL of
"1hat wh|ch |s due to anyone by [ust c|a|m or |ega| guarantees"

kecogn|ze wlll be deflned as Lo percelve Lo be Lrue or requlred
"1o perce|ve as ex|st|ng or true"
ulcLlonarycom
refer onllne dlcLlonarles ln debaLe because Lhey are Lhe mosL prevalenL ln Loplc llL and
common usage Any dlcLlonarles percelved Lo be more quallfled" slmply because Lhey are
obscure should be re[ecLed ln Lhe conLexL of a debaLe as a compeLlLlve acLlvlLy WhaL ls mosL
common and leasL convoluLed ls Lhe besL for a compeLlLlve acLlvlLy
C2 1he afflrmaLlve musL prove LhaL lL ls [usL Lo elevaLe anlmals Lo Lhe same sLaLus as humans
Lhrough Lhe meLrlc of lnvlolable rlghLs and Lhe negaLlve burden wlll be Lo prove LhaL anlmals do
noL [usLly deserve Lhe same rlghLs and proLecLlons afforded Lo human clLlzens
1he standard for the round w||| be g|v|ng mora||y rat|ona| be|ngs the|r due
Anlmals cannoL agree Lo Lhe soclal conLracL and Lherefore cannoL quallfy for rlghLs
NLGA1L CN IACL CovernmenLs are Lhe acLors LhaL provlde rlghLs 1hey provlde rlghLs only Lo
members of Lhelr sLaLe who have agreed Lo Lhe soclal conLracL Anlmals do noL have Lhe
capaclLy Lo reason morally and Lherefore cannoL agree Lo Lhe soclal conLracL Slnce Lhey are noL
a parL of Lhe soclal conLracL rlghLs cannoL be afforded Lo Lhem and you musL negaLe 1hls
comes before all argumenLs ln Lhe round because nonhuman anlmals deflnlLlonally CAnnC1
have rlghLs
C1 Anlmals are noL capable of reclprocal respecLlng of rlghLs because Lhey are unable Lo make
raLlonal moral concepLlons Anlmals can only Lhlnk of survlval and lack Lhe braln capaclLy Lo
percelve or respecL Lhe rlghLs of oLher enLlLles or Lhelr own rlghLs
Cohen 1 wr|tes
A r|ght properly undersLood |s a c|a|m or poLenLlal clalm that one party may exerc|se aga|nst
another 1he LargeL agalnsL whom such a clalm may be reglsLered can be a slngle person a group a communlLy k|ghts
ar|se and can be |nte|||g|b|y defended on|y among be|ngs who actua||y do or can
make mora| c|a|ms aga|nst one another
luLL LLLlSLS ln nLx1 CCPLn CA8u
1he ho|ders of
r|ghts must have the capac|ty to comprehend ru|es of duty govern|ng a|| |nc|ud|ng
themse|ves In app|y|ng such ru|es the ho|ders of r|ghts must recogn|ze poss|b|e
conf||cts between what |s |n the|r own |nterest and what |s [ust Cn|y |n a commun|ty
of be|ngs capab|e of se|frestr|ct|ng mora| [udgments can the concept of a r|ght be
correct|y |nvoked

Cohen Carl 1he Case for Lhe use of Anlmals ln 8lomedlcal 8esearch 1he new Lngland !ournal of Medlclne (1986) 9497
Webrofessor of hllosophy aL Lhe 8esldenLlal College of Lhe unlverslLy of Mlchlgan e ls coauLhor of 1he Anlmal 8lghLs
uebaLe (8owman and LlLLlefleld 2001)
Cohen 2 wr|tes
An|ma|s (that |s nonhuman an|ma|s the ord|nary sense of that word) |ack th|s
capac|ty for free mora| [udgment 1hey are not be|ngs of a k|nd capab|e of exerc|s|ng
or respond|ng to mora| c|a|ms An|ma|s therefore have no r|ghts and they can have
none
Cbvlously anlmals lack Lhe capaclLy Lo morally reason abouL [usLlce or morallLy WlLhouL Lhls
cruclal ablllLy rlghLs cannoL be afforded Lo Lhem l even go beyond my burden and show LhaL lL
would be Lo award rlghLs Lo anlmals
C2 llshes cannoL suffer and Lherefore any argumenLs abouL anlmal sufferlng are arblLrary and
cannoL be consldered ln round
1) 1he deflnlLlon of anlmal ln Lhe scope of Lhe resoluLlon enLalls any member of Lhe klngdom
Anlmalla besldes humans LhaL can move volunLarlly acqulre food and have a nervous sysLem
2) llsh are lncluded ln Lhe klngdom Anlmalla buL cannoL feel paln 1hus any argumenLs abouL how
anlmals can feel paln and are Lhus raLlonal are lnherenLly arblLrary
llsh do noL have Lhe capaclLy do undersLand or feel paln"
kose
1
ln 02
1he dlfferences ln cenLral nervous sysLem sLrucLure LhaL underlle baslc neurobehavloral dlfferences beLween flshes and humans
are descrlbed 1he llLeraLure on Lhe neural basls of consclousness and of paln ls revlewed showlng LhaL (1) behav|ora|
responses to nox|ous st|mu|| are separate from the psycho|og|ca| exper|ence of pa|n (2)
awareness of pa|n ln humans depends on funct|ons of spec|f|c reg|ons of cerebra| cortex and (3)
f|shes |ack these essent|a| bra|n reg|ons or any funct|ona| equ|va|ent mak|ng |t untenab|e that
they can exper|ence pa|n 8ecause the exper|ence of fear s|m||ar to pa|n depends on cerebra|
cort|ca| structures that are absent from f|sh bra|ns |t |s conc|uded that awareness of fear pa|n |s

1
James D. Rose. Department oI Zoology and Physiology, University oI Wyoming. The Neurobehavioral Nature of
Fishes and the Question of Awareness and Pain. 2002
|mposs|b|e for f|shes AlLhough lL ls lmplauslble LhaL flshes can experlence paln or emoLlons Lhey dlsplay robusL
nonconsclous neuroendocrlne and physlologlcal sLress responses Lo noxlous sLlmull 1hus avoldance of poLenLlally ln[urlous sLress
responses ls an lmporLanL lssue ln conslderaLlons abouL Lhe welfare of flshes"

And flsh don'L suffer

kose 2 ln 02
1hus f|shes have nervous systems that med|ate effect|ve escape and avo|dance responses to
nox|ous st|mu|| but these responses musL occur w|thout a concurrent human||ke awareness
of pa|n or suffer|ng or dlsLress whlch depend on separaLely evolved neocorLex Lven among mammals Lhere ls an
enormous range of cerebral corLex complexlLy lL seems llkely LhaL A|so the character of pa|n when |t ex|sts
wou|d d|ffer between mamma||an spec|es a polnL LhaL has been made prevlously by paln lnvesLlgaLors (Melzack
and uennls 1980 8ermond 1997)"

1herefore Lhls lmpacLs lnLo Lhe facL LhaL Lhere ls no consensus on whaL paln really means as lL
varles beLween anlmals ulfferenL anlmals wlll have varylng levels of experlenclng paln Lhus lL ls
noL sufflclenL Lo deLermlne raLlonallLy because lL's noL a unlversallzable norm uo noL voLe off of
Lhe facL LhaL anlmals can suffer because Lhere ls a huge excepLlon ln Lhelr case flsh cannoL
suffer and Lhere ls no way Lo welgh Lhe sufferlng of oLher anlmals 1hls ls a reason Lo voLe neg
because my opponenL has no offense

1herefore you must negate








Lk1LNSICNS
Ia|ue LxLend my value of [usLlce !usLlce ls proscrlbed ln Lhls resoluLlon and so lL should be
preferred
Def|n|t|ons Iust|f|cat|on LxLend my argumenL LhaL common usage dlcLaLes LhaL onllne
dlcLlonarles be preferred and Lhrough LhaL you musL accepL all my deflnlLlons
Standard Slnce [usLlce ls deflned as glvlng morally raLlonal belngs Lhelr due Lhe sLandard ls
slmply an exLenslon of Lhls LxLend my sLandard across Lhe flow
Apr|or| LxLend my framework Aprlorl LhaL sLaLes LhaL anlmals slmply cannoL be afforded rlghLs
because Lhey cannoL meeL Lhe Lerms of Lhe soclal conLracL 1PL8L lS nC1 8CCM lC8
!uuCLMLn1 ln 1PlS 8Cunu My opponenL has falled Lo reply Lo Lhls argumenL and Lherefore
has lC8lLl1Lu 1PL 8Cunu 1he argumenL makes Lhls round an lnS1An1 negaLlve balloL
LveryLhlng else ls lrrelevanL because Lhls argumenL comes before everyLhlng else ln Lhe round
lf anlmals can deflnlLlonally noL be reclplenLs of rlghLs lL cannoL be furLher quallfled as [usL for
Lhese anlmals Lo have rlghLs
C1 LxLend Cohen 1 and 2 who Lell you LhaL rlghLs are only awarded Lo belngs who can
raLlonally accepL Lhose rlghLs and respecL Lhe rlghLs of oLhers Anlmals cannoL exerclse moral
clalms and Lherefore noL acLors who can [usLly be awarded rlghLs
C2 LxLend conLenLlon 2 and lLs cards preempL afflrmaLlve argumenLs based on Lhe sufferlng of
anlmals 1hls conLenLlon renders any argumenLs abouL Lhe sufferlng of anlmals arblLrary and
proves LhaL we cannoL look Lo anlmal sufferlng as an lmpacL ln Lhls round
8LCCkS
Neg Blocks Against Aff
A]1 Marg|na| Cases
#AD 4.) FI#$%
1.) InIants and mentally handicapped people still deserve rights. Marginal case arguments are arbitrary.
$canlon |(1998). hat e Owe To Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 185-186|
Limiting the scope oI the morality oI right and wrong to beings with the capacity to hold judgment sensitive attitudes may seem too restrictive
even as Iar as human beings are concerned. Normal adult human beings have this capacity, but drawing the boundary in this way would seem to
exclude inIants, even young children, and adults who do not develop normal capacities. As far as infants and young children
are concerned, this objection derives its force from a misleading formulation. Infants and young
children are not separate kinds of creatures. #ather, infancy and childhood are, in normal cases, stages
in the life of a being who will have the capacity for judgment-sensitive attitudes. Moreover, in the case oI
children and inIants this is already an actual being, not merely a possible one, since its conscious liIe has begun. Not every human being develops
normal human capacities, however, so there is the question oI what this criterion implies about the moral status oI those severely disabled humans
who never develop even the limited capacities required Ior judgment-sensitive attitudes. %he question is whether we have
reason to accept the requirement that our treatment of these individuals should be governed by
principles that they could not reasonably reject, even though they themselves do not and will not
have the capacity to understand or weigh justiIications. %he answer is that we clearly do. %he mere fact
that a being is ~of human born provides a strong reason for according it the same status as other
humans. This has sometimes been characterized as a prejudice, called 'speciesism. But it is not prejudice to hold that our relation to
these beings gives us reason to accept the requirement that our actions should be justifiable to
them. Nor is it prejudice to recognize that this particular reason does not apply to other beings with comparable capacities, whether or not there
are other reasons to accept this requirement with regard to them. The beings in question here are ones who are born to us or to others to whom we
are bound by the requirements oI justiIiability. This tie oI birth gives us good reason to want to treat them 'as human despite their limited
capacities. Because oI these limitations, the idea oI justiIiability to them must be understood counterIactually, in terms oI what they could
reasonably reject iI they were able to understand such a question. This makes the idea oI trusteeship appropriate in their case, whether it is
appropriate Ior the case oI nonhuman animals or not. It also indicates a basis on which such a trustee could object to proposed principles.
$everely disabled humans have reason to want those things that any human has reason to want,
insofar as these are things that they are capable of benefiting from. These will include, at least, protection and
care, aIIection, and those enjoyments oI which the person is capable. So, while a large part oI the morality oI right and wrong, including rights
and liberties that are important to us because oI our interest in controlling and directing our own lives, may have no application in this case, other
basic duties will have their usual Iorce.


2.) Marginal cases are always in the care oI a rational being. Mentally handicapped people have people
that look aIter them to make sure they make rational decisions.

3.) This argument is nonunique insoIar as there are also marginal cases Ior animals.

4.) Marginal cases oI humans can still make moral claims.
Although some human beings do not possess the caliber oI rational capacity others have, they still can
never be lowered to the status oI animals.
Korsgaard |Christine M. Korsgaard; 'Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals;received her B.A. at the University oI
Illinois in 1974; her PhD at Harvard in 1981; and an LHD at the University oI Illinois in 2004. She has held positions at Yale, the University oI
CaliIornia at Santa Barbara, and the University oI Chicago. She works on moral philosophy and its history, practical reason, agency, personal
identity, and human/animal relations. She is the author oI Iour books. The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge 1996), an expanded version oI her
1992 Tanner Lectures, examines the history oI ideas about the Ioundations oI obligation in modern moral philosophy and presents an account oI
her own.|
~At this point, many champions oI animal rights would suggest that Kant`s argument also implies that human inIants, the insane, people in
comas, and so on, have no rights since they are 'not rational. Since we plainly don`t think that, we should reject the argument. Although I am
about to challenge Kant`s argument myselI, I don`t think it has this implication. An entity, certainly a living entity, is not a mere collection oI
properties or capacities: it is a Iunctional unity, and the idea oI a species is important to the extent that it involves the idea oI a certain way oI
Iunctioning. An inIant, or a severely insane person, is helpless or poorly Iunctioning in part because his or her natural way oI Iunctioning, which
essentially involves reason, is as yet undeveloped or deIective. These are rational beings in whom reason is in an undeveloped or deIective
condition. %he sense in which such people ~lack reason is entirely different from the sense in which a
nonhuman animal ~lacks reason, for the nonhuman animal functions perfectly well in his own way
without it. And different moral responses are suitable to these different kinds of ~lack. In the case
of an infant, or those only temporarily in a nonfunctional state, it is also pertinent to note that a
right is held by a person, and a person is not a mere time-slice of a person; nor is a human infant
merely a ~potential rational being in the same sense that a lump of clay is a ~potential pot. The
permanently insane or otherwise severely deIective may present somewhat diIIerent problems than the inIant or the temporarily nonIunctional
person. But the issue about the mentally insane or defective]them is also] still not the same as the issue
about animals, because there is a difference, morally as well as metaphysically, between being a
defective being of a certain kind and being a different kind. (See my Self-Constitution, V2.1.8, pp. 3334.) The
reasons why we should accord moral respect to human beings at a stage oI development when rationality is not Iully expressed, human beings
who are temporarily non-rational, human beings who are not rational by virtue oI permanent deIect, and to non-human animals are, in my view,
heterogeneous. So I think it is a mistake to appeal to the so-called 'marginal cases argument. My own argument involves no such appeal.

Humans that lack a characteristic are diIIerent than an animal lacking the same characteristic because
animals couldn`t have had that characteristic in the Iirst place. Since a human is a part oI the human race,
they must be given the rights a human deserves.

A]1 We have ob||gat|ons towards an|ma|s
.) %here is no warrant for reasons as to why we have obligations towards animals. Animal cries do
not justify nor translate to rights.
2.) Cross-apply Korsgaard. $he says the opposite; they have no moral obligations and we have no
obligations towards them. %his either washes the debate or you prefer the actual warrants in my
Korsgaard analysis.
3.) Animals can`t reciprocate rights.

$apontzis |Steve. 'Moral Community and Animal Rights 1985, stor.org. CREDS: Philosopher. Studied
with Peter Singer.|
~When this correlation between rights and duties] is coupled with the common belief that animals are
incapable of recognizing and acting on duties, it quickly follows that animals are incapable of
having and reciprocating rights. |.| This argument Irom marginal cases is not particularly insightIul because it does not come to
grips with the reason why the reciprocity requirement has such intuitive appeal. I think the reason behind this appeal is not species
prejudice but a matter of fairness: A`s having right against B is correlated with B`s having a duty
to A; it would be unfair for B`s liberty to be thus restricted without A`s liberty also being similarly
(or otherwise appropriately) restricted.

4.) %he argument does not affirm. We don`t know what these obligations are or why that means
animals deserve rights within the principle of justice. %he obligations are not defined.
5.) %he card advocates welfare of animals, not rights, thus the argument doesn`t function as any
sort of offense for aff ground.

If Humans are qual, animals must also be equal:
-II we were to compare deIective humans to animals, then we could do the same Ior deIective animals and
even lower entities, and soon we would be comparing lower entities to plants. This chain oI comparison
would be never-ending, and thus iI we were to look to this aIIirmative argument, the aIIirmative would
have to deIend the rights oI every living thing in order Ior this argument to stand.

Animals should be recognized because they can suffer:
-The ability to suIIer only gives beings instincts not to suIIer. Instincts do not provide animals with
rationality. Animals who only have instincts cannot modiIy their actions because they do not have the
rationality to act counter to what their instincts say. Thus, an animal that only acts upon instincts is not
subject to moral guidance or selI-government as humans are. The characteristic oI humans that enables
them to be morally recognized is selI-government and their ability to reIlect upon their actions, and
choose those which are most moral. ThereIore in a perIect world, humans would can make only moral
decisions, whereas since animals only make actions based on instinct, they can never make exclusively
morally permissible actions in a perIect world. Since animal cannot make moral decisions iI they wanted
to, they can never provide them with rights. Thus, the ability to suIIer is a too broad oI a means to
determine moral recognition.

f their argument doesnt say anything about pain (also say).
-II we were to only use the ability to suIIer to determine moral recognition, then that would entitle the
aIIirmative to deIend all living things including plants, unicellular organisms, and Iungi since all living
things can indeed suIIer. For example a plant that doesn`t get the proper nutrients or sunlight suIIers Irom
malnutrition. It is obviously ridiculous to include these types oI entities as beings with rights in a human
society. Thus suIIering is too broad oI a basis Ior determining moral recognition since it entitles all living
things to have rights and we cannot look to that.

Not recognizing animals reinforces logic that supports sexism:
-The property oI sexist ideas that makes sexism bad is the Iact that sexism is discriminatory to certain
people oI the same species. Humans are entitled to the characteristics that make humans what they are.
These characteristics are not the same as characteristics animals have because animals are a complete
diIIerent species. This is what makes not recognizing animals rights entirely diIIerent to not recognizing
womens` rights. It is the Iact that humans hold characteristics that segregate them Irom every other
entity. There is a justiIied reason Ior why animals are diIIerent than humans. We are not being
discriminatory to beings oI our own species, but discriminatory to beings oI another species because they
are inherently diIIerent.






Andrews |Kristin, Andrews. Associate ProIessor in the Department oI Philosophy and Cognitive Science Program at York University,
"Animal Cognition", The StanIord Encyclopedia oI Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL
http://plato.stanIord.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/cognition-animal/~.|
#ationality is sometimes understood in terms of acting for reasons. Given this starting point, Glock argues It is
argued] that animals are rational because they can act in light of reasons understood objectively, in
an agent-neutral fashion, and that the animal is sensitive to these reasons (Glock 2009). However,
discussions of animal rationality are confounded by the lack of consensus on what is required for
rationality. Because there are many different kinds of rationality (e.g. practical vs. theoretical, process vs. product),
and given the disagreements both about the cognitive mechanisms implicated in rationality (e.g.
linguistic processing, logical reasoning, causal reasoning, simulation, biases and heuristics), and the extent to which different
kinds of normativity are implicated in rationality (e.g. biological Iitness or reason-respecting propositional attitudes),
there is no straightforward way to answer the question about whether members of any other
species are rational agents.

Thus, the aII cannot solve because they can never prove what rationality means. This is suIIicient to
negate because I am showing you a clear reason why animals are not rational through the Korsgaard
analysis as well as showing you how the aIIirmative is arbitrary.