The Anthrax Envelopes Attack: Reexamining the Biological Threat, INSS Insight

No. 68, August 20, 2008

Ophir, Noam and Friedman, David

The anthrax attack, caused the death of five civilians, prompted widespread
hysteria, and disrupted daily life in the United States. Despite unprecedented
investigative efforts and the propagation of various theories about who might be
responsible for the attack, it remained an unsolved mystery. In the last few weeks there
was a significant turning point in the investigation, when it came to light that authorities
had identified a new suspect and there was an intention to press charges. However,
further developments became moot once the suspect, a scientist at a US army laboratory
that engages in developing solutions to biological weapons, committed suicide.

While the media has focused on the suspect and the attempt to understand what
underlay his alleged decision to carry out a biological attack, the new developments in
the episode have underscored the need to reexamine accepted premises regarding the
threat of biological weapons in general and biological terrorism in particular.

One of the central myths connected to biological terror is the idea of “the biology
student,” whereby any biology student with certain basic equipment that can be bought
relatively easily and inexpensively can produce effective biological weapons. However,
both reality and experience gained to date indicate that the picture is far more complex,
and the most recent incident provides the strongest evidence thus far. The suspect in this
case was an expert on the subject who even won an award for his part in developing a
vaccination against anthrax. At this stage it is not known whether he intended to cause
the greatest number of casualties possible or to inflict limited damage. But the bottom
line – notwithstanding the vast amount of the suspect's knowledge and the use of a
quality biological substance – is that in practice, the attack caused a very small number
of casualties. These results echo the experience of previous events. At the same time,
one should not underestimate the collateral effects of the anthrax attack, including
heightened anxiety in the United States, disruption of daily life, and the costs involved
in cleansing the affected areas.

Another important point relates to the perpetrator’s profile. The great concern over
biological terror is that it will be carried out by an international terror organization, such
as al-Qaeda, or a state actor; since the resources available to such actors are greater than
those available to others, such as local groups or individuals, their capacity to upgrade
the potential into more potent biological capabilities is far greater. Indeed in the case of
the anthrax envelopes, there was concern that a country or terror organization was
behind the attack, partly because a considerable amount of know how and special
equipment were required to produce biological substances of the particular quality used,
and also due to its proximity to the September 11 attacks.

According to details unearthed by the authorities, however, the anthrax attack in

fact joins the limited number of cases in which use was made of biological substances
for hostile intent by private individuals or local groups but not for international terror.
The motive for the attack is not clear and in light of the death of the solitary suspect, it
is possible that it may never be known. Among the possibilities raised are the desire to
test in real life conditions the vaccination he helped develop; the wish to profit from the
rise in vaccination sales; and an attempt to raise awareness of the danger of biological
terror. One way or another, the anthrax attack does not deviate from the historical
pattern of biological substances used for hostile purposes. In practice, there is no solid
evidence of the current use of biological substances for international terror, although
there is evidence that points to interest and even involvement of organizations such as
al-Qaeda in this area.

According to estimates, since the anthrax attack the United States has invested
over $50 billion in protection against the biological threat. Beyond the finances
themselves, one of the side effects of this investment is that today, a considerable
number of companies and institutions, including academic institutions, are involved in
research and development regarding protection against this threat. This often involves
working with and storing dangerous substances, including anthrax. Hence, for example,
the significant increase in the number of laboratories licensed to engage in highly
dangerous biological elements (BSL4). This situation involves several potential
dangers, including loss or theft of biological substances by hostile elements – local or
international. In addition, there is also the danger of a terrorist working from the inside.
There may be various reasons for using the substance. It could be a wish to raise
awareness, a wish to gain glory/money, or because of personal grudges against certain
people or society at large. The large number of people and institutions engaged in the
field of dangerous substances creates a paradoxical situation in which there is a tangible
danger of a threat from the inside – intentional or otherwise – and not of an external
threat.

Examination of accumulated experience over the years including the anthrax

attack indicates that at this stage, biological substances are not the form of weaponry
most favored by terror organizations. The lack of experience with these substances, the
technical complexity involved (principally, in development and manufacture of a quality
substance and its deployment in the field), and the concern over an extreme and wide
ranging response of those targeted explain the limited phenomenon. On the other hand,
the anthrax attack is another incident of the use of biological substances for limited
local purposes. Consequently, one should question whether the fact that the US – like
other countries – has invested enormous amounts in research and development to find a
solution to the biological threat posed by international terror organizations is justified.
In addition, the question arises whether there is any danger that widening the circle of
those involved in the field will increase the actual use of biological substances for
hostile purposes.

While different conclusions were drawn regarding the anthrax envelopes, largely
given their origin vis-à-vis the degree of danger of the biological threat, recent
developments support the argument that there is a tendency to err with regard to the
biological threat, specifically on the side of severity. Based on what is currently known
about the anthrax attack, a more accurate view of biological threats in general and
biological terror in particular should relate to a threat with the potential to cause
considerable damage (particularly if this entails use of infectious disease substances – in
contrast with the anthrax episode), even though the likelihood of this possible
occurrence is relatively low.