August 7, 2007 No.

27

The Saudi Arms Deal

Yiftah Shapir

On the eve of the departure to the Middle East of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, the Bush Administration announced its intention to
expand substantially its military assistance to the region. The proposed plan includes the
sale of up to $20 billion of weaponry to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
The Administration also plans to balance this arms sale with an expanded package
of security assistance to Israel worth about $30 billion over the coming decade. Aid to
Israel thus far has been growing every year, in accordance with an agreement reached in
1996, and will amount to $2.4 billion in FY 2008. Thus, the new package represents an
increased of about 25%. Simultaneously, the Administration announced that it will
extend military assistance to Egypt for another decade at the current level of $1.3 billion
per annum.
Unlike Israel and Egypt, which receive their weaponry in the form of grants,
Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states will pay for their equipment. The arms sale to
Saudi Arabia has been in the works in Washington for several months but the only item
specifically mentioned has been JDAM bombs – GPS-guided bombs of the type used by
the Israeli Air Force in the second Lebanon war. However, JDAMs are relatively
inexpensive weapons; the price tag for several thousand would only amount to a few
million dollars. Thus far, American spokesmen have refused to provide details on the rest
of the package. Sales are apparently planned, not only to Saudi Arabia but also to the
other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates, and Oman – but there is as yet no firm information. Nevertheless,
the $20 billion price being mentioned seems to refer only to sales to Saudi Arabia, for
what senior Pentagon officials implied are air defense systems, anti-missile defenses,
radar systems, early warning aircraft, and naval vessels.
For Saudi Arabia, the United States has never been the sole arms supplier. In
addition to American equipment, the Royal Saudi Air Force operates British Tornado
aircraft and the Saudi Navy relies largely on French-built vessels. Last year, Saudi
Arabia also signed a huge deal with Britain for 72 Typhoon advanced combat aircraft.
The main purpose of the Administration is to use the arms sales to strengthen the
commitment of the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, to America’s grand strategy in the
region. The Administration wants Saudi Arabia to support its policy in Iraq and
especially to refrain from supporting extremist Sunni Islamist organizations – throughout
the world and particularly in Iraq. At the same time, military assistance to the Gulf states
sends a strong signal to Iran by emphasizing American commitment to the security of
those states. The criticism voiced in Tehran following the Administration’s
announcement indicates that this signal was clearly understood.
Two other reasons lie behind the latest American initiative. One concerns the
American response to renewed indications of Russian desire to influence developments in
the Middle East. Evidence of that emerged in recent months in reports of large Russian
arms deal with Syria and Iran and of a possible return of the Russian Navy to the
Mediterranean, based on access to Syrian port facilities in Tartus and Ladhakia. The
second is directly connected to the global arms market: the U.S. Administration is
providing open support for American defense industries in the face of fierce competition
by other large suppliers. In the Gulf region, this primarily means competition with
British, French and, to a lesser extent, Russian manufacturers. In the particular case of
Saudi Arabia, it may even involve a hope of getting the Typhoon deal canceled.

Implications for Israel

Israeli spokesmen were quick to react against the Saudi arms deal even when it only
involved the JDAMs and they warned that the supply of precision munitions to Saudi
Arabia would violate America’s promise to preserve the IDF’s qualitative edge and would
constitute a strategic threat to Israel. Two senior Israeli officials went to Washington to
lay out Israel’s claims before the Administration. They made two central points. The
first was that while Saudi Arabia currently might not constitute a threat to Israel, its
regime is not stable and could be replaced by an extreme anti-Israel successor. If that
were to happen, the precision weaponry would give it a significant advantage which
Israel could not counter. The second point was that simply violating the principle of
preserving Israel’s qualitative edge would damage its deterrent, which rests to a
considerable extent on that American promise.
In fact, Israel’s apprehensions appear to be overblown, notwithstanding the fact
that the prevailing ideology in Saudi Arabia has been exceedingly hostile to Israel since it
came into existence. Apart from sending symbolic representatives in past wars, the
Saudis have never actually acted against Israel. And in array of serious threats to Saudi
basic interests, Israel hardly figures at all. Moreover, the Saudi interest in preserving
good relations with the West and ensuring the flow of oil actually requires tranquility on
the Israeli front. Even a different regime, no matter how radical it might be, would find it
difficult to ignore these realities.
Israeli objections to previous Saudi arms deals have also been raised and rejected
– because of America’s special interest in its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Again on
this occasion, in the face of Administration determination, excessively virulent Israel
opposition would only have produced anger in Washington. So on this occasion, Israel
chose instead to temper its response. In return, it will now receive an upgraded security
assistance package of its own.