Sap Boat Sanity a popular Belief of artificial Truths

66/11

Struggle of Humankind Humans inherently bias of a diverse society of innumerable perceptions and interests born to a world of PIG - Personal Interest Groups influenced by the traditions of family and financial environment reared under the SEE

Satanic Law
TIC

The Immaculate Con

Oxymoron Christian Crusades

Imperialism
1. Belief in Empire Building The policy of extending the rule or influence of a country over other countries or colonies 2. Domination by Empire The political, military, or economic domination of one country over another 3. Takeover and Domination The extension of power or authority over others in the interests of domination Governments of the SEE - Satanic Elite Entrepreneur of the SSRE - Satanic Spirit Roman Empire Capitalist Democracy administered and enforced by Tyrannical Imperialists PRICK Political Religious Intellectual Convoluted Karma "Thy kingdom come"

The request for God's kingdom to come is usually interpreted as a reference to the belief, common at the time, that a Messiah figure would bring about a Kingdom of God.

Traditionally the coming of God's Kingdom is seen as a divine gift to be prayed for,

not a human achievement.

This idea is frequently challenged by groups who believe that the Kingdom will come by the hands of those faithful to work for a better world. It is believed by these individuals that Jesus' commands to feed the hungry and clothe the needy are the Kingdom to which he was referring.

Osmosis
The gradual, often unconscious, absorption of knowledge or ideas through continual exposure

rather than deliberate learning FIBIB

Fickle Inherent Bias Ignorant Bliss "Legal Murders and Wise Fools "Fine words and an insinuating appearance are seldom associated with true virtue"

Satanic insist on tradition spiked Jesus to a cross who resist it

Reality Exists with or without ME Mother Earth

In the time left allotted to me by either God or the Satanic I build an ark as I Noah right thing to do having set the floods upon the USA as if a cold shower will awake them and shrink the monolithic PRICK to a miniature Dick no longer staring down the DAY - Dark Abyss Yoke urethra for the light for if not Jesus who the Christ am I? Jesus a HE - Human Equal like me and you if you please just another me treated the same by the Satanic as ME - Mother Earth Divided they made us ... divided we fell ... PRICK spell with nothing left but FIBIB Their hot air is all that holds them up in the SAPBOAT not long to remain afloat, aid and abet cooperatives stand on quicksand ropes to the trees in truth the intellects the MR - Mental retarded dope Satanic do what Satanic do because they must from dusk to dusk in the BLOT - Bright Light of Truth dust to dust abrogated long ago as trolls in the principles of GREDSCROLL Golden Rule Equality Democratic Spirit Constitution Rule of Law Logistics

The consistency of TECE in due process of PNTR RCR is beyond all comprehension given the ESS Epitome Simplicity Sanity of what it is is to be fully human Reality is the truth impervious to perception, yet precisely due to perception Truth is that which would be observed by God whether or not He exists or whether or not one believes He exists

The Ideal simply reality sanely deal with S - Spirit NHL

Natural Humanic Law

Everyone knows NHL at 5 prior to the first day of

SSS Satanic Sucker School To be Humanic is to know a fellow Humanic what it is to be fully human All the same necessities and vulnerabilities know what is and what is not receptive to a fellow human

1 Planet 1 People 1 Spirit 1 Force 1 Law 1 Sense All in One or None

S ESS Epitome Simplicity Sanity BCS CCC Benchmark Common Sense Catalyst Consistency Continuity TCUP True Constant Unalterable Perpetuity aka Tranquility Correlative Universal Prerogative

FIXED in PERPETUITY
Not Debatable

An invisible invincible entity not touchable by body or mind Confucius 551 BC 479 BC Do not impose on others what you would not wish for yourself Recompense injury with Justice and recompense kindness with kindness "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" Jesus Mens natures are alike; it is their habits that carry them far apart Osmosis The gradual, often unconscious, absorption of knowledge or ideas through continual exposure

rather than deliberate learning

One is entitled to be as dumb one chooses to be for it is democracy
But to not know what it is to be fully human, cooperate and support NHL is to declare self an abrogated Satanic or a Mr - Mental retard PRICK or in FIBIB Political Religious Intellectual Convoluted Karma or in Fickle Inherent Bias Ignorant Bliss In either case drawing serious attention to self The responsibility of the Sovereign People's servants to administer appropriate enforcement nipping in the bud when most efficient and effective to deal with recycling to UP - Ultimate Potential ergo UPS Ultimate Potential Society Self proclaimed "Learned and Honourable" have irrefutably self proven SELF - Scum Earth's Life Forms It is their Satanic habits that carry them far apart with self inflated egos ST - Satanic Thespians proud as hell to parade themselves on CNN and Satanic cult akin where their proficiency to avoid the Truth gives them up for the Satanic Godic they are, of course in Humanic facade half wits to wit, yet deliberately

indifferent to Humanic and reality itself, deliberately negligent of responsibility financed by the Humanic taxpayer, impossible to be more irresponsible to the Humanic, irrefutably responsible to protection and cover-up of fellow Satanic where there is excruciatingly obvious HAT Honour Among Thieves Their success dependent on their charlatan skills to mesmerize us honed their skills to the ultimate deception doing themselves CATCHALL

Cyberspace Accountable Transparency Central Hiti Archives Last Laugh

Operating in the DAY - Dark Abyss Yoke attributes of their PRICK as obvious as black on white when the minds of the Humanic magnificent user friendly brains flick the switch to on the lights of the Satanic flick off The majority of Armed Forces world wide are Humanic becoming wiser by the minute leaving the Satanic holding Dick with PRICK a non-entity in the BLOT Bright Light of Truth Motor mouthing accelerated revs of forked tongues fit to be tied in a knot the PRICK to a screeching halt may reach for their Dick rata a tat tat beating their tom toms as if Tommy guns And the Humanic in wet your pants laughter drop them in exchange for dry ones turning their other cheeks this way and that ... in your face Satanic bastards no longer farting against the wind There is no Satanic Clause in the NHL Satanic abrogation SITI LAW Spirit Invincible Triad Individuals Legal Assertion Writ

There is no catch me if you can, no time limit restrictions, no obstructions to the safety and well being of any me HE - Humanic Equal There is no can't get no satisfaction ************************************************************************************** *****

"Recompense injury with Justice and recompense kindness with kindness" ************************************************************ TECE PNTR RCR
Trial Error Cause Effect Progressive Nature Thought Reason Re-calibration Constant Retrospect

******************************************************** War mongering SEE - Satnic Elite Entrepreneurs MAFIACIDAL **************************************************

OMEN
Old Money Evolves New http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristocracy

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictatorship Dictators may take away much of the peoples freedom http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy

AMEN
Affirmative Meaningful Equilibrium Neutering **************************************
Democracy is a form of government in which all citizens have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives. Ideally, this includes equal (and more or less direct) participation in the proposal, development and passage of legislation into law. It can also encompass social, economic and cultural conditions that enable the free and equal practice of political self-determination. The term comes from the Greek: (dmokrata)

"rule of the people",[1]

which was coined from (dmos) "people" and (Kratos) "power", in the middle of the 5th-4th century BC to denote the political systems then existing in some Greek city-states, notably Athens

following a popular uprising in 508 BC.[2]

According to some theories of democracy, popular sovereignty is the founding principle of such a system.[3] However, the democratic principle has also been expressed as

"the freedom to call something into being which did not exist before,
which was not given and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known."[4] This type of freedom, which is connected to human "natality," or the capacity to begin anew, sees democracy as "not only a political system [but] an ideal, an aspiration, really, intimately connected to and dependent upon a picture of what it is to be human

of what it is a human should be to be fully human."[5]

While there is no specific, universally accepted definition of 'democracy',[6] equality and freedom have both been identified as important characteristics of democracy

since ancient times.[7]

These principles are reflected in all citizens being equal before the law and having equal access to legislative processes. For example, in a representative democracy, every vote has equal weight, no unreasonable restrictions can apply to anyone seeking to become a representative, and the freedom of its citizens is secured by legitimized rights and liberties which are generally protected by a constitution.[8][9]

There are several varieties of democracy, some of which provide better representation and more freedom for their citizens than others.[10][11] However, if any democracy is not structured

so as to prohibit the government from excluding the people from the legislative process,
or any branch of government

from altering the separation of powers in its own favor,

[12][13][14]

then a branch of the system can accumulate too much power and destroy the democracy.

Representative Democracy, Consensus Democracy, and Deliberative Democracy are all major examples of attempts at a form of government

that is both practical and responsive to the needs and desires of citizens.
Many people use the term "democracy" as shorthand for liberal democracy, which may include elements such as political pluralism; equality before the law; the right to petition elected officials for redress of grievances; due process;civil liberties; human rights; and elements of civil society outside the government.

In the United States, separation of powers is often cited as a central attribute,

but in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, the dominant principle is that of parliamentary sovereignty (though in practice judicial independence is generally maintained). In other cases, "democracy" is used to mean direct democracy. Though the term "democracy" is typically used in the context of a political state, the principles are applicable to private organizations and other groups as well. Majority rule is often listed as a characteristic of democracy. However, it is also possible for a minority to be oppressed by a "tyranny of the majority"

in the absence of
governmental or constitutional protections of individual and/or group rights.
Due to PRICK and FIBIB we have a majority oppressed by an illegitimate Majority Vote "tyranny of the minority"

or an oppressed majority unconsciously self imposed osmosis set in like rigger mortise
An essential part of an "ideal" representative democracy is competitive elections that are fair both substantively[15] and procedurally.[16] Furthermore, freedom of political expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press

are considered to be essential, so that citizens are adequately informed

and able to vote according to their own best interests as they see them.[17][18] It has also been suggested that a basic feature of democracy is the capacity of individual participate freely and fully in the life of their society.[19] Democracy has its formal origins in Ancient Greece,[20][21] but democratic practices are evident in earlier societies including Mesopotamia, Phoenicia and India.[22] Other cultures since Greece have significantly contributed to the evolution of democracy such as Ancient Rome, [20] Europe,[20] and North and South America.[23] The concept of representative democracy arose largely from ideas and institutions that developed during the European Middle Ages and the Age of Enlightenment and in the American and French Revolutions.[24] Democracy has been called the "last form of government" and has spread considerably across the globe. [25] The right to vote has been expanded in many jurisdictions over time from relatively narrow groups (such as wealthy men of a particular ethnic group), with New Zealand the first nation to grant universal suffrage for all its citizens in 1893. Popular sovereignty or the sovereignty of the people is the belief that the legitimacy of the state is created by the will or consent of its people, who are the source of all political power. It is closely associated to the social contract philosophers, among whom are Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Popular sovereignty expresses a concept and does not necessarily reflect or describe a political reality.[1]

It is often contrasted with the concept

of parliamentary sovereignty, and with individual sovereignty. Benjamin Franklin expressed the concept when he wrote,

"In free governments, the rulers are the servants and the people their superiors and sovereigns."[2]
508 BC Referenced above [2] 509 BC Overthrow of Roman monarchy, and beginning of Republican period. First pair of Roman consuls elected. Tarquinian conspiracy formed, but discovered and the conspirators executed. Forces of Veii and Tarquinii, led by the deposed king Lucius Tarquinius Superbus defeated in the Battle of Silva Arsia by the Roman army. Consul Publius Valerius Publicola celebrates the first republican triumph on 1 March. September 13, 509 BCThe temple of Jupiter on Rome's Capitoline Hill is dedicated on the ides of September. 508 BCWar between Rome and Clusium 508 BCWar between Clusium and Aricia 508 BCOffice of pontifex maximus created in Rome. 508 BCCleisthenes reorganizes Athens. He creates the deme, a local unit to serve as the basis of his political system. Citizenship is tightly linked to the deme, for each deme keeps the roll of those within its jurisdiction, who are admitted to citizenship. He groups all the demes into 10 tribes, which thus form the link between the demes and the central government. The central government includes an assembly of all citizens and a new council of 500 members. This is a very early form of democracy. 507 BCCleisthenes, Greek reformer, takes power and increases democracy. 506 BCBattle of Boju: The forces of the State of Wu under commander and strategist Sun Tzu defeat the forces of Chu in Zhou Dynasty China, destroying the Chu capital of Ying and causing King Jing of Zhou to

flee. December 4, 502 BCSolar eclipse darkens Egypt. (computed by modern astronomers, no clear historical record of observation exists) 502 BCNaxos rebels against Persian domination sparking the Ionian Revolt. 501 BCNaxos is attacked by the Persian Empire. 501 BCIn response to threats by the Sabines, Rome creates the office of dictator. 501 BCConfucius is appointed governor of Chung-tu. 501 BCGadir (present-day Cdiz) is captured by Carthage. (approximate date) 500 BCBantu-speaking people migrate into south-west Uganda from the west. (approximate date) 500 BCRefugees from Teos resettle Abdera. 500 BCDarius I of Persia proclaims that Aramaic be the official language of the western half of his empire. 500 BCSignifies the end of the Nordic Bronze Age civilization in Oscar Montelius periodization system and begins the Pre-Roman Iron Age. 500 BCFoundation of first republic in Vaishali Bihar India. c. 500 BC She-Wolf, with late 15th century or early 16th century additions (twins), is made. It is now kept at Museo Capitolino, Rome. 500 BCWorld population: 100,000,000[1] c. 500 BCVulca makes Apollo of Veii, from Portonaccio Temple. It is now kept at Museo Nazionale di Villa Giulia, Rome. c. 500 BC - Yayoi period starts in Ancient Japan. The Gutaii tribe began around this time, in Middle and Southern Africa. SS Satanic Self proclaimed "Learned and Honorable" Manner of PRICK thinking excruciating obtrusively Stinking SIR Satanic Intellectual Revenues 14M24S One for Money ... Two for Show Satanic SIC PIG Sense in Common Personal Interest Groups Holy Roman Empire First Reich Medieval - 1718 That would be amid evil Satanic Godic Christian Crusades 1095 - 1291 Roman Catholics Expand Empire Western Europe Similar campaigns continued 15th century Eastern Europe Jesuit

1534
1. Member of Roman Catholic religious order

A member of the Society of Jesus, a Roman Catholic religious order engaged in missionary and educational work worldwide. The order was founded by Saint Ignatius Loyola in 1534 with the objective of defending Catholicism against the Reformation.

2. Offensive Term
An offensive term for somebody regarded as crafty or scheming, especially somebody who uses deliberately ambiguous or confusing words to deceive others http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Act_of_Supremacy Church of England Henry VIII The first Act of Supremacy was a piece of legislation that granted King Henry VIII of England Royal Supremacy, which means that he was declared the supreme head of the Church of England.

It is still the legal authority of the Sovereign of the United Kingdom.

Royal Supremacy is specifically used to describe the legal sovereignty of the civil laws over the laws of the Church in England. The Act of Supremacy of November 1534 (26 Hen. 8, c. 1) was an Act of the Parliament of England under King Henry VIII declaring that he was "the only supreme head on earth of the Church in England" and that the English crownshall enjoy "all honours, dignities, preeminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities, profits, and commodities to the said dignity.".[1] By the wording of the Act, it was made clear that Parliament was not granting the King the title (thereby suggesting that they had the right to later withdraw them) but rather it was stated as a recognized fact. In the Act of Supremacy, Henry abandoned Rome completely. He then went on to found a new church called Ecclesia Anglicana. He appointed himself and his successors as the supreme rulers of this new church. Henry had many successors. One in particular, Sir Thomas More, was trapped between conflicting loyalties. He was the king's humble servant more than anything, but he was also a devout Catholic.

His personal crisis reached a climax in the spring of 1534.

This was the time when the king demanded his subjects to take an oath to obey the Act of Succession, and he was asking more than More could give. More didn't protest; he remained mute. He didn't condemn the oath or anyone who had taken it, but he remained loyal to the crown. He refused to renounce Rome, which was a devastating silence since Henry was taking such an enormous risk. In the end, Henry didn't ever gain the support of his humble servant. More had already opposed Henry's marriage to Anne and refused to attend her coronation. Any further tolerance by Henry would be interpreted as weakness, especially since the former chancellor, garlanded with royal honors was the most influential man in English public life. The king could be merciless or he could forfeit his crown, and for this king that was no choice. More was then charged with treason and imprisoned in the Tower of London. At his trial More finally spoke out. Splitting the Church was a tragic crime, he said; and he could not be an accomplice to it. Nor could he bring himself to believe that, "any temporal man could be the head of spirituality." The hearing was merely a formality because the verdict had already been decided.

He was condemned to be hanged, drawn and quartered.[2]

Chicken before the Egg or vice versa One hanging or four?

I reckon after that More did not find himself hanging around beside himself any More for decidedly More was no More One cannot remain fully human Loyal to Satanic Crown as devout Satanic Catholic

Henry was declared "Defender of the Faith" (Fidei Defensor) in 1521 by Pope Leo X for his pamphlet

accusing Martin Luther of heresy.[3] Parliament later conferred this title upon Henry in 1544.[4] The 1534 Act made official the English Reformation that had been brewing since 1527. The main purpose of this act was so that Henry could get an annulment of his marriage to Catherine of Aragon, because Henry had fallen in love with Anne Boleyn. However, Pope Clement VII still refused to grant the annulment,

due to the familial relations Catherine had with the Holy Roman Emperor at the time.
The Treasons Act was later issued saying that to disavow the Act of Supremacy and to deprive the King of his "dignity, title, or name" was to be considered treason.[5]

Bloody Mary with a pinch of assault salt please

This act was repealed in 1554 by king Henry's eldest daughter, Queen Mary I.[6] Mary had a delicious little lamb whose fleece made a lovely stole

[edit] Second Act of Supremacy 1558 Main article: Act of Supremacy 1558
Henry's Act of Supremacy was repealed (1554) in the reign of his staunchly Catholic daughter, Mary I. It was reinstated by Mary's Protestant half-sister, Elizabeth I, when she ascended the throne. Elizabeth declared herself Supreme Governor of the Church of England, and instituted an Oath of Supremacy, requiring anyone taking public or church office to swear allegiance to the monarch as head of the Church and state. Anyone refusing to take the Oath could be charged with treason." [7] The use of the term Supreme Governor as opposed to Supreme Head pacified Catholics and those Protestants concerned about a female leader of the Church of England. Elizabeth, who was a politique, did not prosecute layman nonconformists, or those who did not follow the established rules of the Church of England unless their actions directly undermined the authority of the English monarch, as was the case in the vestments controversy. The consolidation of church and state under Royal Supremacy, as established by the Tudors, instigated political and religious strife in the succeeding centuries. This strife, along with similar struggles in Europe, is one reason there is a constitutional separation of church and state in many jurisdictions now. In the United Kingdom, however, the Crown, through the government, still retains a significant involvement in the established Church of England. (1554) POPE sets Imperialist on West Invade Murder Rape Ransack and Enslave

Church of England
The Church of England is the officially established Christian church[3] in England and the Mother Church of the worldwide Anglican Communion. The Church of England separated from the Roman Catholic Church in 1534 with the Act of Supremacy and

understands itself to be both Catholic and Reformed:[4]

(The Satanic adeptness to understand SELF separated yet fully intact unreformed and reformed in the name of God for Christ sakes misappropiately

informed maintaining Satanic tradition) Catholic in that it views itself as a part of the universal church of Jesus Christ in unbroken continuity with the early apostolic church. This is expressed in its emphasis on the teachings of the early Church Fathers, as formalised in the Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian creeds.[5] Reformed in that it has been shaped by some of the doctrinal principles of the 16th century Protestant Reformation, in particular in the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Book of Common Prayer.[5]

English Reformation
The English Reformation was the series of events in 16th-century England by which the Church of England broke away from the authority of the Pope and the Roman Catholic Church. These events were, in part, associated with the wider process of the European Protestant Reformation,

a religious and political movement

which affected the practice of Christianity across most of Europe during this period. Many factors contributed to the process: the decline of feudalism and the rise of nationalism, the rise of the common law, the invention of the printing press and increased circulation of the Bible, the transmission of new knowledge

and ideas among scholars and the upper and middle classes.
However, the various phases of the English Reformation, which also covered Wales and Ireland, were largely driven by changes in government policy, to which public opinion gradually accommodated itself.

Based on Henry VIII's desire

for an annulment of his marriage,

the English Reformation was at the outset more of a political affair than a theological dispute. The reality of political differences between Rome and England allowed growing theological disputes to come to the fore.[1] Immediately before the break with Rome, it was the Pope and general councils of the church that decided doctrine. Church law was governed by the code of canon law with final jurisdiction in Rome. Church taxes were paid straight to Rome and it was the Pope who had the final say over the appointment of bishops. The split from Rome made the English monarch the Supreme Governor of the English church by "Royal Supremacy", thereby making the Church of England the established church of the nation. Doctrinal and legal disputes now rested with the monarch, and the papacy was deprived of revenue and the final say on the appointment of bishops.

Many a heads must roll with PRICK and FIBIB intervention of a simple divorce

Setting the stage for the 1618 - 1648 Thirty Year War that began religiously with political intermingling seriously devastated Europe

The structure and theology of the church was a matter of fierce dispute for generations.
These disputes were finally ended by a coup d'tat (the "Glorious Revolution") in 1688, from which emerged a church polity with an established church and a number of nonconformist churches whose members at first suffered various civil disabilities which were only removed over time, as did the substantial minority who remained Roman Catholic in England, whose church organization remained illegal until the 19th century.
Its all about Satanic SIC PIG lust for wealth and power invading murdering raping and enslaving expanding empires Resources: Natural and Humanic most precious able to convert the natural to satanic luxury A smorgasbord of SIC PIG for the FIBIB to assemble their entree of "Righteous Benevolence .... preference and of course with sword back for non-believers Satanic Pin Ball Ricochet on inevitable collision course in the name of 1 God for Christ sake each a unique perception of the S - golden rule despite the fact it is the ESS Epitome Simplicity Sanity The PRICK of evil poke and FIBIB of simple folk due the DAY Dark Abyss Yoke

Protestant Reformation
xyu The Protestant Reformation, also known as the Protestant Revolt or the Reformation, was the European Christian reform movement that established Protestantism as a constituent branch of contemporary Christianity. It was led by Martin Luther, John Calvin and other early Protestants. The efforts of the self-described "reformers", who objected to ("protested") the doctrines, rituals and ecclesiastical structure of the Catholic Church, led to the creation of new national Protestant churches. The Catholics responded with a Counter-Reformation, led by the Jesuit order, which reclaimed large parts of Europe, such as Poland. In general, northern Europe, with the exception of Ireland and pockets of Britain, turned Protestant, and southern Europe remained Catholic, while fierce battles that turned into warfare took place in the central Europe. The largest of the new denominations were the Anglicans (based in England), the Lutherans (based in Germany and Scandinavia), and the Reformed churches(based in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Scotland). There were many smaller bodies as well. The most common dating begins in 1517 when Luther published The Ninety-Five Theses, and concludes in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia that ended years of European religious wars.[1] Treaty of Westpahalia The Peace of Westphalia was a series of peace treaties signed between May and October of 1648 in Osnabrck and Mnster. These treaties ended the Thirty Years' War (16181648) in the Holy Roman Empire, and

the Eighty Years' War (15681648) between Spain and the Dutch Republic.

The Satanic go balistic their Humanic pick up the Tab

The Peace of Westphalia treaties involved the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III of the House of Habsburg, the Kingdoms of Spain, France, Sweden, the Dutch Republic, the Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, and sovereigns of the Free imperial cities and can be denoted by two major events.
The signing of the Peace of Mnster[1] between the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on 30 January 1648, officially ratified in Mnster on 15 May 1648. The signing of two complementary treaties on 24 October 1648, namely: The Treaty of Mnster (Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriensis, IPM),[2] concerning the Holy Roman Emperor and France and their respective allies. The Treaty of Osnabrck (Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis, IPO),[3] concerning the Holy Roman Emperor, the Empire and Sweden and their respective allies. The treaties resulted from the first modern diplomatic congress[4][5], thereby initiating a new system of political order in central Europe, later called Westphalian sovereignty, based upon the concept of asovereign state governed by a sovereign. In the event, the treaties regulations became integral to the constitutional law of the Holy Roman Empire.

The treaties did not restore the peace throughout Europe, however.
France and Spain remained at war for the next eleven years, making peace only in the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659.
Retired Major-General when coherent admits war racket

http://www.wanttoknow.info/warisaracket It's all about money in their 14M24S accounting One for Money Two for Show
Common Law

Common law (also known as case law or precedent), is law developed by judges through decisions of courts and similar tribunals rather than through legislative statutes or executive branch action. A "common law system" is a legal system that gives great precedential weight to common law,[1] on the principle that it is unfair to treat similar facts differently on different occasions.[2] The body of precedent is called "common law" and it binds future decisions. In cases where the parties disagree on what the law is, an idealized common law court looks to past precedential decisions of relevant courts. If a similar dispute has been resolved in the past, the court is bound to follow the reasoning used in the prior decision (this principle is known as stare decisis). If, however, the court finds that the current dispute is fundamentally distinct from all previous cases (called a "matter of first impression"), judges have the authority and duty to make law by creating precedent.[3] Thereafter, the new decision becomes precedent, and will bind future courts. In practice, common law systems are considerably more complicated than the idealized system described above. The decisions of a court are binding only in a particular jurisdiction, and even within a given jurisdiction, some courts have more power than

others. For example, in most jurisdictions, decisions by appellate courts are binding on lower courts in the same jurisdiction and on future decisions of the same appellate court, but decisions of lower courts are only non-binding persuasive authority. Interactions between common law, constitutional law, statutory law and regulatory law also give rise to considerable complexity. However stare decisis, the principle that similar cases should be decided according to consistent principled rules so that they will reach similar results, lies at the heart of all common law systems. Common law legal systems are in widespread use, particularly in England where it originated in the Middle Ages,[4] and in nations or regions that trace their legal heritage to England as former colonies of theBritish Empire, including the United States, Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India,[5] Ghana, Cameroon, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Hong Kong, andAustralia.[6]
Second Reich 1718-1918 Age of Enlightenment The Age of Enlightenment (or simply the Enlightenment or Age of Reason) was a cultural movement of intellectuals in 18th century Europe to mobilize the power of reason to reform society and advance knowledge. It promoted intellectual interchange and opposed intolerance and abuses in Church and state. It originated about 1650-1700, sparked by philosophers Baruch Spinoza (16321677), John Locke (1632 1704), Pierre Bayle (16471706) and scientistIsaac Newton (16431727). Ruling princes often endorsed and fostered Enlightenment figures and even attempted to apply their ideas of government. The Enlightenment was an elite movement of intellectuals that flourished until about 1790-1800, after which the emphasis on reason gave way to Romanticism's emphasis on emotion, and a Counter-Enlightenment gained force. The center of the Enlightenment was France, where it was based in the salons and culminated in the great Encyclopdie (175172) edited by Denis Diderot (17131784) with contributions by hundreds of leading philosophes(intellectuals) such as Voltaire (16941778) and Montesquieu (16891755). Some 25,000 copies of the 35 volume set were sold, half of them outside France. The new intellectual forces spread to urban centers across Europe, notably England, Scotland, the German states, the Netherlands, Russia, Italy, Austria, and Spain, then jumped the Atlantic into the European colonies, where it influenced Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, among many others, and played a major role in the American Revolution. The political ideals influenced the American Declaration of Independence, the United States Bill of Rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and the PolishLithuanian Constitution of May 3, 1791.[1] "Shall I tell you what knowledge is? When you know a thing, to hold that you know it, And when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it. This is knowledge" "Learning without thought is labor lost, thought without learning is perilous" "A little learning is a dangerous thing; Drink deep and taste not the Pierian spring; There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain; And drinking largely sobers us again." Alexander Pope 1688-1744

Third Reich 1933-1945 Himmler a devout Catholic

Sovereignty
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty Sovereignty is the quality of having supreme, independent authority over a geographic area, such as a territory.[1] It can be found in a power to rule and make law that rests

on a political fact for which no purely legal explanation can be provided.

In theoretical terms, the idea of "sovereignty", historically, from Socrates to Thomas Hobbes, has always necessitated a moral imperative on the entity exercising it.

STP
Satanic Truth Prohibition BLOT Bright Light of Truth

Fact political organized criminals

To United Nations United Nations
The United Nations currently only requires that a sovereign state has an effective and independent government within a defined territory. According to current international law norms, states are only required to have an effective and independent system of government pursuant to a community within a defined territory.[2]

ability to guarantee the best interests of its own citizens.

For centuries past, the idea that a state could be sovereign was always connected to its Thus, if a state could not act in the best interests of its own citizens,

it could not be thought of as a sovereign state.[3]

The concept of sovereignty has been discussed, debated and questioned throughout history, from the time of the Romans through to the present day.

It has changed in its definition, concept, and application throughout, especially during the Age of Enlightenment. The current notion of state sovereignty is often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which, in relation to states, codified the basic principles:

territorial integrity border inviolability supremacy of the state (rather than the Church) a sovereign is the supreme lawmaking authority within its jurisdiction.

Reformation
Sovereignty reemerged as a concept in the late 16th century, a time when civil wars had created a craving for stronger central authority, when monarchs had begun to gather power into their own hands at the expense of the nobility, and the modern nation state was emerging. Jean Bodin, partly in reaction to the chaos of the French wars of religion; and Thomas Hobbes, partly in reaction to the English Civil War, both presented theories of sovereignty calling for strong central authority in the form of absolute monarchy. In his 1576 treatise Les Six Livres de la Rpublique ("Six Books of the Republic") Bodin argued that it is inherent in the nature of the state that sovereignty must be:[citation needed] Absolute: On this point he said that the sovereign must not be hedged in with obligations and conditions, must be able to legislate without his (or its) subjects' consent, must not be bound by the laws of his predecessors, and could not, because it is illogical, be bound by his own laws.

Perpetual: Not temporarily delegated as to a strong leader in an emergency or to a state employee such as a magistrate. He held that sovereignty must be perpetual because anyone with the power to enforce a time limit on the governing power must be above the governing power, which would be impossible if the governing power is absolute.

Bodin rejected the notion of transference of sovereignty from people to sovereign; natural law and divine law confer upon the sovereign the right to rule. And the sovereign is not above divine law or natural law. He is above (ie. not bound by) only positive law, that is, laws made by humans. The fact that the sovereign must obey divine and natural law imposes ethical constraints on him. Bodin also held that the lois royales, the fundamental laws of the French monarchy which regulated matters such as succession, are natural laws and are binding on the French sovereign. How divine and natural law could in practice be enforced on the sovereign is a problematic feature of Bodin's philosophy: any person capable of enforcing them on him would be above him.[citation needed] Despite his commitment to absolutism, Bodin held some moderate opinions on how government should in practice be carried out. He held that although the sovereign is not obliged to, it is advisable for him, as a practical expedient, to convene a senate from whom he can obtain advice, to delegate some power to magistrates for the practical administration of the law, and to use the Estates as a means of communicating with the people.[citation needed] With his doctrine that sovereignty is conferred by divine law, Bodin predefined the scope of the divine right of kings.[citation needed]

[edit] Age of Enlightenment

Hobbes, in Leviathan (1651) introduced an early version of the social contract (or contractarian) theory, arguing that to overcome the "nasty, brutish and short" quality of life without the cooperation of other human beings, people must join in a "commonwealth" and submit to a "Soveraigne [sic] Power" that is able to compel them to act in the common good. This expediency argument attracted many of the early proponents of sovereignty. Hobbes deduced from the definition of sovereignty that it must be:[citation needed] Absolute: because conditions could only be imposed on a sovereign if there were some outside arbitrator to determine when he had violated them, in which case the sovereign would not be the final authority. Indivisible: The sovereign is the only final authority in his territory; he does not share final authority with any other entity. Hobbes held this to be true because otherwise there would be no way of resolving a disagreement between the multiple authorities.

Hobbes' hypothesis that the ruler's sovereignty is contracted to him by the people in return for his maintaining their safety, led him to conclude that if the ruler fails to do this, the people are released from their obligation to obey him. Bodin's and Hobbes's theories would decisively shape the concept of sovereignty, which we can find again in the social contract theories, for example, in Rousseau's (17121778) definition of popular sovereignty (with early antecedents in Francisco Surez's theory of the origin of power), which only differs in that he considers the people to be the legitimate sovereign. Likewise, it is inalienable Rousseau condemned the distinction between the origin and the exercise of sovereignty, a distinction upon which constitutional monarchy or representative democracy are founded. Niccol Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Montesquieu are also key figures in the unfolding of the concept of sovereignty. Constitution of the United Kingdom The constitution of the United Kingdom is the set of laws and principles under which the United Kingdom is governed.[1] Unlike many nations, the UK has no single core constitutional document. It is therefore often said that the country has an uncodified, or de facto constitution.[2] However, much of the British constitution is embodied in the written form, within statutes, court judgments, and treaties. The constitution has other unwritten sources, including parliamentary constitutional conventions and royal prerogatives. Since the English Civil War, the bedrock of the British constitution has traditionally been the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, according to which the statutes passed by Parliament are the UK's supreme and final source of law.[3]It follows that Parliament can change the constitution simply by passing new Acts of Parliament. There is some debate about whether this principle remains entirely valid today,[4] in part due to the UK's European Union membership.[5] Rule of Law The rule of law is a legal maxim which provides that no person is above the law, that no one can be punished by the state except for a breach of the law, and that no one can be convicted of breaching the law except in the manner set forth by the law itself.

The rule of law stands in contrast to the idea that the leader is above the law a feature of Roman Law, Nazi law, and certain other legal systems.
The phrase has been used since the 17th century, but the concept is older. For example, the Greek philosopher Aristotle said, "Law should govern".[2]One way to be free from the rule of law is by denying that an enactment has the necessary attributes of law. The rule of law has therefore been described as

"an exceedingly elusive

notion"[3] giving rise to a "rampant divergence of understandings".[4]

At least two principal conceptions of the rule of law can be identified: a formalist or "thin" and a substantive or "thick" definition of the rule of law.

Formalist definitions of the rule of law

do not make a judgment about the "justness" of law itself,

but define specific procedural attributes that a legal framework must have in order to be in compliance with the rule of law. Substantive conceptions of the rule of law go beyond this and include certain substantive rights that are said to be based on, or derived from, the rule of law.[5] History Although credit for popularizing the expression "the rule of law" in modern times is usually given to A. V. Dicey,[6][7] development of the legal concept can be traced through history to many ancient civilizations, including Ancient Greece, Ancient China, ancient Mesopotamia, and Ancient Rome.[citation needed] [edit] Antiquity In Western philosophy, the Ancient Greeks initially regarded the best form of government as rule by the best men, such as Plato's idealized philosopher king.[8] Plato nevertheless hoped

that the best men would be good at respecting established laws, and he explained why:

Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the state, in my view, is not far off;

but if law is the master of the government and the government is its slave,
then the situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the gods shower on a state.[9] More than Plato attempted to do,

Aristotle flatly opposed letting the highest officials wield power beyond guarding and serving the laws.
[8] In other words, Aristotle advocated the rule of law: It is more proper that law should govern than any one of the citizens: upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular persons,

they should be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants of the laws.[2]
According to the Ancient Roman statesman Cicero, "We are all servants of the laws in order that we may be free."[10]

During the Roman Republic, controversial magistrates might be put on trial when their terms of office expired. Under the Roman Empire,

the sovereign was personally immune (legibus solutus), but those with grievances could sue the treasury.[6
Rule of Law http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_law The Rule of law in its most basic form is no one is above the law.
Perhaps the most important application of the rule of law is the principle that governmental authority is legitimately exercised only in accordance with, publicly disclosed laws, adopted and enforced in accordance with established procedural steps that are referred to as due process. The rule of law is hostile to dictatorship and to anarchy. According to modern Anglo-American thinking, hallmarks of adherence to the rule of law commonly include

a clear separation of powers,

legal certainty, the principle of legitimate expectation and equality of all before the law. The concept is not without controversy, and it has been said that

"the phrase the rule of law has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over- use" General over use in proclamation with excessive elusiveness lucidity

Publicly disclosed laws

Canadian Constitution Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the Rule of Law

52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada,

and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency,

of no force or effect.
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law

without discrimination
and, in particular,

without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. Different people have different interpretations about exactly what "rule of law" means. According to political theorist Judith N. Shklar, "the phrase 'the Rule of Law' has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use", but nevertheless this phrase has in the past had specific and important meanings.[22] Among modern legal theorists, most views on this subject fall into three general categories: the formal (or "thin") approach, the substantive (or "thick") approach, and the functional approach.[23][24] The "formal" interpretation is more widespread than the "substantive" interpretation. Formalists hold that the law must be prospective, well-known, and have characteristics of generality, equality, and certainty. Other than that, the formal view contains no requirements as to the content of the law.[23] This formal approach allows laws that protect democracy and individual rights, but recognizes the existence of "rule of law" in countries that do not necessarily have such laws protecting democracy or individual rights. The substantive interpretation holds that the rule of law intrinsically protects some or all individual rights. The functional interpretation of the term "rule of law", consistent with the traditional English meaning, contrasts the "rule of law" with the "rule of man."[24] According to the functional view, a society in which government officers have a great deal of discretion has a low degree of "rule of law", whereas a society in which government officers have little discretion has a high degree of "rule of law".[24] The rule of law is thus somewhat at odds with flexibility, even when flexibility may be preferable.[24] The ancient concept of rule of law can be distinguished from rule by law, according to political science professor Li Shuguang: "The difference....is that, under the rule of law, the law is preeminent and can serve as a check against the abuse of power. Under rule by law, the law is a mere tool for a government, that suppresses in a legalistic fashion."[25] All government officers of the United States, including the President, the Justices of the Supreme Court, and all members of Congress,

pledge first and foremost to uphold the Constitution.

These oaths affirm that the rule of law is superior to the rule of any human leader. [28] At the same time, the federal government does have considerable discretion: the legislative branch is free to decide what statutes it will write, as long as it stays within its enumerated powers and respects the constitutionally protected rights of individuals. Likewise, the judicial branch has a degree of judicial discretion,[29] and the executive branch also has various discretionary powers including prosecutorial discretion. Scholars continue to debate whether the U.S. Constitution adopted a particular interpretation of the "rule of law," and if so, which one. For example, Law Professor John Harrison asserts that the word "law" in the Constitution is simply defined as that which is legally binding, rather than being "defined by formal or substantive criteria," and therefore judges do not have discretion to decide that laws fail to satisfy such unwritten and vague criteria.[30] Law Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks disagrees, writing that Cicero, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and the framers of the U.S. Constitution believed that an unjust law was not really a law at all.[31]

James Wilson said during the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 that, "Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect." George Mason agreed that judges "could declare an unconstitutional law void. But with regard to every law, however unjust, oppressive or pernicious, which did not come plainly under this description, they would be under the necessity as judges to give it a free course."[32]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Khut8xbXK8&feature
Iraq war Illegal Bush broke every rule in the books of the Constitution and the UN Charter 9/11 Bush http://www.WantToKnow.info/911information 2/9/10 10 Years if you think USA Government corrupt http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSYLdoRwkrs Truth Kills http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bvay28lZiHU

[edit] Asia East Asian cultures are influenced by two schools of thought, Confucianism, which advocated good governance as rule by leaders who are benevolent and virtuous, and Legalism, which advocated strict adherence to law. The influence of one school of thought over the other has varied throughout the centuries. One study indicates that throughout East Asia, only South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong have societies that are robustly committed to a law-bound state.[33] According to Awzar Thi, a member of the Asian Human Rights Commission, the rule of law in Thailand, Cambodia, and most of Asia is weak or nonexistent: Apart from a number of states and territories, across the continent there is a huge gulf between the rule of law rhetoric and reality. In Thailand, the police force is an organized crime gang. In Cambodia, judges are proxies for the ruling political party.That a judge may harbor political prejudice or apply the law unevenly are the smallest worries for an ordinary criminal defendant in Asia. More likely ones are: Will the police fabricate the evidence? Will the prosecutor bother to show up? Will the judge fall asleep? Will I be poisoned in prison? Will my case be completed within a decade?[34] In countries such as China and Vietnam, the transition to a market economy has been a major factor in a move toward the rule of law, because a rule of law is important to foreign investors and to economic development. It remains unclear whether the rule of law in countries like China and Vietnam will be limited to commercial matters or will spill into other areas as well, and if so whether that spillover will enhance prospects for related values such as democracy and human rights.[35]. The rule of law in China has been widely discussed and debated by both legal scholars and politicians in China. In India, the longest constitutional text in the history of the world has governed that country since 1950. Although the Constitution of India may have been intended to provide details that would limit the opportunity for judicial discretion, the more text there is in a constitution the greater opportunity the judiciary may have to exercise judicial review.[36] According to Indian journalist Harish Khare, "The rule of law or rather the Constitution [is] in danger of being supplanted by the rule of judges."[37]

Japan had centuries of tradition prior to World War II during which there were laws, but they were not a central organizing principle for society, and they did not constrain the powers of government. As the twenty-first century began, the percentage of people who were lawyers and judges in Japan remained very low relative to western Europe and the United States, and legislation in Japan tended to be terse and general, leaving much discretion in the hands of bureaucrats.[38] [edit] Organizations and scholarly works

Many organizations and scholars have advocated for the rule of law, and have taken positions regarding which interpretation of that concept they prefer.
[edit] International Commission of Jurists In 1959, an international gathering of over 185 judges, lawyers, and law professors from 53 countries, meeting in New Delhi and speaking as the International Commission of Jurists, made a declaration as to the fundamental principle of the rule of law. This was the Declaration of Delhi. They declared that the rule of law implies certain rights and freedoms,

that it implies an independent judiciary,

and that it implies social, economic and cultural conditions conducive to human dignity.
The Declaration of Delhi did not, however, suggest that the rule of law requires legislative power to be subject to judicial review.[39] [edit] United Nations The Secretary-General of the United Nations defines the rule of law as:[40]

a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself,

are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,

equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.

********************************************************************** The following was extracted from the Law Society of Upper Canada - Lawyers Rules of Conduct 103) Interpretation (f) rules of professional conduct cannot address every situation, and a lawyer should observe the rules in the spirit as well as in the letter. ************************************************************************************** *********************

GREDSCROLL
Golden Rule Equality Democratic Spirit Constitution Rule Of Law Logistics Every individuals rights are guaranteed in perpetuity not subject to incompetence or willful neglect, omissions, loopholes, or any inconsistencies with the Constitution governed by the S the ESS not debatable that gives credence to that which is least apt to be mistaken by humans that we all comprehend at 5 prior to the first day of SSS what it is to be fully human and what is and what is not receptive to a fellow human that is the Sovereign People's servants ultimate responsibility ergo accountable to the certainty of the SOS Sanctity of Spirit "S" -

Spirit aka Intent the purpose the humanic have inanely paid

the Satanic self proclaimed "Learned and Honorable" since ancient times to simply structure a system competent to the certainty of the SOS of the SCEDROL that HA HA HA History Attests History Attests History Attests Accumulatively have the mind of a single toad flattened on the road or They are Satanic Bastards in the facade of Humanic 14M24S Statistics Canada and others report The SEE get richer and the poor get poorer seriously afflicted with osmosis as the Media are major players negligent of their responsibilities to inform the people Thy Kingdom come on the backs of Humanic Not a Human Achievement

Furthermore, freedom of political expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press

are considered to be essential,

so that citizens are adequately informed and able to vote according to their own best interests as they see them. MVBDC Majority Vote Bias Democratic Con

SIC PIG Satanic political parties vying for the majority vote to satiate their interests fronted by the SEE of corporate conglomerates bribe the populace inciting their inherent bias absolutely adverse to the principles of HE Humanic Equality
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law

without discrimination
and, in particular,

without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

Charlatan politicians and religious leaders no place in GREDSCROLL Abrogated criminal frauds that the only way to idolize Jesus or God purportedly created in His image is to mirror Him in the aspirations attributed to Him summarized by Jesus who paraphrased the Golden Rule attributed to Confucius In 1797 the Upper Canada government now Ontario instructed their Attorney General educated in Satanic British Empire Imperialist ways to form the Law Society Legal Scam www.lsls.ca Proclaiming self a monopoly to propagate "Learned and Honourable" to administer the laws of Ontario who have infested Canada never intending to be Responsible ergo Accountable M4D Mulroney 4 Democracy
Twenty years the RCMP investigated Mulroney self admitted tax evader acceptance of bribery by armaments conglomerate with them all war mongers and vested interest to support the armaments briberists Bribery does not set well with the Humanic in FIBIB so they call it Lobbyism and legalize with briberists responsible to register so all political SIC PIG know who are the gamers Ontario Attorney General in clear violation of the mandatory Rule of Law "Clear separation of powers" advises all government department, so called independent agencies, and police heads and administers the Law Society Act as a bencher with precedence second only to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada who advises all federal departments, so called independent agencies and RCMP heads. The Ontario Attorney General appoints the chair and four others selecting 5 more from a list provided by the Law Society RAG Responsibilities Attorney General Published on Ontario Government web site The Attorney General does not, however, direct or cause charges to be laid.

While the Attorney General and the Attorney General's agents may provide legal advice to the police,

the ultimate decision whether or not to lay charges is for the police.
Once the charge is laid the decision as to whether the prosecution should proceed, and in what manner, is for the Attorney General and the Crown Attorney. Momentarily appears to be a separation of powers, but then follows with a wipe out Law Society Act Attorney General, guardian of the public interest 13. (1) The Attorney General for Ontario shall serve as the guardian of the public interest in all matters within the scope of this Act or having to do in any way with the practice of law in Ontario or the provision of legal services in Ontario, and for this purpose he or she may at any time require the production of any document or thing pertaining to the affairs of the Society. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 13 (1); 1998, c. 21, s. 7 (1); 2006, c. 21, Sched. C, s. 13. Admissions (2) No admission of any person in any document or thing produced under subsection (1) is admissible in evidence against that person in any proceedings other than proceedings under this Act. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 13 (2); 1998, c. 21, s. 7 (2). Protection of Minister (3) No person who is or has been the Attorney General for Ontario is subject to any proceedings of the Society or to any penalty imposed under this Act for anything done by him or her while exercising the functions of such office. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 13 (3); 1998, c. 21, s. 7 (3). 13.(1)For public purpose is responsible as guardian of the public interest, 13.(2) but evidence against them not permitted in the public interest, and 13.(3) strokes and out believing not accountable ergo not responsible ST Satanic Thespian Entire Canadian system documented in my trek for justice that began 6/30/05 www.cdf1.ca Mcfrauds Even the Access to Information and Privacy Act structured to protect the criminal element with they the major players

RAG As chief law officer, the Attorney General has a

special

responsibility to be the guardian of that most elusive

concept - the rule of law.
The rule of law is a well established legal principle, but hard to easily define. It is the rule of law that protects individuals, and society as a whole, from arbitrary measures and safeguards personal liberties.

Sticklers for Tradition have guarded the elusiveness that protects their elusive illegitimate industry from justice guaranteeing the "Public Interest" not a ghost of a chance for justice or HE - Humanic Equality, however their success is dependent on their PRICK and humanic FIBIB, having provided the means ... GREDSCROL that abrogates them having left an indelible trail leading to the Humanic gold requiring the people only to fire up their magnificent user friendly brains for self. It works for the chainsaw cutting Bush to see the forest back nothing but stumps, and ahead clear as a bell with the PRICK lopped stumped no more Not rocket science
Transcendental 1. Not experienced but knowable Philosophy independent of human experience of phenomena but within the range of knowledge 2. Mystical Relating to mystical or supernatural experience and therefore beyond the material world

With avid use of truth and vigorous accumulation CATCHALL Cyberspace Accountable Transparency Central Hiti Archives Last Laugh

Poof

No mystical or supernatural experiences on the road to "Thy Kingdom Come" A HA - Humanic Achievement Simply register as a 1 Lifer We are the VITIMICS Voluntary Invincible Triad Individuals Monolithice Immaculate Conception Superiors

With ROW - Right of Way ducks scattered in cyberspace waiting for us to line up in a ROW for the ultimate .... *********************************************************************** *
Well aware the Lord helps them that help themselves no evidence to suggest otherwise, however the governments are supposed to be the Sovereign People's servants for the express purpose of serving them with all HE - Human Equals at the onset each responsible to provide for self, each with jobs working together aiding each other to their UP - Ultimate Potential ergo UPS - Ultimate Potential Society each responsible to be in, of, with and under the S held accountable by they specifically assigned to do so, having accepted financial benefit ergo RESPONSIBLE ergo ACCOUNTABLE For the pathetic shambles they who would have us believe are "Learned and Honorable" would have us believe they administer and enforce GREDSCROLL

Renewed interests?
Since ancient times responsible to eradicate the abrogated Satanic bastards, but Satanic bastards enjoying luxurious lifestyle rather reluctant to eradicate self That's left for them they leave in hopelessness and despair The General Assembly has considered rule of law as an agenda item since 1992, with renewed interest since 2006 and has adopted resolutions at its last three sessions.[41] The Security Council has held a number of thematic debates on the rule of law,[42] and adopted resolutions emphasizing the importance of these issues in the context of women, peace and security,[43] children in armed conflict,[44] and the protection of civilians in armed conflict.[45] ThePeacebuilding Commission has also regularly addressed rule of law issues with respect to countries on its agenda.[46] [edit] International Bar Association The Council of the International Bar Association passed a resolution in 2009 endorsing a substantive or "thick" definition of the rule of law:[47]

An independent, impartial judiciary; the presumption of innocence; the right to a fair and public trial without undue delay; a rational and proportionate approach to punishment; a strong and independent legal profession; strict protection of confidential communications between lawyer and client; equality of all before the law; these are all fundamental principles of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, arbitrary arrests; secret trials; indefinite detention without trial; cruel or degrading treatment or punishment; intimidation or corruption in the electoral process, are all unacceptable. The Rule of Law is the foundation of a civilised society. It establishes a transparent process accessible and equal to all. It ensures adherence to principles that both liberate and protect. The IBA calls upon all countries to respect these fundamental principles. It also calls upon its members to speak out in support of the Rule of Law within their respective communities.

One problem for the extortionist of exorbitant illegitimate fees illegitimate private sector lawyer

It is the responsibility of the Attorney General to be the "Guardian of the Public Interest" structuring the system to keep all responsible RAG A key component of the Attorney General's responsibilities to ensure the administration of justice in the province is the administration of the courts and as a result the responsibility for maintaining liaison with the judiciary. In addition to the specific responsibilities to conduct civil litigation on behalf of the Government and its agencies (s. 5(h)),

the Attorney General has broader litigation responsibilities

flowing from the historical powers of the Attorney General referred to in s. 5(d) of the Act. These powers are based on the Crown's parens patriae (parental) authority. The Attorney General's authority, therefore,

is not only to conduct litigation in cases directly affecting the government or its agencies, but also to litigate cases where there is a clear matter of public interest or public rights at stake. Ultimate Conflict of Interest
No clear separation of powers An important part of the Crown's - and thus the Attorney General's - responsibility in conducting criminal prosecutions is associated with the responsibility to represent the public interest -

which includes not only the community as a whole and the victim, but also the accused.
Legal aid is illegal adverse to every individuals equal rights, and specifically states it is the Attorney General's responsibility ... to provide a defending Crown Attorney accountable to the people through the legislature who purport to be the Sovereign People's representatives

The Crown has a distinct responsibility to the court to present all the credible evidence available. The police must be an independent agency upon being provided reasonable evidence a crime has been committed responsible to collect all pertinent evidence unobstructed to present to a court of "competent jurisdiction" The police requiring warrants are illegal adverse to their prerequisite independence put in place by the Satanic to prevent investigations into their financial portfolios and pertinent evidence as in 13.(2) and the illegitimate Privacy Act The responsibility is to present the case fairly - not necessarily to convict. This is a fundamental precept of criminal law, even if it is not a particularly well-understood concept among the general public. One of the Attorney General's responsibilities in fostering public respect for the rule of law, is to assist the public in understanding the nature and limits of the prosecutorial function.

OK AG explain the nature of Satanic understanding what it is to be fully human This has been characterized as a constitutional responsibility to ensure that the public interest is well and independently represented. It may involve interventions in private litigation or Charter challenges to legislation, even if the arguments conclude that the legislation does contravene constitutionally protected rights.

Ultimately the Attorney General is accountable to the people of the province,

through the

Legislature, for decisions relating to criminal prosecutions. Such accountability can only
occur, of course, once the prosecution is completed or when a final decision has been made not to prosecute. The sub judicae rule bars any comment on a matter before the courts that is likely to influence the matter. The sub judicae rule strictly prohibits the Attorney General from commenting on prosecutions that are before the courts. Given the stature of the Attorney General's position, any public comment coming from the office would be seen as an attempt to influence the case. The entire system personnel whose e-mail addresses are published in the GLIST that includes my MPP, and MP have been provided the evidence refusing to hold the Attorney General accountable, for they feel protected by their Satanic predecessors 13. (3) Law Society Act.

Organized Crime personified

[edit] World Justice Project As used by the World Justice Project a non-profit organization committed to advancing the rule of law around the world the rule of law refers to a rules-based system in which the following four universal principles are upheld:[48] 1. The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law; 2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property; 3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient; 4. Access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical adjudicators, attorneys or representatives, and judicial officers who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve. The World Justice Project has developed an Index to measure the extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law in practice. The WJP Rule of Law Index is composed of 10 factors and 49 sub-factors, and covers a variety of dimensions of the rule of law such as whether government officials are accountable under the law, and whether legal institutions protect fundamental rights and allow ordinary people access to justice.[49] How can anything they proclaim or legislate be deemed meaningful if not first presumed to be "Learned and Honorable" administers and enforcers of the law competent and irreproachable either stated or implied

every individual

is equal, consistent with the S, being just Satanic facade words lest administered and enforced with exemplary attentiveness to the SOS prerequisite to the certainty every individual is equal in all matters of law ... with Satanic turkeys mandated turkey legs, part and parcel of the whole concept. No doubt the Satanic governments and Bottom Feeder Piranha could go on in perpetuity skimming the quality of life from the humanic if not for reality that does not give a damn about ME - Mother Earth and the humanic beginning to become aware of reality with WWW III blowing in the prevailing winds [edit] Albert Dicey British jurist A. V. Dicey popularized the phrase "rule of law" in 1885.[6][50] Dicey emphasized three aspects of the rule of law :[51] 1. No one can be punished or made to suffer except for a breach of law proved in an ordinary court. 2. No one is above the law and everyone is equal before the law regardless of social, economic, or political status. 3. The rule of law includes the results of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons. [edit] Joseph Raz In 1977, the influential political theorist Joseph Raz identified several principles that may be associated with the rule of law in some (but not all) societies.[52] Raz's principles encompass the requirements of guiding the individual's behaviour and minimizing the danger that results from the exercise of discretionary power in an arbitrary fashion, and in this last respect he shares common ground with the constitutional theorists A. V. Dicey, Friedrich Hayek and E. P. Thompson. Some of Raz's principles are as follows: That laws should be prospective rather than retroactive. Laws should be stable and not changed too frequently, as lack of awareness of the law prevents one from being guided by it. There should be clear rules and procedures for making laws. The independence of the judiciary has to be guaranteed. The principles of natural justice should be observed, particularly those concerning the right to a fair hearing. The courts should have the power of judicial review over the way in which the other principles are implemented. The courts should be accessible; no man may be denied justice. The discretion of law enforcement and crime prevention agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.

According to Raz, the validity of these principles depends upon the particular circumstances of different societies, whereas the rule of law generally "is not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man".[52] [edit] In relation to economics One important aspect of the rule-of-law initiatives is the study and analysis of the rule of laws impact on economic development. The rule-of-law movement cannot be fully successful in transitional and developing countries without a answer to the question: does the rule of law matter for economic development or not?[53] Constitutional economics is the study of the compatibility of economic and financial decisions within existing constitutional law frameworks, and such a framework includes government spending on the judiciary which in many transitional and developing countries is completely

controlled by the executive. It is useful to distinguish between the two methods of corruption of the judiciary: corruption by the executive branch, in contrast to corruption by private actors. The standards of constitutional economics can be used during annual budget process, and if that budget planning is transparent then the rule of law may benefit. The availability of an effective court system, to be used by the civil society in situations of unfair government spending and executive impoundment of previously authorized appropriations, is a key element for the success of the rule-of-law endeavor.[54] The Rule of Law is especially important as an influence on the economic development in developing and transitional countries. To date, the term rule of law has been used primarily in the English-speaking countries, and it is not yet fully clarified even with regard to such well-established democracies as, for instance, Sweden, Denmark, France, Germany, or Japan. A common language between lawyers of common law and civil law countries as well as between legal communities of developed and developing countries is critically important for research of links between the rule of law and real economy.[55] [edit] In schools The rule of law is generally acknowledged to be a cornerstone of orderly, organized society, including within schools. The Sudbury School is an example of a school where laws are always promulgated in writing, and careful records are kept of the body of precedents surrounding each rule. There is no opening, however small, for arbitrary or capricious authority to step in.[56][57][58] [edit] In conflict with natural law Upholding the rule of law can sometimes require the punishment of those who commit offenses that are justifiable under natural law but not statutory law. Heidi M. Hurd raises the example of a battered woman who rightly believes that there is a strong probability that her husband will eventually attempt to kill her and her children unless she preemptively kills him. If the law does not permit the acquittal of those who claim self-defense in the absence of an imminent threat of harm, then the woman must be punished, or "what will become of the rule of law? For law seemingly ceases to be law if judges are entitled to rethink its wisdom in every case to which it applies and to disregard it whenever it is inferior to the rule that they would fashion."[59] [edit] See also Legal certainty Sovereign immunity Equality before the law Judicial activism Mob rule Violent non-state actor Constitutional economics Judiciary Separation of powers Civil society Nuremberg Principles Public interest litigation Rechtsstaat Rule According to Higher Law State secrets privilege

Notes ^ Cole, John et al. The Library of Congress, page 113 (W. W. Norton & Company 1997). ^ a b Aristotle,Politics 3.16 ^ Tamanaha, Brian Z. (2004). On the Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press. p. 9.^ Tamanaha 2004, p. 9. ^ Craig, Paul P. (1997). "Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical framework". Public Law: 467. ^ a b c Wormuth, Francis. The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism, page 28 (1949). ^ Bingham, Thomas. The Rule of Law, page 3 (Penguin 2010). ^ a b David Clarke, "The many meanings of the rule of law" in Kanishka Jayasuriya, ed., Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia (New York: Routledge, 1998). ^ Cooper, John et al. Complete Works By Plato, page 1402 (Hackett Publishing, 1997). ^ In Latin, Omnes legum servi sumus ut liberi esse possumus. ^ Xiangming, Zhang. On Two Ancient Chinese Administrative Ideas: Rule of Virtue and Rule by Law, The Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for EastWest Cultural and Economic Studies (2002): Although Han Fei recommended that the government should rule by law, which seems impartial, he advocated that the law be enacted by the lords solely. The lords place themselves above the law. The law is thereby a monarchical means to control the people, not the people's means to restrain the lords. The lords are by no means on an equal footing with the people. Hence we cannot mention the rule by law proposed by Han Fei in the same breath as democracy and the rule of law advocated today. ^ Bevir, Mark. The Encyclopedia of Political Theory, page 162.
^ Munro, Donald. The Concept of Man in Early China. Page 4.

^ Guo, Xuezhi. The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective. Page 152. ^ Peerenboom, Randall (1993). Law and morality in ancient China: the silk manuscripts of Huang-Lao. SUNY Press. pp. 171. http://books.google.com/books?id=qxgLcrLL-IIC&dq=. ^ Weeramantry, C. Justice without Frontiers, page 132 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997). ^ U.S. National Archives.

^ Hallam, Henry. The Constitutional History of England, Volume 1, page 441 (1827) ^ Tamanaha, Brian. On the Rule of Law, page 47 (Cambridge University Press, 2004). ^ Lieberman, Jethro. A Practical Companion to the Constitution, page 436 (University of California Press 2005). ^ Massachusetts Constitution, Part The First, art. XXX (1780). ^ Shklar, Judith and Hoffman, Stanley. Political Thought and Political Thinkers, page 21 (University of Chicago Press, 1998). ^ a b Tamanaha, Brian. The Rule of Law for Everyone?, Current Legal Problems, volume 55, via SSRN (2002):
Most legal theorists believe that the rule of law has purely formal characteristics, meaning that the law must be publicly declared, with prospective application, and possess the characteristics of generality, equality, and certainty, but there are no requirements with regard to the content of the law. Others, including a few legal theorists, believe that the rule of law necessarily entails protection of individual rights. Within legal theory, these two approaches to the rule of law are seen as the two basic alternatives, respectively labelled the formal and substantive approaches. But there are other views as well. Some believe that democracy is part of the rule of law. ^ a b c d Stephenson, Matthew. "Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy", World Bank Research (2008). ^ Tamanaha, Brian. On the Rule of Law, page 3 (Cambridge University Press, 2004). ^ a b Kaufman, Daniel et al. "Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 19962006, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280" (July 2007). ^ "Governance Matters 2008", World Bank. ^ Vile, John. A Companion to the United States Constitution and its Amendments, page 80 (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006). ^ Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U. S. 738 (1824): "When [courts] are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it." ^ Harrison, John. "Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text," Virginia Law Review, Volume 83, page 493 (1997). ^ Gedicks, Frederick. "An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment", Emory Law Journal, Vol. 58, pages 585-673 (2009). See also Edlin, Douglas "Judicial Review without a Constitution", Polity, Volume 38, pages 345-368 (2006). ^ Snowiss, Sylvia. Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution, pages 41-42 (Yale University Press 1990). ^ Chu, Yun-Han et al. How East Asians View Democracy, pages 31-32.

^ Thi, Awzar. Asia needs a new rule-of-law debate, United Press International, UPIAsia.com (2008-08-14). ^ Peerenboom, Randall in Asian Discourses of Rule of Law, page 39 (Routledge 2004). ^ Baxi, Upendra in Asian Discourses of Rule of Law, pages 336-337 (Routledge 2004). ^ Robinson, Simon. For Activist Judges, Try India, Time Magazine (2006-11-08). ^ Green, Carl. "Japan: 'The Rule of Law Without Lawyers' Reconsidered", Speech to the Asia Society (2001-03-14). ^ Goldsworth, Jeffrey. Legislative Sovereignty and the Rule of Law" in Sceptical Essays on Human Rights, page 69 (Tom Campbell, Keith D. Ewing, Adam Tomkins eds. Oxford University Press 2001).^What is the Rule of Law?, United Nations Rule of Law. ^ See United Nations General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/61/39, A/RES/62/70, A/RES/63/128. ^ See United Nations Security Council debates S/PRST/2003/15, S/PRST/2004/2, S/PRST/2004/32, S/PRST/2005/30, S/PRST/2006/28. ^ See United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820. ^ E.g. see United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612. ^ E.g. see United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674. ^ United Nations and the Rule of Law. ^ Resolution of the Council of the International Bar Association of October 8, 2009, on the Commentary on Rule of Law Resolution (2005). ^ About the WJP. ^ Agrast, Mark et al. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (2010). ^ Dicey, Albert. An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885). ^ Palekar, S. Comparative Politics and Government 64-65 (PHI Learning 2009). ^ a b Raz, Joseph. "The Rule of Law and It's Virtue", The Law Quarterly Review, volume 93, page 195 (1977); reprinted by Culver, Keith. Readings in the Philosophy of Law, page 13 (Broadview Press, 1999). ^ Luis Flores Ballesteros. "Corruption and development. Does the rule of law factor weigh more than we think?" 54 Pesos May. 2008:54 Pesos 15 Nov 2008. <http://54pesos.org/2008/11/15/corruption-and-development-does-the%E2%80%9Crule-of-law%E2%80%9D-factor-weigh-more-than-we-think/> ^ Peter Barenboim, Defining the rules, The European Lawyer, Issue 90, October 2009 ^ Peter Barenboim, Natalya Merkulova. "The 25th Anniversary of Constitutional Economics: The Russian Model and Legal Reform in Russia, in The World Rule of Law Movement and Russian Legal Reform", edited by Francis Neate and Holly Nielsen, Justitsinform, Moscow (2007). ^ The Sudbury Valley School (1970). Law and Order: Foundations of Discipline, The Crisis in American Education An Analysis and a Proposal. (p. 49-55). Accessed, August 18, 2010.

^ Greenberg, D. (1987). One Person One Vote, Free at Last, The Sudbury Valley School. Accessed, August 18, 2010. ^ Greenberg, D. (1987). Back to Basics, The Sudbury Valley School Experience. Accessed, August 18, 2010. ^ Heidi M. Hurd (Aug., 1992). "Justifiably Punishing the Justified". Michigan Law Review (The Michigan Law Review Association) 90 (8): 22032324. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1289573. External links Articles Tagged "Rule of Law" in The Global Herald "Economics and the Rule of Law" The Economist (2008-03-13). Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, includes academic articles, practitioner reports, commentary, and book reviews. International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, United States Institute of Peace. Dicey, Albert. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Eighth Edition, Macmillan, 1915). Rule of Law Resource Center, LexisNexis Bingham, Thomas. "The Rule of Law", Centre for Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge (2006-11-16). "The Rule of Law Inventory Report", Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL), Hague Academic Coalition (2007-04-20). "UN Rule of Law, Security Officials Outline Key Priorities for 2008", UN News Centre, United Nations (2008-01-21). Yu, Helen et al. "What is the Rule of Law?", Center for International Finance and Development, University of Iowa (2007-08-29) The World Justice Project A multinational, multidisciplinary initiative to strengthen the rule of law worldwide. World Justice Map Map-based information exchange platform facilitating networking among Rule of Law promoters globally. "The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project", World Bank Movement for Rule of Law, Related to Lawyers Movement Pakistan. "Understandings of the Rule of Law in various Legal Orders of the World", Wiki-Project of Freie Universitaet Berlin. Eau Claire County Bar Association rule of law talk Frithjof Ehm "The Rule of Law: Concept, Guiding Principle and Framework" Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_law" Categories: Law | Theories of law | Philosophy of law | Political philosophy | Philosophical terminology

Hidden categories: All articles with unsourced statements | Articles with unsourced statements from April 2011

Legal Certainty

Legal certainty is provided by the legal system to those subject to the law. As such the legal system needs to permit those subject to the law to regulate their conduct with certainty and as such protecting those subject to the law from arbitrary use of state power. As such legal certainty entails a requirement for decisions to be made according to legal rules, ie be lawful. The concept of legal certainty may be strongly linked to that of individual autonomy in national jurisprudence. The degree to which the concept of legal certainty is incorporated into law varies depending on national jurisprudence. Though legal certainty frequently serves as the central principle for the development of legal methods by which law is made, interpreted and applied.[1] Legal certainty is an established legal concept both in the civil law legal systems and common law legal systems. In the civil law tradition, legal certainty is defined in terms of maximum predictability of officials' behaviour. In the common law tradition legal certainty is often explained in terms of citizens' ability to organise their affairs in such a way that does not break the law. In both legal traditions is regarded as grounding value for the legality of legislative and administrative measures taken by public authorities.[2] Rule of law The legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch regarded legal certainty, justice and policy as the three fundamental pillars of law.[1] Today legal certainty is internationally recognised as central requirement for the rule of law.[1] According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development[ (OECD) the concept of the rule of law "first and foremost seeks to emphasize the necessity of establishing a rule-based society in the interest of legal certainty and predictability." At the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Potsdam in 2007 the G8 committed to the rule of law as a core principle and that adherence to the principle of legal certainty.[1] Europe European nations regard legal certainty as fundamental quality of the legal system and guiding requirement for the rule of law. The concept can be traced through English common law[1] and is recognised in all European legal systems.[3] The concept is recognised in Germany as Rechtssicherheit, in France as securite juridique, in Spain as seguridad juridica, in Italy as certezza del diritto, in the Benelux countries as rechtszekerheid, in Sweden asrattssakerhet, in Poland as do obowia

CATCHALL
Cyberspace Accountable Transparency Central Humanic Archives Last Laugh
A random example from the world

PSI TOO REAL

Purpose Spirit Intent Transfer Of Onus Rule Elusively Articulate Law

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factortame#Sovereignty_and_the_EU

1970
The EU's Common Fisheries Policy, which began in 1970, aimed at creating a common market for fisheries products by providing for free access to the waters of all Member States and introducing structural funds to ensure modernisation of the sector.[1] In 1976 it

was agreed that, as from 1 January the following year, Member States would extend the limit of their fishing zones to a distance 200 nautical miles (370 km) from their coastlines. In 1980 the EU concluded a fisheries agreement with Spain which gave the latter (which had the largest fishing fleet in the EU) limited rights to fish in the waters of the Member States. In 1983 concerns over the effect that equality

of access might have on fishing stocks led to the introduction of certain controls,

notably the concept of "total allowable catches" which set maximum quotas of fish which could be caught by each Member State. The intent is consistent with the PSI GREDSCROL ergo Valid having precedence not subject to obstruction factors such as incompetence, omissions, loopholes, Privacy Act, Copyright, diversionary tactics ... whatever as the Onus is on the administers and enforcers of the law and every individual HE in particular that would attempt to compromise the SOS - Sanctity of Spirit compromising the rights of the HE to benefit, not be deprived

HE - Humanic Equality Public Interest as a whole

Purpose of inherently bias humanic law to harness the Satanic greedy seedy weedy BBBB - Bully Brat Bias Beast that exists within all nipping in bud before surfacing that opportunity need not knock once as they will create their own to the detriment of fellow humans and the compromise of the SOS - Sanctity of Spirit
To be Humanic is to know a fellow Humanic All the same necessities and vulnerabilities know what is and what is not receptive

1 Planet 1 People 1 Spirit 1 Force 1 Law 1 Sense All in One or None

S ESS Epitome Simplicity Sanity BCS CCC Benchmark Common Sense Catalyst Consistency Continuity

TCUP True Constant Unalterable Perpetuity aka Tranquility Correlative Universal Prerogative FIXED Not Debatable PIP Precedence in Perpetuity The S an invisible invincible entity untouchable by body or mind 3D Defy Deny Defile All expenses incurred and deprivations resulting from such arrogant blatant in your face S offences ultimately are incurred by they who chose to 3D Often is the case the punishment is less than the loss to the people clear violation of the PSE - Purpose Spirit Intent

Confucius 551 BC 479 BC Do not impose on others what you would not wish for yourself Recompense injury with Justice and recompense kindness with kindness Do unto others as you would have them do unto you Jesus

Taking advantage of government incompetence deliberate or otherwise that runs rampant in Satanic governments being what they do for the benefit of the SEE - Satanic Elite Entrepreneur leaving the Humanic unprotected for the simplification of ransacking, providing innumerable Satanic jobs on both slices of the SSS Satanic Sucker Sandwich that ultimately the humanic have picked up all tabs at humongous expense of quality of life with backroom deals made as to the divvy up of the loot

Absolutely everything they do is for ulterior purpose leaving an indellible trail as their laws inconsistent with the S are not laws, but PFEE Prima Facia Evidence Exposed The S with PIP - Precedence in Perpetuity The evidence clearly shows Factortame Limited intentions to 3D the S of GREDSCROL adverse to the EU fishing agreement being a recognition of certain factors compromising the SOS - Sanctity of Spirit in which HE - Human Equality rights are dependent not subject to any obstructions and the matter to be attended to is how much did the Factortame Fleet fleece the British HE from the date of the EU agreement until ceased

contravening the agreement.

Not debatable
When administered and enforced consistence with the S to the certainty of the SOS in continuity as mandated and prerequisite SEE do not weigh the odds of being caught and if so the profits are greater than the penalty The penalty begins retroactively for all who were deprived, all that was gained illegally is of course stolen property Above making everything right nobody deprived must be a penalty reflecting the seriousness of the crime. All personnel involved in the administering and enforcing of the S in matters of the EU fisheries agreement are responsible and accountable for all losses incurred by they protected by the S, that includes 10 years of EL - Elusive Lucidity the trek laden accumulating the Mother Lode while the HE taken down the yellow brick road thereby demonstrating due diligence to exemplary attentiveness to deterrence. ************************************************

EESE SEE
Efficient Effective Sanity Eradicating Satanic Elite Entrepreneurs ************************************************* Taking advantage of government epitome incompetence like taking candy from a baby with every individual an inherent responsibility to self to ensure the Constitution Establishment personnel are adept to the certainty of the SOS Sanctity of Spirit

In GREDSCROL you do not advantage of the HE - Human Equal. We do not believe we are protected until we know certain we are in perpetuity with all who would deceive, they who administer and enforce with EL- Elusive Lucidity leaving an indelible trail to be picked up when conditions of happenstance are appropriate Meanwhile, from 1980 Spanish fishermen began to infiltrate the UK fishing market by

taking advantage of lax fishing vessel registration

requirements contained in the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 which, although prohibiting ownership of vessels by non-UK nationals, allowed UK registered companies to be registered as the owners. Amongst the early beneficiaries of the 1894 Act was Factortame Limited, a company whose directors were Joseph J L Couceiro, John A Couceiro and Ken L Couceiro, all Spanish nationals resident and domiciled in Spain. The company, together with others whose directors and shareholders were mostly Spanish nationals,

re-registered 53 vessels which had formerly flown the Spanish flag as British fishing vessels under the 1894 Act.

They also acquired 42 existing British vessels with a view to using them in the fishing zone.

Most of these vessels landed their catches in Spain,

but as the fish were caught in UK waters, they counted against the UK fishing quota a practice known as "quota hopping". It would appear the Spanish Fatortame company has exploited the British HE since at least 1894, with the possibility of kickbacks to Satanic British hierarchy for they do absolutely nothing devoid of Satanic nuances All accountable retoactively in perpetuity without PRICK to stand on or motor mouth elusive lucidity holding Dick for defense.

The British government sought to put an end to this practice and enacted a series of measures which proved largely ineffective. In 1988 the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 and the Merchant Shipping (Registration of Fishing Vessels) Regulations were introduced, replacing the system of registration contained in the 1894 Act with a new system under which a vessel could only be registered if it had "a genuine and substantial connection" with the UK. For this to be the case, three conditions had to be fulfilled: (i) the vessel must be British-owned; (ii) the vessel had to be managed and its operations had to be directed and controlled from the UK; and (iii) any charterer, manager or operator had to be a qualified person or company. A "qualified person or company" was a person who was a British citizen resident and domiciled in the UK or a company which was incorporated in the UK and had its principal place of business there having at least 75% of its shares owned by, and at 75% of its directors being, "qualified persons".

As from 31 March 1989, fishing vessel registrations under the 1894 Act would lapse and the owners would be required to re-register under the 1988 Act. None of Factortame's vessels could satisfy the new requirements and an action for judicial review was brought in the Divisional Court in December 1988.

[edit] Factortame I: interim measures

[edit] Arguments of the parties

Factortame sought, first, a preliminary injunction declaring that the offending part of the 1988 Act could not be applied to them on the grounds that such application would be contrary to directly effective rights under EU law, specifically the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of nationality (article 7 of the Treaty of Rome), the right of individuals and companies to establish themselves in business anywhere in the EU (articles 4348), and the right to participate in the capital of companies situated in another Member State (article 294). The claimants also demanded an order of prohibition preventing the Secretary of State from treating its registrations under the 1894 Act as having ceased.

The UK government argued that the registration requirements were intended to ensure that fishing vessels flying the British flag had a genuine link with the UK. It maintained that international law entitled each State to determine the conditions under which a ship might fly its flag and that Community law had not removed that right. It was also contended that the 1988 Act was consistent with the Community policy on fisheries.

[edit] High Court

On 10 March 1989 the Divisional Court (Neill LJ and Hodgson J) unhesitatingly referred the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 of the Treaty of Rome. It asked whether requirements as to nationality, domicile and control imposed by a Member State as conditions for the registration of fishing vessels were compatible with Community law. At the same time, the Court granted an injunction against the application of the 1988 Act pending a ruling by the ECJ. Giving his judgment, Lord Justice Neill stated that although Community law is part of English law and prevails in the event of a conflict, it was open to argument whether a conflict existed in this case; a national court would have to take a decision which preserves the status quo ante. The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal.

[edit] Court of Appeal

The Court of Appeal (Lord Donaldson MR, Bingham LJ and Mann LJ) reversed the Divisional Court's decision on 22 March 1989 on the basis that although a national court was obliged to give effect to Community law, it was not obliged "to override national law in favour of what is no more than an alleged or putative Community right". Furthermore, it did not believe that the Divisional Court had "acknowledged the constitutional

enormity, as the law stands, of requiring a Secretary of State to act contrary to the clearly expressed will of Parliament when the unlawfulness of that expression has yet to be established."

The Divisional Court would not, according to the court, have jurisdiction to grant an injunction

until the claimants had succeeded before the ECJ.

[edit] House of Lords

The case was brought before the House of Lords (Lord Bridge, Lord Brandon, Lord Oliver, Lord Goff and Lord Jauncey) on 18 May 1989 which upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal on the grounds that English law did not contain any rule allowing a preliminary injunction against the application of an Act of Parliament. According to Lord Bridge, two obstacles stood in the way of the granting of the injunction. Firstly, the relief sought required the court to order positive action in the shape of the disapplication of the 1988 Act and the application of the 1894 Act; were Factortame not to succeed before the ECJ, the House of Lords would have "conferred upon them rights directly contrary toParliament's sovereign will". Secondly, the court had no jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction against the Crown.

Nevertheless, Lord Bridge did accept that each of these obstacles was subject to any contrary Community law requirement. This required the House of Lords to determine whether, regardless of the position in national law, there existed an overriding principle of Community law imposing an obligation on a national court, faced with a seriously arguable claim to rights having direct effect under Community law, to grant interim relief. Lord Bridge concluded that as there was no clear authority on this question, a decision from the ECJ was necessary to enable the House of Lords to give judgment. The House was, in any event, obliged to request a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC which obliges courts "against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law" to make a reference. This request for a preliminary ruling was in addition to that already made by the Divisional Court on the compatibility of the 1988 Act with Community law.

[edit] European Court of Justice

The action was lodged at the ECJ on 10 July 1989 with the request that it deal with the matter quickly which it indeed did, giving the case priority over others. The whole matter had up until then proceeded with great speed, taking only 6 months from its commencement before the Divisional Court to the House of Lords' judgment. The questions posed essentially asked whether, in the circumstances of the case, Community law overrode English law and either empowered or obliged UK courts to grant the injunction claimed by Factortame.

Advocate-General Tesauro delivered his opinion on 17 May 1990. He first noted that the injunction sought by Factortame would in fact be available in all Member States except the UK and Denmark. He then proceeded to conclude that a national court must have the power to provisionally set aside a national law which conflicts with Community law, founding his argument on three bases. He recalled that it had been established in Simmenthal II (case 106/77) that directly effective Community law provisions create legal rights which are enforceable by individuals from the date of their entry into force, regardless of any contrary national law. It also followed from the ECJ's case law that it was for the legal system of each Member State to designate the procedures intended to protect Community law rights, and that these procedures must not "be adapted so as it make it impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the national courts are bound to protect" (case 61/79, Denkavit). National courts must, in that respect, apply EC law through available national procedures or, failing that, of their own motion. Focusing on the House of Lords' argument that it could not temporarily suspend the application of a national law, the Advocate-General emphasised the importance of interim relief in every legal system, remarking that its purpose was to ensure that the time needed to establish a right would not deprive that right of any substance. Furthermore, he did not believe that national courts were entitled to give priority to national legislation merely because it had not yet been shown to be incompatible with Community law; if that were the case, rights conferred by national law would have greater protection than that offered to Community law rights.

On 19 June 1990 the ECJ gave its ruling, rephrasing the question posed as "whether a national court which, in a case before it concerning Community law, considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it from granting interim relief is a rule of national law, must disapply that rule". Following the Advocate-General's opinion, the ECJ held that a national court, in fact, has a duty to grant interim relief to safeguard alleged Community rights of individuals until the decision of the ECJ on the interpretation of Community law is available, and where a rule of national law would deny such relief, to set aside that rule. The basis of such a duty lies in the nature and object of directly effective Community law rights which are intended to be fully effective throughout the EU, and where, in order to safeguard such a right, it is necessary to grant interim measures, a

national court must do so. This is especially true where a national court is awaiting a clarification or interpretation of the right claimed by the ECJ.

[edit] House of Lords second decision

On 11 October 1990 the House of Lords gave its judgment in the light of the ECJ's ruling and granted an injunction in favour of Factortame. Three principal issues emerged from their judgment, namely the availability of interim relief against the Crown, the basis on which such relief can be granted, and the impact of the ruling on Parliamentary sovereignty.

[edit] Injunction against the Crown

Lord Goff acknowledged that, as a matter of Community law, interim relief had to be available in principle against the Crown, and the basis for granting it lay in section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

[edit] Criteria for an injunction

In deciding to grant relief to Factortame, two factors influenced the House of Lords. Firstly, the likelihood that Factortame would suffer hardship and loss, were relief not to be allowed. Secondly, the prospects of Factortame succeeding in a full trial of the case once the ECJ had given its ruling on the compatibility of the 1988 Act; in this regard, the House of Lords took into account indications from the ECJ's first ruling that Factortame's arguments had 'considerable force'. Lord Goff did, however, emphasise that the courts would not, in other cases, readily or easily grant an injunction against the Crown which effectively prevents the Crown from applying national law.

[edit] Sovereignty and the EU

Addressing the public criticism expressed following the ECJ's decision and the alleged erosion of Parliamentary sovereignty, Lord Bridge remarked that such comments were "based on a misconception", and that under the European Communities Act 1972, the law regulating the UK's membership of the EU, it had "always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law." In the same way that Parliament had introduced legislation to remedy areas of UK law which did not meet the standards set by EU directives, the House of Lords was now accomplishing the same task in giving judgment for Factortame. There was nothing new, in this respect, in recognising the supremacy of EU law in the areas in which it applies.

These comments[2] were perceived by Sir William Wade as 'revolutionary',[3] in that Lord Bridge suggests that Parliament has, in passing the European Communities Act 1972, managed to bind its successors from repealing the Act impliedly. It had previously been thought that no Parliament could ever bind its successors in such a way. In a case where two statutes conflicted, the traditional approach would have been to apply the later statute on the basis that the inconsistent parts of the earlier statute had been repealed. Such an interpretation of the case is supported by statements in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council and Hunt v Hackney Borough Council to the effect that there now exist two forms of Acts of Parliament: ordinary acts which can be repealed impliedly, and 'statutory' or 'constitutional' acts which can only be repealed expressly. (See in particular the judgment of Laws LJ in Thoburn). Nevertheless, there is no restriction on the ability of Parliament to expressly repeal the European Communities Act 1972. Furthermore, the case does not, on a strict reading, constitute a breach of Parliamentary sovereignty. The Merchant Shipping Act 1988 was not a purposeful and direct conflict with EC law, but was instead an attempt to give effect to the fishing quotas required under EC law. Therefore, the courts were not striking down a domestic Act of Parliament, but were instead attempting to interpret legislation in a manner compatible with the Treaty obligations that arise under the European Communities Act 1972 (as proposed by Lord Diplock in the case of Garland v British Rail Engineering). It remains to be seen how the courts would respond to an Act of Parliament intentionally contradicting EC law. However, in the case of Macarthys v Smith, Lord Denning suggested that, should such an event occur, the courts would be obliged to obey the domestic law over the European.

[edit] Factortame II: compatibility of the 1988 Act

On 25 July 1991 the ECJ gave its ruling on the question referred by the Divisional Court, namely whether the conditions for registration of fishing vessels under the 1988 Act were compatible with Community law. Agreeing with Advocate-General Mischo's opinion, the court held that "it is for the Member States to determine [...] the conditions which must be fulfilled in order for a vessel to be registered in their registers and granted the right to fly their flag, but, in exercising that power, the Member States must comply with the rules of Community law." In particular, the conditions for registration should not constitute obstacles for nationals of one Member State to establish themselves in business in the territory of another Member State (the freedom of establishment), nor should they discriminate on the basis of nationality. In the event, the ECJ found the nationality requirements in the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 discriminatory and contrary to Article 43 EC as a restriction on the freedom of establishment. It also violated articles 12 and 221 EC. The residence and domicile conditions also breached Article 43. In effect, by introducing a requirement based on an individual's residence and domicile, the Act operated an unfair distinction between UK nationals and those from other Member States as "the great majority of nationals of the [UK] are resident and domiciled in that State and therefore meet that requirement

automatically, whereas nationals of other Member States would, in most cases, have to move their residence and domicile to [the UK] in order to comply with the requirements of [the 1988 Act]." In respect of the condition that the vessel should be managed and its operations directed from the UK, the ECJ found, however, that this requirement was compatible with Community law. The UK government had argued that the conditions imposed by the 1988 Act were justified on the basis that the Common Fisheries Policy allowed for a system of national quotas and the 1988 Act ensured the effectiveness of that system. This was rejected by the ECJ which stated that fishing vessel registration criteria were permitted, but not where they violated Community law. It was, in that respect, open to the UK government to introduce conditions ensuring that a 'real economic link' existed between the ship and the State of registration, but such a link had to "concern only the relations between the vessel's operations and the population dependent on fisheries and related industries". In other words, it would have been possible for the UK government to prescribe conditions which protected UK fishing communities from the effects of the opening up of national fishing waters to other Member States, but it could not do that through the imposition of explicit nationality and residence conditions.

[edit] Factortame III: state liability

Following the ECJ's second ruling, the case returned once more to the Divisional Court which, on 18 November 1992, requested a third ruling from ECJ concerning the conditions under which a Member State may incur liability for damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law attributable to that State. At around the same time the German Federal Court had asked for a ruling on a similar question in the case of Brasserie du Pcheur v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland and so the two cases were joined.

At this time the ECJ had just delivered judgment in Francovich which established the principle that "a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law". The Factortame case provided the court for an opportunity to elaborate on the principles underlying the liability of Member States. It was a case in which almost all Member States intervened to deny, whether wholly substantially, the right to claim damages; the UK accepted that there was, in principle, such a right. The EC Treaty does not deal expressly with the consequences of a breach of Community law by a Member State, and so it was for the court to rule on the question having regard to "the fundamental principles of the Community legal system and, where necessary, general principles common to the legal systems of the Member States."

In its judgment delivered on 5 March 1996 the ECJ reaffirmed the right of reparation, and stated that it existed irrespective of whether the provision of Community law in question has direct effect. Furthermore, the principle applies to any case where a Member State

breaches Community law, irrespective of which organ of the State was responsible for the breach. The ECJ rejected the contentions that the right to reparation required the introduction of legislation by the EU, and that the availability of damages should be decided, in each case, on the basis of the national law of the State in question. The court proceeded to outline the conditions on which liability would be established. It underlined that such conditions could not, in the absence of a particular justification, differ from the conditions applicable to the liability of the Community in similar circumstances. Further, the right to reparation would depend on the nature of the breach of Community law in question and the extent of the discretion available to the State in question. The conditions are: 1. the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; 2. the breach must be sufficiently serious; 3. there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation and the damage sustained by the injured party. In the case where a State had exercised broad discretion in passing legislation which breached Community law (as was the case in Factortame), for the breach to be "sufficiently serious" it must be "manifest" and "grave". National courts have jurisdiction to decide how to characterise the breach in question, taking into account the clarity and precision of the Community rule infringed, whether the damage was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable, and whether a Community institution contributed towards the adoption or maintenance of contrary national measures or practices. These same conditions apply to state liability for damage caused by the decision of a judicial body adjudicating at last instance.

[edit] Factortame IV: right to damages

The matter came back to the Divisional Court (Hobhouse LJ, Collins J and Moses LJ) which ruled on 31 July 1997 that the UK had committed a sufficiently serious breach of Community law in passing the offending provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, and that that breach gave rise to damage for which Factortame should be compensated. The court rejected a claim by Factortame for exemplary damages. The decision was appealed by the UK government to the Court of Appeal (Lord Woolf MR, Schiemann LJ and Walker LJ) which rejected the appeal on 8 April 1998. The government appealed again to the House of Lords (Lord Slynn, Lord Nicholls, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Clyde and Lord Hope). The House of Lords unanimously ruled in favour of Factortame on 28 October 1999. It rejected the argument that the government's reliance on legal advice at the time of passing the 1988 Act did not deprive the breach of its grave and manifest character. The court did accept, however, that the government had acted in good faith in passing the Act. Nevertheless, the government had been aware of the risk it was running with such legislation and it had done everything possible to ensure that fishermen could not obtain

interim relief against the Act's application. The case would now go back to the Divisional Court for the amount of damages to be determined. In March 2000, Factortame and the other claimants (approximately 90 Anglo-Spanish fishing companies) accepted an offer of settlement from the Secretary of State. Under the terms of the settlement the claimants, who had originally claimed 285 million, received 55 million including interest of some 26 million.[4]

[edit] Factortame V: limitation issues

On 27 November 2000 Judge Toulmin in the Technology and Construction Court held, under the Limitation Act 1955, Factortame's claims against the UK government were 'actions founded on tort', and that consequently a six-year limitation period applied. This meant that other claims against the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 would only be admissible if they had been lodged by 10 July 1996 (i.e. six years from the House of Lords' decision of 9 July 1990 granting Factortame interim relief), if not such claims were statute-barred. The Judge therefore rejected claims by Factortame in respect of other fishing vessels which had been refused registration under the 1988 Act, but which had not formed part of the original claim lodged in 1988, nor had been claimed before July 1996. The Judge also rejected an attempt by Factortame to obtain damages for injury to feelings and aggravated damages caused by the government's breach of Community law. Factortame had argued that claims for discrimination under European law were broadly comparable to claims for discrimination to individuals under the Race Relations Act 1976. This was not accepted by Judge Toulmin who emphasised that such damages were only awarded in cases where the breach in question had caused harm to the claimant's self-esteem.

[edit] Academic debate

This section requires expansion. The Factortame case has produced large amounts of academic debate as to whether it can be reconciled with the idea of legislative supremacy as stated by Dicey. Sir William Wade argues that the Factortame judgment alters the Rule of Recognition.[5]

[edit] Sovereignty from the United Kingdom perspective

The issue of whether the UK Parliament or the European Court of Justice has ultimate sovereignty over European Community laws which apply to the UK is still an area of intense legal debate and conflicting views. In current practice, the UK recognises the primacy of the European Court of Justice for those areas of law in which the EU has competency. However, in Macarthys Ltd v Smith, Lord Denning said, "If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating

the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then . . . it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament."[6][7] This view of the UK's ultimate sovereignty was supported by Lord Justice Laws in the Thoburn v Sunderland City Council case, when he said, "...there is nothing in the European Communities Act which allows the European Court, or any other institution of the EU, to touch or qualify the conditions of Parliament's legislative supremacy in the United Kingdom...That being so, the legislative and judicial institutions of the EU cannot intrude upon those conditions." That European law has primacy over UK law has been stated many times. In ECJ Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964), the ECJ stated, "...the Members States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields." In Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) their ruling states, "...the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights." The question of who has the ultimate 'Kompetenz-Kompetenz' (i.e. the right to decide the limits the European Court of Justice's jurisdiction) has not been settled. The Factortame case is important for two reasons. Firstly, the European Court of Justice re-asserts the primacy of European Community law, and its ability to overrule conflicting domestic legislation. It also changes the balance of power in the constitution. For the first time since 1688 (prior to the Bill of Rights), the judiciary is able to set aside the will of the legislature, even though it has knowledge of its express wish. The Factortame case is often cited as evidence for the erosion of UK sovereignty and independence by the Eurosceptic movement in the UK. The central question is therefore whether Parliament is truly sovereign.

[edit] See also

European Union law Constitution of the United Kingdom History of the British constitution

[edit] References
1. ^ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do? language=en&id=74&ftuId=FTU_4.4.1.html

^ Lord Bridge [1991] 1 AC 603, 658; quoted in Craig, Paul; Grinne de Brca (2007). EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials (4th ed. ed.). Oxford, New York:

Oxford University Press. p. 367f. ISBN 978-0-19-927389-8. "Some public comments on the decision of the Court of Justice, affirming the jurisdiction of the courts of member states to override national legislation if necessary to enable interim relief to be granted in protection of rights under Community law, have suggested that this was a novel and dangerous invasion by a Community institution of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. But such comments are based on a misconception. If the supremacy within the European Community of Community law over the national law of member states was not always inherent in the EEC Treaty it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary. Under the terms of the 1972 Act it has always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law. [...] Thus there is nothing in any way novel in according supremacy to rules of Community law in those areas to which they apply [...]" ^ Wade, Sir William; Forsyth, Christopher (2000). Administrative Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 28. ISBN 978-0-19-876525-7. 2. ^ "House of Lords, Hansard Debates, 8 February 2001". http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200001/ldhansrd/vo010208/text/1020 8w02.htm. Retrieved 2008-01-19. 3. 4. ^ Wade, Sir William (1996). "Sovereignty - Evolution or Revolution?". Law Quarterly Review 112: 574. 5. 6. ^ Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd v Smith [1979] ICR 785 at p. 789, quoted in Steiner, Josephine; Lorna Woods; Christian Twigg-Flesner (2006). "Section 4.4.2: Effect of the European Communities Act 1972, s.2(1) and (4)". EU Law (9th ed. ed.). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 79. ISBN 9780-19-927959-3. "If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then . . . it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament." 7. ^ Jack Straw MP (2005-02-08). "Select Committee on European Scrutiny Minutes of Evidence: Examination of Witnesses (Questions 229-239): Rt hon Jack Straw MP and Mr David Frost". House of Commons Publications.http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmeul eg/38-xiv/5020802.htm. Retrieved 2008-01-09. "I think your Committee will be familiar with what Lord Denning, then Master of the Rolls, said in McCarthy v Smith: "If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision of it or with the intention of acting inconsistently with itit says so in express termsI should

have thought it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute in our Parliament." That much is clear. Other consequences would follow in those circumstances, which arise from our signature on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty, Article 27, which says that you have to respect the international obligations into which you have entered."

[edit] External links

Companies House: company registration information for Factortame Limited

[edit] Factortame I
House of Lords judgment, 18 May 1989 ECJ's ruling, 19 June 1990 House of Lords 2nd judgment, 11 October 1990

[edit] Factortame II

ECJ's 2nd ruling, 25 July 1991

[edit] Factortame III

ECJ's 3rd ruling, 5 March 1996

[edit] Factortame IV

Divisional Court, 31 July 1997 Court of Appeal, 8 April 1998 House of Lords, 28 October 1999

[edit] Factortame V

High Court, 27 November 2000

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factortame_litigation" Categories: European Union case law | United Kingdom constitution | English case law | English administrative case law | 1989 in case law | 1990 in case law | 1989 in the United Kingdom | 1990 in the United Kingdom Hidden categories: Articles needing additional references from January 2008 | All articles needing additional references | Articles to be expanded from January 2008 | All articles to be expanded | Use dmy dates from January 2011

This page was last modified on 13 April 2011 at 11:15.

zujacego prawa, and in Finland as oikeusvarmuuden periaate. Legal certainty is now recognised as one of the general principles of European community law and "requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person - if need be, with appropaite advice - to forresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail".[1] The principle of legal certainty, and as such the rule of law, requires that: laws and decisions must be made public laws and decisions must ne definite and clear the decisions of courts must be regarded as binding the retroactivity of laws and decisions must be limited legitimate interests and expectations must be protected.[1]

General principle of European Union law The concept of legal certainty is recognised one of the general principles of European Union law by the European Court of Justice since the 1960s.[4] It is a important general principle of international law and public law, which predates European Union law. As a general principle in European Union law it means that the law must be certain, in that it is clear and precise, and its legal implications foreseeable, specially when applied to financial obligations. The adoption of laws which will have legal effect in the European Union must have a proper legal basis. Legislation in member states which implements European Union law must be worded so that it is clearly understandable by those who are subject to the law.[5] In European Union law the general principle of legal certainty prohibits retroactive laws, ie laws should not take effect before they are published. The general principle also requires that sufficient information must be made public to enable parties to know what the law is and comply with it. For example in Opel Austria v Council [1997] ECR II-39 Case T-115/94 The European Court of Justice held that European Council Regulation did not come into effect until it had been published. Opel had brought the action on the basis that the Regulation in question violated the principle of legal certainty, because it legally came into effect before it had been notified and the regulation published.[6] The doctrine of legitimate expectation, which has its roots in the principles of legal certainty and good faith, is also a central element of the general principle of legal certainty in European Union law.[7] The legitimate expectation doctrine holds that and that "those who act in good faith on the basis of law as it is or seems to be should not be frustrated in their expectations".[8] This means that a European Union institution, once it has induced a party to take a particular course of action, must not renege on its earlier position if doing so would cause the party to suffer loss. The European Court of Justice has considered the legitimate expectation doctrine in cases where violation of the general principle of legal certainty was alleged in numerous cases involving agricultural policy and European Council regulations, with the leading case being Mulder v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij [1988] ECR 2321 Case 120/86.[9] The misuse of powers test is another significant element of the general principle of legal certainty in European Union law. It holds that a lawful power must not be exercised for any other purpose than that for which it was conferred. According to the misuse of power test a decision by a European Union institution is only a misuse of power if "it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been adopted with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving end other than those stated." A rare instance where the European Court of Justice has held that a European Union institution has misused its powers, and therefore violated the general principle of legal uncertainty, is Giuffrida v Commission [1976] ECR 1395 Case 105/75.[10] The general principle of legal certainty is particularly stringently applied when European Union law imposes financial burdens on private parties.[11] European human rights law The concept of legal certainty is recognised by the European Court of Human Rights.[1]

US In US law the principle of legal certainty is phrased as fair warning and the void for vagueness principle.[12]

Natural Law
Natural law or the law of nature (Latin: lex naturalis) has been described as a law whose content is set by nature and is thus universal.[1] As classically used, natural law refers to the use of reason to analyze human nature and deduce binding rules of moral behavior. The phrase natural law is opposed to the positive law (meaning "man-made law", not "good law"; cf. posit) of a given political community, society, or nationstate, and thus can function as a standard by which to criticize that law.[2] In natural law jurisprudence, on the other hand, the content of positive law cannot be known without some reference to the natural law (or something like it). Used in this way, natural law can be invoked to criticize decisions about the statutes, but less so to criticize the law itself. Some use natural law synonymously with natural justice or natural right (Latin ius naturale)[citation needed] Although natural law is often conflated with common law, the two are distinct in that natural law is a view that certain rights or values are inherent in or universally cognizable by virtue of human reason or human nature, while common law is the legal tradition whereby certain rights or values are legally cognizable by virtue of judicial recognition or articulation.[3] Natural law theories have, however, exercised a profound influence on the development of English common law,[4] and have featured greatly in the philosophies of Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Surez, Richard Hooker, Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, Francis Hutcheson, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emmerich de Vattel. Because of the intersection between natural law and natural rights, it has been cited as a component in United States Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. The essence of Declarationism is that the founding of the United States is based on Natural law. Equality before the law Equality before the law or equality under the law or legal egalitarianism is the principle under which each individual is subject to the same laws.[1] Article 7 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law."[1] According to the UN, this principle is particularly important to the minorities and to the poor.[1] Thus, the law and the judges must treat everybody by the same laws regardless of their gender, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic position etc. Equality before the law is one of the basic principles of classical liberalism. [2][3] Golden Rule
[1] ethical code, or morality[2] that essentially The Golden Rule or ethic of reciprocity is a states either of the following:

maxim,

1. One should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself (positive form)[1] 2. One should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be treated (negative/prohibitive
form, also called the Silver Rule)

Not Debatable Perpetuity

The Golden Rule is arguably the most essential basis for the modern concept of human rights, in which each individual has a right to just treatment, and a reciprocal responsibility to ensure justice for others.[3] A key element of the Golden Rule is that a person attempting to live by this rule treats all people with consideration, not just members of his or her in-group. The Golden Rule has its roots in a wide range of world cultures, and is a standard which different cultures use to resolve conflicts.[1][4] The Golden Rule has a long history, and a great number of prominent religious figures and philosophers have restated its reciprocal, bilateral nature in various ways (not limited to the above forms).[1] As a concept, the Golden Rule has a history that long predates the term "Golden Rule" (or "Golden law", as it was called from the 1670s).[1][5] The ethic of reciprocity was present in certain forms in the philosophies of ancient Babylon, Egypt, Persia, India, Greece, Judea, and China.[citation needed]

Legal Maxim
A legal maxim is an established principle or proposition. The Latin term, apparently a variant on maxima, is not to be found in Roman law with any meaning exactly analogous to that of a legal maxim in the Medieval or modern sense of the word, but the treatises of many of the Roman jurists on Regular definitiones, and Sententiae juris are, in some measure, collections of maxims. Most of the Latin maxims developed in the Medieval era in European countries that used Latin as their language for law and courts. The attitude of early English commentators towards the maxims of the law was one of unmingled adulation. In Thomas Hobbes, Doctor and Student (p. 26), they are described as of the same strength and effect in the law as statutes. Not only, observes Francis Bacon in the Preface to his Collection of Maxims, will the use of maxims be in deciding doubt and helping soundness of judgment, but, further, in gracing argument, in correcting unprofitable subtlety, and reducing the same to a more sound and substantial sense of law, in reclaiming vulgar errors, and, generally, in the amendment in some measure of the very nature and complexion of the whole law.[1] A similar note was sounded in Scotland; and it has been well observed that a glance at the pages of Morrisons Dictionary or at other early reports will show how frequently in the older Scots law questions respecting the rights, remedies and liabilities of individuals were determined by an immediate reference to legal maxims. In later times, less value has been attached to the maxims of the law, as the development of civilization and the increasing complexity of business relations have shown the necessity of qualifying the propositions which they enunciate. But both historically and practically, they must always possess interest and value. The principal collections of legal maxims are: English Law, Bacon, Collection of Some Principal Rules and Maxims of the Common Law (1630); Noy, Treatise of the principal Grounds and Maxims of the Law of England (1641, 8th ed., 1824); Wingate, Maxims of Reason (1728); Francis, Grounds and Rudiments of Law and Equity (2nd ed. 1751); Lofft (annexed to his Reports, 1776); Broom, Legal Maxims (yth ed. London, 1900).

Scots Law Lord Trayner, Latin Maxims and Phrases (2nd ed., 1876);

Stair, Institutions of the Law of Scotland, with Index by More (Edinburgh, 1832).

American Treatises A. I. Morgan, English Version of Legal Maxims (Cincinnati, 1878); S. S. Peloubet, Legal Maxims in Law and Equity (New York, 1880). John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary: Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America and of the Several States of the American Union, Revised Sixth Edition, 1856. A long list of maxims is contained in the section for the letter "M". Anonymous, Latin for Lawyers, Chapter II, "A Collection of over one thousand Latin maxims, with English translations, explanatory notes, and cross-references", Sweet and Maxwell, 1915.

[edit] See also

List of legal Latin terms Maxims of equity

[edit] Notes
1. ^ Combined with a tract entitled The Use of the Common Law, for preservation of our Persons,
goods, and good Names, in a book entitled The Elements of the Common Lawes of England, facsimile reprint by Da Capo Press, 1969, may be viewed at Constitution Society This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed (1911). Encyclopdia Britannica (Eleventh ed.). Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_maxim" This page was last modified on 11 February 2011 at 18:56.

Legal Maxins of Equity

The maxims of equity evolved, in Latin and eventually translated into English, as the principles applied by courts of equity in deciding cases before them.[1] Among the traditional maxims are:

[edit] Equity regards done what ought to be done

This maxim means that when individuals are required, by their agreements or by law to have done some act of legal significance, Equity will regard it as having been done as it ought to have, even before it has actually happened. This makes possible the legal phenomenon of equitable conversion. Sometime this is phrased as "equity regards as done what should have been done." The consequences of this maxim, and of equitable conversion, are significant in their bearing on the risk of loss in transactions. When parties enter a contract for a sale of real property, the buyer is deemed to have obtained an equitable right that becomes a legal right only after the deal is completed.

Due to his equitable interest in the outcome of the transaction, the buyer who suffers a breach may then be entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance (although not always, see below). It also is reflected in how his damages are measured if he pursues a legal, substitutionary remedy instead of an equitable remedy. At law, he is entitled to the value at the time of breach, whether it has appreciated, or depreciated. The fact that the buyer may be forced to suffer the depreciation means that he bears the risk of loss if, for example, the improvements on the property he bought burn down while he is still in escrow. Additional Examples: Problems may sometimes arise because, through some lapse or omission, cover is not in force at the time a claim is made. If the policyholder has clearly been at fault in this connection, because, for example, he has not paid premiums when he should have, then it will normally be quite reasonable for an insurer to decline to meet the claim. However, it gets more difficult if the policyholder is no more at fault than the insurer. The fair solution in the circumstances may be arrived at by applying the principle that equity regards that as done that ought to be done [See para 1, above]. In other words, what would the position have been if what should have been done had been done? Thus, in one case, premiums on a life policy were overdue. The insurer' s letter to the policyholder warning him of this fact was never received by the policyholder, who died shortly after the policy consequently lapsed. It was clear that if the notice had been received by the policyholder, he or his wife would have taken steps to ensure the policy continued in force, because the policyholder was terminally ill at the time and the cover provided by the policy was something his wife was plainly going to require in the foreseeable future. Since the policyholder would have been fully entitled to pay the outstanding premium at that stage, regardless of his physical condition, the insurer (with some persuasion from the Bureau) agreed that the matter should be dealt with as if the policyholder had done so. In other words, his widow was entitled to the sum assured less the outstanding premium. In other similar cases, however, it has not been possible to follow the same principle because there has not been sufficiently clear evidence that the policy would have been renewed. Another illustration of the application of this equitable principle was in connection with motor insurance. A policyholder was provided with cover on the basis that she was entitled to a ' no claims' discount from her previous insurer. Confirmation to this effect from the previous insurer was required. When that was not forthcoming, her cover was cancelled by the brokers who had issued the initial cover note. This was done without reference to the insurer concerned, whose normal practice in such circumstances would have been to maintain cover, but to require payment of the full premium until proof of the no claims discount was forthcoming. Such proof was eventually obtained by the policyholder, but only after she had been involved in an accident after the cancellation by the brokers of the policy. Here again, the fair outcome was to look at what would have happened if the insurer's normal practice had been followed. In such circumstances, the policyholder would plainly have still had a policy at the time of the accident. The insurer itself had not acted incorrectly at any stage. However, in the circumstances, it was equitable for it to meet the claim.

[edit] Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy

When seeking an equitable relief, the one that has been wronged has the stronger hand. The stronger hand is the one that has the capacity to ask for a legal remedy (judicial relief). In equity, this form of remedy is usually one of specific performance or an injunction (injunctive relief). These are superior remedies to those administered at common law such as damages. The Latin legal maxim is ubi jus ibi remedium ("where there is a right, there must be a remedy"), sometimes cited as ubi jus ibi remediam.

The maxim is necessarily subordinate to positive principles and cannot be applied either to subvert established rules of law or to give the courts a jurisdiction hitherto unknown, and it is only in a general not in a literal sense that maxim has force. Case law dealing with this maxim is include Ashby v White and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The principle was key in the decision of Marbury v. Madison, wherein it was necessary to establish that Marbury had a right to his commission in the first place in order for Chief Justice Marshall to make his more wide-ranging decision.

[edit] Equity delights in equality

Where two persons have an equal right, the property will be divided equally. Thus Equity will presume joint owners to be tenants in common unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise. Equity also favours partition, if requested, of jointly held property.

[edit] One who seeks equity must do equity

To receive equitable relief, the party must be willing to complete all of their own obligations as well. The applicant to a court of equity is as subject to the power of that court as the defendant. This may also overlap with the clean hands maxim (see below). [edit] Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit. Once the party knows they have been wronged, they must act relatively swiftly to preserve their rights. Otherwise, they are guilty of laches. Laches is a defense to an action in equity. This maxim is often displaced by statutory limitations, but even where a limitation period has not yet run, equity may apply the doctrine of "laches," an equitable term used to describe delay sufficient to defeat an equitable claim. In Chief Young Dede v. African Association Ltd.the equitable rule of laches and acquiescence was introduced. Alternatives: Delay defeats equity Equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights

[edit] Equity imputes an intent to fulfill an obligation

Generally speaking, near performance of a general obligation will be treated as sufficient unless the law requires perfect performance, such as in the exercise of an option. Text writers give an example of a debtor leaving a legacy to his creditor equal or greater to his obligation. Equity regards such a gift as performance of the obligation so the creditor cannot claim both the legacy and payment of the debt.

[edit] Equity acts in personam.

In England, there was a distinction in the type of adjudicatory jurisdiction of the courts and the chancery. Courts of law had jurisdiction over property, and their coercive power arose out of their ability to adjust ownership rights. Courts of equity had power over individuals. Their coercive power was the ability, on authority of the crown, to hold a violator in contempt, and take away his or her freedom (or money) until he obeyed. This distinction helped preserve a separation of powers between the two courts. Nevertheless, courts of equity also developed a doctrine that an applicant must assert a "property interest." This was a limitiation on their own power to issue relief. It does not mean that the courts of equity had taken jurisdiction over property. Rather, it required that the applicant be asserting a right of some significance, as opposed to emotional and dignitary interests.

[edit] Equity abhors a forfeiture

Today, a mortgagor refers to his interest in the property as his "equity." The origin of the concept, however, was actually a mirror-image of the current practice. At common law, a mortgage was a conveyance of the property, with a condition subsequent, that if the grantor paid the secured indebteness to the grantee on or before a date certain (the "law" day) then the conveyance would be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. As was inevitable, debtors would be unable to pay on the law day, and if they tendered the debt after the time had passed, the creditor owed no duty to give the land back. So then the debtor would run to the court of equity, plead that there was an unconscionable forfeiture about to occur, and beg the court to grant an equitable decree requiring the lender to surrender the property upon payment of the secured debt with interest to date. And the equity courts granted these petitions quite regularly and often without regard for the amount of time that had lapsed since the law day had passed. The lender could interpose a defense of laches, saying that so much time had gone by (and so much improvement and betterment had taken place) that it would be inequitable to require undoing the finality of the mortgage conveyance. Other defenses, including equitable estoppel, were used to bar redemption as well. This unsettling system had a negative impact on the willingness of lenders to accept real estate as collateral security for loans. Since a lender could not re-sell the property until it had been in uncontested possession for years, or unless it could show changed circumstances, the value of real estate collateral was significantly impaired. Impaired, that is, until lawyers concocted the bill of foreclosure, whereby a mortgagee could request a decree that unless the mortgagor paid the debt by a date certain (and after the law date set in the mortgage), the mortgagor would thereafter be barred and foreclosed of all right, title and equity of redemption in and to the mortgaged premises. To complete the circle, one needs to understand that when a mortgagor fails to pay an installment when due, and the mortgagee accelerates the mortgage, requiring immediate repayment of the entire mortgage indebtedness, the mortgagor does not have a right to pay the past-due installment(s) and have the mortgage reinstated. In Graf v. Hope Building Corp., 254 NY 1 (1930), the New York Court of Appeals observed that in such a case, there was no forfeiture, only the operation of a clause fair on its face, to which the mortgagor had freely assented. In the latter 20th Century, New York's lower courts eroded the Graf doctrine to such a degree that it appears that it is no longer the law, and that a court of conscience has the power to mandate that a default be excused if it is equitable to do so. Of course, now that the pendulum is swinging in the opposite direction, we can expect courts to explain where the limits on the newly expanded equity of redemption lie...and it is probably not a coincidence that the cases that have eroded Graf v. Hope Building Corp. have been accompanied by the rise of arbitration as a means for enforcing mortgages. See, generally, Osborne, Real Estate Finance Law (West, 1979), Chapter 7.

[edit] Equity does not require an idle gesture

Also: Equity will not compel a court to do a vain and useless thing. It would be an idle gesture for the court to grant reformation of a contract and then to deny to the prevailing party an opportunity to perform it as modified.

[edit] One who comes into equity must come with clean hands
It is often stated that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands (or alternatively, equity will not permit a party to profit by his own wrong). In other words, if you ask for help about the actions of someone else but have acted wrongly, then you do not have clean hands and you may not receive the help you seek. For example, if you desire your tenant to vacate, you must have not violated the tenant's rights. However, the requirement of clean hands does not mean that a "bad person" cannot obtain the aid of equity. "Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 215, 229 (1934) (Brandeis, J.). The defense of unclean hands only applies if there is a nexus between the applicant's wrongful act and the rights he wishes to enforce. For instance, in Riggs v. Palmer (1889) 115 N.Y. 506, a man who had killed his grandfather to receive his inheritance more quickly (and for fear that his grandfather may change his will) lost all right(s) to the inheritance. In D&C Builders v. Rees (1966), a small building firm did some work on the house of a couple named Rees. The bill came to 732, of which the Rees had already paid 250. When the builders asked for the balance of 482, the Rees announced that the work was defective, and they were only prepared to pay 300. As the builders were in serious financial difficulties (as the Rees knew), they reluctantly accepted the 300 'in completion of the account'. The decision to accept the money would not normally be binding in contract law, and afterwards the builders sued the Rees for the outstanding amount. The Rees claimed that the court should apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which can make promises binding when they would normally not be. However, Lord Denning refused to apply the doctrine, on the grounds that the Rees had taken unfair advantage of the builders' financial difficulties, and therefore had not come 'with clean hands'. Further reading: The 'Lectric Law Library's Lexicon On Clean Hands Doctrine

[edit] Equity delights to do justice and not by halves

When a court of equity is presented with a good claim to equitable relief, and it is clear that the plaintiff also sustained monetary damages, the court of equity has jurisdiction to render legal relief, e.g., monetary damages. Hence equity does not stop at granting equitable relief, but goes on to render a full and complete collection of remedies.

[edit] Equity will take jurisdiction to avoid a multiplicity of suits

Thus, "where a court of equity has all the parties before it, it will adjudicate upon all of the rights of the parties connected with the subject matter of the action, so as to avoid a multiplicity of suits." Burnworth v. Hughes, 670 P.2d 917, 922 (Kan. 1983). This is the basis for the procedures of interpleader and the more rarely used Bill of Peace.

[edit] Equity follows the law

Equity will not allow a remedy that is contrary to law. The court of Chancery never claimed to override the courts of common law. In Story on Equity third English edition 1920 page 34,"where a rule, either of the common or the statute law is direct, and governs the case with all its circumstances, or the particular point, a court of equity is a much bound by it as a court of law, and can as little justify a departure from it." it is only when there is some important circumstance disregarded by the common law rules that equity interferes. As per Cardozo in Graf v. Hope Building Corporation, 254 N.Y 1 at 9 (1930), "Equity works as a supplement for law and does not supersede the prevailing law."

[edit] Equity will not aid a volunteer

Equity cannot be used to take back a benefit that was voluntarily but mistakenly conferred without consultation of the receiver. This maxim protects the doctrine of choice. This maxim is very important in restitution. Restitution developed as a series of writs called special assumpsit, which were later additions in the courts of law, and were more flexible tools of recovery, based on Equity. Restitution could provide means of recovery when people bestowed benefits on one another (such as giving money or providing services) according to contracts that would have been legally unenforceable. However, pursuant to the equitable maxim, restitution does not allow a volunteer or "officious intermeddler" to recover. A volunteer is not merely someone who acts selflessly. In the legal (and equitable) context, it refers to someone who provides a benefit regardless of whether the recipient wants it. For example, when someone mistakenly builds an improvement on a home, neither equity nor restitution will allow the improver to recover from the homeowner. The exception is if the doctrine of estoppel applies. Maxim 2 == Equity follows the law Meaning: Latin term Acquits sequitur legem. The equity court observed common law while administering justice according to conscience. Maitland says that, We ought not to think of common law & equity as of two rival systems. Equity has come not to destroy the law but to fulfill it, to supplement it, to explain it. Every jot & every title of law was to be bayed, but when all this had been done yet something might be needed, something that equity would require & that was added by equity. There goal was the same but due to historical reason they chose different path. Equity respected every word of law & every right at law but where the law was defective, in those cases, equity provides equitable right & remedies. According to Snell, If some important point is disregarded by common law court, then equity interferes. Thus, Equity follows the law but not always. Recognition in Bangladesh: Bangladesh has not recognized the distinction between equitable and legal interest. Equity rules therefore in Bangladesh can not override the specific provisions of law. As for example, every suit in Bangladesh has to be brought within the limitation period and no judge can create can exception to this or can prolong the time limit. Similarly no court can confer rights, which can be acquired only by registration of a document, on a party, without getting the document registered

[edit] Where equities are equal, the law will prevail

Equity will provide no specific remedies where the parties are equal, or where neither has been wronged.

The significance of this maxim is that applicants to the chancellors often did so because of the formal pleading of the law courts, and the lack of flexibility they offered to litigants. Law courts and legislature, as lawmakers, through the limits of the substantive law they had created, thus inculcated a certain status quo that affected private conduct, and private ordering of disputes. Equity, in theory, had the power to alter that status quo, ignoring the limits of legal relief, or legal defences. But, they were hesitant to do so. This maxim reflects the hesitancy to upset the legal status quo. If in such a case, the law created no cause of action, equity would provide no relief; if the law did provide relief, then the applicant would be obligated to bring a legal, rather than equitable action. This maxim overlaps with the previously mentioned "equity follows the law."

[edit] Between equal equities the first in order of time shall prevail
This maxim operates where there are two or more competing equitable interests; when two equities are equal the original interest will succeed.

[edit] Equity will not complete an imperfect gift

If a donor has made an imperfect gift, i.e. lacking the formalities required at common law, equity will not assist the intended donee. A subset of equity will not assist a volunteer. Note the exception in Strong v Bird (1874) LR 18 Eq 315. If the donor appoints the intended donee as executor of his/her will, and the donor subsequently dies, equity will perfect the imperfect gift.

[edit] Equity will not allow a statute to be used as a cloak for fraud
Equity prevents a party from relying upon an absence of a statutory formality if to do so would be unconscionable and unfair. This can occur in secret trusts and also constructive trusts and so on.

[edit] Equity will not allow a trust to fail for want of a trustee
If there is no trustee, whoever has title to the trust property will be considered the trustee. Otherwise, a court may appoint a trustee, or in Ireland the trustee may be any administrator of a charity to which the trust is related.

[edit] See also

Brocard (legal term) Legal maxim

[edit] References
1.
^ Richard Edwards, Nigel Stockwell (2005). Trusts and Equity. Pearson Education. pp. 34. ISBN 1405812273. Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxims_of_equity" Categories: Equity | Legal doctrines and principles | Legal history of England This page was last modified on 5 June 2011 at 15:35. Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply. See Terms of Use for details. Wikipedia is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.

Rule According to a higher law

The rule according to a higher law means that no written law may be enforced by the government unless it conforms with certain unwritten, universal principles of fairness, morality, and justice. [1] Thus, the rule according to a higher law may serve as a practical legal criterion to qualify the instances of political or economical decision-making, when a government, even though acting in conformity with clearly defined and properly enacted legal rules, still produces results which many observers find unfair or unjust.[2] "Higher law" can be interpreted in this context as the divine or natural law or basic legal values, established in the international law, the choice depending on the viewpoint. But this is definitely a Law above the law. [3] And it is in this capacity that it possesses the equal legal value for both the common and civil law jurisdictions, as opposed to natural law which is largely associated with common law. [4] "To recognize the necessary connection between the rule of law as an ideal and well-constructed constitutional government does not and should not be taken to imply that all states can or should mantain the same constitutional structures in practice".[5] The rule according to higher law is a practical approach to the implementation of the higher law theory which creates a bridge of mutual understanding (with regard to universal legal values) between the English language doctrine of the rule of law, traditional for the countries of common law, and the originally German doctrine of Rechtsstaat, translated into other languages of continental Europe as Etat de droit (Fr.), Estado de derecho (Sp.), Stato di diritto (It.), and (Ru.).[6] The latter doctrine is the product of continental European legal thought which had adopted it from German legal philosophy. Its name can be translated into English as legal state or "state of law" or "state of rights" or "constitutional state" consistently meaning the state in which the exercise of governmental power is kept in check by the higher law. Amartya Sen mentioned that the legal theorists in ancient India used term of classical Sanscrit "nyaya" in the sense of not just a matter of judging institutions and rules, but of judging the societites themselves. [7]

[edit] Examples
Before the Civil War, African Americans were legally denied equal rights and freedoms pursuant to formally valid codes prescribing the relations between master and slave. Even though these codes were de jure fully suitable for application in legal practice, yet their enforcement by the then U.S. government de facto violated basic human rights of a significant part of the population.

Generally speaking, the occurrence of such "justly enacted unjust laws" fully depends on the stance taken by the country's political leadership towards the rule of law principle. In some countries, the political leaders assert that the rule of law is a totally void concept. Therefore, they argue that any government may strip its subjects of their fundamental freedoms or infringe their vital interests so long as this is done by way of a duly implemented legal mechanism. For example, at the Nuremberg trials, in an attempt to justify their abominable crimes against Jewish and Romany population of Europe during World War II, some of the former leaders of Nazi Germany argued that they had broken none of the laws effective when Hitler had been in power. And it is only by invoking the rule according to a higher law that the Allied prosecutors were able to legitimately overcome such defenses.[8] In other countries, conversely, the political leaders assert that all written laws must be kept in line with the universal principles of morality, fairness, and justice. These leaders argue that, as a necessary corollary to the axiom that "no one is above the law," the rule of law requires the government to treat all persons equally under the law. However, the proclaimed right to equal treatment is susceptible to instantly becoming void each time the government denies a sufficient level of respect, dignity, and autonomy to a certain class of individuals or to human rights in general. ".[9] Therefore, the unwritten and universally selfexplanatory principles of equality, autonomy, dignity, and respect are said to overrule conventional written laws enacted by the government. It is these principles that are often referred to as "natural law." They also constitute the basis of the "higher law theory."

[edit] Constitutional government as enforcement of the higher law

The Rechtsstaat doctrine (Legal state, State of right, Constitutional state, Constitutional government) was first introduced by the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant (17241804) in his latest works completed after the U.S. and French constitutions had been adopted in the late 18th century. Kants approach is based on the supremacy of countrys written constitution created using principles of the Higher Law. This supremacy meant creating guarantees for the implementation of his central idea: a permanently peaceful life as a basic condition for the happiness and prosperity of the citizens. Kant was basing his doctrine exclusively on the idea of constitutionalism and constitutional government. Kant had formulated the main problem of constitutionalism as an instrument for the practical implementation of the Higher Law as follows, The constitution of a state is eventually based on the morals of its citizens, which, in its turn, is based on the goodness of this constitution. This Kants idea has become the foundation for the constitutional theory of the 21st century. The Legal state concept is based on the ideas introduced by Immanuel Kant, for example, in hisGroundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals: The task of establishing a universal and permanent peaceful life is not only a part of theory of law within the framework of pure reason, but per se an absolute and ultimate goal. To achieve this goal, a state must become the community of a large number of people, living provided with legislative guarantees of their property rights secured by a common constitution. The supremacy of this constitution must be derived a priori from the considerations for achievement of the absolute ideal in the most just and fair organization of peoples life under the aegis of public law.[10] The Russian legal system, born in the 19th century as a result of the transformations initiated by the reforms of the Emperor Alexander II, was (and still is) based primarily upon the German legal tradition. It was from the latter that Russia had adopted the doctrine of Rechtsstaat, which literally translates as "Legal State." Its closest English analogue is "the rule of law."[11] The Russian Legal state concept adopts the written constitution as the country's supreme law (the rule of constitution). It is a fundamental but undefined principle that appears in the very first dispositive provision of Russias post-Communist

constitution: The Russian Federation Russia constitutes a democratic federative legal state with a republican form of governance. Similarly, the very first dispositive provision of Ukraines Constitution declares that Ukraine is a sovereign and independent, democratic, social, legal state. Hence, the effort to invest meaning to the Legal State definition is anything but theoretical. President of the Constitutional Court of Russia Valery Zorkin wrote in 2003, Becoming a legal state has long been our ultimate goal, and we have certainly made serious progress in this direction over the past several years. However, no one can say now that we have reached this destination. Such a legal state simply cannot exist without a lawful and just society. Here, as in no other sphere of our life, the state reflects the level of maturity reached by the society."[12] The Russian concept of Legal state has adopted many segments of constitutional economics which serves as a practical implementation of the higher law theory in economics. The 1986 recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and one of the founders of constitutional economics James M. Buchanan argues that, in the framework of constitutional government, any governmental intervention or regulation must be conditioned by the three following assumptions. First, every failure of the market economy to function smoothly and perfectly can be corrected by governmental intervention. Second, those holding political office and manning the bureaucracies are altruistic upholders of the public interest, unconcerned with their own personal economic well-being. And third, changing the government responsibilities towards more intervention and control will not profoundly and perversely affect the social and economic life. Buchanan rejects any organic conception of the state as superior in wisdom, to the individuals who are its members. This philosophical position is, in fact, the very subject matter of constitutional economics. A constitutional economics approach allows for a combined economic and constitutional analysis, helping to avoid a one-dimensional understanding. Buchanan, together with Kant, believes that a constitution in its capacity as the Higher Law, intended for use by at least several generations of citizens, must be able to adjust itself for pragmatic economic decisions and to balance interests of the state and society against those of individuals and their constitutional rights to personal freedom and private happiness. Buchanan also outlines importance of protection of the moral principles underlying constitutional norms. He writes that "the ethics of constitutional citizenship is not directly comparable to ethical behavior in interaction with other persons within the constraints imposed by the rules of an existing regime. An individual may be fully responsible, in the standard ethical sense, and yet fail to meet the ethical requirement of constitutional citizenship."[13]

[edit] See also

[edit] Notes

1.

^ West's Encyclopedia of American Law (in 13 volumes), 2nd Ed., edited by Jeffrey Lehman and Shirelle Phelps. Publisher: Thomson Gale, 2004. ISBN 0787663670. 2. ^ M.N.S. Sellers, Republican Legal Theory: The History, Constitution and Purposes of Law in a Free State, Basingstoke, 2004 3. ^ Edward S. Corwin, The Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law (1955). 4. ^ Leslie F. Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, Journal of Politics 48 (1986): 5171

5.

^ Mortimer Sellers, An Introduction. The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspectives, edited by Mortimer Sellers and Tadeusz Tomaszewski, Springer, Heidelberg - London - New York, 2010, pp. 45.ISBN 978-904813749-7. 6. ^ Peter Barenboim, Naeem Sidiqi, Bruges, the Bridge between Civilizations: The 75 Anniversary of the Roerich Pact, Grid Belgium, 2010. ISBN 978-5-98856-114-9 7. ^ Amartya Sen, Global justice in Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law, edited by James J. Heckman, Robert L. Nelson,and Lee Cabatingan,Routledge, London and New York, 2010, 8. ^ Introductory note by Antonio Cassese for General Assembly resolution 95(I) of 11 December 1946 (Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nrnberg Tribunal) on the website of theUN Audiovisual Library of International Law 9. ^ Augusto Zimmermann, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: The Failure of Constitutionalism in Brazil, The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspectives, edited by Mortimer Sellers and Tadeusz Tomaszewski, Springer, Heidelberg - London - New York, 2010, p.101.ISBN 978-904813749-7. 10. ^ Immanuel Kant, History of Political Philosophy, edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1987. 11. ^ Peter Barenboim, Defining the rules, The European Lawyer, Issue 90, October 2009. 12. ^ The World Rule of Law Movement and Russian Legal Reform, edited by Francis Neate and Holly Nielsen, Justitsinform, Moscow, 2007. 13. ^ Buchanan, J., Logical Formulations of Constitutional Liberty, Vol. 1., Indianapolis, 1999. P. 372.

[edit] References
West's Encyclopedia of American Law (in 13 volumes), 2nd Ed., edited by Jeffrey Lehman and Shirelle Phelps. Publisher: Thomson Gale, 2004. ISBN 0787663670. Kants Principles of Politics, including his essay on Perpetual Peace. A Contribution to Political Science, translation by W. Hastie, Edinburgh: Clark, 1891. In Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch Dicey, Albert. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th Edition, Macmillan, 1915). Bingham, Thomas. "The Rule of Law", Centre for Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge (2006-11-16). Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955) Buchanan, James M., 1986. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," Nobel Prize lecture, reprinted in American Economic Review, 77(3), p p. 243-250. _____, 1990a. "The Domain of Constitutional Economics," Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1), pp. 1-18. Also as at 1990b & [1]. "Economics and the Rule of Law" The Economist (2008-03-13). Philip P. Wiener, ed., "Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas", (David Fellman, "Constitutionalism"), vol 1, p. 485 (1973-74). Herman Belz, "A Living Constitution or Fundamental Law? American Constitutionalism in Historical Perspective" (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1998), ISBN 9780847686438 Louis Michael Seidman, "Critical Constitutionalism Now", 75 Fordham Law Review 575, 586 (Nov. 2006).

[edit] External links

"Democracy Conference". Innertemple.org.uk. http://www.innertemple.org.uk/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=250&Itemid=198. Retrieved 2010-08-22.

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_according_to_higher_law" Categories: Law | Philosophy of law | Theories of law This page was last modified on 19 May 2011 at 18:14.

In India Public Interest Litigation

In Indian law, public interest litigation means litigation for the protection of the public interest. It is litigation introduced in a court of law, not by the aggrieved party but by the court itself or by any other private party. It is not necessary, for the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, that the person who is the victim of the violation of his or her right should personally approach the court. Public interest litigation is the power given to the public by courts through judicial activism. However, the person filing the petition must prove to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is being filed for a public interest and not just as a frivolous litigation by a busy body. Such cases may occur when the victim does not have the necessary resources to commence litigation or his freedom to move court has been suppressed or encroached upon. The court can itself take cognisance of the matter and proceed suo motu or cases can commence on the petition of any publicspirited individual. Sovereign Immunity Sovereign immunity, or crown immunity, is a type of immunity that in common law jurisdictions traces its origins from early English law. Generally speaking it is the doctrine that the sovereign or state cannot commit a legal wrong and is immune from civil suit or criminal prosecution; hence the saying, In many cases, states have waived this immunity to allow for suits; in some cases, an individual may technically appear as defendant on the state's behalf.

[edit] In the Middle Ages

Pope Gelasius I opined on the general principles that underlie sovereign immunity: There are two powers, august Emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled, namely, the sacred authority of the priests and the royal power. Of these that of the priests is the more weighty, since they have to render an account for even the kings of men in the divine judgment. You are also aware, dear son, that while you are permitted honorably to rule over human kind, yet in things divine you bow your head humbly before the leaders of the clergy and await from their hands the means of your salvation. In the reception and proper disposition of the heavenly mysteries you recognize that you should be subordinate rather than superior to the religious order, and that in these matters you depend on their judgment rather than wish to force them to follow your will.[1]

[edit] In constitutional monarchies

In a constitutional monarchy the sovereign is the historical origin of the authority which creates the courts. Thus the courts had no power to compel the sovereign to be bound by the courts, as they were created by the sovereign for the protection of his or her subjects.

[edit] Australia
There is no automatic Crown immunity in Australia, although the Crown may be explicitly or implicitly immune from any particular statute. There is a rebuttable presumption that the Crown is not bound by a statute: Bropho v State of Western Australia. The Crown's immunity may also apply to other parties in certain circumstances: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Baxter Healthcare.

[edit] Belgium
Article 88 of the Constitution of Belgium states: The Kings person is inviolable; his ministers are accountable.[2]

[edit] Denmark
Article 13 of the Constitution of Denmark states: The King shall not be answerable for his actions; his person shall be sacrosanct. The Ministers shall be responsible for the conduct of the government; their responsibility shall be determined by Statute.[3] Accordingly the monarch cannot be sued in his or her personal capacity, but this immunity from lawsuits does not extend to the state as such.

[edit] Holy See

The Holy See, of which the current pope is head (often referred to incorrectly as the Vatican or Vatican City State, a distinct entity) claims sovereign immunity for the pope, supported by many international agreements. See pope#International position.

[edit] Malaysia
In Malaysia, an amendment to the constitution in 1993 made it possible to bring proceedings against the king or any ruler of a component state in the Special Court. Prior to 1993, rulers, in their personal capacity, were immune from any proceedings brought against them.[4]

[edit] Nigeria
Section 308 of the Nigerian constitution of 1999 provides immunity from court proceedings, i.e., proceedings that will compel their attendance in favour of elected executive officers, namely the President and his vice and the Governors of the states and the deputies. This immunity extends to acts done in their official capacities so that they are not responsible for acts done on behalf of the state. However, this immunity does not extend to acts done in abuse of the powers of their office of which they are liable upon the expiration of their tenure. But does the elected executive constitute the sovereign in Nigeria? it seems that the judiciary will be better described as the sovereign in Nigeria if the sovereign is the person who in

the last resort is able to decide his own competence and that of other contender in the event of any conflict of authority. Failing this, the constitution as an expression of the will of Nigerians is the sovereign.It is important to note that the judiciary has absolute immunity for actions decisions taken in their official capacity.

[edit] Norway
Article 5 of the Constitution of Norway states: The King's person is sacred; he cannot be censured or accused. The responsibility rests with his Council.[5] Accordingly the monarch cannot be prosecuted or sued in his or her personal capacity, but this immunity does not extend to the state as such.

[edit] Spain
The Spanish monarch is personally immune from prosecution for acts committed by government ministers in the King's name, according to Title II, Section 56, Subsection 3 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978.[6][7] The Person of the King of Spain is inviolable and shall not be held accountable. His acts shall always be countersigned in the manner established in section 64. Without such countersignature they shall not be valid, except as provided under section 65(2).[6][7] La persona del Rey de Espaa es inviolable y no est sujeta a responsabilidad. Sus actos estarn siempre refrendados en la forma establecida en el artculo 64, careciendo de validez sin dicho refrendo, salvo lo dispuesto en el artculo 65,2.[6][7]

[edit] Sri Lanka

By the Constitution of Sri Lanka, the President of Sri Lanka has sovereign immunity.

[edit] Sweden

Article 7, Chapter 5, of the Swedish Instrument of Government states: "The King may not be prosecuted for his actions. Nor may a Regent be prosecuted for his actions as Head of State." This only concerns the King as a private person, since he does not appoint the government, nor do any public officials act in his name. It does not concern other members of the Royal Family, except in such cases as they are exercising the office of Regent when the King is unable to serve. It is a disputed matter among Swedish constitutional lawyers whether the article also implies that the King is immune against lawsuits in civil cases, which do not involve prosecution.

[edit] Singapore

The President of Singapore does to a certain extent have sovereign immunity subjected to clause 22k(4).[1] (See Part V under government regarding the President of Singapore)

[edit] United Kingdom

The position was drastically altered for the United Kingdom by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 which made the government generally liable, with limited exceptions, in tort and contract. Even before then it was possible to claim against the Crown with the Attorney-General's fiat (i.e., permission) (a petition of right). Alternatively, Crown servants could be sued in place of the Crown, and the Crown as a matter of course paid any sums due. Further, mandamusand prohibition were always available against ministers because they derive from the royal prerogative.

However, as of 2011 lawsuits against the sovereign in his or her personal and private capacity remain inadmissible in British law. The State Immunity Act 1978 regulates the extent to which foreign states are subject to the jurisdiction of British courts.

[edit] In Iceland
According to article 11 of the constitution of Iceland the president is not accountable and cannot be prosecuted without parliament's consent.

[edit] In Italy
According to the Italian Constitution, the President of the Italian Republic is not accountable, and he is not responsible for any act of his office, unless he has committed high treason or attempted to subvert the Constitution. The Italian penal law makes it a criminal offense to give the President responsibility for actions of the Italian Government in public.

The Italian Constitutional Court has declared the partial incompatibility with the Italian Constitution of a law that forced courts to delay all trials against the Italian Prime Minister while he is in office. The revised

version says that the trial hearings have to be scheduled in agreement between the Judge and the Government

[edit] In the United States

Main article: Sovereign immunity in the United States

In the United States, the federal government has sovereign immunity and may not be sued unless it has waived its immunity or consented to suit. The United States has waived sovereign immunity to a limited extent, mainly through theFederal Tort Claims Act, which waives the immunity if a tortious act of a federal employee causes damage, and the Tucker Act, which waives the immunity over claims arising out of contracts to which the federal government is a party.

[edit] State sovereign immunity

In Hans v. Louisiana (1890), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Eleventh Amendment (1795) re-affirms that states possess sovereign immunity and are therefore generally immune from being sued in federal court without their consent. In later cases, the Supreme Court has strengthened state sovereign immunity considerably. In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak (1991), the court explained that

we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty, and that a State will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to suit, either expressly or in the "plan of the convention." [Citations omitted.]

In Alden v. Maine (1999), the Court explained that while it has

sometimes referred to the States immunity from suit as "Eleventh Amendment immunity[,]" [that] phrase is [a] convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, [because] the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution's structure, and its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.

Writing for the court in Alden, Justice Anthony Kennedy argued that in view of this, and given the limited nature of congressional power delegated by the original unamended Constitution, the court could not "conclude that the specific Article I powers delegated to Congress necessarily include, by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause or otherwise, the incidental authority to subject the States to private suits as a means of achieving objectives otherwise within the scope of the enumerated powers."

However, a "consequence of [the] Court's recognition of pre-ratification sovereignty as the source of immunity from suit is that only States and arms of the State possess immunity from suits authorized by federal law." Northern Insurance Company of New York v. Chatham County (2006 emphases added). Thus, cities and municipalities lack sovereign immunity, Jinks v. Richland County (2003), and counties are not generally considered to have sovereign immunity, even when they "exercise a 'slice of state power.'" Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1979).

[edit] International law

Sovereign immunity is available to countries in international court but if they are acting more as a contracting body (example: making agreements in regards to extracting oil and selling it), then sovereign immunity may not be available to them.

Under international law, and subject to some conditions, countries are immune from legal proceedings in another state. This stems from customary international law.[8] The US recognizes this concept under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (1976).

[edit] See also

Command responsibility Impeachment Diplomatic immunity Other forms of immunity Public Duty Doctrine

[edit] References
1.
^ Duo sunt

2.

^ Legal Department of the House of Representatives, with the collaboration of Mr A. MacLean (2009-01). "The Belgian Constitution". http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/publications/constitution/grondwetEN.pdf. retrieved 2009-05-31. 3. ^ Folketinget (2009-08-06). "Unofficial translation of the Constitutional Act of Denmark". http://www.folketinget.dk/pdf/constitution.pdf. 4. ^ Lawyerment - Document Library - Laws of Malaysia - Constitution 5. ^ The Constitution of Norway in English Retrieved 21 November 2006 6. ^ a b c Ttulo II. De la Corona, Wikisource 7. ^ a b c The Royal Household of H.M. The King website 8. ^ Akehurst's modern introduction to international law, by Peter Malanczuk, Michael Barton Akehurst, Routledge 7 ed., 1997, ISBN 041511120X, Page 118 Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_immunity" Categories: Sovereign immunity Hidden categories: Articles to be merged from March 2011 | All articles to be merged | Articles containing potentially dated statements from 2011 | All articles containing potentially dated statements This page was last modified on 12 June 2011 at 08:56. Constitutional economics From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search

Constitutional economics is a research program in economics and constitutionalism that has been described as extending beyond the definition of 'the economic analysis of constitutional law' in explaining the choice "of alternative sets of legal-institutional-constitutional rules that constrain the choices and activities of economic and political agents." This is distinct from explaining the choices of economic and political agents within those rules, a subject of "orthodox" economics.[1] Constitutional economics studies the "compatibility of effective economic decisions with the existing constitutional framework and the limitations or the favorable conditions created by that framework."[2] It has been characterized as a practical approach to apply of the tools of economics to constitutional matters. [3] For example, a major concern of every nation is properly allocated of available national economic and financial resources. The legal solution to this problem falls within the scope of constitutional economics. Constitutional economics takes into account the significant impacts of political economic decisions as opposed to limiting analysis to economic relationships as functions of the dynamics of distribution of marketable goods and services. "The political economist who seeks to offer normative advice, must, of necessity, concentrate on the process or structure within which political decisions are observed to be made. Existing constitutions, or structures or rules, are the subject of critical scrutiny".[4]

[edit] Origins
The term constitutional economics was coined in 1982 by the U.S. economist Richard McKenzie to designate the main topic of discussion at a conference held in Washington, D.C. Mackenzies neologism

was then adopted by another American economist James M. Buchanan as a name for a new academic sub-discipline. It was Buchanans work on this sub-discipline that in 1986 brought him the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his "development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making." Buchanan rejects any organic conception of the state as superior in wisdom, to the individuals who are its members. This philosophical position is, in fact, the very subject matter of constitutional economics. A constitutional economics approach allows for a combined economic and constitutional analysis, helping to avoid a one-dimensional understanding. Buchanan believes that a constitution, intended for use by at least several generations of citizens, must be able to adjust itself for pragmatic economic decisions and to balance interests of the state and society against those of individuals and their constitutional rights to personal freedom and private happiness. Buchanan introduced rich cross-disciplinary concepts of "constitutional citizenship" and "constitutional anarchy". Constitutional anarchy is a modern policy that may be best described as actions undertaken without understanding, or taking into account the rules that define the constitutional order. This policy is justified by references to strategic tasks formulated on the basis of competing interests regardless of their subsequent impact on political structure. At the same time Buchanan introduces the concept of "constitutional citizenship", which he designates as compliance of citizens with their constitutional rights and obligations that should be considered as a constituent part of the constitutional policy. Buchanan also outlines importance of protection of the moral principles underlying constitutional norms. James Buchanan wrote "the ethics of constitutional citizenship is not directly comparable to ethical behavior in interaction with other persons within the constraints imposed by the rules of an existing regime. An individual may be fully responsible, in the standard ethical sense, and yet fail to meet the ethical requirement of constitutional citizenship." [5] Buchanan considered the term "constitutionality" in the broad sense and applied it to families, firms and public institutions, but, first of all, to the state. Buchanans Nobel lecture quoted the work of the late 19th century Swedish economist Knut Wicksell, who greatly influenced Buchanans research: "If utility is zero for each individual member of the community, the total utility for the community cannot be other than zero". In epigraph to the chapter of Nobel lecture entitled "The Constitution of Economic Policy" Wicksell states that "whether the benefits of the proposed activity to the individual citizens would be greater than its cost to them, no one can judge this better than the individuals themselves."[4] There is an important opinion of Ludwig Van den Hauwe that constitutional economics draws substantial inspiration from the reformist attitude which is characteristic of Adam Smiths vision, and that Buchanans concept can be considered the modern-day counterpart to what Smith called the science of legislation[6]. The growing public interest in the theory and practice of constitutional economics has already spawned specialized academic periodicals, such as Constitutional Political Economy[7] (established in 1990).

[edit] Legal approach

Judge Richard Posner emphasized the importance of a constitution for economic development. He examines the interrelationship between a constitution and the economic growth. Posner approaches constitutional analysis mainly from the perspective of judges, who constitute a critical force for interpretation and implementation of a constitution, thus de facto in common law countries creating the body of constitutional law. He emphasizes the importance of constitutional provisions "in setting broader outer bounds to the exercise of judicial discretion". Thus a judge, when trying a case, is guided firstly by the spirit and letter of the constitution. The role of economics in this process is to help "identify

the consequences of alternative interpretations" of the constitution. He further explains that "economics may provide insight into questions that bear on the proper legal interpretation". In the end, as Judge Posner emphasizes, "the limits of an economic approach to deciding constitutional cases [are] set by the Constitution". In addition, he argues that "effective protection of basic economic rights promotes economic growth."[8] Concurrently with the rise of academic research in the field of constitutional economics in the U.S. in the 1980s, the Supreme Court of India for almost a decade had been encouraging public interest litigation on behalf of the poor and oppressed by using a very broad interpretation of several articles of the Indian Constitution. This is a vivid example of a de facto practical application of the methodology of constitutional economics.[9] The President of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Valery Zorkin made a special reference to the educational role of constitutional economics, "In Russia, the addition of such new academic disciplines as constitutional economics to the curricula of university law and economics departments becomes critically important."[10]

[edit] Russian school

The Russian school of constitutional economics was created in the early twenty-first century with the idea that the constitutional economics allows for a combined economic and constitutional analysis in the legislative (especially budgetary) process, thus helping to overcome arbitrariness in the economic and financial decision-making. For instance, when military expenses (and the like) dwarf the budget spending on education and culture. Constitutional economics studies such issues as the proper national wealth distribution. This also includes the government spending on the judiciary, which in many transitional and developing countries is completely controlled by the executive. The latter undermines the principle of checks and balances, instrumental in the separation of powers, as this creates a critical financial dependence of the judiciary. It is important to distinguish between the two methods of corruptionof the judiciary: the state corruption (through budget planning and various privileges being the most dangerous), and the private corruption. The former makes it almost impossible for any business to optimally facilitate the growth and development of national market economy. In the English language, the word constitution possesses a whole number of meanings, encompassing not only national constitutions as such, but also charters of corporations, unwritten rules of various clubs, informal groups, etc. The Russian model of constitutional economics, originally intended for transitional and developing countries, focuses entirely on the concept of constitution of state. This model of the constitutional economics is based on the understanding that it is necessary to narrow the gap between practical enforcement of the economic, social and political rights granted by the constitution and the annual (or mid-term) economic policy, budget legislation and administrative policies conducted by the government. In 2006, the Russian Academy of Sciences has officially recognized constitutional economics as a separate academic sub-discipline.[11] Since many a country with a transitional political and economic system continues treating its constitution as an abstract legal document disengaged from the economic policy of the state, practice of constitutional economics becomes there a decisive prerequisite for democratic development of the state and society.

[edit] See also

Arthashastra Civil society Constitutionalism Constitutional law

Institutional economics Independence of the judiciary James M. Buchanan Justification for the state Law and economics Legal reform Public Interest Litigation New political economy Rule of Law

[edit] Notes
1.
^ Ludwig Van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional Economics II," The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, pp. 223-24. 2. ^ Peter Barenboim, 2001. "Constitutional Economics and the Bank of Russia," Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, 7(1), p. 160. 3. ^ Christian Kirchnez, The Principles of Subsidiary in the Treaty on European Union: A Critique from a Perspective of Constitutional Economics, 6 TUL. J.INTL. & COMP. L. 291, 293 (1998) 4. ^ a b James M. Buchanan, 1986. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," Nobel Prize lecture. 5. ^ Buchanan, J. Logical Formulations of Constitutional Liberty. Vol. 1. Indianapolis, 1999. P. 372. 6. ^ Ludwig Van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional Economics II," The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, pp. 223-24. 7. ^ http://www.springerlink.com/content/102866/?sortorder=asc&p_o=61 8. ^ Posner R., 1987. "The Constitution as an Economic Document," George Washington Law Review, 56(1), pp. 4-38. Reprinted in J. W. Ely, ed., 1997, Main Themes in the Debate over Property Rights, pp. 186-220. 9. ^ Jeremy Cooper, Poverty and Constitutional Justice, in Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings, edited by Larry May and Jeff Brown, Wiley-Blackwell, UK, 2010. 10. ^ Valery Zorkin, Twelve Theses on Legal Reform in Russia in The World Rule of Law Movement and Russian Legal Reform, edited by Francis Neate and Holly Nielsen, Justitsinform, Moscow, 2007] 11. ^ Peter Barenboim, Natalya Merkulova, The 25th Anniversary of Constitutional Economics: The Russian Model and Legal Reform, in The World Rule of Law Movement and Russian Legal Reform, edited by Francis Neate and Holly Nielsen, Justitsinform, Moscow, 2007

[edit] References
McKenzie, Richard, ed., 1984. Constitutional Economics, Lexington, Mass. Backhaus, Jrgen G., ed. The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics: Farina, Francesco, 2005. "Constitutional Economics I," pp. 184-222. Van den Hauwe, Ludwig, 2005. "Constitutional Economics II," pp. 223-38.

James A. Dorn, 2004. "Creating a Constitutional Order of Freedom in Emerging Market Economies," Economic Affairs, 24(3), pp. 5863. Abstract. Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan, 1985. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy , Chicago. In The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 10, chapter links, Library of Economics and Liberty. Buchanan, James M., 1974. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago. In The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 7. Chapter links at left menu, Library of Economics and Liberty. _____, 1986. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," Nobel Prize lecture, reprinted in American Economic Review, 77(3), pp. 243-250. _____, 1987. "constitutional economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, v. 1, pp. 58588. _____, 1990a. "The Domain of Constitutional Economics," Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1), pp. 1-18. Also as at 1990b & [1]. _____, 1990b. The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order, University of Michigan Press. Description & chapter links. _____ and Gordon Tullock, 1962. The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press. Chapter-preview links. Constitutional Political Economy. Description and abstract links. Frey, Bruno S., 1997, "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, 107(443), pp. 1043-1053. Hayek, Friedrich A., 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago. "The Rule of Law," ch. 11. _____. Law, Legislation and Liberty. Chicago. 3 v.: 1973. v. 1. Rules and Order. Scroll down to chapter-preview links. 1976. v. 2. The Mirage of Social Justice. Links. 1979. v. 3. The Political Order of a Free People. Links.

Mueller, Dennis C., 2008. "constitutions, economic approach to,' The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, 2005. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Description and chapter links. Sutter, Daniel, 1995. "Constitutional Politics within the Interest-Group Model," Constitutional Political Economy, 6(2), p p. 127-137. "Economics and the Rule of Law" The Economist (2008-03-13). Voigt, Stefan, 1997. "Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey," Public Choice, 90(1-4), pp. 11-53. Hernando de Soto, "Law connects", International Bar News, December 2008

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_economics" Categories: Constitutional law | Law and economics This page was last modified on 7 May 2011 at 10:51.

State Secret Privilege

Bush 9/11 Cover - up
The state secrets privilege is an evidentiary rule created by United States legal precedent. Application of the privilege results in exclusion of evidence from a legal case based solely on affidavits submitted

by the government stating that court proceedings might disclose sensitive information which might endanger national security.[1][2][3][4][5][6] United States v. Reynolds,[7] which involved military secrets, was the first case that saw formal recognition of the privilege. Following a claim of "state secrets privilege", the court rarely conducts an in camera examination of the evidence to evaluate whether there is sufficient cause to support the use of this doctrine. This results in court rulings in which even the judge has not verified the veracity of the assertion.[1] The privileged material is completely removed from the litigation, and the court must determine how the unavailability of the privileged information affects the case.[3][5]

[edit] Function
The purpose of the state secrets privilege is to prevent courts from revealing state secrets in the course of civil litigation (in criminal cases, the Classified Information Procedures Act serves the same purpose). The government may intervene in any civil suit, including when it is not a party to the litigation, to ask the court to exclude state secrets evidence. While the courts may examine such evidence closely, in practice they generally defer to the Executive Branch. Once the court has agreed that evidence is subject to the state secrets privilege, it is excluded from the litigation. Often, as a practical matter, the plaintiff cannot continue the suit without the privileged information, and drops the case. Recently, courts have been more inclined to dismiss cases outright, if the subject matter of the case is a state secret.

[edit] Distinguished from other legal doctrines

The state secrets privilege is related to, but distinct from, several other legal doctrines: the principle of non-justiciability in certain cases involving state secrets (the so-called "Totten Rule");[8] certain prohibitions on the publication of classified information (as in New York Times Co. v. United States, the Pentagon Papers case); and the use of classified information in criminal cases (governed by the Classified Information Procedures Act).

[edit] History
[edit] Origins
The doctrine was effectively imported from British law which has a similar privilege.[1][2] It is debatable whether the state secrets privilege is based upon the President's powers as commander-inchief and leader of foreign affairs (as suggested in United States v. Nixon) or derived from the idea of separation of powers (as suggested in United States v. Reynolds)[1] It seems that the US privilege "has its initial roots in Aaron Burr's trial for treason." In this case, it was alleged that a letter from General James Wilkinson to President Thomas Jefferson might contain state secrets and could therefore not be divulged without risk to national security.[1]

[edit] Supreme Court recognition in United States v. Reynolds

The privilege was first officially recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in the 1953 decision United States v. Reynolds (345 U.S. 1). A military airplane, a B-29 Superfortress bomber,

crashed. The widows of three civilian crew members sought accident reports on the crash but were told that to release such details would threaten national security by revealing the bomber's top-secret mission.[1][2][3][4][5][6][9][10] The court held that only the government can claim or waive the privilege, and it is not to be lightly invoked, and last there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer.[1] The court stressed that the decision to withhold evidence is to be made by the presiding judge and not the executive.[1] In 2000, the accident reports were declassified and released, and it was found that the assertion that they contained secret information was fraudulent. The reports did, however, contain information about the poor condition of the aircraft itself, which would have been very compromising to the Air Force's case. Many commentators have alleged government misuse of secrecy in this landmark case.
[11]

Despite this ruling, a case might still be subject to judicial review since the privilege was intended to prevent certain, but not all, information to be precluded.[1]

[edit] Recent use

According to former White House Counsel, John Dean: While precise numbers are hard to come by (because not all cases are reported), a recent study reports that the "Bush administration has invoked the state secrets privilege in 23 cases since 2001." By way of comparison, "between 1953 and 1976, the government invoked the privilege in only four cases."[9] While Henry Lanman reports in Slate: "... the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press reported that while the government asserted the privilege approximately 55 times in total between 1954 (the privilege was first recognized in 1953) and 2001, it's asserted it 23 times in the four years after Sept. 11."[10][12] However, at least one article has retracted these figures, finding they were based on erroneous information: "Correction: In this article, we incorrectly reported that the government invoked the state secrets privilege in 23 cases since 2001. The figure came from the 2005 Secrecy Report Card published by OpenTheGovernment.org. The privilege was actually invoked seven times from 2001 to 2005, according to the corrected 2005 report card, which is not an increase from previous decades"[13] Lanman continues to cite two political science professors at the University of Texas-El Paso who concluded that "courts have examined the documents' underlying claims of state secrecy fewer than one-third of the times it has been invoked. And, ..., courts have only actually rejected the assertion of the privilege four times since 1953."[10]

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the privilege is increasingly used to dismiss entire court cases, instead of only withholding the sensitive information from a case.[1] Also in 2001, George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13233extending the accessibility of the state secrets privilege to also allow former presidents, their designated representatives, or representatives designated by their families, to invoke it to bar records from their tenure.[5]

An article in the NYT, in August 2007, on a lawsuit involving Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication concludes that it would seem that the unprecedented frequency with which the Bush administration invoked and invokes this principle has made judges more skeptical and willing to ask the government to validate its claims. In the words of Tom Blanton, director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University "What seems clear is that until a year or two ago, the judges rarely even questioned it when the government raised the 'state secrets' claim. It was a neutron bomb no plaintiffs left standing. But we're now seeing that judges are starting to actually look behind the government's secrecy claims and see what's really there."[14]

[edit] Criticism
Since 2001, there has been mounting criticism of the state secrets privilege. Such criticism generally falls into four categories:

[edit] Weak external validation of executive assertion of privilege

Many commentators have expressed concern that the courts never effectively scrutinize executive claims of privilege.[1] Lacking independent national security expertise, judges frequently defer to the judgment of the executive and never subject executive claims to meaningful scrutiny.

[edit] Executive abuse of the privilege to conceal embarrassing facts

Commentators have suggested that the state secrets privilege might be used as often to prevent disclosure of embarrassing facts as to protect legitimate secrets.[1][2][3][4][5][10][15][16] Or, in the words of Professors William G. Weaver and Robert M. Pallitto in an article in the Political Science Quarterly: "[T]he incentive on the part of administrators is to use the privilege to avoid embarrassment, handicap political enemies, and to prevent criminal investigation of administrative action."[13][17] In several prominent cases, the evidence that the government successfully excluded was later revealed to contain no state secrets. i.e. United States v. Reynolds, Sterling v. Tenet, Edmonds v. Department of Justice and the Pentagon Papers.

[edit] Expansion into a justiciability doctrine

Some academics and practitioners have criticized the expansion of the state secrets privilege from an evidentiary privilege (designed to exclude certain pieces of evidence) to a justiciability doctrine (designed to exclude entire lawsuits). Under its original formulation, the state secrets privilege was meant only to exclude a very narrow class of evidence whose revelation would harm national security. However, in a large percentage of recent cases, courts have gone a step further, dismissing entire cases in which the government asserts the privilege, in essence converting an evidentiary rule into a justiciability rule. The government response has been that in certain cases, the subject of the case is itself privileged. In these cases, the government argues, there is no plausible way to respond to a complaint without revealing state secrets.

[edit] Elimination of judicial check on executive power

Glenn Greenwald alleges that the Bush administration attempted to expand executive power, as evidenced by the unitary executive theory propagated by John Yoo. The theory suggests that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, cannot be bound by Congress or any law, national or international. By invoking the state secrets privilege in cases involving actions taken in the war on terror (i.e. extraordinary rendition, allegations of torture, allegedly violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act)[18] Greenwald opines the administration tried to evade judicial review of these claims of exceptional war powers. In effect, this is preventing a judicial ruling determining whether there is a legal basis for such expansive executive power.[12][19] With that in mind, applying this privilege makes impeachment the only possible means left for Congress to exercise their duty to uphold the checks and balances constitutionally intended to prevent abuse of power.[2][13][16]

[edit] Calls for reform

See also: State Secrets Protection Act In recent years, a number of commentators have called for legislative reforms to the state secrets privilege.[20][21][22] These reforms center around several ideas:

1. Requiring judges to review each piece of evidence that the executive claims is subject to the 2.
privilege.[20][23][24] Requiring the executive to craft alternative evidence that is not subject to the privilege, for the opposing party to use in place of the original, privileged evidence.[23] Such substitute evidence should only be required when it is possible to do so without harming national security. Prohibiting courts from dismissing claims on the basis of the state secrets privilege until after they have reviewed all available evidence. Permitting the court to appoint an outside expert to scrutinize the evidence for national security content.[21] Excluding illegal government action from the definition of "state secrets," or otherwise allowing the court to address the legality (instead of just the secrecy) of government conduct. This would prevent the government from using the state secrets privilege to conceal its illegal conduct.[21]

3.

4. 5.

On January 22, 2008, Senators Edward Kennedy and Arlen Specter introduced S. 2533, the State Secrets Protection Act.[25]

[edit] Court cases

[edit] United States v. Reynolds
Main article: United States v. Reynolds In United States v. Reynolds (1953), the widows of three crew members of a B-29 Superfortress bomber that had crashed in 1948 sought accident reports on the crash, but were told the release such details would threaten national security by revealing the nature of the bomber's top-secret mission. The Supreme Court ruled that the executive branch could bar evidence from the court if it deemed that its release would impair national security. In 1996, the accident reports in question were declassified and released, and when discovered in 2000 were found to contain no secret information. They did, however, contain information about the poor condition of the aircraft itself, which would have been very compromising to the Air Force's case. Many legal experts have alleged government abuse of secrecy in this landmark case.[2][3][5][9][10]

[edit] Richard Horn

Main articles: Richard Horn and Horn v. Albright Former DEA agent Richard Horn brought a suit against the CIA for bugging his home. The case was dismissed because of the privilege.[1][6] Richard Horn's case was reinstated on July 20, 2009 by USDC Judge Royce C. Lambreth on the basis that the CIA had engaged in fraud on the court. On 30 March 2010, as a result of a multi-million dollar settlement agreement between Horn and the government, Lamberth dismissed the underlying case with prejudice. Subsequently, later that same year, in a 22 September order, Lamberth issued a final order vacating his earlier opinions and orders finding that CIA lawyers, Tenet, and Brown had committed fraud on the court. Lamberth also specifically ordered that a sentence be removed from his 30 March 2010 Memorandum. The removed sentence had stated that "allegations of wrongdoing by the government attorneys in this case are not only credible, they are admitted."

[edit] Notra Trulock

In February 2002 it was invoked in the case of Notra Trulock, who launched a defamation suit against Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee, charged with stealing nuclear secrets; President Bush stated that national security would be compromised if Trulock were allowed to seek damages from Lee; though it resulted in the case being dismissed, another suit was launched directly attacking then-FBI Director Louis Freeh for interfering and falsely invoking the state secrets privilege.

[edit] Sibel Edmonds

Main article: Sibel Edmonds

The privilege was invoked twice against Sibel Edmonds.[1][2][6] The first invocation was to prevent her from testifying that the Federal Government had foreknowledge that Al-Qaeda intended to use airliners to attack the United States on September 11, 2001; the case was a $100 trillion action filed in 2002 by six hundred 9/11 victims' families against officials of the Saudi government and prominent Saudi citizens. The second invocation was in an attempt to derail her personal lawsuit regarding her dismissal from the FBI, where she had worked as a post-9/11 translator and had been a whistleblower.

[edit] Thomas Burnett

The privilege was invoked in Thomas Burnett vs. Al Barka Investment & Development Corporation (Civil No. 04ms203) a motion to quash a subpoena for the testimony of Sibel Edmonds. The government's motion to quash based on state secrets privilege was granted in part.

[edit] Sterling v. Tenet

Main articles: Sterling v. Tenet and Jeffrey Alexander Sterling Jeffrey Sterling was a black CIA agent who started a racial discrimination suit. It was thrown out on account of this privilege.[1][6]

[edit] Nira Schwartz

The privilege was invoked in Schwartz vs. TRW (Civil No. 96-3065, Central District, Cal) a Qui-Tam claim by Schwartz. Intervention and assertion of the state secrets privilege, by the government, resulted in case dismissal.

[edit] Crater Corporation

The privilege was invoked in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit case of Crater Corporation vs. Lucent Technologies Inc. and AT&T Company, (Crater Corp. v. Lucent Technologies, September 7, 2005). Crater was prevented from proceeding with discovery in its patent infringement case (U.S. Patent No. 5,286,129) by the United States' assertion that discovery could cause "extremely grave damage to national security". The infringement case centered on WetMate underwater fiber optic coupling devices beneath the sea.

[edit] ACLU vs. NSA/CIA

On May 26, 2006, the U.S. Justice Department filed a motion to dismiss ACLU v. NSA, the ACLU's lawsuit against the NSA by invoking the state secrets privilege. On July 26, 2006, the case was dismissed. In a different case in Michigan, brought by the ACLU against the NSA on behalf of various scholars, journalists, attorneys, and national non-profit organizations, Judge Anna Diggs Taylor ruled on August 17, 2006, that the program was unconstitutional and should be halted. She upheld the doctrine, but ruled that the government's public statements concerning the operation were admissible and constituted sufficient proof for the case to continue without any privileged evidence or discovery. On July 6, 2007, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals threw out Taylor's decision, ruling 2-1 that the ACLU could not produce evidence to prove that the ACLU had been

wrongfully wiretapped by the NSA, and therefore did not have the standing to bring such a case to court, regardless of the legality question. On February 19, 2008, the Supreme Court declined to hear the ACLU's appeal. See ACLU v. NSA.

[edit] Center for Constitutional Rights et al. v. Bush et al.

On May 27, 2006 the Justice Department moved to preempt the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) challenge to warrantless domestic surveillance by invoking the state secrets privilege. The Bush Administration is arguing that CCR's case could reveal secrets regarding U.S. national security, and thus the presiding judge must dismiss it without reviewing the evidence.

[edit] AT&T and NSA wire-tap case

Main articles: NSA call database, NSA warrantless surveillance controversy, and Hepting v. AT&T In April 2006, the Bush administration took initial steps to use the state secrets rule to block a lawsuit against AT&T and the National Security Agency brought by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The EFF alleged that the government has secret computer rooms conducting broad, illegal surveillance of U.S. citizens.[5][10] Testifying at a January 29, 2008 House Judiciary Committee hearing on reform of the state secrets privilege, EFF attorney Kevin Bankston contended that the administration's interpretation of the privilege was overly broad, and failed to properly consider the evidentiary procedures provided for by Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. [26] However, the case was dismissed on June 3, 2009,[27] citing retroactive legislation (section 802 of FISA) stating that in the case of a covered civil action, the assistance alleged to have been provided by the electronic communication service provider was in connection with an intelligence activity involving communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007; designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack, or activities in preparation for a terrorist attack, against the United States; and the subject of a written request or directive, or a series of written requests or directives, from the Attorney General or the head of an element of the intelligence community (or the deputy of such person) to the electronic communication service provider indicating that the activity was authorized by the President; and determined to be lawful.
[28]

[edit] Khalid El-Masri

Main articles: Khalid El-Masri and Extraordinary rendition

In May 2006, the illegal detention case of Khalid El-Masri was dismissed based on the privilege, which was invoked by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Khalid El-Masri alleged that he was falsely held by the CIA for several months (which the CIA acknowledges) and was beaten, drugged, and subjected to various other inhumane activity while in captivity. He was ultimately released by the CIA with no charge ever being brought against him by the United States government. Judge T.S. Ellis, III of the U.S. District Court dismissed the case because, according to the court, the simple fact of holding proceedings would jeopardize state secrets, as claimed by the CIA.[3] [2]. On March 2,

2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. [3] On October 9, 2007, the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of the Fourth Circuit's decision, letting the doctrine of state secrets privilege stand.[29]

[edit] Maher Arar

Main articles: Maher Arar and Extraordinary rendition The privilege was invoked against a case where Maher Arar, a wrongfully-accused and tortured victim, sought to sue Attorney General John Ashcroft for his role in deporting Arar to Syria to face torture and extract false confessions. It was formally invoked by Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey in legal papers filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The invocation read, "Litigating [the] plaintiff's complaint would necessitate disclosure of classified information", which it later stated included disclosure of the basis for detaining him in the first place, the basis for refusing to deport him to Canada as he had requested, and the basis for sending him to Syria.

[edit] Jane and John Doe

On January 4, 2007 District Court Judge Laura Taylor Swain ordered the dismissal of Jane Doe et al. v. CIA, 05 Civ. 7939 based on the state secrets privilege. Jane Doe and her children sued the CIA for money damages after her husband's covert employment with the CIA was "terminated immediately for unspecified reasons".[4].

[edit] Quotes
"Because it is so powerful and can trample legitimate claims against the government, the state secrets privilege is not to be lightly invoked" (United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953)) [5] "The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary rule that allows the government to withhold information from discovery when disclosure would be inimical to national security." Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991).

[edit] See also

Espionage Act of 1917 Executive privilege Extraordinary rendition by the United States Mosaic theory Unitary executive theory Whistleblower Federal Tort Claims Act Classified Information Procedures Act, Silent witness rule State Secrets Protection Act Silent witness rule

[edit] External links

In The Name Of National Security: Unchecked Presidential Power And The Reynolds Case, Louis Fisher. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006, ISBN 0700614648. State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation Robert Chesney, Wake Forest University School of Law The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers AMANDA FROST, American University Washington College of Law Selected Case Files Involving "State Secrets" Project on Government Secrecy, Federation of American Scientists

[edit] References
1.
^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o The state secrets privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through Government Misuse by Carrie Newton Lyons, the Lewis & Clark Law Review, published by Lewis & Clark Law School, Volume 11 / Number 1 / Spring 2007. 2. ^ a b c d e f g The State Secrets Privilege and executive Misconduct by Shayana Kadidal, one of the lead attorneys on the Center for Constitutional Rights, JURIST, May 30, 2006 3. ^ a b c d e f Dangerous Discretion: State Secrets and the El-Masri Rendition Case by Aziz Huq, Director of the Liberty and National Security Project at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, JURIST, March 12, 2007 4. ^ a b c The Suit Challenging the NSA's Warrantless Wiretapping Can Proceed, Despite the State Secrets Privilege The Suit Challenging the NSA's Warrantless Wiretapping Can Proceed, Despite the State Secrets Privilege: Why The Judge Made the Right Call By JULIE HILDEN, FIndLaw, August 15, 2006 Examining Two Recent Rulings Allowing Suits Against the NSA's Warrantless Wiretapping To Proceed, Despite the State Secrets Privilege: Part Two in a Series By JULIE HILDEN, FindLaw, August 23, 2006 5. ^ a b c d e f g Building the Secrecy Wall higher and higher by Glenn Greenwald, Unclaimed Territory, April 29, 2006 6. ^ a b c d e Bush Wielding Secrecy Privilege to End Suits By Andrew Zajac, The Chicago Tribune, March 3, 2005 7. ^ United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, paragraph 8 (1953) (the privilege against revealing military secrets, a privilege which is well established in the law of evidence). Text 8. ^ Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005) 9. ^ a b c ACLU v. National Security Agency: Why the "State Secrets Privilege" Shouldn't Stop the Lawsuit Challenging Warrantless Telephone Surveillance of Americans By JOHN W. DEAN, FindLaw, June 16, 2006 10. ^ a b c d e f Secret GuardingThe new secrecy doctrine so secret you don't even know about it By Henry Lanman, Slate, May 22, 2006, 11. ^ Stephens, Hampton. Supreme Court Filing claims Air Force, government fraud in 1953 case: Case could affect 'state secrets' privilege Inside the Air Force March 14, 2003. Retrieved May 3, 2007.

12.

^ a b Rechecking the Balance of Powers The Bush administration has finally been rebuked for its repeated efforts to evade judicial review By Glenn Greenwald, In These Times, July 21, 2006 13. ^ a b c [1] By Susan Burgess, The News Media and the Law, Fall 2005 14. ^ Lichtblau, Eric (August 31, 2007). "U.S. Cites Secrets Privilege as It Tries to Stop Suit on Banking Records". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/us/nationalspecial3/31swift.html?ref=us. Retrieved 2009-07-09. 15. ^ Congress and Judges Gagged Arlen Specter and a CIA torture victim know Only the Oval Office decides what the law is by Nat Hentoff, Village Voice, June 19th, 2006 16. ^ a b Closing Our Courts Crying 'state secrets,' the administration seals the courts to avoid scrutiny by Nat Hentoff, Village Voice, June 9th, 2006 17. ^ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007 Testimony of William G. Weaver, J.D., Ph.D. Senior Advisor, National Security Whistleblowers Coalition and Associate Professor University of Texas at El Paso, Inst. for Policy and Econ. Development and Dept. of Political Science, February 13, 2007 18. ^ Secrecy and Foreign Policy by Robert Pallitto, Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), December 8, 2006 19. ^ Snapshots of the U.S. under the Bush administration by Glenn Greenwald, Unclaimed Territory, May 23, 2006 20. ^ a b Florence, Justin and Gerke, Matthew: "State Your Secrets: The smart way around telecom immunity." http://www.slate.com/id/2177962/ 21. ^ a b c "State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Legislation" by Robert Chesney. George Washington Law Review (2007). 22. ^ "The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through Government Misuse" by Carrie Newton Lyons, 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 99 (2007). 23. ^ a b Report on Reforming the State Secrets Privilege, American Bar Association, 2007. 24. ^ "State Your Secrets" by Lou Fisher. Legal Times, 2006. 25. ^ "Introduction of the State Secrets Protection Act". Federation of American Scientists. 2008-01-22. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_cr/statesec.html. Retrieved 2008-02-08. 26. ^ "Statement of Kevin S. Bankston, Senior Staff Attorney Electronic Frontier Foundation" (PDF). Oversight Hearing on Reform of the State Secrets Privilege by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. 2008-01-29. http://www.eff.org/files/EFF_HJC_SSP_written_testimony_Final.pdf. Retrieved 2008-02-08. 27. ^ Hepting v. AT&T, U.S. District Court (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 3 June 2009). Text 28. ^ Bazan, Elizabeth B. (7 July 2008). "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of Selected Issues" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34279.pdf. 29. ^ Greenhouse, Linda (2007-10-10). "Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Torture Appeal". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/10/washington/10scotus.html?ref=us. Retrieved 2007-1010.

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_secrets_privilege" Categories: United States government secrecy | Evidence law | George W. Bush administration controversies | Executive branch of the United States government | Classified information This page was last modified on 20 May 2011 at 06:09.

Political Corruption
Political corruption is the use of legislated powers by government officials for illegitimate private gain. Misuse of government power for other purposes, such as repression of political opponents and general police brutality, is not considered political corruption. Neither are illegal acts by private persons or corporations not directly involved with the government. An illegal act by an officeholder constitutes political corruption only if the act is directly related to their official duties. Forms of corruption vary, but include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement. While corruption may facilitate criminal enterprise such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, it is not restricted to these activities. The activities that constitute illegal corruption differ depending on the country or jurisdiction. For instance, certain political funding practices that are legal in one place may be illegal in another. In some cases, government officials have broad or poorly defined powers, which make it difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal actions. Worldwide, bribery alone is estimated to involve over 1 trillion US dollars annually.[1] A state of unrestrained political corruption is known as a kleptocracy, literally meaning "rule by thieves". Political corruption

Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010

Concepts

Electoral fraud Economics of corruption Nepotism Bribery Cronyism Slush fund

Corruption by country

Angola Armenia Canada Chile China (PRC) Colombia

Cuba Ghana India Iran Kenya Ireland Nigeria Pakistan Paraguay Philippines Russia South Africa Venezuela United States
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Contents
[hide]

1 Effects o 1.1 Effects on politics, administration, and institutions o 1.2 Economic effects o 1.3 Environmental and social effects o 1.4 Effects on Humanitarian Aid o 1.5 Other areas: health, public safety, education, trade unions, etc. 2 Types o 2.1 Bribery o 2.2 Trading in influence o 2.3 Patronage o 2.4 Nepotism and cronyism o 2.5 Electoral fraud o 2.6 Embezzlement o 2.7 Kickbacks o 2.8 Unholy alliance o 2.9 Involvement in organized crime 3 Conditions favorable for corruption o 3.1 Size of public sector 4 Governmental corruption 5 Fighting corruption 6 Whistleblowers 7 Campaign contributions 8 Measuring corruption 9 See also 10 References 11 Further reading 12 External links

[edit] Effects

[edit] Effects on politics, administration, and institutions

Detail from Corrupt Legislation (1896) by Elihu Vedder. Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C.

Corruption poses a serious development challenge. In the political realm, it undermines democracy and good governance by flouting or even subverting formal processes. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies reduces accountability and distorts representation in policymaking; corruption in the judiciary compromises the rule of law; and corruption in public administration results in the inefficient provision of services. It violates a basic principle ofrepublicanism regarding the centrality of civic virtue. More generally, corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and public offices are bought and sold. At the same time, corruption undermines the legitimacy of government and such democratic values as trust and tolerance.

[edit] Economic effects

See also: Corporate crime Corruption undermines economic development by generating considerable distortions and inefficiency. In the private sector, corruption increases the cost of business through the price of illicit payments themselves, the management cost of negotiating with officials, and the risk of breached agreements or detection. Although some claim corruption reduces costs by cutting bureaucracy, the availability of bribes can also induce officials to contrive new rules and delays. Openly removing costly and lengthy regulations are better than covertly allowing them to be bypassed by using bribes. Where corruption inflates the cost of business, it also distorts the playing field, shielding firms with connections from competition and thereby sustaining inefficient firms.[2] Corruption also generates economic distortions in the public sector by diverting public investment into capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful. Officials may increase the technical complexity of public sector projects to conceal or pave the way for such dealings, thus further distorting investment. Corruption also lowers compliance with construction, environmental, or other regulations, reduces the quality of government services and infrastructure, and increases budgetary pressures on government. Economists argue that one of the factors behind the differing economic development in Africa and Asia is that in the former, corruption has primarily taken the form of rent extraction with the resulting financial capital moved overseas rather than invested at home (hence the stereotypical, but often accurate, image of African dictators having Swiss bank accounts). In Nigeria, for example, more than $400 billion was stolen

from the treasury by Nigeria's leaders between 1960 and 1999.[3] University of Massachusetts researchers estimated that from 1970 to 1996, capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan countries totaled $187bn, exceeding those nations' external debts.[4] (The results, expressed in retarded or suppressed development, have been modeled in theory by economist Mancur Olson.) In the case of Africa, one of the factors for this behavior was political instability, and the fact that new governments often confiscated previous government's corruptly-obtained assets. This encouraged officials to stash their wealth abroad, out of reach of any future expropriation. In contrast, Asian administrations such as Suharto's New Order often took a cut on business transactions or provided conditions for development, through infrastructure investment, law and order, etc.

[edit] Environmental and social effects

Corruption facilitates environmental destruction. Corrupt countries may formally have legislation to protect the environment, it cannot be enforced if officials can easily be bribed. The same applies to social rights worker protection,unionization prevention, and child labor. Violation of these laws rights enables corrupt countries to gain illegitimate economic advantage in the international market. The Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen has observed that "there is no such thing as an apolitical food problem." While drought and other naturally occurring events may trigger famine conditions, it is government action or inaction that determines its severity, and often even whether or not a famine will occur. Governments with strong tendencies towards kleptocracy can undermine food security even when harvests are good. Officials often steal state property. In Bihar, India, more than 80% of the subsidized food aid to poor is stolen by corrupt officials.[5] Similarly, food aid is often robbed at gunpoint by governments, criminals, and warlords alike, and sold for a profit. The 20th century is full of many examples of governments undermining the food security of their own nations sometimes intentionally.[6]

[edit] Effects on Humanitarian Aid

The scale of humanitarian aid to the poor and unstable regions of the world grows, but it is highly vulnerable to corruption, with food aid, construction and other highly valued assistance as the most at risk. [7] Food aid can be directly and physically diverted from its intended destination, or indirectly through the manipulation of assessments, targeting, registration and distributions to favour certain groups or individuals.[7] Elsewhere, in construction and shelter, there are numerous opportunities for diversion and profit through substandard workmanship, kickbacks for contracts and favouritism in the provision of valuable shelter material.[7] Thus while humanitarian aid agencies are usually most concerned about aid being diverted by including too many, recipients themselves are most concerned about exclusion.[7] Access to aid may be limited to those with connections, to those who pay bribes or are forced to give sexual favours.[7] Equally, those able to do so may manipulate statistics to inflate the number beneficiaries and syphon of the additional assistance.[7]

[edit] Other areas: health, public safety, education, trade unions, etc.
See also: Police corruption Corruption is not specific to poor, developing, or transition countries. In western countries, there have been cases of bribery and other forms of corruption in all possible fields: under-the-table payments made to reputed surgeons by patients willing to be on top of the list of forthcoming surgeries,[8] bribes paid by suppliers to the automotive industry in order to sell poor quality connectors used for instance in safety equipment such as airbags, bribes paid by suppliers to manufacturers of defibrillators (to sell poor quality capacitors), contributions paid by wealthy parents to the "social and culture fund" of a prestigious university in exchange for it to accept their children, bribes paid to obtain diplomas, financial and other advantages granted to unionists by members of the executive board of a car manufacturer in exchange for

employer-friendly positions and votes, etc. Examples are endless. These various manifestations of corruption can ultimately present a danger for the public health; they can discredit certain essential institutions or social relationships. Corruption can also affect the various components of sports activities (referees, players, medical and laboratory staff involved in anti-doping controls, members of national sport federation and international committees deciding about the allocation of contracts and competition places). There have also been cases against (members of) various types of non-profit and non-government organisations, as well as religious organisations. Ultimately, the distinction between public and private sector corruption sometimes appears rather artificial and national anti-corruption initiatives may need to avoid legal and other loopholes in the coverage of the instruments.

[edit] Types
[edit] Bribery
Main article: Bribery A bribe is a payment given personally to a government official in exchange of his use of official powers. Bribery requires two participants: one to give the bribe, and one to take it. Either may initiate the corrupt offering; for example, a customs official may demand bribes to let through allowed (or disallowed) goods, or a smuggler might offer bribes to gain passage. In some countries the culture of corruption extends to every aspect of public life, making it extremely difficult for individuals to stay in business without resorting to bribes. Bribes may be demanded in order for an official to do something he is already paid to do. They may also be demanded in order to bypass laws and regulations. In addition to using bribery for private financial gain, they are also used to intentionally and maliciously cause harm to another (i.e. no financial incentive). In some developing nations, up to half of the population has paid bribes during the past 12 months.[9]

In recent years, efforts have been made by the international community to encourage countries to dissociate and incriminate as separate offences, active and passive bribery. Active bribery can be defined for instance as the promising, offering or giving by any person, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage [to any public official], for himself or herself or for anyone else, for him or her to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions.(article 2 of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) of the Council of Europe). Passive bribery can be defined as the request or receipt [by any public official], directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage, for himself or herself or for anyone else, or the acceptance of an offer or a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions (article 3 of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173)). The reason for this dissociation is to make the early steps (offering, promising, requesting an advantage) of a corrupt deal already an offence and, thus, to give a clear signal (from a criminal policy point of view) that bribery is not acceptable. Besides, such a dissociation makes the prosecution of bribery offences easier since it can be very difficult to prove that two parties (the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker) have formally agreed upon a corrupt deal. Besides, there is often no such formal deal but only a mutual understanding, for instance when it is common knowledge in a municipality that to obtain a building permit one has to pay a "fee" to the decision maker to obtain a favourable decision. A working definition of corruption is also provided as

follows in article 3 of the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 174): For the purpose of this Convention, "corruption" means requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or behavior required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect thereof.

[edit] Trading in influence

Trading in influence, or influence peddling in certain countries, refers to the situation where a person is selling his/her influence over the decision process involving a third party (person or institution). The difference with bribery is that this is a tri-lateral relation. From a legal point of view, the role of the third party (who is the target of the influence) does not really matter although he/she can be an accessory in some instances. It can be difficult to make a distinction between this form of corruption and certain forms of extreme and poorly regulated lobbying where for instance law- or decision-makers can freely "sell" their vote, decision power or influence to those lobbyists who offer the highest retribution, including where for instance the latter act on behalf of powerful clients such as industrial groups who want to avoid the passing of certain environmental, social, or other regulations perceived as too stringent, etc. Where lobbying is (sufficiently) regulated, it becomes possible to provide for a distinctive criteria and to consider that trading in influence involves the use of "improper influence", as in article 12 of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) of the Council of Europe.

[edit] Patronage
Main article: Patronage Patronage refers to favoring supporters, for example with government employment. This may be legitimate, as when a newly elected government changes the top officials in the administration in order to effectively implement its policy. It can be seen as corruption if this means that incompetent persons, as a payment for supporting the regime, are selected before more able ones. In nondemocracies many government officials are often selected for loyalty rather than ability. They may be almost exclusively selected from a particular group (for example, Sunni Arabs in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the nomenklatura in the Soviet Union, or the Junkers in Imperial Germany) that support the regime in return for such favors. A similar problem can also be seen in Eastern Europe, for example in Romania, where the government is often accused of patronage (when a new government comes to power it rapidly changes most of the officials in the public sector).

[edit] Nepotism and cronyism

Main articles: Nepotism and Cronyism

Favoring relatives (nepotism) or personal friends (cronyism) of an official is a form of illegitimate private gain. This may be combined with bribery, for example demanding that a business should employ a relative of an official controlling regulations affecting the business. The most extreme example is when the entire state is inherited, as in North Korea or Syria. A milder form of cronyism is an "old boy network", in which appointees to official positions are selected only from a closed and exclusive social network such as the alumni of particular universities instead of appointing the most competent candidate.

Seeking to harm enemies becomes corruption when official powers are illegitimately used as means to this end. For example, trumped-up charges are often brought up against journalists or writers who bring up politically sensitive issues, such as a politician's acceptance of bribes. In the Indian political system, leadership of national and regional parties are passed from generation to generation creating a system in which a family holds the center of power, some examples are most of the Dravidian parties of south India and also the largest party in India Congress.

[edit] Electoral fraud

Main article: Electoral fraud

Electoral fraud is illegal interference with the process of an election. Acts of fraud affect vote counts to bring about an election result, whether by increasing the vote share of the favored candidate, depressing the vote share of the rival candidates, or both. Also called voter fraud, the mechanisms involved include illegal voter registration, intimidation at polls, and improper vote counting.

[edit] Embezzlement
Main article: Embezzlement Embezzlement is outright theft of entrusted funds. It is a misappropriation of property. Another common type of embezzlement is that of entrusted government resources; for example, when a director of a public enterprise employs company workers to build or renovate his own house.

[edit] Kickbacks
See also: Anti-competitive practices and Bid rigging

A kickback is an official's share of misappropriated funds allocated from his or her organization to an organization involved in corrupt bidding. For example, suppose that a politician is in charge of choosing how to spend some public funds. He can give a contract to a company that is not the best bidder, or allocate more than they deserve. In this case, the company benefits, and in exchange for betraying the public, the official receives a kickback payment, which is a portion of the sum the company received. This sum itself may be all or a portion of the difference between the actual (inflated) payment to the company and the (lower) market-based price that would have been paid had the bidding been competitive. Kickbacks are not limited to government officials; any situation in which people are entrusted to spend funds that do not belong to them are susceptible to this kind of corruption. Kickbacks are also common in the pharmaceutical industry, as many doctors and physicians receive pay in return for added promotion and prescription of the drug these pharmaceutical companies are marketing.

[edit] Unholy alliance

An unholy alliance is a coalition among seemingly antagonistic groups, especially if one is religious,[10] for ad hoc or hidden gain. Like patronage, unholy alliances are not necessarily illegal, but unlike patronage, by

its deceptive nature and often great financial resources, an unholy alliance can be much more dangerous to the public interest. An early, well-known use of the term was by Theodore Roosevelt (TR): "To destroy this invisible Government, to dissolve the unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics is the first task of the statesmanship of the day." 1912 Progressive Party Platform, attributed to TR[11] and quoted again in his autobiography[12] where he connects trusts and monopolies (sugar interests, Standard Oil, etc.) to Woodrow Wilson, Howard Taft, and consequently both major political parties.

[edit] Involvement in organized crime

An illustrative example of official involvement in organized crime can be found from 1920s and 1930s Shanghai, where Huang Jinrong was a police chief in the French concession, while simultaneously being a gang boss and co-operating with Du Yuesheng, the local gang ringleader. The relationship kept the flow of profits from the gang's gambling dens, prostitution, and protection rackets undisturbed. The United States accused Manuel Noriega's government in Panama of being a "narcokleptocracy", a corrupt government profiting on illegal drug trade. Later the U.S. invaded Panama and captured Noriega.

[edit] Conditions favorable for corruption

It is argued that the following conditions are favorable for corruption: Information deficits o Lacking freedom of information legislation. The Indian Right to Information Act 2005 has "already engendered mass movements in the country that is bringing the lethargic, often corrupt bureaucracy to its knees and changing power equations completely."[13] o Lack of investigative reporting in the local media. o Contempt for or negligence of exercising freedom of speech and freedom of the press. o Weak accounting practices, including lack of timely financial management. o Lack of measurement of corruption. For example, using regular surveys of households and businesses in order to quantify the degree of perception of corruption in different parts of a nation or in different government institutions may increase awareness of corruption and create pressure to combat it. This will also enable an evaluation of the officials who are fighting corruption and the methods used. o Tax havens which tax their own citizens and companies but not those from other nations and refuse to disclose information necessary for foreign taxation. This enables large scale political corruption in the foreign nations.[14][citation needed] Lacking control of the government. o Lacking civic society and non-governmental organizations which monitor the government. o An individual voter may have a rational ignorance regarding politics, especially in nationwide elections, since each vote has little weight. o Weak civil service, and slow pace of reform. o Weak rule of law. o Weak legal profession. o Weak judicial independence. o Lacking protection of whistleblowers.

Lack of benchmarking, that is continual detailed evaluation of procedures and comparison to others who do similar things, in the same government or others, in particular comparison to those who do the best work. The Peruvian organization Ciudadanos al Dia has started to measure and compare transparency, costs, and efficiency in different government departments in Peru. It annually awards the best practices which has received widespread media attention. This has created competition among government agencies in order to improve.[15]

Opportunities and incentives o Individual officials routinely handle cash, instead of handling payments by giro or on a separate cash deskillegitimate withdrawals from supervised bank accounts are much more difficult to conceal. o Public funds are centralized rather than distributed. For example, if $1,000 is embezzled from a local agency that has $2,000 funds, it is easier to notice than from a national agency with $2,000,000 funds. See the principle of subsidiarity. o Large, unsupervised public investments. o Sale of state-owned property and privatization.[citation needed] o Poorly-paid government officials. o Government licenses needed to conduct business, e.g., import licenses, encourage bribing and kickbacks. o Long-time work in the same position may create relationships inside and outside the government which encourage and help conceal corruption and favoritism. Rotating government officials to different positions and geographic areas may help prevent this; for instance certain high rank officials in French government services (e.g. treasurerpaymasters general) must rotate every few years. o Costly political campaigns, with expenses exceeding normal sources of political funding, especially when funded with taxpayer money. o Less interaction with officials reduces the opportunities for corruption. For example, using the Internet for sending in required information, like applications and tax forms, and then processing this with automated computer systems. This may also speed up the processing and reduce unintentional human errors. See e-Government. o A windfall from exporting abundant natural resources may encourage corruption.[16] (See Resource curse) o War and other forms of conflict correlate with a breakdown of public security. Social conditions o Self-interested closed cliques and "old boy networks". o Family-, and clan-centered social structure, with a tradition of nepotism/favouritism being acceptable. o A gift economy, such as the Soviet blat system, emerges in a Communist centrally planned economy. o Lacking literacy and education among the population. o Frequent discrimination and bullying among the population. o Tribal solidarity, giving benefits to certain ethnic groups

According to a study of the conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation, lack of economic freedom explains 71% of corruption[17]

[edit] Size of public sector

It is a controversial issue whether the size of the public sector per se results in corruption. As mentioned above, low degree of economic freedom explains 71% of corruption. The actual share may be even greater, as also past regulation affects the current level of corruption due to the slowing of cultural changes (e.g., it

takes time for corrupted officials to adjust to changes in economic freedom).[18] The size of the public sector in terms of taxation is only one component of economic un-freedom, so the empirical studies on economic freedom do not directly answer this question. Extensive and diverse public spending is, in itself, inherently at risk of cronyism, kickbacks, and embezzlement. Complicated regulations and arbitrary, unsupervised official conduct exacerbate the problem. This is one argument forprivatization and deregulation. Opponents of privatization see the argument as ideological. The argument that corruption necessarily follows from the opportunity is weakened by the existence of countries with low to non-existent corruption but large public sectors, like the Nordic countries.[19] However, these countries score high on the Ease of Doing Business Index, due to good and often simple regulations, and have rule of law firmly established. Therefore, due to their lack of corruption in the first place, they can run large public sectors without inducing political corruption. Like other governmental economic activities, also privatization, such as in the sale of government-owned property, is particularly at the risk of cronyism. Privatizations in Russia, Latin America, and East Germany were accompanied by large scale corruption during the sale of the state owned companies. Those with political connections unfairly gained large wealth, which has discredited privatization in these regions. While media have reported widely the grand corruption that accompanied the sales, studies have argued that in addition to increased operating efficiency, daily petty corruption is, or would be, larger without privatization, and that corruption is more prevalent in non-privatized sectors. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that extralegal and unofficial activities are more prevalent in countries that privatized less.[20] There is the counter point, however, that oligarchy industries can be quite corrupt ( "competition" like collusive price-fixing, pressuring dependent businesses, etc. ), and only by having a portion of the market owned by someone other than that oligarchy, i.e. public sector, can keep them in line ( if the public sector gas company is making money & selling gas for 1/2 of the price of the private sector companies... the private sector companies won't be able to simultaneously gouge to that degree & keep their customers: the competition keeps them in line ). Private sector corruption can increase the poverty/helplessness of the population, so it can affect government corruption, in the long-term. In the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity is applied: a government service should be provided by the lowest, most local authority that can competently provide it. An effect is that distribution of funds into multiple instances discourages embezzlement, because even small sums missing will be noticed. In contrast, in a centralized authority, even minute proportions of public funds can be large sums of money.

[edit] Governmental corruption

If the highest echelons of the governments also take advantage from corruption or embezzlement from the state's treasury, it is sometimes referred with the neologism kleptocracy. Members of the government can take advantage of thenatural resources (e.g., diamonds and oil in a few prominent cases) or state-owned productive industries. A number of corrupt governments have enriched themselves via foreign aid, which is often spent on showy buildings and armaments. A corrupt dictatorship typically results in many years of general hardship and suffering for the vast majority of citizens as civil society and the rule of law disintegrate. In addition, corrupt dictators routinely ignore economic and socialproblems in their quest to amass ever more wealth and power. The classic case of a corrupt, exploitive dictator often given is the regime of Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled the Democratic Republic of the Congo (which he renamed Zaire) from 1965 to 1997. It is said that usage of the termkleptocracy gained popularity largely in response to a need to accurately describe

Mobutu's regime. Another classic case is Nigeria, especially under the rule of General Sani Abacha who was de facto president of Nigeria from 1993 until his death in 1998. He is reputed to have stolen some US$34 billion. He and his relatives are often mentioned in Nigerian 419 letter scams claiming to offer vast fortunes for "help" in laundering his stolen "fortunes", which in reality turn out not to exist.[21] More than $400 billion was stolen from the treasury by Nigeria's leaders between 1960 and 1999.[22] More recently, articles in various financial periodicals, most notably Forbes magazine, have pointed to Fidel Castro, General Secretary of the Republic of Cuba since 1959, of likely being the beneficiary of up to $900 million, based on "his control" of state-owned companies.[23] Opponents of his regime claim that he has used money amassed through weapons sales, narcotics, international loans, and confiscation of private property to enrich himself and his political cronies who hold his dictatorship together, and that the $900 million published by Forbes is merely a portion of his assets, although that needs to be proven.[24]

[edit] Fighting corruption

Mobile telecommunications and radio broadcasting help to fight corruption, especially in developing regions like Africa,[25] where other forms of communications are limited. In the 1990s, initiatives were taken at an international level (in particular by the European Community, the Council of Europe, the OECD) to put a ban on corruption: in 1996, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, for instance, adopted a comprehensive Programme of Action against Corruption and, subsequently, issued a series of anti-corruption standard-setting instruments: the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173); the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 174); the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191); the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption (Resolution (97) 24); the Recommendation on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials (Recommendation No. R (2000) 10); and the Recommendation on Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns (Rec(2003)4)

The purpose of these instruments was to address the various forms of corruption (involving the public sector, the private sector, the financing of political activities, etc.) whether they had a strictly domestic or also a transnational dimension. To monitor the implementation at national level of the requirements and principles provided in those texts, a monitoring mechanism the Group of States Against Corruption (also known as GRECO) was created. Further conventions were adopted at the regional level under the aegis of the Organization of American States (OAS or OEA), the African Union, and in 2003, at the universal level under that of the United Nations.

[edit] Whistleblowers
Main article: Whistleblower

[edit] Campaign contributions

In the political arena, it is difficult to prove corruption. For this reason, there are often unproven rumors about many politicians, sometimes part of a smear campaign. Politicians are placed in apparently compromising positions because of their need to solicit financial contributions for their campaign finance. If they then appear to be acting in the interests of those parties that funded them, it could be considered corruption. Though donations may be coincidental, the question asked is, why are they funding politicians at all, if they get nothing for their money. Laws regulating campaign finance in the United States require that all contributions and their use should be publicly disclosed. Many companies, especially larger ones, fund both the Democratic and Republican parties. Certain countries, such as France, ban altogether the corporate funding of political parties. Because of the possible circumvention of this ban with respect to the funding of political campaigns, France also imposes maximum spending caps on campaigning; candidates that have exceeded those limits, or that have handed in misleading accounting reports, risk having their candidacy ruled invalid, or even being prevented from running in future elections. In addition, the government funds political parties according to their successes in elections. In some countries, political parties are run solely off subscriptions (membership fees). Even legal measures such as these have been argued to be legalized corruption, in that they often favor the political status quo. Minor parties and independents often argue that efforts to rein in the influence of contributions do little more than protect the major parties with guaranteed public funding while constraining the possibility of private funding by outsiders. In these instances, officials are legally taking money from the public coffers for their election campaigns to guarantee that they will continue to hold their influential and often well-paid positions. As indicated above, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe recognised in 1996 the importance of links between corruption and political financing. It adopted in 1837 the Recommendation on Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns (Rec(2003)4). This text is quite unique at international levels as it aims i.a. at increasing transparency in the funding of political parties and election campaigns (these two areas are difficult to dissociate since parties are also involved in campaigning and in many countries, parties do not have the monopoly over the presentation of candidates for elections), ensuring a certain level of control over the funding and spending connected with political activities, and making sure infringements are subject to effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions. In the context of its monitoring activities, the Group of States Against Corruption has identified a great variety of possible improvements in those areas (see the country reports adopted under the Third Evaluation Round).

[edit] Measuring corruption

Measuring corruption statistically is difficult if not impossible due to the illicit nature of the transaction and imprecise definitions of corruption.[26] While "corruption" indices first appeared in 1995 with the Corruption Perceptions Index, all of these metrics address different proxies for corruption, such as public perceptions of the extent of the problem.[27] Transparency International, an anti-corruption NGO, pioneered this field with the Corruption Perceptions Index, first released in 1995. This work is often credited with breaking a taboo and forcing the issue of corruption into high level development policy discourse. Transparency International currently publishes three measures, updated annually: a Corruption Perceptions Index(CPI) (based on aggregating third-party polling of public perceptions of how corrupt different countries are); a Global Corruption Barometer (based on a survey of general public attitudes toward and experience of corruption); and a Bribe Payers Index,

looking at the willingness of foreign firms to pay bribes. The Corruption Perceptions Index is the best known of these metrics, though it has drawn much criticism[27][28][29] and may be declining in influence.[30] The World Bank collects a range of data on corruption, including survey responses from over 100,000 firms worldwide and a set of indicators of governance and institutional quality. Moreover, one of the six dimensions of governance measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators is Control of Corruption, which is defined as "the extent to which power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests."[31] While the definition itself is fairly precise, the data aggregated into the Worldwide Governance Indicators is based on any available polling: questions range from "is corruption a serious problem?" to measures of public access to information, and not consistent across countries. Despite these weaknesses, the global coverage of these datasets has led to their widespread adoption, most notably by the Millennium Challenge Corporation.[26] In part in response to these criticisms, a second wave of corruption metrics has been created by Global Integrity, the International Budget Partnership, and many lesser known local groups, starting with the Global Integrity Index, first published in 2004. These second wave projects aim not to create awareness, but to create policy change via targeting resources more effectively and creating checklists toward incremental reform. Global Integrity and the International Budget Partnership each dispense with public surveys and instead uses in-country experts to evaluate "the opposite of corruption" which Global Integrity defines as the public policies that prevent, discourage, or expose corruption.[32] These approaches compliment the first wave, awareness-raising tools by giving governments facing public outcry a checklist which measures concrete steps toward improved governance.[26] Typical second wave corruption metrics do not offer the worldwide coverage found in first wave projects, and instead focus on localizing information gathered to specific problems and creating deep, "unpackable" content that matches quantitative and qualitative data. Meanwhile, alternative approaches such as the British aid agency's Drivers of Change research skips numbers entirely and favors understanding corruption via political economy analysis of who controls power in a given society.[26]

Rule of Law http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_law The Rule of law in its most basic form is no one is above the law. Perhaps the most important application of the rule of law is the principle that governmental authority is legitimately exercised only in accordance with, publicly disclosed laws, adopted and enforced in accordance with established procedural steps that are referred to as due process. The rule of law is hostile to dictatorship and to anarchy. According to modern Anglo-American thinking, hallmarks of adherence to the rule of law commonly include a clear separation of powers, legal certainty, the principle of legitimate expectation

and equality of all before the law.

The concept is not without controversy, and it has been said that

"the phrase the rule of law has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over- use"

General over use in proclamation and excessive elusiveness lucidity

Learned and Honorable

The adeptness to know what is right and make it wrong WET Without Exercising Thought publicly disclosed laws

GREDSCROL
Golden Rule Equality Democratic Spirit Constitution Rule of Law SITI LAW www.sitilaw.com Spirit Invincible Triad Individuals Legal Assertions Writ
The resolve to any problem begins with recognizing there is one ...defining ... set a plan in place ... fire it up

To be Humanic is to know a fellow Humanic All the same necessities and vulnerabilities know what is and what is not receptive 1 Planet 1 People 1 Spirit 1 Force 1 Law 1 Sense All in One or None S ESS

Epitome Simplicity Sanity BCS CCC Benchmark Common Sense Catalyst Consistency Continuity TCUP True Constant Unalterable Perpetuity aka Tranquility Correlative Universal Prerogative FIXED Not Debatable

An invisible invincible entity untouchable by body or mind

The Humanic short of the Satanic long of it efficient and effective direct for humanic benefit Confucius 551 BC 479 BC Do not impose on others what you would not wish for yourself Recompense injury with Justice and recompense kindness with kindness "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" Jesus The enactment of laws begin with PSI - Purpose, the Spirit , the Intent Hence the Spirit has precedence so defined Democracy is a form of government in which all citizens have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives. Ideally, this includes equal (and more or less direct) participation in the proposal, development and passage of legislation into law. It can also encompass social, economic and cultural conditions that enable the free and equal practice of political self-determination. The term comes from the Greek: (dmokrata)

"rule of the people",[1]

which was coined from (dmos) "people" and (Kratos) "power", in the middle of the 5th-4th century BC to denote the political systems then existing in some Greek city-states, notably Athens

following a popular uprising in 508 BC.[2]

The Satanic have concluded the humanic are the fuel of their thirsty furnace ever striving to satiate their insatiable lust for wealth and power

The never ending story of yesterday, but not today in due natural process

In 2500 years "Thy Kingdom Come"to the Satanic with the Satanic in charge not a HA - Humanic Achievement

Representative Democracy, Consensus Democracy, and Deliberative Democracy are all major examples of attempts at a form of government

that is both practical and responsive to the needs and desires of citizens.

At 5 prior to the first day of SSS we know what is and what is not receptive to a fellow human Obviously the source of the "Learned and Honorable" collectively have a mind dwarfed by that of a single toad flattened on the road

You know what? Satanic abrogated in GREDSCROLL have to go The means in place ... Magnificent user friendly brains and Rule of Law ... like a chainsaw fire them up to make them meaningful

An example of their TOO Transfer of Onus

CATCHALL
Cyberspace Accountable Transparency Central Humanic Archives Last Laugh
A random example from the world

PSI TOO REAL

Purpose Spirit Intent Transfer Of Onus Rule Elusively Articulate Law

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factortame#Sovereignty_and_the_EU

1970
The EU's Common Fisheries Policy, which began in 1970, aimed at creating a common market for fisheries products by providing for free access to the waters of all Member States and introducing structural funds to ensure modernisation of the sector.[1] In 1976 it was agreed that, as from 1 January the following year, Member States would extend the limit of their fishing zones to a distance 200 nautical miles (370 km) from their coastlines. In 1980 the EU concluded a fisheries agreement with Spain which gave the latter (which had the largest fishing fleet in the EU) limited rights to fish in the waters of the Member States. In 1983 concerns over the effect that equality

of access might have on fishing stocks led to the introduction of certain controls,

notably the concept of "total allowable catches" which set maximum quotas of fish which could be caught by each Member State. The intent is consistent with the PSI GREDSCROL ergo Valid having precedence not subject to obstruction factors such as incompetence, omissions, loopholes, Privacy Act, Copyright, diversionary tactics ... whatever as the Onus is on the administers and enforcers of the law and every individual HE in particular that would attempt to compromise the SOS - Sanctity of Spirit compromising the rights of the HE to benefit, not be deprived

HE - Humanic Equality Public Interest as a whole

Purpose of inherently bias humanic law to harness the Satanic greedy seedy weedy BBBB - Bully Brat Bias Beast that exists within all nipping in bud before surfacing that opportunity need not knock once as they will create their own to the detriment of fellow humans and the compromise of the SOS - Sanctity of Spirit
To be Humanic is to know a fellow Humanic All the same necessities and vulnerabilities know what is and what is not receptive

1 Planet 1 People 1 Spirit 1 Force 1 Law 1 Sense All in One or None

S ESS Epitome Simplicity Sanity BCS CCC Benchmark Common Sense Catalyst Consistency Continuity TCUP True Constant Unalterable Perpetuity aka Tranquility Correlative Universal Prerogative FIXED Not Debatable PIP Precedence in Perpetuity The S an invisible invincible entity untouchable by body or mind 3D Defy Deny Defile All expenses incurred and deprivations resulting from such arrogant blatant in your face S offences ultimately are incurred by they who chose to 3D Often is the case the punishment is less than the loss to the people clear violation of the PSE - Purpose Spirit Intent

Confucius 551 BC 479 BC Do not impose on others what you would not wish for yourself Recompense injury with Justice and recompense kindness with kindness Do unto others as you would have them do unto you Jesus

Taking advantage of government incompetence deliberate or otherwise that runs rampant in Satanic governments being what they do for the benefit of the SEE - Satanic Elite Entrepreneur leaving the Humanic unprotected for the simplification of ransacking,

providing innumerable Satanic jobs on both slices of the SSS Satanic Sucker Sandwich that ultimately the humanic have picked up all tabs at humongous expense of quality of life with backroom deals made as to the divvy up of the loot

Absolutely everything they do is for ulterior purpose leaving an indellible trail as their laws inconsistent with the S are not laws, but PFEE Prima Facia Evidence Exposed The S with PIP - Precedence in Perpetuity The evidence clearly shows Factortame Limited intentions to 3D the S of GREDSCROL adverse to the EU fishing agreement being a recognition of certain factors compromising the SOS - Sanctity of Spirit in which HE - Human Equality rights are dependent not subject to any obstructions and the matter to be attended to is how much did the Factortame Fleet fleece the British HE from the date of the EU agreement until ceased contravening the agreement.

Not debatable
When administered and enforced consistence with the S to the certainty of the SOS in continuity as mandated and prerequisite SEE do not weigh the odds of being caught and if so the profits are greater than the penalty The penalty begins retroactively for all who were deprived, all that was gained illegally is of course stolen property Above making everything right nobody deprived must be a penalty reflecting the seriousness of the crime. All personnel involved in the administering and enforcing of the S in matters of the EU fisheries agreement are responsible and accountable for all losses incurred by they protected by the S, that includes 10 years of EL - Elusive Lucidity the trek laden accumulating the Mother Lode whil the HE taken down the yellow brick road thereby demonstrating due diligence to exemplary attentiveness to deterrence. ************************************************

EESE SEE
Efficient Effective Sanity Eradicating Satanic Elite Entrpreneurs ************************************************* Taking advantage of government epitome incompetence like taking candy from a baby with every individual an inherent responsibility to self to ensure the Constitution Establishment personnel are adept to the certainty of the SOS Sanctity of Spirit

In GREDSCROL you do not advantage of the HE - Human Equal. We do not believe we are protected until we know certain we are in perpetuity with all who would deceive, they who administer and enforce with EL- Elusive Lucidity leaving an indelible trail to be picked up when conditions of happenstance are appropriate Meanwhile, from 1980 Spanish fishermen began to infiltrate the UK fishing market by

taking advantage of lax fishing vessel registration

requirements contained in the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 which, although prohibiting ownership of vessels by non-UK nationals, allowed UK registered companies to be registered as the owners. Amongst the early beneficiaries of the 1894 Act was Factortame Limited, a company whose directors were Joseph J L Couceiro, John A Couceiro and Ken L Couceiro, all Spanish nationals resident and domiciled in Spain. The company, together with others whose directors and shareholders were mostly Spanish nationals,

re-registered 53 vessels which had formerly flown the Spanish flag as British fishing vessels under the 1894 Act.
They also acquired 42 existing British vessels with a view to using them in the fishing zone.

Most of these vessels landed their catches in Spain,

but as the fish were caught in UK waters, they counted against the UK fishing quota a practice known as "quota hopping". It would appear the Spanish Fatortame company has exploited the British HE since at least 1894, with the possibility of kickbacks to Satanic British hierarchy for they do absolutely nothing devoid of Satanic nuances All accountable retoactively in perpetuity without PRICK to stand on or motor mouth elusive lucidity holding Dick for defense.

The British government sought to put an end to this practice and enacted a series of measures which proved largely ineffective. In 1988 the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 and the Merchant Shipping (Registration of Fishing Vessels) Regulations were introduced, replacing the system of registration contained in the 1894 Act with a new system under which a vessel could only be registered if it had "a genuine and substantial connection" with the UK. For this to be the case, three conditions had to be fulfilled: (i) the vessel must be British-owned; (ii) the vessel had to be managed and its operations had to be directed and controlled from the UK; and (iii) any charterer, manager or operator had to be a qualified person or company. A "qualified person or company" was a person who was a British citizen resident and domiciled in the UK or a company which was

incorporated in the UK and had its principal place of business there having at least 75% of its shares owned by, and at 75% of its directors being, "qualified persons".

As from 31 March 1989, fishing vessel registrations under the 1894 Act would lapse and the owners would be required to re-register under the 1988 Act. None of Factortame's vessels could satisfy the new requirements and an action for judicial review was brought in the Divisional Court in December 1988.

[edit] Factortame I: interim measures

[edit] Arguments of the parties

Factortame sought, first, a preliminary injunction declaring that the offending part of the 1988 Act could not be applied to them on the grounds that such application would be contrary to directly effective rights under EU law, specifically the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of nationality (article 7 of the Treaty of Rome), the right of individuals and companies to establish themselves in business anywhere in the EU (articles 4348), and the right to participate in the capital of companies situated in another Member State (article 294). The claimants also demanded an order of prohibition preventing the Secretary of State from treating its registrations under the 1894 Act as having ceased.

The UK government argued that the registration requirements were intended to ensure that fishing vessels flying the British flag had a genuine link with the UK. It maintained that international law entitled each State to determine the conditions under which a ship might fly its flag and that Community law had not removed that right. It was also contended that the 1988 Act was consistent with the Community policy on fisheries.

[edit] High Court

On 10 March 1989 the Divisional Court (Neill LJ and Hodgson J) unhesitatingly referred the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling under Article

234 of the Treaty of Rome. It asked whether requirements as to nationality, domicile and control imposed by a Member State as conditions for the registration of fishing vessels were compatible with Community law. At the same time, the Court granted an injunction against the application of the 1988 Act pending a ruling by the ECJ. Giving his judgment, Lord Justice Neill stated that although Community law is part of English law and prevails in the event of a conflict, it was open to argument whether a conflict existed in this case; a national court would have to take a decision which preserves the status quo ante. The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal.

[edit] Court of Appeal

The Court of Appeal (Lord Donaldson MR, Bingham LJ and Mann LJ) reversed the Divisional Court's decision on 22 March 1989 on the basis that although a national court was obliged to give effect to Community law, it was not obliged "to override national law in favour of what is no more than an alleged or putative Community right". Furthermore, it did not believe that the Divisional Court had "acknowledged the constitutional enormity, as the law stands, of requiring a Secretary of State to act contrary to the clearly expressed will of Parliament when the unlawfulness of that expression has yet to be established."

The Divisional Court would not, according to the court, have jurisdiction to grant an injunction

until the claimants had succeeded before the ECJ.

[edit] House of Lords

The case was brought before the House of Lords (Lord Bridge, Lord Brandon, Lord Oliver, Lord Goff and Lord Jauncey) on 18 May 1989 which upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal on the grounds that English law did not contain any rule allowing a preliminary injunction against the application of an Act of Parliament. According to Lord Bridge, two obstacles stood in the way of the granting of the injunction. Firstly, the relief sought required the court to order positive action in the shape of the disapplication of the 1988 Act and the application of the 1894 Act; were Factortame not to succeed before the ECJ, the House of Lords would have "conferred upon them rights directly contrary toParliament's sovereign will". Secondly, the court had no jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction against the Crown.

Nevertheless, Lord Bridge did accept that each of these obstacles was subject to any contrary Community law requirement. This required the House of Lords to determine whether, regardless of the position in national law, there existed an overriding principle of Community law imposing an obligation on a national court, faced with a seriously arguable claim to rights having direct effect under Community law, to grant interim relief. Lord Bridge concluded that as there was no clear authority on this question, a decision from the ECJ was necessary to enable the House of Lords to give judgment. The House was, in any event, obliged to request a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC which obliges courts "against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law" to make a reference. This request for a preliminary ruling was in addition to that already made by the Divisional Court on the compatibility of the 1988 Act with Community law.

[edit] European Court of Justice

The action was lodged at the ECJ on 10 July 1989 with the request that it deal with the matter quickly which it indeed did, giving the case priority over others. The whole matter had up until then proceeded with great speed, taking only 6 months from its commencement before the Divisional Court to the House of Lords' judgment. The questions posed essentially asked whether, in the circumstances of the case, Community law overrode English law and either empowered or obliged UK courts to grant the injunction claimed by Factortame.

Advocate-General Tesauro delivered his opinion on 17 May 1990. He first noted that the injunction sought by Factortame would in fact be available in all Member States except the UK and Denmark. He then proceeded to conclude that a national court must have the power to provisionally set aside a national law which conflicts with Community law, founding his argument on three bases. He recalled that it had been established in Simmenthal II (case 106/77) that directly effective Community law provisions create legal rights which are enforceable by individuals from the date of their entry into force, regardless of any contrary national law. It also followed from the ECJ's case law that it was for the legal system of each Member State to designate the procedures intended to protect Community law rights, and that these procedures must not "be adapted so as it make it impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the national courts are bound to protect" (case 61/79, Denkavit). National courts must, in that respect, apply EC law through available national procedures or, failing that, of their own motion. Focusing on the House of Lords' argument that it could not temporarily suspend the application of a national law, the Advocate-General emphasised the importance of interim relief in every

legal system, remarking that its purpose was to ensure that the time needed to establish a right would not deprive that right of any substance. Furthermore, he did not believe that national courts were entitled to give priority to national legislation merely because it had not yet been shown to be incompatible with Community law; if that were the case, rights conferred by national law would have greater protection than that offered to Community law rights.

On 19 June 1990 the ECJ gave its ruling, rephrasing the question posed as "whether a national court which, in a case before it concerning Community law, considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it from granting interim relief is a rule of national law, must disapply that rule". Following the Advocate-General's opinion, the ECJ held that a national court, in fact, has a duty to grant interim relief to safeguard alleged Community rights of individuals until the decision of the ECJ on the interpretation of Community law is available, and where a rule of national law would deny such relief, to set aside that rule. The basis of such a duty lies in the nature and object of directly effective Community law rights which are intended to be fully effective throughout the EU, and where, in order to safeguard such a right, it is necessary to grant interim measures, a national court must do so. This is especially true where a national court is awaiting a clarification or interpretation of the right claimed by the ECJ.

[edit] House of Lords second decision

On 11 October 1990 the House of Lords gave its judgment in the light of the ECJ's ruling and granted an injunction in favour of Factortame. Three principal issues emerged from their judgment, namely the availability of interim relief against the Crown, the basis on which such relief can be granted, and the impact of the ruling on Parliamentary sovereignty.

[edit] Injunction against the Crown

Lord Goff acknowledged that, as a matter of Community law, interim relief had to be available in principle against the Crown, and the basis for granting it lay in section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

[edit] Criteria for an injunction

In deciding to grant relief to Factortame, two factors influenced the House of Lords. Firstly, the likelihood that Factortame would suffer hardship and loss, were relief not to be allowed. Secondly, the prospects of Factortame succeeding in a full trial of the case once the ECJ had given its ruling on the compatibility of the 1988 Act; in this regard, the House of Lords took into account indications from the ECJ's first ruling that Factortame's arguments had 'considerable force'. Lord Goff did, however, emphasise that the courts would not, in other cases, readily or easily grant an injunction against the Crown which effectively prevents the Crown from applying national law.

[edit] Sovereignty and the EU

Addressing the public criticism expressed following the ECJ's decision and the alleged erosion of Parliamentary sovereignty, Lord Bridge remarked that such comments were "based on a misconception", and that under the European Communities Act 1972, the law regulating the UK's membership of the EU, it had "always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law." In the same way that Parliament had introduced legislation to remedy areas of UK law which did not meet the standards set by EU directives, the House of Lords was now accomplishing the same task in giving judgment for Factortame. There was nothing new, in this respect, in recognising the supremacy of EU law in the areas in which it applies.

These comments[2] were perceived by Sir William Wade as 'revolutionary',[3] in that Lord Bridge suggests that Parliament has, in passing the European Communities Act 1972, managed to bind its successors from repealing the Act impliedly. It had previously been thought that no Parliament could ever bind its successors in such a way. In a case where two statutes conflicted, the traditional approach would have been to apply the later statute on the basis that the inconsistent parts of the earlier statute had been repealed.

Such an interpretation of the case is supported by statements in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council and Hunt v Hackney Borough Council to the effect that there now exist two forms of Acts of Parliament: ordinary acts which can be repealed impliedly, and 'statutory' or 'constitutional' acts which can only be repealed expressly. (See in particular the judgment of Laws LJ in Thoburn). Nevertheless, there is no restriction on the ability of Parliament to expressly repeal the European Communities Act 1972.

Furthermore, the case does not, on a strict reading, constitute a breach of Parliamentary sovereignty. The Merchant Shipping Act 1988 was not a purposeful and direct conflict with EC law, but was instead an attempt to give effect to the fishing quotas required under EC law. Therefore, the courts were not striking down a domestic Act of Parliament, but were instead attempting to interpret legislation in a manner compatible with the Treaty obligations that arise under the European Communities Act 1972 (as proposed by Lord Diplock in the case of Garland v British Rail Engineering). It remains to be seen how the courts would respond to an Act of Parliament intentionally contradicting EC law. However, in the case of Macarthys v Smith, Lord Denning suggested that, should such an event occur, the courts would be obliged to obey the domestic law over the European.

[edit] Factortame II: compatibility of the 1988 Act

On 25 July 1991 the ECJ gave its ruling on the question referred by the Divisional Court, namely whether the conditions for registration of fishing vessels under the 1988 Act were compatible with Community law. Agreeing with Advocate-General Mischo's opinion, the court held that "it is for the Member States to determine [...] the conditions which must be fulfilled in order for a vessel to be registered in their registers and granted the right to fly their flag, but, in exercising that power, the Member States must comply with the rules of Community law." In particular, the conditions for registration should not constitute obstacles for nationals of one Member State to establish themselves in business in the territory of another Member State (the freedom of establishment), nor should they discriminate on the basis of nationality.

In the event, the ECJ found the nationality requirements in the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 discriminatory and contrary to Article 43 EC as a restriction on the freedom of establishment. It also violated articles 12 and 221 EC. The residence and domicile conditions also breached Article 43. In effect, by introducing a requirement based on an individual's residence and domicile, the Act operated an unfair distinction between UK nationals and those from other Member States as "the great majority of nationals of the [UK] are resident and domiciled in that State and therefore meet that requirement automatically, whereas nationals of other Member States would, in most cases, have to move their residence and domicile to [the UK] in order to comply with the requirements of [the 1988 Act]." In respect of the condition that the vessel should be managed and its operations directed from the UK, the ECJ found, however, that this requirement was compatible with Community law.

The UK government had argued that the conditions imposed by the 1988 Act were justified on the basis that the Common Fisheries Policy allowed for a system of national quotas and the 1988 Act ensured the effectiveness of that system. This was rejected by the ECJ which stated that fishing vessel registration criteria were permitted, but not where they violated Community law. It was, in that respect, open to the UK government to introduce conditions ensuring that a 'real economic link' existed between the ship and the State of registration, but such a link had to "concern only the relations between the vessel's operations and the population dependent on fisheries and related industries". In other words, it would have been possible for the UK government to prescribe conditions which protected UK fishing communities from the effects of the opening up of national fishing waters to other Member States, but it could not do that through the imposition of explicit nationality and residence conditions.

[edit] Factortame III: state liability

Following the ECJ's second ruling, the case returned once more to the Divisional Court which, on 18 November 1992, requested a third ruling from ECJ concerning the conditions under which a Member State may incur liability for damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law attributable to that State. At around the same time the German Federal Court had asked for a ruling on a similar question in the case of Brasserie du Pcheur v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland and so the two cases were joined.

At this time the ECJ had just delivered judgment in Francovich which established the principle that "a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law". The Factortame case provided the court for an opportunity to elaborate on the principles underlying the liability of Member States. It was a case in which almost all Member States intervened to deny, whether wholly substantially, the right to claim damages; the UK accepted that there was, in principle, such a right. The EC Treaty does not deal expressly with the consequences of a breach of Community law by a Member State, and so it was for the court to rule on the question having regard to "the fundamental principles of the Community legal system and, where necessary, general principles common to the legal systems of the Member States."

In its judgment delivered on 5 March 1996 the ECJ reaffirmed the right of reparation, and stated that it existed irrespective of whether the provision of Community law in question has direct effect. Furthermore, the principle applies to any case where a Member State

breaches Community law, irrespective of which organ of the State was responsible for the breach. The ECJ rejected the contentions that the right to reparation required the introduction of legislation by the EU, and that the availability of damages should be decided, in each case, on the basis of the national law of the State in question.

The court proceeded to outline the conditions on which liability would be established. It underlined that such conditions could not, in the absence of a particular justification, differ from the conditions applicable to the liability of the Community in similar circumstances. Further, the right to reparation would depend on the nature of the breach of Community law in question and the extent of the discretion available to the State in question. The conditions are:

1. the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals;

2. the breach must be sufficiently serious;

3. there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation and the damage sustained by the injured party.

In the case where a State had exercised broad discretion in passing legislation which breached Community law (as was the case in Factortame), for the breach to be "sufficiently serious" it must be "manifest" and "grave". National courts have jurisdiction to decide how to characterise the breach in question, taking into account the clarity and precision of the Community rule infringed, whether the damage was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable, and whether a Community institution contributed towards the adoption or maintenance of contrary national measures or practices. These same conditions apply to state liability for damage caused by the decision of a judicial body adjudicating at last instance.

[edit] Factortame IV: right to damages

The matter came back to the Divisional Court (Hobhouse LJ, Collins J and Moses LJ) which ruled on 31 July 1997 that the UK had committed a sufficiently serious breach of Community law in passing the offending provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, and that that breach gave rise to damage for which Factortame should be compensated. The court rejected a claim by Factortame for exemplary damages. The decision was appealed by the UK government to the Court of Appeal (Lord Woolf MR, Schiemann LJ and Walker LJ) which rejected the appeal on 8 April 1998. The government appealed again to the House of Lords (Lord Slynn, Lord Nicholls, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Clyde and Lord Hope).

The House of Lords unanimously ruled in favour of Factortame on 28 October 1999. It rejected the argument that the governm ent's reliance on legal advice at the time of passing the 1988 Act did not deprive the breach of its grave and manifest character. The court did accept, however, that the government had acted in good faith in passing the Act. Nevertheless, the government had been aware of the risk it was running with such legislation and it had done everything possible to ensure that fishermen could not obtain interim relief against the Act's application. The case would now go back to the Divisional Court for the amount of damages to be determined.

In March 2000, Factortame and the other claimants (approximately 90 Anglo-Spanish fishing companies) accepted an offer of settlement from the Secretary of State. Under the terms of the settlement the claimants, who had originally claimed 285 million, received 55 million including interest of some 26 million.[4]

[edit] Factortame V: limitation issues

On 27 November 2000 Judge Toulmin in the Technology and Construction Court held, under the Limitation Act 1955, Factortame's claims against the UK government were 'actions founded on tort', and that consequently a six-year limitation period applied. This meant that other claims against the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 would only be admissible if they had been lodged by 10 July 1996 (i.e. six years from the House of Lords' decision of 9 July 1990 granting Factortame interim relief), if not such claims were statute-barred. The Judge therefore rejected claims by Factortame in respect of other fishing vessels which had been refused registration under the 1988 Act, but which had not formed part of the original claim lodged in 1988, nor had been claimed before July 1996.

The Judge also rejected an attempt by Factortame to obtain damages for injury to feelings and aggravated damages caused by the government's breach of Community law. Factortame had argued that claims for discrimination under European law were broadly comparable to claims for discrimination to individuals under the Race Relations Act 1976. This was not accepted by Judge Toulmin who emphasised that such damages were only awarded in cases where the breach in question had caused harm to the claimant's self-esteem.

[edit] Academic debate

This section requires expansion. The Factortame case has produced large amounts of academic debate as to whether it can be reconciled with the idea of legislative supremacy as stated by Dicey. Sir William Wade argues that the Factortame judgment alters the Rule of Recognition.[5]

[edit] Sovereignty from the United Kingdom perspective

The issue of whether the UK Parliament or the European Court of Justice has ultimate sovereignty over European Community laws which apply to the UK is still an area of intense legal debate and conflicting views. In current practice, the UK recognises the primacy of the European Court of Justice for those areas of law in which the EU has competency. However, in Macarthys Ltd v Smith, Lord Denning said, "If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then . . . it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament."[6][7]

This view of the UK's ultimate sovereignty was supported by Lord Justice Laws in the Thoburn v Sunderland City Council case, when he said, "...there is nothing in the European Communities Act which allows the European Court, or any other institution of the EU, to touch or qualify the conditions of Parliament's legislative supremacy in the United Kingdom...That being so, the legislative and judicial institutions of the EU cannot intrude upon those conditions."

That European law has primacy over UK law has been stated many times. In ECJ Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964), the ECJ stated, "...the Members States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields." In Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) their ruling states, "...the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights."

The question of who has the ultimate 'Kompetenz-Kompetenz' (i.e. the right to decide the limits the European Court of Justice's jurisdiction) has not been settled.

The Factortame case is important for two reasons. Firstly, the European Court of Justice re-asserts the primacy of European Community law, and its ability to overrule conflicting domestic legislation. It also changes the balance of power in the constitution. For the first time since 1688 (prior to the Bill of Rights), the judiciary is able to set aside the will of the legislature, even though it has knowledge of its express wish.

The Factortame case is often cited as evidence for the erosion of UK sovereignty and independence by the Eurosceptic movement in the UK. The central question is therefore whether Parliament is truly sovereign.

[edit] See also

European Union law

Constitution of the United Kingdom

History of the British constitution

[edit] References

1.

^ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do? language=en&id=74&ftuId=FTU_4.4.1.html

2. ^ Lord Bridge [1991] 1 AC 603, 658; quoted in Craig, Paul; Grinne de Brca (2007). EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials (4th ed. ed.). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 367f. ISBN 978-0-19-927389-8. "Some public comments on the decision of the Court of Justice, affirming the jurisdiction of the courts of member states to override national legislation if necessary to enable interim relief to be granted in protection of rights under Community law, have suggested that this was a novel and dangerous invasion by a Community institution of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. But such comments are based on a misconception. If the supremacy within the European Community of Community law over the national law of member states was not always inherent in the EEC Treaty it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary. Under the terms of the 1972 Act it has always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law. [...] Thus there is nothing in any way novel in according supremacy to rules of Community law in those areas to which they apply [...]"

3.

^ Wade, Sir William; Forsyth, Christopher (2000). Administrative Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 28. ISBN 978-0-19-876525-7.

4. ^ "House of Lords, Hansard Debates, 8 February 2001". http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200001/ldhansrd/vo010208/text/1020 8w02.htm. Retrieved 2008-01-19.

5.

^ Wade, Sir William (1996). "Sovereignty - Evolution or Revolution?". Law Quarterly Review 112: 574.

6. ^ Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd v Smith [1979] ICR 785 at p. 789, quoted in Steiner, Josephine; Lorna Woods; Christian Twigg-Flesner (2006). "Section 4.4.2: Effect of the European Communities Act 1972, s.2(1) and (4)". EU Law (9th ed. ed.). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 79. ISBN 9780-19-927959-3. "If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then . . . it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament."

7. ^ Jack Straw MP (2005-02-08). "Select Committee on European Scrutiny Minutes of Evidence: Examination of Witnesses (Questions 229-239): Rt hon Jack Straw MP and Mr David Frost". House of Commons Publications.http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmeul eg/38-xiv/5020802.htm. Retrieved 2008-01-09. "I think your Committee will be familiar with what Lord Denning, then Master of the Rolls, said in McCarthy v Smith: "If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision of it or with the intention of acting inconsistently with itit says so in express termsI should have thought it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute in our Parliament." That much is clear. Other consequences would follow in those circumstances, which arise from our signature on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty, Article 27, which says that you have to respect the international obligations into which you have entered."

[edit] External links

Companies House: company registration information for Factortame Limited

[edit] Factortame I

House of Lords judgment, 18 May 1989

ECJ's ruling, 19 June 1990

House of Lords 2nd judgment, 11 October 1990

[edit] Factortame II

ECJ's 2nd ruling, 25 July 1991

[edit] Factortame III

ECJ's 3rd ruling, 5 March 1996

[edit] Factortame IV

Divisional Court, 31 July 1997

Court of Appeal, 8 April 1998

House of Lords, 28 October 1999

[edit] Factortame V

High Court, 27 November 2000

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factortame_litigation"

Categories: European Union case law | United Kingdom constitution | English case law | English administrative case law | 1989 in case law | 1990 in case law | 1989 in the United Kingdom | 1990 in the United Kingdom Hidden categories: Articles needing additional references from January 2008 | All articles needing additional references | Articles to be expanded from January 2008 | All articles to be expanded | Use dmy dates from January 2011 This page was last modified on 13 April 2011 at 11:15.

Whats it all about Alfie?

Rule of Law The rule of law is a legal maxim which provides that no person is above the law, that no one can be punished by the state except for a breach of the law, and that no one can be convicted of breaching the law except in the manner set forth by the law itself.

The rule of law stands in contrast to the idea that the leader is above the law a feature of Roman Law, Nazi law, and certain other legal systems.
The phrase has been used since the 17th century, but the concept is older. For example, the Greek philosopher Aristotle said, "Law should govern".[2]

One way to be free from the rule of law is by denying that an enactment has the necessary attributes of law.
The rule of law has therefore been described as

"an exceedingly elusive notion"[3] giving rise to a

"rampant divergence of understandings".[4]

At least two principal conceptions of the rule of law can be identified: a formalist or "thin" and a substantive or "thick" definition of the rule of law.

Formalist definitions of the rule of law

do not make a judgment about the "justness" of law itself,

but define specific procedural attributes that a legal framework must have in order to be in compliance with the rule of law.

Substantive conceptions of the rule of law go beyond this and include certain substantive rights that

are

said to be based on, or derived from, the rule of law.[5]

Sovereignty
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty Sovereignty is the quality of having supreme, independent authority over a geographic area, such as a territory.[1] It can be found in a power to rule and make law that rests

on a political fact for which no purely legal explanation can be provided.

In theoretical terms, the idea of "sovereignty", historically, from Socrates to Thomas Hobbes, has always necessitated a moral imperative on the entity exercising it.

According to the Ancient Roman statesman Cicero, "We are all servants of the laws in order that we may be free."[10] During the Roman Republic, controversial magistrates might be put on trial when their terms of office expired. Under the Roman Empire,

the sovereign was personally immune (legibus solutus), but those with grievances could sue the treasury.[6
Traditional Neutering DJ VUs procon Diversionary Elusive Justice Articulated Valid Understanding Satanic aka GREEDSCROLL Gratuitous Righteous Entrepreneur Elusivity Discretionary Satanic Connotation Rule of Law Lucidity Integral role in the SSS Satanic Sucker Sandwich aka Satanic Sucker School Roll the humanic to Kingdom come LECTURES Legal Elusive Certainty Taxpayers Usury Righteous Economical Scamming