http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05GEORGETOWN1281.html# 05GEORGETOWN1281, JAGDEO: U.S.

LOSING PR BATTLE IN LATIN AMERICA Reference ID 05GEORGETOWN1281 Created 2005-12-07 17:02 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification SECRET Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO7822 RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHGE #1281/01 3411702 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 071702Z DEC 05 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2841 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0066 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL 0010 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 001281 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM EAGR ELTN SCUL KPAO XM GY SUBJECT: JAGDEO: U.S. LOSING PR BATTLE IN LATIN AMERICA REF: A. GEORGETOWN 1271 B. GEORGETOWN 1273 Classified By: Political Officer Benjamin Canavan for reason 1.4(d) 1. (C) SUMMARY. Charge and PolOff met with President Jagdeo on December 5 for an informal, amiable discussion of ongoing bilateral issues. Jagdeo also shared his candid view on a topic that clearly interests him -- the U.S. public relations problem in Latin America. During the conversation, Jagdeo could not conceal his deep mistrust of Guyana's main opposition party, the PNC/R. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- -------------"US is Losing the Public Relations Battle in Latin America" --------------------------------------------- -------------2. (C) Charge and PolOff met with President Jagdeo on December 5 for an informal, amiable discussion of ongoing bilateral issues. Jagdeo had requested the meeting when speaking with Charge at a dinner the week before. 3. (C) Jagdeo used a discussion of Guyana's border dispute

with Venezuela to segue into sharing his view of Chavez and, more broadly, anti-American sentiment in Latin America. He began with an admonition that the U.S. has to be more careful in its dealings with Latin America since "neo-liberalism has not worked in the region". Jagdeo said that he and other Latin American leaders, noting Chavez as an exception, do understand and accept that a model based on the private sector is the only solution for achieving economic development. However, improvements can be made to the neo-liberal model, he said, and lots of ordinary people feel that it is causing greater poverty in society. He said that Latin American leaders, regardless of whether they are left-wing or right-wing, need to be seen as focusing on alleviating poverty, promoting land reform, improving health care, and addressing issues of indigenous and minority groups. 4. (C) Jagdeo said that the "U.S. is losing the public relations battle in Latin America". People have the perception that transnational companies are carrying away the wealth of Latin American countries. He said that the more the U.S. attacks and criticizes Chavez publicly, the more it reinforces this negative perception in Latin America -despite the generosity and idealism of the American people. --------------------------------------------- -------Comfort with Election Process, Deep Mistrust of PNC/R --------------------------------------------- -------5. (C) Charge raised the issue of election preparations, noting general donor satisfaction with the voter registration process except that the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) does not have a robust public relations initiative and Amerindians in remote communities often do not have the documents required to register and vote (ref A). Jagdeo responded that getting the registration process' momentum going in time for the election was the key issue in his mind. As for registration in remote communities, he said that GECOM, the General Register Office, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Amerindian Affairs had met recently to address this issue. 6. (C) While distancing himself from GECOM's activities, Jagdeo did say that GECOM needs to look at three issues -- a more robust public relations strategy, more registration stations since the current twenty-three are too far and expensive to reach for many constituents, and strong penalties for any illegal activities in the registration and voting process. He pointed out that some groups encourage tactics like underage voting -- a thinly veiled barb directed at the opposition PNC/R party. He said the government (GoG) has acceded to GECOM's additional funding requests, even though GECOM is "milking us now", because of the importance of a smooth election process. He said there needs to be one

coordinating local election observer group as GECOM cannot practicably accredit three hundred churches, for example. Jagdeo expressed his hope that the Carter Center would return to monitor the 2006 election. In addition to the Carter Center, he said the GoG has officially asked the OAS, EU, and Commonwealth Secretariat to monitor the elections. 7. (C) In discussing election preparations, Jagdeo made several strongly partisan statements that underscore the absolute mutual distrust between the PPP/C and PNC/R parties. He is unconvinced of the need for long-term international election observers because the problem with Guyana's GEORGETOWN 00001281 002 OF 002

electoral mechanisms is not one of incompetence but rather the burden of the past. He said elections staff show bias and, putting it in very blunt terms, "we're paranoid" and "you should understand it", most likely referring to a recently released volume of Foreign Relations of the United States that details covert US support to assist former PNC president Forbes Burnham rig elections. When Charge mentioned the importance of leaders' commitment to the democratic political process and OAS' high reputation democracy and governance work, Jagdeo expressed his deep skepticism of the value of such work in Guyana's political environment. What is the point of another training program for the same MPs, he asked, when they do not want to then engage in a constructive political process in parliament. He said that smart people attend the training sessions, return to their offices, and plot -- because they think there is a different way to power than fair elections. --------------------------------------------- -----Mennonites Eye Guyana - GoG Fears Jonestown's Ghost --------------------------------------------- -----8. (C) Last week Jagdeo expressed interest in beginning cultivation of Guyana's intermediate savannahs. Charge told Jagdeo that a group of Mennonites from the Southern U.S. was returning to Guyana for a second look at the possibility of establishing a farming community in Guyana's southern interior. He briefly described Belize's half century of experience with Mennonite farming communities. Jagdeo acknowledged that the Mennonites' intentions might dovetail with his plan to cultivate more of Guyana's hinterlands (ref B), and said he would ask the government of Belize about their experience. However, Jagdeo also noted that establishment of a religious farming community would be a sensitive issue given the firm hold that the Jonestown experience still has on the national psyche. He said that GoG was also talking with an Israeli group that hoped to develop a large agricultural project in the interior.

9. (C) Jagdeo mentioned Guyana's changing geography in light of GoG's transportation initiatives. Specifically, he described a road project underway that would link Supenaam, Essequibo, with Venezuela. He emphasized, though, that he was "not creating access for Chavez" as the road would end a little short of the border. ------Comment ------10. (S) Jagdeo, attending the meeting alone, remained amiable, attentive, unhurried, friendly and frank throughout. He urged Charge to forget diplomatic niceties and share his impressions of Guyana, as he is open minded to criticism. The President became noticeably more animated when he turned the conversation to Latin America's perception of the U.S. and again when discussing his frustration with the political opposition. By contrast, he openly deferred to the Presidential Secretariat Head on the subjects of counter-narcotics and security, saying that he "does not pay much attention to those subjects". An economist himself, Jagdeo clearly relishes repartee over economic models and theories. His view of the U.S. relationship with Latin America dealt exclusively with differences in economic frameworks rather than political philosophies. Jagdeo's contempt for the PNC/R seeped out over an hour-long conversation. Like for most PPP party members, the past (specifically, the 1964-1992 period spent effectively shut out of Guyana's political system) is a constant companion. For Jagdeo, even the country's regrettable litter problem is a direct result of the Guyanese people losing respect for the rule of law when the PNC outlawed wheat flour during Burnham's self-sufficiency drive. End Comment. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05GEORGETOWN1313.html# 05GEORGETOWN1313, GLIMMER OF HOPE IN GUYANA'S ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING Reference ID 05GEORGETOWN1313 VZCZCXYZ0010 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #1313 3492005 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 152005Z DEC 05 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2880 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0875 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0157 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0077 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN SAN JUAN PR RUEABND/DEA MIAMI FL RUEAORD/CUSTOMS CARIBBEAN ATTACHE MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 001313 SIPDIS SIPDIS CARACAS FOR LEGATT, PORT OF SPAIN ALSO FOR DEA AND LEGATT, JUSTICE FOR OPDAT - RLIPMAN, SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015 TAGS: SNAR EFIN PGOV KCRM GY SUBJECT: GLIMMER OF HOPE IN GUYANA'S ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING FIGHT REF: A. GEORGETOWN 323 B. GEORGETOWN 370 Classified By: Political Officer Benjamin Canavan for reason 1.4(b) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Guyana's Director of Public Prosecutions met with PolOff on December 13 and indicated that she is preparing what would be a watershed money laundering case. Two suspects implicated in a 2004 UK drug bust received wire transfers in Guyana in 2002 totaling almost USD 300,000 and exchanged that money into Guyanese currency. END SUMMARY. Created 2005-12-15 20:05 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

2. (C) On December 13, PolOff met with Acting Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Shalimar Ali-Hack. The DPP is an independent entity responsible for the prosecution of major criminal cases in the High Court and less serious criminal offenses in the magistrates' courts. Ali-Hack has spent her entire career in the DPP's office, becoming Acting DPP in January 2005. During the meeting, she mentioned a money laundering case that she is prosecuting herself in the hopes of winning a landmark first conviction on money laundering charges in Guyana. 3. (C) The two suspects in the case owned one property and rented another in London when British authorities raided them in 2004. The raids revealed the properties to house operations making crack cocaine. UK authorities also found approximately USD 70,000 and GBP 70,000 in cash at these locations. The connection to Guyana is that the same two suspects received wire transfers of approximately USD 300,000 in Guyana in 2002. The suspects then exchanged the USD for Guyanese dollars in two tranches at a local currency exchange "cambio". 4. (C) Ali-Hack wants to prosecute this case using the provisions of the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act of 2000. The consensus view of those trying to combat drug trafficking and money laundering in Guyana is that the existing law is too weak to effectively try persons suspected of committing these crimes. The head of Guyana's Financial Intelligence Unit is currently completing an amendment to the money laundering legislation that he hopes to table in parliament in 2006. A successful prosecution by Ali-Hack would be an unprecedented event in Guyana where the courts have to date failed to punish those responsible for drug trafficking. 5. (U) Efforts to indict people on drug trafficking and money laundering charges in Guyana are hampered by several statutory restrictions. Only original documents can be admitted into evidence. This precludes everything from electronic surveillance to testimony by video link. No witness protection program exists. Guyanese regulations do not allow plea-bargaining or immunity, making it almost impossible to convince drug mules to cooperate. Cases often take years to reach trial. Even before reaching trial stage, a Magistrate's Court will hold a preliminary inquiry equivalent to a full trial at which witnesses appear and evidence is presented. Only then will the judge commit the case to the High Court, where the trial is repeated. These hurdles have prevented many narcotics cases from resulting in prosecutions. 6. (C) The Director of Public Prosecutions position has been vacant since September 2002 when the former DPP was wounded in a drive-by shooting. Advertisements for the position have appeared recently in local newspapers. Ali-Hack intends to

apply for the permanent position herself. Other potential candidates include Justice of Appeal (and former DPP) Ian Chang and Justice William Ramlall. Justice Chang served on the Presidential Commission of Inquiry that exonerated former Minister of Home Affairs Ronald Gajraj in March 2005 of involvement in extra-judicial killings (see reftels). BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05GEORGETOWN1329.html# 05GEORGETOWN1329, CABINET INSIDER AMBIVALENT ABOUT PROSECUTING DRUG LORDS Reference ID 05GEORGETOWN1329 VZCZCXYZ0006 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #1329 3542059 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 202059Z DEC 05 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2906 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0169 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 001329 SIPDIS SIPDIS CARACAS FOR LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN ALSO FOR DEA AND LEGATT JUSTICE FOR OPDAT - RLIPMAN SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2015 TAGS: SNAR EFIN PGOV PREL KCRM GY SUBJECT: CABINET INSIDER AMBIVALENT ABOUT PROSECUTING DRUG LORDS Classified By: Political Officer Benjamin Canavan For reason 1.4(d) 1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador met with Head of Presidential Secretariat Roger Luncheon on December 16 to discuss DEA SIPDIS plans in Guyana (reported septel). Luncheon's comments during the meeting about how to fight the drug trade in Guyana, such as his stated preference for sanctioning rather than prosecuting drug traffickers, are cause for some concern. END SUMMARY. Sanctions, Not Prosecutions, to Fight Drug Trade --------------------------------------------- --2. (C) Ambassador, DCM, and PolOff met with Head of Presidential Secretariat Roger Luncheon on December 16. During the meeting, Ambassador reiterated the need for Created 2005-12-20 20:59 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

concerted cooperation among Guyana's law enforcement agencies to fight drug trafficking, especially since the traffickers often appear to be better coordinated than the authorities. Ambassador acknowledged that Luncheon and President Jagdeo are concerned about the seizures of drugs emanating from Guyana. Luncheon responded in detail with his opinion on how Guyana ought to fight the drug trade. 3. (C) Luncheon said that everyone knows who is trafficking drugs and laundering money, but Guyana lacks "the final step in getting quality information that can be used to finish prosecutions successfully". Ambassador said that the U.S. could help in this area by providing legal assistance and noted that it may be possible to obtain indictments in the U.S. in cases where it can be demonstrated that drug shipments are destined for the U.S. Luncheon said that he is unconvinced about the benefits of legal assistance. Instead, he would prefer to tighten up bank supervision to expose money launderers. Luncheon said that he favors "sanctions other than prosecution" to instill in narco-criminals the fear of losing business rather than fear of prosecution. Luncheon reasoned that this environment would force money launderers to move their ill-gotten gains out of the banks and through other channels with a higher risk of detection. He believes this method of public shaming would be more effective in fighting the drug trade than trying to prosecute drug smuggling cases. Ambassador reminded Luncheon that the U.S. government is working closely with Guyana's Financial Intelligence Unit to crack down on money laundering. 4. (C) COMMENT. Luncheon's opinion that prosecuting drug traffickers is not a viable policy objective is disturbing given the serious nature of the narco-trafficking problem in Guyana. And while bank supervision does need to be tightened considerably, that is unlikely to have significant effect given that Guyana narco-traffickers are well invested in money-exchange "cambios", the timber and construction industries, retail shops, and other cash businesses that provide easy mechanisms to launder dirty money. END COMMENT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05GEORGETOWN1349.html 05GEORGETOWN1349, TEIXEIRA STRUGGLING TO CONTROL HOME AFFAIRS Reference ID 05GEORGETOWN1349 Created 2005-12-28 23:20 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification SECRET Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GEORGETOWN 001349 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE ALSO FOR INL/HSTC E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR SMIG KFRD KCOR KCRM GY SUBJECT: TEIXEIRA STRUGGLING TO CONTROL HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY REF: GEORGETOWN 1269 Classified By: Charge d,Affaires Michael D. Thomas for reason 1.4(b) an d (d) 1. (U) SUMMARY. Charge, Deputy Consul, and PolOff met with Minister of Home Affairs Gail Teixeira on December 23. Teixeira had requested a Consular briefing on trends in fake Guyanese civil documents detected by the Consular Section. Teixeira also described problems with control of the visa process in Guyana's foreign missions, including those in India, China, Israel, and Africa. Teixeira also discussed voter registration problems that continue to dog the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) (septel). END SUMMARY. No Control Over Birth, Marriage Registrations --------------------------------------------2. (C) Charge, Deputy Consul, and PolOff met with Minister Teixeira at the MHA on December 23. Teixeira had asked Ambassador last month to send a Consular Officer to brief her on fraudulent birth and marriage certificates issued by the General Register Office (GRO) that had been detected by the Consular Section. Teixeira was particularly worried that she is not getting full and accurate details on these incidents in the briefings GRO gives her. Deputy Consul described the problematic birth and marriage certificates submitted to the Consular Section in Immigrant Visa cases, which appear to have been genuinely issued using GRO paper and seals, but which were not obtained in accordance with Guyanese law. The clear implication is that GRO is issuing civil documents

improperly. 3. (SBU) Birth certificates. In a common example, someone whose original birth certificate does not list a father is able to obtain a new certificate from GRO that includes the purported father's name. Teixeira confirmed this was not legal without the father at least going to court and accepting paternity. 4. (SBU) Marriages. Guyanese marriage certificates state whether the marriage is by license, by notice, or by banns. The latter two methods require both the bride and groom to be in Guyana for weeks before the marriage. In Guyana's widespread business marriages, the Guyanese-American petitioner will usually remain in the country less than a week and use an unscrupulous marriage officer to wed them and obtain a certificate. Texeira confirmed these quick visit marriages are invalid if done by notice or banns. 5. (C) Minister Teixeira expressed what seemed to be genuine displeasure with these improperly or unlawfully issued civil documents involving GRO. She explained how she is already trying to fix the problem. She has confronted GRO about similar incidents but to date GRO has denied responsibility for the fraudulent documents. However, the evidence is too convincing now -- the paper stock, seal, and signatures of these certificates are all genuine. Regarding marriages, Teixeira has revoked the license of one marriage officer and is scrutinizing the entire marriage license process. She has also required the GRO to implement basic management controls over controlled items, such as locking up the seal when not in use and inventorying and securing supplies of blank certificates. She also asked Deputy Consul to keep her apprised on a monthly basis of problems encountered with GRO issued documents. Trying to Control Who Comes In and Who Stays Out --------------------------------------------- --6. (C) Teixeira mentioned several suspicious visa cases on her plate. She said this flow of people wanting to enter Guyana on unlikely pretenses could relate to trafficking in persons, the gold and diamond industries, arms smuggling, or terrorist links. She said she would like to work with USG to prevent these activities. She takes some files immediately to the Guyana Police Force's Special Branch for them to check Interpol databases or any other sources, since the Ministry has no computer resources to conduct such checks. 7. (C) Following up on the November 17 meeting's discussion of Indian tour operators (reftel), Teixeira said she is taking a hard line with tour operators applying for visas for large groups of young, single, businessmen purportedly traveling to Guyana for tourism. Almost every set of applicants included an older man with an Indian passport issued at a location outside of India (such as Beirut or

Frankfurt). Teixeira has compiled a case file with passport numbers for each of these tour group applicants. In early December, a new tour operator appeared requesting visas for another group of "tourists". Teixeira forwarded the operator's supposed e-mail address to the Indian High Commission, which determined the address was fictitious. 8. (C) Teixeira described a court case involving a group of Indians waylaid in Guyana before trying to enter the U.S. or Canada illegally. In what she said is a typical scam, their families probably paid human smugglers to take them to "America". After bringing the group to Guyana (in the "Americas") the smugglers then demand additional payments for onward transport to the U.S. or Canada. In the case at hand, one man escaped and went to the Indian High Commission. Three Indians are now in protective custody as witnesses but the authorities will not be able to keep them much longer. Teixeira does not know how these three entered Guyana. She admitted she is unsure what she is dealing with but this case is just the "tip of the iceberg". 9. (S) Teixeira described the steps she has taken to curtail irresponsible, or corrupt, consular operations at Guyana's diplomatic posts. She said she encountered "great resistance in foreign missions trying to tighten up on visa issuances" and lamented that the MFA and other ministries do not understand that visa officers overseas are an important part of the country's security apparatus. All diplomatic missions are supposed to send visa issuance reports to the MHA, but the Ministry receives them six weeks after the fact when the travelers have already either transited Guyana or have arrived and disappeared. -- Teixeira said she has managed to bring Beijing visa operations under control. Guyana has ceased issuing visas for Chinese to join their families in Guyana, although Chinese are still granted visas to work in the timber and sugar industries (Note: China is financing a US$100 million restructuring of Guyana's sugar industry. End note.) She said that a corrupt system operated in China involving the mission and the Ministry. Now, the mission in Beijing can only deal with bilateral cooperation and investment issues. -- In response to Charge's question, Teixeira said the visa situation in India is "manageable". All visa applications from South India come to the MHA in Georgetown for adjudication, allowing for greater scrutiny. She believes South Indians who want a Guyanese visa would not travel all the way to New Delhi to apply in person at the High Commission there. In response to Charge's direct question about visa operations at Guyana's Embassy in New Delhi, Teixeira said "Delhi doesn't deal with us". When the conversation turned to Delhi, the normally animated Teixeira slowed down and spoke carefully and deliberately. She was

noticeably less forthcoming about the situation in Delhi than about any other topic during the two and a half hour meeting. However, she did suggest twice that her relationship with the Delhi Embassy was dictated by orders from higher authority. (Note: Teixeira's predecessor as Minister of Home Affairs, Ronald Gajraj, was implicated in death squad activity and was forced to resign under pressure from the US and other donors after he admitted to consorting with and illegally granting gun licenses to known murders. Gajraj has now taken up appointment in New Delhi as Guyana's High Commissioner to India. End note.) -- Texeira said Guyana's embassy in Suriname and Guyana's honorary consuls (particularly in Africa and Israel) are now her biggest problems on the visa front. 10. (S) In Teixeira's words, Guyana does not have an immigration policy. There is little control over visa issuance. Immigration authorities cannot control or keep track of who enters the country. The government loses immigration cases in court. Deportation is expensive and often ineffective. In the past, all immigration decisions contained a note that refused applicants could appeal directly to the Minister, a practice Teixeira said she had abolished. Teixeira said disorder in the immigration process is embarrassing to the government and the GoG wants to do something about it. But President Jagdeo is also concerned about profiling travelers by race or nationality -- an image he does not want to project. Corruption Interferes Constantly -------------------------------11. (S) During the meeting, Teixeira acknowledged there "was quite a lot of corruption in the immigration division". She has tried to deal with it by firing many employees in the Ministry. However, she fears that these corrupt former employees will sell their knowledge of the system and ability to forge documents. For example, she said the former MHA Security Policy Coordinator, Sultan Kassim, is "very closely linked to a number of networks, particularly the Chinese" and described a slush fund financed by Brazilian fees for work permits that Gajraj and Kassim had run. Unable to pin any direct evidence of illegal activity on Kassim, Teixeira said she had dealt with him by sending him on long-term leave. 12. (S) Teixeira stated that while corruption also existed in the police force and GRO, the corruption of justices and magistrates was the most worrying. She said all Guyanese know which cases, magistrates, and lawyers are tainted by corruption. As a result, the government cannot win important convictions. Similarly, she said everyone knows who the "drug lawyers" are, but the local bar association is too feeble to disbar anyone.

Still Uneasy about American Religious Groups and Airstrips --------------------------------------------- ------------13. (C) Teixeira reiterated the concern she raised at the previous meeting about the Seventh Day Aviation medical group operating in Guyana. She said a different group now wants to build an airstrip in the Rupununi hinterland. This group has suddenly expanded from one priest with an aircraft in the late 1990s to a group of around 20 missionaries whose projects always involve airstrips. Teixeira emphasized the government's desire for fewer rural airstrips, given their link to narco-trafficking, and its policy of destroying some of them. She thinks these American religious groups are somehow taking advantage of the Amerindian villages that host them. However, besides referring to reports of drug drops at one location, she shared no evidence of possible sinister activity on the missionaries' part. Request for Assistance ---------------------14. (U) Teixeira made two requests for assistance. -- First, she would like to computerize the civil document process (all birth, marriage, and death certificates are now handwritten) and create scanned archival copies of all old records. She said two groups are submitting proposals to do this but she does not have the money to implement the project. Teixeira noted that this major project will have to wait until after the 2006 elections. -- Second, Teixeira asked for assistance in auditing the GRO's internal control procedures and in training GRO personnel to better understand and manage the critical security component to their jobs. She would like such training to culminate in new standard operating procedures for GRO's activities. Comment ------15. (C) This meeting further confirmed that Teixeira genuinely wants to fight the corruption and inefficiency that have a crippling effect on her broad portfolio (including GRO, immigration, the attorney general and the courts, and the police force). Long-standing smuggling routes that transfer illegal migrants from India, Pakistan, and China through Guyana to the U.S. and Canada are ideal for exploitation by terrorists and others who would do us harm. Thus, it would be strongly in U.S. interest to find ways to assist Teixeira in vetting suspect visa applications and tightening control of civil documents. 16. (C) Unfortunately, although Teixeira criticizes her predecessor Gajraj's imperious, direct control over the Ministry's workings, she has only slightly loosened the reins of control herself. This may reflects her very valid concerns over both corruption and competence within the MHA,

or the PPP's habit of centralized decision-making and micro-management. The fact that she involves herself personally in sensitive visa applications supports either hypothesis. Another possibility is that the position has overwhelmed her. Post rates Teixeira highly as an honest, forthright interlocutor. However, more than a few Guyanese insiders think of her as a lightweight better suited to her previous position as Minister of Youth, Culture, and Sport. END COMMENT. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05GEORGETOWN1350.html# 05GEORGETOWN1350, GUYANA ELECTION PREVIEW #2: CALL FOR LONG-TERM Reference ID 05GEORGETOWN1350 Created 2005-12-29 00:04 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 001350 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL GY SUBJECT: GUYANA ELECTION PREVIEW #2: CALL FOR LONG-TERM OBSERVERS, DIFFICULTIES WITH REGISTRATION AND BIOMETRICS REF: GEORGETOWN 1271 Classified By: Political Officer Benjamin Canavan For reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) SUMMARY. While progress continues on some fronts, three major problems loom with preparations for the 2006 elections: a) the urgent need to secure long-term observers to monitor the registration process that began in October; b) hiccups in the plan to scan and cross-match all registered voters' fingerprints; c) some citizens' inability to obtain birth certificates needed to register. The next donor meeting will take place on January 5. END SUMMARY. Donor Consensus that Long-Term Observers are Critical --------------------------------------------- -------2. (C) The Commonwealth, European Union, and CARICOM all have preliminary plan to send short-term observers to monitor the July/August polling-day mechanics. However, the process of casting and counting votes is not/not the chief concern for the upcoming elections and the blessing of short-term poll-watchers who were not in Guyana for the registration process will not convince disgruntled losing parties that the election was free and fair. The ABCEU donor group members (America, Britain, Canada, European Union, United Nations) all agree that a long-term Election Observation Mission (EOM) should monitor the voter registration process that began in October and the creation of the 2006 voter list. These are the two most contentious issues for the Guyanese electorate. 3. (C) The focus of post-election violence in the last three

elections has been the PNC's loss in polls declared free and fair by all observers. With reason or not, the PNC has blamed its losses on failures in the registration process and compilation of the voters list. In the run-up to the 2006 election, PNC leaders are making very clear in private conversations that they dispute the legitimacy of the registration process and that the elections should be postponed two years so they can be held "properly". In the meantime, they propose an interim power-sharing government for two years. (Note: The PNC concerns are interesting given that all GECOM decisions regarding the 2006 elections so far have been made by unanimous votes, including the PNC-nominated commissioners.) 4. (C) The worrisome difference for the 2006 election is that this time some PNC leaders are suggesting that "certain elements", who are always "unnamed" and "uncontrollable", will use pre-election violence to prevent/postpone the elections while the international community forces President Jagdeo to let the PNC into an interim power-sharing government. Ambassador, EmbOffs, and other donor missions reiterate the unacceptability and folly of this strategy at every official and private opportunity. An independent, credible, expert evaluation of the registration process by a long-term EOM could significantly affect Guyanese perceptions of the registration process and could reduce the potential for pre-election violence. The opportunity to do this will be gone by the time short-term election observers arrive. Fishing for Long-term Observers: 5 Lines in Water, No Catches Yet -------------------------------5. (SBU) Guyana's 2006 general elections began with the opening of continuous registration in October 2005. Speaking with international donors in June 2005, President Jagdeo made clear that he wanted as many observers as possible for as long as possible. Unfortunately, his office did not send the invitation letters to potential observer organizations until September 2005, only a month before the registration process began. The Commonwealth, EU and Carter Center have already begun discussions with the GoG regarding plans for observer missions. 6. (C) The Commonwealth sent an Observer Assessment Mission in early December. The Commonwealth's Special Advisor for the Caribbean shares donors' view that long-term observers are critical, but says it is unlikely the Commonwealth can invest the resources necessary for long-term observers. As an alternative she will make frequent short trips to Guyana to observe the registration process and prepare for the two Commonwealth observer teams that will arrive one month and one week prior to elections. 7. (C) The EU is due to send an election observer assessment

mission in January. The EC delegate and UK High Commissioner are both pressing the EU to include long-term observers in their plans, but even if the EU acts rapidly after its assessment mission, it would be difficult to get an EU team in place before the continuous registration exercise concludes in mid-March. 8. (C) Minister of Public Service Jennifer Westford told Charge on December 21 that she had just returned from discussions with Jason Calder and President Carter in Atlanta regarding the Carter Center sending observers. She said the Carter Center "will send a team in two or three weeks to look around". Post's USAID mission has also encouraged the Carter Center to send long-term observers and has offered funding, but has not yet received any feedback. 9 (C) The Canadian High Commissioner appears to have given up on getting an OAS long-term observer in place. He reported that Canada is now seeking to fund a long-term observer via the UN. Canada hopes that the UN might be able to react quickly enough to get an observer on the ground soon enough to be here during the critical registration period. 10. (C) OAS A/SYG Ramdin separately told Ambassador and other donor chiefs that he seeks to invigorate long-term involvement of OAS in strengthening democracy and governance in Guyana. The OAS mission in Guyana is moribund at best and apparently unaware (and seemingly uninterested in) OAS plans for involvement in the upcoming election. Problems with Voter Registration -------------------------------11. (C) The donor community remains concerned that the requirement--new for the 2006 election--that new registrants show a birth certificate or passport as proof of age/citizenship may disenfranchise many potential voters. More importantly, even if the absolute numbers affected are relatively small, this problem is tailor-made for forces that seek to disparage the electoral process. Canadian High Commissioner Picard met with Minister of Home Affairs Gail Teixiera on December 9 to discuss the issue and briefed the donor community the next day. According to Picard, Teixeira acknowledges the urgent need to implement measures to correct this problem. However, Teixeira warned that other senior government officials may not share this sense of urgency and are reluctant to take the necessary steps to address the problem. The donors agreed to press the birth certificate issue further. To that end, Picard sent a letter to Teixeira on December 16 with copies to Head of the Presidential Secretariat Roger Luncheon a SIPDIS nd the Chairman of GECOM Steve Surujbally. The letter states: "Given the importance to ensure that all citizens who

are entitled to vote can exercise that right, the Donor community would like to know what measures the Government of Guyana plans to take in order to ensure that information about late birth registration is widely available and that applications are processed in an efficient and timely manner so as to enable voters to register with GECOM as soon as possible." The letter also requests a briefing by the responsible GoG officials. The donors hope that the letter will put the issue on the cabinet's agenda for action. 12. (C) On December 23, Teixeira informed Charge that she had met with GECOM, the General Register Office (GRO), the Ministry of Local Government, and the Ministry of Amerindian Affairs (MAA) to address the registration issue. She said that in 2004 the GoG had undertaken a birth registration drive in the interior with MAA Community Development Officers (CDOs) and GRO personnel collaborating to late register 4,000 people. The GoG plans to leverage this experience by sending the CDOs out to find others who still need to register, help them prepare their affidavits and documents, and then present them to GRO. 13. (C) Although Teixeira felt that the bulk of unregistered births are in the interior, she said the elderly who do not have birth certificates face problems, too. They may have voted in the past when registration rules were enforced less strictly. However, if they have since moved or lost their ID card, they will not be able to re-register. Teixeira complained that people are confused over the voter registration process and that she does not understand why GECOM will not accept baptismal certificates as adequate proof of citizenship, even joking that these are probably more reliable than GRO-issued birth certificates. Teixeira encouraged Charge to bring future concerns with voter registration to her attention, as the GoG does not want to disenfranchise anyone. Despite Fingerprint Analysis, Voter List to be Contentious --------------------------------------------- ------------14. (C) GECOM is moving ahead with a plan to scan and cross-match fingerprints to eliminate any multiple voter registrations. A team from the Electoral Office of Jamaican (EOJ) is scheduled to arrive in January to scan approximately 450,000 sets of fingerprints from the 2001 final voters list (2001 OLE) and an anticipated 60,000 from newly registered voters. EOJ will then cross-match all the prints to look for duplicate registrations. The project is scheduled to take three months. Donors are skeptical about the EOJ project for several reasons, primarily GECOM's inability to provide the results of 500 sample fingerprint scans EOJ took during an exploratory visit in November; also GECOM's doubtful ability to negotiate a sound contract with EOJ; and GECOM's expatriate IT manager's reservations about the project.

15. (SBU) The PNC continues to insist on house-to-house verification to delete from the voters list any persons who have died or migrated. This is already a source of serious dispute between the PNC and GECOM and could trigger future conflict. Regardless of whether their complaints are valid, opposition members are exasperated and angry that GECOM, in almost five years, has taken no action to rid the 2001 OLE of persons not qualified to vote. The detailed timeline for GECOM's election preparations lists house-to-house verification of the 2001 OLE as an activity yet to be completed (verification of newly registered voters is ongoing). However, the GECOM Chairman told donors he has no intention to do this verification. Broken Server ------------16. (C) GECOM has tried and failed to switch on the long-dormant server that contains the official 2001 OLE. The Joint International Technical Assessor (JITA) said that GECOM is waiting for parts to repair the server. News of this technical difficulty surfaced three weeks ago. Opposition members have latched onto it as an example of GECOM's ineptitude and as further justification for their condemnation of GECOM's Chairman. ID Cards behind Schedule -----------------------17. (U) Production of ID cards is two months behind schedule as GECOM is waiting for necessary equipment to arrive. The JITA told the donor community that the earliest ID card production will begin is late February or March. This would still leave three to four months to print and distribute the cards and is not cause for concern at this time. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06GEORGETOWN71.html 06GEORGETOWN71, GECOM MAKES ENCOURAGING PROGRESS: ELECTION PREVIEW Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN71 VZCZCXYZ0025 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0071/01 0201350 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 201350Z JAN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3025 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0207 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0081 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2110 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000071 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY SUBJECT: GECOM MAKES ENCOURAGING PROGRESS: ELECTION PREVIEW #3 REF: A. 05 GEORGETOWN 1350 B. 05 GEORGETOWN 1271 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) SUMMARY. Preparations for Guyana's 2006 elections are gathering steam. The Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) has addressed donor concerns in a number of areas. This cable reviews the latest status of various preparation activities -- observers, voter registration, media code of conduct, voters list database, ID card production. An update to the contentious issue of verifying the 2001 voter list, and its broader, ominous implications for the election, will be reported septel. END SUMMARY Encouraging News on Long-term Observers --------------------------------------2. (U) Canada will provide funding for one long-term observer who will work under the auspices of the Commonwealth Created 2006-01-20 13:50 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

Secretariat.

This individual will likely be the first

SIPDIS long-term presence on the ground for the 2006 election and should arrive in time to monitor the continuous election process before its scheduled completion on March 19. 3. (C) Ambassador spoke with Head of Presidential Secretariat Roger Luncheon on Monday January 16 regarding OAS long-term observers. Luncheon mentioned that he had written to OAS SYG Insulza on September 15, and thought that this letter was non-specific enough to cover long-term observers. The impression Luncheon got from Insulza's December 2 response was that OAS did not consider Guyana a priority and was essentially brushing off the observer invitation. Ambassador informed Luncheon that we understand OAS needs a specific request and provided points from WHA/OAS that should go into a letter. Luncheon responded: "consider it done". 4. (C) The GoG and GECOM Chairman both strongly favor long-term observers, knowing that it will provide credibility to what promises to be a highly contentious election process. Post believes that the combination of the second invitation letter and OAS A/SYG Ramdin's visit to Guyana beginning February 14 will help convince OAS of the importance in sending its own long-term mission. Voter Registration Appears on Track ----------------------------------5. (U) GECOM's most recent figures indicate that approximately 28,000 new voters have registered since continuous registration started in October. GECOM expects a total of 38,000 new registrants by the end of the process on March 19. The only area of concern is Region 4, where uptake has been slower. (Note. Region 4 is home to Georgetown, a traditional stronghold of the opposition PNC/R which is not encouraging its supporters to register. End Note.) GECOM is also almost current on at-home verification of new registrants' residences. The media campaign to encourage voter registration has picked up in recent days. 6. (U) The Ministers of Home Affairs and Amerindian Affairs have cooperated to institute a procedure for conducting late registration of births for those who do not have a birth certificate. This had been a concern in December as reports came in of Guyanese citizens, primarily Amerindians in the interior, lacking the documentation required to register to vote (Ref A). The Ministry of Home Affairs has employed Community Development Officers with Amerindian Affairs stationed in those remote areas to undertake late birth registrations. Leading Media Practitioners Sign Code of Conduct --------------------------------------------- ---

7. (U) All of Guyana's leading media organizations signed a Code of Conduct that kicked off on January 7. Among other things, the code spells out the media's responsibility to provide equitable share of election coverage to all registered parties, to engage in fair and balanced reporting, and to refrain from publishing or broadcasting material that might incite racial hatred. Although the media signed a similar code of conduct before the 2001 elections that had little effect in deterring irresponsible reporting, the current process has already succeeded in some respects. For instance, it brought together disparate media practitioners (the government news agency, independent newspapers, politically controlled TV stations, etc.) for frank discussions of the media's role during elections. The next step is to establish an Independent Refereeing Panel, to be composed of prominent Caribbean media figures, which will review complaints about coverage during the elections campaign. As in the past, however, this panel will lack true power to sanction those who violate the code. Election Mechanics -----------------8. (U) GECOM finally managed to turn on the server that contains the 2001 voters list (the starting point for the 2006 list). The server had failed to operate when GECOM initially tried to access it in late 2005, news of which was used by opposition parties to denigrate GECOM's image. GECOM has hired dozens of personnel to begin data entry of new voter registration information within two weeks. 9. (U) The De La Rue ID card production equipment has not yet arrived. GECOM does not expect ID card production to be ready until the end of February at the earliest. Although behind schedule, this still leaves ample time to produce and distribute an expected 50,000 to 70,000 cards (for new registrants and replacements for lost cards) in advance of a July poll date. Comment ------10. (C) GECOM's encouraging progress in a number of areas should not give the impression that Guyana is on track for a smooth election season. Quite the contrary, there are growing signs of serious trouble on the horizon (to be reported septel). The center of controversy is how GECOM will verify that the 2001 voters list -- which will serve as the basis for the 2006 list -- is "clean" of unqualified voters. The main opposition party PNC/R is determined to reject any process short of going house to house to verify each and every one of the 440,185 registered voters on the 2001 list. What exactly would be "verified" is in question. In addition, opposition parties are stating both publicly and privately that GECOM cannot possibly be ready to hold

elections by the constitutionally due date of August 4. These statements are disingenuous at best, considering the three elections since 1992, all of which were declared acceptable by international observers, have all been conducted in only two to three months. It is becoming increasingly evident that the PPP is the only major party interested in holding elections as constitutionally due by August 4. Other parties, secure in the knowledge that they cannot win a free election, prefer not to have an election. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06GEORGETOWN112.html 06GEORGETOWN112, SHAHEED "ROGER" KHAN: GUYANA'S OWN ESCOBAR? Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN112 Created 2006-02-01 13:37 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification SECRET Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000112 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016 TAGS: SNAR PINR PINS PGOV KCRM KCOR NS GY SUBJECT: SHAHEED "ROGER" KHAN: GUYANA'S OWN ESCOBAR? REF: A. PARAMARIBO 39 B. 05 GEORGETOWN C. 05 GEORGETOWN D. 04 GEORGETOWN E. 04 GEORGETOWN 1253 1122 426 29

Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen for reason 1.4(b) and (d) 1. (S) SUMMARY. Shaheed "Roger" Khan (DOB: 13-Jan-72), Guyana's number one narco-criminal, threatens to exert control over the fragile Guyanese state akin to Pablo Escobar's erstwhile control over Colombia. Khan is presently active in drug trafficking, money laundering, and arms smuggling. His so-called legitimate economic interests include construction and forestry. Vermont has an outstanding warrant for Khan's arrest on weapons charges. END SUMMARY. Narcotics --------2. (S) Khan is believed to be Guyana's leading drug trafficker, more powerful than other established players such as Clay Hutson, Ricardo Rodrigues, and Brahma Nandalall. He established connections with Colombian criminals a few years ago and has since become a major trafficker of cocaine from Colombia. Khan has risen to the top of Guyana's narco-criminal class quickly and ostentatiously. His Colombian associates scolded him in September 2004 for his indiscriminate activities and advised him to get out of the spotlight.

3. (S) DEA developed a plan in 2004 to establish a counternarcotics operation in Guyana. An informant leaked details about the plan. After the leak, Khan threatened to blow up the site of the operation and threatened the lives of Ambassador and the then RSO (Ref D). These threats forced the operation's abandonment. 4. (S) Khan surrounds himself with a coterie of former police tactical squad members for security. He reportedly pays his low-level security personnel USD 1,600 per month -- at least eight times what they previously earned with the police force. Phantom Squad and Bouterse Connections -------------------------------------5. (C) Khan was a principle in the "Phantom Squad" (aka death squad) that former Minister of Home Affairs Gajraj employed to crack down on crime from 2002 to 2004 (Ref E). 6. (S) Minister of Home Affairs told us Khan regularly travels to Suriname and Trinidad and meets with Desi Bouterse. According to RNAS, Khan and Bouterse met at a hotel in Suriname as recently as December 2005. Arms Smuggling -------------7. (S/NF) According to RNAS, Khan has been active in smuggling arms into Guyana from Suriname, French Guyana, and possibly France. He exchanges cocaine for the arms. Khan has also established connections with FARC and has acted as a middleman in cocaine for arms transactions. In such instances, Khan has smuggled guns into Guyana and then exchanged them with the FARC for cocaine. There are strong indications that Khan was deeply involved in a December 2005 shipment of weapons to FARC in Columbia. Money Laundering and other Economic Interests --------------------------------------------8. (S) Khan has a business relationship with Farouk Razac of Swiss House Cambio, a big money laundering operation, to launder his narco-trafficking proceeds. According to RNAS, Khan's drug proceeds have also funded mosques and sent Muslims to study abroad. 9. (U) Khan acquired Kaow Island in the Essequibo River from local entrepreneur and suspected drug dealer Harry Rambarran in February 2005. Once owned by the now bankrupt Willems Timber, Kaow Island has a wharf for ocean going vessels, an airstrip, access to Guyana's bush roads that radiate out from Bartica, and a 136,000-acre timber concession. In September 2005, Rambarran sued Khan for defaulting on a USD 1.1 million promissory note made in partial payment for the island. 10. (C) Khan is reportedly in negotiations with former GUYSUCO Chairman Vic Oditt to purchase a 200 square mile

ranch at Pirara in the Southern Rupununi region. The ranch has a large airstrip, and Khan is believed to be acting at the behest of Colombian or Panamanian narco-interests. 11. (U) In late 2005 the Guyana Forestry Commission granted a State Forest Exploratory Permit for a large tract of land in Guyana's interior to Aurelius Inc., a company controlled by Khan (Ref C). 12. (U) Khan is a director of Classic Development Inc. and Dream Works Developers, both construction concerns. Khan is financing several real estate projects, including a 60-70 unit housing unit development in East Bank Demerara near the new stadium under construction for the 2007 Cricket World Cup. 13. (C) Guyanese Bank executives tell us all this is being done without any bank financing. Run-ins with the Law -------------------14. (U) According to LEGATT/Port of Spain, Khan is wanted in Vermont on weapons charges. Vermont has not sought Khan's extradition. 15. (U) Khan and two other men, one an active duty policeman, were arrested at a Guyana Defence Force roadblock in December 2002 at Good Hope, East Coast Demerara in a bulletproof vehicle. The vehicle contained sophisticated cell phone intercept equipment, satellite phones, and high-powered weapons. All three were found not guilty of illegal possession of arms and ammunition charges. 16. (C) A senior functionary in the Office of the President told us that the communications equipment and weapons were handed back over to Khan. Our interlocutor said the arrest had been "a mistake" because Khan was "working with the police" when the arrest was made. 17. (U) According to local newspapers, Khan appeared in court January 4, 2006 on charges following an incident in which an individual and had a gun placed to his head. Both pled were released on GYD 15,000 (USD 75) bail. and a colleague of "wounding" was assaulted not guilty and

Political Influence ------------------18. (C) Khan has bought off countless people in Guyana. Through this patronage he is able to operate with impunity. It is believed that GoG is compromised to such an extent that it will not pursue Khan, despite paying lip service to the fight against narco-trafficking. Comment -------

19. (C) Multiple sources have expressed fears to Ambassador that not only has Khan penetrated almost every level of Guyanese government and society, but that he will exert ever greater influence over the political scene beginning with this year's elections. Most respected commentators believe that Guyana has already become or is well on the way to being a narco-state. If Guyana is a narco-state, then Khan is its leader. Ambassador has spoken with GoG to little avail about Khan's drug activities and unaccounted wealth. The GoG has adopted a head-in-the-sand approach to Khan and narco-trafficking in general. The GoG asks for hard evidence and pretends not to know how Khan acquires his means. END COMMENT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06GEORGETOWN137.html# 06GEORGETOWN137, DEATH THREAT AGAINST U.S. AMBASSADOR AND PROMINENT Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN137 Created 2006-02-08 23:27 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification SECRET Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000137 SIPDIS DS/IP/WHA DS/ER/CC DS/IP/FPO WHA/CAR WHA/EX S/CRS BRIDGETOWN ALSO FOR ORA CARACAS ALSO FOR LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN ALSO FOR DEA, LEGATT, AND ORA E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 02/08/2016 TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV PREL SNAR GY SUBJECT: DEATH THREAT AGAINST U.S. AMBASSADOR AND PROMINENT GUYANESE REF: GEORGETOWN 111 Classified By: DCM Michael D. Thomas for reason 1.4 (d) 1. (S) Ambassador met with Major General (ret.) Norman McLean on February 8 at McLean's request. At the meeting, McLean handed Ambassador a sheet of paper listing information he had received from a policeman who has access to the Buxton area. This paper described a discussion regarding an operation to kill high profile people in retaliation for the murder of Ronald Waddell (reftel). Ambassador's name was one of thirteen names listed. This paper described a discussion that reportedly occurred February 4 after Waddell's funeral procession. According to press reports and McLean's information, when the funeral procession reached Buxton, some members of the crowd removed Waddell's body from the casket, told police, the media, and other members of the procession to wait while they paraded through an area known as "the Gulf", where persons in black masks carrying AK-47s fired shots into the air as a final salute to the man who had praised the vigilante "Buxton resistance". 2. (S) It is difficult to evaluate the credibility of this threat. However, McLean is a serious and experienced security professional. McLean said his source offered to

obtain further information, but McLean advised him not to. McLean said he brought the matter to Ambassador's attention because he believes the source is credible and he believes that retaliation for the Waddell murder is inevitable. 3. (S) Post is taking the following actions to improve Ambassador's security. -- A/RSO detailed to Ambassador's existing Police Protective Detail when Ambassador traveling out of home or office. -- RSO will re-brief Ambassador's Protective Detail and Drivers on principles of protection. -- Ambassador and Ambassador's driver will increase variation in routes and times of Ambassador's travel. -- One SD team (two members) will be dedicated to the Ambassador. -- RSO will ask Commissioner of Police to detail an armed Police Officer of the Special Response Team to the EMR. -- Motor pool will vary armored vehicle used to transport Ambassador rather than using one vehicle constantly. 4. (S) Text of note follows. INFORMATION RECEIVED After the funeral of Waddell on Saturday, it seems that elements associated with the group had a discussion on some form of retaliation. The two-for-one ratio was expanded on this occasion for more high profile targets. The following were identified as possible targets but Odinga Lumumba is felt to be top of the list. Odinga Lumumba - High Profile target seen as an organizer Sita Ramlal - too powerful and dismissing black people Norman McLean - Association with the above and wanted badly for crossing over to PPP Chief Justice Carl Singh - High Profile target Donald Ramotar - As above Roger Luncheon - As above and a sell out of black people Steve Surujbali - High Profile target Juror in Mark Benschop Case Roger Khan) Ricardo) Brian Tiwari Khursid Sattaur Indian Roland Bullen Government for obvious reasons Begin quote:

Association or control of Phantom groups High Profile Indian Government Official and High profile US Ambassador lending support to

It is understood that reconnaissance has started in several areas e.g., Bel Air where there is a Phantom House and where

SR lives. Hits could start on the anniversary of the jailbreak around Mash time. The scenarios could be Hits direct and by staged vehicle accidents. Purpose to cause chaos and confusion, disrupt the likelihood of investment and frustrate the upcoming Elections and improve chances of a Constitutional crisis. It is understood further that an operative named Rawlins aka &Fine Man,8 Oliver Hinckson, Godwin McPherson and others, are orchestrating these actions. End Quote. 5. (SBU) A copy of the note as been e-mailed to WHA/CAR Laura Luftig. Post Bio notes on persons named as targets: -----------------------------------------6. (S) Odinga Lumumba: Strong man for the former PNC government. Followed ex-Prime Minister Hamilton Green to the GGG when the PNC expelled Green then moved to the PPP. Currently Coordinator of the President's Youth Choice Initiative, Presidential Advisor on Empowerment PPP Member of Parliament, President of the Guyana Football League, central figure in a wildlife export scandal, frequently seen clubbing with President Jagdeo and popularly rumored to procure women for the President. 7. (SBU) Sita Ramlal: Registrar of the Supreme Court and Norman McLean's girlfriend. 8. (SBU) Norman McLean: Served as both Commissioner of Police and Chief of Staff of the Guyana Defense Force during the Burnham years. Since the early 1990s McLean has been Human Resources Manager of Omai Gold Mines, a subsidiary of Canada's Cambior Inc. A fixture in the business community, McLean has occupied a number of positions including President of the Guyana Manufactures Association, member of the Security Sub-Committee of the Local Organizing Committee for the 2007 Cricket World Cup, Deputy Chairman of the Ethnic Relations Commission. Most pertinent to the matter at hand, McLean served as a member of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry that incredibly cleared former Minister of Home Affairs Gajraj of involvement in extra-judicial killings by the Phantom Squad. 9. (C) Carl Singh: Chief Justice of the High Court, Acting Chancellor of the Judiciary, active in efforts to streamline administration of justice and reduce judicial corruption, and widely perceived to be partial to the PPP Government. 10. (SBU) Juror in Mark Benschop Case: the only one of ten jurors who voted to convict Benschop for treason after he led a crowd storming the Office of the President in 2002.

Popular opinion believes the juror was suborned by the PPP/government to vote guilty. 11. (U) Donald Ramotar: General Secretary of the People's Progressive Party, Member of Parliament. 12. (S) Roger Luncheon: Head of the Presidential Secretariat and second ranking member of Cabinet after the Prime Minister. Commonly referred to as "Machiavelli" by the Diplomatic Corps. Commissioner of Police Felix says Luncheon ordered him to say that the arrest of drug-kingpin and Phantom Squad member Roger Khan at a Guyana Defense Force roadblock in an armored vehicle with high-tech cell phone intercept equipment and automatic weaponry was a mistake because it was a police operation (Felix refused). 13. (SBU) Steve Surujballi: Chairman of the Guyana Elections Commission, veterinarian, former director of the National Dairy Development Program, former member of the Working People's Alliance. 14. (U) Roger Khan: Guyana's number one narco-trafficker and a member of the Phantom Squad used by GoG in 2003-2004 to reign in an out-of-control crime situation. Widely rumored to be responsible for the execution-style murder of Ronald Waddell. 15. (SBU) Brian Tiwari: Managing Director of engineering firm B.K. International Contractors that wins many government contracts. Locally referred to as one of the "untouchables" because his firm continues to get government contracts despite poor performance. 16. (SBU) Khursid Sattaur: Commissioner General of Guyana Revenue Authority. Disliked by nearly everyone who has any contact with the GRA. Bio Notes on purported perpetrators: ----------------------------------17. (SBU) Rawlins aka "Fine Man": A gang member resident in Buxton. Reportedly the target of a 2005 Roger Khan-led execution attempt that mistakenly killed a young boy in Buxton. 18. (SBU) Oliver Hinckson: According to McLean, a former GDF lieutenant. Now associated with the COPS Security Service. 19. (C) Godwin McPherson: Former number two in the Guyana Defense Force with the rank of Colonel was cashiered from the GDF in 1996 and prosecuted for multiple charges of theft and embezzlement totaling nearly US$2 million. Currently serves as PNC Representative on the National Sports Commission Board and President of the Guyana Amateur Basketball Federation. Now employed as Physical Education Coordinator at the

Ministry of Education. Served as Chief Elections Officer for the April 2005 Guyana Public Service Union elections that were marred by accusations of irregularities in counting the ballots. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06GEORGETOWN139.html 06GEORGETOWN139, TEIXEIRA SHARES INFORMATION ON SUSPECT VISA SEEKERS Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN139 Created 2006-02-09 20:53 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000139 SIPDIS SIPDIS INL/HSTC CA/FPP WHA/CAR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016 TAGS: PGOV SNAR SMIG KFRD KCOR KCRM GY SUBJECT: TEIXEIRA SHARES INFORMATION ON SUSPECT VISA SEEKERS REF: A. 05 GEORGETOWN 1349 B. 05 GEORGETOWN 1269 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen for reason 1.4 (d) 1. (C) Ambassador met with Minister of Home Affairs Gail Teixeira on January 12 and January 20 to discuss various matters. At the January 12 meeting, Teixeira handed a document to Ambassador containing a list of Indian nationals who had applied for Guyanese tourist visas through Indian "tour operators" (reftels). The list includes name, date of birth, place of birth, and passport number of sixty-two visa applicants. Post has e-mailed a copy of the document to the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) and the consular sections of Embassy New Delhi and Embassy Islamabad. 2. (SBU) Teixeira also provided updates on her efforts to address corruption within the General Register Office (GRO) responsible for civil documents. - Since EmbOffs gave Teixeira a report on December 23 regarding fraudulent Guyanese visa applications, she has continued to explore ways of improving document security. For example, she has obtained three estimates for systems that would print civil documents, which are all currently handwritten. She does not have money for this project. Ambassador said he would investigate the possibility of USG assistance for Teixeira's initiative to clean up GRO. Two key objectives are: a) assisting GoG to computerize the civil

registry system to improve document security and modernize archival record keeping; and b) reviewing current procedures at GRO to identify areas lacking security and provide training to correct deficiencies. Post will pursue funding for these objectives through USAID's Democracy and Governance program and through INL. - Despite the prevalence of fraudulent marriages in Guyana, Teixeira said that the Minister of Tourism, Industry, and Commerce Manzoor Nadir wants to amend the law to encourage marriage tourism. - After several months, bids to institute machine-readable passports by 2007 are still sitting with Guyana's tender board. 3. (C) COMMENT. Teixeira still seems to be fighting a lonely, uphill battle against fraud and corruption in the Ministry of Home Affairs. A shocking lack of control over Guyana's civil registry, visas, and passports presents narco-criminals, smuggled aliens, and potential terrorists with an easy way to obtain travel documents. She expressed gratitude that we are sharing information with her, but complained that problems have worsened since she began to "turn screws" on the Ministry. She believes that corrupt elements are either deliberately trying to embarrass her or trying to get as many fraud transactions through before she tightens the screws further. END COMMENT BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06GEORGETOWN167.html# 06GEORGETOWN167, A/SYG RAMDIN WANTS STRONG OAS ENGAGEMENT IN GUYANA Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN167 Created 2006-02-17 15:21 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000167 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY OAS SUBJECT: A/SYG RAMDIN WANTS STRONG OAS ENGAGEMENT IN GUYANA REF: A. GEORGETOWN 71 B. 05 GEORGETOWN 1350 C. 05 GEORGETOWN 1271 D. 05 BRIDGETOWN 2394 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (SBU) SUMMARY. OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin visited Guyana February 13-14. Key takeaways from his visit are: a) Ramdin wants to increase OAS' involvement in Guyana and will act quickly to form a long-term mission of some sort; b) he wants any OAS electoral observation mission to act in close partnership with CARICOM and/or the Commonwealth; and c) he took fully on board donor concerns about Guyana's political climate, stating publicly and forcefully that elections must proceed as constitutionally due by August 4. We believe Ramdin left with a far greater appreciation for the political intransigence, rather than technical problems, that threaten Guyana's ability to hold elections that are free, fair, and without fear of violence. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- ---------Ramdin: OAS Wants Strong Engagement in Election Process --------------------------------------------- ---------2. (U) During his February 13-14 visit, Ramdin met with various stakeholders, including the GoG, opposition parties, the diplomatic community, and CARICOM. He referred to the trip as the first official visit of more to come as he and OAS SYG Insulza are trying to reestablish stronger engagement

with OAS members. Ambassador hosted a lunch February 13 for Ramdin and the international donor community (U.S., UK, Canada, EU, UNDP, CARICOM, IDB, IMF). 3. (C) At the lunch, donors shared with Ramdin their concerns that Guyana is on course for a political crisis. They stressed the need for OAS to take an "early prevention" approach to Guyana, not only by sending a long-term observer mission for the 2006 elections, but also by establishing a stronger political presence in the country. As an aside, Ramdin half-joked that his job would be easy if the consensus in Washington equaled that around the lunch table. 4. (C) Ramdin broadly agreed with donor concerns about the elections, saying that OAS wants to be "engaged strongly in this process". He also stated explicitly and repeatedly that when OAS gets engaged, it wants CARICOM on its side given that organization's "moral authority" in the region. CARICOM A/SYG Granderson sounded a cautionary note, reminding the group of CARICOM's extreme prudence regarding its members' internal affairs and that regional heads are not seized by events in Guyana. 5. (C) Ramdin accepted the donor view that delaying elections cannot be countenanced as an option and said that OAS would deliver that message clearly to political leaders. --------------------------------------------- ----------Ramdin: No Country should be Held Hostage by Politicians --------------------------------------------- ----------6. (U) Also on February 13, Ramdin and Commonwealth Secretariat Special Envoy to Guyana Sir Paul Reeves were the SIPDIS keynote speakers at the Private Sector Commission's "Elections and Democracy" lecture. Both speakers hammered home the point that elections must proceed as constitutionally due and that any alternative to this would be, in Ramdin's words, "counter-productive, costly, and damaging". 7. (U) In his remarks, Ramdin stated that elections are fair if the state provides conditions for a "reasonably level playing field" and that "no country should be held hostage" by the refusal of political parties and their leaders to accept election results. He then spelled out his key steps to a successful election process -- an independent elections commission; timely preparations by the commission; clear deadlines for well-defined activities; proper training for poll workers and robust voter education; a cleaned-up, credible voter list; and a secure environment in which to vote.

------------------------------------Debriefing Donors and OAS' Next Steps ------------------------------------8. (U) Ramdin met again with donors the evening of February 14. He shared his reflections on the visit and spelled out what he sees as his plan for Guyana going forward. 9. (C) Ramdin reiterated to donors that he wants OAS to partner with CARICOM in Guyana. He said that after meeting with CARICOM, he still did not have a clear understanding of how involved they are willing to get in Guyana's elections. Nevertheless, he will make his Guyana trip report available to them. He also wants to involve St. Lucia PM Anthony, who has the lead on governance and justice within CARICOM. Ramdin plans to visit him to advocate for a stronger CARICOM role in Guyana. 10. (C) Ramdin described three key areas in the election process that he felt require far greater attention. First, the political leaders themselves (President Jagdeo and PNC/R opposition leader Robert Corbin in particular) need to establish a dialogue, preferably informal and agenda-free. Second, the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) must do more to facilitate ongoing dialogue with the political parties and the public at large, working specifically to settle the dispute over the voter list. Third, civil society must participate more actively in the process, holding more events like the previous evening's "Elections and Democracy" lecture. 11. (C) As for OAS' plans, Ramdin will discuss his findings with Insulza and define their position in advance of an Insulza visit. Between Monday noon and Tuesday evening Ramdin changed from saying that he hoped to get Insulza to visit Guyana, to saying that Insulza would visit, hopefully soon. 12. (C) Ramdin clearly wants to increase OAS' involvement in Guyana, concentrating on crisis prevention, and preferably in close cooperation with CARICOM and/or the Commonwealth. He envisions the OAS observer as someone who is actively involved in the election process -- the political as well as technical aspects. Ramdin intends to move very quickly on getting a long-term observation mission to Guyana (i.e., by early March, before the March 19 end of continuous registration). This was after getting assurances from President Jagdeo and from the major political parties that they all would welcome a long-term mission. (Note: Post subsequently learned that SYG Insulza had received a letter from the GoG inviting OAS to send long-term observers, about which Ramdin was apparently unaware.) 13. (C) Ramdin laid out a range of options for what the OAS observer mission might look like: a) Special Envoy, as in

Haiti, although Ramdin felt this was the least likely option; b) Permanent Mission; c) Technical mid-level staff; or d) High-level person from the region who would come to Guyana periodically, although Ramdin said it would take at least two months to prepare this last option. 14. (C) Ramdin sounded a little skeptical that the technical preparations for the election are entirely satisfactory. He intends to put someone at OAS to work assessing GECOM's activity timeline and progress to date. Post has e-mailed the Joint International Technical Assessor's monthly reports to Ramdin's advisor to assist. 15. (C) The Canadian High Commissioner repeated to Ramdin that his government is willing to fund 2 or 3 long-term observers, but needs to obligate its money quickly before the March 31 end of Canada's fiscal year. He also gave Ramdin a copy of the Terms of Reference they are using for these observers. 16. (C) As the meeting wrapped up, Ramdin suggested a bargaining chip that might be used to mollify the opposition -- a pre-election agreement signed between the political parties, and with the international community as a guarantor in some fashion. This agreement would contain an agenda of important issues that the political parties would be committed to discuss and resolve after the elections. This would address one of the opposition's principal grievances -that the governance reform process agreed to in 1997 is still unrealized. Donors responded favorably to the concept. ------Comment ------17. (C) Before moving to OAS, Ramdin lived and worked for two years in Georgetown as A/SYG of CARICOM (Granderson's predecessor), including the period of the last election. He is very familiar with the players and issues in Guyana, as well as with the history of OAS' 2001 observation mission. He didn't say anything directly, but did just once allude briefly to "issues" that need to be worked out with the OAS bureaucracy regarding OAS' involvement in Guyana. He also described how he and Insulza are "shaking up" OAS, including by traveling frequently to the field rather than staying in Washington. 18. (C) Ramdin seems to be a realist when it comes to elections. He repeatedly alluded to the fact that no election is perfect, but should be the best possible given local circumstances. He referred specifically to his experience observing the December 2005 election in St. Vincent and the Grenadines (ref D). The voter list there contained 91,000 names -- demographically impossible given a

general population of 110,000. But Ramdin walked away from that experience confident that the will of the electorate had prevailed. Such common sense does not prevail in Guyana's political opposition, which makes unrealistic demands while discrediting simple solutions like properly using indelible ink on election day. End Comment. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06GEORGETOWN181.html 06GEORGETOWN181, OPPOSITION DRAWS BATTLE LINE: ELECTION PREVIEW #4 Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN181 Created 2006-02-24 20:35 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000181 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR S/CRS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY SUBJECT: OPPOSITION DRAWS BATTLE LINE: ELECTION PREVIEW #4 REF: A. GEORGETOWN 71 B. C. D. E. F. GEORGETOWN 111 GEORGETOWN 137 GEORGETOWN 167 05 GEORGETOWN 1350 05 GEORGETOWN 1271

Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Action Request for WHA: See para 15 1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Technical preparations for Guyana's elections are proceeding reasonably well (ref A), but the process is deadlocked for political reasons. The main opposition party PNC/R, facing dim electoral prospects, is working to obstruct and discredit the election process. The PNC/R leadership is following a two-track strategy -tentatively preparing for elections on the one hand but maneuvering for postponed elections on the other. The Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) is now at an impasse over the issue of how to verify the voter list. The PNC/R has stated its demand clearly -- it will not go to elections unless GECOM conducts a full house-to-house verification of the entire list of 440,185 registered voters from 2001. Such an exercise is as lengthy, costly, and unnecessary as it sounds. Post and the rest of the international donor community continue to actively encourage GECOM and the political parties to communicate, resolve differences, and move ahead

with elections preparations. However, this message does not appear to be getting through to elements determined to disrupt the process. If the OAS wants to put early crisis prevention in Guyana into practice, then the time has come. --------------------------------------------- ----------Opposition Leader Corbin Addresses Nation, Attacks GECOM --------------------------------------------- ----------2. (U) Robert Corbin, leader of the opposition PNC/R, delivered an address to the nation on television February 14. This address was little more than a personal attack on GECOM for its purported lack of progress in addressing the PNC/R's concerns about the electoral process -- principally that the 2001 voter list (2001 OLE) must be verified through a full house-to-house verification exercise (see para 9). 3. (C) The level of personal animosity that Corbin and the PNC/R are directing at GECOM and its embattled Chairman Dr. Steve Surujbally is cause for great concern. Surujbally has privately expressed fears for his personal safety. As the political atmosphere becomes more volatile, the risk that Surujbally will resign is increasing. His resignation would likely bring the electoral process to a standstill. --------------------------PNC/R Acting in Desperation --------------------------4. (U) Corbin's address confirmed that the opposition would prefer to make GECOM and the voter list scapegoats rather than embark on a constructive political campaign. The PNC/R appears to be acting in desperation -- much of the party leadership is resigned to a poor election result and campaign funding sources are drying up. 5. (C) In private conversations with Ambassador, persons associated with the opposition have indicated that Corbin believes the PNC/R will not win the election (Note: PNC/R received 42% of votes in the 2001 election) and that the PNC/R has failed to raise sufficient funds to run a competitive campaign largely because of concerns about Corbin's leadership. These interlocutors also warn (perhaps disingenuously) that the PNC/R does not fully control militant, armed elements that may resort to political violence if the opposition's demands are not met. The recent murder of Afro-Guyanese journalist/activist Ronald Waddell and reports of weapons shipments into Guyana have raised the tension level considerably (refs B and C). ----------------------------------------Calls for Postponing/Boycotting Elections -----------------------------------------

6. (U) The PNC/R and some other opposition members see little to gain from elections in 2006 and would welcome a delay. They favor a period of shared governance between the PPP/C government and the opposition. This view stems from the Herdmanston accord that resolved the crisis after the 1997 election. The accord committed the government and the opposition to undertake broad constitutional reform to move beyond a winner-take-all, race-driven political system. This process has stalled and some feel that elections should not take place until these reforms are completed. 7. (U) For example, the African Cultural and Development Association (ACDA) has taken this position. ACDA placed a full-page advertisement in the January 18 Kaieteur News (one of two daily independent newspapers). The ad listed ten reasons why African Guyanese should not vote, such as another election without shared governance "would commit future generations of African people to powerlessness". 8. (U) There is no reason to even countenance the idea of postponing elections. On a technical level, GECOM is well placed to fulfill its mandate by August 4 -- to deliver an election in which each eligible voter is able to register and to vote only once. The Joint International Technical Assessor (JITA) has confirmed that preparations are proceeding satisfactorily. GECOM has developed a viable plan for "cleaning up" the 2001 OLE that will form the basis for the 2006 voter list. Polling day safeguards such as indelible ink and voter lists with photographs will minimize fraud. -----------------------------------Dispute Over Voter List Verification -----------------------------------9. (U) The opposition claims that the 2001 OLE is somehow padded with tens of thousands of ineligible or fictitious voters -- despite the fact that independent experts who examined the list vouched that it meets international standards. One frequently heard, baseless claim is that the tens of thousands of Guyanese who have emigrated since 2001 need to be removed from the voter list. On the contrary, article 59 of Guyana's constitution grants every Guyanese citizen the right to vote regardless of where they live. 10. (U) The PNC/R is demanding full house-to-house verification in order to legitimate the 2001 OLE -- an unnecessary, time-consuming, expensive exercise. GECOM has estimated this would take six months and cost USD 2 million, meaning it could not be completed by the August 4 constitutional due date for elections. Moreover, no law allows GECOM to remove registered voters who are not home when the verifiers come to check. Real and perceived elections shenanigans during the previous five decades continue to fuel mutual distrust between the PNC/R and

governing PPP/C parties. However, a full house-to-house verification would simply lead to further disputes. --------------------------------------------- ------------Supporting GECOM Process, But Election Still Guyana's Show --------------------------------------------- ------------11. (U) Donors have undertaken several initiatives to keep the electoral process on track. - Donors invited all political parties to the Canadian High Commission February 3 in the wake of Waddell's murder to condemn all forms of violence. Only the PNC/R refused to come, on the grounds that the "conditions did not facilitate a productive meeting", later specifying that the PNC/R could not be in the same room as the PPP/C. - Donors met with Surujbally February 10 to urge him to improve GECOM's public relations effort with the political parties and the general public. - OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin and Commonwealth Secretariat Special Envoy to Guyana Sir Paul Reeves were both in Georgetown the week of February 13 consulting with political and civil society leaders. At a widely publicized symposium they both made clear that elections must proceed as constitutionally due and that boycotting the polls would be terribly self-defeating. 12. (SBU) While actively supporting the electoral process, the donors are determined not to allow GECOM, the GoG, or opposition parties to drag the international community into a situation where it is held accountable for the election process. The message is clear -- Guyanese are responsible for running this election. --------------------------------------------- --Process Now Deadlocked, Crisis Prevention Needed --------------------------------------------- --13. (U) Preparations for the 2006 elections have reached an impasse over the issue of voter list verification. The opposition PNC/R is adamant in its demand for full house-to-house verification. The six commissioners on the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) are deadlocked. The three who represent the opposition refuse to budge from this demand. 14. (C) Donor missions (U.S., Canada, UK, EU, UNDP, IMF, IDB) are in full agreement that the PNC/R must be approached soon to resolve this verification impasse. The donors further agree that Ramdin's concept of a "pre-election agreement" on a post-election agenda would be an effective bargaining chip (ref D). Agreement on a defined list of important political issues to be addressed immediately following the elections,

with the international community as guarantor, would give the opposition an incentive to participate constructively. However, a pre-election agreement would require the Government of Guyana's full support in order to work. It would not be appropriate for the bilateral donors to initiate these discussions. 15. (SBU) Action Request: Post requests WHA to urge OAS to quickly approach the opposition parties and the Government of Guyana in order to foster a dialogue on the concept of a guaranteed pre-election agreement. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06GEORGETOWN191.html 06GEORGETOWN191, GUYANA FM LIKES GUATEMALA FOR UNSC Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN191 Created 2006-02-27 17:47 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000191 SIPDIS SIPDIS IO/UNP - BHARRIS WHA/PPC - RYONEOKA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016 TAGS: PREL GT VE GY UNSC UN SUBJECT: GUYANA FM LIKES GUATEMALA FOR UNSC REF: STATE 27055 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Ambassador met with Foreign Minister (and UN PermRep) Rudy Insanally February 27 to deliver demarche regarding the candidates for the 2007-2008 Latin America non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 2. (C) Insanally said that he has discussed the matter with Guatemala's UN PermRep Gert Rosenthal. He commented that Guatemala "would do well" if Rosenthal were Guatemala's front man on the issue. Insanally then shared several points with Ambassador: - The CARICOM member states will endeavor at first to reach a consensus decision on which country's candidacy to support. - Guatemala has a certain advantage because it is a small state and from Central America. CARICOM places great importance on the rights of small states in multilateral fora and tries to support Central American states. - However, the border dispute between Guatemala and Belize (a CARICOM member) will also be a factor. Insanally advised Rosenthal that Guatemala ought to do or say something "to tranquilize this issue". - Insanally said he would discuss the UNSC candidates with his CARICOM counterparts. He also suggested that the

proposed late March CARICOM ministerial conference with Secretary Rice in the Bahamas would be an ideal opportunity SIPDIS to raise the issue. - Insanally did not comment directly on Venezuela. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06GEORGETOWN197.html# 06GEORGETOWN197, SIXTH ANNUAL TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ASSESSMENTReference ID 06GEORGETOWN197 Created 2006-03-01 15:31 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO3607 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0197/01 0601531 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 011531Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3188 INFO RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 4262 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0235 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0916 RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHC/USAID WASHDC RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 GEORGETOWN 000197 SIPDIS G/TIP G INL DRL PRM IWI WHA/PPC - Michael Puccetti SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PHUM SMIG ASEC PREF ELAB KCRM KWMN KFRD GY SUBJECT: SIXTH ANNUAL TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ASSESSMENTGUYANA REF: STATE 3836 1. (SBU) The following is Embassy Georgetown's submission of information requested in reftel for the 2006 Annual Trafficking in Persons Report: BEGIN REPORT. Overview of a country's activities to eliminate trafficking in persons:

-- A. Is the country a country of origin, transit, or destination for international trafficked men, women, or children? Specify numbers for each group; how they were trafficked, to where, and for what purpose. Does the trafficking occur within the country's borders? Does it occur in territory outside of the government's control (e.g. in a civil war situation)? Are any estimates or reliable numbers available as to the extent or magnitude of the problem? Please include any numbers of victims. What is (are) the source(s) of available information on trafficking in persons or what plans are in place (if any) to undertake documentation of trafficking? How reliable are the numbers and these sources? Are certain groups of persons more at risk of being trafficked (e.g. women and children, boys versus girls, certain ethnic groups, refugees, etc.)? Most TIP in Guyana occurs internally. Post has received reports of limited trans-border trafficking of victims destined for Suriname and Barbados. Within Guyana, trafficking reportedly occurs in the interior of the country, where government oversight is light and law enforcement is lacking, and between the interior and coastal communities. Statistical data is limited, but an International Organization for Migration (IOM) survey of 58 informants released in June 2005 cited 12 examples of trafficking for forced labor, 24 examples of trafficking for prostitution, and 8 cases of trafficking for purposes of domestic servitude. A typical trafficking profile involves young women from the rural interior, primarily of Amerindian (indigenous) descent, who receive promises to work in rum shops and restaurants on the coast and are then forced to work without compensation and/or to provide sexual services. The IOM's assessment, the most comprehensive to date, also found instances of trafficking for purposes of forced labor that involved sawmill operators or land-grant owners taking Amerindian men and boys from their communities and forcing them to engage in debt bondage. Sources of information used to compile Post's report include the Ministry of Labor, Human Services, and Social Security (MLHSSS), the Guyana Police Force (GPF), Help and Shelter, the Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA), Red Thread, the IOM, the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC)and members of Parliament representing both the Government and the Opposition. -- B. Please provide a general overview of the trafficking situation in the country and any changes since the last TIP Report (e.g. changes in direction). Also briefly explain the political will to address trafficking in persons. Other items to address may include: What kind of conditions are the victims trafficked into? Which populations are

targeted by the traffickers? Who are the traffickers? What methods are used to approach victims? (Are they offered lucrative jobs, sold by their families, approached by friends of friends, etc.?) What methods are used to move the victims (e.g., are false documents being used?). Guyana has made progress in moving beyond acknowledging TIP as a problem and identifying cases to actively prosecuting traffickers and assisting victims. The past year has seen several arrests of TIP perpetrators under the Combating Trafficking in Persons Act of 2005, and political will to GEORGETOWN 00000197 002 OF 010

address TIP remains evident. Significant efforts in the reporting period included 10 training sessions for community facilitators to identify and report TIP cases. The MLHSSS conducted these seminars at various sites across the country and reached an estimated 361 participants. The MLHSSS also continued outreach and sensitization campaigns to interior communities. However, despite overt political will, Guyana's capacity to secure convictions remains limited. The GOG's designated TIP coordinator reports that magistrates assigned to rural areas are unfamiliar with trafficking in persons law, and cases tried in Georgetown move at an excruciatingly slow pace amidst Guyana's heavily-backlogged judicial system. In addition, contacts in the interior report little active law enforcement activity. TIP enforcement in Guyana is still very much reactive. Post has observed little change in the general modus operandi of traffickers. Destinations for trafficked persons tend to center around transportation and commercial nodes, notably in interior logging and mining communities and also in the Corentyne River region. Young, impoverished Amerindian women from rural areas remain the major target, and they are typically lured into jobs as waitresses at restaurants or rum shops, as domestic workers, or as salesclerks that ultimately involve sexual exploitation and uncompensated labor. In some instances, victims are forcibly abducted. In one case last year, a businessman and two accomplices were arrested for kidnapping girls from the Pomeroon River area and bringing them to work as waitresses in the Corentyne. The traffickers tend to be small business owners. Post has no information on the use of false documents in trafficking, although what trans-border trafficking that occurs generally involves movement without any documents. -- C. What are the limitations on the government's ability to address this problem in practice? For example, is funding for police or other institutions inadequate? Is overall corruption a problem? Does the government lack the

resources to aid victims? The GOG identifies the cost and time required to access rural communities in which the majority of TIP activity occurs as a major limitation. The MLHSSS has prioritized acquisition of radio and communication sets, motorcycles and an outboard motor engine to access locations that are typically accessible only by river or several days' hike. In addition, the government's capacity to prosecute cases is severely limited. The MLHSSS's TIP coordinator has called for specialized training for legal personnel to properly investigate and prosecute TIP cases and has proposed having a specifically designated magistracy for TIP cases. Post does not have information on corruption as it specifically relates to trafficking in persons. The GOG has provided around USD 30,000 to fund Help and Shelter, a victim services provider. USAID and UNICEF have also contributed resources for victim assistance. -- D. To what extent does the government systematically monitor its anti-trafficking efforts (on all fronts -prosecution, prevention and victim protection) and periodically make available, publicly or privately and directly or through regional/international organizations, its assessments of these anti-trafficking efforts? The MLHSSS, the designated lead agency in the GOG's anti-TIP efforts, issued an annual "Review of Counter Trafficking in Persons Activities 2004-2005" in January 2006 that included information on legislation, law enforcement activities, public awareness and sensitization programs, and victim protection efforts. The report also included an assessment of challenges and emerging needs that mainly focused on policing the vast hinterland and reaching out to Amerindian communities. In addition, the Ministry periodically released GEORGETOWN 00000197 003 OF 010

activity reports for its Counter-TIP Unit, which includes dates, locations, and number of participants for its public awareness and training efforts. 3. PREVENTION: -- A. Does the government acknowledge that trafficking is a problem in that country? If no, why not? The GOG continues to recognize trafficking in persons as a problem and works with the USG, the IOM, UNICEF and other stakeholders to combat it. TIP is regularly referenced in public discourse, and was most recently labeled as a "growing menace" in the 2006 budget speech.

-- B. Which government agencies are involved in antitrafficking efforts and which agency, if any, has the lead? The Ministry of Labor, Human Services, and Social Security is the designated lead agency for the GOG's anti-trafficking efforts. A three-person Counter-Trafficking Unit within the MLHSSS coordinates the GOG's efforts under the supervision of Minister Bibi Shadick. In addition, the Guyana Police Force (GPF), the Ministry of Amerindian Affairs, and the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC) participate in the GOG's anti-TIP efforts. In the past, Minister Shadick has said publicly and to USG officials that human trafficking in Guyana is an Amerindian problem, therefore responsibility for combating trafficking in persons should reside with the Ministry of Amerindian Affairs. -- C. Are there, or have there been, government-run antitrafficking information or education campaigns? If so, briefly describe the campaign(s), including their objectives and effectiveness. Do these campaigns target potential trafficking victims and/or the demand for trafficking (e.g. "clients" of prostitutes or beneficiaries of forced labor). The MLHSSS has held a series of seminars since July 2004 to sensitize the public about trafficking in persons. In 2005 the Ministry launched a public awareness campaign that included an estimated 56 articles in various publications, radio programs, and meetings with prominent stakeholders in the religious, mining, business, and local government communities. Most of these activities have focused on potential victims and victim identification. -- D. Does the government support other programs to prevent trafficking? (e.g., to promote women's participation in economic decision-making or efforts to keep children in school.) Please explain. In January 2006, the non-governmental organization Partners of the Americas launched a U.S. Department of Labor-funded US$2 million program to combat child labor through education. The program will focus on re-entry of truant children into the school system an awareness campaign to sensitize parents, educators, and other stakeholders of the worst forms of child labor and the importance of education. The MLHSSS has also provided seed money to families to assist with school expenses as part of its social welfare program, trained social workers in trafficking awareness, and plans to promote vocational education programs to potential trafficking targets. The MLHSSS also sponsors a domestic violence sensitization and victim assistance program through Help and Shelter. The domestic violence public awareness includes a TIP component. The NGO Red Thread, a non-government organization works with women to improve economic decision-making: efforts that are generally

lauded by the GOG. The GPF works with the GHRA to provide human rights training to officers outside of Georgetown and to new officers during their orientation and training. The GHRA provides the training free of charge. GEORGETOWN 00000197 004 OF 010

-- F. What is the relationship between government officials, NGOs, other relevant organizations and other elements of civil society on the trafficking issue? As reported in previous submissions, some NGO relationships with the GOG are strained, while others are getting stronger. Help and Shelter enjoys a positive relationship with the MLHSSS, although, privately, the coordinator was dismayed that Minister Shadick's mentioned of the general location of the organization's victim shelter in the press; the location is kept secret for the victim's protection. The GHRA collaborates with the GOG on training and identification, but it argues that the GOG should be more proactive in TIP enforcement. Contacts who represent Amerindian communities have echoed this claim. -- G. Does it monitor immigration and emigration patterns for evidence of trafficking? Do law enforcement agencies screen for potential trafficking victims along borders? The GOG's immigration record-keeping system is antiquated, and the GOG does not make a concerted effort to cull travel patterns for evidence of trafficking. To Post's knowledge, most of the trans-border human trafficking activity occurs across the country's porous borders with Suriname and Brazil, making efforts to screen for potential trafficking victims along borders extremely difficult. -- H. Is there a mechanism for coordination and communication between various agencies, internal, international, and multilateral on trafficking- related matters, such as a multi- agency working group or a task force? Does the government have a trafficking in persons working group or single point of contact? Does the government have a public corruption task force? The Counter-TIP Unit within the MLHSSS is the designated government office for TIP concerns, with Minister Bibi Shadick as the point of contact. All trafficking cases are referred to the GPF's Criminal Investigative Division. The GPF works closely with the MLHSSS to prepare cases for prosecution. Guyana does not have a public corruption task force. -- J. Does the government have a national plan of action to

address trafficking in persons? If so, which agencies were involved in developing it? Were NGOs consulted in the process? What steps has the government taken to disseminate the action plan? As reported in last year's submission, the GOG has a national plan of action to address TIP. The GOG, under the auspices of the MLHSSS consulted the GPF, the GGMC, the Ministry of Amerindian Affairs, the Women's Affairs Bureau, Red Thread, the GHRA, Help & Shelter, Ribbons of Life, a variety of local women's rights groups, and the IOM to develop the plan. The National Plan of Action included a nationwide public awareness campaign. The MLHSSS estimates that roughly 3,000 participants have attended the town-hall type meetings in each of Guyana's 10 regions. The Ministry worked with the IOM to train 30 trainers from each of the regions to return to their communities and raise awareness. The National Assembly passed the Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill on December 13, 2004 as part of the plan. 4. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS: For questions A-D, posts should highlight in particular whether or not the country has enacted any new legislation since the last TIP report. -- A. Does the country have a law specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons--both trafficking for sexual GEORGETOWN 00000197 005 OF 010

exploitation and trafficking for non- sexual purposes (e.g. forced labor)? If so, what is the law? Does the law(s) cover both internal and external (transnational) forms of trafficking? If not, under what other laws can traffickers be prosecuted? For example, are there laws against slavery or the exploitation of prostitution by means of coercion or fraud? Are these other laws being used in trafficking cases? Are these laws, taken together, adequate to cover the full scope of trafficking in persons? Please provide a full inventory of trafficking laws, including civil penalties, (e.g., civil forfeiture laws and laws against illegal debt). The Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act became law in April 2005. In addition, perpetrators who kidnap or lure victims for purposes of sexual exploitation may be charged under Guyanese Criminal Law Chapter 8.01, Section 87 (forced detention--sex) and Sections 72 and 73 (procurement). In addition, the Kidnapping Act Chapter 8.03 (2003) and the Labor Act (Conditions of Employment of Certain Workers) Chapter 99.03 may be relevant to TIP cases. The latter

governs employment conditions for workers in rest houses, rum shops, discos, and other workplaces that typically lure TIP victims. -- B. What are the penalties for traffickers of people for sexual exploitation? For traffickers of people for labor exploitation? Traffickers of people convicted on summary judgment (lesser offenses) are subject to prison terms of 3-5 years. Traffickers of people convicted on indictment (more serious offenses) are subject to prison terms of 5 years to life imprisonment. All convicted traffickers are subject to confiscation of property used or gained during the course of the crime and would be ordered to pay restitution to victims. In addition convicted traffickers face: -two additional years imprisonment if the person used, threatened to use, or caused another to use or threaten to use a dangerous weapon; -five additional years imprisonment if the victim suffers a serious bodily injury or if the crime involves sexual assault; -five additional years imprisonment if the trafficking victim was exposed to life threatening illness or was forced into any addiction to drugs and/or medication; -ten additional years imprisonment if the victim suffers a permanent or life-threatening injury; -three additional years imprisonment if the crime was organized by an organized criminal contingent; -four additional years imprisonment if the crime resulted from abuse of power or a position of authority. -- C. What are the penalties for rape or forcible sexual assault? How do they compare to the penalty for sex trafficking? Guyanese criminal law calls for a maximum of life imprisonment for rape, five years for sexual assault and ten years for forced detention for purpose of sexual exploitation. This compares to a possible sentence of 5 years to life under the TIP act. -- D. Is prostitution legalized or decriminalized? Specifically, are the activities of the prostitute criminalized? Are the activities of the brothel owner/operator, clients, pimps, and enforcers criminalized? Are these laws enforced? If prostitution is legal and regulated, what is the legal minimum age for this activity? Note that in many countries with federalist systems, prostitution laws may be covered by state, local, and

GEORGETOWN 00000197

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provincial authorities. Prostitution, including the activities of the prostitute and the brothel owner/operator, clients, and pimps, are illegal in Guyana, but these laws are rarely enforced. The National Assembly passed the Age of Consent Bill in October 2005, raising the age of consent from thirteen to sixteen years of age. -- E. Has the Government prosecuted any cases against traffickers? If so, provide numbers of investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and sentences, including details on plea bargains and fines, if relevant and available. Are the traffickers serving the time sentenced: If no, why not? Please indicate whether the government can provide this information, and if not, why not? (Note: complete answers to this section are essential. End Note) To date, the government has secured no convictions under the Trafficking in Persons Act passed in April 2005. Based on information provided by the MLHSSS and the GPF, Post is aware of 10 people who have been charged under the act. All the matters are still pending before the excruciatingly slow Guyanese judicial system. To post's knowledge, two defendants have been remanded to prison pending the outcome of the trial and eight were released on bail. The GPF reports 15 pending TIP investigations. -- F. Is there any information or reports of who is behind the trafficking? For example, are the traffickers freelance operators, small crime groups, and/or large international organized crime syndicates? Are employment, travel, and tourism agencies or marriage brokers fronting for traffickers or crime groups to traffic individuals? Are government officials involved? Are there any reports of where profits from trafficking in persons are being channeled? (e.g. armed groups, terrorist organizations, judges, banks, etc.) Reports suggest traffickers are independent business people who typically lure victims into employment at their enterprises. Several recent arrests have involved cases where a business person collaborated with residents of rural areas who trafficked women from their community. Post has no information on the direct involvement of government officials. -- G. Does the government actively investigate cases of trafficking? (Again, the focus should be on trafficking cases versus migrant smuggling cases.) Does the government

use active investigative techniques in trafficking in persons investigations? To the extent possible under domestic law, are techniques such as electronic surveillance, undercover operations, and mitigated punishment or immunity for cooperating suspects used by the government? Does the criminal procedure code or other laws prohibit the police from engaging in covert operations? According to the GPF's designated TIP coordinator, GPF officers typically apply surveillance to suspected TIP locations to gather evidence of activity before making a raid. Criminal procedure does authorize electronic surveillance, undercover ops and plea bargaining in exchange for testimony, but Post is not aware of these techniques being applied to date in TIP cases. -- H. Does the government provide any specialized training for government officials in how to recognize, investigate, and prosecute instances of trafficking? Police officers have attended the MLHSSS's training sessions on TIP identification. However, contacts in the rural Rupununi region report that the police have little GEORGETOWN 00000197 007 OF 010

familiarity with recognizing or prosecuting TIP cases. In addition, Minister Shadick contends that magistrates assigned to rural areas are unfamiliar with the intricacies of TIP investigations and has suggested that a magistrate in Georgetown be the designated judicial official for TIP prosecutions. --I. Does the government cooperate with other governments in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases? If possible, can post provide the number of cooperative international investigations on trafficking? The MLHSSS reported two incidents of women being trafficked to Barbados in which the perpetrators were not intercepted. In addition, cooperation with Barbados authorities reportedly prevented two victims from being trafficked. The MLHSSS also works closely with the Brazilian Embassy in Georgetown to obtain information on potential Brazilian TIP victims. The previous year's submission referenced links with Suriname officials established in the wake of the discovery of women being trafficked into that country from Guyana. -- J. Does the government extradite persons who are charged with trafficking in other countries? If so, can post provide the number of traffickers extradited? Does the government extradite its own nationals charged with such

offenses? If not, is the government prohibited by law form extraditing its own nationals? If so, what is the government doing to modify its laws to permit the extradition of its own nationals? Guyana does not have a legal restriction on the extradition of its nationals. Post is unaware of any requests to Guyana from other countries for extradition of suspects to face trafficking in persons charges. -- K. Is there evidence of government involvement in or tolerance of trafficking, on a local or institutional level? If so, please explain in detail. Post has no evidence of government involvement in trafficking of persons. In fact, in one case last year, the wife of a senior police official in Port Kaituma was arrested after the police received reports that she was involved in trafficking. The IOM's study does include one interview where an informant alleged that people are afraid to report trafficking to the police because the police in turn inform the proprietors where they received the information. On a broader level, weak institutions and corruption have traditionally aided and abetted migrant smuggling in Guyana. -- L. If government officials are involved in trafficking, what steps has the government taken to end such participation? Have any government officials been prosecuted for involvement in trafficking or traffickingrelated corruption? Have any been convicted? What actual sentence was imposed? Please provide specific numbers, if available. Not applicable. -- M. If the country has an identified child sex tourism problem (as source or destination), how many foreign pedophiles has the government prosecuted or deported/extradited to their country of origin? Does the country's child sexual abuse laws have extraterritorial coverage (like the U.S. PROTECT Act)? Guyana is not known to be a destination for child sex tourism. -- N. Has the government signed, ratified, and/or taken GEORGETOWN 00000197 008 OF 010

steps to implement the following international instruments? Please provide the date of signature/ratification if appropriate.

--ILO Convention 182 concerning the prohibition and immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labor. --ILO Convention 29 and 105 on forced or compulsory labor. --The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography. --The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Guyana ratified ILO Convention 182 on January 15, 2001. Guyana ratified ILO Conventions 29 and 105 on June 8, 1966. Guyana has not signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography or the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. 5. PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS: -- A. Does the government assist victims, for example, by providing temporary to permanent residency status, relief from deportation, shelter and access to legal, medical and psychological services? If so, please explain. Does the country have victim care and victim health care facilities? If so, can post provide the number of victims placed in these care facilities? The MLHSSS provided funding to renovate Help and Shelter's victim shelter, which was completed in late 2005. In addition, the MLHSSS's Counter-TIP Unit refers cases to probation officers who can make referrals for additional services. Help and Shelter also has a directory of relief services. According to the IOM, there is no legislation offering alternative treatment for illegal migrants where abuse is suspected. -- B. Does the government provide funding or other forms of support to foreign or domestic NGOs for services to victims? Please explain. The MLHSSS provided GY$6 million (US$30,000) to Help and Shelter to renovate its shelter in 2005. The 2006 budget includes GY$1 million (US$5,000) for Help and Shelter. -- C. Is there a screening and referral process in place, when appropriate, to transfer victims detained, arrested or placed in protective custody by law enforcement authorities to NGO's that provide short- or long-term care?

The MLHSSS and law enforcement refer cases to Help and Shelter. Post notes that the intake forms at the shelter do not specifically inquire whether the client is a TIP victim, but the shelter's coordinator says that such information is usually indicated in the intake worker's case notes. Help and Shelter is currently not housing any TIP victims. Children are typically returned to their parents. -- D. Are the rights of victims respected, or are victims also treated as criminals? Are victims detained, jailed, or deported? If detained or jailed, for how long? Are victims fined? Are victims prosecuted for violations of other laws, such as those governing immigration or prostitution? Post reported in its 2005 submission that some trafficking victims from Suriname were detained for immigration violations. Post has not received additional reports of such GEORGETOWN 00000197 incidents. -- E. Does the government encourage victims to assist in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking? May victims file civil suits or seek legal action against the traffickers? Does anyone impede the victims' access to such legal redress? If a victim is a material witness in a court case against the former employer, is the victim permitted to obtain other employment or to leave the country? Is there a victim restitution program? There are no known restrictions on material witnesses' freedom of movement. The GOG does not have a victim restitution program, and, while victims have the legal rights to file a civil suit against a perpetrator, this has not been tested. -- F. What kind of protection is the government able to provide for victims and witnesses? Does it provide these protections in practice? What type of shelter or services does the government provide? Does it provide shelter or any other benefits to victims for housing or other resources in order to aid the victims in rebuilding their lives? Where are child victims placed (e.g. in shelters, foster-care type systems or juvenile justice detention centers)? Help and Shelter has a secret location where victims can be sheltered while their case is prosecuted. In addition to housing, the shelter provides counseling and medical services. Renovation is complete, and it is scheduled to formally reopen in March 2006. -- G. Does the government provide any specialized training 009 OF 010

for government officials in recognizing trafficking and in the provision of assistance to trafficked victims, including the special needs of trafficked children? Does the government provide training on protections and assistance to its embassies and consulates in foreign countries that are destination or transit countries? Does it urge those embassies and consulates to develop ongoing relationships with NGOs that serve trafficked victims? Government officials have attended the MLHSSS's workshops on TIP prevention as well as those held by the IOM. In addition, two MLHSSS representatives and representatives from two NGOs have attended overseas seminars hosted by the IOM. The GOG has not engaged its handful of overseas missions and consulates in TIP matters. -- H. Does the government provide assistance, such as medical aid, shelter, or financial help, to its repatriated nationals who are victims of trafficking? When the MLHSSS encounters such cases, it refers the victims to Help and Shelter as well as to the social workers in the Counter-TIP Unit. The GOG also provides medical attention, housing, and repatriation allowances to victims. In the past, repatriated victims have been provided with housing at the Amerindian Hostel in Georgetown before receiving funds to return to their communities. -- I. Which international organizations or NGOs, if any, work with trafficking victims? What type of services do they provide? What sort of cooperation do they receive from local authorities? NOTE: If post reports that a government is incapable of assisting and protecting TIP victims, then post should explain thoroughly. Funding, personnel, and training constraints should be noted, if applicable. Conversely, a lack of political will to address the problem should be noted as well. Help and Shelter completed renovation of its shelter in late 2005. In addition, Red Thread and the GHRA work with victims of domestic abuse, HIV/AIDS, the sex trade, and trafficking GEORGETOWN 00000197 010 OF 010

victims. They provide HIV/AIDS testing, counseling, and shelter. While most NGOs have not as yet worked directly with trafficking victims, all have expressed their willingness to do so. USAID, UNICEF and the IOM have assisted these efforts. END REPORT. 2. Embassy Georgetown's point of contact is Ed Luchessi, Economic/Commercial Officer, telephone (592)226-4309, IVG 747-0220, fax (592)227-0240. Embassy officers spent an

estimated 24 hours preparing this report. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06GEORGETOWN153.html# 06GEORGETOWN153, EDITORIAL ON GUYANA'S SECURITY CHALLENGE Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN153 Created 2006-02-13 20:44 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000153 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINS SOCI GY SUBJECT: EDITORIAL ON GUYANA'S SECURITY CHALLENGE REF: GEORGETOWN 111

The editorial in Sunday's Stabroek News describes very well the conundrum of security in Guyana and the state's limited capability to police its territory. The Stabroek News is Guyana's leading independent daily newspaper. Begin quote: An effective state Sunday, February 12th 2006 Given all the circumstances the police undoubtedly made a wise decision not to go into Buxton during the funeral of Mr Ronald Waddell last Saturday, although they did accompany the procession up the East Coast highway, and armed ranks lined both sides of the road as the motorcade passed through Annandale. While the judgement of the police cannot be faulted on this occasion, nevertheless, the fact that Buxton is still a no-go area for the authorities speaks volumes about the capabilities of the state. Last week at a press conference in Freedom House, the PPP had one of its periodic grumbles about the failure of the police to rid the village of gunmen, as if in some split personality sense, it was no longer the party in government with its hands on the levers of power. It is clear that despite all that has happened, the party has not yet come to terms with how this situation evolved and its role in the process. Which is a pity, because we live in troubled times, which require a realistic approach in

assessing events and a sensitivity of judgement when making decisions. The PPP/C came into office at a disadvantage in 1992, in the sense that it did not trust the security forces, whose members were seen as being loyal to the main opposition. In addition, where the GPF was concerned, the professionalism of this force had been seriously undermined under the PNC and corruption was already a major problem. Also noteworthy was the fact that the previous government had depended on a special unit in the force which had become notorious for its association with extra-judicial killings. One might have thought that the new government would have regarded it as a priority to build a genuinely professional police force with forensic and investigative capability, deal with corruption among its members, move away from a reliance on what was popularly known as the "death squad," invest some real money in equipping the GPF, explore ways of encouraging Indians to join, and negotiate with the IMF over the matter of salaries so that officers would at least be beyond temptation where petty bribes were concerned. History, however, got in the way, and the experience of the 1960s blinded the government to a rational approach to the problem of their security. Instead of enhancing the professional capacity of the police, they undermined the institution of the GPF. It was starved of equipment, and there was political interference at various levels in its operations, because the administration placed its trust in those individuals and groups within the force with whom it felt comfortable, rather than in the force as a whole. Inevitably this subverted the normal chain of command. In addition, the administration placed its trust in the Target Special Squad - taking the same route as its predecessor - which became notorious for the allegations of extra-judicial killings made against it. Furthermore, it defended the TSS vigorously, despite the fact that the latter was perceived as targeting African victims, thereby raising the political temperature, and despite the fact that it emerged during a grand jury hearing in the United States into a US visa scam that some of its members were involved in corrupt activities and had hired themselves out as an enforcement squad. And then 2002 hit the country, and the government found itself with a thoroughly demoralized, totally illequipped police force with neither the human nor technical resources to confront the crisis. Furthermore, because of the level of corruption among its officers,

the public did not trust the GPF with information, which effectively ruled out any intelligence-led investigations. It is true that eventually the government was prevailed upon to disband the TSS and pour some funds into the police force, but in the meantime the immediate problem of the major Buxton gunmen was dealt with by shadowy death squads, whose possible association with the state has never been elucidated because the government has never held a comprehensive enquiry into the matter - or even into the origin and development of the Buxton phenomenon in the first instance. The limited enquiry which was held, while it cleared then Minister of Home Affairs Ronald Gajraj from any association with such a squad (or squads), did not address the larger question. As it is the death squad(s) are still around, while a new generation of gunmen haunts the southern reaches of Buxton. And the weakened enforcement arms of the state have so far been unable to deal with either. On an ominous note we have started this election year with the killing of a political activist, and given the tensions and the number of gunmen of whatever affiliation around, we say again, it is imperative for the health of the nation that this case be solved. We say again too, if the police cannot make progress, then the government must seek external assistance. Rebuilding the Guyana Police Force is going to take time, but the administration should do all it can to facilitate that process by among other things implementing the recommendations of the Disciplined Services report. It should also start confronting problems directly, rather than indirectly as is its wont. It is only when the state is seen to exert itself in a lawful fashion that it will be perceived to be strong and not weak. And the state needs to be perceived as effective at the moment; after all, the warlords are waiting in the wings. End quote. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06GEORGETOWN205.html 06GEORGETOWN205, BRAZEN CRIMES IN GEORGETOWN SHOCK, PORTEND Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN205 Created 2006-03-02 20:48 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000205 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DS/IP/WHA DS/ICI/PII CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PINS ASEC PGOV SOCI SNAR MCAP KCRM GY SUBJECT: BRAZEN CRIMES IN GEORGETOWN SHOCK, PORTEND REF: A. GEORGETOWN 111 B. 02 GEORGETOWN 1425

1. (U) SUMMARY. A SPATE OF SEEMINGLY DISPARATE CRIMES HIT GEORGETOWN BETWEEN FEBRUARY 22 AND 27: A) A POSSIBLE STAGED KIDNAPPING; B) THE DISAPPEARANCE OF POWERFUL WEAPONS FROM A GUYANA DEFENCE FORCE (GDF) STOREHOUSE; C) A HIGH-SPEED BOAT CHASE ALONG THE CAPITAL'S WATERFRONT; AND MOST DISTURBINGLY, D) A PARAMILITARY-STYLE OPERATION IN WHICH A HEAVILY-ARMED GROUP BLOCKED THE ONLY ROAD CONNECTING GEORGETOWN TO THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, KILLING VICTIMS INDISCRIMINATELY. GUYANESE AND EX-PATS FEAR THESE EVENTS ARE FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE COUNTRY IS IN THE EARLY STAGES OF ESCALATING ELECTION-YEAR VIOLENCE. END SUMMARY. ------------------------------------------EIGHT MURDERED IN HOUR-LONG REIGN OF TERROR ------------------------------------------2. (U) A PARTY OF 25 TO 30 PERSONS ARMED WITH SEMIAUTOMATIC RIFLES, SHOTGUNS, AND PISTOLS KILLED EIGHT PERSONS FEBRUARY 26 ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF GEORGETOWN. SEVERAL OTHER PERSONS WERE INJURED. THE PARTY OF GUNMEN FIRST ATTACKED A GAS STATION IN ECCLES LOCATED JUST SOUTH OF GEORGETOWN ON THE EAST BANK HIGHWAY, THE ONLY ROAD CONNECTING THE CAPITAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THE GUNMEN ROBBED THE STATION ATTENDANTS OF A NOMINAL AMOUNT

OF CASH AND THEN SHOT AND KILLED THREE PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS. THREE PERSONS IN PASSING VEHICLES WERE ALSO HIT BY STRAY BULLETS. THE GUNMEN TRIED TO SET FIRE TO THE GAS PUMPS BEFORE MOVING ON TO THE ADJACENT COMMUNITY OF AGRICOLA WHERE THEY CONTINUED THEIR ASSAULT. THEY SHOT AND KILLED FOUR PERSONS AND SET FIRE TO A HOME IN AGRICOLA. THE POLICE ARRIVED AFTER THE GUNMEN HAD ALREADY FLED THE SCENE. THE GUNMEN MANAGED TO OPERATE WITH IMPUNITY FOR CLOSE TO AN HOUR BY BLOCKING TRAFFIC ON THE EAST BANK HIGHWAY. ACCORDING TO WITNESSES, THE ASSAULT BORE THE MARKS OF A WELL-ORGANIZED OPERATION RATHER THAN JUST A ROVING GANG. SEVERAL OF THE VICTIMS ARE FAMILY MEMBERS OF PERSONS RUMORED TO HAVE INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. ----------------------------------WEAPONS STOLEN FROM ARMY STOREHOUSE ----------------------------------3. (SBU) THE GDF ANNOUNCED FEBRUARY 28 THAT THIRTY-THREE AK-47 SEMI-AUTOMATIC RIFLES AND FIVE AUTO-PISTOLS HAD DISAPPEARED, PRESUMED STOLEN, FROM ITS GEORGETOWN WEAPONS STOREHOUSE (LOCATED LESS THAN A MILE FROM THE CHANCERY). THE GDF AND GUYANA POLICE FORCE (GPF) ARE CONDUCTING A JOINT INVESTIGATION. SIX PERSONS WHO WORK AT THE STOREHOUSE HAVE BEEN DETAINED FOR QUESTIONING. SOURCES WITHIN THE GDF HAVE INDICATED THAT THE AUTHORITIES MAY REQUEST U.S. ASSISTANCE IN ANALYZING FORENSIC EVIDENCE FOUND AT THE STOREHOUSE. ACCORDING TO NEWS REPORTS ON MARCH 2, SIX 7.62MM GENERAL PURPOSE MACHINE GUNS MAY ALSO BE MISSING. --------------------------------------------- ----HIGH-SPEED BOAT CHASE NETS SUSPECTED FUEL SMUGGLER --------------------------------------------- ----4. (U) THE GUYANA ENERGY AGENCY (GEA) AND COAST GUARD (GDFCG) COOPERATED FEBRUARY 26 TO TAKE INTO CUSTODY A FISHING TRAWLER, THE MV SEA TROUT, SUSPECTED OF HAVING ILLEGAL FUEL ON BOARD. THE FAST INTERCEPTOR BOAT DONATED BY THE U.S. TO THE GDFCG IN MAY 2005 MADE THE DIFFERENCE IN TRACKING DOWN THE TRAWLER AND ITS TWO SPEEDBOAT ESCORTS. THIS PURSUIT ALONG GEORGETOWN'S WATERFRONT WAS THE MOST DRAMATIC EXAMPLE TO DATE OF GEA'S FLEDGLING CAMPAIGN TO FIGHT ILLEGAL FUEL SMUGGLING FROM VENEZUELA, BELIEVED TO BE RAMPANT. THE SEA TROUT BELONGS TO ASHMINS TRADING LTD, A COMPANY OWNED BY LENNOX JOHN. ELEVEN PERSONS -- INCLUDING JOHN, HIS WIFE, AND NINE ASHMIN'S EMPLOYEES -- FACE VARIOUS CHARGES, ALTHOUGH NOT RELATED TO ILLEGAL FUEL. --------------------------------------------- -POSSIBLY STAGED KIDNAPPING OF EX-COP'S DAUGHTER --------------------------------------------- -5. (U) EX-POLICEMAN SEAN BELFIELD REPORTED FEBRUARY 22 THAT HIS FOUR-YEAR OLD DAUGHTER HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED FROM A

GEORGETOWN NURSERY SCHOOL. THE MEDIA REPORTED THAT BELFIELD OFFERED G$5 MILLION FOR INFORMATION ABOUT HIS DAUGHTER'S WHEREABOUTS AND THAT A RANSOM DEMAND WAS MADE FEBRUARY 23. THE CHILD RETURNED HOME BY PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION THE FOLLOWING DAY. ON FEBRUARY 27, THE POLICE COMMISSIONER ANNOUNCED THAT AFTER INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION THE GPF BELIEVED THE KIDNAPPING HAD BEEN STAGED. BELFIELD WAS ONE OF TWO PERSONS ARRESTED ALONG WITH NARCO-TRAFFICKER AND PHANTOM SQUAD LEADER ROGER KHAN IN DECEMBER 2002 IN AN ARMORED VEHICLE WITH CELL PHONE INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT, BULLETPROOF VESTS, AND SEVERAL LARGE HIGH-POWERED AUTOMATIC WEAPONS (REF B). ------COMMENT ------6. (SBU) LOCALS AND EX-PATS ALIKE ARE SEARCHING FOR POSSIBLE LINKAGES AMONG THESE CRIMINAL EVENTS. THEORIES ABOUND. THE ECCLES/AGRICOLA GUNMEN MAY HAVE USED THE STOLEN GDF WEAPONS. THE ATTACK ON THE ECCLES GAS STATION MAY HAVE BEEN IN RETALIATION FOR SOMEONE TIPPING OFF THE AUTHORITIES TO ILLEGAL FUEL ON THE MV SEA TROUT. THE ECCLES/AGRICOLA OPERATION MAY HAVE BEEN RETRIBUTION FOR THE KIDNAPPING. THESE EVENTS MAY BE THE PUBLIC MANIFESTATION OF DRUG LORDS' TURF WAR, OR THEY MAY BE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. AT THIS POINT, THERE IS ONLY SPECULATION. 7. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED. HOWEVER, MANY OBSERVERS HAVE DRAWN THREE CONCLUSIONS FROM THESE EVENTS. FIRST, THE SEVERITY AND TIMERITY OF THE CRIMES INDICATE A LEVEL OF LAWLESSNESS SHOCKING EVEN BY GUYANESE STANDARDS. SECOND, THERE IS LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE AUTHORITIES' ABILITY OR WILL TO UNRAVEL THESE CRIMES AND BRING THE PERPETRATORS TO JUSTICE. LASTLY, THE FEELING IN GEORGETOWN IS THAT THE PAST WEEK'S EVENTS HAVE USHERED IN A NEW STAGE IN THE ESCALATION OF PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE (REF A). END COMMENT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06GEORGETOWN208.html 06GEORGETOWN208, GOG TO INVESTIGATE UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN INTERIOR Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN208 Created 2006-03-03 12:21 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000208 SIPDIS SIPDIS G/TIP E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV SMIG ELAB CVIS KCRM KCOR GY SUBJECT: GOG TO INVESTIGATE UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN INTERIOR REF: GEORGETOWN 1349 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen. Reason 1.4 (b) 1. (SBU) Commissioner of the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC), Robeson Benn, informed EconOff on February 28 that mine officers and immigration officials will begin inspecting interior mining locations by the second week of March in an effort to identify and regularize undocumented workers. Reports indicate a number of undocumented Brazilians work in the mining industry, and Benn suggested that mining operations that have relocated to Guyana after being expelled from Bolivar state in Venezuela are also a draw for such workers. Guyanese law requires that no less than fifty percent of workers on a mining operation be Guyanese. Benn stated that the GOG has yet to determine how to handle undocumented foreign workers (i.e. Brazilians) at sites exceeding this limitation that the GGMC may find. 2. (C) Benn also corroborated information reported in reftel that a business of immigration brokers purporting to arrange work permits for Brazilian workers flourished under the previous Home Affairs Minister, Ronald Gajraj, who had also removed the GGMC's responsibility for vetting work permit applications. Current Home Affairs Minister Gail Teixiera has restored the GGMC's authority to vet work permit applications. BULLEN BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06GEORGETOWN235.html 06GEORGETOWN235, JAGDEO TAKING CAMPAIGN TO LOW ROAD: ELECTION Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN235 VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0235/01 0721617 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 131617Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3250 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0931 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0254 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0097 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2123 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000235 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM SNAR KDEM GY SUBJECT: JAGDEO TAKING CAMPAIGN TO LOW ROAD: ELECTION PREVIEW #5 REF: GEORGETOWN 205 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) --------------------------------------------- ------------Jagdeo asks ABC Representatives how Election is Shaping Up --------------------------------------------- ------------1. (C) President Jagdeo summoned Ambassador as well as the British and Canadian High Commissioners to his home on short notice Saturday March 4. Jagdeo wanted to discuss the elections and security. He said that he has started his campaign. (Note: Jagdeo has not yet been officially designated the PPP's presidential candidate.) He then surprised his guests by asking them how election preparations are going. Ambassador and the High Commissioners replied that the Joint International Technical Assessor (JITA), whose reports are shared with the GoG, has said technical Created 2006-03-13 16:17 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

preparations are proceeding well despite some slippage in a few areas. ----------------------------------------Jagdeo already Slinging Mud at Opposition ----------------------------------------2. (U) Jagdeo used a March 5 address at Babu John commemorating the death of former President and PPP leader Cheddi Jagan as a platform to score political points with core Indo-Guyanese supporters. Jagdeo exhorted the audience to vote for the PPP because "I want you to know that the same people who have to steal guns now would be given te guns if the government changes". Jagdeo was rferring to the recent theft of thirty-three AK-4s and five Baretta auto-pistols from a Guyana Deense Force (GDF) storehouse (reftel). Jagdeo reportedly went on that "the opposition forces" have o answer to the people "as to why they allow their friends, their bandit friends to take over those people's villages and rob innocent civilians." He did not offer any actual evidence to support the accusation that opposition forces are responsible for the weapons theft and the Agricola/Eccles assault. 3. (C) PolOff met with Alliance For Change (AFC) leader Khemraj Ramjattan February 22. The AFC is a new party launched in October 2005 by former members of the ruling PPP and opposition PNC and WPA parties. Ramjattan is a former PPP Central Committee member and there is no love lost between him and Jagdeo. Ramjattan told PolOff that Jagdeo is playing the race card repeatedly when meeting with Indo-Guyanese constituents. Ramjattan said that Jagdeo warns them not to vote for the AFC because its Presidential candidate, Raphael Trotman, is Afro-Guyanese. --------------------------------------------- -----------GoG Sues Media Firm for Airing Comments on PPP/Drugs Link --------------------------------------------- -----------4. (U) The Office of the President (OP) initiated legal action March 10 against Vieira Communications Limited (VCL), owner of an independent television station. VCL's news program carried comments by opposition PNC leader Robert Corbin linking drug traffickers to the PPP administration -comments that OP contends are libelous and unfounded. However, Corbin's comments merely echo statements that appear in the 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). ------Comment ------5. (C) Jagdeo's intent is transparent -- to arouse the

public's fear and leverage that into votes. His distrust of the GDF, often expressed in private, is now bubbling to the surface. The VCL lawsuit would seem frivolous at any time, but coming just five days after Jagdeo's slanderous remarks at Babu John it is crudely hypocritical. Ramjattan's assertion that Jagdeo is pursuing a racist, divisive line in private campaign sessions seems very credible. The PPP feels vulnerable that they may not win an outright majority in the upcoming election and will play hardball to avoid this result. Unfortunately, this approach can only reinforce Guyana's vicious political cycle of mutual recrimination between the PPP and PNC and racially-oriented election violence. END COMMENT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06GEORGETOWN248.html 06GEORGETOWN248, EMINENT GUYANESE WARN DIPLOMATS OF ELECTION THREATS Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN248 Created 2006-03-14 16:43 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000248 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM KCRM GY SUBJECT: EMINENT GUYANESE WARN DIPLOMATS OF ELECTION THREATS REF: A. GEORGETOWN 224 B. GEORGETOWN 205 C. GEORGETOWN 181 D. GEORGETOWN 167 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY. Members of the Private Sector Commission (PSC) met with donors March 8 and 10 to discuss their deep concerns about preparations for Guyana's upcoming elections, the deteriorating security situation, and the disturbing nexus between the two. These Guyanese civil society figures are certain that the two major political parties (the ruling PPP/C and opposition PNC/R) have heavily armed groups at their disposal. The PSC implored the donors to intervene somehow to defuse the situation. The donors demurred, reminding the PSC that it is primarily the Guyanese people's responsibility to resolve the country's political impasse. Separately, Ambassador met March 10 with Guyana Defence Force (GDF) Chief of Staff Edward Collins, who tried to dispel rumors of a coup plan by expressing his commitment to defending the state. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- -------------Private Sector Group Predicts Escalating Political Violence --------------------------------------------- --------------

2. (SBU) The PSC is an advocacy group of prominent business leaders (Guyana's wealthy and wise) that takes public stances on various issues - including governance and security matters. It is as active a civil society organization as exists in Guyana, a fact that often puts it in the GoG's doghouse, given the GoG's instinctive aversion to unsolicited advice from outside the cabinet. In addition to Ambassador, U.K., Canada, Brazil, EU, UNDP, IMF, and IDB Chiefs of Mission attended. 3. (C) Norman McLean - Chairman of the PSC Subcommittee on Governance and Security, former Commissioner of Police, and former head of the GDF - told donors he believes that the recent paramilitary-style assault in Agricola and Eccles and the theft of thirty-three AK-47s and five Baretta pistols from a storehouse at GDF's headquarters (ref B) was an act of political violence. McLean warned that the stolen weapons are intended for sinister purposes with national security repercussions, rather than "to help criminals rob people". PSC member Kit Nascimento sounded an even more ominous note, saying the assault bore the hallmarks of an insurrection and that the GoG is "on the verge of losing control" as criminal elements can take over the country "whenever they wish". He argued that these criminal elements have now proven their ability to isolate Georgetown by blocking the city's southern approach (the East Bank Highway) at Agricola and its eastern approach (the East Coast Highway) at Buxton. --------------------------------------------- -------Opposition Thinks Election Delay Plays into its Hands --------------------------------------------- -------4. (C) PSC vice-chairman Jerry Gouveia, referring to unspecified PSC sources, said that political motives were probably behind the weapons theft and Agricola/Eccles assault. The implication is that the political opposition is willing to let militant factions employ violence to prevent elections. Nascimento said the opposition leaders know they cannot win the national election at this time, but a delay will help them capitalize on the government's increasing difficulty in handling economic and security issues. 5. (C) McLean and Gouveia both said opposition leader Robert Corbin felt that the PNC had blundered in its negotiations after the disputed 1997 and 2001 elections. The PNC accepted the victorious PPP party's promise of constitutional reform too hastily in exchange for ending post-election unrest. Constitutional reform then failed because neither the PNC nor the PPP wanted real change. The PNC under Desmond Hoyte thought that it could somehow win an election and so did not want to diminish executive powers. Corbin does not want to make the same mistake again, so he is prepared to create "mayhem" in order to drive the PPP to the negotiating table and extract concessions giving the PNC greater involvement in

Guyana's governance. Note: It is hard to imagine the increasingly strident President Jagdeo conceding much executive power. --------------------------------------------- -----------GDF's Loyalty in Doubt; Ambassador Meets with Head of GDF --------------------------------------------- -----------6. (C) The PSC leaders doubt that the GDF and GPF are "loyal to the state this time". This long-held theory has gained traction in recent weeks. The PPP government has always viewed the predominantly Afro-Guyanese uniformed services warily. Head of the Presidential Secretariat Roger Luncheon shared this fear with Ambassador as recently as March 3 (ref A). 7. (C) Ambassador met with the GDF Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Edward Collins, before the PSC meeting March 10. Ambassador mentioned that he had heard rumors circulating of a possible coup plan involving former GDF officers. Collins did not reveal any prior knowledge of these rumors, but he did assert the need to "preemptively destroy" any such threats while they are still at an embryonic stage. He stated unequivocally that the GDF is part of the government, suggesting that any coup attempt would have to topple the GDF top brass first before it took on the political leadership. Although Collins expressed his commitment to defending the state, his enthusiasm for President Jagdeo's leadership came across as lukewarm. Collins does not appreciate Jagdeo's overly personal style of running Guyana's affairs. -------------------------------------PSC Plea for Help and Donors' Response -------------------------------------8. (C) After warning the donors how threatening the nexus between crime, violence, and political brinksmanship has become, the PSC leaders called on them to intervene. The donors responded that they are each supporting Guyana's electoral process through bilateral channels. However, the donors explained that they would not broker some sort of compromise between the GoG and the opposition through bilateral channels. Rather, it is primarily the responsibility of the Guyanese people and influential segments of society (like the PSC) to drive changes in the country's ruptured political system. The donors are wary of getting dragged too far into Guyana's political morass, setting themselves up to be scapegoats if the election process fails. 9. (SBU) As an alternative solution, the donors raised the idea of appeasing the opposition through an OAS-brokered political pact on a post-election reform agenda - as proposed

by OAS A/SYG Ramdin (ref D). The PSC found the concept promising but thought it would require watertight guarantees from the international community to convince the opposition that the pact is not just a rehash of past deals. This would require a credible threat of cutting off multilateral loans, and possibly even bilateral aid, to Guyana if the GoG does not fulfill its obligation under the pact. ------Comment ------10. (C) McLean, Nascimento, and Gouveia all had strong ties to the pre-1992 PNC regime. Post is inclined to take their comments seriously because, as Nascimento himself put it, "we know how they think". The PSC highlighted three key forces playing out in Guyana. Heavily armed, well-organized groups are capable of conducting major operations with impunity and without interference from law enforcement. The political opposition mistakenly believes that preventing elections and fueling unrest will help it gain power. The armed criminal groups will take instructions from political interests as long as it suits them. The donors were already aware of these issues to some degree, but hearing Guyana's "wise men" describe them so bluntly underscored how volatile this election year has become. 11. (C) Comment continued: Home Affairs Minister Teixeira made a convincing case to Ambassador and DCM the evening of Friday March 10 that the Agricola murders were a targeted operation by "Fine Man"'s criminal organization against the Roger Khan organization, describing connections between the dead (or their family members) and Khan. This does not change the above analysis. A criminal organization was able to cut the link between the capital and the airport for 45 minutes with impunity while conducting a search and destroy mission against an enemy organization. While this may have been a criminal-directed rather than political-directed operation, it is widely perceived to be politically directed and certainly demonstrated to the public the expanding ability of criminal organizations to seize control from the state. END COMMENT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06GEORGETOWN257.html# 06GEORGETOWN257, Radio, monopoly and technology in Guyana Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN257 Created 2006-03-17 20:25 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000257 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PROP PGOV PHUM SCUL KDEM GY SUBJECT: Radio, monopoly and technology in Guyana 1. Summary: The Stabroek News, the leading independent daily newspaper in Guyana, carried an editorial on Friday, March 17, analyzing GoG ambivalence with regard to radio broadcasting in Guyana. The editorial is reproduced below: Begin Text: One cannot avoid the conclusion that after thirteen years in government the PPP/C has absolutely no intention of releasing its stranglehold on radio, and allowing private broadcasters to operate. We are now going into the third election since it came into office, and given its track record of using the state media for politically partisan purposes, there can be no optimism that things are about to change this year, of all years. Already almost three years have passed since it issued its draft broadcasting bill, which ran into a storm of criticism not least because some of its provisions were out of consonance with the recommendations of the Report of the Joint Committee on Radio Monopoly, Non-Partisan Boards and Broadcasting Legislation. This committee had comprised members of both the government and the main opposition, and had submitted its final report in December 2001. Among other things, this document had proposed guidelines for the setting up of an autonomous National Broadcasting Authority. When the proposed broadcasting bill first appeared, the government said it was placing it in the public arena for debate, and indeed, debate there was, including some insightful commentary from media specialists such as Messrs Kit Nascimento and Hugh Chomondeleley. However, though there were further discussions between the parties there was no positive outcome. Subsequently, of course, Leader of the Opposition Robert Corbin withdrew from the 'constructive engagement' with President Jagdeo, and so the entire question was left in limbo.

Unfortunately for the government this is still no excuse; if it was really serious about legislation to govern broadcasting which would meet the larger requirements of all sides, it would certainly have found a way to move forward. As it is a few weeks ago Mr Corbin said the PNC/R might entertain the possibility of starting a pirate radio station; if the party does go this route, it would be nothing more than the administration deserves for all its foot-dragging on the issue. It might be noted as an aside that the BBC radio monopoly in the UK was broken in 1964 by the pirate station Radio Caroline, which broadcast from a converted ferry moored outside British territorial waters. As was remarked by more than one commentator in 2003, the administration is labouring over an old-fashioned broadcasting bill, while the rest of the world is looking at telecommunications legislation. Even as things stand locally, technology overtook the situation a long time ago. The government is clearly concerned about control of radio, but there are no controls on the internet and it is unlikely it would be able to introduce any. Nowadays with the appropriate software, audio content can be sent to a digital device - something called podcasts. Theoretically, therefore, the PNCR would not even need to bother about a radio station, it could just podcast its propaganda. Admittedly, that would limit it to internet users, but the number of those is likely to continue to increase, no matter what the administration does or does not do. Many BBC radio programmes are available in podcast form, while some of the print media too are dabbling in podcasting, including the Guardian Unlimited and the Daily Telegraph. The latter, it is reported, has something close to a daily news bulletin, and also has some of its columnists reading their pieces. While that might not sound very inspiring, no doubt their efforts will become more sophisticated as time goes by. It is possible, therefore, that somewhere down the line newspapers (not to mention others) will maintain the equivalent of radio stations - albeit only for internet purposes - and perhaps progress eventually to video-podcasts. Given the integration of communications technology, some people will be listening to podcasts on mobile phones. The irony of the situation is that President Jagdeo has publicly committed himself to trying to give every child access to the internet. While that might be laudable, one wonders if he has fully thought out the implications of this dream project. The truth of the matter is there is no controlling information any longer; the worldwide web and attendant developments have put paid to that. By the time the government gets around, therefore, to looking at broadcasting legislation encompassing radio licences (among other things), no one will be listening to radios any more.

End Text. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06GEORGETOWN278.html 06GEORGETOWN278, SECRET TAPE, RAID ON DRUG LORD'S ASSETS ROCK GUYANA Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN278 VZCZCXYZ0011 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0278/01 0822033 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 232033Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3299 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0938 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0265 RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0012 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000278 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR INL/LP DS/IP/WHA DS/ICI/PII CARACAS ALSO FOR LEGATT AND DATT PORT OF SPAIN ALSO FOR DEA, A/LEGATT, ORA SAO PAOLO ALSO FOR DEA SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 TAGS: SNAR PINS PGOV KCOR KCRM GY SUBJECT: SECRET TAPE, RAID ON DRUG LORD'S ASSETS ROCK GUYANA REF: A. GEORGETOWN 234 B. GEORGETOWN 205 C. GEORGETOWN 112 D. GEORGETOWN 111 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) SUMMARY. Georgetown is flush with intrigue as a joint army/police team conducted raids March 19-20 on drug lord Shaheed "Roger" Khan's properties and, concurrently, a secret recording of Police Commissioner Winston Felix's phone conversations was anonymously and widely distributed to the media, GoG, private sector, and diplomatic missions. Created 2006-03-23 20:33 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification SECRET Origin Embassy Georgetown

Theories abound as to the motives and linkages behind these events, but no conclusive explanations have emerged yet. However, one thing is clear - the power struggle between narco-trafficking interests and the Guyanese state has escalated to a new level. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- -------Army/Police Joint Operation Targets Khan's Properties --------------------------------------------- -------2. (U) The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) and Guyana Police Force (GPF) conducted a joint operation March 19 and 20, targeting homes and businesses belonging to Guyana's top drug lord Shaheed "Roger" Khan. The GDF spearheaded the operation, with the GPF in tow to make arrests and ensure chain of custody for seized evidence. 3. (C) The GDF claims that the operation was part of its attempt to recover the 33 AK-47s and other weapons that disappeared from the GDF headquarters' armory one month ago (ref B). Given Khan's known role as a large-scale weapons trafficker, it seems unlikely that he would resort to stealing weapons from the GDF. It is more plausible that the GDF wanted to counteract the growing impunity with which criminal organizations are operating in Guyana. Post sources indicate the operation was a scattershot effort in hopes of finding anything incriminating. Regardless of the motive, Post believes the operation succeeded in penetrating criminal organizations' comfort zones and, specifically, ratcheting up the pressure on Khan. 4. (C) According to public reports, the joint team has seized cocaine and illegal firearms and detained nineteen people and 175 vehicles. In March 20 meeting with Charge and UK and Canada High Commissioners, Minister of Home Affairs Gail Teixeira added that the operation netted 41 kilograms of cocaine, GPF and GDF uniforms, computers, and sophisticated communications intercept equipment. The GDF has custody of the seized items and has requested USG assistance with forensic analysis - particularly of the computers. Post has offered Teixeira such assistance in writing and is making necessary arrangements with LEGATT. 5. (C) Khan's whereabouts are unknown. Teixeira said he must have been tipped off to the raid, even though the GDF planned the operation unbeknownst to both GPF and Teixeira. --------------------------------------------- ----------Secret Tape of Police Commissioner's Phone Call Released SIPDIS --------------------------------------------- ----------6. (C) A taped conversation between GPF Commissioner Winston

Felix and opposition party PNC/R executive committee member Basil Williams was anonymously and widely distributed March 20 to the media, GoG, private sector, and diplomatic missions. Post was already familiar with a shorter version of the tape, which appears to be a Khan production. Khan had for some time been seeking an outlet for the tape; the Ambassador and DCM discussed it with Teixeira March 10 (ref A). Khan was pushing the spin that the longer recording implicates Felix in deliberately misdirecting the investigation into the recent murders at Agricola (ref B), leading to the conclusion that Felix should be sacked and replaced by (the notoriously corrupt) Deputy Police Commissioner/Crime Chief Henry Greene. 7. (U) Reaction to the tape from the media and GoG has been surprisingly muted so far. Teixeira released a statement that the GoG was "deeply disturbed about the circulation and broadcast" of the tape, which had "implications for national security". The media's cautiousness partly derives from a sense that there is a lot they do not know rather than from lack of interest. More attention has been paid to the potential origins and the security implications of the tape how and why were the Police Commissioner's phone calls recorded. The press has even speculated that Khan has intercept equipment capable of producing such a tape. 8. (U) The taped conversation itself spans a variety of topics - including the GPF's response to the Agricola murders, the upcoming national elections, and Ronald Waddell's execution (refs B and D). However, the conversation does not seem to contain incriminating statements. It does contain a frank, expletive-laced discussion between the Police Commissioner and a senior opposition politician about serious criminal activities. The tape actually captures Felix making some reasonable comments - such as, "some people don't understand, you know once you want to play with violence, violence will have to surround you". Certainly the tape may be embarrassing for the conversants and their bosses, but it does not actually implicate anyone in anything. The tape is a tool in Khan's plot to get rid of Felix because the commissioner is intent on fighting organized crime. 9. (S) Ambassador spoke early March 20 with Norman McLean former Commissioner of Police and former head of the GDF regarding the tape. McLean said that President Jagdeo had heard the tape and that Felix would be offered early retirement. Greene, who has a heavily tarnished reputation and a relationship with Khan, is the logical choice to replace Felix. Post is seeking Department concurrence to have Greene's visa revoked on those grounds. 10. (S) Charge and UK and Canadian High Commissioners met with Teixeira evening of March 20. Teixeira agreed that

given the dubious origins of the tape and likelihood that it had been edited before its release, there should be due consideration before any decisions are taken regarding Felix's continued employment. However, Teixeira also indicated that the tape and Felix's future would be a major subject on the agenda for the March 21 Cabinet meeting and that she could not guarantee that cooler heads would prevail. Charge and the High Commissioners indicated that there would be serious difficulties for continued bilateral police cooperation if Greene were named Police Commissioner. Teixeira concurred that Greene would be a problem for many reasons and asked for assistance in leaking to the media the fact that the tape originated with Khan. 11. (S) As of March 23, Felix's position is still vulnerable, but improving. Teixeira told Charge March 22 that she "got things on a more even keel" at the Cabinet meeting. Sources indicate a meeting/confrontation between President Jagdeo and Felix occurred March 21, during which Jagdeo demanded that Felix retract certain statements that could be interpreted as implying GoG involvement with the tape. Felix refused, and he apparently also refused to take early retirement. Sacking Felix would require investigation and action by the Disciplined Services Commission. Given the lack of serious impropriety on the longer version of the tape and the lack of concern from the media and the public regarding Felix's remarks as recorded, it seems unlikely that a call for an investigation of Felix would gain much traction. The bottom line is that the general public thinks that whatever Felix said in his private conversations makes for a relatively innocuous indisretion compared to secretly recording phone calls of senior government officials. ------Comment ------12. (S) The release of the secret tape within a day of the GDF/GPF raid on Khan's properties is an unlikely coincidence. Khan reportedly despises Felix because he is resistant to Khan's control. It is almost certain that Khan wants Felix replaced by someone more pliable - someone like Greene. Even though Felix was not the driving force behind the raid on Khan (GDF Chief of Staff Edward Collins was), releasing the tape was probably Khan's (or his associates') way of fighting back. If that was Khan's strategy, it has backfired so far. 13. (C) Comment continued. The role of McLean and fellow Private Sector Commission leader Jerry Gouveia in spreading word of the tape is also troubling. Gouveia in particular has played the role of Khan's cheerleader in recent weeks, vouching for the legitimacy of the tape and Khan himself. It is unclear whether these eminent figures sought to discredit Felix simply because they think he is incompetent or for a

less benign reason. Teixeira has told Charge and UK and Canada High Commissioners that Gouveia and McLean enjoy a very close relationship with and ready access to President Jagdeo, including the ability "to pick up the telephone and call him at any time", which implies an uncomfortably convenient link between Jagdeo and Khan. END COMMENT. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06GEORGETOWN290.html 06GEORGETOWN290, POLICE CHIEF REQUESTS USG HELP INVESTIGATING DRUG Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN290 Created 2006-03-28 20:18 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000290 SIPDIS SIPDIS CARACAS ALSO FOR LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN ALSO FOR A/LEGATT, DEA SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016 TAGS: SNAR PINS KCRM GY SUBJECT: POLICE CHIEF REQUESTS USG HELP INVESTIGATING DRUG LORD REF: A. GEORGETOWN 278 B. GEORGETOWN 205 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Guyana Police Force (GPF) Commissioner Winston Felix paid Ambassador a visit March 27 to request U.S. government assistance on two specific matters. The requests stem from last week's joint army/police raids on drug lord Shaheed "Roger" Khan's properties and the widely, anonymously distributed secret recording of Felix's phone conversation with a senior opposition politician (ref A). Felix followed up this personal request to Ambassador with an official letter March 28 reiterating the support he is seeking. 2. (C) Felix seeks assistance to determine whether a recently constructed house believed to be owned by a Khan and/or Ricardo Rodrigues associate, and currently in GPF's control, has a concealed basement. This house is located near the residence of the Canadian and UK High Commissioners, who observed the installation of a very large concrete pit during the suspected house's construction. The High Commissioners initially thought this underground structure was for a swimming pool, yet the completed house has no pool. Felix believes that a concealed basement might contain illegal items, including drugs and the AK-47s that disappeared from the Guyana Defence Force's armory in February (ref B). Multiple sources have confirmed that an unusually high number

of vehicles went to the suspected house during the first raids against Khan's properties. Felix said the GPF lacks the resources to detect a concealed basement, but he does not want to release the building until he is sure that no such underground structure exists. 3. (C) Felix also requested assistance in conducting a thorough sweep of his office to ensure that there is no surreptitious recording device. Khan is responsible for the secret Felix recording and indications are that Felix's SIPDIS office may have been bugged. The local phone company GT&T conducted a cursory check of Felix's office, but not to Felix's satisfaction. 4. (C) Post RSO is working with A/LEGATT and DEA Port-of-Spain on these requests. 5. (C) Comment. Felix is Post's most trusted and effective interlocutor on law enforcement issues. The recent army/police raids have put Khan and his associates on the defensive. Failing to thoroughly investigate for a concealed basement at the suspected house would be a terrible missed opportunity. Likewise, further illegal recordings of Felix's conversations by Khan would only hamper the current, unprecedented initiative to bring Guyana's leading narco-traffickers to justice. End comment. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06GEORGETOWN300.html# 06GEORGETOWN300, INCSR PROMPTS GREATER SCRUTINY OF FOREST Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN300 Created 2006-03-30 20:00 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO7657 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0300 0892000 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 302000Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3326 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000300 SIPDIS SIPDIS PORT OF SPAIN ALSO FOR DEA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR EAGR PGOV KCRM KPAO GY SUBJECT: INCSR PROMPTS GREATER SCRUTINY OF FOREST CONCESSIONS REF: A. GEORGETOWN 278 B. GEORGETOWN 254 1. The Guyana Forestry Commission (GFC) is taking steps to prevent narco-traffickers from gaining control of timber concessions in Guyana. This is a direct reaction to the 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), which stated that the GFC "granted a State Forestry Exploratory Permit (SFEP) to Aurelius Inc., a company controlled by known drug trafficker Shaheed 'Roger' Khan." After the INCSR's release, Forestry Commissioner James Singh quibbled with this assertion on semantic grounds only. 2. The independent Stabroek News reported March 28 that concerns about the lack of due diligence into Aurelius' owners were raised at recent GFC meetings, and that the GFC board has agreed to examine more rigorously the bona fides of future SFEP applicants. A GFC board member has confirmed this to PolOff, adding that the GFC genuinely wants to defend the timber industry from infiltration by narco-interests. 3. Guyana's timber industry offers an easy cover situation for narco-criminals, so an ineffective or complicit GFC poses a significant threat. Timber is a capital-intensive business

that requires substantial up-front equipment purchases - very convenient for laundering money. The timber concessions are located in remote locations - where owners operate airstrips invisible to the Guyanese authorities as well as freighters full of timber that can be used as cover for drug shipments. 4. Comment. A more circumspect GFC is an important development in Guyana's fight against narco-trafficking. Post is encouraged by some Guyanese authorities' fledgling efforts to put pressure on major drug traffickers. End comment. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06GEORGETOWN308.html 06GEORGETOWN308, GUYANA POLL DATE UNDER THREAT: ELECTION PREVIEW #6 Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN308 VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0308/01 0931812 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 031812Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3333 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0943 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0270 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0105 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2132 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0034 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000308 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM OAS GY SUBJECT: GUYANA POLL DATE UNDER THREAT: ELECTION PREVIEW #6 REF: A. GEORGETOWN 248 B. C. D. E. GEORGETOWN 181 GEORGETOWN 167 GEORGETOWN 71 05 GEORGETOWN 1350 Created 2006-04-03 18:12 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The likelihood of Guyana holding elections by the August 4 constitutional due date has plummeted over the past ten days. The Guyana Elections Commissioner (GECOM) Secretariat - the technical staff - took the country by

SIPDIS surprise March 24 when they circulated a draft revised plan showing an election date (E-day) pushed back from July 18 to September 25. Because of the resulting uproar, GECOM has continued to tweak the revised plan and, as of a March 31 draft, E-day is slated for August 24. Any delay beyond August 4 is cause for serious concern, as it would usher in an unpredictable and volatile political situation. All stakeholders must take decisive action within the next two weeks - otherwise an election delay is inevitable. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) Key Guyana elections developments in the past two weeks: - March 21: Charge meets with PNC/R leaders, who reiterate their stance that publishing a preliminary voters list (PVL) - to be used in the "claims and objections" (C&O) period based on the 2001 voters list without prior house-to-house verification of every name on the list is "unacceptable" and wil not be allowed to happen. The proposed house-tohouse verification would cost US$2 million and tae at least six months (ref B). - March 24: Doors meet with GECOM just as the revised plan wit the September 25 E-day is circulated. GECOM Chaiman Dr. Steve Surujbally calls the revised plan "first step towards the bloodbath." - March 2: President Jagdeo calls impromptu meeting with mbassador and UK, Canada, and EU chiefs of missionto express his displeasure with the revised plan saying he "can't contemplate an extension" beyod August 4. - March 27: Jagdeo calls all-hands meting - with donors, GECOM (including Surujballyand the other six commissioners), and both JointInternational Technical Assessors (JITAs) - to ubraid GECOM for not fulfilling its mandate to delier elections within the constitutional timeframe. - March 28: GECOM commissioners hold their stattory weekly meeting, fail to make any of the decisions needed to break the political impasse over election preparations. - March 29: Donors issue joint statement that they "are satisfied that the GECOM Secretariat has the technical capability and capacity . . . to deliver free and fair elections within the constitutional timeframe". - March 29-31: GECOM staff, JITAs, and some commissioners hold working sessions on the revised plan, move the proposed E-day to August 24, but no formal decision is taken. 3. (U) There are four protagonists in this unfolding drama:

GECOM; Jagdeo and the ruling PPP/C party; the parliamentary opposition parties (led by the PNC/R); and the international donors. However, the Guyanese electorate - who should be the fifth protagonist - is virtually precluded from participating due to political manipulation. ----GECOM ----4. (SBU) The GECOM commissioners remain deadlocked 3-vs-3 along political lines. Chairman Surujbally can break the deadlock by casting a deciding vote, but he is extremely reluctant to do this, out of both a desire for consensus decision-making and a not unreasonable fear for his personal safety. 5. (C) The GECOM Secretariat, led by Chief Elections Officer Gocool Boodhoo, is extremely frustrated by the commissioners' inability to agree on key issues, thus preventing the Secretariat from completing its election preparations. At SIPDIS Jagdeo's March 27 meeting, an exasperated Boodhoo spelled out clearly the four critical decisions that the commissioners must make quickly to get preparations back on track: a) how to handle verification of the voters list; b) how to compose the PVL; c) how to incorporate results from the Electoral Office of Jamaica fingerprint analysis project (ref E); and d) when to set the eligibility cut-off date for 18 year olds to vote. Even with these timely decisions Boodhoo believes holding elections by August 4 would be "difficult". 6. (U) Moving ahead with printing the PVL is of utmost importance because that will serve as the basis for the C&O process when political parties and the public can come forward with information to further refine the voters list. C&O was scheduled to commence April 4. The draft plan has C&O delayed until May 2 - a major disruption to the election timeline. 7. (U) The atmosphere at GECOM is tense. Inside, the Secretariat is working under pressure to craft a realistic SIPDIS election plan, while their political masters bicker rather than give urgently needed policy guidance. Outside, opposition protesters continue to picket demanding full house-to-house verification; GECOM even received a bomb threat March 29. -------------Jagdeo & PPP/C --------------

8. (C) Jagdeo is very concerned that an election delay will tarnish his reputation on the international stage - he seems desperate not to be seen as a head of state who cannot hold elections on time. In meetings with donors and GECOM, Jagdeo expressed his utter disbelief that E-day could slip from July 18 in the original plan to September 25. He repeatedly asked - and did not receive a satisfactory answer - what had changed to throw off the election schedule. He is "totally against" a postponement of elections past the August 4 constitutional due date and challenged GECOM to fulfill its mandate to conduct elections by then. Specifically, he told GECOM Chairman Surujbally that he should cast a deciding vote if necessary. 9. (SBU) Jagdeo misstepped tactically in calling the March 27 meeting with GECOM and donors before the commissioners had the opportunity to discuss the revised plan. This has led to strong criticism from the opposition that he is meddling in GECOM's work. -----------------PNC/R - Opposition -----------------10. (U) The revised plan plays directly into the opposition's hands. Almost every relevant opposition party (with the exception of the upstart Alliance For Change) endorses an election postponement, as that is the easiest way for them to gain leverage in negotiating with the GoG. The national assembly must dissolve no later than May 4. The national assembly's life can be extended with a constitutional amendment supported by a two-thirds majority, which would require the PNC/R's support. 11. (C) The opposition will use any election delay as a pretext to press even harder for full house-to-house verification of the 2001 voter's list that will be the basis for the 2006 PVL. The PNC/R leadership revealed the true motive behind their insistence at March 21 meeting with Charge. They want to remove emigrants from the voters list on the flimsy assumption that emigrants are predominantly Indo-Guyanese and therefore more likely to be PPP supporters. (Note: At least 100,000 Guyanese have emigrated since 2001. There is no overseas voting, but Guyanese emigrants maintain the constitutional right to vote and may return to Guyana to do so. The voter's list was accepted by party leaders before the 2001 election and verified by Guyanese and international scrutineers both before and after the 2001 election. Even with an otherwise unnecessary "verification" exercise, no legal means currently exist to disenfranchise emigrants.) 12. (C) At the same meeting, the PNC/R leaders said that young Afro-Guyanese are drawn to more extreme factions

advocating an election boycott. They explained that a delay would "minimize that element's basis for anger", a not so subtle allusion to the very real threat of political violence if the PNC/R's demands go unmet. -----Donors -----13. (U) Donors remain determined not to get embroiled in the internal political dispute over election preparations. They are wary of getting dragged into the blame game over elections that has already begun. 14. (U) The donor signatories (U.S., UK, Canada, EC) to the elections memorandum of understanding with GECOM and the GoG issued a joint statement March 29. In it, the signatories stated they "are satisfied that the GECOM Secretariat has the technical capability and capacity . . . to deliver free and fair elections within the constitutional timeframe", and they "urge all political parties . . . to work with GECOM to find timely responses to the political challenges" to elections. 15. (SBU) Donors agree that the most promising way to get election preparations back on track and to minimize political violence is through a strong high-level international political presence on the ground. This was a key element of the OAS proposal for a Guyana Electoral Observation Mission circulated to donors several weeks ago. However, OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin has stopped seeking someone to fill that role because of inadequate donor response to OAS' funding request for this mission. (Note. USG has committed US$50,000; Canada CDN$75,000; and Brazil US$5,000.) The funding gap is over US$400,000. 16. (SBU) The PNC/R must be offered some inducement to convince it to cooperate with elections. During Ramdin's February 12-15 visit to Guyana he mooted the concept of a pre-electoral pact "guaranteed by the international community", committing the political parties to implement reforms to Guyana's governance system immediately after elections (ref C). The international community has very little leverage to force the PNC/R to cease obstructing the election process. Ramdin's proposed political pact is the best bargaining chip available, but will require a high-level, multilateral initiative to broker a deal. ------Comment ------17. (SBU) The window of opportunity to get Guyana's election process back on track is closing fast - so fast that unless GECOM and other stakeholders (including the USG and other

donors) take decisive action within the next two weeks, Guyana has no chance of sticking to its constitutional timeframe. As of now, the JITAs believe that GECOM "could still pull off the elections if it had the will" to do so. 18. (SBU) Comment continued. Despite the ongoing debate over when E-day should be, the fundamental impasse remains the opposition's reluctance to go ahead with elections they are convinced they will lose. The opposition will not commit to the electoral process until it gets a good enough political deal to compensate. Post firmly believes that Ramdin's proposed OAS Electoral Observation Mission offers the best chance to clinch such a deal. The likely alternative is sobering - the opposition will stonewall on elections while its militant factions use verification as an excuse to commit political violence. End comment. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06GEORGETOWN344.html 06GEORGETOWN344, OAS OBSERVERS FOR GUYANA, CONCERN OVER ELECTION Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN344 VZCZCXYZ0032 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0344/01 1081416 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 181416Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3373 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0282 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0111 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2138 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0040 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000344 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR S/CRS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM OAS XL GY SUBJECT: OAS OBSERVERS FOR GUYANA, CONCERN OVER ELECTION DELAY REF: A. GEORGETOWN 308 B. GEORGETOWN 181 C. GEORGETOWN 167 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) SUMMARY. OAS A/SYG Ramdin led a three-person OAS mission to Guyana April 6-11 that paves the way for an OAS Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) with a broader role of ensuring that Guyana has elections. His visit coincided with the Guyana Elections Commission's (GECOM) capitulation that it cannot deliver elections by the August 4 constitutional due date, primarily the result of the political impasse between the ruling and opposition party Commissioners. Created 2006-04-18 14:16 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

Ramdin wants to address this impasse by facilitating the high-level political dialogue lacking in Guyana. The long-term component of OAS' EOM should begin by end of April. Ramdin is eager to get this technical mission started, but insufficient funding commitments are still a sticking point. END SUMMARY. ----------------------Ramdin Makes the Rounds ----------------------2. (U) OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin visited Guyana April 8-11, preceded by Steve Griner of the Promotion of Democracy Department and advisor Sherry Tross. Ramdin met privately with Ambassador and twice more with donors to hear their perspective and share his view on OAS' strategy for Guyana. Ramdin also met with several stakeholders, including President Jagdeo, GECOM Chairman Dr. Steve Surujbally, and political parties - with the notable exception of the main opposition PNC/R, whose leader was out of the country and whose deputies could not find a mutually convenient time to meet. -----------------------No Elections by August 4 -----------------------3. (U) Surujbally told Ramdin during their meeting that GECOM could no longer meet the August 4 constitutional deadline for elections. Ramdin referred to this inevitable delay in his April 10 conference. This was the first official pronouncement, albeit indirect, that GECOM could not hold elections within the constitutional timeframe - thus saving Surujbally and GECOM the blushes of having to break the news to the public themselves. (Note: The disarray in which this leaves the election process to be reported septel.) --------------------------------------"Problems are political, not technical" --------------------------------------4. (SBU) Ramdin left Guyana more convinced than ever, as is post and other donors, that the obstacles to Guyana's electoral process are political rather than technical. As such, OAS will continue to press for elections as soon as possible. Ramdin's prescription to break the deadlock is for the political parties to reengage in meaningful dialogue. Ramdin proposed privately the establishment of an "inter-political party forum" to foster this dialogue, emphasizing, however, that OAS' role is just to "facilitate" and not to "mediate". 5. (C) Unfortunately, this "forum" idea is a watered down version of the "political pact" concept that Ramdin had

initially floated during his February visit (ref C), and which post felt was a long shot but at least the best chance of convincing the PNC/R to stop stonewalling elections. Ramdin felt it was too ambitious to expect the parties to come together right off the bat and agree to a political pact on reforms - instead, he now favors a staged approach of dialogue on the electoral process followed by an agreement on post-election reforms. 6. (C) Of further concern, the PPP/C party leaders rejected the idea of initiating this dialogue when meeting Ramdin, who feels the PPP/C is not concerned with the current political situation and in fact sees engagement as a sign of vulnerability. Ramdin reported that he pointedly told Jagdeo how troublesome is his party's apparent indifference to political dialogue, especially given the GoG's heavy dependence on foreign aid. Jagdeo responded that he had invited opposition leader Robert Corbin to meet on election issues and expected to do so within two weeks (not fast enough, donors believe). Donors agreed to take on the task of encouraging the parties, particularly the PPP/C, to pursue political dialogue. ---------------------------------OAS Long-term Observers on the Way ---------------------------------7. (U) Ramdin said that a two-person, long-term observation team is slated to arrive in Guyana by month end. Steve Griner - who observed the 1992 Guyanese elections with the Carter Center - is likely to lead this team. ---------------------------------------Stumping for Greater CARICOM Involvement ---------------------------------------8. (C) Since his last visit (ref C), Ramdin met with St. Lucia PM Kenny Anthony, as current chair of CARICOM's Justice and Governance portfolio, and Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) FonMin Knowlson Gift, as T&T is current CARICOM Heads of Government chair, to confer on Guyanese elections. PM Anthony may visit Guyana in early May and FonMin Gift in late April, ostensibly for bilateral reasons or to visit CARICOM's new headquarters, but actually to assess the political situation on the ground. 9. (C) Ramdin remains adamant about greater CARICOM involvement in a Guyana electoral mission, but CARICOM simply is not ready yet. He is still eager to identify a high-level individual from the region who can collaborate with OAS in Guyana. Outgoing Jamaica Prime Minister PJ Patterson had been mentioned for this role, but that looks unlikely after both Anthony and Gift reacted lukewarmly to this suggestion.

--------------------------------------------Ramdin, Insulza Want Company on Future Visits --------------------------------------------10. (U) Ramdin said that he and OAS SYG Insulza intend to maintain momentum in Guyana through visits "several times over the next few months". Ramdin expressed his desire to have high-level companions on future visits to demonstrate OAS as an institution. Ramdin specifically mentioned Ambassador Maisto and DAS Duddy, as well Tim Dunn, his Canadian counterpart, and Brazil's representative. ------------------------OAS Still Has Cap in Hand ------------------------11. (U) Throughout his visit, Ramdin stressed the need for further monetary and in-kind contributions so that OAS can embark on this critical EOM without the risk of having to pull the plug before its completion. Ambassador suggested to Ramdin that OAS also approach T&T for funding, as they can afford to assist and also have a vested interest in Guyana's stability. --------------OAS' Next Steps --------------12. (U) Besides reporting to the OAS Permanent Council April 12, Ramdin intends to issue a statement stressing the need for dialogue between Guyana's political parties and to arrange high-level calls from SYG Insulza, and hopefully others, to Jagdeo and Corbin reinforcing the same message. On the other hand, Ramdin is wary of putting too much pressure on the political leaders - his preference is for OAS' EOM to take a "balanced, technical approach". ------Comment ------13. (U) Post remains enthusiastic about Ramdin's understanding of Guyana's political landscape and his strong commitment to taking preemptive measures before unrest escalates. Post and other donors will warmly welcome the imminent EOM. OAS' plan compares very favorably to that of the Commonwealth Secretariat, which went radio silent for months after promising greater involvement. However, OAS' plan does not convincingly chart a course to solve the political calculus now facing Guyana - the PNC/R must receive some tangible concession in exchange for backing down from its intransigent demand for full house-to-house verification

of the voters list (refs A and B). BULLEN

End comment.

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06GEORGETOWN361.html 06GEORGETOWN361, RISING INTEREST IN URANIUM EXPLORATION IN GUYANA Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN361 Created 2006-04-20 16:05 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO9446 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0361 1101605 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 201605Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3395 INFO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2141 RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0017 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL RUEHVC/AMCONSUL VANCOUVER 0003 RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000361 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12598: N/A TAGS: EMIN ECON GY SUBJECT: RISING INTEREST IN URANIUM EXPLORATION IN GUYANA 1. The GOG announced on April 19 that the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC) has awarded a permit to Canadianbacked Prometheus Resources Guyana to conduct uranium exploration. The firm, affiliated with Vancouver-based Chemico Corporation, will have a three-year permit to conduct research in Regions Seven and Eight (Western Guyana). 2. According to the GGMC, this is the first Reconnaissance Permit to be issued for uranium exploration since the French firm Cogema was active in Guyana from the late 1970's to the mid-1980's. An Australian firm, Pharsalus Ltd., has also expressed interest in uranium exploration. The firm's application is on hold pending the firm's incorporation in Guyana, and company officials are expected to travel to Guyana next month. 3. COMMENT: The interest in uranium, spurred by high prices in international markets, follows similar interest in gold and bauxite production. In terms of potential markets, the Government Information Agency's press release noted that "several countries, including Iran, are currently conducting advanced studies on uranium for energy conversion". END COMMENT.

THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06GEORGETOWN365.html# 06GEORGETOWN365, Venezuela and the Caribbean Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN365 Created 2006-04-21 14:21 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO0780 RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHGR RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHGE #0365/01 1111421 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 211421Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3399 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0285 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000365 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PBTS ECIN EINV EPET EAID XL VE GY SUBJECT: Venezuela and the Caribbean 1. Following is text of the editorial in today's Stabroek News newspaper, Guyana's leading independent newspaper. The editorial is a good reflection of the Guyanese thinking man's view of Venezuela, Chavez, and the 160 year-old boundary dispute. 2. BEGIN TEXT: It was columnist Mr. Reggie Dumas writing in the Trinidad Express earlier this week who reminded readers of Dr Eric Williams's famous speech to the PNM in 1975 entitled 'The threat to the Caribbean Community.' In an address which sounds almost prophetic today, the late Prime Minister described Venezuela's Caribbean vision and ambitions as "starting off from barren, uninhabited rocks to a network of economic arrangements out of which is emerging a Venezuelan oil and industrial metropolis and an indebted Caribbean hinterland, the Caribbean as we know it integrated into Venezuela, the naval power of the future, the oil power of the present, the tourist mecca in the making, its position in its Venezuelan Sea fortified by its 200-mile exclusive economic zone: all to the plaudits of the Caribbean people themselves, with Trinidad and Tobago the odd man out." There should be one qualification to this assessment. At the

time when Eric Williams said it, Trinidad and Tobago was not the only odd man out; Guyana too was not in any doubt about Venezuela's strategic objectives. The issue is, has anything changed in Venezuela since that time to cause one to conclude that Dr Williams's views no longer have applicability? Certainly, where internal politics are concerned, President Hugo Chavez has brought a revolutionary style to government in Caracas; but what about foreign policy? Where Guyana specifically is concerned, prior to his accession to office President Chavez's pronouncements on the border controversy were the most hawkish since the days of President Herrera Campins in the early 1980s. Things did not improve after he became head of state. President Jagdeo landed up at a South American leaders' summit in Brasilia, for example, to find his Venezuelan counterpart in full swing with maps pinned up and pointer in hand belabouring the international media on the subject of Venezuela's claim. On October 3, 1999, the one hundredth anniversary of the Paris award, Mr. Chavez - among other things - sent his warplanes to violate Guyana's airspace, his officials proffering some ludicrous excuse for the occurrence. And then there was the case of the Beal spaceport proposal, which was to be sited in the Waini and which Miraflores vigorously opposed. Exactly how significant that opposition was in helping to scuttle the deal, we shall probably never know; however, in the case of the oil companies which were granted exploratory concessions in Essequibo waters by the Guyana Government, the situation is much clearer. Those which were already working fields in Venezuela itself were left in no doubt that if they did not relinquish their Guyanese licences, it would have an impact on their Venezuelan investments. And then two years ago President Chavez breezed into Georgetown for a 'love-fest,' all bonhomie, charm and seeming generosity. He was thinking roads, not invasion, he told a receptive Government of Guyana, and suggested he might be open to allowing Essequibo to develop its resources. Since then we have had PetroCaribe, more talk of a road linking Caracas and Georgetown, and Mr. Chavez's version of the Guyana Shield Project. So exactly which Hugo Chavez is the real one? On the matter of boundaries, it must be noted that the government of our neighbour to the west has not seen fit to withdraw its spurious claim to three-fifths of our land; and while it might be argued that no Venezuelan head of state could suddenly announce such a dramatic turnabout one bright morning and still survive, one would expect a softening of approach. But where allowing us free rein to develop our Essequibo resources is concerned, then Foreign Minister Roy

Chaderton explained to the press following President Chavez's visit here that things which would help communities develop, such as water, agricultural programmes or electricity, would not be opposed, but Venezuela would not tolerate any multinationals developing hydrocarbon reserves, for example, in Essequibo. As for the first-named, Caracas has never opposed electrification or water projects at the village level (large hydropower schemes were a different matter), and where the second is concerned, if our neighbour dictates what kind of GEORGETOWN 00000365 002 OF 002

company can operate in our territory, exactly what has changed? In this instance, Miraflores knows well that we have no state entity capable of developing an oil and gas industry, so is this just creating a possible opening to bring in PdVSA to assist in due course, and perhaps reintroduce a state capitalist element back into Guyana? And make no mistake, PdVSA is not as autonomous as it was; it is now an instrument of President Chavez's social and political policies. And there has been no change in Venezuela's irredentist behaviour in relation to other Caribbean territories either. President Chavez has been even more diligent in preferring his country's claim to Bird Rock, for example, than were his precedessors. Never mind that if that were declared to be Venezuelan, several of our Caricom sister territories would lose their EEZ. So much for Caracas's vaunted concern for the poor and under-privileged. And it was Mr. Dumas who pointed out that Venezuela still had not abandoned its claim either to the Trinidadian islands of Monos, Huevos and Chacachacare. And then we have PetroCaribe. Mr. Dumas, with the clinical approach of someone whose country simply does not need Venezuela's oil, has drawn attention to the small print. He quotes the agreement, which says, "[w]ithin the framework of PetroCaribe, state bodies shall be required to implement energy-related operations. Venezuela offers technical cooperation to support the creation of state agencies in countries not possessing qualified state institutions for this purpose." In addition, he says, the PetroCaribe Secretariat would be "assigned to the [Venezuelan] Ministry SIPDIS of Energy and Petroleum" for the purposes of the day-to-day administration of the programme. In other words, as he observes, despite Caricom's commitment to the private sector's role, the signatories to PetroCaribe have now "opted for a reversion to statism..."

As for the much-touted road from Caracas to Georgetown, it would simply bring the North-West District and coastal Guyana within the Venezuelan sphere, while the Guyana Shield Project was originally envisaged as achieving the economic integration of the area between the Orinoco and Amazon Rivers, but as amended by President Chavez, significantly, it now omits Brazilian Guiana. The Government of Guyana has never even had the courtesy to open up the serious implications of such a project for public discussion. So then, has President Chavez changed? The short answer is, only his methods. He has been open enough to tell the world what he seeks: a socialist universe, the elimination of US influence on the continent and the integration of South America and the Caribbean under his socialist Bolivarian Alternative - for which one can read Venezuelan hegemony. It was reported yesterday that he had said he was "ready to programme a new Mercosur" far from the currents of neoliberalism, and that he was withdrawing from the Andean pact because of the recent trade agreements made by Peru and Colombia with the United States. It is alleged he has used oil money to interfere in the politics of various South American countries, and only yesterday too, the Peruvian Association of Exporters accused him of funding a campaign against their country's free trade agreement with the United States. Angered by US naval exercises in the Caribbean he has announced his own naval manoeuvres off his coast. President Chavez will run up against all kinds of impediments to the implementation of his vision in the case of several of the larger Latin countries, who among other things, have their own international ambitions, but he is off to a flying start in the Caribbean and Guyana. Of course he doesn't need to send his warplanes to violate our airspace, when he can integrate a large part of our territory, and that of our neighbours within the Venezuelan sphere by blandishments and oil payment concessions. And all this "to the plaudits of the Caribbean people," as Eric Williams put it. END TEXT. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06GEORGETOWN371.html 06GEORGETOWN371, GUYANA ELECTION DELAYED, PROESS IN DISARRAY: Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN371 VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0371/01 1141526 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 241526Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3406 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0951 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0287 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0114 RUEHT/AMEMBASY OTTAWA 2142 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0043 RUMIAAA/HQ USSUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000371 SIPDIS Created 2006-04-24 15:26 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

SIPDIS WHA/AR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS KDM OAS GY SUBJECT: GUYANA ELECTION DELAYED, PROESS IN DISARRAY: PREVIEW #7 REF: A. GEORGETOW 344 B. GEORGETOWN 328 C. GEORGETOWN 08 D. GEORGETOWN 181 Classified By: Ambasador Roland W. Bullen For reason 1.4 (d) 1. U) SUMMARY. The Guyana Elections Commission (GECO) says it cannot deliver elections by the Auust 4 constitutional

due date and will not be ready before August 30. This raises thorny constitutional questions about Guyana's governance after August 4. GECOM has also failed to set a new election date, which leaves the process in limbo. Making matters worse, the three opposition election commissioners have "withdrawn" from GECOM, further disrupting the process. President Bharrat Jagdeo and opposition leader Robert Corbin met April 19 - an encouraging sign - but did not achieve a breakthrough. As it currently stands, if key compromises are not reached by May 4 when Parliament dissolves, Guyana will be left with neither a legislature nor an election date. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- --------It's Official: No Elections by Constitutional Deadline --------------------------------------------- --------2. (SBU) GECOM decided April 12 that it cannot meet the August 4 constitutional deadline for elections and, furthermore, cannot deliver elections before August 30. However, GECOM stopped short of declaring a new election date, leaving the election timeline in disarray. In the absence of official word, several rumors are circulating Georgetown about when elections might be held. The donor-funded Joint International Technical Assessor (JITA) who monitors GECOM's activities told PolOff that GECOM is capable of delivering elections by August 31 and that any failure to do so will only be the result of "deliberate sabotage" by political forces who do not want elections to take place. --------------------------------------------- ------Sulking Opposition Commissioners Withdraw from GECOM --------------------------------------------- ------3. (SBU) The three opposition-nominated GECOM commissioners announced April 15 that they had "withdrawn" - but did not resign - from GECOM. (Note: Actually resigning would entail financial hardships such as having to retroactively pay duty on their imported duty-free personal vehicles.) They cited GECOM Chairman Steve Surujbally's misleading and non-transparent management style as the reason why they could no longer work with him. The commissioners have made their point, storming away from the table but preserving the option to return. 4. (SBU) The commissioners and GECOM staff have often expressed their frustration with Surujbally in the past five years. But the real impetus for their action now is that Surujbally voted with the PPP-nominated commissioners to proceed with printing of the Preliminary List of Electors, a step the opposition opposes. Casting the tie-breaking (4 to 3) vote was unprecedented and it paves the way for the Claims and Objections exercise to begin May 2. Proceeding with

Claims and Objections now is critical if elections are to be held without additional delay. 5. (SBU) Where does this leave the elections process? The absence of opposition commissioners might make it easier for GECOM to make urgently needed decisions - the constitution allows the remaining three commissioners and the Chairman to form a quorum. But this would give the opposition parties a very convenient excuse for disowning and discrediting the election process at a later date. Corbin made this perfectly clear in declaring that "the elections commission is treading on dangerous ground" if it plans to make decisions about elections without the opposition commissioners. --------------------------------------------- ----Jagdeo, Corbin Meet: A First Step Towards Dialogue --------------------------------------------- ----6. (SBU) President Jagdeo met with opposition leader Robert Corbin April 19, a step that post and other donors have been urging for months. The upshot was an agreement to establish a four-person team to assess the constitutional implications of the now inevitable delay of elections beyond their August 4 due date. This team will be comprised of two from each side - reported to be Attorney-General Doodnauth Singh and Speaker of Parliament Ralph Ramkarran on one side, with PNC/R Chairman Winston Murray and senior counsel Rex McKay on the other. Ramkarran and Murray command some respect as independent-minded politicians, but it is difficult to foresee how a structure that pits the two parties evenly against each other will bring any resolution to the extremely contentious constitutional questions at play. 7. (SBU) The Jagdeo-Corbin meeting, although a useful first step in reestablishing dialogue, does not mean that compromise is in the offing. The opposition PNC/R's weekly statement April 20 flatly sets out its position - Jagdeo and his cabinet cannot hold office after August 4 without a constitutional amendment requiring a two-thirds majority vote in the National Assembly. This further supports post's view that the opposition's strategy remains the same - to trade its support for a constitutional amendment in exchange for full house-to-house verification as a concession. 8. (SBU) Baroness Amos, leader of the UK House of Lords and Tony Blair confidante, will visit her native Guyana the weekend of April 29-30 following the UK-CARICOM summit in Barbados. She plans to use the occasion to talk some sense into Guyana's political leaders - and not a moment too soon as the Parliament dissolves May 4, at which time Guyana will have neither a legislature nor an election date. --------------------------------------------- -----

Continued Veiled Threats by Opposition Troublesome --------------------------------------------- ----9. (C) The PNC/R also launched another personal broadside against Surujbally in its April 20 statement, accusing him of "pursuing a dangerous program of deception". In the wake of the April 22 assassination of GoG cabinet-member Satyadeow Sawh (septel), this type of rhetoric is no laughing matter. Surujbally, who has been the focus of verbal attacks by opposition politicians for months, recently confided to Ambassador that he considers himself a "dead man walking". 10. (C) The PNC/R leaders have made a habit of peppering their public statements with references to the chaos and violence that will ensue if election preparations continue on their current path. Of course, they point to other uncontrollable, unnamed elements as the sources of such unrest. Post believes these veiled threats are irresponsible and inflammatory, giving succor to those who want to disrupt the election process. Post will devise and seek Department concurrence on tactics to be used against political parties that directly or indirectly promote election-related violence. -------Comment -------11. (SBU) Guyanese bristle at comparisons between their country and Haiti. Yet, as one letter-writer put it recently in the Stabroek News, Guyana "is suffering from gross managerial incompetence" if after five years and US$15 million, GECOM cannot deliver an election for less than 500,000 voters on time. Recent events underscore GECOM's fundamentally flawed structure where the politically appointed commissioners are put in straightjackets by their political masters. 12. (SBU) Comment continued. GECOM made a critical mistake when it failed to set a new election date when announcing August 4 was no longer achievable. We are now in a state of limbo. GECOM staff are moving ahead with preparations for an August 31 poll date. But as far as the opposition parties are concerned, nothing can happen until a full house-to-house verification exercise is agreed to and a deal is struck on post May 4 governance. And so with each passing week that these fundamental issues go unresolved, Guyana heads closer to a Haiti-like scenario of election delays. End comment. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06GEORGETOWN372.html# 06GEORGETOWN372, GOG CABINET MEMBER ASSASSINATED Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN372 Created 2006-04-24 15:53 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO2774 PP RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0372/01 1141553 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 241553Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3409 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0290 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000372 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA/CAR DS/IP/WHA DS/ICI/PII DS/DSS/ITA CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PINS PGOV ASEC KCRM GY SUBJECT: GOG CABINET MEMBER ASSASSINATED REF: A. GEORGETOWN 205 B. GEORGETOWN 137 C. GEORGETOWN 111 1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Cabinet member and People's Progressive Party (PPP) insider Satyadeow Sawh was gunned down at his home April 22 in an apparent targeted assassination. Most observers detect a political link behind the killing. Regardless of the motive, this adds more fuel to the fire as pre-election tensions continue rising in Guyana. President Jagdeo plans to request external assistance in tracking down those responsible. END SUMMARY --------------------------------------Sawh: An Uncontroversial Cabinet Figure ---------------------------------------

2. (U) Satyadeow Sawh, Minister of Agriculture (acting), Fisheries, Other Crops and Livestock, was murdered at approximately 12:30 a.m. April 22 at his home in La Bonne Intention (LBI), East Coast Demerara. Indications are that six to ten masked men armed with AK-47s invaded Sawh's premises and killed Sawh, two siblings, and a security guard. Three others were injured; Sawh's wife was unharmed. 3. (U) Sawh was a jocular, well-liked, fifty year-old dual national of Guyana and Canada, where he spent much of his adult life and remained politically active in the PPP's overseas arm. After the PPP won the 1992 national election he served as Guyana's ambassador in Caracas. Sawh returned to Guyana in 1996, taking a seat in the National Assembly and assuming a cabinet position through the Fisheries, Other Crops and Livestock portfolio. He took on the additional responsibility of acting Minster of Agriculture in 2003, but did not appear to have higher political ambitions. His handling of severe flooding in coastal agricultural areas in early 2006 drew some criticism. --------------------------------------------- -Motive Unclear but Signs Point to Assassination --------------------------------------------- -4. (SBU) Various theories are circulating about what is behind the killings, but these reflect more conjecture than hard evidence. Even Jagdeo and his Police Commissioner Winston Felix have different opinions - Jagdeo sees a political motive while Felix suspects robbery. Sawh's killing does bear marks of a political assassination. It comes on the heels of the April 6 murder of prominent local contractor Gazz Sheermohamed and the January 30 murder of talk-show host Ronald Waddell (ref C) in a similar fashion. Robbery does not appear to have been a primary motive in any of these cases. Sawh's killers did not take much from his house; Sheermohamed's killers left a large amount of cash in the car where he was shot. -- One theory is that militant anti-government elements are behind the Sawh and Sheermohamed killings in a bid to provoke chaos. This, according to their twisted logic, would lure the international community into taking a more active role in Guyana's internal politics and lead to the imposition of a shared government model. The fact that Sawh's assailants came and left on foot supports this theory - Buxton, notorious as the nucleus of armed resistance against the government, is only three miles from Sawh's LBI home. This is certainly the PPP's line: in his April 22 address to the nation, Jagdeo urged Guyanese "to prevent extremists from hijacking the political agenda". The Cabinet has also announced its concern that the attack might be "part of a sinister plot to impact the outcome" of the upcoming

elections. -- A second theory is that these killings are somehow related to the victims' involvement in unspecified criminal activity. Such rumors about prominent Guyanese are commonplace. Although Sawh's work did bring him into contact with some very suspect individuals, most observers feel he was relatively clean. -- A third theory is that Sawh's killing was a random armed robbery. But few believe this given the operation's efficiency and the use of assault rifles unavailable to the GEORGETOWN 00000372 002 OF 002

common criminal in Guyana. 5. (U) Elections are due in 2006 and Guyana has a long history of violence around election time. This year is shaping up no differently. Brazen robberies are occurring more frequently, often in broad daylight. The levels of lawlessness and fear in Guyana are rising sharply. In late February, over thirty AK-47s and other powerful weapons were found missing from an army storehouse; then a heavily-armed group conducted a paramilitary-style operation in the Eccles and Agricola communities, executing eight after blockading the road to the international airport (ref A). Emerging reports indicate ballistic tests confirm that weapons used in Sawh's killing match those used in the Eccles/Agricola operation. 6. (U) Several organizations, including the main opposition party PNC/R, have issued statements condemning the killings. Post plans to coordinate with the UK, Canadian, EU, and UN missions to issue a joint statement condemning these acts of violence, similar to the statement made after Waddell's murder. 7. (U) Post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) met April 22 at 11:00 a.m. to discuss the killing and its implications (reported septel). ------Comment ------8. (SBU) Although Sawh's killing has horrified Georgetown, it has not truly surprised the political set. Post's interlocutors have warned for over a year that the upcoming election season would bring with it political violence. No one expects this to be the final salvo, although one hopes the ruling PPP will resist the temptation to use Sawh's killing to reap political gain by pinning this on the

opposition without hard evidence. The mood in Georgetown is marked both by somber introspection and by indignation with the security forces' inability to solve - let alone prevent any of this year's execution-style killings. Calling Sawh's death the first assassination of a government minister in Guyana's history, the independent Stabroek News' April 23 editorial stated flatly, "We have crossed the Rubicon". Others are echoing this theme - vigilante justice rules in Guyana, which now resembles a big ranch more than a nation-state. Felix will come under ever greater scrutiny and pressure to resign until he can demonstrate tangible progress in solving these cases. It is certainly in the USG's interest to provide whatever assistance possible to help the overwhelmed police force in its investigations. END COMMENT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06GEORGETOWN417.html# 06GEORGETOWN417, SABOTAGE OF TELEPHONE SYSTEM CONTINUES Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN417 Created 2006-05-10 11:32 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO9604 PP RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0417 1301132 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 101132Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3460 RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000417 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12598: N/A TAGS: ECPS MCAP PINS ECON GY SUBJECT: SABOTAGE OF TELEPHONE SYSTEM CONTINUES REF: GEORGETOWN 219 1. SUMMARY: Guyana Telephone and Telegraph (GT&T) has revealed several "acts of sabotage" that have disrupted telephone communications for several key military installations and large businesses. The events are the latest in a series of acts of vandalism against the company's facilities. END SUMMARY. 2. GT&T, owned by U.S. firm Atlantic Tele Network, announced that more than 1,000 customers were without telephone service following two acts of vandalism over the May 5 to 7 weekend. In one act, vandals severed a cable in the Alberttown section of Georgetown. The outage reportedly left the Guyana Defense Force installation at Camp Ayangana without telephone service, including a hotline number established for information on the recent theft of 33 AK-47s from the base. In the second incident, vandals broke a padlock and cut cables inside a telephone switch box at Houston, just south of Georgetown on the East Bank of Demerara. The outage affected several businesses in the largely industrial area, including Banks DIH, the country's largest distillery, and the company's D'Aguiar Park housing compound, which was a subject of recent GDF raids.

3. The phone company noted that the vandalism appeared to be a "well orchestrated plan", with a company official estimating that repairs could take up to two weeks. A GT&T official told EmbOff on May 9 that the company expects to have service to the GDF facility restored by the following day. 4. COMMENT: These latest incidents follow a series of acts of sabotage that disrupted internet and data service on the Americas II cable (reftel). The earlier incidents, which occurred in relatively rural coastal areas, sparked speculation that the sabotage was intended to undermine the company's image amidst GOG allegations that it was offering poor service to Guyanese customers. The latest incidents, however, have been widely reported as acts of vandalism and were clearly not accidental. The particular choice of locations and their potential strategic importance raise concerns about the security of Guyana's communications infrastructure as well as the vandals' motive. END COMMENT.

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06GEORGETOWN419.html# 06GEORGETOWN419, NOMINEES FOR REGIONAL ANTI-TIP TRAINING: GUYANA Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN419 Created 2006-05-10 19:23 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO0354 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0419 1301923 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 101923Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3462 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000419 SIPDIS G/TIP FOR ANTHONY ETERNO AND WHA/PPC FOR MICHAEL PUCCETTI SIPDIS E.O. 12598: N/A TAGS: SNAR SMIG KCRM KWMN ELAB EAID GY SUBJECT: NOMINEES FOR REGIONAL ANTI-TIP TRAINING: GUYANA REF: STATE 42921 1. As requested in reftel, post, in coordination with the Ministry of Labor, Human Services, and Social Security (MLHASS), nominates the following individuals for the June 19-30 "Trafficking in persons Course for Investigators": 1) Name: Francis Trim Rank: Assistant Superintendent, Guyana Police Force Passport Number: Guyana 589517 Date of Birth: 24-JUN-1960 Contact Number: 592-610-3037 2) Name: Keith Bretnol Knight Rank: Assistant Superintendent, Guyana Police Force Passport Number: Guyana 642918 Date of Birth: 30-MAY-1960 Contact Number: 592-261-2559 (home) or 592-226-4700 (office) 3) Name: Joycelyn Percival Rank: Sergeant, Guyana Police Force Passport Number: Guyana 0981926 Date of Birth: 12-APR-1963 Contact Number: 592-226-0167 (home) or 592-643-1909 (office)

4) Name: Robert Tyndall Rank: Sergeant, Guyana Police Force Passport Number: Guyana 0750638 Date of Birth: 14-JAN-1960 Contact Number: 592-610-7047 5) Name: Fazil Karimbaksh Rank: Sergeant, Guyana Police Force Passport Number: Guyana 590777 Date of Birth: 13-APR-1972 Contact Number: 592-333-2100 6) Name: Brian James Rank: Constable, Guyana Police Force Passport Number: Guyana 0884072 Date of Birth: 23-MAY-1977 Contact Number: 592-227-2195 (home) 7) Name: Javed Shadick Rank: Technical Officer (TIP Unit), MLHSSS Passport Number: Guyana 1126303 Date of Birth: 01-SEP-1979 Contact Number: 592-227-4082 8) Name: Yoganand Persaud Rank: Legal Officer, MLHSSS Passport Number: Guyana 0820048 Date of Birth: 08-MAR-1972 Contact Number: 592-254-0336 Alternate) Name: Keon Benjamin Rank: Lance Corporal, Guyana Police Force Passport Number: Guyana 1098946 Date of Birth: 19-JAN-1979 Contact Number: 592-625-6183 (cell) or 592-218-0715 (home) 2. CONS, POL and RSO have vetted these names, and post has no adverse information. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06GEORGETOWN424.html 06GEORGETOWN424, INTERAGENCY EFFORT TO APPREHEND GUYANESE Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN424 VZCZCXYZ0003 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0424/01 1311553 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 111553Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3467 INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0301 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 4276 RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 3877 RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM J3 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000424 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR INL/LP DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - PPETTY CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016 TAGS: SNAR PREL PINS KCRM GY NS SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY EFFORT TO APPREHEND GUYANESE NARCO-CRIMINALS REF: A. PARAMARIBO 259 B. PARAMARIBO 39 C. GEORGETOWN 112 D. GEORGETOWN 278 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reason 1.4 (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador met April 20 in Port of Spain with Ambassador to Suriname Marsha E. Barnes and officials from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Created 2006-05-11 15:53 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Georgetown

Embassies Georgetown and Paramaribo. The meeting accomplished two goals: a) DHS and DOJ briefed Ambassadors on the status of criminal cases against Guyana's most wanted narco-traffickers; and b) Ambassadors charted a course of action aimed at getting these narco-criminals into U.S. custody as expeditiously as possible. END SUMMARY ---------Background ---------2. (C) Shaheed "Roger" Khan is Guyana's number one narco-trafficker, but the threat he poses to U.S. national interests extends much further than just drug smuggling (ref C). He has brokered drugs-for-guns deals, sending weapons to the FARC for cocaine. He is reported to have social and operational links to Desi Bouterse, former Surinamese strong-man, convicted narcotics trafficker, and possible coup-plotter (ref B). Khan was a driving force behind the "Phantom Squad" that carried out extra-judicial killings with impunity in Guyana in 2002-03. Currently, he is trying to use secretly taped conversations of Guyana's police chief to engineer a shake-up in the police leadership (ref D). In short, Khan is no longer just a prominent cocaine smuggler he threatens the internal security of Guyana and others in the region. --------------------------------------------- -------------Strong Case against Khan and other Guyanese Narco-Criminals --------------------------------------------- -------------3. (C) The DHS officials outlined their long investigations of Guyana-New York cocaine smuggling rings, confirming that thousands of kilograms of cocaine from Guyana (originating from Colombia and Venezuela) have been imported into the U.S. in recent years. A common thread running through these investigations is that Khan, along with his accomplice Clay Hutson, are the primary sources of cocaine from Guyana. The Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) handling these cases believes that the evidence against Khan and Hutson is now strong enough to move forward with charges against them for conspiring to import cocaine into the U.S., adding "if we get them, we will convict them". 4. (C) Once indicted, DOJ intends to seek the extradition of Khan and the others. The GOG has no track record to speak of in fulfilling extradition requests. In fact, the GOG effectively rebuffed a 2003 extradition request for many of these same individuals because the Attorney General insisted that the relevant witnesses come to Guyana in order to proceed. This was a preposterous condition given the justified fear these witnesses felt about returning to Guyana. Ideally, the GOG will be more cooperative this time around and realize that harboring these narco-criminals is

self-destructive. DOJ will seek to submit confidential affidavits in support of the extradition requests rather than bring witnesses to Guyana. Unfortunately, extradition remains an untested route, so the Ambassadors have explored alternative methods for getting the prospective indictees into custody. -------------------Suriname Alternative -------------------5. (C) Ambassadors also met privately with their RSOs, DEA, and the AUSA to determine how best to get Khan and the other prospective indictees into U.S. custody. The top priority is to locate Khan, who has gone to ground since March 2006 army/police raids on his properties in Guyana (ref D). (Note: One of the prospective indictees was arrested in connection with these raids.) Khan is believed to travel to Suriname regularly - entering illegally - where, surrounded by his henchmen, he feels relatively at ease and consorts with Bouterse. Embassy Paramaribo has learned from police intelligence that Khan has crossed into Suriname twice in the past month by helicopter for meetings along the Corintijn River, returning the same day. 6. (C) Ambassadors agreed that the GOS might have greater interest in resolving the Khan problem and expelling him rather than allow him to remain in Suriname as an outlaw and potentially destabilizing force. Because of this, Ambassador Barnes agreed, once advised that individuals have been indicted, to first approach the GOS at the highest levels before Ambassador Bullen approaches the GOG - which she has since done (ref A). --------------Plan for Guyana --------------7. (C) Once the extradition paperwork has been prepared, and after Ambassador Barnes has gauged GOS support on this issue, Ambassador Bullen will approach President Jagdeo to give him advanced warning of the imminent requests. Post believes the next two months provide auspicious timing to convince Jagdeo to assist in locating and handing over these narco-criminals. National elections are anticipated in September. Guyana's deteriorating security situation means that Jagdeo's PPP party is extremely vulnerable to this issue on the campaign trail. These extradition requests will offer a tailor-made chance for Jagdeo to back up his anti-drug trafficking rhetoric with deeds. If he does not cooperate, then word of the requests is likely leak out, causing him and his party great embarrassment in Guyana. 8. (U) This cable was cleared by Embassy Paramaribo.

Bullen

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06GEORGETOWN433.html 06GEORGETOWN433, NARCO-CRIMINAL ROGER KHAN LASHES OUT AT USG Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN4 33 VZCZCXYZ0011 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0433/01 1312020 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 112020Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3476 INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0304 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 4279 RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 3880 RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM J3 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000433 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR INL/LP DS/IP/WHA DS/ICI/PII DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - PPETTY CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016 TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL KCRM GY SUBJECT: NARCO-CRIMINAL ROGER KHAN LASHES OUT AT USG REF: A. PORT OF SPAIN 345 B. GEORGETOWN 290 C. GEORGETOWN 278 D. GEORGETOWN 234 E. GEORGETOWN 112 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) Guyana's leading narco-trafficker Shaheed "Roger" Khan has stepped up his public relations attack since news of his Created 2006-05-11 20:20 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

grand jury indictment emerged May 5 on conspiracy to import cocaine emerged. Khan approached various media organizations May 10 with a statement painting himself as a victim of a harassment campaign by the USG, Guyana's security forces, and the opposition party PNC/R. 2. (U) Guyana's two independent newspapers ran stories about the statement but did not publish the statement itself. The Stabroek News' top headline May 11 quoted the Embassy's official response: "Mr. Khan is welcome to apply for a U.S. visa through our normal procedures in order to travel to the U.S. so that he can be processed through the U.S. judicial system". The government-owned Guyana Chronicle did not carry the story. 3. (C) Khan's statement claims that he met with the "Deputy Ambassador of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Regional Security Officer of the Caribbean" in March 2006. This claim is false. At Khan's request, U.S. law enforcement officials did meet with him, but no State Department personnel participated in that meeting (ref A). The purpose of the meeting was ostensibly to discuss the secret recording Khan possessed of a conversation between the police commissioner and a prominent opposition politician (ref C), although Khan mostly resorted to self-aggrandizing monologues. 4. (C) COMMENT. Khan has launched this public relations attack out of desperation. He has been on the run since March, when a joint services team raided his businesses and the police issued a bulletin seeking him for questioning, making him a "wanted man" whereas he previously operated with impunity in Guyana. Khan is the self-styled vigilante protector of the GoG against perceived threatening Afro-Guyanese elements in the police, army, political opposition, and the Buxton gangs. In private conversations, very senior GoG leaders often reveal a similar sense of paranoia about the state security forces and also what can only be termed as nostalgia for the 2002-2003 period when death squads, under Khan's active management, were trying to "solve" Guyana's crime problem extra-judicially. As preposterous as Khan's statement is, it does underscore Post's belief that some GoG figures have greater trust in thugs like Khan to protect their interests than the police and army. END COMMENT. 5. (U) Text of statement follows. Statement by Shaheed Khan The Grand Jury Indictment, and anything flowing from it, including a request for my extradition have been motivated by political considerations. I am perceived by persons in the U.S.A., The Guyana Police Force (G.P.F.), The Guyana Defence Force (G.D.F.) and the People's National Congress Reform BEGIN TEXT:

(P.N.C/R) as someone who has the will and capacity to fight crime and to protect the people of Guyana against a coup d'etat. During the crime spree in 2002 I worked closely with the crime-fighting sections of the Guyana Police Force and provided them with assistance and information at my own expense. My participation was instrumental in curbing crime during this period. When the American Diplomat MR. LESNIACK was kidnapped and taken to the village of Buxton I met with operatives from the American Embassy on a daily basis and provided them with information and hard evidence that led to the issuance of an arrest warrant for SHAWN BROWN, the person responsible for the kidnapping. More recently I met with American Operatives, including the Deputy Ambassador of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S.Regional Security Officer of the Caribbean, in March 2006 at the Ocean View International Hotel. I provided them with evidence that the leaders of the security forces in Guyana had strong political motives for encouraging and protecting the so-called "armed resistance of Buxton." That meeting lasted for about 3 hours and I expressed my concerns to them about national security. From the time the G.D.F. started to play a role in Guyana's crime problem in 2002 and now again in 2006 their only real target has been me, leading to my illegal arrest by the G.D.F. in 2002 and the targeting of my business premises and persons connected to me, in 2006. The timing of the request by the Americans for my extradition is no coincidence. It has coincided with a period of Guyana's history when the country's security is most at risk, and most vulnerable to a coup d'etat. Guyanese are urged not to forget the role of the Americans in the 1960's in our country or the fabrication of "weapons of mass destruction" to justify that country's political agenda in Iraq. The indictment against me is a similar fabrication and is actuated by bad faith so that I may be punished, detained and restricted in my movements to set the scene for the P.N.C./R to thwart the democratic process and to fulfill their political ambitions by any means necessary. The silence of the American Embassy concerning matters of national security is tacit approval of the violent depths of which we have recently plunged. It should be noted that it took a Grand Jury less time to indict me than it is taking the American Government to authenticate the voices on the taped recording allegedly between Commissioner FELIX and the PNC/R Vice Chairman. The disinclination of the Americans to do the authentication and their unwillingness to even comment on my stated close relationship with Police Commissioner FELIX should be compared with their previous eagerness to listen to

the likes of SHAFEEK BACCHUS when the professionalism of a PPP-C Government Minister was in question. In this regard, the Americans have b een acting in collusion with leaders of the G.P.F. and G.D.F. and the PNC/R. Leaders of the G.P.F. and the G.D.F. have recently been cited for contempt of Court orders and no longer have respect for the rule of law. The G.P.F. and the G.D.F. are now setting themselves up as the de facto power in Guyana. The Americans aided and abetted a criminal rebellion in Haiti to remove a democratically elected government. The rebellion was successful and an interim American puppet government was installed. This interim government never charged or prosecuted the rebels after the ouster of Aristide. Latin America is moving away from U.S. hegemony and now socialist governments are in Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Guyana and it is also likely that Peru and Nicaragua will follow the same path. Guyana has once again assumed geopolitical importance and it is crucial for American interests to install a puppet regime here in Guyana. END TEXT. Bullen

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06GEORGETOWN462.html# 06GEORGETOWN462, POLITICAL STALEMATE CONTINUES: ELECTION PREVIEW #8 Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN4 62 Created 2006-05-17 19:23 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO8472 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0462/01 1371923 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 171923Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3509 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0956 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0306 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0117 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2145 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0046 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000462 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM OAS GY SUBJECT: POLITICAL STALEMATE CONTINUES: ELECTION PREVIEW #8 REF: A. GEORGETOWN 371 B. GEORGETOWN 344 C. GEORGETOWN 308 D. GEORGETOWN 181 1. (U) SUMMARY. Guyana's election impasse has moved into a new phase. The country currently has neither a legislature (dissolved May 2 by President Jagdeo) nor an election date (no new date has been set since the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) decided April 12 that it could not meet the August 4 constitutional due date for elections (ref A)). Over the past month GECOM has worked towards a revised timeline for an August 31 election day. The GoG has temporarily bought itself some breathing room by unilaterally

amending the constitution to extend the election deadline by one month -- a move that has predictably brought threats of legal action from the opposition. Observers agree that meeting even this new September 2 constitutional deadline will be very difficult. While Parliament's dissolution passed without great incident, opposition leaders at a May 13 rally called on their supporters to take to the streets in protest. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- -----Governance Status: No Legislature, No Election Date --------------------------------------------- -----2. (U) President Jagdeo dissolved Parliament on May 2 (the next to last possible day) without bipartisan consensus on election timing or how to deal with the country's governance until elections take place. Just prior, Parliament amended Article 61 of Guyana's constitution to require that elections be held within four months of Parliament's dissolution, instead of three months as originally written. The GoG was able to pass this amendment with a simple majority. Legislators left Article 69, the other pertinent section, unchanged -- the new Parliament "shall begin ... four months from the end" of the prior Parliament's dissolution. Unlike Article 61, Article 69 is one of the constitution's sections that requires a two-thirds majority (and thus opposition support) to amend. The parliamentary opposition parties were counting on this fact to extract political concessions for their support of an amendment. Circumvented by the GoG, the opposition predictably disagrees with the GoG's constitutional interpretation and has threatened legal challenge. 3. (SBU) Where does this constitutional tinkering leave the elections process? On the one hand, the GoG has temporarily bought itself some breathing room by extending the constitutional due date for elections to September 2, in post's estimation. (Note: The parties and GECOM are still unclear as to whether the actual new due date is September 2nd or 3rd -- underscoring that this was a rush job constitutional amendment). On the other hand, the consensus view in Georgetown is that the chances of meeting the new deadline are slim. Under Article 69, the new Parliament is still constitutionally mandated to meet by September 2. GECOM is working on the basis of a timeline with an August 31 election day. This creates an untenable situation. In practical terms, this means that votes would have to be transported and counted, results announced, and new MPs named between August 31 and September 2 -- an almost inconceivable scenario even in the unlikely event that there are no more slippages in GECOM's work plan. 4. (U) The GoG's internal legal analysis supporting Article 61's amendment also set forth the opinion that President

Jagdeo and his ministers could remain in their positions indefinitely until the next elections are held. --------------------------------------------- -------------Opposition Election Commissioners Return: But For How Long? --------------------------------------------- -------------5. (U) The three opposition-nominated election commissioners who "withdrew" from GECOM April 15 returned to the fold for GECOM's May 12 meeting. Nevertheless, the meeting was acrimonious and unproductive. The source of dispute remains GEORGETOWN 00000462 002 OF 002

the opposition's demand for verification of the voters list (reftels). Having set a precedent of retreating when they fail to get their way, the opposition commissioners could withdraw again before the May 19 GECOM meeting. --------------------------------------------- -----Faltering Political Dialogue; Opposition Rally Call --------------------------------------------- -----6. (U) The ruling PPP/C and main opposition PNC/R parties continue to engage in a halting dialogue aimed at resolving the impasse over verification. If a solution is to be found, it will have to come from the politicians rather than GECOM. However, both sides have sent only lukewarm signals of willingness to compromise. 7. (U) The parliamentary opposition parties held a May 13 rally, urging their supporters to "enter the struggle" and go "into the streets". PNC/R leader Robert Corbin later invoked his stock phrase again: "There can be no peace without justice." As usual, the speakers did not explain what these statements/threats entail, nor what supporters should do once they are in the streets. -----------------------------OAS Long-term Observers Arrive -----------------------------8. (U) OAS' two-person electoral observation mission arrived in Guyana May 12-13. They are on contract to remain in country through the end of September and will focus on technical preparations for the elections. ------Comment ------9. (SBU) Most observers think that further slippages in election preparations are unavoidable, meaning that the

additional month gained by the constitutional amendment is merely a superficial fix. The root cause of the unresolved election delay is the ruling PPP/C and opposition PNC/R's unwillingness to find a political compromise that allows elections to proceed in a constructive fashion. Without such negotiation and compromise, the political temperature in Guyana will continue to rise as September and a fresh constitutional crisis draw closer. END COMMENT. Bullen

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06GEORGETOWN471.html# 06GEORGETOWN471, OPPOSITION SUES GOG, WANTS COURT TO WEIGH IN ON Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN4 71 Created 2006-05-19 18:12 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO1256 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0471 1391812 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 191812Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3533 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0962 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0312 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0119 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2147 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0048 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000471 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY SUBJECT: OPPOSITION SUES GOG, WANTS COURT TO WEIGH IN ON ELECTION REF: A. GEORGETOWN 462 B. GEORGETOWN 371 C. GEORGETOWN 308 D. GEORGETOWN 181 1. (U) The main opposition PNC/R threw up another major obstacle to election preparations May 18. It filed a lawsuit in Guyana's High Court challenging the legality of a May 2 constitutional amendment that had extended the election deadline to September 2. The plaintiff is Joe Hamilton, the PNC/R's Chief Scrutineer, designated rabble-rouser, and font of alarmist misinformation about the election process. The defendants in the case are Attorney General Doodnauth Singh, Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) Chairman Dr. Steve

Surujbally, Chief Elections Officer (CEO) Gocool Boodoo, and all six GECOM commissioners. 2. (U) The basis for the lawsuit is that amending Article 61 of the constitution to extend the election deadline to September 2 conflicts with Article 69, which requires the newly elected Parliament to meet by September 2. (Note: Ref A describes the constitutional issue in detail.) The claim seeks declarations that the May 2 amendment is invalid and that the GoG will be "unconstitutional and illegal" after August 2, 2006. In addition, the claim seeks an injunction to restrain the GECOM Chairman and CEO from conducting an election after August 2. 3. (SBU) The sense among Georgetown's legal/political circles is that the GoG overplayed its hand in devising a way to amend the constitution and extend the election deadline through a simple majority, without the parliamentary opposition's acquiescence. Some feel the case may have some legal merit and where it goes from here is uncertain. There is no direct precedent in Guyana to support the claim, although there may be regional ones. Regardless of the outcome in the courtroom, the PNC/R has a notable track record of using the courts to disrupt previous elections. The damage will be done if the lawsuit succeeds in the PNC/R's real objective -- gumming up election preparations to cause further delay. 4. (SBU) COMMENT. The lawsuit confirms what post and other donors feared months ago. The original August 4 constitutional deadline for holding elections was one of the few things that rival political parties could not dispute. By failing to adhere to that deadline, the election process has moved into uncharted territory in constitutional terms. The ruling PPP/C wants elections as soon as practicable. The PNC/R wants a significant delay. Now that the process has meandered off the constitutional path, the two sides are very unlikely to agree on when the election date should be. A credible scenario would see the PPP/C ram elections through as close to September 2 as possible -- thereby giving the opposition the perfect excuse to disavow the election results and tacitly condone civil disturbance and violence by its supporters. END COMMENT. Bullen

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06GEORGETOWN489.html# 06GEORGETOWN489, REQUEST AND RATIONALE FOR DEA OFFICE IN GUYANA Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN4 89 VZCZCXYZ0020 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0489/01 1442005 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 242005Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3554 RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0314 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 4281 RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 3883 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN SAN JUAN PR RUEABND/DEA MIAMI FL UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000489 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA/CAR INL/LP CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT SAN JUAN FOR HARRIS AND BERGMAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR PREL KCRM GY SUBJECT: REQUEST AND RATIONALE FOR DEA OFFICE IN GUYANA REF: (A)GEORGETOWN 424, (B)GEORGETOWN 112, (C)GEORGETOWN 22 1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In light of the great and increasing influence of the narcotics trade and related transnational crimes in Guyana, Post requests the formal establishment of a DEA office at Embassy Georgetown. Guyana is well on its way to narco-statehood -- a prospect that poses a real threat to U.S. interests. A permanent DEA presence would significantly improve USG's ability to fight drug trafficking in Guyana. END SUMMARY. Created 2006-05-24 20:05 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

2. (SBU) The level of narco-trafficking influence on the political, judicial and economic systems in Guyana creates ripe conditions for the emergence of a narcostate. Because Guyana is a country of only 750,000 people with an official GDP of less than USD 1 billion, it does not garner much USG attention relative to more powerful and/or troublesome nations in the region. Narcocriminals, on the other hand, do not underestimate Guyana's attributes. They see a country with porous borders, corrupt and ineffective law enforcement, little or no control over its airspace, vast swaths of uncontrolled land, ready access to the Caribbean, North America, and Europe, and a government that has been lukewarm about clamping down on the drug trade. In other words, these narco-criminals see Guyana as a country where they can operate with impunity. 3. (SBU) Guyana shares borders with Venezuela, Suriname and Brazil -- three neighbors that provide a steady illicit flow of contraband across its borders. An especially disturbing development is Guyana's involvement in "drugs for arms" financing for insurgent groups like the FARC throughout the region. In addition, large-scale Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) infiltration into Venezuela has led to their playing a significant role in narcotics smuggling activities on the Guyana/Venezuela border. 4. (SBU) "Disrupting Criminal Organizations" is the primary objective in Post's FY2008 Mission Performance Plan (MPP). However, accomplishing this goal is made difficult by the lack of a permanent DEA presence at Post. The DEA mission in Trinidad also covers Guyana, but is fully pre-occupied with the counter-narcotics initiatives in their host nation. DEA has done an excellent job serving both nations, but Guyana demands greater focus and its own DEA staff to fully address the severe narco-trafficking situation on the ground. A permanently manned office at Embassy Georgetown would ensure that DEA can work more effectively to accomplish the critical MPP counter-narcotics objectives and provide more sustained support to local law enforcement agencies in Guyana. 5. (SBU) Plans are already in train for DEA to assist in the establishment of a vetted counter-narcotics unit in Guyana. An important challenge facing this unit is the pervasive corruption in the country, which has undermined previous Guyanese counter-narcotics initiatives. Establishing a DEA office will allow close and constant monitoring of the vetted unit to help alleviate this problem. 6. (SBU) In economic terms for USG, a DEA office in

Guyana would be more cost-effective over the long term. Without this office, the high level of activity generated by drug trafficking organizations in Guyana would result in ongoing, costly TDY expenditures relative to ICASS costs. 7. (U) Ambassador plans to meet with Michael Braun, DEA Chief of Operations, in June to discuss the formal establishment of a DEA office at Post via the NSDD-38 process. 8. (U) This messge was cleared by DEA Port of Spain. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06GEORGETOWN499.html 06GEORGETOWN499, TIME HAS COME FOR COORDINATED PLAN ON GUYANA Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN4 99 VZCZCXYZ0014 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0499/01 1452117 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 252117Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3565 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0964 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0316 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0120 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2148 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0050 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000499 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM GY SUBJECT: TIME HAS COME FOR COORDINATED PLAN ON GUYANA ELECTIONS REF: A. GEORGETOWN 471 B. GEORGETOWN 462 C. GEORGETOWN 371 D. GEORGETOWN 308 E. GEORGETOWN 181 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY. The Commonwealth Secretariat's Special Envoy to Guyana briefed Ambassador and other donor representatives May 25 on his "depressing" visit to Guyana. The Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) conceded May 24 that it would not be able to hold elections before September 12, beyond Created 2006-05-25 21:17 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

even the amended constitutional due date. Ambassador and UK, Canada, EU (ABCE Group) chiefs of mission are in unanimous agreement that the time has come for the international community to get tough with both the GoG and the main opposition PNC/R party if there is to be an acceptable election process. This requires the ABCE Group capitals to take a coordinated, unified approach to the Guyana problem. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------Election Date Pushed Back (Again) --------------------------------2. (SBU) The GECOM commissioners agreed May 19 to extend the Claims and Objections period by twelve days until June 10. (Note: Claims and Objections offers voters several weeks to verify at one of 102 offices that they are registered correctly or to point out that someone else does not belong on the list; the entire list is also searchable on GECOM's web-site). Opposition-nominated commissioners requested the twelve-day extension because three Claims and Objections offices in remote interior locations had opened late. The PPP-nominated commissioners agreed to the delay either because they believed doing otherwise would invite another court challenge to elections or as a sop to the opposition commissioners in the absence of any progress on the real stumbling block to elections -- verification of the voters list. 3. (SBU) GECOM's technical staff reworked their election timeline in light of the extension, resulting in a new plan to hold elections September 12 -- twelve days later than the August 31 date that GECOM had unconvincingly held to for the past six weeks. 4. (U) A September 12 polling date blows right through the new September 2 constitutional due date for elections (ref B). Even if the opposition's legal challenge to the constitutional tinkering that set the new date is dismissed (ref A), Guyana is now on course to have elections outside the parameters of the Constitution. --------------------------------------------- ------------Commonwealth Envoy's Grave Concerns on where Guyana Headed --------------------------------------------- ------------5. (C) ABCE Group received briefing May 25 from the Commonwealth Secretariat's Special Envoy to Guyana, Sir Paul Reeves, as he wrapped up his week-long visit to Guyana. Sir Paul unsuccessfully appealed for Jagdeo to accept his responsibility, as head of state, to continue speaking with the opposition leader Robert Corbin to find a solution to the election morass. Corbin, for his part, expressed only the slightest willingness to compromise.

6. (C) Sir Paul's main concern is that the election date is now a "movable feast". The latest September 12 throws Guyana squarely into an extra-constitutional situation. Although Jagdeo speaks loosely about invoking emergency powers, the GoG will soon lack a clear mandate to govern. 7. (C) Sir Paul -- whose disposition is in no way rash or alarmist -- has concluded that meaningful political change in Guyana will only come about through coordinated, concerted international pressure. The donor community in Georgetown agrees unanimously with this assessment. -----------------------------------------Next Step: Unified Message from ABCE Group -----------------------------------------8. (C) The ABCE Group and UNDP ResRep will reconvene May 29 to discuss a path forward. The key objective is to formulate a unified message on elections. Donors would deliver this message to the GoG, the opposition parties, and ideally to the Guyanese public. Washington, London, Ottawa, and Brussels would deliver the same message to Guyana's ambassador/high commissioner in those capitals. The upcoming OAS General Assembly offers another opportunity to deliver the message on Guyana's elections. 9. (C) The content of the message will depend on how far the ABCE capitals are willing to exercise their two principal leverage points -- multilateral lending and bilateral aid. The threats of vetoing IDB loans, withholding debt forgiveness, and rethinking new aid programs are the strongest cards to bring the PPP to the negotiating table. These ideas are still very much in their embryonic stages. For instance, pressure must also be brought to bear on the recalcitrant opposition -- the point is not just to punish the GoG. Both the PPP and PNC/R share blame for the sad state of affairs that prevails in Guyana. Bullen

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06GEORGETOWN530.html# 06GEORGETOWN530, GOG BOND DEFAULT RATTLES FINANCE COMMUNITY Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN5 30 Created 2006-06-06 18:45 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO9901 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0530 1571845 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 061845Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3600 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000530 SIPDIS SANTO DOMINGO FOR FCS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EINV EFIN ECON EMIN GY SUBJECT: GOG BOND DEFAULT RATTLES FINANCE COMMUNITY 1. SUMMARY: Media reports have revealed that the GOG is seeking better terms on US$20 million of government bonds after failing to pay on maturity. The default, as well as the flat-footed GOG response, has shocked the finance community and signals a next stage in the GOG's dogged pursuit of debt relief. END SUMMARY. 2. On June 2 the independent Stabroek News quoted Information Liaison to the President, Robert Persaud, as saying the GOG is seeking Paris Club-like terms of up to 90% relief on bonds that matured on May 17. The GOG issued the bonds in 1994 to rescue the then Guyana Mining Enterprise following the restructuring of the bauxite industry. Citizens Bank Limited subsequently bought a large number of the bonds at a discount and through sub-participation agreements. In addition, more than twenty institutional investors and several local pension funds hold the bonds. The default reportedly came as a surprise to the bondholders, who had been receiving yearly 5% tax-free interest and had no prior signal that the GOG would seek to redefine the terms. 3. In the wake of the default, several private sector observers have criticized the GOG's action. Chairman of Private Sector Commission, Yesu Persaud, was reported as saying that the default was not a good signal to investors,

while President of the Guyana Banker's Association, Michael Archibald, called the GOG's position "very difficult to understand". Allan Parris, Managing Director of Citizens Bank, labeled the action by the government as "ridiculous" and suggested that the Bank is giving the government some time before taking unspecified measures. 4. Local financial analyst and commentator Patrick Van Beek suggests the GOG's action was short-sighted, as the GOG could have leveraged excess liquidity in the financial system by issuing long-term Guyanese dollar denominated bonds to repay the current bonds and salvage its creditworthiness. In addition, George Edwards, Operations Manager of the Guyana Association of Securities Companies and Intermediaries Inc (GASCI) believes that the decision by the government to not to honor its debt obligations will undermine plans to create a secondary market with bonds being traded on the stock exchange. 5. COMMENT: While the default does not signal an impending balance of payments crisis, the GOG's apparently nonchalant reaction is revealing. Finance Minister Saisnarine Kowlessar has made no public comment to date. More disturbingly, Lawrence Williams, governor of the ostensibly independent central bank, has been quoted as saying he would "prefer if the government would make its position clear" before commenting. Most importantly, the misplaced reference to Paris Club terms in managing its internal debt suggests that the default may be a textbook example of moral hazard-inspired by Guyana's substantial external debt relief-creeping into its domestic obligations. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06GEORGETOWN532.html# 06GEORGETOWN532, SHAMBLES": EDITORIAL ON GUYANA'S PRECARIOUS Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN5 32 Created 2006-06-06 21:02 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO0017 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0532/01 1572102 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 062102Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3602 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0319 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0966 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000532 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINS SNAR KCRM GY SUBJECT: "SHAMBLES": EDITORIAL ON GUYANA'S PRECARIOUS SITUATION The following editorial in the Stabroek News June 5 edition describes well the precarious state of affairs that prevails in Guyana across the security, political, and economic spheres (despite a few inaccuracies about USG's involvement). The Stabroek News is Guyana's most respected daily newspaper. BEGIN TEXT. Shambles Monday, June 5th 2006 It is hard to find a period in our recent history when everything that mattered seemed to be in a complete shambles. The security situation is a total disaster. A sitting minister has been murdered and weeks later not a suspect has been arrested and neither the police nor the government seems to have an inkling about what to do. When the government appears as paralysed and impotent as it does right now it is time for every citizen to begin to worry about his/her safety. The situation is the same with eight people murdered at Agricola/Eccles and the

disappearance of 30 AK-47s from the army's HQ. Now, in recent days, the crime-besieged villages of Enterprise and Annandale have again suffered from murderous attacks by gunmen who have operated with impunity. There has been no response from the security services even though their much vaunted camping operation at the back of Buxton was supposed to yield an end to such attacks and the capture of the elusive gunmen. On the economic front, the closure for two months of Omai Bauxite Inc because of stiff competition from Chinese ore is a telling sign of the jeopardy that primary commodity producers like Guyana face from the emerging market giants like China and Brazil. There will be no mercy or compassion only heartless and impersonal WTO rules. And if that wasn't enough trauma on top of the loss of sugar revenues beginning this year, the government has shot itself in the foot by defaulting on US$20M worth of bauxite bonds issued by the administration of President Cheddi Jagan in 1994. It is a mind-boggling move that has already done incalculable damage to the creditworthiness of the government and even if the government reversed itself and paid up today, the serious investor will still have major doubts about whether it could be trusted. Then there is the elections impasse. The Surujbally commission has managed to conjure a crisis of epic proportions because of its inept management of the verification/residency issue. If each member of that Commission had paid serious attention to their mandate and had conducted good faith negotiations on the matter they might have realized two or three years ago that the best solution would have been to approach the courts for an urgent interpretation of the provisions governing the qualification of an elector. Presumably this would have satisfied all sides. The Commission has managed to leave this vital issue hanging just a few months before the scheduled poll with the result that aside from the deep automatic polarization that occurs at elections further tension is being generated at the level of the commission and from the constant salvoes booming from the parties at each other. The tapes Into this volatile and dangerous brew has been added the controversy over the tapes allegedly of the Police Commissioner Winston Felix speaking to several persons. The government has now initiated proceedings that could result in the removal of the commissioner from office. There is clearly a groundswell of public opinion that if what was said on the tape was uttered by the police commissioner then he has a lot of explaining to do and that his credibility has been seriously hurt. Moving

against him on that basis is therefore unexceptionable. What is exceedingly troubling is that the campaign against the police commissioner appears to have been choreographed by those close to businessman Roger Khan, for whom an arrest warrant has been issued by the police and who has since been indicted by the US authorities on a drug charge. To have your top cop weakened and emasculated when he really needed to be in full charge of his force and to be on top of crime is not the most propitious circumstance for the country at this point. GEORGETOWN 00000532 002 OF 003

But that is what Mr Khan et al have succeeded in accomplishing and the government had better be careful in this dangerous period. The timeline of the key events leading up to the move against Mr Felix is instructive. On March 1 this year the US State Department issued its annual report on the drugs trade and money laundering in which it named Mr Khan as a known drug trafficker. It appears that sometime after this, in a bid to extricate himself from this dilemma, Mr Khan engaged the US authorities and had a meeting with them. His version of the meet was that he was discussing an alleged conspiracy against the government and the lack of intent on the part of the police in tackling the Buxton criminals. The US says he was met to discuss impending drug proceedings against him. Several of the infamous tapes with the alleged Felix voice were played by Mr Khan at this meeting. It also appears that around this time some of the tapes were also dispatched to senior government officials and Mr Felix and others in the security services became aware of them. On March 19 this year, the first series of raids against several of Mr Khan's establishments were conducted under the rubric of recovering the missing AK-47s. Up to that point there had been no robust campaign by the joint services to find these weapons even though they had been reported as missing since February 27, three weeks earlier. Surely the most appropriate time to have conducted this operation would have been immediately upon discovering that the weapons had vanished. It would seem that the joint services had discovered that Mr Khan was playing hardball and by circulating tapes with possibly compromising statements by joint services officials he presented a clear and present danger to them. Selfpreservation had apparently kicked in for Mr Khan and key officials in the joint services. The day after the first raids against Mr Khan, the first tape supposedly between Mr Felix and Mr Basil Williams was circulated to the

media. In the days to come, the country was treated to raid after raid which were characterized as the search for the weapons but which may have been influenced by other factors. It was only on Saturday that an AK-47 was found and this has been claimed as one from the missing batch though presumably more authentication would have to be done. Even if this is one of the weapons, the joint services campaign has not impressed in its mapping and execution of the recovery operation and the reality would be that 29 rifles and five hand guns are still circulating. Moreover, rifles similar to those that went missing have been used in recent attacks and crime remains as out of control as it has been - the minister's murder (April 22) occurring during the period of intense joint services activity. Days after the raids began the police issued a wanted bulletin for Mr Khan which he immediately challenged and went underground and then the US got into the act by unsealing an indictment against Mr Khan in early May. More tapes followed and as a result of the furore generated by these Mr Felix now faces the threat of removal from office. In the circumstances, the average Guyanese who is seeking only better security could be excused for feeling that he or she is a mere pawn in a high stakes battle involving a businessman indicted for drugs, security officials seeking to preserve their status and the US promoting its own interests. Crime fighting in this manoeuvring is merely incidental. It should be noted that Mr Khan has only begun to speak of his alleged crime-fighting in 2002/3 now that he faces arrest and extradition. By implication he puts himself on the side of the government and presumably may have recordings and information that may link him with officialdom. Is that what comes next? How connected and clued the government is to all of this is still unclear. It must know however that it bears primary responsibility for fighting crime and thus far it has failed disastrously. With a weakened police commissioner, rampant crime, underworld machinations and election venom, the only reasonable antidote for the country is professional help for the security forces from outside. There is no time for shilly-shallying and handwringing. On their poor performance alone, Mr Felix, his predecessors and several other top functionaries in the security services could have been removed a long time GEORGETOWN 00000532 003 OF 003

ago. What it has failed to do since 1992 in terms of professionalizing the force and orienting it to properly

fight crime the PPP/C government must do in the next few months probably with the help of the private sector and friendly countries such as Canada. It must also ensure that it isn't compromised by the underworld and those who play fast and loose with law and order. No time can be lost even if more tapes are played; especially if more tapes are played. END TEXT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06GEORGETOWN533.html# 06GEORGETOWN533, RESPONDING TO GOG SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUEST Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN5 33 VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0533/01 1581350 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 071350Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3605 INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0322 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0122 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2150 RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 3887 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000533 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR INL/LP DS/IP/WHA DS/T/ATA CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016 TAGS: PINS PREL ASEC KCRM GY SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO GOG SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUEST REF: A. GEORGETOWN 406 B. GEORGETOWN 372 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) Para 9 contains action request for WHA. 2. (SBU) SUMMARY. The GoG requested security assistance from the U.S., UK and Canada in the wake of Agriculture Minister Satyadeow Sawh's assassination April 22 (refs A and B). The GoG's initial request was hasty and vague -- a knee-jerk reaction to a colleague's brutal killing. President Jagdeo raised the issue again in a May 22 meeting with Ambassador and defined the request more clearly. Post requests WHA Created 2006-06-07 13:50 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

guidance on response to GoG, bearing in mind Post's reservations spelled out in para 8. END SUMMARY --------------------------Initial GoG Request Unclear --------------------------3. (U) The GoG requested security assistance from the U.S., UK and Canada in the wake of Minister Sawh's assassination April 22 (refs A and B). Head of the Presidential Secretariat Dr. Roger Luncheon wrote Ambassador April 24 SIPDIS asking for help in: -- "Expanding Investigations into the loss of the AK-47 weapons from the military and leading to the recovery." -- "Enhancing the Criminal Investigation Department's investigation in to the execution of Minister S. Sawh and his family." -- "Provision of Crime fighting equipment for an elite force." 4. (SBU) The letter's vagueness dismayed Ambassador and the UK and Canada High Commissioners, who all transmitted the request to their respective capitals for consideration. ---------------------------------------What the British and Canadians are Doing ---------------------------------------5. (C) The British have brought the request to high-level attention at the FCO. Baroness Amos (the Guyanese-born Leader of the House of Lords) on her recent visit to the Caribbean mooted the idea of hosting a meeting between the ruling PPP/C and main opposition PNC/R parties. Security matters -- and the ongoing political stalemate in Guyana -would be the principal agenda items for such a meeting. Jagdeo initially rebuffed the idea but has since reconsidered, putting the meeting back on the table. Despite this initiative, UK High Commission officials harbor the same reservations as Post concerning the GoG's assistance request -- see para 8. (Note: The UK has already devoted considerable resources to helping the Guyana Police Force (GPF) establish a tactical squad, but this effort has stalled over the GoG's reluctance to import the MP-5 weapons needed for the unit to become operational. The GoG tried to procure cheaper weapons instead -- a misadventure that resulted in a shipment of inferior firearms from a questionable source. End Note.) 6. (C) The Canadian High Commissioner is out of the country until June 12, but has reported to Ambassador that Canada

will likely provide some support -- but limited to the investigation into the Sawh case. (Note: Sawh and two of his relatives also killed were Canadian citizens. End note.) --------------------------------------------- -----Jagdeo Reiterates, Clarifies Request for Assistance --------------------------------------------- -----7. (C) Ambassador and A/LEGATT met with President Jagdeo May 22 to discuss the results of FBI-administered polygraphy exams regarding the weapons theft from the Guyana Defence Force (GDF). Jagdeo used the occasion to reiterate the request for U.S. assistance in the investigation of Sawh's assassination, but he also provided more clarity. Jagdeo wants the U.S. to provide a security advisor to assist the investigation. Specifically, Jagdeo envisions a hands-on advisor who would stay in Guyana for "several months" working side-by-side with local law enforcement, guiding the investigative process. ------------------------------------------Serious Reservations about Jagdeo's Request ------------------------------------------8. (C) Post has a few serious reservations about Jagdeo's request. Providing a long-term security advisor will not lead to sustainable improvement in Guyana's administration of justice because: -- First, the GDF and GPF were not consulted. This underscores how little Jagdeo and the GoG inner circle trust their own security forces. Post finds it difficult to see how any assistance plan can succeed without GDP/GPF buy-in. -- Second, Jagdeo has made up his mind that the so-called Afro-Guyanese "armed resistance" is responsible for Sawh's killing and the missing AK-47s. He appears unwilling to countenance any another explanation, even in the face of convincing evidence. Why dedicate USG investigative resources if the GoG may not accept the conclusions? -- Third, the U.S., UK and Canada have provided Guyana with extensive security/law enforcement training in recent years, with only modest results. The problem is two-fold: a lack of political will to tackle Guyana's criminal threats head-on, and a lack of resources and motivation in the police ranks. ------------------------------How to Respond / Action Request ------------------------------9. (SBU) Post requests Department's guidance/concurrence on reply to GoG. Post recommends responding with a letter that includes the following points:

-- The USG is already providing substantial assistance to the GoG on specific investigations and will continue to do so (i.e., FBI laboratory, gun-trace information, polygraphy exams). -- The USG is unable to provide a long-term security advisor to Guyana at this time. -- The GoG could retain an independent security expert to serve in an advisory role, and the USG could help identify such experts. -- The USG understands the severity of Guyana's security challenge and encourages a broad-based, non-partisan strategy to tackle it. The USG stands ready to work with the GoG and its security and law enforcement agencies on capacity-building initiatives that strengthen the rule of law in Guyana. Bullen

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06GEORGETOWN546.html 06GEORGETOWN546, USING IDB DEBT WRITE-OFF AS LEVERAGE WITH GOG Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN5 46 VZCZCXYZ0015 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0546/01 1601848 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 091848Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3623 RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000546 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/EPSC - EMARTINEZ EB/IFD/ODF - KDIZOGLIO TREASURY FOR OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY - BLEO TREASURY FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS - CGREWE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016 TAGS: PGOV EFIN PREL EAID KCRM GY SUBJECT: USING IDB DEBT WRITE-OFF AS LEVERAGE WITH GOG REF: GEORGETOWN 499 CQified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY. Post understands that the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) will consider forgiving $3.5 billion of debt owed by its five poorest members, including Guyana. This presents a unique opportunity to influence the GoG to follow through on long overdue governance improvements. The donor community in Georgetown is convinced that bringing about real improvement in Guyana's democracy requires concerted international pressure. The potential IDB write-off is the last big chance for donors to leverage conditional debt relief into pressure on the GoG. END SUMMARY. ---------------------------------------The Case for Governance Reform in Guyana ---------------------------------------Created 2006-06-09 18:48 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

2. (U) Guyana's economy and society has stagnated, at best, for the better part of a decade. National elections, constitutionally due by August 4, have been delayed at least until September and preparations are bogged down (reftel). Local elections were last held in 1994. Over 2% of the population "votes with their feet" each year by migrating to the U.S., Canada, and elsewhere. Narco-traffickers operate with impunity. Political connections to the ruling PPP party are the most valuable assets to have. Investors are extremely skittish about sinking capital into the country. Despite some exogenous setbacks -- like severe flooding and the loss of EU preferential prices for sugar -- the main culprit holding Guyana back is poor governance. Guyana's percentile rank across all six World Bank Governance Indicators fell by 11 percent between 1998 and 2004. 3. (U) There is a way forward. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) brokered a 1998 agreement between the two main political parties to settle post-election unrest -- the Herdmanston Accord. In exchange for the opposition PNC calling off its protests, the two sides agreed to undertake broad constitutional reform to address race relations, justice, equity and progress. However, no enforcement mechanism was put in place to ensure the Accord's implementation. Eight years later, the commitments remain unfulfilled (for which the PPP and PNC share the blame). While not a panacea, implementing the Accord and other expert-recommended governance reforms would be a big step in the right direction for Guyana. ---------------------------------------Debt Forgiveness is the Lever for Change ---------------------------------------4. (U) Improving Guyana's democratic system and practices is a key part of Post's Mission Performance Plan. However, the USG has very little leverage with which to induce a recalcitrant GoG to change its spots. The mention of money, though, fixes the GoG's attention. Guyana has been on a roll of late in relieving itself of its external debts. Yet despite all of this debt forgiveness and resulting financial flexibility, there has been little or no corresponding improvement in the GoG's performance. 5. (U) Multilateral and bilateral debt relief chronology: -- December 2003: Guyana qualifies for US$334 million in relief upon its Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) completion point.Q- January 2004: The Paris Club (including Trinidad and Tobago pledge relief of US$156 million. -- June 2004: U.S. writes off 100 percent of bilateral debt with Guyana, US$36 million. -- December 2004: Russia writes off US$16 million. -- June 2005: At the G8 meeting, Guyana secures 100 percent

U.S.)

and

cancellation of its debts owed to the IMF and the International Development Association (IDA) through the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). -- October 2005: Guyana signs bilateral debt cancellation agreement with Trinidad and Tobago amounting to US$123 million. -- December 2005: OPEC Fund for International Development relieves Guyana of US$5 million. -- January 2006: IMF relieves Guyana of its remaining debt of US$65 million. -- July 2006: World Bank is set to cancel US$218 million owed to the IDA. 6. (U) At the end of 2005, Guyana had US$470 million in remaining debt to the IDB, or around 43% of Guyana's total external debt stock -- making the IDB the GoG's single largest creditor. In his January 2006 budget speech, Finance Minister Saisnarine Kowlessar highlighted as a top priority continued lobbying for extension of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) to IDB debt. In essence, the potential IDB write-off is the last big chance for donors to leverage conditional debt relief into pressure on the GoG. ------------------------------------Canada and IDB in Guyana are on Board ------------------------------------7. (C) The Canadian High Commission (CHC) is in full agreement that pressure must be brought to bear on Guyana using IDB debt forgiveness as a lever. Ambassador is confident that IDB's resident representative (protect) also favors this approach and will meet with him later in June to discuss the issue further. The CHC has already contacted Ottawa and Washington colleagues to convey much the same message as contained in this telegram. ------Comment ------8. (C) Ambassador's comment: I urge the Department and other USG agencies to coordinate their strategy on Guyana's debt forgiveness with other IDB members, particularly Canada. Tying debt forgiveness to constitutional and governance reform is a golden opportunity to bring about meaningful change in Guyana. End Comment. Bullen

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06GEORGETOWN552.html# 06GEORGETOWN552, SUBJECT: CIVIL DOCUMENT SECURITY IN GUYANA: THE Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN5 52 Created 2006-06-12 20:19 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO6173 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0552/01 1632019 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 122019Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3631 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000552 SIPDIS DEPT FOR CA/FPP SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD KCRM CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC GY SUBJECT: SUBJECT: CIVIL DOCUMENT SECURITY IN GUYANA: THE GENERAL REGISTRAR'S OFFICE 1. SUMMARY: A Vice Consul covering the anti-fraud portfolio and a Fraud Investigator LES visited the General Registrar's Office (GRO) to observe how civil documents in Guyana are issued and safeguarded. Although these systems are becoming more secure, there are gaps in the systems which cause concern to the Consular Section. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------------- -------A short overview of birth records in Guyana --------------------------------------------- -------2. Before 1987 requests for birth records were submitted to the Registrar General by the midwife or attendant. Although regulations were in place to allow both parents' names, whether married or not, to appear on the birth record, due to poor legal interpretation this was not generally practiced until approximately 1983. Before that time, the father's name generally only appeared if the parents were married to each other. Guyanese law states that once a man marries a woman, the children held in common can have his name listed on their birth certificate. This means that even if a man were to marry a woman when they were each 65 and the woman's child was 40, the child's birth certificate could be amended to read that the mother's husband is the father of the child. When this is done, the

birth registration is `re-registered' and the reregistration is noted on the birth certificate. There is a plan underway, supported by the GRO, to a law that would allow a man to petition the court have his name added to a child's birth record. If law is passed, this could become a new vehicle for fraud. It is not clear whether or not there would any note on birth certificates indicating that the father's name was listed through a petition to the court. pass to this be

Parents can also `late register' a child. Most late registrations take place shortly before a child enrolls in nursery school. In some cases, the Consular Section sees beneficiaries who were not registered until months before they were petitioned for by a relative. A late registration can be done at any time. --------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------REQUIREMENTS TO REGISTER A CHILD AND THE ISSUANCE PROCESS --------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------3. Many of the usual safeguards to ensure accurate birth registrations in the U.S. are not practiced in Guyana. To register a child the parent(s) must complete a registration form (which is a triplicate form) and bring the completed form to a registration center. There are 400 registration centers located in health clinics and hospitals throughout Guyana. Until recently, approximately 2002, regulations requiring parent(s) to provide identification to register a child was not strictly enforced. This means that a brother could easily stand in for another brother and sign for a child as if it were his own. The Consular Section knows of incidents where this has occurred. The registration form and the fee (which does not even cover the cost of paper and shipping, let alone staff salaries) are forwarded to the GRO in Georgetown where the registration form is filed and the birth certificate is issued. Birth certificates are written by hand by approximately twelve clerks. The clerks must account for each birth certificate. At the beginning of the day, they sign for a quantity of blank certificates. Each clerk has a log book in which they record the certificate number and the name of the person to whom it was issued. Based on FPU checks, the certificate number and the name do not always match. At the end of the day, the clerks return the unused certificates to their manager.

The Registrar said that it is possible that some of the clerks could alter information on a birth certificate during the transcription process due to lack of oversight. ---------------------------------THE DOCUMENT ITSELF ---------------------------------4. Birth certificates are printed on whatever paper is available to the printer, according to the Registrar. Over 002 OF 002

GEORGETOWN 00000552

the last year, there have been at least three different paper stocks used: a light green polka dot, a stark white and a white with a light green overlay. This constant changeover in paper stocks makes it difficult for new Consular officers to authenticate birth certificates. On the other hand, once a Consular officer becomes acquainted with the various paper stocks and when they were issued, s/he can easily distinguish a 1999 certificate from a 2004 certificate. Birth certificates are printed in batches of 50,000 certificates. Each batch requires a separate tender. Although the same printer has been used for a number of years, he is not assured of being awarded the contract and does not keep extra stocks available. The Registrar would like to use a more secure and consistent paper stock but does not have the space available to store the paper. Security features in birth certificates are inconsistent. Some birth certificates have embossed certificate numbers, others do not. In a recent print, some of the certificates had embossed numbers, while others did not, making it difficult for Consular officers to detect fake birth certificates. One fairly consistent security feature throughout the birth certificates is the embossed "Certificate of Birth" across the top and an embossed border. The ink color is not consistent, changes from print to print and changes within a printing as the ink runs out. There are no watermarks, threads or UV-sensitive ink in any of the birth certificates. The Registrar would like a more secure document, but has no funds to pay for these security features. The most secure of the security features is the dry seal. Each birth certificate is sealed with a dry seal. The dry seal changed from the word `GUYANA' to the coat of arms of Guyana in late 2001. 5. If there were a fire at the GRO all birth records for

all persons born in Guyana would be destroyed. The GRO is located on the fourth floor of the Guyana Post Office Building, a concrete structure in the clustered downtown Georgetown area. Along one wall, which is made entirely of windows covered in mesh, there is a walkway. All of the walls inside the structure are made of wood, as is the racks on which the bound volumes of birth certificates are kept. There are two sets of original bound volumes in which all of the birth certificates are recorded. They are both kept in the same office. ---------------------------------------BIRTH CERTIFICATE FRAUD ---------------------------------------6. The Consular Section sees a number of fraudulent birth certificates every week. Although some of these appear not to be on authentic birth certificate paper stock, many of them are. Recently, after admitting to presenting a fraudulent birth certificate, two applicants said that a relative in New York sent the birth certificate to them. In both of these cases, the birth certificates were printed on authentic paper, but with a counterfeit seal. Consular Officers and the Registrar General believe that some of the paper stocks have been stolen or that the printer prints extra copies for document vendors. --------------------------------------OPPORTUNITIES TO ASSIST --------------------------------------7. The Registrar's Office is plagued with opportunities for fraud and misfeasance. This directly impacts the safety and security of the American people. Persons could easily obtain a legitimate document with altered information. These documents could facilitate visa issuance. One of the Mission's MPP indicators is to provide equipment and training in record keeping to the Registrar's Office. USAID has a proven track record of improving registry databases in other countries. The Mission feels that upgrading the registry system should be a priority project for USAID in order to meet the MPP indicator.

BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06GEORGETOWN562.html 06GEORGETOWN562, GUYANA NARCO-RUMORS: ACETONE IMPORTS, STALLED HOTEL Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN5 62 VZCZCXYZ0029 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0562 1661620 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 151620Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3641 INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0709 RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 1160 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0327 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 4283 RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 3890 RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA MIAMI FL RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN SAN JUAN PR RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000562 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR INL/LP CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016 TAGS: SNAR PGOV PINR KCRM GY SUBJECT: GUYANA NARCO-RUMORS: ACETONE IMPORTS, STALLED HOTEL REF: GEORGETOWN 300 Classified By: Political Officer Benjamin Canavan For reason 1.4(d) 1. (U) PolOff's recent conversations with prominent locals yielded noteworthy comments about developments in Guyana's narco-trade. 2. (C) PolOff spoke June 7 with Stanley Ming (protect), vice-chairman of the opposition PNC/R party and prominent Guyanese businessman. He is a large importer by Guyanese standards -- a licensed distributor of John Deere, Mitsubishi and Yamaha products. Ming has been a forthcoming Created 2006-06-15 16:20 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

interlocutor with post for several years. But he is a reluctant politician, preferring to discuss auto racing or his vision for Guyana as a South American transportation hub. 3. (C) Ming expressed grave concern that narco-criminals are using forest concessions as cover for cocaine processing labs. He argues that the labs are being set up in reaction to pressure exerted on Colombian operations. (Note: See reftel and 2006 INCSR for more detail on narco-trafficking infiltration of Guyana's forestry sector.) Ming said he is certain that large quantities of acetone (a solvent used in cocaine production) have been imported into Guyana in the past two years. He added that the remote forest concession for which leading narco-criminal Shaheed "Roger" Khan tried to obtain a permit in 2005 is not commercially attractive given its timber content, but does provide a very dense canopy -- ideal for concealing illicit activities. 4. (C) PolOff spoke June 4 with Glenn Lall (protect), publisher of the Kaieteur News. Lall has a sketchy past -he translated a shoe trading business (and rumored involvement with alien smuggling) into a muckraking independent newspaper. He has a finger firmly on the pulse of Guyana's underworld, which serves his media enterprise well. 5. (C) Lall said that Prakash "Buddy" Shivraj has run into financial difficulties, which threaten to halt progress on his hotel project -- "Buddy's International Four Star Hotel". Shivraj is a Guyanese businessman widely acknowledged to be involved with local narco-traffickers, at a minimum laundering their money. His main business venture appears to be a five-story bar/nightclub/restaurant/gym (the predictably named "Buddy's") in Georgetown. 6. (C) Lall said that Shivraj has tried unsuccessfully to tap local narco-criminals to obtain additional funds to complete the hotel's construction. The five-story concrete frame went up quickly in early 2006, but it still needs major interior and exterior work. Shivraj obtained neither bank financing nor the required permits for the hotel's construction. The 230-room project is situated next to the new stadium that will host Cricket World Cup (CWC) matches in Spring 2007. Failure to complete the hotel by then would surely render it financially unviable. This would also severely embarrass the GoG, which -- because of Guyana's dire lack of adequate hotel space for CWC -- looked the other way in allowing Shivraj to embark on the project. Ingram

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06GEORGETOWN577.html# 06GEORGETOWN577, VENEZUELA-GUYANA BORDER DISPUTE OVERSHADOWS Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN5 77 VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0577/01 1671631 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 161631Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3657 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0329 RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000577 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016 TAGS: PBTS ECON EPET PREL GY SUBJECT: VENEZUELA-GUYANA BORDER DISPUTE OVERSHADOWS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REGIONAL COOPERATION REF: A. 04GEORGETOWN257 B. 05GEORGETOWN979 C. 05GEORGETOWN1184 D. GEORGETOWN 519 E. 04GEORGETOWN185 F. 01GEORGETOWN679 Classified By: ECONOMIC OFFICER EDWARD LUCHESSI FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d) 1.(C) SUMMARY: For better or worse, the long-simmering Guyana-Venezuela border dispute has tempered the GOG's receptiveness to the BRV's outreach in the region. Despite Hugo Chavez's high-profile visit to Guyana in February 2004, relations between Guyana and Venezuela remain cordial but not close. A number of factors, most notably the border issue and fiscal austerity requirements that have kept Guyana from tapping PetroCaribe, have prevented Guyana from moving toward its Western neighbor's camp geopolitically and economically. The border issue also continues to undermine Guyana's development of its resource-rich Essequibo region, to the detriment of Guyanese and U.S. economic interests. Created 2006-06-16 16:31 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

Nevertheless, Guyana is unlikely to push for resolution lest it agitate the BRV. END SUMMARY. --------------------------CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS -------------------------2. (C) Venezuela currently claims Guyanese territory west of the Essequibo River, which had been formally awarded to then-British Guyana by an Arbitral Tribunal in 1899. The two countries have been working the issue through the U.N. Good Offices process since 1990, with little forward motion. In the most recent high-level discussion of the matter, following Chavez's February 2004 visit to Georgetown, President Jagdeo told Emboffs that Chavez had dismissed the claim as spurious and said the dispute was an imperialist issue, blaming pressure from the U.S. and UK in the run-up to Guyana's independence for Venezuela's pursuit of the claim (Ref A). However, the BRV has shown no willingness to renounce the claim. 3. (SBU) In his speech justifying the foreign affairs budget in February 2006, GOG FonMin Rudy Insanally described recent relations with Venezuela as a "quiet truce" and said the GOG continues to work through "patient diplomacy" to resolve the border issue. News of the Venezuelan National Assembly's approval of a Chavez-inspired motion to add an eighth star to the Venezuelan flag to represent the province of Guyana in March 2006 made headlines in Guyana but did not inspire a concerted GOG response. The two countries continue to maintain dialogue through the Guyana/Venezuela High Level Bilateral Commission (HLBC) and its various subcommittees dealing with health, political consultations, transportation, culture, and narcotics. The last meeting, held March 31-April 1, 2006, in Georgetown and attended by Isanally and BRV Foreign Affairs Vice Minister Cesar Pavel Rondon Daza, included language reaffirming commitment to the U.N. Good Offices Process and instructing the facilitators to meet before May 15, 2006. As of mid-June 2006, this meeting has not occurred. Head of the Frontiers Unit of the GOG Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Keith George, says the meeting was delayed due to the parliamentary responsibilities of Guyana's facilitator, Ralph Ramkarran, the Speaker of Guyana's parliament, in the run-up to the dissolution of Guyana's parliament in anticipation of the impending elections. George expects the two facilitators will meet with each other and the Good Officer, Oliver Jackman of Barbados, prior to the U.N. General Assembly in September, at which point the foreign ministers are expected to meet as well. --------------ECONOMIC IMPACT ---------------

4. (U) Uncertainty surrounding the border issue has led to decades of missed economic opportunities in the Essequibo region. Among the more high-profile incidents was Texas-based Beal Aerospace's decision to forgo construction of a USD 100 million rocket launch site long the Waini River in October 2000. While the company ultimately cited declining profitability of the aerospace industry as the cause of its withdrawal of the program--which also encountered substantial political opposition within Guyana--the project received severe condemnation from the BRV Foreign Ministry, which branded the project a "colonialist arrangement" that would provide cover for U.S. military expansion in the region. Development of the region's oil resources is also held up by the border situation. ExxonMobil, which holds a potentially lucrative concession in the offshore beds that fall within the disputed area, has been unable to cultivate the block lest it jeopardize its holdings in the BRV. 5. (C) Partly as a result of the border issue, Guyana has been slow to embrace the BRV's offers to the region, including PetroCaribe. Historically, Guyana has been wary of Venezuelan petropolitics, as evidenced by Jagdeo's statement during negotiations of the Caracas Energy Accord in 2000 that Guyana "has always been opposed to petroleum or food-exporting countries using these commodities as political weapons against importing countries." To be certain, other factors have also tempered Guyana's attitude toward PetroCaribe. Guyana has yet to receive any PetroCaribe shipments, due mostly to its inability to assume additional debt and the Prime Minister's preference that the oil be refined in Trinidad prior to shipment to Guyana (Ref B). Prime Minister Hinds reiterated his call for an arrangement whereby oil could be sourced from Venezuela and refined in Trinidad in a media interview in March 2006. 6. (C) Ironically, fuel smuggling may also undermine the attractiveness of PetroCaribe in Guyana. ExxonMobil executives recently informed post they estimate that 20% of the fuel available on the Guyanese market is smuggled out of Venezuela. Guyana is essentially already accessing cheap fuel from Venezuela--without incurring an additional debt burden--albeit through the informal economy. A lack of GOG capacity to market PetroCaribe fuel may also be tempering Guyana's involvement in the initiative. The state-owned Guyana Oil Company (GUYOIL) has been plagued by mismanagement and scandal, culminating in the ouster of its second managing director in four years in October 2005. Among the more scandalous events surrounding the management shake-up was the revelation that Guyoil was unable to account for GD85 million (USD425,000). ---------------------------COOPERATION ON OTHER FRONTS

---------------------------7. (C) Talk of a road linking Guyana with Venezuela has persisted for some time with little development. The March 2006 HLBC called for convening a Joint Venezuela/Guyana Technical Committee to discuss terms of reference for a feasibility study. The road gained the endorsement of a team of technical experts who examined three potential routes before recommending a road project move forward in the GOG's Transportation Sector Study issued in early 2006 (ref. C). However, the potential for any movement forward on a road is slim. President Jagdeo has dismissed the idea in the past as a "possible Trojan horse" (ref. A), and competing GOG transport priorities, including the long-awaited Berbice River Bridge and a road to Brazil, would take precedence. 8. (U) Venezuela sent environmental scientists and relief supplies in February 2006, following flooding in the Mahaica River basin. The government-owned Guyana Chronicle featured a front-page photograph of a Venezuelan military plane arriving at Timehri airport. Commerce Minister Manzoor Nadir also negotiated with Venezuelan authorities to source 30,000 tons of cement to alleviate a shortage in March 2006. 9. (C) Guyana has a standing invitation for Jagdeo to reciprocate Chavez's 2004 state visit, an invitation that was reiterated in the March HLBC. However, FonMin Insanally recently told Emboffs that Venezuela had demurred on a visit this year, citing impending elections in both countries (ref. D). Post reporting at the time of Chavez's 2004 visit, however, implied that the trip was hastily planned in part to project an image of a government "not under siege" (Ref E), suggesting Chavez may seize such erratic political opportunism in the future. In the meantime, the next HLBC subcommittee meeting, the Mixed Commission on Drugs, is expected to meet in late June. 10. (C) COMMENT: Guyana is essentially paralyzed in its relations with Venezuela. The BRV indirectly exerts control over western Guyana, an area rich in natural resources, by dissuading large-scale economic development there. This state of affairs materially harms Guyana (and hampers U.S. commercial interests too). However, the GOG is very reluctant to push for a bilateral resolution, for fear of antagonizing Chavez. Instead, the GOG would rather have others apply the pressure on Venezuela to resolve the border dispute. Tellingly, President Jagdeo has in the past requested that USG and UK issue statements affirming the 1899 settlement and the current boundary (Ref F). 11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: There is another factor at work as well--Chavez and Castro appeal on some level to those in the GOG who still harbor Marxist sympathies. Despite the damage

wrought by Venezuela's specious claim, they instinctively gravitate to Venezuela and Cuba and regard the U.S. with utmost suspicion. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06GEORGETOWN594.html 06GEORGETOWN594, GUYANA VOTER LIST IN LEGAL LIMBO: ELECTION PREVIEW Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN5 94 Created 2006-06-19 20:47 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO3941 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0594/01 1702047 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 192047Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3676 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0969 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0332 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000594 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY SUBJECT: GUYANA VOTER LIST IN LEGAL LIMBO: ELECTION PREVIEW #9 REF: A. GEORGETOWN 499 B. GEORGETOWN 471 C. GEORGETOWN 462 D. GEORGETOWN 181 1. (U) SUMMARY. The Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) is progressing with its work to prepare a final voter list for the upcoming national elections. But Guyanese disagree whether registered electors must reside in Guyana to have the right to vote. Because emigration rates are so high, this is a very controversial political and social issue. That it remains unresolved less than three months before elections (hopefully) take place just underscores the disfunction of Guyanese politics. END SUMMARY. -------------------------------"Residency Requirement" to Vote? --------------------------------

2. (U) The question of whether a person must reside in Guyana in order to vote has simmered for years. Unfortunately, GECOM and the political parties have made no effort to resolve this "residency requirement" question. This is a sensitive issue for Guyanese that transcends ethnic boundaries. Many ordinary Guyanese feel that those who emigrate -- at least 2 percent of the total population each year -- relinquish their right to have a say in domestic politics. (Note: This should not be confused with overseas voting, which has been disallowed since 1991 because the PNC historically used it to help rig elections. The issue at hand is whether Guyanese citizens living abroad and still registered to vote can return to Guyana and vote on election day.) Over 80 percent of this year's voter list has been "carried over" from the 2001 and 1997 registration exercises. Given the huge outflux of emigrants from Guyana, 10 to 15 percent of these voters have probably left the country since the last election in 2001. --------------------------------------------- -GECOM / Civil Society Group Seek Legal Opinions --------------------------------------------- -3. (U) In late May, the Private Sector Commission (PSC), one of Guyana's few notable civil society groups, called on GECOM to advise the public on "what is required under the law with regard to the matter of residency." If there is in fact a residency requirement to be a registered elector, then the consensus is that a full verification exercise will be necessary. This would result in a further, extensive election delay. 4. (SBU) GECOM agreed to seek legal opinions on the matter, as did the PSC separately. Five pre-eminent Guyanese legal minds have weighed in with legal opinions -- two for and three (including the Attorney General) against a residency requirement. Predictably, the issue remains unsettled despite this flurry of legal opinions. When PolOff asked a PSC leader what would now be done with these opinions, the reply came: "Throw them over the shoulder." For months, post and other donors have urged the GoG and GECOM to obtain a binding legal ruling from the courts that would resolve the dilemma, to no avail. Post also asked around if the matter could be brought directly to the fledgling Caribbean Court of Justice, but this appears unfeasible. ----------------What the Law Says ----------------5. (U) Articles 59 and 159 of Guyana's constitution seem clear that every Guyanese citizen eighteen or older can vote if registered as an elector, regardless of domicile. (Note:

Guyana allows dual-nationality, so emigrants retain Guyanese citizenship.) The one catch in the constitution is that to be registered as an elector, one must satisfy "such other qualifications as may be prescribed by or under any law". Some argue that other such laws (i.e., the 2005 National Registration Amendment Act, the 2000 Election Laws Amendment Act, and the 1991 Constitutional Amendment Act) contain statutes that require residency to be properly registered. Overall, the case against a residency requirement seems stronger. GEORGETOWN 00000594 002 OF 002

--------------------------------------------- ---------Just an Extension of House-to-House Verification Debate --------------------------------------------- ---------6. (U) The residency requirement issue is taking center stage now because the main opposition party PNC/R sees it as a legal lever to force house-to-house verification of the voter list. Opposition leaders insist on physically verifying each voter at his/her residence because they want emigrants removed from the rolls. They believe that most emigrants are Indo-Guyanese -- and thus more likely to support the ruling PPP/C. 7. (U) The PNC/R has painted itself into a corner over this issue (ref D) and has tried, with limited success, to mobilize its base to demand house-to-house verification. Nevertheless, election preparations are moving forward without house-to-house, forcing the PNC/R to resort to legal tactics instead. They have already challenged the constitutional amendment extending the election deadline one month to September 2 (ref B). The PNC/R also orchestrated several thousand "objections" to Indo-Guyanese names on the preliminary voter list in the final days of the recently concluded Claims and Objections period -- on the grounds that these people were either fictitious, deceased, or no longer in Guyana. ------Comment ------8. (SBU) The residency requirement question is an important one, which should have been decided long ago through the legislative process. That GECOM failed to push for a resolution is symptomatic of Guyana's political disfunction and GECOM's inability to take decisions. That said, the timing of the PNC/R's challenge over residency is opportunistic, even cynical. If the legal argument for a residency requirement were so strong, it begs the question of

why the PNC/R did not push the issue earlier, rather than in the immediate run-up to elections. The PNC/R appears to be grasping at straws to find a way to delay elections further and remove emigrants from the voter list. The GoG, for its part, has made matters worse by not heeding advice to obtain a legal ruling. Both sides share the blame for this failure to resolve the residency requirement issue -- a failure that has inserted yet more uncertainty into an already shaky election process. END COMMENT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06GEORGETOWN595.html 06GEORGETOWN595, AMBASSADOR: TIE IDB DEBT FORGIVENESS, MCC TO REFORM Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN5 95 VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0595 1711505 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 201505Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3678 C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000595 SIPDIS SIPDIS FROM THE AMBASSADOR FOR WHA A/S SHANNON E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID EFIN KDEM KMCA GY SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR: TIE IDB DEBT FORGIVENESS, MCC TO REFORM REF: A. GEORGETOWN 546 B. GEORGETOWN 499 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen for reason 1.4(d) 1. (C) I recently learned that the IDB is planning to forgive the debt owed by its five poorest members -- including almost a half billion dollars that Guyana owes. I cannot stress enough the unique opportunity this gives us to induce meaningful reform in a country that has obstinately resisted it for years. A chance like this won't come around again soon. 2. (C) For over three years my fellow chiefs of mission and I have been forced to play the role of civil society because the two main political parties -- the ruling PPP/C and opposition PNC/R -- have discounted the role of Guyana's own civil society. Yet as we approach elections, long overdue constitutional and other governance reforms spelled out in the 1998 Caricom-brokered Herdmanston Accord remain incomplete. The parties have been unwilling to implement these reforms, including a badly needed overhaul of the divided structure of the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) and a revival of local government elections. 3. (C) Guyana is anxious to secure debt relief from the IDB. Created 2006-06-20 15:05 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

The outstanding debt portfolio is very significant -- US$470 million at year-end 2005 (about 50 percent of Guyana's annual GDP) -- and by far the largest source of debt remaining on Guyana's books. Guyana is also a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) threshold candidate. President Jagdeo considers both IDB debt forgiveness and MCC funding absolutely vital. We can use these as leverage to influence Guyana's leaders, on both sides, to do what they should. I believe that we should make these initiatives contingent upon elections going forward and the parties implementing promised reforms within an agreed timeframe. 4. (C) There is uncommonly close consensus within the donor community here in Georgetown. The Commonwealth's Special Envoy Sir Paul Reeves and OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin are part of this consensus; on recent visits they saw "no progress" in the "depressing" political stalemate. We all agree that meaningful political change in Guyana will only come about through coordinated, concerted international pressure -- such as what I am proposing -- on both the Government and the PNC/R. We also agree that all donor agencies and international stakeholders must deliver this message simultaneously. 5. (C) If we fail to press home this issue now, our successors will be back in the same place in five years when the next election is due. Guyana will still be stuck in neutral, or worse. Guyana's percentile rank across all six World Bank Governance Indicators fell by 11 percent between 1998 and 2004. I fear this downward trend will continue if we let this opportunity slip through our hands. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06PARAMARIBO399.html 06PARAMARIBO399, DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED ROGER KHAN ACTIVITIES Reference ID 06PARAMARIBO3 99 VZCZCXYZ0019 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHPO #0399/01 1741839 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 231839Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8477 INFO RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 2000 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1554 S E C R E T PARAMARIBO 000399 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR INR DEPT FOR WHA/CAR-LUFTIG E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2016 TAGS: PINR SNAR KCRM PREL PGOV GY NS SUBJECT: DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED ROGER KHAN ACTIVITIES (C-AL6-00586) REF: A. SECSTATE 92995 B. PARAMARIBO 039 C. PARAMARIBO 043 D. PARAMARIBO 285 E. 05 PARAMARIBO 751 F. PARAMARIBO 090 G. PARAMARIBO 135 Created 2006-06-23 18:39 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Paramaribo

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARSHA E. BARNES, REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d). Post presents response to reftel A. In light of the recent arrest of Shaheed "Roger" Khan, Post notes the state of flux in relationship between Khan and Desi Bouterse. 1. (S/NF) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED "ROGER" KHAN'S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP? Khan and Bouterse are partners in the drug trade, according to sensitive sourcing. The police suspect that Surinamese

citizen Steven Douglas, the owner of local fishing and hunting store "Tacklebox"," has served as the intermediary between the two. 2. (S/NF) HOW AND THROUGH WHAT MEANS DOES KHAN SUPPORT BOUTERSE? WHAT CAN OR DOES BOUTERSE OFFER IN RETURN? Khan is believed to help Bouterse's financial situation by giving him the means to supplement his income through narcotics trafficking. According to a senior Surinamese law enforcement official, the dismantling of several criminal rings by the GOS through seizures, arrests, and convictions over the last two years hurt Bouterse financially and forced him to reach out to new partners, such as Khan. According to the scenario outlined by the Attorney General to the Ambassador in January, Khan had planned to support Bouterse's efforts to avoid jail time via the creation of civil unrest and possible assassination attempts. (See refs B and C). It is not clear what Bouterse can provide in return, but he likely offered Khan access to Surinamese criminal elements and structures, eased access to regular shipping to Europe for drug movement, and protection while in Suriname. Just after his arrest, Khan engaged one of Suriname's leading criminal defense lawyers, Irwin Kanhai, who is also defending Bouterse in the December 1982 murder trial. 3. (S/NF) IS KHAN ACTIVE IN THE NARCOTICS TRADE, AND IF SO, WHICH DRUG TRAFFICKING GROUPS DOES HE DEAL WITH? DOES HE MAINTAIN TIES TO ANY OTHER CRIMINAL GROUPS, SUCH AS TERRORIST OR ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS? WHAT FINANCES AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITY DOES HE HAVE AT HIS DISPOSAL? As reported in INSCR, Khan is the head of a major drug trafficking organization based in Guyana. In this capacity, he has dealt directly with Columbia drug cartels and criminal groups in the U.S. and Suriname. According to Minister of Justice and Police Chan Santokhi, Khan has conducted arms-for-drugs deals with FARC. According to sensitive sourcing, Bouterse still has connections to Eduardo Beltran, who is a major regional narcotics logistics/transportation handler currently operating out of Venezuela. Beltran reportedly travels to Suriname on a monthly basis. At the time of Khan's arrest, he was found with 33 cell phones, 2 satellite phones, and a powerful laptop, which would suggest technical sophistication. Embassy Georgetown would be better able to address his financial situation. 4. (S/NF) HOW OFTEN, AND WHERE, DOES BOUTERSE TRAVEL TO GUYANA? REF C INDICATES KHAN WAS LAST IN SURINAME IN JANUARY 2006, BUT ANALYSTS WOULD WELCOME INFORMATION ON HOW

OFTEN HE TRAVELS TO SURINAME. According to Bouterse's public admission he travels to Guyana on a regular basis, but "keeps his travels quiet so as not to cause problems for friends." (See ref D). Over the course of the past a year, Surinamese police know of three separate occasions in which Bouterse went to Guyana. The last known Bouterse trip to Guyana was the first week of May. Bouterse has also admitted to regular travel to Brazil. According to Minister Santokhi, Khan has traveled to Suriname on a "regular basis" over the last year; police know of two Khan visits to Paramaribo in the last year. Police know that Khan has also visited Bouterse's property located near Wasjabo, a village that sits on the Corantijn River not far from the town of Apoera on the GuyaneseSurinamese border, but do not know of dates or times. Out of Washabo is likely where Bouterse crosses into Guyana, as there are no border controls in the isolated location. According to the Attorney General, Bouterse has also met with Khan in the western town of Nickerie at a property owned by NDP Parliamentarian Mohamed Rashied Doekhie. 5. (S) OTHER THAN THROUGH VIOLENCE, DO BOUTERSE OR KHAN HAVE ANY PLANS TO CREATE CIVIL UNREST THROUGH PROPAGANDA, RUMOR CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR POLITICAL LEADERS, OR STIRRING RACIAL OR SOCIOECONOMIC TENSIONS? As the leader of Suriname's largest single opposition party (NDP), Bouterse takes full advantage of his well-organized political apparatus to publicly harangue and provoke government leaders through public speeches, protests, and parliamentary antics, often-generating significant public discussion. In fall 2005, Bouterse led a series of ineffectual political street protests demanding the government step down. (See ref E). Since then, Bouterse's NDP party has conducted a concerted and aggressive campaign to undermine the fragile majority of the governing coalitions, force new elections and form a government. (See ref F). In the context of the upcoming December murder trial, these actions are likely an extension of Bouterse's suspected efforts to create a critical mass of unrest and instability in order to force the government to end his criminal trial. Some observers portray Bouterse as a spent force, however, who would be unable to muster enough domestic support to create the level of unrest required to end the trial. There are also indications of splits within Bouterse's NDP (See ref G). These observations combined with reported cash flow problems may explain Bouterse's reported outreach to

Khan for support. A few months ago, Bouterse asserted that President Ronald Venetiaan's nephew and head of Suriname's intelligence services (CIVD) Col. Johan Ceder was involved in arms-fordrugs trade with Brazilian criminal organizations. However, in this small society with its large informal sector, drug trafficking and money laundering, it is not far fetched to think that there may be a kernel of truth at root of smear campaign. According to the Attorney General, Bouterse has put out the word in an NDP neighborhood that former Minister of Trade and Industry Siegfried Gilds had brought Khan into the country to assassinate the Minister of Justice and Police and Attorney General. Gilds is under investigation for money laundering. The Attorney General categorically dismissed this possibility. For Bouterse, such a disinformation campaign serves to shift the blame and distance himself from Khan, while settling old political scores against the man who removed him as head of the armed forces in the early 1990's. If the GOS hands over Khan to the US, Bouterse may try to garner support by portraying the current government as a puppet of the US. This plan is less than likely to occur, however, as public opinion for the most part supports a Khan departure from Su riname and would backfire for Bouterse. 6. (C) HOW CAPABLE ARE THE SURINAMESE MILITARY AND POLICE TO QUARANTINE ANY DISTURBANCES? HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DOES BOUTERSE HAVE ON SURINAME'S MILITARY AND POLICE? The police are capable of containing disturbances of shortterm duration and minimal scope within Paramaribo city limits. However, any large-scale disturbance involving simultaneous events around the city would likely spin out of control, with even those not aligned with Bouterse taking advantage of the situation to loot and riot. This would necessitate military intervention, but it would take significant time for police and military together to restore order in a sustained disruption scenario. There is also a history of political arson in Suriname, which places Paramaribo's many historic downtown wooden structures at risk. For events taking place outside the city, i.e. the interior, police would be unable to handle a disturbance of any significance and require immediate military assistance. It is highly questionable whether the CIVD would play a constructive role in quelling a disturbance. The CIVD has nominal responsibility for national security but is in fact used primarily for domestic political intelligence, and it

is comprised of thugs and shady characters with ambiguous loyalties. That officers in the CIVD serve as a protective force for senior GOS officials is disquieting. The President and his cabinet have a habit of slow, uncoordinated public reaction to adverse events, signaling that in the midst of a significant disturbance, there could be a security vacuum as the populace vainly looks towards a plodding government for reassurance that order will be restored. Bouterse still appears to have a degree of support in the military, but it is difficult to measure. A group of roughly 10 lower ranking persons in uniform attended a Bouterse led NDP rally in late 2005 to show their support. The Commander of the Armed Forces was reportedly extremely angry at this, as members of the military members are restricted from political involvement while in uniform; the commander handed down subsequent disciplinary actions. In 2004 a Bouterse crony, LTC Hans Jannasch, was sentenced to eight years in prison by a Surinamese judge for running an ecstasy lab; Jannasch was still on the military payroll at the time, but was not active. According to the commander of the land forces, senior officers are always vigilant and watchful for the potential for growing support for Bouterse. Bouterse has little direct influence within the Surinamese police force, but his past as a two-time military coup leader and his alleged links to organized crime still intimidate police, who would plan any operations against him with utmost care. French police have recently trained the police Arrest Team on making arrest under difficult circumstances in preparation for a possible Bouterse arrest. Police and military are currently conducting joint training exercises in preparation for the December murder trial. The head of the Military Police recently requested US military police protective service training in August to train a 40-60 person military police force assigned to conduct security for the trial. 7. (S) WHAT IS BOUTERSE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RULING PEOPLE'S PROGRESSIVE PARTY (PPP) IN GUYANA? IS THE PPP SUPPORTING BOUTERSE'S EFFORTS? Post is not aware of any significant links between Bouterse and the PPP, but there have been past connections between Bouterse and the Guyanese opposition PNCR. Despite both being in the opposition at the time, in June 2004 Bouterse's NDP party and the PNCR signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) calling for a urgent and peaceful

resolution to the border dispute between Guyana and Suriname. According to PNCR leader Robert Corbin, the signing was at the initiative of Bouterse. MOU discussions took place in Georgetown and in Nickerie in western Suriname. 8. (S) WILL EITHER GUYANA OR VENEZUELA GRANT BOUTERSE ASYLUM OR PROVIDE HIM WITH OTHER SUPPORT? IF SO, WHY WOULD THEY DO SO? Post defers to Georgetown and Caracas. 9. (S) DOES BOUTERSE HAVE TIES TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT MAY CONSIDER OFFERING HIM ASYLUM OR OTHER SUPPORT? It is unlikely that Bouterse would receive asylum from other governments. However, Dutch Embassy contacts maintain that Bouterse owns isolated property in northern Brazil that could be a possible hideaway. 10. (C) WHAT IS KHAN'S ABILITY TO HELP DESTABILIZE THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT AND/OR THE ELECTIONS? Post defers to Embassy Georgetown. 11. (S/NF) IS THERE EVIDENCE, BEYOND POSSIBLE CONJECTURE, THAT KHAN ENJOYS SOME LEVEL OF POLITICAL PROTECTION FROM SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT AND, IF SO, FROM WHOM? Post defers to Embassy Georgetown. 12. (S/NF) WHAT ARE THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT'S OPTIONS AND CAPABILITIES, ASSUMING THERE IS THE POLITICAL WILL TO DO SO, FOR, AT A MINIMUM, CONTAINING KHAN AND HIS ACTIVITIES OR, AT BEST, SUCCESSFULLY APPREHENDING AND PROSECUTING HIM? Post defers to Embassy Georgetown. BARNES

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06GEORGETOWN640.html 06GEORGETOWN640, C/NF) GUYANA RESPONSE: DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN6 40 VZCZCXYZ0032 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0640/01 1801822 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 291822Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3729 INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0339 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 4287 RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 3896 S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000640 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR INR DEPT FOR WHA/CAR PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2031 TAGS: PINR SNAR KCRM PREL PGOV GY NS SUBJECT: (C/NF) GUYANA RESPONSE: DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED ROGER KHAN ACTIVITIES (C-AL6-00586) REF: A. SECSTATE 92995 B. PARAMARIBO 399 C. GEORGETOWN 433 D. 02 GEORGETOWN 1425 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Post presents response to ref A. Noting that Shaheed "Roger" Khan is now in custody, Post takes this opportunity to mention other narco-criminals in Guyana eager to take over Khan's turf (see paras 14-17). As Minister of Home Affairs told Ambassador at their June 23 meeting: "When one star goes down, another one goes up." 2. (S/NF) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED "ROGER" KHAN'S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP? See previous SIMO reporting from Georgetown. Created 2006-06-29 18:22 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Georgetown

3. (S/NF) HOW AND THROUGH WHAT MEANS DOES KHAN SUPPORT BOUTERSE? WHAT CAN OR DOES BOUTERSE OFFER IN RETURN? No longer applicable. 4. (S/NF) IS KHAN ACTIVE IN THE NARCOTICS TRADE, AND IF SO, WHICH DRUG TRAFFICKING GROUPS DOES HE DEAL WITH? DOES HE MAINTAIN TIES TO ANY OTHER CRIMINAL GROUPS, SUCH AS TERRORIST OR ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS? WHAT FINANCES AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITY DOES HE HAVE AT HIS DISPOSAL? Khan is a known drug trafficker who is believed to have ties with Colombian, Brazilian, and Venezuelan drug trafficking groups. Post does not know that Khan has ties to terrorist groups. Post does believe that Khan has ties to organized crime groups. Khan had access to large sums of money and could purchase whatever technical resources he needed. In 2002, for example, the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) detained Khan and two others (including a Guyana Police Force (GPF) officer) after finding them in possession of an armored vehicle, military arms and cell-phone surveillance equipment (ref D). The latter was a Cellular Protocol Analyzer model CSM 7806 manufactured by Smith-Meyers. Khan and the others were hastily released, the charges dropped, and the equipment returned. 5. (S/NF) HOW OFTEN, AND WHERE, DOES BOUTERSE TRAVEL TO GUYANA? REF C INDICATES KHAN WAS LAST IN SURINAME IN JANUARY 2006, BUT ANALYSTS WOULD WELCOME INFORMATION ON HOW OFTEN HE TRAVELS TO SURINAME. Post is unaware of any specific travel by Bouterse to Guyana. However, he has stated publicly that he travels to Guyana and Brazil despite the Interpol Red Notice against him. 6. (S) OTHER THAN THROUGH VIOLENCE, DO BOUTERSE OR KHAN HAVE ANY PLANS TO CREATE CIVIL UNREST THROUGH PROPAGANDA, RUMOR CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR POLITICAL LEADERS, OR STIRRING RACIAL OR SOCIOECONOMIC TENSIONS? Yes. Khan has pursued a very active "public relations" campaign to paint himself as a Robin Hood figure, polarizing Guyanese opinion in the process (ref C). Through his intermediaries, this campaign continues even after his arrest: -- Khan claims that he fled to Suriname because Guyanese security forces were on a hunt to murder him. -- He accuses the USG, the GDF, GPF, and the PNC/R (Guyana's main opposition party) of colluding to remove the PPP government. -- He disseminated two secret recordings (there may be others) of Police Commissioner Winston Felix's conversations

in a bid to force him out. -- He claims credit for bringing the 2002-03 crime wave in Guyana under control, meting out vigilante justice on behalf of the government. Background: The ruling PPP (supported by Indo-Guyanese) distrusts the GPF and GDF because they are staffed and led mostly by Afro-Guyanese. In private conversations, PPP insiders reveal their paranoia about the security forces' connections to the political opposition and possible coup-plotting. In this environment, Khan finds an Indo-Guyanese audience willing to believe that he is their protector against Afro-Guyanese criminals. Khan exploits this to stir racial tensions and discredit his enemies. But this influence has its limits. Recent demonstrations -organized and bankrolled by Khan and his associates -protesting the conduct of joint services raids on the properties of suspected criminals fizzled out quickly. 7. (C) HOW CAPABLE ARE THE SURINAMESE MILITARY AND POLICE TO QUARANTINE ANY DISTURBANCES? HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DOES BOUTERSE HAVE ON SURINAME'S MILITARY AND POLICE? Post defers to Embassy Paramaribo's response. 8. (S) WHAT IS BOUTERSE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RULING PEOPLE'S PROGRESSIVE PARTY (PPP) IN GUYANA? IS THE PPP SUPPORTING BOUTERSE'S EFFORTS? Post is unaware of any relationship between Bouterse and the PPP. However, Bouterse has links with the PNC/R (ref B). As Home Affairs Minister Gail Teixeira recently told Ambassador: Bouterse's link with Buxton is a "key factor" for Guyana and Suriname because so much "revolves around him". (Note: Buxton, an Afro-Guyanese community about 10 miles east of Georgetown, is a hot-bed of criminal/militant activity. Desi Bouterse's son Dino organized a Surinamese soccer team's trip to Buxton a few years ago. It is believed that the team bus carried weapons to Buxton.) 9. (S) WILL EITHER GUYANA OR VENEZUELA GRANT BOUTERSE ASYLUM OR PROVIDE HIM WITH OTHER SUPPORT? IF SO, WHY WOULD THEY DO SO? Post does not believe that Guyana would grant Bouterse asylum or provide him with other support. 10. (S) DOES BOUTERSE HAVE TIES TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT MAY CONSIDER OFFERING HIM ASYLUM OR OTHER SUPPORT? Post defers to Embassy Paramaribo's response.

11. (C) WHAT IS KHAN'S ABILITY TO HELP DESTABILIZE THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT AND/OR THE ELECTIONS? While active in Guyana, destabilizing elections did not seem to be a priority for Khan. Keeping a pliable PPP in power through a successful re-election suited his interests. However, even in custody Khan could potentially cause great embarrassment to -- or even bring down -- Guyana's government by revealing his links with the PPP and the skeletons in its closet. 12. (S/NF) IS THERE EVIDENCE, BEYOND POSSIBLE CONJECTURE, THAT KHAN ENJOYS SOME LEVEL OF POLITICAL PROTECTION FROM SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT AND, IF SO, FROM WHOM? Khan did enjoy political protection from GoG officials at the highest levels. At a minimum, former Home Affairs Minister Ronald Gajraj and long-time Head of the Presidential Secretariat Dr. Roger Luncheon collaborated with Khan. SIPDIS Gajraj (now Guyana's High Commissioner to India) orchestrated Guyana's "death squads" in 2002-03 -- certainly in close collaboration with Khan. Luncheon (President Jagdeo's deputy) is known to have intervened and ordered the authorities to release Khan and return his equipment as described in para 4. Also, eyewitnesses say they have seen Khan leaving the President's office. Ever since Khan's May 2006 indictment in the U.S. on drug charges, the GoG has tried assiduously to distance itself from him. 13. (S/NF) WHAT ARE THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT'S OPTIONS AND CAPABILITIES, ASSUMING THERE IS THE POLITICAL WILL TO DO SO, FOR, AT A MINIMUM, CONTAINING KHAN AND HIS ACTIVITIES OR, AT BEST, SUCCESSFULLY APPREHENDING AND PROSECUTING HIM? Even in the unlikely event that the GoG and the security forces were on the same page and determined to go after narco-criminals, their ability to do so is extremely limited. The narco-criminals have entourages of highly-trained, well-armed ex-tactical squad members at their disposal. The GPF cannot compete with them. In addition, corruption and tip-offs are so rampant that the GPF and GDF rarely enjoy the element of surprise. Even if these challenges were overcome, a successful arrest would stand little chance of progressing through the judicial system. Guyana has not convicted a single drug trafficker of note.

-------------------WAITING IN THE WINGS -------------------14. (C) Khan was the brashiest of Guyana's narco-criminals, but he was by no means the only one. Others will certainly try to fill the void left by Khan's departure from the local scene. Two leading candidates are Bramhanand (Alt: Bramhand, Brammanand) Nandalall and Clayton Hutson (DOB:31-Dec-64). Older than the upstart Khan, they have been active in drug trafficking for many years. Nandalall is the "godfather" of organized crime in Guyana. Khan and Hutson both worked for him before setting them up their own criminal organizations. 15. (C) Ambassador met with Home Affairs Teixeira June 23 to discuss Khan and other matters. Teixeira was eager to share her views on the risk and instability that Khan's capture causes in Guyana. She guesses Hutson might become the next kingpin. She said that Nandalall is keeping very quiet and is rumored to be cooperating with the U.S. 16. (C) Teixeira warned that Khan's departure from the scene opens the door for the criminal situation to become more political -- she said it will no longer be about "just narcotics, but about ethnicity" as well. She fears that if Hutson uses this opportunity to assume a larger role, then he and his accomplices will pose a serious political threat with the help of drug and gun trafficking. 17. (C) COMMENT. GoG leaders were comfortable with Khan because they thought he was on their side; the possibility of a new kingpin allied with the political opposition makes them very nervous indeed. Other sources indicate that Nandalall is more likely than Hutson to take over as Guyana's number one narco-criminal. Judging from Teixeira's tone, Hutson leans politically towards the PNC/R. Nandalall's political stance is uncertain, but it is telling that the PPP government has never gone after him during his many years of criminal activity. END COMMENT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06GEORGETOWN667.html# 06GEORGETOWN667, PLAN TO COAX GUYANA INTO IMPLEMENTING GOVERNANCE Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN6 67 VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0667/01 1882007 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 072007Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3761 INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0974 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0126 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2154 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0062 C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000667 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM GY SUBJECT: PLAN TO COAX GUYANA INTO IMPLEMENTING GOVERNANCE REFORMS REF: A. GEORGETOWN 595 B. GEORGETOWN 499 Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen For Reason 1.4 (d) 1. (U) This is an action request for WHA -- see para 6. 2. (C) Ambassador met July 6 with mission chiefs from UK, Canada, European Community (EC), UNDP, IDB, and World Bank to discuss a strategy for approaching President Jagdeo with a coordinated message on elections. The group proposes that U.S., UK, Canada and EC (ABCE Group) meet with Jagdeo Thursday July 13 to deliver a joint demarche and leave behind an aide memoire (see draft para 8). The objective is to urge him to publicly commit now to implement governance reforms within a specific timeframe after elections. Created 2006-07-07 20:07 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

3. (C) The ABCE Group will use the meeting to remind Jagdeo of their consistent support for the election process. Second, they will urge him to exercise leadership in implementing overdue reforms to pull Guyana out of its political morasse. Third, they will highlight the "carrots" on offer and the implications of inaction. 4. (C) The incentives to encourage implementation include building these reform commitments into IDB country indicators -- benchmarks that would allow disbursement of debt relief and other upcoming programs. These same benchmarks could also be incorporated into the Millennium Challenge Account Threshold program and the EC's governance funding. However, the ABCE Group will make clear that by not acting: 1) Jagdeo risks jeopardizing assistance to Guyana; 2) These incentives would become conditions; and 3) The international community would make a public statement explaining its position. 5. (C) This plan calls for a united front by all international stakeholders, including CARICOM, OAS, and the Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec). In addition, the ABCE Group is urging the OAS and ComSec long-term election observers now on the ground to issue statements about GECOM's ability to deliver free and fair elections. 6. (U) Post requests WHA concurrence with this course of action and the aide memoire by Wednesday July 12. 7. (C) COMMENT: Post stongly believes that privately urging Jagdeo to make this public commitment to reform is the right tactic. As it currently stands, the political will to follow through on badly needed reform is lacking. Obtaining this commitment now, before elections, increases the probability of its success. The ABCE Group will seek similar commitments from other political parties. Guyana will not get itself on the right path to development until these reforms are implemented. Post is confident that there is full consensus among all international stakeholders on this plan -bilaterals, IFIs, and multilaterals. As Ambassador recently wrote to A/S Shannon (ref A): "We all agree that meaningful political change in Guyana will only come about through coordinated, concerted international pressure . . . If we fail to press home this issue now, our successors will be back in the same place in five years when the next election is due." END COMMENT. 8. (SBU) Following is the draft aide memoire, as sent to London and Ottawa by British and Canadian High Commissioners. BEGIN TEXT: Aide memoire on implementing already agreed reforms to ensure democratic and accountable governance.

The elections in Guyana are expected to happen soon. We have been supporting GECOM and we will continue to do so as it prepares to deliver free and fair elections to the people of Guyana. We have as you know been making public statements in support of the electoral preparations on the basis of the views from the international experts and observers. You have stated to a number of us that you intend to implement a reform agenda if you are re-elected. Building on already agreed reforms and more recent discussions, we understand the reform programme to include: a) firmly establishing Parliament as the primary forum for political debate and for rendering accounts to Guyanese citizens; b) implementing much needed and long overdue constitutional and electoral reforms; c) reforming the security sector and the judiciary so that the rule of law prevails. We believe that it would be opportune for you to commit publicly, before the elections, to this agenda. This commitment would be strengthened by detailing a timetable for the early implementation of the reforms, to present to the new Parliament within three months of its formation. We will be urging all political parties contesting the election to make a similar commitment. This would allow us to move forward in support of Guyana's development, either bilaterally or as members of international financial institutions, and further support the implementation of these reforms. END TEXT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06GEORGETOWN663.html# 06GEORGETOWN663, GUYANA POLITICS BACK TO THE FORE: ELECTION PREVIEW Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN6 63 Created 2006-07-07 18:21 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO2445 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0663/01 1881821 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 071821Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3756 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0972 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0342 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0124 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2152 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0060 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000663 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM GY SUBJECT: GUYANA POLITICS BACK TO THE FORE: ELECTION PREVIEW #10 REF: A. GEORGETOWN 594 B. GEORGETOWN 371 C. GEORGETOWN 328 D. GEORGETOWN 181 1. (U) SUMMARY. Election-related activity hit a lull in the latter half of June as news of narco-criminal Shaheed "Roger" Khan's arrest transfixed Guyana. With Khan now in U.S. custody, election controversy is heating up again. Although many electoral preparations are progressing well, the main opposition party PNC/R has stepped up efforts to discredit the process. PNC/R leader Robert Corbin crashed this week's CARICOM Heads of Government meeting in St. Kitts to foment regional concern that things are not right in Guyana. END

SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- ---------Inching towards Elections: Revised Voter List Published --------------------------------------------- ---------2. (U) The Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) has printed and distributed the Revised List of Electors (RLE). The RLE incorporates changes to the voters list that arose during the May 2 to June 10 Claims and Objections exercise. June 30 kicked off the 21-day statutory period that the RLE must be on display. This is an important stage-gate in the election timeline, contributing to the positive tones emanating recently from the GECOM Chairman, the GoG, and the Joint International Technical Assessor (JITA) about progress on elections. Once the RLE display period ends on July 20, then production and certification of the final voters list (OLE) can begin. When the OLE is ready -- on July 25 according to an internal, unofficial GECOM work plan -- the Chairman notifies President Jagdeo, who can then announce a firm election date. 3. (U) There seems to be a rebound in confidence -- which had been flagging -- that, on technical grounds, elections can take place during the September 5-12 window. (Note: Even this optimistic timing is extra-constitutional; the outside date to stay true to the constitution is September 2 at the absolute latest.) --------------------------------------------- ----------Opposition Withdraws from Elections Commission ... Again --------------------------------------------- ----------4. (U) Having detected this mood of optimism, the PNC/R has predictably moved to quelch it. Two of the opposition-nominated GECOM Commissioners have "withdrawn" from GECOM once again and are threatening to resign -- a familiar gambit (ref B). This move could throw a wrench into election preparations. When commissioners walk out, it interrupts GECOM's work. 5. (U) The PNC/R has placed full-page advertisements in local newspapers explaining why the voters list is "flawed and illegal". (Note: International election experts and a recently concluded sampling exercise by a local observer group have repeatedly found the list to be clean enough to meet international standards. The opposition's motive is to remove emigrants from the list, but there is no legal basis for doing this. See refs A, C, D.) The PNC/R has also resorted to scathing criticism of the diplomatic community, and Ambassador in particular, for stating that GECOM is capable of delivering a free and fair election. --------------------------------------

Opposition's End Run to CARICOM Summit -------------------------------------6. (U) PNC/R leader Robert Corbin crashed this week's CARICOM Heads of Government meeting in St. Kitts to foment regional concern that things are not right in Guyana. He met with CARICOM SYG Edwin Carrington, Commonwealth Secretariat SYG Don McKinnon, and others on the margins to argue his case that the voters list is unacceptable. He also circulated a letter addressed to outgoing CARICOM Chair, T&T Prime GEORGETOWN 00000663 002 OF 002

Minister Manning, requesting that CARICOM send a "high-powered fact-finding" team to assess the situation in Guyana. The letter stated that the opposition's concerns must be "addressed urgently if we are to be spared yet another post-election trauma." Corbin is traveling on to London to raise funds, where he also intends to meet Lord Triesman of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 7. (U) President Jagdeo opened the door for Corbin's maneuver by not attending the annual CARICOM summit. Instead, he and ruling party PPP cabinet members fanned out across Guyana on an "outreach" mission to visit villages and hold town hall meetings. Although ostensibly intended for the Government to get in touch with the people, this initiative was blatant political campaigning by the PPP. ------Comment ------8. (SBU) As elections draw closer, the PNC/R continues to spout its hard-line rhetoric. Corbin's letter to CARICOM reiterates the thinly veiled threat of political violence if the opposition does not get its way (ref B). The PNC/R has backed itself into a corner over the voter list issue and risks marginalizing itself if elections go forward in early September. Corbin's direct appeal to CARICOM leaders is just another attempt to provoke foreign intervention on its side -- since the PNC/R has already failed to convince the international donor community that Guyana is unprepared for elections. Although the PNC/R might find some sympathetic ears in the region, CARICOM's response will likely be limited by its non-interventionist mantra. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06GEORGETOWN685.html 06GEORGETOWN685, JAGDEO DETERMINED TO HOLD ELECTIONS ON AUGUST 28 Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN6 85 VZCZCXYZ0013 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0685/01 1941923 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 131923Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3786 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0976 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0347 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0128 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2156 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0068 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000685 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM OAS GY SUBJECT: JAGDEO DETERMINED TO HOLD ELECTIONS ON AUGUST 28 REF: A. GEORGETOWN 663 B. GEORGETOWN 594 C. GEORGETOWN 462 D. GEORGETOWN 371 Classified By: DCM Michael D. Thomas For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: President Jagdeo is determined to hold national elections on August 28 -- one to two weeks sooner than expected -- and within the constitutional deadline. The Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) needs to push hard to be ready by then. The pressure is also on donor countries and international organizations to ensure that observer missions will be operational on time. Much of the political Created 2006-07-13 19:23 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

opposition will be up in arms when word of a possible August 28 date gets out. They or the courts could still derail the election. ------------------------------------Jagdeo Predicts August 28 Polling Day ------------------------------------2. (C) President Jagdeo confidentially told Ambassador during a July 11 meeting that the Election Day will be August 28. This date is one to two weeks sooner than expected given that GECOM decided in April that it could not deliver elections before August 30 (ref D). Jagdeo said August 28 has the following advantages: 1) it is on a Monday, Guyana's traditional voting day; 2) it falls within the (extended) constitutional timeframe; and 3) it allows five days for slippage while remaining within the extended constitutional deadline. (Note: In prior conversations Jagdeo has admitted his great concern that an election delay will tarnish his reputation on the international stage.) 3. (C) For the ruling People's Progressive Party (PPP), August 28 is also extremely convenient because it allows them to strike quickly before other parties have much chance to campaign and gain momentum. The PPP is prepared to risk pushing GECOM staff into the election faster than they would like. Tellingly, GECOM's Chairman hinted to donors at July 12 meeting that he is aware of Jagdeo's preferred timing and "things are gelling" to make that possible. However, it would be premature to say the process is going full steam ahead -- a few hazards remain. For example, a number of legal questions about the voters list remain unresolved (ref B). The courts have been reluctant to deal with these lawsuits so far; but GECOM's Chairman has stated publicly that he will abide by any court decision, even if it means delaying elections. Also, those who buy into the hard-line rhetoric of the PNC/R and WPA opposition parties could take to the streets in a bid to postpone elections. (Note: Speaker of the National Assembly told Ambassador there is well-established case law that suits of the sort filed by the PNC can only be filed and heard as Election Petitions after the election, not as law suits before the elections. Thus the current suits should be dismissed.) 4. (C) Jagdeo's predicted timeline for an August 28 Election Day: -- July 20: Statutory period for displaying the Revised List of Electors ends. -- o/a July 21: GECOM notifies Jagdeo that the Official List of Electors (OLE, the final voters list) is printed and ready. -- July 24/25: Jagdeo immediately announces Nomination Day of July 27 and Election Day of August 28. -- July 27: Nomination Day, deadline for parties to submit

lists of candidates. This kicks off the 32-day statutory campaign period and the real election countdown. -- August 28: Election Day -- September 2: Constitutional deadline for the newly elected Parliament to meet (ref C). --------------------------------------------- ----------August 28 Date Ratchets Up Urgency of Election Observers --------------------------------------------- ----------5. (C) This latest election plan leaves very little time for international observer missions to get organized. Currently, only two OAS and one Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) long-term election observers are in Guyana. Short-term OAS and ComSec missions are expected to follow, but the August 28 Election Day catches the observers by surprise. There were over 200 international observers for the last election in 2001. The same number, at an absolute minimum, will be required this time. There will be nearly 2,000 polling stations. The credibility of the election will hinge largely on the effective monitoring of polling stations susceptible to fraud (i.e., in mono-ethnic communities). For the observation missions to run smoothly, it is critical that capitals act quickly on requests for resources. ------------------------------------Comment: Where does August 28 put us? ------------------------------------6. (C) No one has spoken seriously about an August Election Day for over three months. But the view among Guyana's political circles is now tilting towards a consensus that elections will indeed go ahead by the end of August. From the perspective of the U.S. and other donors, whether Election Day is August 28 or later is irrelevant -- as long as the date allows enough time for GECOM to be fully prepared to run an election up to international standards. Meeting this new deadline seems possible, but very tight. The donors' other, more elusive, objective is for all parties to participate in the elections and accept the results. Unfortunately, the stubborn opposition will likely discredit the results and tacitly condone election-related turmoil regardless of timing. END COMMENT. BULLEN

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06GEORGETOWN694.html# 06GEORGETOWN694, COMMERCIAL COURT RULES AGAINST GOG IN BOND DEFAULT Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN6 94 Created 2006-07-17 12:00 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO0485 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0694 1981200 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 171200Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3796 INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000694 SIPDIS WHA/EPSC - ED MARTINEZ SIPDIS E.O. 12598: N/A TAGS: EFIN PGOV KJUS ECON GY SUBJECT: COMMERCIAL COURT RULES AGAINST GOG IN BOND DEFAULT Ref: GEORGETOWN 530 1. On July 12, 2006, Guyana's newly christened Commercial Court ruled in favor of a plaintiff who had sued the GOG after it defaulted on a $US201,085 bond. The bondholder, Carol Correia, sued the GOG on June 29, 2006 seeking the principal plus 5% interest on the 12-year bond, which matured on May 17. Correia's affidavit claimed that Accountant General Hardat Outar refused to accept the bonds and make payment when she tried to redeem them in early June. The Commercial Court made its ruling after a representative of the Attorney General's office failed to appear. 2. This ruling would seem to set a precedent for the roughly US$25 million Guymine bond default that made headlines just over one month ago (Reftel). Citizens Bank, a subsidiary of Banks DIH (owner of Guyana's flagship brewery) and holder of US$21.7 million of the bonds, sued the GOG after the Finance Ministry announced on June 1 that it intends to seek Paris Club like terms for repayment. The GOG argues that the comparable treatment clause (Clause III, Paragraph 1) of the Paris Club Agreed Minutes of January 14, 2004, prevents it from according more favorable treatment to non-Paris Club creditors and contends that repaying the Guymine debt, specified by name in the Agreed Minutes, would jeopardize debt relief as a result. However, several financial commentators, including former Finance Minister Asgar Ally, under whose tenure the Paris Club terms were agreed to, suggest that the GOG would be better advised to roll the

Guymine debt into U.S. dollar bonds or Guyana dollar denominated bonds fixed to the U.S. T-bill interest rate, arguing that the Paris Club has allowed repayment of commercial debt in similar instances. 3. The GOG's failure to appear seems puzzling. Paul Geer, head of the Financial Intelligence Unit, told EconOff that officials within the Attorney General's office told him the Attorney General was unaware of the suit. Geer, a former banker, speculates that, behind the scenes, the GOG may be deliberately dragging its heels so that it can then use a local court ruling ordering it to honor domestic bonds as justification for repaying the Guymine debt despite previously arguing that it was bound not to do so by the Paris Club Agreed Minutes. He also notes that an all-out default by the GOG will bankrupt Citizens Bank and possibly bring down the DIH conglomerate. 4. COMMENT: The timely ruling bodes well for the Commercial Court, which was established with assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank. The court was formally established on June 7, 2006 with a docket of twelve cases. The judgment against the GOG suggests the court is impartial, so far, and the quick deliberation is a positive sign that it is not subject to the lengthy delays that plague to rest of the judicial system. END COMMENT. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06GEORGETOWN704.html# 06GEORGETOWN704, POLICE COMMISSIONER OUT, INTERIM REPLACEMENT TIED Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN7 04 VZCZCXYZ0007 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0704/01 1981735 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 171735Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3806 INFO RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 1168 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0349 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0130 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2158 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 4291 RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 3900 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000704 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS WHA/CAR INL/LP DS/IP/WHA CARACAS ALSO FOR LEGATT AND DATT PORT OF SPAIN ALSO FOR DEA AND A/LEGATT E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016 TAGS: SNAR PGOV CVIS KCRM KCOR GY SUBJECT: POLICE COMMISSIONER OUT, INTERIM REPLACEMENT TIED TO NARCO-TRAFFICKERS REF: A. GEORGETOWN 406 B. GEORGETOWN 278 C. GEORGETOWN 205 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (S) SUMMARY. President Jagdeo and his deputy, Head of the Presidential Secretariat Dr. Roger Luncheon, separately highlighted to US, UK, Canada and EU chiefs of mission that Police Commissioner Winston Felix is out as of July 24. Jagdeo wants to name a replacement by October -- after Created 2006-07-17 17:35 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Georgetown

elections -- and Deputy Police Commission Henry Greene will fill the position in the interim. Ambassador and UK High Commissioner separately expressed to Jagdeo and Luncheon their grave concern at Greene's elevation, even if only temporary. Ambassador made clear that information available to USG agencies suggests Greene's links with criminal activities and that Post will seek authorization to release such information to the GoG. We will try again to head off Greene's appointment before his swearing-in within the next few days. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- ----------Luncheon Seeks U.S. Reaction to Greene as Acting Commish --------------------------------------------- ----------2. (C) Head of the Presidential Secretariat Dr. Roger Luncheon called in Ambassador on short notice July 12 and said that Police Commissioner Winston Felix will begin pre-retirement leave July 24. Luncheon told Ambassador that Jagdeo had chosen Deputy Commissioner Greene to assume the role of Acting Commissioner, a decision apparently made Tuesday evening after the Ambassador's farewell call on Jagdeo. Luncheon -- alluding to the recent cancellation of Greene's A visa, but not his B1/B2 visa -- sought Ambassador's reaction to this decision. 3. (S) Ambassador said that he had made it clear in previous conversations with GoG officials that the USG would have difficulty working with Greene and repeated those concerns. He added that Greene's name appears repeatedly in reporting by various USG agencies in connection with criminal activities (ref B). Ambassador added that, although not at liberty to provide details, it would be very embarrassing for the GoG if a sitting Police Commissioner were indicted in a foreign court. Ambassador also told Luncheon that he would seek permission from the relevant USG agencies to release further information to the GoG. 4. (S) Throughout the meeting Luncheon took pot shots at Jagdeo, including for dragging his feet on important decisions. He said Jagdeo is mistaken in believing he can shift Greene out easily in October -- precedent shows how difficult it is to dislodge an "acting" commissioner. Once Greene is sworn in as Acting Commisioner, his eventual confirmation as permanent Commissioner is virutally cast in stone. Jagdeo told Ambassador July 11 there would be big changes in the post-electoral cabinet, that he had informed several Cabinet members, and that many were not happy. Luncheon began his meeting with the Ambassador by announcing that he would retire after the election, for health reasons. His displeasure with Jagdeo was clear throughout the meeting, and highly atypical. Luncheon and Greene were schoolmates and remain close. Post has doubts as to whether Luncheon accurately conveyed the substance of Ambassador's warnings to

Jagdeo. --------------------UK Reaction to Greene --------------------5. (S/NF) Jagdeo also called in UK High Commissioner Fraser Wheeler the afternoon of July 12 to preview the decision on Felix and Greene. Wheeler told Jagdeo "we have problems" with Greene and asked if Felix could stay on through elections. However, Wheeler stopped short of saying the UK would not work with Greene. --------------------------------------------- ---------Jagdeo Discusses Commissioner Issue Further with Envoys --------------------------------------------- ---------6. (C) The Police Commissioner topic came up again at July 13 US, UK, Canada and EU demarche on Jagdeo regarding governance reforms (septel). At that meeting, Jagdeo said Greene will be Acting Commissioner until October, by which time he hopes to have a replacement named. Jagdeo added that he intends to consider a broad group of candidates, including non-policemen, for the position. He wants to reform the police force and its culture, and he may hire a security firm to lead this effort. Jagdeo has received a proposal from a firm associated with Bernard Kerik, the former New York police commissioner and failed nominee for DHS Secretary. US, UK, Canada and EU chiefs of missions again expressed their collective concern at the proposed elevation of Greene, unaware that Dr. Luncheon was at that moment announcing the decision to the press. --------Next Step --------7. (S) Subsequent to these meetings, the DEA informed Ambassador they have developed specific, reliable information that documented continuing payoffs by narco-traffickers to Greene. The Consular Section is drafting a Request for Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) to Consular Affairs seeking concurrence to revoke Greene's visa. DEA has also provided language for Charge to use in informing President Jagdeo: "U.S. law enforcement has reliable reports from multiple sources that Henry Greene has benefited from, and continues to benefit from, the proceeds of drug trafficking." 8. (C) Jagdeo is in the U.S. and Canada on a fundraising trip, returning July 18. Upon his return, Charge intends to inform him that we have received authorization to release additional information and provide the DEA cleared language. At the same time, Post will outline for Jagdeo the negative

consequences for USG cooperation with the Guyanese police of having an Acting Commissioner who is known to be in the pocket of narco-traffickers. For example, it would be impossible for DEA to set up the long-awaited vetted anti-narcotics unit -- an initiative that Jagdeo has repeatedly said he supports. ------Comment ------9. (C) When EmbOffs last spoke privately with Felix, he seemed resigned to early retirement, even relieved at the prospect. The fallout from Guyana's spate of unsolved, brazen crimes and the release of secret tapes of his conversations (reftels) -- constant calls in the media for his removal, snipes from the government, death threats -clearly diminished Felix's appetite to stay on until reaching mandatory retirement age in October. With the notable exception of Home Affairs Minister Gail Teixeira, the GoG's inner circle lost trust in Felix. Greene is widely perceived among Guyanese police and society as corrupt and violent. How the GoG can have any greater faith in Greene is very puzzling. 10. (S) Comment continued: Post's interactions Greene have been, without fail, extremely negative. In addition to being crooked, he is grossly incompetent in his current job as Crime Chief. For example, he is unwilling or unable to protect sensitive information or to fulfill straightforward extradition requests. Greene as Commissioner would be bad for Guyana's security and would compromise all international cooperation with the Guyana Police Force. Even if acting for only three months, he can do serious harm to USG interests as well as to Guyana's security. It will be embarrassing and difficult for the GoG to back-track on its public announcement of the plan to elevate Greene, but not as embarrassing as it would be if international donors' views on Greene become public after he is sworn in as Acting Commissioner. We will continue interventions to make the GoG reconsider. END COMMENT. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06GEORGETOWN710.html# 06GEORGETOWN710, GUYANA: RESPONSES TO DEMARCHE ON GOVERNANCE REFORMS Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN7 10 VZCZCXYZ0007 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0710/01 2001413 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 191413Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3814 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0978 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0133 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2161 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0070 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000710 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM OAS GY UK CA SUBJECT: GUYANA: RESPONSES TO DEMARCHE ON GOVERNANCE REFORMS REF: A. STATE 114561 B. GEORGETOWN 667 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: US, UK, Canada and EU chiefs of mission delivered demarche on governance reforms to President Jagdeo July 13, Opposition Leader Robert Corbin July 14, the upstart Alliance For Change (AFC) July 17, and the ruling People's Progressive Party (PPP) July 18. Jagdeo generally agreed with the principles in the demarche but would not be drawn into committing to a specific timeline. Corbin accepted the message on governance reform in a distracted manner, but is much more concerned with the mechanics of impending elections. END SUMMARY. Created 2006-07-19 14:13 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

--------------------------------------------- ------Jagdeo Receptive, But Non-Committal on Reform Timing --------------------------------------------- ------2. (C) Chiefs of mission from the US, UK, Canada and EU (ABCE Group) delivered demarche on governance reforms to President Jagdeo July 13. Jagdeo appeared engaged as Canada High Commissioner read demarche points, as if familiar with the content of the message and generally in agreement. Jagdeo responded that the ABCE Group would see "much of what you requested in the PPP manifesto after the election date is set". He agreed with the principles that the National Assembly must be strengthened to become the primary forum for political discussion and that electoral system must be fixed. However, Jagdeo left the impression of not fully appreciating how seriously donors take this issue of reform. 3. (C) Despite ABCE Group's prodding, Jagdeo would not be drawn into a specific timeline for implementing the reforms. Rather, he said the terms of Guyana's multilateral loans dictated the pace of governance reforms and that he wants constitutional reform process to resume before year-end. Jagdeo blamed the breakdown in the reform process on the main opposition People's National Congress (PNC) party, claiming that his executive had fixed everything it could unilaterally. --------------------------------------------- ----------Corbin Accepts Demarche, More Concerned with Voters List --------------------------------------------- ----------4. (C) ABCE Group delivered demarche to opposition leader Robert Corbin of the PNC and Working People's Alliance (WPA) co-leader Rupert Roopnarine July 14. (Note: The PNC and WPA have cooperated in recent months as the One Guyana Platform.) Corbin broadly accepted the demarche's message -- calling the reforms "easy" -- and remains focused instead on his "lack of confidence" in the election process. He and Roopnarine lamented in forceful yet vague and sometime contradictory terms the purported failure of the Guyana Election Commission (GECOM) to carry out its obligations. They struggled to respond to UK High Commissioner's query as to what GECOM actions in the near-term would satisfy the One Guyana Platform. They eventually named as two conditions "some sort of verification" of the voters list and applying the results of the EOJ exercise (which GECOM says it has done). (Note: The EOJ exercise refers to the cross-matching of registered voters' fingerprints undertaken by the Electoral Office of Jamaica that revealed 947 certain duplicates and 4,427 possible duplicates out of a total cohort of over half a million fingerprint scans.) But they were far more interested in discussing the potential consequences of holding elections by late August/early September given their doubts about GECOM's preparedness.

Roopnarine warned the ABCE Group not to discount the "spontaneous rage of disenfranchised voters." --------------------------------------------- ----AFC Believes in Reforms, Preoccupied with Campaign --------------------------------------------- ----5. (C) ABCE Group delivered demarche to AFC co-leaders Raphael Trotman and Khemraj Ramjattan July 17. As expected, they concur with the message. Reforming governance in Guyana is part of their mantra. They want to sever the obligation for MPs to vote with their party by rote rather than with their conscience. But rather than dwell on the reforms issue, the AFC leaders were eager to discuss the challenges they face in election preparations. For example, the state-run radio monopoly has stopped airing paid AFC political advertisements, on the grounds that the campaign period has not officially begun. --------------------------------------PPP Also Supportive of Demarche Message --------------------------------------6. (C) ABCE Group delivered demarche to PPP General Secretary Donald Ramotar July 18. He, too, agreed with the points on governance reform. ------Comment ------7. (C) Guyana's political leaders do not view the content of the governance reform demarche as controversial. They broadly agree that revitalization of the reform process is essential to Guyana's future. However, in trying to pin the blame for past failure on each other the political parties continue to put the reform process at risk. Post, together with UK, Canada, and EU representatives will use every possible opportunity to remind Jagdeo and political party leaders to commit to a specific timetable for implementing specific reforms. The ABCE Group in Georgetown is of one mind that continued flow of governance assistance funding to Guyana should be conditioned on resumption of a meaningful reform process, with timelines and benchmarks, immediately after elections. Otherwise Guyana will continue to find itself in the same predicament every election cycle. END COMMENT. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06GEORGETOWN724.html# 06GEORGETOWN724, GUYANA ELECTIONS ON AUGUST 28; PNC WILL PARTICIPATE Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN7 24 Created 2006-07-24 19:51 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO9682 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0724 2051951 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 241951Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3829 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0980 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0353 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0135 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2163 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0072 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000724 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY SUBJECT: GUYANA ELECTIONS ON AUGUST 28; PNC WILL PARTICIPATE REF: A. GEORGETOWN 710 B. GEORGETOWN 685 C. GEORGETOWN 594 1. (U) Summary: President Jagdeo announced to the nation July 21 that general elections will be held on August 28. The following day, opposition leader Robert Corbin said the People's National Congress (PNC) will contest the elections, grudgingly, rather than follow through on its threat to boycott. The campaign season officially kicks off on July 26, nomination day, when the political parties submit their candidate lists. Some feared that news of an August 28 election date could spark demonstrations, but none materialized over the weekend. It appears the only thing that could derail the process now is a court decision on one

of the unresolved election-related legal issues (ref C). Summary. -------------------------------No Surprise: August 28 Confirmed --------------------------------

End

2. (U) President Jagdeo confirmed Georgetown's poorly-kept secret July 21, announcing to the nation that general SIPDIS elections will be held August 28. He also took the occasion to call on all sides to complete constitutional and parliamentary reforms after elections -- as he told U.S., UK, Canada, and EU chiefs of mission he would do in response to their joint demarche on governance reform (ref A). The August 28 date leaves no margin of error for the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) in its preparations. But it does have the distinct advantage of falling within the extended constitutional timeframe, thus avoiding a controversial situation for the GoG (ref B). --------------------------------------------Opposition to Compete, But Not Happy About It --------------------------------------------3. (U) Opposition leader Corbin made his own televised address July 22 in which he said the PNC and several smaller parties including the Working People's Alliance (WPA) would contest the elections, under the "One Guyana Platform", despite "full knowledge that the final voters' list contains genuine shortcomings and that GECOM is not prepared for these Elections." This is a departure from the PNC's veiled threats up until now that elections "will not" happen without (more) "verification" of the voters list. News of the August 28 date -- much earlier than many opposition parties wanted -- could have been a flashpoint, but there was no sign of unrest over the weekend. ------Comment ------4. (SBU) Opinions among Georgetown's political set have changed markedly in recent days. Whereas many (if not most) predicted blood in the streets if elections went forward this summer, some now foresee the possibility of an election season without major violence. The fact that the PNC has announced it will participate in the elections is a major factor in this calculus, along with the PNC's apparent difficulty in attracting enthusiasm among its traditional support base. 5. (SBU) Comment continued: Corbin's address revealed a real

lack of enthusiasm for the election and hinted at various excuses the PNC can feed its supporters if they fall short at the ballot box -- a padded voters list, lack of safeguards against election day fraud, not enough polling stations. None of these excuses holds water, but the PNC leadership is persistent in its efforts to discredit the election process. As long they continue to do so, we cannot completely discount the threat of election-related unrest following a PNC defeat. End comment. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06GEORGETOWN725.html 06GEORGETOWN725, GOG PICKS CROOKED POLICE CHIEF DESPITE REVOKED VISA Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN7 25 VZCZCXYZ0010 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0725/01 2052124 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 242124Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3830 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0981 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0354 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0136 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2164 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000725 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS WHA/CAR INL/LP DS/IP/WHA DEPT OF JUSTICE - OIA FOR PPETTY, OPDAT FOR RLIPMAN CARACAS ALSO FOR LEGATT AND DATT PORT OF SPAIN ALSO FOR DEA AND A/LEGATT SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 TAGS: SNAR PGOV PINR PREL KCOR GY SUBJECT: GOG PICKS CROOKED POLICE CHIEF DESPITE REVOKED VISA REF: A. STATE 118421 B. GEORGETOWN 708 C. GEORGETOWN 704 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (S) SUMMARY: The GoG moved ahead with its plan to elevate Deputy Commissioner Henry Greene to Acting Police Created 2006-07-24 21:24 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Georgetown

Commissioner, despite his visa ineligibility for involvement with drug traffickers. Greene assumed his new position July 24. Greene's elevation will bring much international assistance to the Guyana Police Force (GPF) to a halt. This issue reveals a real stubborn streak in Jagdeo -- he is doggedly sticking with Greene, knowing that he is corrupt and incompetent, that doing so strains Guyana's security situation and its foreign relations, and imperils GPF operational efficiency. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- -------------July 18: U.S., UK, Canada, EU Discuss Greene with President --------------------------------------------- -------------2. (S) Charge met with President Jagdeo July 18 to convey DEA-provided language regarding Henry Greene's ties to narco-traffickers. At their request the UK, Canada and EU chiefs of mission accompanied Charge to reemphasize their own governments' serious concerns about Greene. Jagdeo had Head of the Presidential Secretariat Roger Luncheon and Foreign Minister Insanally with him. 3. (S/NF) Charge repeated for Jagdeo's benefit what Ambassador Bullen had told Luncheon July 12 -- that Greene's name has appeared repeatedly in reports from various USG agencies -- and that as Ambassador had promised, we had sought authorization from U.S. law enforcement agencies to pass on some of that information (ref C). Jagdeo claimed that Luncheon had not briefed him on this. Charge read him the DEA-provided language: "U.S. law enforcement has reliable reports from multiple sources that Henry Greene has benefited from, and continues to benefit from, the proceeds of drug trafficking." Jagdeo reacted badly. He complained in strong terms that the USG "never" shares intelligence information and had not said anything before about having concerns with Greene. He went so far as to tell Luncheon to stop all GoG intelligence sharing with the Embassy. At a couple points when Jagdeo was catching his breath, Charge reiterated that we, UK and Canada had in fact expressed our concerns about Greene in the past on several occasions and at senior levels of the GoG. Charge expressed USG's desire to continue cooperation with the police, but explained that in addition to legal complications, many types of cooperation would not be prudent if Greene became top cop. Jagdeo said they had announced Greene and will move forward with him, and that's final -- in October, after elections, the GoG will consider a permanent successor. 4. (S) The conversation moved to more congenial topics before Charge reengaged Jagdeo on the Greene issue. Then Jagdeo, in a more amiable tone, admitted that rumors abound about Greene, but implausibly maintained the GoG does not have anything solid they can use against him. He said the situation is difficult because they have already announced

that Greene will move up. But if the U.S. were to take some action, like revoking Greene's visa, it could provide the GoG the needed cover to reconsider the decision. Luncheon then reminded Jagdeo that although Felix starts pre-retirement leave on July 24, he technically remains on the job and could be called back to duty. 5. (S) After taking leave of Jagdeo, Luncheon pulled Charge aside in the hallway and reiterated several times that it will be difficult to rescind Greene's advancement after the end of this week. Luncheon indicated that if they soon learned that Greene's visa was revoked, they would prevent Greene from taking over from Felix. --------------------------------------------- ---------July 20: Department Concurs, Post Revokes Greene's Visa --------------------------------------------- ---------6. (S) Consul revoked Greene's previously-issued B-1/B-2 visa July 20 based on information recently developed by DEA and with Department's concurrence (ref A). He is ineligible under section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Greene broke into tears when informed of this, fearing the embarrassment the revocation will cause, and denied involvement with drug trafficking. He expressed surprise that the revocation was not due to his "troubling the girls". (Note: Allegations of rape have dogged Greene throughout his career. Insiders tell us that the victims include at least five policewomen. Greene uses his rank to intimidate victims into not speaking out, but his behavior is widely known within the police force.) 7. (C) Charge was unable to speak with Jagdeo, Luncheon, or Minister of Home Affairs (and voice of reason in the GoG) Gail Teixeira July 20 but received a letter from Luncheon late in the day. The letter reprised Jagdeo's accusations that the USG withheld compromising information about Greene until the eleventh hour. The letter made it clear that the GoG would move ahead with plans to elevate Greene to Acting Commissioner. ---------------------------------July 21-24: GoG Sticks with Greene ---------------------------------8. (S) Charge spoke briefly on July 21 with Luncheon, who explained that the GoG was proceeding with its announced decision to elevate Greene. The following day, Charge met with Luncheon for a broad ninety-minute discussion. Luncheon appeared uncomfortable and defensive talking about Greene. He accused the U.S. of essentially wanting a veto over Guyana's police and army chiefs. He lamented that the Office of the President does not have hard evidence of Greene's wrongdoings, reiterating that the GoG cannot act on the basis

of rumor. The idea that the USG has better information on GoG officials than he does clearly gets under Luncheon's skin. He tried to dismiss Greene's tarnished reputation, saying that all senior GoG officials have skeletons in the closet. -----------Consequences -----------9. (C) Greene's new position will have consequences on foreign assistance involving the GPF. Post does not currently have any programs with the GPF that fall under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act. However, there are other types of assistance that it would not be prudent to implement as long as Greene is in charge. For example, DEA told Post it cannot proceed with establishing a vetted anti-narcotics unit if Greene is Commissioner. Also, the ATF is pulling out of its scheduled installation of a gun-trace computer terminal to help the GPF track firearms. Post will continue to evaluate carefully all proposed cooperation and interaction with the GPF -- to determine how it will advance USG interests and how the public will interpret it. 10. (S/NF) UK High Commissioner Fraser Wheeler spoke with Jagdeo three times between July 21 and 24 to convey Her Majesty's Government's concerns about Greene's elevation. Wheeler told Jagdeo that he had an offer to provide the GPF with pre-election security training, but cannot go ahead if Greene is top cop. Jagdeo replied that he is under intense political pressure to stick with Greene. The source of this pressure is unclear. In fact, Post has yet to hear anyone defend Greene as a qualified, deserving candidate for the Commissioner job. 11. (S/NF) The Canadian High Commissioner also told Charge that his government will cease all cooperation with the police if the Greene appointment goes through. ------Comment ------12. (S) It now appears that Jagdeo and Luncheon did not seriously entertain the idea of calling off Greene's appointment as Acting Commissioner. Immediately after Charge's July 18 meeting with them, Jagdeo informed EU Ambassador that the decision was made and final. This contradicts what he told Charge -- that revoking Greene's visa would give the GoG cover to back down. Luncheon and Jagdeo have been disingenuous throughout this episode, especially in protesting they were unaware of our concerns about Greene. Earlier in the year, Charge, UK and Canada

High Commissioners had long discussions with Teixeira regarding Greene. Teixeira has described in some detail her struggles to get Jagdeo and Luncheon to come around to her point of view. Ambassador made USG concerns extremely clear to Luncheon on July 12; UK and Canada High Commissioners did the same with Jagdeo on July 12 when informed of the GoG's intention to elevate Greene. 13. (S) Comment continued: The path forward looks tricky. We now turn our attention to limiting the damage Greene causes and pushing for an effective permanent Commissioner to be named quickly after the elections (slated for August 28). Luncheon, clearly a Greene protector, may not be around long after elections (ref C), but Jagdeo poses his own problem. At times, Jagdeo comes across as a practical, level-headed leader -- meaning well but hampered by a cabinet full of old party cronies. At other times, however, Jagdeo seems enamored by the image of Guyana as victim -- a poor, little country pushed around by the rich powers. In such instances, he lashes out at diplomatic pressure and makes decisions like this one that are, frankly, bad for Guyana. End comment. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06GEORGETOWN743.html 06GEORGETOWN743, NOMINATION DAY AND POLL PUT GUYANA ELECTIONS INTO Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN7 43 Created 2006-07-28 13:01 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO3961 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0743/01 2091301 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 281301Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3853 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0986 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0358 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0139 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2167 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0073 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000743 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY SUBJECT: NOMINATION DAY AND POLL PUT GUYANA ELECTIONS INTO FOCUS REF: GEORGETOWN 724 1. (U) SUMMARY: Georgetown was boisterous on July 26 Nomination Day as the political parties -- arriving in turns to the tune of chanting supporters and Caribbean music -presented their candidate lists to the Chief Election Officer at City Hall. A less than expected total of eleven parties appeared, only six of which have a realistic shot at winning seats in the National Assembly on August 28. Independent poll results released the same day show the PPP/C in line to win the presidency again but short of recapturing an outright majority in the National Assembly. END SUMMARY. -----------------------------------Six Parties Capable of Winning Seats

-----------------------------------2. (U) Nomination Day went off with hardly a hitch July 26. Eleven parties appeared at Georgetown's City Hall to present their candidate lists for Guyana's August 28 national and regional elections, much fewer than the thirty-plus parties that had attended Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) preparatory meetings. Following are snapshots of the six parties capable of winning National Assembly seats. Five other parties presented candidates but are not expected to contest the election on a national level. 3. (SBU) People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) Presidential candidate: Bharrat Jagdeo Prime Minister candidate: Samuel Hinds Seats won in 2001: 34 Rumors abound that current PM Hinds, despite being named as Prime Ministerial candidate, does not intend to continue in the government, preferring assignment as Ambassador to Ottawa. One rumored successor, Geology and Mines Commissioner Robeson Benn, appears on the candidate list. Moses Nagamootoo, a charismatic and well-liked PPP veteran who publicly split with the party in 2005, has returned to the fold and appears on the list. Attorney-General Doodnauth Singh, who recently received emergency medical treatment in the U.S., is not on the list. Nor is 85 year-old PPP co-founder and former President Janet Jagan. 4. (SBU) One Guyana People's National Congress Reform (OG/PNCR) Presidential candidate: Robert Corbin Prime Minister candidate: To be announced July 30 at a campaign kick-off rally -- unclear whether OG/PNCR has even decided yet who it will be. 2001 PM candidate Stanley Ming, founder of the party's Reform wing and said to have recently resigned from the PNCR's Central Executive, is not on the list. Seats won in 2001: 27 Corbin is leading a party with an image problem and little time to correct it before elections. The ungainly OG/PNCR acronym made its first appearance on Nomination Day. The PNCR had been scrambling to decide just who would join their camp to contest elections. The "One Guyana" part of the platform includes the small National Front Alliance party (received 0.1 percent of the vote in 2001), unnamed unions, and unnamed civic organizations. It seems unlikely that this amalgamation will boost the PNCR's appeal at the ballot box. What the PNCR can still boast is a core of fervent supporters, as evidenced when they broke through the security gate and filled City Hall's courtyard just before the six o'clock deadline for submitting candidate lists. This is the

same time that large PNCR groups have been known to rush polling stations demanding to vote just before closing on election day. The symmetry was not lost on Guyanese who observed the scene. 5. (U) Alliance For Change (AFC) Presidential candidate: Raphael Trotman Prime Minister candidate: Khemraj Ramjattan Seats won in 2001: n/a GEORGETOWN 00000743 002 OF 003

The seven-month old AFC's candidate list, tilted to youth and unproven politicians below the three co-leaders, did not contain any big surprises. Some expected to see high-profile defectors from other parties on the list. 6. (SBU) Justice For All Party (JFAP) Presidential candidate: C. N. Sharma Prime Minister candidate: Geoffrey Sankies Seats won in 2001: 0 TV-station owner and muckraking newsman Sharma is one of Guyana's most recognizable and popular figures. Although the elite disparage his Creolese dialect, poorer Guyanese gravitate to his man-of-the-people demeanor. Sharma thought he had won a National Assembly seat in 2001 but a recalculation showed he lost it by only a few votes. The GoG took Sharma's TV channel off the air during the January 2005 floods because it deemed his news broadcasts too critical of the government's response to the disaster. 7. (U) Guyana Action Party/Rise Organize And Rebuild (GAP/ROAR) Presidential candidate: Paul Hardy, GAP leader Prime Minister candidate: Ravi Dev, ROAR leader Seats won in 2001: GAP/WPA 2, ROAR 1 GAP and ROAR are all that remain of the "big tent" concept for a coalition of smaller opposition parties to run together. Hardy's constituency is among the Amerindian communities in Guyana's hinterland. Dev draws his support from rural Indo-Guyanese. 8. (U) The United Force (TUF) Presidential candidate: Manzoor Nadir Prime Minister candidate: Michael Abraham Seats won in 2001: 1 Nadir is Minister of Tourism, Industry, and Commerce in the PPP/C government, but will contest the election independently.

-------------Notably Absent -------------9. (SBU) A few small parties that had been expected to run have pulled out of the election. The Working People's Alliance (WPA) announced July 25 that it would boycott the elections. The party joined forces with GAP in 2001 and won two seats. The WPA was an instrumental part of the Marxist anti-PNC government movement in the 1970s and 1980s, but has become less relevant in recent years, too academic, and its constituency has dwindled -- it may not be back. Neither the Unity Party (led by Joey Jagan, son of former President and PPP leader Cheddi Jagan) nor Amcit businessman Peter Ramsaroop's Vision Guyana -- one-man outfits that failed to latch onto a coalition -- will contest the 2006 election. -----------------------Independent Poll Results -----------------------10. (U) The North American Caribbean Teachers Association (NACTA) released the results of its latest opinion poll July 26. NACTA is unique in having a proven track record of political polling in Guyana, and the results carry more weight than those of political parties' own polls. NACTA conducted face-to-face interviews of approximately 2,180 persons throughout the country. The racial composition of the sample closely mirrored the most recent census data. 11. (U) Poll results -- support for political parties: PPP/C: 42 percent (won 53 percent in 2001) PNCR: 29 percent (won 42 percent in 2001) AFC: 13 percent JFAP: 5 percent (won 1 percent in 2001) GAP/ROAR: 1 percent TUF: 1 percent (won 1 percent in 2001) Other/undecided: 9 percent GEORGETOWN 00000743 ------Comment ------12. (SBU) Although the mood was mostly festive and peaceful during Nomination Day, the aggressive last-minute arrival of the PNCR contingent exposed an inability or unwillingness on the part of the PNCR leaders to curb the energy of their most fervent supporters. Unfortunately, this is a sign that the mob activity which traditionally mars Guyanese elections is not a thing of the past. The question remains how serious it 003 OF 003

will be. 13. (U) Comment continued: The NACTA poll results reinforce the conventional wisdom that the PPP/C's ability to secure an outright majority is in doubt and that the AFC (or even the JFAP) is poised to win enough seats to act as balance of power. This outcome would usher in a new era of coalition government. The election is shaping up to be the closest and least predictable in Guyana's history, which only gives the major parties more incentive to resort to crude campaign tactics over the next thirty days. End comment. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN787.html 06GEORGETOWN787, GUNMEN KILL NEWSPAPER WORKERS IN GEORGETOWN Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN7 87 VZCZCXYZ0013 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0787 2211846 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 091846Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3909 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0362 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000787 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR DS/IP/WHA CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016 TAGS: PINS PGOV ASEC KCRM GY SUBJECT: GUNMEN KILL NEWSPAPER WORKERS IN GEORGETOWN REF: A. GEORGETOWN 406 B. GEORGETOWN 372 C. GEORGETOWN 205 Classified By: Political Officer Benjamin Canavan For Reason 1.4 (d) 1. (U) SUMMARY. Guyana is aghast at the brutal killing of six men August 8 by roving gunmen. The main target of the operation was the complex where the independent Kaieteur News is printed, located in Eccles along the road connecting Georgetown to the airport. The killings are reminiscent of a February paramilitary-style operation in the same area that killed eight (ref C) and the March assassination of Agriculture Minister Sawh (refs A and B). END SUMMARY 2. (U) Following is a sequence of events August 8, drawn from media reports and EmbOffs' conversations with contacts: Created 2006-08-09 18:46 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

-- A riot broke out at the Camp Street prison around 19:00 to 21:00 (reports vary). This overcrowded urban prison, located just south of central Georgetown, is the largest in Guyana. Inmates broke windows and threw out mattresses, apparently in a protest over prison conditions. The Guyana Police Force (GPF) locked down the prison and closed off surrounding streets. Some observers are speculating that the prison riot was intended to distract the police from the operation that followed. Post has not yet learned of evidence that directly links this event to the subsequent killings. -- Shortly before 22:00, gunfire was heard in Bagotstown, just south of the city and less than a mile from Eccles. Details of this part of the operation are sketchy, but it appears that two were killed and others injured by ten to fifteen roving gunmen in the Bagotstown area. -- Between 22:00 and 22:30, a group of gunmen -- said to be separate from the gang in Bagotstown -- approached the Kaieteur News printery located in the Eccles indutrial estate. The gunmen shot the security guard before entering the building. They ordered five employees to lie on the floor and shot them in the head execution-style. One of the employees survived and is in intensive care. A sixth employee managed to hide. By 23:00 media and police were on the scene. No arrests have been made. The ethnicity of the attackers is unknown. At least some of the gunmen wore masks. 3. (C) COMMENT. Post's interlocutors are puzzled as to the motive for these killings and we can only speculate. One theory is that this was a response to ongoing joint army/police operations against Afro-Guyanese criminal enclaves in Buxton and other coastal villages east of Georgetown. Another theory points in the other direction. Kaieteur's publisher Glenn Lall told PolOff recently that People's Progressive Party (PPP) officials have pressured him to tone down his columnists' criticism of the ruling PPP. On August 7, Lall expressed his fear that his interests might be attacked. What is clear is that the gunmen intended to send a message rather than commit a robbery. These events shatter the short period of relative calm that had prevailed in Georgetown for the past couple months -- since Shaheed "Roger" Khan exited the scene and as election preparations fell into place. END COMMENT. SANDS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN804.html 06GEORGETOWN804, ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE OUTLINES STRATEGY, GAINS Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 04 VZCZCXYZ0020 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0804/01 2221920 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 101920Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3926 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0990 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0363 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0142 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2170 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0077 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000804 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY SUBJECT: ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE OUTLINES STRATEGY, GAINS MOMENTUM REF: GEORGETOWN 743 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES MICHAEL D. THOMAS FOR REASON 1.4(d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Dick Morris, political advisor to third-party contender Alliance for Change (AFC), described the party's strategy as it heads into the final weeks of its campaign. The AFC is optimistic that it can continue to siphon votes from the opposition People's National Congress (PNC) while ultimately encouraging mostly Indo-Guyanese supporters of the ruling People's Progressive Party (PPP) to cross racial voting lines. However, fears for AFC Presidential candidate Raphael Trotman's personal safety may temper its ability to reach out to voters. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) Charge and British High Commissioner met Morris at his invitation July 31. Morris opened by describing a three-pronged strategy as the AFC heads into the finals weeks before the August 28 election. The AFC is currently running Created 2006-08-10 19:20 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

an issue-based campaign focused on gaining recognition among younger, undecided voters. Morris cited polling data that showed the AFC 13 percent behind the PPP/C and on par or slightly ahead of the PNC (now running as One Guyana (OG)/PNCR as described in reftel) and Trotman's strong popularity among ethnically-mixed voters. Morris said the party has commissioned a new poll, the results of which would likely be announced the week of August 7, and he was confident that the data would show the AFC pulling ahead of the OG/PNCR. He predicts this momentum will propel the party to the second stage of its strategy--Trotman appealing directly to PNC supporters to come into the AFC fold. This means convincing Afro-Guyanese PNC supporters that they would not be throwing their vote away because the moribund PNC is a toothless opposition party. In Morris' view, the final stage of the strategy in the campaign's last week will involve AFC leaders appealing to Indo-Guyanese backers of the PPP, convincing them that momentum has "tipped" in favor of the AFC. 3. (C) Trotman came briefly to the meeting, at which point the topic turned to security. Trotman confided that he currently has no personal security and is becoming increasingly worried for his safety. He is convinced that an intruder entered his house during a recent campaign trip to the hinterland. Trotman said he had been in talks with the Embassy's previous Military Liaison Officer, now retired and working in Guyana, about contracting for security services, but this had apparently fallen through. He said he has also reached out to an advisor to former Jamaican Prime Minister PJ Patterson for advice on personal security. Morris said the party's strategy of advertising party leaders Trotman, Sheila Holder and Khemraj Ramjattan together rather than highlighting just Trotman as the AFC presidential candidate was done partly to reduce Trotman's target potential. 4. (C) Morris also sought advice on the quality of safeguards to prevent election-day fraud. AFC backers have apparently allocated US$50,000 for an exit poll on election day, and Morris intends to hire Gallup out of the Dominican Republic in the absence of any local bodies capable of performing such an exercise. Charge mentioned that the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB) will be conducting a quick count to validate polling day results, however, Morris, likening the probably two to three day wait for final tallies to "a ten month wait for an abortion doctor", was hopeful that an exit poll could be a useful validation tool to counter possible voting fraud. ------COMMENT ------5. (C) Morris' cheerleading aside, the AFC remains very much a work in progress. The average Guyanese suspects that the

U.S. favors the AFC and is even financing it. Trotman and company see this as a positive and do not try to dispel this myth. Other positive factors for the AFC: (a) enough funding to maintain a robust media presence with frequent newspaper inserts (at discounted rates extended by the two independent papers' publishers) and sharp TV ads (at least by Guyana's low standards); (b) many prominent Guyanese (e.g. business leaders, the top pollster, even a few sons and daughters of senior PPP and PNC officials) confide that they like the AFC; and (c) the AFC is undeniably popular among younger voters, confirmed by the clumsy PPP and PNC efforts of late to claim they are in fact the parties for youth. However, the AFC still faces stiff headwinds. Some distrust Trotman (ex-PNC) and Ramjattan (ex-PPP) as unreformed apparatchiks of their former parties who split away because of over-sized egos. The PPP and PNC do agree that the AFC poses a direct threat to their 50 year duopoly on power, so both will continue to hammer away at the AFC on the campaign trail. When the AFC leaders gathered July 28 for their first big rally after Nomination Day, the stage collapsed under them--no clearer reminder that this is still a fledgling party. Thomas

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN815.html 06GEORGETOWN815, U) GUYANA ELECTION PREPARATIONS (C-AL6-01121) Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 15 VZCZCXYZ0034 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0815/01 2261742 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 141742Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3941 INFO RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 4297 S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000815 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2031 TAGS: PINR PGOV SNAR GY SUBJECT: (U) GUYANA ELECTION PREPARATIONS (C-AL6-01121) REF: A. SECSTATE 130068 B. GEORGETOWN 804 C. GEORGETOWN 787 D. GEORGETOWN 743 E. GEORGETOWN 725 F. GEORGETOWN 679 G. GEORGETOWN 433 H. GEORGETOWN 235 I. GEORGETOWN 205 J. 03 GEORGETOWN 1150 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) Post presents response to ref A. 2. (C) WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS WITHIN THE GUYANA ELECTIONS COMMISSION (GECOM)? HOW IS CHAIRMAN STEVE SURUJBALLY VIEWED WITHIN GECOM? (C) The much-maligned GECOM has withstood constant criticism and is on track to deliver free and fair elections August 28. One commissioner resigned in late July. Then an internal memorandum from the Deputy Chief Election Officer, in which he threatened to resign and cast doubt on the feasibility of an August 28 election, leaked to the press. But the inexorable momentum towards elections has now taken over and Created 2006-08-14 17:42 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin SECRET Embassy Georgetown

steamrolled these obstacles. This does not mean that Surujbally has suddenly become a unifying, admired figure -deep fissures remain in GECOM. But the professionalism of the technical staff, who care deeply about their reputations, is now the driving force. And because preparations are in their final operational stage, the politicized commissioners have less opportunity to undermine the process. 3. (C) HOW UNIFIED IS THE PPP GOING INTO THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS? (C) The PPP is trying very hard to present a very unified campaign face, but divisions lurk beneath the surface. Jagdeo and the party are not on the same page. The PPP was scrambling until just before Nomination Day to assemble its list of candidates. (S) Jagdeo told Ambassador Bullen July 11 that there will be "substantial" cabinet changes after the elections and he has already informed these ministers. One casualty may be Head of the Presidential Secretariat Dr. Roger Luncheon, who has held that position as Guyana's de facto number two since the PPP came to power in 1992. Luncheon has even criticized Jagdeo in recent meetings with Ambassador and DCM, and described conflicts between the PPP government (Jagdeo, essentially) and PPP party headquarters. Other observers have described the split between the idealistic Communist wing of the party (who, ironically, are fairly well-disposed to the U.S.) and the opportunists who entangled the party/government into dealing with narco-criminal Roger Khan. (C) Khemraj Ramjattan told PolOff in June that his contacts on the PPP's Executive Committee said there is a real split in the party leadership over Jagdeo. The old-timers fear that Jagdeo will force them out if he wins another term in office. 4. (C) PRESS INDICATED THAT NAGAMOOTOO HAS GONE BACK TO THE PPP. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PPP, GOING INTO THE ELECTIONS? (C) The PPP hopes that charismatic party-veteran Nagamootoo will bring in another 3 to 4 percent of the popular vote. This is a coup for the PPP, letting him back into the party -- chastened but in a much weaker position. Nagamootoo's presence on the PPP candidate list allows it to court young voters (who might be drawn to the AFC) while still appealing to older, traditional PPP supporters. But relations between Jagdeo and Nagamootoo are reportedly poor. No doubt, announcing in 2003 that he would seek the 2006 PPP presidential nomination did not endear him to Jagdeo (ref J). Nagamootoo has been virtually non-existent at PPP campaign events, which focus on Jagdeo, PM Hinds and new faces on the PPP list. Rumor has it that Nagamootoo is out of the country

for all of August. 5. (C) WHAT IS MOSES NAGAMOOTOO'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE (AFC) PARTY AND ITS LEADER KHEMRAJ RAMJATTAN? (C) They are close personally and professionally, but Ramjattan must have been disappointed that his friend and colleague went back to the PPP. The younger but more successful attorney Ramjattan shepherded Nagamootoo's late entry into law practice. And Nagamootoo publicly stood by Ramjattan during his 2004 expulsion from the PPP. 6. (C) WILL NAGAMOOTOO TRY TO CHALLENGE JAGDEO WITHIN THE PPP? WHAT IS NAGAMOOTOO'S SUPPORT BASE WITHIN THE PPP? WHAT IS HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE? (C) It is very unlikely that Nagamootoo has the support within the party hierarchy to mount a serious bid to challenge Jagdeo. His principled 2005 "disengagement" (or expulsion) from the PPP over the Gajraj affair surely alienated the inner circle. However, Nagamootoo is undoubtedly thinking of ways to use post-election negotiations over control of the National Assembly to gain a significant position. (C) Nagamootoo has broad appeal with the general public and those nostalgic for the PPP of the Cheddi Jagan era (see opinion poll results para 7). But as time passes, the PPP becomes more and more Jagdeo's party and less Jagan's. Nagamootoo is a genial, well-liked man. However, he has spent most of his adult life in the confines of the PPP structure and frankly does not have much chief executive style leadership experience. 7. (C) DOES JAGDEO HAVE THE MAJORITY OF SUPPORT WITHIN THE PPP AND ITS CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO REMAIN LEADER OF THE PARTY? WHAT IS JAGDEO'S POPULAR SUPPORT OUTSIDE OF THE PARTY? WHAT INFLUENCE DOES JANET JAGAN EXERT WITHIN THE PPP, ON JAGDEO, ON OTHER KEY POLITICAL ACTORS? WHAT IS JAGDEO'S LEADERSHIP STYLE WITHIN THE PARTY AND WITHIN HIS GOVERNMENT? HAS IT CHANGED IN THE RUN-UP TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS, AND IF SO, HOW? WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JAGDEO OF KHAN'S IMPENDING TRIAL? (C) Jagdeo enjoys greater support outside the party than he does among the old guard of the PPP inner circle. That said, the PPP Executive Committee realizes that Jagdeo is the best shot they have at winning an outright majority. An October 2005 poll of politicians' popularity showed that 58 percent of respondents had a favorable view of Jagdeo, second only to TV muckraker and small party leader C N Sharma. 53 percent of respondents had a positive opinion of Nagamootoo; former President Janet Jagan scored 51 percent.

(C) Jagdeo has tried to personalize his leadership as much as possible, with the help of his gaggle of "Presidential Advisors" whose allegiance is largely to Jagdeo rather than the party (e.g., Robert Persaud - media, Kellawan Lall political, Manniram Prashad - investment, Odinga Lumumba Community Development). For example, the state-run TV station (NCN) bombarded the airwaves this summer with spots declaring that the "personal intervention of His Excellency President Bharrat Jagdeo" made World Cup soccer coverage possible. (Note: Despite the overt suggestion that Jagdeo forked over cash himself, he actually just directed NCN to buy the broadcast rights at a loss due to scarcity of advertisers.) This episode may seem innocuous, but it underscores the extent to which Jagdeo and the state media try to portray him as benevolently overseeing his fiefdom. Not so long ago, Jagdeo was still considered by most political observers as a pawn of the party hierarchy. Now some PPP stalwarts must be fretting over the president they created. (C) There are no signs that Jagdeo's micro-managing leadership style has changed in the run-up to elections. In fact, the August 28 election date is largely a product of his determination to have elections before the September 2 extended constitutional deadline. (S) Even at 85 years old Janet Jagan remains the matriarch of the PPP, although her role will decline rapidly as her health continues to decline. She still appears in public at party events and writes a column in the PPP organ "Weekly Mirror". Tellingly, Jagdeo apologized to Ambassador Bullen July 11 for Jagan's vitriolic column that described the "stench of rendition" in relation to Khan's expulsion. Jagdeo took pains to make clear that Jagan does not speak on behalf of the GoG. (Note: This is the first Guyanese election in over fifty years that has not featured Janet Jagan as a prominent member of the PPP slate.) (S) The possibility that Khan reveals the PPP's dirty laundry is the big wild card. Post understands that Khan may have compromising information about Jagdeo. If Khan does reveal this information in a proffer, it would spell the end for Jagdeo. Nagamootoo could benefit in this scenario -- but it is a long shot. The conventional wisdom says that the highest levels of the GoG will go to great lengths to prevent Khan from spilling the beans. 8. (C) WHAT IS THE AFC'S SUPPORT BASE?

(SBU) EmbOffs have observed very mixed crowds at AFC events -- cutting across ethnic, age, social and economic lines. The question is whether the AFC will retain this support into the polls. In past elections, similar levels of support for

"up and coming" parties disappeared at the ballot box. Please see ref B for a more thorough status report on the AFC. 9. (C) WILL THE AFC SUPPORT THE PPP OR PNC/R IN THE ELECTIONS? (C) The AFC will support neither party in the elections. Depending on the results, the AFC will probably be open to joining a coalition after the elections to control the National Assembly. 10. (C) WHAT IS FORMER PNC/C MEMBER RAPHAEL TROTMAN'S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH RAMJATTAN? (C) EmbOffs have met on numerous occasions with Trotman and Ramjattan, both together and individually, in recent months. There is no indication that their relationship is strained. They are united in a shared disgust for what the PNC and PPP have done for Guyana. Ramjattan appears comfortable with being the AFC's prime ministerial candidate behind Trotman's presidential bid. 11. (C) HOW UNITED IS THE OPPOSITION PNC/R AND WHAT ARE THE PARTY'S MOTIVES IN TRYING TO DELAY ELECTIONS? REF H INDICATES THE PARTY HAS CHANGED ITS POSITION APPROACHING THE ELECTIONS SINCE 2002, AFTER THE DEATH OF ITS FORMER PARTY LEADER DESMOND HOYTE. REF C INDICATES THE PNC/R IS DELIBERATELY DELAYING THE VOTE BECAUSE PARTY OFFICIALS DO NOT BELIEVE THEY CAN WIN. (C) Please see ref D for more on the image problem facing the PNC (or the PNC/R-One Guyana platform, as it is now known). Despite continuing to complain about the voters list, the PNC leadership appears resigned to an August 28 election and probably realizes that pushing for further delay at this point would be self-defeating. However, we cannot discount the possibility that the recent surge in violence may be part of an effort by PNC extremists to force an election delay, causing a constitutional crisis that would require a politically negotiated solution. 12. (C) HOW MUCH SUPPORT DOES THE CURRENT PNC/R LEADER ROBERT CORBIN HAVE WITHIN THE PARTY? ARE THERE ANY OTHER PARTY MEMBERS THAT COULD CHALLENGE CORBIN'S LEADERSHIP? WHO ARE CORBIN'S KEY ADVISERS? WHAT IS THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE? DOES HE HAVE A SHADOW CABINET, AND IF SO, WHOM DOES IT CONSIST OF? (C) Corbin is on shaky ground within the party heading into elections, but that is nothing new. Rumors of his stepping down have circulated for years -- yet no one has staked a convincing claim to replace him. Trotman was an up-and-comer until he split with the party; Winston Murray is widely admired but not seen as Afro-Guyanese enough; Vincent

Alexander is a steady and loyal deputy but lacks sufficient charisma; Stanley Ming is winding down his involvement in politics; and then there are a number of PNC firebrands who possess no more voter appeal than Corbin. So the party is stuck with a man whose well-known history as a rapist and an enforcer under Hoyte and Burnham prevent him for winning many votes outside of Afro-Guyanese. He does not have a formal shadow cabinet, although some PNC MPs focus on specific issues (e.g., Debbie Backer, Hamley Case, and Basil Williams - security; Winston Murray, Jerome Khan, and James McAllister - economic development). 13. (C) PAST REPORTING INDICATES THE PNC/R IS STALLING ELECTIONS BECAUSE OF ITS DEMAND OF VERIFICATION OF THE VOTER LIST. HAS THE GOVERNMENT INDICATED ANY IMPENDING DECISION ON THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT TO VOTE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS? HOW DOES THE PNC/R SEE THE SITUATION PLAYING OUT IF ELECTIONS CONTINUE TO BE PUSHED BACK? (C) A lawsuit dealing with the residency requirement issue is now before the court. But given how slowly cases crawl through Guyana's court system, no one expects a quick and final decision on the matter. So the lawsuits are unlikely to affect the August 28 date. However, a decision in the future in favor of a residency requirement could give PNC supporters reason to discredit the 2006 election results. There is precedent in Guyana -- Justice Claudette Singh ruled on a case that vitiated the 1997 election results just weeks before the 2001 election. 14. (C) THE PNC/R CALLED FOR A RALLY IN OPPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN EARLY MAY. HAVE ANY OF THE OPPOSITION'S RALLIES OR PROTESTS MATERIALIZED? (SBU) The PNC has held campaign rallies with moderate success. But the protests they tried to mobilize against GECOM failed to catch on. 15. (C) WHAT IS THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN GUYANA? HOW WELL EQUIPPED ARE GUYANA' S SECURITY FORCES TO HANDLE ANY POSSIBLE ELECTION VIOLENCE? HOW SOLID IS INTERIM COMMISSAR HENRY GREENE'S AUTHORITY OVER THE POLICE? WHAT IS HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE? (C) The security situation had improved after the Guyana Police Force (GPF) and Guyana Defence Force (GDF) began joint raids on suspected drug traffickers' properties in March 2006 and after U.S. law enforcement took leading narco-criminal Shaheed "Roger" Khan into custody in June 2006. However, the calm was shattered August 8 when gunmen attacked the Eccles/Bagotstown area just south of Georgetown. This rampage culminated in the execution-style killing of five staff at the printery of the independent Kaieteur News (ref C). This operation bore similarities to the February 2006

Agricola/Eccles massacre (ref I). The capital is now very much on edge as people try to decipher what this means. A series of bank robberies August 11 and rumors of a planned break-out at the main prison are also contributing to the fearful atmosphere. (C) Guyana's security forces have received riot control training from the UK and may be capable of handling a level of violence associated with previous elections -- mob activity in central Georgetown. However, the more powerful weapons and sophisticated tactics used by criminals in Guyana since 2001 pose a greater threat. The GPF is incapable of preventing or responding to this type of threat; the GDF would need to get involved. (S) Doubts remain as to how vigorously the predominantly Afro-Guyanese GPF and GDF ranks would quell aggressive protests by Afro-Guyanese PNC supporters. The PPP leadership is paranoid that the security forces are not loyal to the government. However, they do see Acting Police Commissioner Henry Greene as their man, which may have played into Jagdeo's thinking in elevating him. Greene wants to satisfy his political patrons and cement his position as permanent commissioner -- so is likely to cooperate with the PPP's wishes when it comes to handling election violence. However, Greene is also known to be on the payroll of narco-traffickers who have connections to some in the "Buxton resistance" -- whose members are responsible for recent horrific crimes, none of which Green solved in his former role as Crime Chief. Note that the PPP does not mind some pre-election violence, as that props up their cynical pitch to Indo-Guyanese that they must vote PPP or else suffer at the hands of Afro-Guyanese criminals (ref H). (C) Greene's authority over the police appears to be holding. Although some senior GPF members detest Greene, there have been no mass resignations yet as some had predicted. (Note: These may still happen if Greene is made permanent commissioner.) Greene's leadership style (if it can be called that) is to compensate for his professional incompetence and serial sexual assault of female subordinates through sycophancy, intimidation, bureaucratic manipulation, and cultivating relationships with well-connected criminals (ref E). 16. (C) IS THERE ANY INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE SECURITY FORCES ARE CONNECTED TO THE PNC/R AND ARE NOT LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT? (S) There is no concrete information to substantiate rumors that GDF Chief of Staff Brigadier General Collins is connected to the PNC. Greene has divided loyalties -- to the government on the one hand (see para 15), but also to the various narco-traffickers, alien smugglers and other criminal

elements he consorts with. Ninety percent or more of GDF and GPF personnel are Afro-Guyanese and the conventional wisdom is that they must then be connected to the PNC -- but this is an over-generalization. Many GPF officers take their jobs seriously but lack the resources to take on better equipped and organized criminals, just as many GDF officers take pride in their professional duty to defend the state. What is clear, though, is that certain ex-GDF officers (both in Guyana and overseas) are aligned with the PNC. For example, ex-GDF Oliver Hinckson -- who is believed to have links with the "Buxton resistance" criminals -- openly associates with the PNC and may act in some security advisor capacity within the party. 17. (C) IS THERE ANY INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE GUYANESE DEFENSE FORCES ARE STAGING A COUP D' ETAT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT? (C) No. Collins told his peers at the May 2005 Caribbean Heads of Defense conference that there has never been a coup in Guyana and there never will be. He and all of his senior staff had expected to visit Washington for a high-level visit in late July, until Jagdeo quashed all travel by security forces until after elections. Such a trip would seem unusual for a cabal of coup-plotting officers just prior to elections. 18. (C) PRESS INDICATED THAT WEAPONS WERE STOLEN FROM A GUYANESE DEFENSE FORCE DEPOT. IS THERE ANY FURTHER INDICATION OF THE LOCATION OF THE STOLEN WEAPONS OR THEIR INTENDED USE? (C) One of the AK-47s, still in its packaging, was found by a joint services operation June 3 in Enterprise, near Buxton. It is widely believed that the weapon was planted there. The joint services have reportedly recovered three more of the missing AK-47s as part of its ongoing operation to take down the August 11 bank robbers. The search to locate the missing weapons has lost some steam over the past two months, despite USG assistance in administering polygraph exams to GDF personnel. 19. (C) THE PRIVATE SECTOR COMMISSION CLAIMS THE TWO MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE HEAVILY ARMED GROUPS AT THEIR DISPOSAL. WHO, IF ANY, ARE THE ARMED GROUPS AT EACH PARTY'S DISPOSAL? WHAT WEAPONS AND OTHER RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO EACH PARTY AND/OR ARMED GROUP? HOW HAS ROGER KHAN'S EXPULSION TO THE US AFFECTED THE SECURITY BALANCE ON THE GROUND? TO WHAT EXTENT DO ANY OF KHAN'S LIKELY SUCCESSORS AS HEAD OF GUYANA'S CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD MAINTAIN TIES TO EITHER POLITICAL PARTY? (C) Both parties appear to have access to weapons and armed groups. Khan's armed group was believed to be at the PPP's disposal -- although it might be more accurate to say that

the PPP was at Khan's disposal. Another armed group -- the so-called "Buxton resistance" -- includes notorious local criminals such as Rondell "Fine Man" Rawlins. It is definitely anti-PPP but is not necessarily at the PNC's disposal, and it also has links to Khan. Some interlocutors refer to three or more armed groups. Regardless of the number, these groups are driven primarily by criminal agendas, but are susceptible to political manipulation. (Note: Speculation about possible PNC involvement in recent criminal activities to be reported septel.) All groups have access to AK-47s and handguns, but have the resources to acquire other weapons through drug trafficking, money laundering, or other criminal proceeds (ref G). For instance, during a July 30 skirmish between the joint services and criminals camped out in the "backlands" behind villages along East Coast Demerara, one criminal threw a grenade at the security forces (inexpertly, as he blew his arm off in the process). Some observers speculate this might be related to the grenades stolen recently from a Surinamese army depot. (C) It is not yet clear how Khan's departure from the scene has affected the security balance. Khan's potential successors -- such as Clayton Hutson, Omprakash "Buddy" Shivraj, Bramhanand Nandalall -- are all believed to have some ties with the PPP government that has been in power for fourteen years. They have all built criminal enterprises and substantial wealth under the PPP's nose, which they could not have done without the government's acquiescence. Thomas

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN817.html 06GEORGETOWN817, INFORMATION ON DAR-UL-ULOOM ISLAMIC CENTER AND Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 17 VZCZCXYZ0009 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0817/01 2261846 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 141846Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3947 INFO RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 3908 S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000817 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2031 TAGS: PINR PK TD GY SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON DAR-UL-ULOOM ISLAMIC CENTER AND RADICAL ISLAM IN GUYANA (C-CT6-00891) REF: A. STATE 118929 B. 05 GEORGETOWN 551 Classified By: CHARGE d'AFFAIRES MICHAEL D. THOMAS FOR REASON 1.4(c) 1. (U) Post has gathered the following information in response to the questions posed in Ref A: A. (S/NF) What is the relationship between the Dar-ul-Uloom Islamic Center in Guyana and the center in Trinidad? Individuals from the center in Guyana and Trinidad share personal and professional relationships. Both centers belong to the same sect of Islam and sponsor cross religious training. As a result, students visit schools in both countries and will travel depending on the location of an instructor (i.e. a visiting professor). In July 2006 Maulana Abdus Salaam and 11 others from Trinidad attended the annual joure in Guyana. Post is also aware of at least one resident of Guyana who has studied at the center in Trinidad (Sheik Ahad Ayatullah Husain, details in paragraph F below). B. (S/NF) Has the center issued Guyanese visas for individuals with suspected terrorist ties? If so, how? Created 2006-08-14 18:46 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Georgetown

Guyanese visas are issued by Guyanese Embassies or the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Post is not aware of the Dar-Ul-Uloom center sponsoring suspected terrorists for Guyanese visas. Note, however, that the MHA does not vet visa applicants with the Embassy, so our lack of knowledge does not mean this has not happened. C. (S/NF) What types of Jihadist literature has the Dar-ul-Uloom Islamic Center circulated in Guyana. Post is unaware of the center's distribution of any such literature in Guyana; however, this does not necessarily mean it does not happen. D. (S/NF) What is post's assessment of Muslim groups in Guyana? Are groups discussing a movement toward a more radical and extremist Islam? Analysts would appreciate an update from ref report, 03 GEORGETOWN 01100. Post has not observed a marked increase in the Muslim population nor a recent trend toward overt radicalism. However, Charge notes a more fundamentalist flavor to Guyanese Islam than during his first tour in 1992-1994. Several Guyanese interlocutors have commented unfavorably on activities of fundamentalist/radical Islamic missionaries. The results of the 2002 census, released in late 2005, show that individuals identifying themselves as Muslim account for 7.2 percent of Guyana's population, a slight decrease from the 8 percent reported in the previous census a decade earlier. Most Muslim organizations in Guyana are not overtly political, although the mainstream Central Islamic Organization of Guyana (CIOG) occasionally issues policy statements, such as its August 7, 2006 call on the GOG to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. Muslim organizations occasionally make anti-U.S. statements pertaining to lifestyle, dress, music, etc., and pay to broadcast anti-U.S. propaganda on TV. For instance, "Islamic Documentaries", a weekly paid commercial program, aired on July 27 a documentary entitled "Fatima's letter" that was viruently anti-American/pro-insurgent. The program claimed that U.S. soldiers were raping Islamic virgins at Abu Gharib prison and called on insurgents to kill both the virgins and the soldiers to end their shame. However, Muslim leaders in Guyana have made no/no statements to commit violent acts (i.e. bombing, murder, etc.). E. (S/NF) Have there been any indicators that marriages between Guyanese and U.S. persons have been arranged for the purpose of facilitating U.S. citizenship? The Consular Section regularly encounters applicants who have arranged marriage solely for immigration purposes. Ref B describes some of the more common tactics. Post has no trend data indicating that Muslim groups arrange marriages more

than the rest of the population. F. (S/NF) Have any Darul Uloom Islamic Center members traveled to the U.S? If so, when and where? Post is aware of three individuals associated with the Darul Uloom Islamic Center in Guyana who possess a visa to travel to the United States. Each were contacted by consular staff during the course of a routine validation study with the following results: 1) Name: Ramzan Khan DPOB: 17-NOV-1969, Guyana Passport number: A010307 (Guyana) Case number: 2000314 629 0003 Date of issue: 20-NOV-2005 Date of expiration: 08-NOV-2005 Visa class: B1/B2 Purpose of travel: (from case notes) Financed by Muslims from around the world, would not be more specific. Huijatul Ulama Darul Uloom, $70,000 per month, students all live at school, all boys, 30 full time, 20 part time, 5 full time teachers. 921,048 savings, no property, has been teacher since 1993, claims was in India studying in Ghuja. Disposition: Subject told ConOff he twice transited Miami to visit friends in Panama. 2) Name: Asgar Alli DPOB: 24-JAN-1987, Georgetown, Guyana Passport number: A015455 (Guyana) Case number: 2003321 741 0003 Date of issue: 17-NOV-2003 Date of expiration: 16-NOV-2004 Visa class: B1/B2 Purpose of travel: Vacation in Bronx, NY Disposition: Per information received from DHS, subject entered U.S. on 20-NOV-2003 and departed on 7-DEC-2003. Subject entered again 28-AUG-2004, no confirmed departure. At time of application, subject was student at Darul Uloom Zakariyya. One-year visa expired 22-NOV-2005. When ConOff attempted contact in August 2006, subject's home number as listed on application turned out to be a wrong number, and subject's business number was no longer in service. 3) Name: Sheik Ahad Ayatullah Husain DPOB: 12-JAN-1982, Georgetown, Guyana Passport number: 0741400 Case number: 2004212 158 0004 Date of issue: 30-JUL-2004 Date of expiration: 29-JUL-2009 Visa class: B1/B2 Purpose of travel: holiday/business (shopping for father's store) Disposition: According to DHS, subject has long entry and

exit history. Subject was denied entry at preclearance in Nassau, Bahamas due to overstay in U.S. from 21-JUL-2005 to 3-APR-2006. TECS ID X9L01810100CIQ. At time of application, subject was a student at Darul Uloom school at Reshad Avenue and Mon Plasair Road, Cunupia, Trinidad. Subject received multiple-entry, five-year visa valid through 29-JUL-2009. Two attempts to contact subject at telephone number listed on application rang out. Post is also aware of four individuals who have been refused visas to travel to the U.S.: 1) Name: Sultan Khan DPOB: 27-JAN-1979, Georgetown, Guyana Passport Number: 0797971 (Guyana) Case number: 2001053 085 0002 Application Date: 22-FEB-2001 Disposition: Going to study at Darul-Uloom Al Madina Inc., 182 Sobieski Street, Buffalo, NY. Letter accompanying application from Haseeb Yusuf, leader of Guyana Islamic Trust, claimed Hafiz Abdur-Rahman Memi of the Muslim Community of Barbados would pay expenses. 2) Name: Nematulla Zafarulla Mullan DPOB: 24-MAY-1978, Billimora, India Passport Number: A8502478 (India) Case number: 2006192 906 0010 Application Date: 11-JUL-2006 Disposition: Has taught at Dar-Ul-Uloom for 1.5 years. Seeking to lead Taraveeh prayers at Al-Furqan Islamic Foundation at 2301 Woodward Street, Philadelphia, PA. Spouse Neeimabanu Aiyyubhusen DOB 20-JUL-1983. 3) Name: Badrudeen Khan (other surname used Mowlana) DPOB: 28-APR-1966, Mahaica, Guyana Passport Number: A031621 (Guyana) Case number: 2005258 930 0003 Application Date: 15-SEP-1005 Disposition: Sought to visit friends at 2205 SW 62nd Terr., Miramar, FL, contact name Shafayat Mohamed. Principal at Darul-Ul-Uloom center in Georgetown. Concealed pending immigrant visa petition. 4) Name: Melinda Ally DPOB: 31-DEC-1992, New Amsterdam, Guyana Passport Number: 0803129 (Guyana) Case number: 2005201 165 0003 Application Date: 20-JUL-2005 Disposition: Student at Dar-Ul-Uloom, sought to visit uncle in U.S. G. (S/NF) What connections exist between the Darul Uloom Islamic Center and the Jamaat Al-Tabligh?

Post is attempting to obtain more data. SIMO will send information as it is obtained. 2. (S/NF) SIMO comment: For additional information, see TD 314/59967-04 and contact HQ SOUTHCOM J2 at 305-437-1090. Thomas

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN828.html 06GEORGETOWN828, SECURITY FEARS MAR RUN-UP TO GUYANA ELECTIONS Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 28 VZCZCXYZ0003 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0828/01 2282132 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 162132Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3960 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0365 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000828 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR DS/IP/WHA DS/ICI/PII CARACAS ALSO FOR DAO AND LEGATT PORT OF SPAIN ALSO FOR DEA AND LEGATT SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2016 TAGS: PINS PGOV ASEC CASC KCRM GY SUBJECT: SECURITY FEARS MAR RUN-UP TO GUYANA ELECTIONS REF: A. GEORGETOWN 787 B. C. D. E. GEORGETOWN GEORGETOWN GEORGETOWN GEORGETOWN 406 372 815 205 Created 2006-08-16 21:32 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin SECRET Embassy Georgetown

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY. One week after the August 8 execution-style killing of five Kaieteur News printery employees (ref A), we take stock of the consequences for Guyana and the August 28 elections. Uncertainty remains over the gunmen's motive, but the front-running theory of conspiracy-minded Guyanese is that they are carrying out an orchestrated terror campaign under direction from some element associated with the opposition PNC/R. The GoG certainly takes this view -- which

naturally makes us circumspect -- but it is still conjecture without evidence. Regardless, the spate of criminal violence has affected the election climate, but if the criminals' intent is to hijack the election process, they have not yet succeeded. Guyana remains on track to go to the polls in twelve days. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- -------August 10: Claim that Roger Khan had Hand in Killings --------------------------------------------- -------2. (S) Charge spoke by phone August 10 with Peter Ramsaroop (a prominent Guyanese-American businessman and aspiring politician), who described a long conversation he had August 3 with Kaieteur News publisher Glenn Lall. According to Ramsaroop, Lall confided that narco-criminal Shaheed "Roger" Khan (currently incarcerated in New York awaiting trial) is blackmailing those whom he helped protect during the 2002-2004 crime spree. Khan may need funds to pay his legal bills or to finance his vulnerable drug trafficking operation. Ramsaroop told Charge that Lall refused these demands and as a result was fearful of becoming a target. In this scenario, gunmen controlled by Khan's organization killed the Kaieteur News employees to send a clear message to others who do not want to pay up. --------------------------------------------- --------August 11: Home Affairs Minister Convinced of PNC Plot --------------------------------------------- --------3. (S) Minister of Home Affairs Gail Teixeira met with Charge and UK and Canada Chiefs of Mission August 11 to discuss Guyana's deteriorating security situation in the run-up to the August 28 general election. Teixeira outlined the GoG's interpretation of the killings and recent turmoil -- they are part of a centrally orchestrated terror campaign by the PNC/R's security committee. She alluded to information that suggests the perpetrators' motive is to make people afraid to participate in the election and/or provoke a constitutional crisis by forcing an election postponement past the September 2 deadline. She is convinced that leader of the PNC Robert Corbin at least concurred with the attacks. 4. (S) Teixeira lamented that the joint services -- the Guyana Police Force (GPF) and the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) -- are reluctant to see a political hand in the violence, although that opinion is now changing. Teixeira said that armed Afro-Guyanese gang members (commonly referred to as the "Buxton resistance") are essentially available for hire and are trying to embed themselves in new places now that the joint services have cracked down on their traditional refuge in Buxton. --------------------------------------------- --------------

August 13: Kaieteur News Publisher also sees Political Hand --------------------------------------------- -------------5. (C) PolOff met August 13 with Glenn Lall to discuss the killings. He believes the attack was politically motivated -- although not necessarily directed by Corbin himself. Lall's paper is not especially pro-government (he professes to support the upstart Alliance For Change). Instead, Lall thinks that the gang targeted Kaieteur because it is such a public and high-profile institution, although he also intimated that the attackers may have expected to find weapons at the printery. (Note: The Kaieteur News is said to have the highest circulation of Guyana's three dailies; it offsets its tabloid style and lurid crime coverage with a vibrant, serious op-ed section.) Lall also insisted that he knows some of the gang members, who were as young as twelve. 6. (C) The paper has been targeted in the past. Lall described a grenade attack a few years ago when his printery set on fire -- apparently the work of drug kingpin Brahmanand Nandalall's men who objected to the Kaieteur News' coverage of Nandalall's kidnapping. Lall himself has an interesting past, with possible connection to alien smuggling. 7. (C) Lall acknowledged rumors that he had hired ex-members of Roger Khan's so-called Phantom Squad -- connected to former Home Affairs Minister Ronald Gajraj -- that carried out extra-judicial killings in 2002-2003. He dismissed the rumors, but admitted that he does employ off-duty officers from the President's and Prime Minister's details as security for his office and his wife's shoe business. 8. (C) Lall said he does not think Khan is still pulling the strings of his criminal organization now that he is in New York awaiting trial. Lall said two or three people are taking it over. --------------------------------------------- --------Connection between Kaieteur and Minister Sawh Killings --------------------------------------------- --------9. (C) Both Teixeira and Lall said that some of those who killed the Kaieteur News employees are also responsible for assassinating Agriculture Minister Sawh in April 2006 (refs B and C). These attacks bore similarities in terms of tactics and dress. One of these joint suspects, Jermaine "Skinny" Charles, was taken into GPF custody Saturday morning, August 12. It is unclear whether the GPF found him or Lall's privately hired "security" men did and then handed him over. --------------------------------------------- -Prison Unrest and Bank Robberies Add to Malaise --------------------------------------------- --

10. (C) Inmates in Guyana's main Camp Street prison, located in central Georgetown, have created disturbances three times between August 8 and August 14. Teixeira said that she had a week's advanced notice that something would happen at Camp Street, but the prison service underestimated the threat. Although the disturbances were ostensibly over poor prison conditions, Post believes rumors that they were coordinated with attacks on the outside are credible. Guards shot and injured two prisoners who were trying to escape August 13. This is an especially raw issue for Guyanese because of the 2002 prison break-out that led to a widespread crime spree. 11. (U) Bandits carried out a series of bank robberies August 11 in Rose Hall, Berbice (about 10 miles east of New Amsterdam), injuring one. The GoG believes these criminals are in league with the "Buxton resistance" and those who committed the attack on Kaieteur. Since the bank heists, a joint services manhunt has killed three suspected robbers and recovered three AK-47s identified as part of the thirty stolen from the GDF storehouse in February 2006 (refs D and E). ------Comment ------12. (C) Guyana is prone to grand conspiracy theories -- so it does not surprise us that the GoG and Lall are connecting the dots between the PNC/R leadership and the Kaieteur killings, prison unrest, Berbice bank robberies, and other major crimes in 2006. While PNC/R leader Corbin is morally capable of such machinations, we do not yet see a direct link. However, we do agree that gang members connected with extreme elements of the PNC/R are pursuing a vague political agenda. If that is the plan, it is working only in part. Yes, the public is scared and many middle and upper-class Guyanese are leaving the country for the election period (and thus will not be able to vote). But the criminals have not yet provoked an election delay and constitutional crisis. The PPP government spin machine has even turned the August 8 attacks into a positive campaign issue. Two days later, the GoG wheeled out Jagdeo and Bernard Kerik (CEO of the Kerik Group, disgraced former New York Police Commissioner and failed nominee to head DHS) agreeing to a deal to assist in the IDB-funded US$20 million GPF restructuring. END COMMENT. Thomas

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN832.html 06GEORGETOWN832, PUSHING FOR POST-ELECTION REFORMS IN GUYANA Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 32 VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0832 2292128 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 172128Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3966 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0144 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2172 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0080 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000832 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM GY SUBJECT: PUSHING FOR POST-ELECTION REFORMS IN GUYANA REF: A. STATE 114561 B. GEORGETOWN 667 C. GEORGETOWN 710 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Chiefs of mission from the US, UK, Canada, EU, UNDP IDB, World Bank, and IMF (collectively, the "donors") met August 15 to identify and agree on donors' next steps to coax the incoming post-election government into implementing critical governance reforms. 2. (C) The donors agreed on seven key reform priorities REFORMS IMPACTING THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER: -- Reforming the electoral system to make Parliament accountable to the electorate. REFORMS IMPACTING THE EXERCISE OF POWER: -- Reforming GECOM and the technical machinery for elections. -- Holding local government elections (last held in 1994 and Created 2006-08-17 21:28 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

overdue since 1999). -- Reforming the media, particularly state-owned media, through the design, agreement, and implementation of new media legislation. -- Reforming the security sector (police, judiciary). -- Reforming the public service. -- Reforming public finance mechanisms. 3. (C) Reform efforts are already underway for items two through seven, though many have been side-tracked and need reinvigoration. The first item -- forging a connection between the electorate and their representatives in the National Assembly -- is the linchpin for Guyana's future. Currently on election day Guyana's voters choose a party knowing who is its candidate for President. But they do not know whom they are choosing to represent them in the National Assembly. Party headquarters pick and choose their MPs from their party lists after finding out how many seats they won. Therefore, the members of the National Assembly are accountable only to their political parties and not to the people. The six critical reforms involving exercise of power all depend on Parliamentary action. Some have been stalled for over a decade. Without accountability of Parliamentarians to the electorate, the people have no way to press for the governance reforms they want. Donors are of one mind that without changing this perverse Marxist-inspired electoral system, Guyana's broader reform and development plan is doomed. Guyana can only move forward if its people can elect the legislature directly and hold it accountable for its actions, or lack thereof. --------NEXT STEP --------4. (C) Donors have reached consensus on the next step -capitals and international organizations should coordinate their post-election congratulatory messages to the winning presidential candidate (likely to be Bharrat Jagdeo again) to highlight the critical need for renewed efforts on reform programs, most importantly instituting real reforms to the electoral system. Unless Department objects, in coming days Post will work with the donor group to draft points on governance reforms that we will encourage capitals (Washington, London, Ottawa, Brussels) and secretariats (OAS, UN, The Carter Center, the Commonwealth) to draw from when drafting their individual congratulatory messages to the election winner. 5. (C) This next step builds on our successful efforts in early July (in coordination with the UK, Canada, and EU) to get political parties to commit to post-election governance reforms (reftels). The parties made the commitments we wanted them to -- we should remind the winner of his

commitment immediately after elections. Thomas

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN833.html 06GEORGETOWN833, GUYANA ELECTION SCENARIOS: POSSIBLE UNREST, Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 33 VZCZCXYZ0014 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0833/01 2331808 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 211808Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3967 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0992 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0368 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0145 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2173 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0081 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000833 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM GY SUBJECT: GUYANA ELECTION SCENARIOS: POSSIBLE UNREST, COALITIONS REF: GEORGETOWN 743 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) SUMMARY: With elections just a week away, Guyana's 65-seat National Assembly is still up for grabs and the security situation remains on edge. While Bharrat Jagdeo looks all but certain to win another term as president with a plurality, his People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) may fall short of the absolute majority it needs to control the National Assembly. If the PPP/C gets less than fifty percent of the vote, it will usher in a new era of coalition politics in Guyana. Opinion is divided over whether Georgetown will descend into post-election violence again this time. END Created 2006-08-21 18:08 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

SUMMARY. ---------------------Latest Polling Figures ---------------------2. (U) Despite the difficulty in conducting statistically valid polls in Guyana, the non-partisan North American Caribbean Teachers Association (NACTA) has a proven track record of political polling in Guyana. Support by party (percent): Aug. 21 ------47 27 16 4 2 1 3 Aug. 7 -----45 28 15 5 2 1 4 July ---42 29 13 5 1 1 9

PPP/C PNC/R AFC JFA ROAR-GAP TUF Undecided

--------------------------------------------AFC Plays Kingmaker for Either PPP/C or PNC/R --------------------------------------------3. (C) The primary aim of the Alliance For Change (AFC) is to hold the PPP to less than fifty percent of Parliament. AFC Presidential candidate Trotman tells us the AFC will not enter a formal alliance with either the PPP/C or the the PNC/R, but rather prefers for the AFC to work as a constructive, responsible, and independent member of the Parliamentary opposition -- supporting the government when it deserves support and opposing measures that deserve opposition. 4. (SBU) However, if it AFC gains six to ten seats in Parliament, the AFC could find itself in position to negotiate with the PPP/C or People's National Congress/Reform-One Guyana (PNC/R) to control a majority in the National Assembly. There are two major obstacles to either coalition forming: 1) The AFC's presidential candidate Raphael Trotman and prime ministerial candidate Khemraj Ramjattan split acrimoniously with the PNC/R and PPP/C, respectively, in the past two years; 2) AFC supporters may feel disillusioned by a coalition, since its existence is predicated on rejecting Guyana's two dominant parties. On the other hand, by playing one off against the other the AFC could put itself in a strong position as kingmaker. 5. (C) If it linked up with the PPP/C, the AFC could be in a position to demand a few key Cabinet seats as the junior partner in government. Given the lack of a PPP/C track

record in working constructively with another party and the AFC's vehement criticism of the PPP/C government, this scenario would surely cause friction. Furthermore, Trotman tell us that he is wary of linking with the PPP/C unless it cleans house. He is specifically worried that major PPP/C figures may be indicted in the U.S. for narco-trafficking and does not want to be associated with a PPP/C government if that happens. Post thinks a PPP/C-AFC alliance would either break down quickly or, in an optimistic scenario, provoke a salutary upheaval within the PPP/C as incompetent and/or corrupt party cronies get eased out. 6. (SBU) A PNC/R-AFC combination of the two largest opposition parties could provide them with enough seats to control the National Assembly. This would give the coalition a strong hand in developing legislation with the PPP executive and allow them to push their own initiatives. The AFC would be bolder in negotiating with the PNC/R -- a party in long-term decline that now appeals almost solely to Afro-Guyanese -- than with the PPP. --------------------------------------------PPP/C and PNC/R Gang Up to Keep AFC Out in Cold --------------------------------------------7. (SBU) Another potential scenario -- widely rumored in Georgetown -- is that the PNC/R will join forces with the PPP/C. Although these two parties have been bitter rivals for over forty years, they could grudgingly enter a coalition in order to preserve the status quo and shut out the AFC. Both parties have enjoyed the benefits of an entrenched two-party system, so the threat of having to share power with the upstart AFC may drive them together. "Re-merging" with the PPP (the PNC originally splintered from the PPP in the 1950s) would effectively spell the PNC/R's end -- but its leadership is so desperate to get back into the corridors of power that it might not care. -----------------------------------No Clarity on Post-Election Violence -----------------------------------8. (SBU) In the run-up to election day, Georgetown is crawling with "Guyana watchers" from far and wide (i.e., OAS, The Carter Center, CARICOM, UK, USG) who have followed the nation's electoral scene since Guyana's first free election in 1992 -- yet there is no consensus around the potential for post-election violence. There are too many new variables at play, including the potential impact of the AFC. During much of the past year it looked like the PNC/R was trying to derail the election process to provoke a constitutional crisis and/or an international response. The PNC/R is hotly contesting the election. But this does not necessarily

indicate that PNC/R elements -- still convinced that the PNC/R will lose -- may not try to use violence as a tool to secure a role in government. Many Guyanese seem resigned to violence because it happens after every election, but no one has specific information about what could happen this time. 9. (SBU) The Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) intends to announce final election results to the public by 20:00 Wednesday August 30. The intervening 48 hours is a critical period for those who would foment unrest. But if the announcement of results drags out longer or appears disorganized, it will give disgruntled factions an excuse to mobilize and protest. Much is riding on GECOM's performance to reduce the chance of violence. Unfortunately, GECOM is behind on key communictions and logistics issues despite the donor community's repeated urging over the past several months. GECOM is still sorting out the plan and funding for setting up a media center to announce the results. Also, they have not finalized its strategy for transmitting the results from the field to GECOM. Guyana has been in this position before -- hectic, last-minute election preparations. Odds are that something will go wrong. ------Comment ------10. (C) If the PPP/C pulls off an absolute majority, then the next five years will just be more of the same for Guyana. Forty years of single-party dominance of all branches of government have served Guyana poorly (first by the PNC, then the PPP/C since 1992). The legislature has serious work ahead of it in order to implement the reforms Guyana needs to secure stability and development. A scenario that includes a third party block in Parliament positioned to be the balance of power gives all major parties political a real stake and has the best chance of shaking up Guyanese politics. END COMMENT. Thomas

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN838.html# 06GEORGETOWN838, DISCIPLINED SERVICES VOTE: SMOOTH, BUT A COUPLE Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 38 Created 2006-08-22 20:57 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO7977 RR RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0838/01 2342057 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 222057Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3975 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0995 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0373 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0148 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2176 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0085 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000838 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM GY SUBJECT: DISCIPLINED SERVICES VOTE: SMOOTH, BUT A COUPLE GLITCHES 1. (U) SUMMARY: In a preview of the August 28 elections, members of Guyana's disciplined services voted on August 21. Initially there was confusion over the ballots at a few polling stations and some service members did not find their names on the voters list. This underscores the fallibility of the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) voter education efforts -- the same glitches on Election Day could spell much greater confusion. Otherwise, the day proceeded without incident as an estimated 70-80 percent of the services' 8,000 members cast votes. Local and international observers present at the stations have reported that the process went relatively smoothly. END SUMMARY. 2. (U) Members of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF), Guyana Police Force (GPF), Guyana Prison Service and Guyana Fire

Service cast their votes August 21 -- a week before the general election -- so they can work on Election Day. Service members voted at 48 polling stations as well as scattered mobile voting stations in Guyana's interior. The independent Stabroek News quoted GECOM chairman Steve Surujbally estimating a turnout of 70-80 percent. Local and international observer groups have not indicated that problems occurred on any widespread scale. Local observer group the Electoral Assistance Bureau, which observed 37 the polling stations, reported that the voting went fairly smoothly. 3. (U) Media reports indicated that some service members initially refused to vote because the ballots lacked a six digit stamp that is normally placed on each ballot at the polling station prior to voting. This prompted GECOM to meet with political party representatives and issue a statement and television advertisement clarifying that the disciplined services' ballots are in fact not supposed to be stamped until they arrive at designated polling places for counting on Election Day. The ballots will then be stamped with the number of that polling station and mixed with the general ballots for counting. (Note: This system is intended to maintain the secrecy of how the disciplined services' vote. It is an improvement over the 2001 election, when their votes -- heavily in favor of the opposition PNC -- were tallied separately then leaked to the press.) This glitch appears to have resulted from poor communication on GECOM's part rather than a conspiracy. 4. (SBU) In addition, media sources as well as Locally Employed Staff with relatives in the GPF reported instances of voters unable to find their name on the voters list and thus prevented from voting, although the extent of this was unsubstantiated. Of the Chief of Mission's two GPF bodyguards, one voted and the other did not find his name on the voters list -- despite checking the list repeatedly in recent weeks and reporting this omission to his supervisor.Stabroek News reported that the GPF failed to submit accurate information on some of its ranks, and that those who were unable to vote on August 21 would be allowed to vote in the general election on August 28. Georgetown's rumor mill quickly speculated that the ruling People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) was telling police ranks not to vote on August 21 as a way to disenfranchise a group that traditionally supports the opposition PNC -- a far-fetched yet unsurprising theory. 5. (U) The political parties' statements on the process were predictable. Media reports quoted PPP/C spokesman Robert Persaud as saying the process was "smooth and orderly" despite initial confusion. Meanwhile, opposition People's National Congress-One Guyana spokesman Vincent Alexander alleged that "a large number of voters" were unable to find

their name on the voters' list and called on GECOM to mount a public relations exercise to ensure similar confusion does not occur on Election Day. Alliance For Change (AFC) Presidential candidate Raphael Trotman also expressed concern about the unstamped ballots. 6. (SBU) COMMENT: Less clear is how Guyana's service members voted. The predominately Afro-Guyanese disciplined services have historically supported the PNC, although with the emergence of the AFC as a third-party challenger, this GEORGETOWN 00000838 002 OF 002

support may no longer be taken for granted. The PPP, meanwhile, has been overtly courting joint services' support in recent days. President Jagdeo heaped praise on the joint services after they shot and killed eight men suspected of committing a series of bank robberies August 18 -- an about-face after Jagdeo spent most of 2006 criticizing the GPF and GDF. On August 20, the day before the disciplined services voted, the Government Information Agency also issued a statement from President Jagdeo that the security forces would receive a special allowance for working on Election Day. 7. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: While the disciplined services vote was by most accounts well-run, the initial confusion surrounding the balloting procedures highlights both the failures of GECOM's public relations efforts and the atmosphere of tension and suspicion as Guyana heads toward the August 28 election. GECOM has a very thin margin of error, as administrative details that at first glance may seem mundane could easily become the basis for political unrest. END COMMENT. Thomas

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN839.html# 06GEORGETOWN839, CHILD LABOR AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (TIP) DIGEST-JULY Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 39 VZCZCXYZ0010 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0839/01 2351654 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 231654Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3977 INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000839 SIPDIS G/TIP - RACHEL OWEN WHA/PPC - MIKE PUCCETTI LABOR FOR ILAB - DONNA CHUNG JUSTICE FOR OPDAT - BOBBY LIPMAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB ECON PHUM SOCI KCRM GY SUBJECT: CHILD LABOR AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (TIP) DIGEST-JULY 2006 The following is a digest of child labor and Trafficking in Persons (TIP) related news events as reported in Guyanese media outlets in July 2006: 1. NGO in project to combat child labor in Region Three 2. Shadick: TIP Networks to be established countrywide 3. Indigenous group calls for intervention by people trafficking unit in Region Seven 4. Shadick taps Amerindian Captains, Councillors for TIP training 5. Shadick Under Fire for Comments on Alleged Pornography Ring 6. Concern about Acting Police Commissioner --------------------------------------------- ------NGO in project to combat child labor in Region Three --------------------------------------------- ------1. (U) Partners of the Americas launched a planning session for child labor eradication in Region Three (Essequibo Island/West Demerara) on July 12. The three-and-a-half year, US$2.4M project, Created 2006-08-23 16:54 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

entitled "EDUCARE Guyana", is being funded by the United States Department of Labor and is being executed by Partners of the Americas. Speaking at the formal session, EDUCARE Guyana Project Director Ed Denham urged the Regional Education Department and the schools of Region Three to be involved. Studies have shown that a significant child labor problem exists in Region Three. Denham noted that preliminary figures also show low attendance and high drop-out rates from schools in the region. The study also revealed a high degree of "Worst Forms of Child Labor" in all regions of Guyana. Denham said that the program will encompass raising awareness of child labor, institutional strengthening and policy development, and strengthening of the education systems. The first step in the program's implementation will be the creation of a database of children who have dropped out of primary schools in the last two to three years. Contact will then be made with the parents of these students and the needs of these families will be identified. Following this the project will provide mechanisms to surmount the barriers that keep these children from assessing education. (Source: Stabroek News, July 17, 2006) -----------------------------------------TIP Networks to be established countrywide -----------------------------------------2. (U) Community-level Trafficking in Persons (TIP) networks will be established countrywide in the Guyana's effort to lift Guyana from a Tier Two country to Tier One and place more emphasis on TIP prevention. According to Minister within the Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security Bibi Shadick, the issue is one that is still being given significant emphasis by the Government and training of persons to establish these networks will commence in early August 2006. Among the areas to benefit from the program, which is partly funded by the U.S. Department of State and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), are the Amerindian communities in Region Five, Six and Eight. Minister Shadick also noted that six members of the Guyana Police Force and two officers of the Anti-TIP unit within the Ministry recently participated in a two-week training workshop in the Bahamas. The workshop focused extensively on the ways to investigate TIP and other measures to be taken in the fight. The minister also noted that the Guyana Police Force has already organized a training program for Police Officers to deal with the crime. Officers of the TIP unit recently met with the Chif Justice Carl Singh requesting that a Magistrate e designated to handle all matters relating to TP and for the matters to be brought before the Gorgetown Court. The decision was taken as a resul of the lengthy time taken for the completion of a earlier case against perpetrators. (Source: Guyna Chronicle, July 18, 2006) --------------------------------------------- --Indigenous grou calls for intervention by people trafficking unit in Region Seven --------------------------------------------- ---

3. (U) The Guyana Organizatio of Indigenous People (GOIP) says there is need or intervention with regard to Trafficking in Persons (TIP) among other issues in Region Seven (Cuyuni-Mazaruni). The Regional Chairman Gordon Bradford said there is need for more intervention from the Trafficking in Persons unit at the Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security as some girls who were recently sold for prostitution purposes at Itaballi were later diagnosed with sexually transmitted diseases. The Regional Chairman said more indigenous citizens need to address this issue and pursue the establishment of an institution for women as they recover from their ordeal. It is noted that indigenous persons are part of the problem and changes in their attitudes are needed if their vulnerability to this type of exploitation is to stop. This group needs to actively force themselves out of the cycle of poverty and dependency and inform themselves about conditions laid out in the Revised Amerindian Act. (Source: Source: Stabroek News, July 25, 2006) --------------------------------------------- -------Shadick taps Amerindian Captains, Councillors for TIP training --------------------------------------------- -------4. (U) Minister within the Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security, Bibi Shadick announced July 25 that Captains and Councillors of Amerindian Villages countrywide are next in line to be trained in the fight against TIP. The Minister noted that the training of volunteer social workers (VSWs) in communities across the country has proven very fruitful. Shadick said that more than 400 people have been coursed on how to identify and seek ways of preventing the crime at the community level. The TIP unit in the Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security continues to receive reports daily from members of the public and VSWs throughout the country about cases that need to be investigated. However, Guyana remains a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Nationally Organized Crimes and the Supplemental Protocol to prevent, suppress and to punish those guilty of TIP. (Source: Guyana Chronicle Guyana Chronicle, July 26, 2006) --------------------------------------------- --------Shadick Under Fire for Comments on Alleged Pornography Ring --------------------------------------------- --------5. (SBU) GOG point person on Trafficking in Persons issues, Bibi Shadick, has come under fire for comments related to an alleged rape/pornography ring that made headelines in mid-July. The independent, tabloid-style Kaieteur News reported victims' accounts of being drugged and forced to engage in sexual activity by sons of prominent Georgetown families, who then distributed photographs of the incident on the internet and on a Video-CD "Guyana Girls Gone Wild". One of the men in the video is Shadick's nephew. Widespread outrage prompted the Guyanese police force to arrest employees at video stores peddling pornographic videos made in Guyana, but the investigation did not extend to store owners or the producers and

distributors of the video. When asked to comment on the incident, Shadick reportedly said on the basis of two still photographs that the victims appeared to be "willing participants" and that the photographs in question appeared to depict consensual sexual activity. The comments prompted several letters of condemnation in local media outlets. Meanwhile, Shadick confided to EmbOff in late August that, while her West Bank Demerara/Essequibo Islands constituency is virtually guaranteed to vote her back into Parliament in the August 28 election, she is not certain if she will retain her current position in the Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security. ---------------------------------------Concern about Acting Police Commissioner ---------------------------------------6. (SBU) Crime Chief Henry Greene was elevated to Acting Police Commissioner following the retirement of Police Commissioner Winston Felix on July 24. The appointment marks a setback for victim sensitization efforts. Of particular relevance to the TIP community: Police sources report Greene has sexually assaulted several police women during his tenure as a senior officer, and he has used his rank to prevent victims from pursuing charges. Post is concerned about Greene's disposition toward the Guyana Police Force's anti-TIP and victim protection/advocacy efforts should he ultimately be confirmed as Police Commissioner. 7. Post point of contact on Trafficking in Persons matters is Edward Luchessi, Economic/Commercial Officer, tel: 011-592-226-4309, e-mail: LuchessiEP@state.gov. THOMAS

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN850.html 06GEORGETOWN850, GUYANA GENERAL ELECTIONS AUGUST 28: FINAL PREVIEW Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 50 VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHGE #0850/01 2371939 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 251939Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3991 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0998 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0378 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0150 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2178 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0087 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000850 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/OAS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY SUBJECT: GUYANA GENERAL ELECTIONS AUGUST 28: FINAL PREVIEW REF: A. GEORGETOWN 838 B. GEORGETOWN 833 C. GEORGETOWN 828 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Heading into the final weekend before Guyana's August 28 general elections, international observers have descended upon the capital in force. Two dozen Mission employees and contractors will participate as observers under the OAS' auspices. The ruling People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) is going all out in its bid to maintain an absolute majority in Parliament, which still looks vulnerable (ref B). Some campaign tactics -- particularly by Created 2006-08-25 19:39 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification Origin CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Georgetown

the PPP/C -- have marred the final week. There have been no reports of election-related violence since the August 8 murders of five newspaper employees, but the mood in Georgetown remains apprehensive given the history of post-election unrest. END SUMMARY. ----------------------Election Nuts and Bolts ----------------------2. (U) Guyanese go to the polls August 28 to elect their president and parties for the National Assembly. The GoG has declared August 28 a public holiday. Polls will open at 06:00 and lines to vote will close 18:00. Just under 2,000 polling stations will accommodate a controversial voters list of 499,369 names -- with a maximum of 450 electors per station. We expect nearer to 400,000 people will actually vote, as the list includes many who registered in the 1997 and 2001 elections but have since migrated and will not return to vote. --------------------------------------------- -----International Observers Shoulder Big Responsibility --------------------------------------------- -----3. (SBU) Four organizations are providing approximately 160 international observers. This is a big shortfall compared to the 390 international observers that observed the 2001 election. The four observer groups are coordinating closely with one another, despite very different mandates and staffing. 4. (C) OAS: 124 observers, led by OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin. The only group with sufficient numbers to cover the election comprehensively. Twenty-four U.S. mission employees and contractors are volunteering as observers under the OAS' auspices. Ramdin intends to stay in Guyana until September 2. He will then deliver his verbal report to the OAS September 6. Ramdin predicts this report may include admonishments about the need for electoral and constitutional reforms in Guyana, laying the groundwork for a Permanent Council declaration. 5. (C) The Carter Center: about 10 observers, led by Sir John Compton (former St. Lucia prime minister). The focus of the Carter Center's "presence" is on the pivotal post-election period rather than election observation of polling sites. Center officials have hinted that President Carter himself is prepared to make himself available if it looks like a breakthrough on governance reform can be clinched after the elections. 6. (SBU) Commonwealth: 18 observers, led by Ratu Epeli Nailatikau (former Fiji Islands deputy prime minister and

speaker). A group of VIP observers with limited knowledge of Guyana -- unlikely to play a central post-election role. 7. (C) CARICOM: 10 observers, led by former Barbados Chief Elections Officer Hensley Robinson. A modest team, as in the past. CARICOM is still extremely reluctant to meddle in member states' internal politics, although Ramdin wants CARICOM to exert its influence more strongly in Guyana. --------------------------------------Low Blows on Campaign Trail Homestretch --------------------------------------8. (C) Two local television stations are refusing to air a political advertisement, "The Great Pretender", that warns viewers that People's National Congress/Reform (PNC/R) leader Robert Corbin and Alliance For Change (AFC) leader Raphael Trotman cannot be trusted. The attack ad -- not identified as a PPP/C production -- shows footage of a riot of Afro-Guyanese, presumably in Georgetown after the 2001 elections. Objective media experts agree that the ad is unnecessary and out of place, especially at this late stage of the campaign. Robert Persaud (President Jagdeo's chief spin doctor) is staunchly defending the ad and other questionable PPP/C media tactics. 9. (SBU) GoG authorities are searching the Linden area for the transmitter of a three-week old pirate radio station. The station is reportedly broadcasting music and political advertisements for the PNC/R. The PPP/C is crying foul -Head of the Presidential Secretariat Roger Luncheon dispatched a letter of concern to Charge -- but the larger issue is the GoG's continued hold on its radio monopoly despite heavy national and external criticism. 10. (C) The Director of Public Prosecutions recommended August 22 that Justice For All Party (JFAP) presidential candidate C.N. Sharma be charged with indecent assault on a minor. Sharma, a popular muckraking journalist and TV station owner, is accused of indecently assaulting an 11-year-old girl in July. Sharma claims the move is nothing but an attempt by the PPP/C to besmirch his character just before the election. There is a history of similar such charges against Sharma, including at least one several years ago with some credibility. Many observers believe this latest charge is an election-related political attack. 11. (U) In a sophomoric twist to the campaign's final week, billboards advertising several parties including the PPP/C and PNC/R have been painted over or ripped down. All sides are denying responsibility and pinning blame on others. --------------Campaign Issues

--------------12. (U) Unfortunately, the presidential candidates have not held any public debates. The parties have often resorted to mudslinging and name-calling. When they do turn to issues, crime/security and jobs are the main focus. The PPP/C's usual tactic is to compare statistics of how Guyana is faring now compared to pre-1992 during the PNC's 28-year reign. The opposition parties key on Guyana's economic stagnation, the PPP/C's corruption and its perceived ties to narco-criminality. This year's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) has actually been one of the more serious topics on the campaign trail. The PPP/C and PNC/R have both aired advertisements quoting extensive passages from the INCSR to support their respective positions. ------------------------What We'll be Looking For ------------------------13. (SBU) Post will follow two aspects of the election with particular interest: a) The level of organization at the polls and whether they close on time in an orderly fashion; and b) The transmission and announcement of results. Problems in these areas triggered unrest in Georgetown after prior elections. 14. (SBU) GECOM is capable of pulling off a smooth election day, but its internally fragmented structure and habit of last-minute planning does not inspire confidence. An indifferent voter education campaign has not helped matters. Rumor spreads much quicker than fact in Guyana -- if a disruptive rumor starts, it could make for a chaotic election day. 15. (SBU) GECOM requested US$97,000 of donor funding August 22 for an elections media center. Communicating results quickly and accurately is vital to a successful election. In past elections, the process of announcing results has been confused, delayed, or simply incorrect -- a catalyst for post-election unrest and violence. The EU has stepped in to contribute 50,000 Euros (about US$62,300) for this, which should be enough to make the media center happen at this late stage. USAID was prepared to assist as well, but would have required more bureaucratic due diligence of the bloated budget. Complicating matters further this time is AFC campaign manager Dick Morris' plan to hire Gallup to do an exit poll. Guyana has no history of an exit poll and a population famously unwilling to reveal its ballot choices -we fear that Morris' numbers may not match the actual results. ------Comment -------

16. (SBU) The week leading up to elections has been surprisingly quiet. By local standards, if the worst conflict is about defacing billboards and controversial TV ads, then that is good news. However, neither we nor our Guyanese interlocutors are breathing easy yet -- that will come only after the official results are in and accepted by all parties. In a best-case scenario, that will occur by August 31. But in Guyanese elections, there is almost always a hitch. END COMMENT. Thomas

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN854.html 06GEORGETOWN854, GUYANA ELECTION STATUS REPORT AUGUST 28, Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 54 Created 2006-08-28 20:08 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO3237 OO RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0854/01 2402008 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 282008Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3997 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1003 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0383 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0153 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2181 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0090 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000854 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY SUBJECT: GUYANA ELECTION STATUS REPORT AUGUST 28, 15:30 HOURS REF: GEORGETOWN 850 1. (U) As of 15:30, election day is proceeding as smoothly as could be expected. We have spoken with all 17 OAS observer teams that include U.S. Mission personnel. Eight of these teams are around Georgetown, the others are dispersed throughout the country. Altogether, these teams have observed at least 10 percent of the approximately 2,000 polling stations. The teams report: -- No major problems. All Polling Agents and local observers present at the polling stations since before dawn are telling us that the process is running fine and there are no major problems. -- All sites opened on time at 6:00 or by 6:10. -- Good turn-out at the opening with some lines, but not unreasonably long or disorderly. Turn-out has slowed down since then as expected. At most stations we have canvassed, we hear that about 40 to 65 percent of registered voters had cast ballots by the

early afternoon. Poll wokers expect another rush in the afternoon after the midday lull. -- At the larger sites (i.e., schools) with 8 or more polling stations, some voters are confused as to which specific polling station they need to go to. With patience, this issue has ironed itself out. -- Polling Agents from the People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) and the People's National Congress/Reform (PNC/R) are present at most stations. The Alliance For Change (AFC) Polling Agents are not quite as widespread; the other three parties contesting national elections have only token Polling Agent presence. (Note: Polling Agents are party representatives who can observe the process in the polling station and keep track of who has voted). The presence of domestic observers varies by location. -- It is relatively quiet in Georgetown and on the roads, reminiscent of a Sunday morning. Departing from precedent and making Election Day a public holiday has made for a very different atmosphere. Most of shops in Georgetown's central business district are shuttered. 2. (SBU) The biggest glitch so far: -- The AFC and Justice For All Party (probably the third and fourth largest vote-winners, respectively) have complained that their Polling Agents have not been admitted to certain polling stations because they lack the proper letter of appointment. AFC Prime Ministerial candidate Khemraj Ramjattan called the DCM to raise the issue. Two of our observers in rural Region 2 also report confusion over AFC Polling Agents, although in each case they were eventually admitted to the polling stations. It is unclear who is responsible for this mix-up because the official Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) manual does mention Polling Agents needing a letter, although many Presiding Officers are clearly not demanding this. GECOM Chairman Dr. Steve Surujbally addressed the issue at his remarks this morning (see below). GECOM claims that it did not instruct Presiding Officers to require this letter. The bottom line is that this is a limited snafu and will not derail the election. 3. (U) GECOM's Media Center is up and running: -- Chairman Surujbally addressed the media and took questions at 11:30 and again at 14:30 from the GECOM media center, which is now operational after hasty construction this weekend. -- Surujbally reported one case of voter intimidation in East Coast Demerara. Police ranks were quickly dispatched to defuse the situation. -- His summary at this point: "All reports to the GECOM Command Center indicate no major problems".

-- His next update will be at 18:30 after polls have closed. 4. (U) What we will look for during the remainder of the day: -- Will the polling stations have to contend with an unmanageable late afternoon rush? -- Will more serious rumors or confusion about voting procedures arise during the late rush? GEORGETOWN 00000854 002 OF 002

-- Will the streets remain quiet after darkness? ROBINSON

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06GEORGETOWN855.html 06GEORGETOWN855, GUYANA ELECTION STATUS REPORT: AUGUST 29 Reference ID 06GEORGETOWN8 55 Created 2006-08-29 18:50 Released 2011-08-30 01:44 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Embassy Georgetown

VZCZCXRO9722 OO RUEHGR DE RUEHGE #0855/01 2411850 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 291850Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3999 INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1005 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0385 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0155 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2183 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0092 RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000855 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA FOR DAS DUDDY WHA/CAR WHA/OAS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM OAS GY SUBJECT: GUYANA ELECTION STATUS REPORT: AUGUST 29 AT 13:00 HOURS REF: A. GEORGETOWN 854

B. GEORGETOWN 850 1. (U) SUMMARY: Georgetown remained quiet overnight as the consensus solidified that the August 28 national and regional elections proceeded better than expected on a technical level. OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin made a statement to this effect after the polls closed. Field reports from Embassy personnel who volunteered as OAS observers -- many of whom were deployed to traditionally volatile areas -- confirm that the voting and tallying process went smoothly except for some instances of disorganization. But election day itself was never supposed to be the hardest part. Now the country turns its attention to the results, which are trickling in slower

than promised. We and most Guyanese are apprehensive about how the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) will report the results. Delay and/or confusion could still trigger unrest. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- --------GECOM Slow in Reporting Results; Feedback from Parties --------------------------------------------- --------2. (SBU) GECOM had intended to begin releasing results August 28 at 23:00, but missed that deadline. Results are now trickling in. As of 13:00 August 29, GECOM had released returns for 35 percent of the polling sites in Region 4, which includes the capital and is the most populous region. Traditionally an opposition People's National Congress/Reform (PNC/R) stronghold, these initial counts show the PPP/C with a lead in Region 4. This is just the sort of information that has the potential to strike a nerve in restive Georgetown communities. GECOM will address the media again at 20:00. ----PNC/R ----3. (SBU) A senior PNC/R figure told PolOff that the PNC/R is disappointed with the low voter turnout, but has not heard major complaints within the party about the conduct of the election day process -- an encouraging sign. (Note: Only about two-thirds of registered voters appear to have cast ballots, a decrease from Guyana's historical turnout of above 80 percent. However, this is reasonable given that as many as 15 percent of registered voters may have emigrated over the past several years.) ----PPP/C ----4. (SBU) The People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) General Secretary Donald Ramotar told the press he believes the PPP/C has a SIPDIS slim majority. Ramotar told PolOff that they will refrain from taking their internal numbers public as long as GECOM does a decent job transmitting results. He also predicts the PPP/C won 52 to 53 percent of the vote and will maintain its absolute majority in Parliament. --AFC --5. (SBU) Results from an exit-poll commissioned by the upstart Alliance For Change (AFC) are quietly making the rounds among the Georgetown political set. This poll indicates a PNC/R victory, the PPP/C second, and a strong AFC showing of 21 percent. We have very little confidence in these numbers -- plus the methodology and

sample-size used are unknown. Our PNC/R source does not give great credence to the AFC exit poll. However, the fact that the PNC/R is aware of these numbers suggesting it won could spell trouble if the actual results confirm a PPP/C victory as expected. 6. (SBU) AFC leader Trotman told DCM he believes the AFC achieved its objectives: preventing the PPP/C from winning a majority, and making the AFC the balance of power. While he wants to believe the AFC won 21 percent, he also cannot explain the PPP/C and PNC/R numbers and has taken on board numerous interventions from the international community over the past week regarding the difficulty of obtaining accurate exit poll results in Guyana. Trotman's optimism is likely misplaced. GEORGETOWN 00000855 002 OF 002

----------------------------AmCits and Peace Corps all OK ----------------------------7. (U) The Consular Section reports there have been no calls from AmCits on election-related issues. As a precautionary measure, all Peace Corps Volunteers are out of Georgetown. ------------------------OAS Statement from Ramdin ------------------------8. (U) Following is the text of OAS A/SYG Ramdin's statement late August 28 after he had consulted twice with Ambassador and other donor community Chiefs of Mission. BEGIN TEXT: On election day, 28 August, 2006, the OAS Observer Mission deployed a team of 123 observers in the 10 regions in Guyana to observe General and Regional Elections. Reports from OAS observers throughout the day indicated that the General and Regional Elections took place in a calm, professional and orderly manner. The OAS Observer Mission extends congratulations to the people of Guyana for the peaceful conduct of the polls; GECOM for its work in preparing and conducting the elections; polling station officials, party agents and domestic observers for their commitment and professionalism; law enforcement and the disciplined forces for maintaining a peaceful and orderly environment; and the media for keeping the electorate informed about the process. The OAS Observer Mission calls on GECOM to transmit the results of the elections as soon as verified to further promote confidence in the process, and the electorate and contesting parties to exercise patience while awaiting the results of the elections. The Mission further underscores the importance of maintaining a constructive and

peaceful environment in the coming days. ------Comment -------

END TEXT.

9. (SBU) Embassy and other OAS observers report generally good dymanics in the polling stations, with GECOM polling staff, political party agents, and local/international observers interacting in friendly mutually supportive manner. This is a change from previous elections marked by mutual suspicion. The acknowledgement by the three major parties that polling went well is also a positive change from past three elections. The real test now will be political party reactions once the final results are announced Wednesday or Thursday. END COMMENT. ROBINSON