Revisiting The Limits to Growth: Could The Club of Rome Have Been Correct, After All?

An Energy White Paper by Matthew R. Simmons October 2000

THE PRICE OF PROGRESS

When each of us as an individual decides to buy something, we first consider the price. Yet society at large has long bought the idea of continual growth in

population and production without adding up the final reckoning.

Now a team of M.I.T. scientists, with the aid of a giant computer, has completed a study of the future if present growth continues. Their inescapable conclusions are beyond anyones grimmest fears. Possibly within as little as 70 years, our social and economic system will collapse unless drastic changes are made very soon.

The Limits to Growth has made headlines the world over. Its shock waves have caused our most cherished assumptions to come crashing down. It is a book that we can ignore only at our peril.

If this book doesnt blow everybodys mind who can read without moving his lips, then the earth is kaput.

- Robert C. Townsend Author of Up the Organization

Revisiting The Limits To Growth: Could The Club Of Rome Have Been Correct, After All?

In the early 1970s, a book was published entitled, The Limits To Growth, a report of the

Club of Romes project on the predicament of mankind. Its conclusions were stunning. It

was ultimately published in 30 languages and sold over 30 million copies. According to a

sophisticated MIT computer model, the world would ultimately run out of many key

resources. These limits would become the ultimate predicament to mankind.

Over the past few years, I have heard various energy economists lambast this erroneous

work done. Often the book has been portrayed as the literal poster child of misinformed

Malthusian type thinking that misled so many people into believing the world faced a

short mania 30 years ago. Obviously, there were no The Limits To Growth. The worry that shortages would rule the day as we neared the end of the 20th Century became a bad joke. Instead of shortages, the last two decades of the 20th Century were marked by glut.

The world ended up enjoying significant declines in almost all commodity prices.

Technology and efficiency won. The Club of Rome and its nay-saying disciples clearly

lost!

The critics of this flawed work still relish in pointing out how wrong this theory turned out to

be.

A Foreign Affairs story published this past January, entitled Cheap Oil, forecast two

decades of a pending oil glut.

In this article, the Club of Romes work was scorned as

being the source document which led an entire generation of wrong-thinking people to

believe that energy supplies would run short. In this Foreign Affairs report, the authors

stated,

.the sky-is-falling school of oil forecasters has been systematically wrong for

more than a generation. In its dramatic 1972 The Limits to Growth report, the group of

prominent experts known as The Club of Rome wrote that only 550 billion barrels of oil

remained and that they would run out by 1990.

This past May, Rice Universitys Baker Institute held an energy forum entitled Running on

Empty? where the topic of future energy reliability was carefully addressed.

John

Lichtblau, Chairman of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation (PIRINC) made

reference to this work in his keynote remarks. In a comment on how virtually all global

forecasts of resource-constrained oil production turned out to be wrong, he said Many of

you still recall the widely quoted, very prestigious Club of Rome report of 1972 which predicted a fundamental resource constraint on oil supplies by the end of the 20th

Century.

For a publication that is almost 30 years out of print, it is fascinating that anyone still even

remembers what the book said. I have occasionally been privately amused at the passion

this Club of Rome work still evokes. As I have heard this study thoroughly discredited, I

have wondered whether the anger this book still creates is the equivalent of getting livid at

a bartender the morning after, when ones headache was so wicked. Could the core

angst this work still generates result from a backlash or an embarrassment by these same

critics for embracing these shortage concepts and then being proved wrong?

The first time this Club of Rome topic caught my attention was after I addressed the

International Association of Energy Economists at their annual meeting in Dallas, Texas,

on Election Day, 1994. At this program, I spoke of the pending end of all three bubbles

which had kept such an overhang on energy supplies and kept prices so low: the oil

bubble, the gas bubble, the drilling rig bubble (there had been a huge surplus of

equipment.) I also addressed the pending volatility in our energy market now that NYMEX

pricing had taken over (I called it a new driver of the Energy Bus.) I thought it was a pretty

good talk, But, the question and answer session brought forth not a single question. There

was total silence from an obviously disbelieving audience. So I clearly missed the mark.

As I was leaving the hotel where the program was held, someone approached me and

said, I listened to your talk! He paused. I was unsure whether to answer with Thanks!

Before I could respond, the person then said, Your thesis was interesting. You are

obviously a Malthusian; a Club of Romer or a classic chronic believer in shortages!

I knew then that my message had been totally missed. My talk never made any reference

to any form of shortages. I was merely warning that era of the vast energy excesses was

almost gone. In an attempt to put my talk into more simplistic language, I responded No.

In fact, I am not a Malthusian at all, I am an Agrarian. I study cycles of commodities. Most

happen to be agricultural. The patterns are always the same. Demand for a particular

crop ends up growing too fast. Supplies then get short and the price soars. The farmer

quickens his planting cycle to capture these high prices just as demand is starting to fall

due to being too high. This creates a larger glut. Prices then plunge. The farmer stops

planting. As supplies then dwindle, low prices begin to stimulate demand. As a result,

commodities swing back and forth, rocketing from peak to bottom and back to peak. It

happens to virtually all agricultural products.

I continued, the only difference between agriculture and energy is that it takes a few

months to plant wheat compared to around seven years to plant and then harvest a new

energy field. So the cycles are simply longer! Therefore, ten years from now, all you guys

will be discussing the likelihood of $200 oil just as demand is dropping and supplies are on

the rise!

I was quite pleased with this quick response and thought it also captured the essence of

what I had tried to tell this skeptical audience earlier that afternoon. But the person to

whom I delivered this impeccable logic merely responded, Ill be damned, I could have

sworn you were a classic Malthusian! and then walked away.

Through this humorous exchange, I was accidentally introduced to the whole Club of

Rome notion. While I vaguely remember hearing about the work in the early 1970s,

before this Dallas encounter, I had never focused on what it was all about.

Since becoming aware of this Club of Rome work in 1994, I continually hear the Club of

Rome shortage thesis raised by various energy economists who thoroughly condemn the

work as being absolutely wrong. But I have never given any thought to what the Club of

Romes specific predictions actually were, nor have I ever known who this mysterious

Club plotting the end of the world even was.

The primary reason I have never pursued more knowledge about this work is that I have

never subscribed to the theory of the world ever encountering a permanent energy

shortage. Running out of oil has never borne any relationship to my growing concern

over the past decade that not all is well in the energy world.

My energy worries have always centered on the simple prospect that demand could some

day start outstripping supply. This is a totally different problem than running out of energy.

Both are definite problems, they merely address different issues.

The two problems actually bear no relation to one another. Running short of daily supply

is a little like food and famine. The world has never run out of food, yet we have suffered

regional famines since the beginning of time. These are merely logistical distribution

problems.

My curiosity about what the Club of Rome actually predicted in this The Limits to Growth

book was triggered this past spring after hearing a talk by James Wolfenson, head of the

World Bank, at a Global Harvard Business School Conference in Berlin. Mr. Wolfenson

gave the keynote opening address to a group of 1200 HBS alumni from around the world,

gathered to discuss A World Without Walls: The Challenges of a Global Economy.

His talk focused on the acute need for the affluent population of the globe to never

overlook or forget the less fortunate parts of the world. As he eloquently stated, there are

only 1.2 billion people now living in the highly developed countries of the world. 250

million are in the United States, 500 million living in the expanded Europe and 350 million

in Canada, Mexico and the Pacific Rim countries of the OECD. For this group, affluence

is not only on the rise, it has also never been better.

But Mr. Wolfenson then warned of the risks inherent by overlooking the 4.8 billion people

living in the less developed or transition economies of the world. An astonishing 2 billion

of these people live on less than $2 a day! One billion live on less than $1 a day! Abject

poverty abounds throughout these less fortunate countries. In our modern global society,

with global telecommunication, Mr. Wolfenson warned that it is not reasonable to even

think that we can maintain this great gap between the well to do and the impoverished for

another 50 years.

In Wolfensons opinion, the great challenge of the next several decades is to narrow this

prosperity gap. Doing this will not be an easy task. But it must be done.

As I heard these grim statistics, it forced me to re-think an in-depth research I did in the summer of 1997 on the Insatiable Energy needs of China.1
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Chinas Insatiable Energy Needs white paper published by Matthew R. Simmons in August 1997.

The prime conclusion I reached after doing this China research which entailed an

extensive analysis of what happens to energy use when a poor country begins to prosper,

is that energy growth always goes hand in hand with countries switching from being poor

to becoming even slightly affluent.

As I finished this China study, it left me wondering whether the world really had the

sufficient resource base to allow China to achieve its dream of economic success. From

the work I did on per capita energy use, if China ever becomes the equivalent of Japan in

1960, let alone finally convert its vast body of people to the prosperity of the United States

today, this transition would consume so much energy that it raises the question of whether

such added energy really exists. At the least, it would strain the worlds energy resources

to its limits.

Within months of finishing the China Energy Report, the Asian flu invaded the world.

Suddenly, the notion of China (or any Asian country) continuing to grow began to seem

remote. So I unintentionally forgot the primary conclusions of this China study.

On my way back from Berlin, I kept thinking about the implications of the poor population

of the globe finally becoming normal citizens of the world. This led me to muse about the

whole Club of Rome issue. The more I mused, the more I began to wonder whether this

group might have been correct in their concerns after all. Perhaps they were only wrong in

their timing by 30 to 50 years. Or perhaps this group envisioned that by 2000, the world

would have closed the gap between the rich and the poor, thus creating the shortages

which their report warned would occur.

As soon as I returned to the U.S., I had our librarian find a copy of the book which the Club

of Rome produced almost 30 years ago.

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WHAT THE LIMITS TO GROWTH ACTUALLY SAID

After reading The Limits to Growth, I was amazed. Nowhere in the book was there any

mention about running out of anything by 2000. Instead, the books concern was entirely

focused on what the world might look like 100 years later. There was not one sentence or

even a single word written about an oil shortage, or limit to any specific resource, by the

year 2000.

The members of the Club or Rome were also not a mysterious, sinister, anonymous

group of doomsayers. Rather, they were a group of 30 thoughtful, public spirited-intellects

from ten different countries. The group included scientists, economists, educators, and

industrialists. They met at the instigation of Dr. Aurelia Peccei, an Italian industrialist

affiliated with Fiat and Olivetti.

The group all shared a common concern that mankind faced a future predicament of grave

complexity, caused by a series of interrelated problems that traditional institutions and

policy would not be able to cope with the issues, let alone come to grips with their full

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context. A core thesis of their work was that long term exponential growth was easy to

overlook. Human nature leads people to innocently presume growth rates are linear. The

book then postulated that if a continuation of the exponential growth of the seventies

began in the worlds population, its industrial output, agricultural and natural resource

consumption and the pollution produced by all of the above, would result in severe

constraints on all known global resources by 2050 to 2070.

The genesis of this book was a series of early meetings being held by The Club of Rome in

1968. These meetings culminated in a decision to initiate a remarkably ambitious undertaking.

The task was to examine the complex problems troubling men of all nations; poverty in the

midst of plenty, degradation of the environment, loss of faith in institutions, uncontrolled urban

spread, etc.

Phase One of the project of the predicament of mankind took shape in 1970. The group

commissioned a team of Economic Modelers at MIT to forecast, in approximate terms, what

pressures the globe would undergo if the current growth trends continued for another 100 years.

This research was financed by the Volkswagen Foundation.

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At the time, the technique of conducting computer based integrated modeling was quite

new. The technique was called System Dynamics, where various inter-related elements

and positive and negative feedback loops influence the various ingredients and outputs of

the model.

The initial results of this modeling work were sufficiently alarming that Club of Rome participants

decided to publish them, and call the book The Limits to Growth. The book was published by

Potomac Associates, a non-partisan research and analysis organization seeking to encourage

lively inquiry into critical issues of public policy.

The book painstakingly acknowledged that the models work was still preliminary.

Much

more detailed analysis was needed to hone in on the issues this model raised. The decision to

publish the results, as rough as they were, was driven by a desire to quickly get the issues into

the public domain. This would hopefully command critical attention to the work and spark debate

in all societies about the changes needed to avoid the catastrophic elements that the model

indicated would occur by 2070, absent any changes.

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While many readers concocted various imaginary assumptions, the books conclusions were

quite simple.

The first conclusion was a view that if present growth trends continued

unchanged, a limit to the growth that our planet has enjoyed would be reached sometime within

the next 100 years. This would then result in a sudden and uncontrollable decline in both

population and industrial capacity.

The second key conclusion was that these growth trends could be altered. Moreover, if proper

alterations were made, the world could establish a condition of ecological stability that would be sustainable far into the future.

The third conclusion was a view that the world could embark on this second path, but the

sooner this effort started, the greater the chance would be of achieving this ecologically stable

success.

The book, in its entirety, is beautifully written. It takes only a few hours to read. I would highly

recommend it to anyone. It is an interesting mixture of simple, tried and true economic laws,

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combined with a terrific dose of logic. Without a doubt, there are some serious doomsday

elements laid out which our world would face if the conclusions of this modeling work were

ignored, and key trends continue to rise at exponential vs. linear rates. But, the book essentially

lays out an optimistic outlook on how easily these limits to growth can be altered if a real effort

to accomplish this is made at an early stage, rather than attempting such changes too late.

The most amazing aspect of the book is how accurate many of the basic trend extrapolation

worries which ultimately give raise to the limits this book expresses still are, some 30 years

later. In fact, for a work that has been derisively attacked by so many energy economists, a

group whose own forecasting record has not stood the test of time very well, there was nothing

that I could find in the book which has so far been even vaguely invalidated. To the contrary,

the chilling warnings of how powerful exponential growth rate can be are right on track. The

thesis that it is easy to misjudge this type of growth has also been proven by the volumes of

misguided criticism that the report engendered.

The world is now 30 years into this 100-year view. It did grow as fast as the book warned. The

gap between rich and poor never narrowed. Instead, the gap between the haves and the

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have-nots grew by a significant measure.

It is interesting to contemplate how horrified the

books authors would be today, given the population trends that happened post 1972. The

current strain on many of our precious resources is already becoming serious. It would have

been far worse by 2000, given the rate of expansion which happened to the worlds poor

population, had these people also begun to significantly improve their standard of living at the

same time. An accidental safety valve for many potentially scarce resources turned out to be

the widening of the rich/poor gap.

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THE WORLD IN 2000

We are now almost one-third of the way around The Club of Romes 100 -year track. In

1970, the world population totaled 3.4 billion. Of this, 1.2 billion were living in more

developed countries while 2.2 billion resided in less-developed countries. The rich/poor

split was 35/65.

Eight of the 20 most populated countries were modern industrial societies. Their combined

population totaled 787 million, which then made up 25% of the globe. Europes Big Four

(England, Germany, France, and Italy) had 161 million people. All ranked in the top 20.

Three decades later, the worlds total population approximates 6.4 billion. Given the

inaccurate census data for many fast growing poor countries of the world, it could be even

higher. The population growth of Europes Big Four was one of the slowest in the world.

Yet, even these countries grew by 61% to 260 million. However, three of the Big Four now

rank outside the top twenty as various much faster-growing poor countries have taken

their place.

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In 2000, the population of China and India alone are the size of the entire less developed

population of the globe 30 years ago. In three decades, the rich/poor gap has widened from

35/65 to 20/80! Since all the poor populations of the globe are expanding fast, this gap is likely

to grow even wider as the remaining 70 years of the Clubs timeframes unwind, unless

measures are quickly taken to change this alarming trend.

The text in The Limits to Growth mentioned the possibility that global population might total 7

billion by the turn of the Century. The book also contained a graph showing the exponential

growth of the world since 1690. According to this trendline, the world population would reach 6

billion in 2000 (see Exhibit 1.)

EXHIBIT 1

World Population

Source: The Limits To Growth by Donella H. Meadows/Dennis L. Meadows and Jrgen Randers/William W. Behrens III.

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The most up-to-date U.S. Census Bureau estimate for the actual worlds population in 2000 is

6.4 billion, almost equi-distant between these two estimated numbers. (Since the quality and

accuracy of the data for the fastest growing regions of the world could easily be off by 10 to

15%, with any error likely to be understating the real total, we might be a lot closer to 7 billion

then anyone knows.)

The birth rates in many affluent countries steadily fell over the past thirty years while China

enacted its one-child policy. Otherwise, the world population would already be about 2.3 billion

higher than it is today.

Pakistan and Bangladesh are the poorest countries on the globe. In 1970, they ranked 9th and 10th as the highest populated countries on earth with 132 million people. Thirty years later, these

two impoverished countries have both notched up, ranking number seven and eight in the world

with a combined population of almost 300 million people, greater than the USA. Over the past

three decades, both these countries have virtually become the poster children of the poorer

countries of the globe.

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The book detailed the economic and population growth rates for 10 countries in 1968 and how

this translated into a GNP per capita in each country. The report then used simple arithmetic to

calculate extrapolated values for GNP per capita from 1968 to the year 2000. While their text

states, the values shown will almost certainly not actually be realized.

They are not

predictions. The values merely indicate where the general direction of our system, as it is

currently structured, is taking us.

The report demonstrated that the process of economic

growth, as it is occurring today, is inexorably widening the absolute gap between the rich and

the poor nations of the world. Exhibit 2 and 3 detail the 1968 data and the extrapolated GDP to

2000.

EXHIBIT 2

Economic And Population Growth Rates

Population (1968) (Million) 730 524 238 201 123 113 101 88 63 60 Average Annual Growth Rate Of Population (1961-68) (% Per Year) 1.5 2.5 1.3 1.4 2.6 2.4 1.0 3.0 2.4 1.0 GNP Per Capita (1968) (U.S. Dollars) 90 100 1,100 3,980 100 100 1,190 250 70 1,970 Average Annual Growth Rate Of GNP Per Capita (1961-68) (% Per Year) 0.3 1.0 5.8 3.4 3.1 0.8 9.9 1.6 0.3 3.4

Country Peoples Republic Of China India USSR U.S. Pakistan Indonesia Japan Brazil Nigeria Federal Republic Of Germany

Source: The Limits To Growth by Donella H. Meadows/Dennis L. Meadows and Jrgen Randers/William W. Behrens III.

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EXHIBIT 3

Extrapolated GNP For The Year 2000

Country Peoples Republic Of China India USSR U.S. Pakistan Indonesia Japan Brazil Nigeria Federal Republic Of Germany GNP Per Capita (In U.S. Dollars) 100 140 6,330 11,000 250 130 23,200 440 60 5,850

Source: The Limits To Growth by DonellaH. Meadows/Dennis L. Meadows and Jrgen Randers /William W.BehrensIII. __________________________ SIMMONS Based on the 1968 dollar with no allowance for

& C OMPANY INTERNATIONAL

While the authors themselves failed to appreciate the power of combining the extrapolated

population growth with industrial growth, it is remarkable to look at how these numbers finally

turned out. 2000 is no longer a forecast, it is here. As detailed in the following Exhibits IV,

several countries actual per capita GNP were, in fact, ahead of the extrapolations detailed in

The Limits to Growth. On balance, the ten countries came close to meeting a projection which

the authors of The Limits to Growth did not think could really happen in just 30 years.

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As the authors of The Limits to Growth so plainly said three decades ago, exponential growth

rates can be very powerful. They can create growth curves which suddenly mushroom, as 3%

increments of small numbers suddenly become a 3% increase of a much larger base.

This

mushroom growth can quickly become almost overwhelming until powerful forces of physical

limits, the finally unseen consequences of such growth rates, suddenly appear out of nowhere,

bring these trends to an abrupt halt.

EXHIBIT 4

Comparison Of Extrapolated 2000 Per Capita GNP To 1999 Actual GNP

In 1968 U.S. Dollars Extrapolated Estimate 100 140 11,000 250 130 23,200 440 60 5,850 1999 Actual 240 112 9,080 110 210 9,700 900 100 6,806

China India U.S. Pakistan Indonesia Japan Brazil Nigeria Germany

Note: USSR not used since dissolution makes numbers difficult to get accurate comparability.

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From an energy perspective, the world was consuming 111 million barrels of oil equivalent

(BOE) per day in 1970 as The Limits to Growth was being written.

The worlds energy growth

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had already soared from under 30 million BOE in 1940 to 67 million BOE in 1960 and almost

doubled that in another 10-years. By 1980, energy growth totaled 147 million BOE per day, in

1990 it reached 164 million BOE per day and is fast approaching 180 million BOE per day in

2000. Table 1 below illustrates this growth.

TABLE 1

Growth In World Energy Consumption

200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Million BOE/Day

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While the world has clearly not run out of energy by 2000, this past energy consumption growth

occurred while the FSU, third largest energy user on earth in 1970, ultimately collapsed, with its

energy use falling by one-third over the past decade. Had the FSU continued its consumption

growth of the 1980s, the world would be approaching a daily energy consumption of 200 million

BOE per day as we enter a new century.

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As shown in Exhibit 5, many of the developing countries had growth rates between 3% and 6%

over the past 30 years and many of these countries still barely use any energy in per capita

terms, relative to the prospering parts of the world. Had the gap between the rich and the poor

narrowed over the past 30 years, and the FSU prospered at the same time, the world could

have easily reached an energy consumption rate of between 220 to 240 million BOE per day by

2000, assuming such vast energy additions could have been supplied.

EXHIBIT 5

Primary Energy Consumption

(Million tons of energy in barrel of oil equivalent)
Country North America Latin America Europe Middle East Africa Japan Australia Asia China USSR Total Million BOE/Day 1972 1,948 126 1,523 79 96 311 64 214 335 837 5,631 117 1980 2,419 341 169 117 164 360 86 338 453 1,169 6,904 144 1990 2,133 369 1,741 254 206 428 101 551 668 1,398 7,856 164 1999 2,432 497 1,801 380 261 507 117 878 753 908 8,534 178 + + + + + + + + + CGR 0.08% 3.0% 0.6% 6.0% 3.8% 1.8% 2.3% 5.4% 3.1% 0.3% 1.6%

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Given the massive increase in total energy use that actually occurred in just 30 years, it is also

enlightening to examine the worlds energy mix over this same period. Exhibit VI details the

various components of the worlds energy mix in 1972, 1980, 1990, and 1999. Oil use fell from

46% of total energy use in 1972 to 41% in 1999, but almost this entire decline happened

between 1972 and 1980, as the price of oil grew ten-fold. Since then, oil has remained in a

relatively stable band.

EXHIBIT 6

World Energy Mix

1972 Petroleum Natural Gas Total Hydrocarbon Coal Nuclear Hydro Total 46% 19% 65% 29% 0.7% 0.6% 100% 1980 43% 19% 62% 29% 3% 6% 100% 1990 40% 23% 63% 28% 7% 2% 100% 1999 41% 24% 65% 25% 8% 2% 100%

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Natural gas use increased from 19% in 1972 to 24% in 1999, coal fell from 29% to 25%.

Nuclear had an explosive growth, as this new energy source was just being introduced in 1972. By the end of the 20th Century, nuclear comprised 8% of the worlds total energy use. Though

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this affected only a handful of countries that actively pursued a nuclear energy plan as part of

their long-term energy strategies.

It is also interesting to contemplate the possible strains on our oil and gas resources had

nuclear not been commercialized, particularly if the gap between rich and poor been narrowed

over this period of time.

Exhibit 7 details the growth in the worlds petroleum use over the past 60-years as oils use

grew from just over 5 million barrels a day in 1940 to 75 million barrels a day in 2000. Since

petroleum is still the only energy that creates transportation fuel, it should continue to grow well

into the middle of the 21st century.

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EXHIBIT 7

Worldwide Oil Consumption

Million Bbls/Day 1940 U.S. Canada Western Europe Japan Australasia Total OECD Latin America Africa M.E.F. Asia China Total USSR/Eastern Europe Total 3.1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.1 4.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.4 5.3 1950 7.1 0.4 1.5 0.1 0.2 9.3 0.9 0.8 0.1 1.8 0.9 12.0 1960 12.3 0.9 4.2 0.6 0.3 18.3 1.7 1.6 0.2 3.5 2.8 22.1 1970 14.4 1.5 12.6 4.4 0.7 33.6 3.5 2.8 1.0 7.3 7.4 39.5 1980 16.5 1.9 13.9 4.9 0.8 38.0 4.6 6.3 1.8 12.7 10.9 61.6 1990 16.3 1.7 13.4 5.3 0.8 37.5 5.0 10.8 2.3 18.1 9.8 65.4 2000 19.0 1.8 14.6 5.8 1.0 42.2 6.6 16.4 4.6 27.6 5.2 75.0

Source: BP Statistical Review Of Energy. ______________________ Including Mexico.

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While it is staggering to see a non-renewable energy such as petroleum grow in use from 5 to

75 million barrels per day, just think what this number would have been in 2000 had the

rich/poor gap of the world merely stayed at the 35/65 rate of the 1970s.

There are lots on non-energy facts and figures that highlight the remarkable progress the world

made between 1970 and 2000, and how many more goods and foodstuffs we now consume.

Technology has made the greatest strides imaginable over the past 30-years, creating

inventions never even dreamed of in 1970! But the number of malnourished people living below

poverty lines has also soared over this same period. Globally, the net amount of land under

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crops is growing far more slowly than population.

As the worlds population grows, less

renewable fresh water is available for each person. Desalinized seawater has so far kept this

issue from becoming a crisis.

The role of fish in the human diet is also noteworthy. Fish have historically served as an

inexpensive and widely available source of proteins and essential nutrients, including a type of

fatty acid critical to the development of infant brains.

Over the past 30-years, the global fish catch has managed to remain quite stable. But much of

this apparent stability came through a widespread use of aqua-culture which now provides one

fish out of every three the world now consumes. Meanwhile, the composition of the wold fish

catch is steadily shifting to smaller and less appetizing fish. Some high protein species already

seem headed for commercial or even biological extinction.

So the world made it safely though the end of the 20th century. But various signs in all the

trouble areas which The Limits to Growth spoke of are not terribly comforting to a premise that

the world can safely glide through another 30 years, let alone to 2050 or 2070.

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The most profound message which The Club of Rome passionately urged people to consider is

the power of this type of exponential growth and the danger of the gap that existed between the

worlds rich and poor. That message is still alive and well. On September 26, 2000, the World

Banks top economists issued yet another warning of the urgent need to begin reducing what

used to be a rich/poor gap but has now evolved into a rich/poor gulf.

According to these economists, while the global economy grew by 2.3% a year between 1965 and 1990, the gap between rich and poor countries is 10 TIMES wider than what it was 30 years

ago. Both were measured in per capita terms, and the gap between rich and poor is also

growing within many affluent countries.

Why is this message so mute to so many? Will it take a hasty wake-up call to finally create the

meaningful questioning of how this enigma is solved? The Club of Rome got the whole picture

right. It was the rest of us who missed the mark!

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THE BOOK AND ITS CONTROVERSY

Why did this book become so controversial and why do so many articulate and seemingly

knowledgeable people still lash out at its content as being wrong, when in fact, all the major

conclusions are precisely on track? So far, not a single observed trend has emerged to allay

the worries and concerns laid out by the Club of Rome. Why was the book greeted with such a

firestorm of criticism, instead of invoking the thoughtful debate which the authors so hoped

would occur?

I can only surmise at some answers, as I had never followed the debate over the course of so

many years.

My guess at the answer lies in two areas: First, it is a natural part of human nature to ignore the

impact of events whose consequences fall far into the future. The here and now dominates the

way most people naturally think. If a seer wandered into a town predicting a massive flood a

decade from now, and the next summer turned out to be particularly dry and arid, it is human

nature to belittle the seer as being wrong, ignoring the fact that his prediction was still nine years

30

hence. This human nature phenomenon used to be cartooned in an advertisement run by New

England Life. The ad showed two gentlemen at a prestigious mens club, with brandy in hand.

One asks, Why would anyone want to buy life insurance?

As this question is raised, a

massive bull moose trophy had already fallen from the clubs wall and was only inches away

from crashing onto the questioners head! We are brought up to think that cause and effect has

immediacy to it. Human nature is not good at coping with time-delayed reactions, particularly

when the delay is possibly decades away.

The authors of The Limits to Growth deal with this phenomenon of short-term focus through a

graph depicted in Exhibit 8.

EXHIBIT 8

Human Perspectives

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INTERNATIONAL

31

It shows the relationship between time and space. In the lower left-hand corner, family

represents the closest limit for space, while one week being the closest limit for time. The

furthest right hand quadrants represent the world for space and 100 years for time. The authors

contention is that almost everyone is preoccupied by short limits in both space and time (e.g.

what will I eat today?) Few ever think about what could happen to the entire world in far distant

periods of time.

It was the upper right hand corner of space and time that the authors

addressed. It seems clear that few readers of the book focused on this global view and lengthy

time. Instead, they read into the book a different message, letting imagination drift back to the

lower left corner of this graph.

A major event then fueled further confusion about the real issues of the book. The Limits to

Growth ended up being published shortly before the world experienced the Oil Shock of 1973.

In the ensuing panic that the 1973 Oil Crisis brought forth, the 100-year message that the

authors of this book tried to warn about (so that meaningful changes in population growth and

industrial consumption might begin in order to avoid the dangers implied by this work far into the

future) got blurred into an immediate panic that a tiny blip in oil supplies was possibly the arrival

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of such shortages, some 100 years earlier than this mysterious or even clandestine Club of

Rome was trying to discuss.

My other guess is that some of the worst and most vocal critics of this book were people who

most passionately embraced the concept of immediate shortages facing the world through the

1970s. After all, by 1980 there were many prominent energy analysts who stridently embraced

the idea that $50 to $100 oil was almost inevitable. When these high prices then failed to

materialize, and as the gap between slipping demand and rising supply created an oil bubble,

this enabled oil prices to stay within a $15 to $20 per barrel range for the better part of two

decades, the embarrassment of being wrong turned the whole group of energy experts into

angry critics of The Limits to Growth and passionate believers that prices would stay low

forever. It must have been easy to shift part of the blame for why they had been so wrong to the

stupidity of The Club of Rome. This is my equivalent of blaming the bartender for a hangover!

Sadly, the dialogue and increased in-depth analysis that The Club of Rome so hoped would

begin as a result of their publication never occurred in the face of growing criticism. Phase One

of the predicament of mankind accidentally became the final chapter of this thesis. As the

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discredit of this work grew, few even took time to measure the pace of change. Even fewer

remembered the real message of the book.

The Club of Rome still exists. It did not wither away, although its own web site acknowledges

that most people assume it ceased to function after the death of its charismatic founder, Aurelio

Peccei, in 1984. It ended up commissioning more than a dozen other reports, since Limits was

first published; though, none ever attracted the widespread attention of The Limits of Growth.

Membership to The Club of Rome is still limited to one hundred members. Meetings are still

held at the invitation of its members. Its most recent report was published in 1995 and dealt

with the worlds unemployment dilemma. Interim reports on the problems of governability or

the lack thereof and on the global warming problem were presented at its last annual meeting

held in Puerto Rico in 1996.

So the Club is intact, but the passionate concerns spelled out by The Limits to Growth have

clearly cooled. Lost in time is whether the issues raised in 1972, creating such intense debate

when finally published, were actually correct and lurk as an unseen but smoldering ember.

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EXTRAPOLATING THE WORLD BEYOND 2000

30 years have now elapsed since the original research of the book was first done. The world is

now 30% of the way towards the doomsday scenario depicted by trend-lining the extrapolated

growth of the previous 100 years. As the book accurately predicted, population growth

expanded. This was almost inevitable as most parents of 2000 were already born when the

book was first written.

What can we infer about the state of the world over the next 30 years from continuing this

extrapolating exercise? Is it realistic to assume that the gap between the rich and poor will

never narrow? Could the world remain at peace if the gap never narrows or even widens? And,

if it does narrow, as the World Bank head warned must occur to keep the world prosperous and

peaceful, are we really certain that the world has sufficient resources in place to accommodate

such changes?

These are the issues that should now be dominating the think tank discussions of the worlds

public policy planners. At least the energy aspects these issues raise deserve close

examination. To extend the analyses embodied in The Limits to Growth out another 30 to 50

35

years no longer takes a supercomputer. Any hand held calculator can now do compounding

growth rates. When a simple extrapolation in the growth trends for population, industrial activity,

consumption of both agricultural and natural resources and the resultant pollution is done, the

alarms raised are more discomforting today, with the benefit of an added 30 years, than the

authors of The Limits to Growth contended three decades ago.

However, we still have 70-years to go before the 2070 limit, which the MIT model suggested

was an end to more growth, is reached. Perhaps it is irrelevant that all the mileposts raised as

red flags in The Limits to Growth have so far been met. After all, there is ample time to correct

any seriously dangerous trend. Correct?

In the books chapter defining the deceptive powers of exponential growth and the apparent

suddenness with which it approaches a fixed limit, the authors describe the French Riddle of the

Lily Pond. In this riddle, the lily pond has a potentially virulent lily that apparently will double in

size each day. If the lily grows unchecked it will cover the entire pond in 30 days, choking off all

other forms of life in the water by the time it covers the entire pond. If a skeptic waited until 50%

36

of the pond was covered before taking any remedial action to save the pond, when would he act? The answer: on the 29th day of the month! But by then, would be too late.

The world can debate when corrective action needs to begin, if exponential growth suddenly

shows all of the classic signs of pending overshoot. But everyone should agree that waiting until the proverbial 29th day is a classic and unrepentable blunder of the highest order.

37

THE LIMITS TO ENERGY GROWTH

I have no good data or knowledge about agricultural or non-energy consumption data. A casual

reading of the possible future limits to water, arable land, fish stocks, etc. causes one to

question how the world could even cope with continued population growth an a narrowing of the

rich/poor gap.

But simply focussing on the energy issues which should concern the world argues that the world

probably cannot wait another 30 years to begin pondering whether we could begin to

experience problems and sheer limits to non-renewal energy consumption. The lead times for

any corrective actions or alternative energy alternatives are simply too great.

Take the energy needs of China as an example of the problem. This giant population pool is struggling to remove the shackles of poverty suffered throughout the 20th Century. There is a

case to be made that by 2030, or at least by 2050, China could become the Japanese Miracle of

1960, or even what Japan is like today. At the least, China could become the equivalent of a

Thailand, Greece or Turkey today.

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If such a transformation were to take place, are the worlds resources sufficient for this miracle

to safely occur?

The arithmetic is easy to do. Over the past 30 years, Chinas population has grown from 850

million people to 1.25 billion. Extrapolate this growth to 2030 and there will be almost 2 billion

people. If China climbs the ladder from near poverty today to even the lowest end of the OECD

countries energy consumption, this means that Chinas energy consumption would grow more

than six-fold to over 100 million BOE per day, or two-thirds of the entire worlds total energy use

today.

If Chinas population nears 2 billion by 2030, and China retains its current energy mix, where

almost 75% comes from using a particularly dirty coal, its coal usage would increase to a level

50% greater than all the coal now consumed by the entire world! The implied pollution this

would create is precisely the type of pollution dangers implied by the Club of Rome 30 years

ago. Since Chinas enormous coal usage already irritates eyes throughout Japan when the

winds blow eastwards, using so much added coal could literally darken Asian skies.

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If China weans itself meaningfully from its high rate of coal use, and simultaneously improves its

economy, the growth this implies for added consumption of oil and gas is simply staggering.

Even the most avid cheap oil forever advocates would have a hard time convincing

themselves that such an explosive growth could really happen. This is a classic example of

System Dynamics working as they should.

If India also made a similar climb up the ladder of economic success, the numbers for added

energy use would rocket off the charts. But China and India are but two of many countries that

still qualify as genuine energy pigmies.

Exhibit 9 shows the power of energy extrapolation from seven of the leading countries that

qualify as energy pigmies. The seven include China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh,

Philippines and Egypt. In 1970, the population of these seven countries was 1.7 billion. In 2000,

they now represent 2.9 billion people. Their total energy consumption now totals 25.4 million

BOE per day. While this is a lot of sheer energy volume, it amounts to a miniscule 3.2 barrels of

oil equivalent energy per capita each year, one thirtieth of what the U.S. now consumes.

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EXHIBIT 9

Impact Of Seven Energy Pigmy Countries

2000 Energy Consumption (Million BOE/D) 15,680 5,750 1,670 770 210 460 900 25,440 Extrapolated Growth At 2030 Popultaion Growth People Rate In 2030 1.5% 2.0% 2.0% 2.6% 2.2% 2.5% 2.3% 1,942 1,853 406 305 236 170 135 5,047

Population (Millions) China India Indonesia Pakistan Bangladesh Phillipines Egypt Total 1,262 1,014 224 141 123 81 68 2,913

Energy Growth Rate 0.2% 2.8% 3.6% 2.9% 1.8% 3.4% 1.3%

Per Capita 4.8 4.8 7.8 4.7 1.0 5.7 7.1

Total BOE/Day 25,540 24,370 8,680 3,930 650 2,650 2,630 68,450

__________________________ Expotated growth in 2030 uses 1970 through 2000 growth in population to 1970 through 2000 growth in per capita energy consumption.

SIMMONS & COMPANY

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If the 1970-2000 growth in population for each of these pigmy countries is extrapolated to 2030,

the population of these seven pigmies will exceed 5 billion. If their growth in per capita energy

use from 1970 to 2000 is also extended to 2030, these seven countries, alone, would consume

an additional 68 million barrels of oil equivalent energy per day. More staggering is the thought

that such growth could take place and still leave these energy pigmies on an energy diet of

under 5 barrels of oil equivalent per year. This would leave these countries at only one-quarter

of the low end of the OECD energy use in 2000.

41

To fully appreciate the magnitude of what the Limits of Growth authors called a classic over

shoot where growth finally and suddenly overwhelms the system, simply assume that by

some economic miracle, these seven energy pigmies find a way to all become the equivalent of

the least prosperous countries of the OECD today (which consume around 20 BOE energy on a

per capita basis in 2000.) This change, alone, would equate to over 100 million BOE per day of

energy consumption in 2030, almost one half of what the entire world now uses.

Nigeria is another classic example of a 21st century energy pigmy. Its statistics were excluded

from my group of seven simply due to limited data on Nigerias energy use over the past 30

years. But, good statistics exist for Nigerias current energy needs.

As Africas largest country, Nigeria has seen its population grow from 51 million in 1970 to 123

million today. Despite its size, Nigerias current total energy consumption is less than 500,000

BOE per day. This equates to a meager 1.3 BOE per person each year. Despite producing

close to 2 million barrels of oil per day, the country is mired in poverty. It faces a serious energy

crisis due to declining electricity generation. Its total installed electrical generating capacity is

42

less than 1% of that of the United States. But in July 2000, only 25% of this tiny power capacity

even worked. The balance is in a chronic state of disrepair.

If Nigeria finally turned its economy around, like so many other role models have done over the

past 50 years, the exponential energy needs of just this one country are profound.

Here is how Nigerias numbers work. Assume that Nigerias past 30-year population growth

continues for another 30 years. By 2030, Nigeria would have 300 million people. If its GDP and

energy use grew to what Mexico now enjoys (10 BOE per capita in 1999), Nigerias energy

consumption would grow by almost 20 fold to over 8 million BOE per day.

These numbers also highlight the possible export squeeze which many major energy exporters

could face if their populations continue to grow while their GDP improves.

Nigerias total economy is now fueled by its oil and natural gas exports. For these exports to

remain static, Nigerias oil and gas output would have to rise almost five-fold in the next 30

years. A handful of other oil producers have been able to experience such meteoric production

43

growth, but they all started with an insignificant base. Since Nigeria is now one of the ten top

energy producers in the world, the likelihood of them quintupling their current output has to be a

genuine stretch. More likely is a scenario where rapid increases in the countrys prosperity

finally turns the country from being a major energy exporter to a net energy importer, as China

suddenly experienced over the past decade.

Nigeria is not the only big energy exporter facing this same risk. This issue could become a

problem for the entire group of OPEC producers.

All have seen dramatic growth in their

population.

In 1970, the OPEC countries population totaled 245 million. By 2000, their

population grew to 524 million. If each countrys 30-year population growth is extrapolated to

2030, these countries will support over 1.1 billion people. Exhibit 10 details the population

growth of the OPEC producers from 1970 through 2000 and the population demographics which

an extrapolation of these growth rates produces by 2030.

The implications of this explosive population growth creates an interesting future energy

dilemma. Focus on just one of the OPEC countries as a classic illustration of some possible

limits to future growth.

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EXHIBIT 10

OPEC Countries Population Growth

In Millions Of People Extrapolated Population In 2030 412 297 150 69 58 64 81 13 6 7 1,157

Country Indonesia Nigeria Iran Algeria Venezuela Iraq Saudi Arabia Libya Kuwait UAE Total

1970 123 51 29 14 10 9 6 2 1 -245

1980 155 70 39 19 15 13 10 3 1 1 326

1990 189 92 56 25 19 18 15 4 2 2 422

2000 225 123 66 31 24 24 22 5 2 2 524

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Saudi Arabia had only 6 million people in 1970. By 2000, their population grew to 22 million. 43% of Saudi Arabias 22 million people are 14 years old or less. The countrys fertility rate is

6.3 children per female. If these trends continue, Saudi will have 45 to 50 million people by the

year 2030. If Saudi Arabias population growth from 1970 to 2000 continues unabated, the

country will have 80 million people by 2030. On the surface, these numbers sound impossible

but they merely highlight how hard it is to gauge exponential rather than linear rates of growth.

45

Most people still think Saudi Arabia is a very rich country. To the contrary, its economy is now

in shambles as a result of the population explosion which has already occurred. The July 2000

Foreign Affairs had an article highlighting the social and financial pressures already facing this

key energy supplier entitled Saudi Arabia Over a Barrel.

Saudis domestic debt in 2000

already exceeds more than 100 percent of its GDP. Its budget deficit in 1998, when oil prices

collapsed, was nearly 11% of its GDP. Saudis 2000 budget has government expenditures

growing by 12%, so even considerably higher oil prices will still produce a deficit forecast at

15% of total budget.

Major Saudi cities routinely experience regular power brownouts in the summer months, and the

desalinization plant in Jiddah, the countrys second largest city, cannot keep up with water

demand.

If Saudi modernizes its economy to a level which the United States now enjoys, its increased

electricity needs would propel its internal energy use from just over 2.1 million BOE per day to

over 12 million BOE per day by 2030. If Saudis 50 (to possibly 80) million people also want to

drive, the oil consumption this implies makes it far-fetched to think that Saudi could also

46

continue to be the rest of the worlds swing oil producer too.

I suspect the demographic

numbers for Saudi Arabia would truly shock the authors of The Limits to Growth. But these

numbers are real facts and the future they portend is profound from an energy perspective.

Saudis demographics are not an exception to the rest of the OPEC countries.

A careful

analysis of the OPEC countries population, their current electricity use (as a proxy for total

energy use) and the age and fertility rate for each country portrays the possible energy

squeeze the world could experience if the population of these countries continues to grow and

eventually narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. Exhibit 11 details this data.

With the exception of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, every OPEC producer has a far

lower GDP per capita than any of the prosperous countries of the OECD. Many still have 25 to

50% of their population living below the poverty line. Their average electricity use per capita is

only 15% to 20% of what the U.S. now enjoys.

47

All of these countries have a burgeoning population of people under 14 years old, and their

senior citizens (those older than 65) make up only 2% to 5% of the population base. Many of

the countries also have a current fertility rate of 3 to 6 children per female.

Exhibit 11

OPECS Population & Energy Demographics

Country Algeria Libya Iran Iraq Kuwait Nigeria Qatar Saudi UAE Venezuela Indonesia Equador Population (1988) 31.0 5.0 65.0 22.0 2.0 114.0 0.7 21.5 2.3 22.0 216.0 12.0 GDP 140 38 339 52 44 106 12 186 40 195 602 59 Per Capita 4,600 6,700 5,000 2,400 22,700 966 17,100 9,000 17,400 8,500 2,830 4,800 Population Below Poverty (%) 23 N/A 53 N/A N/A 34 N/A N/A N/A 31 N/A 35 Electricity Consumption 18.5 17 80 28 23 14 5 95 18 73 67 8 Electricity Use N/A 3.4 1.2 1.3 11.5 0.1 7.1 4.4 7.8 3.3 0.3 0.7 Population Under 14 Years 37% 36% 36% 44% 32% 45% 27% 43% 31% 33% 30% 35% Population Over 65 Years 4% 4% 4% 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 5% 5% 5% Fertility 3.3 3.8 2.5 5.1 3.2 6.0 3.4 6.3 3.5 2.6 2.6 2.6

Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency.

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INTERNATIONAL

What these numbers suggest is that some, or possibly all, OPEC producers might end up

consuming all of the energy they now export, even if they vastly increase their respective energy

supplies.

Some of these countries will undoubtedly switch from being energy exporters to

becoming energy importers, assuming some other countries end up with enough spare capacity

to still be an energy exporter by 2030!

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Is this OPEC scenario a mere fantasy or a sky is falling scare tactic? Only time will tell. But it

must be highly unrealistic to assume that another 30-years could elapse with these struggling

countries continuing to supply the rest of the world with precious energy whilst also still being

mired in poverty.

If OPECs internal energy use gradually erodes its ability to export, this raises an extremely

serious energy question. Could the rest of the world ever find a substitute from anywhere else?

Might the world find a host of other countries that become the OPECs of 2020 to 2050? Will

new forms of energy easily substitute this lost supply? Or, will the rest of the world become far

more energy efficient by the time these changes occur? Again, only time will finally tell the real

story, but these are precisely the mind-boggling issues which the Club of Rome hoped would be

resolved.

The Limits to Growth laid out in some detail how abrupt the arrival of a growth overshoot can be.

Imagine the impact on the worlds energy markets if all of the OPEC producers simultaneously

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became energy neutral and then potential energy importers, due merely to a combination of

rapid people growth and rising per capita energy use both occurring within a similar time period.

50

Energy Mix and Pollution: The Ultimate Limit to Growth?

When The Limits to Growth was first written, mans concern about ecology, the environment and

pollution was in its infancy. The first Earth Day was held only two years before the books

publication.

As environmental awareness grew, it remained localized to only the OECD

countries for much of the past thirty years.

I understand that Kazahstans first appointed

Minister of Ecology, speaking at an energy forum in late 1992, said that even the terms

environment and ecology were only introduced into the Russian language in 1988.

There are still enormous gaps in our knowledge of many key pollution issues. The extent to

which pollution results from run-offs into/from river flows, waste disposal from fertilizers and

even from methane emissions like cows is still barely understood.

Carbon dioxide seems to be one form of pollution creating the greatest scientific concern for its

potential to trap heat close to the earths surface.

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Population growth clearly enlarges the scale of carbon dioxide emission, even if per capital

consumption rates of pollution emitting items around the world had peaked and were now on the

decline.

Unfortunately, the opposite is the case.

There is a tremendous inequity in todays global

emissions.

One-fifth of the worlds population released over 60% of all measured carbon

emissions, while a much poorer one-fifth of the globes population released less than 2%. This

tiny emission is not the result of any concise effort to curb pollution. It merely speaks to the

abject poverty and miniscule industrial and energy use from a significant part of the globe, some

thirty years after The Limits to Growth first raised these pollution issues.

The one area which attracts the highest level of pollution concern is the globes energy usage.

As issue which gets far less notice is the energy mix which each country now has and the

future possible shifts in this energy mix.

The pollution impact of energy mix is at the heart of the pollutive impact of a growing population

that uses more and more energy. If the wrong form of energy, like coal, for instance, comprises

52

the bulk of all incremental energy growth, the probable impact this would have on our

atmosphere, absent some remarkable technical breakthroughs in clean coal energy creation, is

truly frightening.

Because this issue is so serious, it is worth examining the impact on possible future levels of

energy consumption and the impact this has on pollution, given various scenarios of the worlds

future energy mix.

If these issues are ignored, this could end up creating a genuine crisis for mankind, which

suddenly shows up in a classic overshoot.

If any reasonable energy consumption number is calculated for the year 2030, other than

a nonsensical assumption that the poor population of the globe never improves or grows in

number, the resultant volumetric energy growth will be staggering. If the world is fortunate

enough to find a way to actually produce such vast sums of added energy, a secondary

problem emerges.

The pollution created by this added energy could become

overwhelming or even life-threatening.

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These added energy volumes put a sharp focus on the type of energy mix that the world will

use thirty to fifty years from now. If coal retains its current mix, absent some revolutionary

improvement in the emissions that it produces, the worlds atmosphere will obviously be very

different than it is today. But, every percent decrease in coal use puts an added strain on the

alternate barrels of oil equivalent energy that would take coals place.

Take natural gas as a prime example since it is currently the cleanest form of energy that can

now be a realistic substitute for coal. Assume no growth in energy and assume also that coal

usage, which now accounts for about 40% of the worlds energy source, drops by only 5% and

is substituted by natural gas. This minor change would require the equivalent of almost twice as

much natural gas as Canada now consumes. If the worlds total energy use increases by 40 to

100 million BOE per day and coal usage drops by even 5% or 10%, the necessary natural gas

supply additions this shift implies start to go haywire.

While I have never been a believer that the world will face any true energy shortages in terms of

running out, as opposed to allowing daily supply fall short of daily demand, feeling comfortable

54

that the world could actually find a way to produce two or five times more natural gas in 30 to 50

years does arouse some curiosity as to whether the reserve base is sufficient for this to happen.

After all, natural gas is still a non-renewable resource. But these enormous volume additions

are precisely what an extrapolation of some simple trends imply.

As more and more natural gas is used to supply these increases in population growth and the

poor countries are fortunate enough to have meaningful GDP improvements, and as pollution

forces a conversion from coal to natural gas, there must be a risk that we suddenly use so much

natural gas that the worlds supply literally runs out. This is not an event likely to happen in

2005 or even 2010, but if it is even remotely a risk, solving it needs to be addressed today.

The French Riddle of the Lily Pond is still alive and well. It takes decades of planning to combat not having enough environmentally friendly energy, like natural gas. If we wait until the 29th

day when the lily has one more days growth before finally covering the pond, coursing a

different path will take place too late.

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Finding solutions to this type of energy dilemma is not an easy task. No silver bullets exist. A

simple solution is to ban further energy use. But, this nave assumption leaves too much of the

world prematurely trapped as energy pigmies. As The Limits to Growth pointed out almost 30

years ago, One of the best indications of wealthy human population is the amount of energy

consumed per person. That statement is even truer in 2000 than it was in 1972!

It is simply intolerable and totally unrealistic to ban wealth creation for the 4.8 billion people not

as fortunate as the remaining 1.2 to 1.6 billion who guzzle energy at a rate of 10 to 30 times the

consumption rate of the poor.

It is also nave and even less probable that the affluent people will voluntarily decide to

dramatically reduce their energy use in order to make way for the less fortunate to improve

their lifestyles.

The Limits to Growth should have forced these thought provoking, tough questions to the

forefront of current energy discussions.

They are real issues with few realistic answers.

56

Despite all the advances in technology and knowledge between 1972 and 2000, there are no

better solutions to the dilemmas posed in The Limits to Growth today than there were in 1972.

The authors of The Limits to Growth pointed to the dilemma surrounding pollution as a possible

restraint to the worlds growth in 1972. At that time there was a serious lack of knowledge about

what the appropriate upper limits of pollution growth in the worlds delicate ecological structure

might be. In 1972, mans concern for the effect of this action on the natural environment was

still very embryonic.

Scientific attempts to measure the environmental impact of human

consumption had just begun.

30 years later, the environments debate has become far more heated. Millions of trees have

been cut merely to produce the papers written about the environment! But clear, solid, scientific

proofs for where pollution limits kick in are still unclear. Not much progress was made on

defining what the genuine upper limits are to energy pollution, let alone all the other forms of

pollutants created by people and expanding industrial activity. Perhaps this void is yet another

fallout of the lack of the follow-through which The Limits to Growth authors so hoped would

occur.

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The only certainty in the current pollution debate seems to fall back to the improbable

assumption that exponential growth can continue on its present course for quite a few more

years before colliding with some immovable limits. Whether these limits occur by 2030, or even

before, or whether the world can reach the 2070 timeframe, which The Limits to Growth

addressed, is still unknown. Unlike the French Lily Pond Riddle, science has yet to define the

equivalent of the virulent lilys growth.

From an energy perspective, there must be some practical limits to the pollution fallout from a

possible doubling, tripling or even quadrupling current energy use in todays forms of energy. If

the coal mix does not decline, we must face some genuine doomsday scenarios.

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THE NEED FOR NEW ENERGY ALTERNATIVES

This whole topic raises the question of what other form of energy is next? If non-renewable

energy remains non-renewable and if pollution emissions are a risk of material concern

(particularly from coal), then the world must begin to find realistic sources of new renewable or

alternative energy. We cannot wait until the non-renewable energy cupboard is either empty or

too dirty to use any longer.

In 1972, The Limits to Growth authors pointed to three obvious energy alternatives: nuclear,

wind and solar. At the time, each held great promise as the future for clean energy growth.

Nuclear energy became a reality. It was only an energy sliver in 1972, but by 2000, it has

grown to 8% of the worlds total energy use. It became the only significant new energy source native to the 20th Century. It offered an even far cleaner way to create electricity than using

natural gas.

59

Sadly, the era of nuclear energy seems to have come and gone in the blink of an eye. Less

than a decade after nuclear energy was first introduced, the Three Mile Island disaster occurred.

Within a year, the U.S. saw its last order placed for a new nuclear power plant. Other countries

continued to expand their nuclear use.

But even France, Germany and Japan, the most

progressive nuclear users, are now under fierce pressure to not only drop any further expansion

in nuclear use, but are also debating whether their existing base of nuclear supply should be

maintained.

In the United States, not only have no new plants been ordered in over 20 years, we are now

beginning to dismantle our current nuclear base. It has been decades since any blueprints have

been developed for a new generation of nuclear power. Left to its current course, nuclear

energy is being buried almost before it reached adolescence in the grand scope of energy time.

The final nuclear irony is that no solution was ever found to the one perplexing problem nuclear

energy faced in 1972. Disposing of expended nuclear waste was an unsolved riddle when The

Limits to Growth was published. It remains as serious of a riddle today. Scientists now debate

how harmful expended nuclear waste might really be, but so far, there is not even any

60

acceptable permanent burial grounds for this spent waste. Everyone seems to share a genuine

not in my backyard concern to disposing of spent nuclear waste.

If nuclear energy has no growth role in the 21st Century, this puts an enormous focus on the

other three horsemen of renewable energy: wind, water and sun. Sadly, all three have their

own Achilles heel.

Water, i.e. hydro-electric power through building dams, is a time-tested reliable and clean form

of electricity creation. However, most of the obvious dam sites in many parts of the world have

already been erected. And, hydro-electric power also comes at a devastating ecological cost

unless dammed water merely covers non-useable land.

In the current energy long-range planning, few new dams are even envisioned. The few that

are now underway, like Chinas Three Gorges, are under savage environmental attack.

growing band of environmentalists are now launching a movement to begin breaching the

current dams so fish spawning can better thrive over the next 100 years. Like nuclear, this form

of energy might now start to wane.

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If water like nuclear, also has no additive role to the 21st Centurys energy mix, this leaves wind

and solar as the remaining solutions absent perfecting new forms of energy like fuel cells and

cold fusion.

Wind and solar have been around for a long time as energy sources, even though both became

ways to create electricity only a few decades ago. Despite a lengthy period of research, both

have severe limits to creating any sizeable energy output. Neither is dispatchable, a term

used in electricity circles to connote the ability to turn on a generator when energy is needed

and then immediately send the required energy to an energy consumer. Both are extremely

costly on a Btu of energy equivalent. Neither has been able to scale to a level to create

meaningful energy pools.

Since the sun does not always shine, nor the winds always blow, their dispatch will remain

irregular until a technology to store massive amounts of electricity is created. No real research

into this energy need is even taking place today. Despite all the research and development

poured into wind and solar energy, both remain as costly to produce as they were some 20 to

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30 years ago. Some critics also claim that both wind and solar use more energy in merely

building each form of power generation than either produce in a year or two. Both also bring

their own form of pollution - visual, and in the case of wind, noise.

In 1999, all forms of renewable energy (excluding hydro) generated only one-tenth of 1% of

Americas electricity. Of this tiny amount, geothermal accounted for almost half. Wood, the

worlds oldest energy form, and waste being burned accounted for almost all the remaining renewal energy. As the 20th century came to an end, wind and solar collectively only created one-tenth of 1% of renewable electricity in the U.S. What this means, in simple arithmetic, is

that the two promising new energy techniques, heralded to hold such promise when The Limits to Growth was first published, still account for only 1000th of 1% of U.S. electricity generation!

To say that no progress was made in this taxing energy issue since The Limits to Growth first hit

the bookstands is a colossal understatement.

There is always hope that a totally new form of energy becomes commercial long before any

sheer limits begin to curtail the worlds growth. Fuel cells and cold fusion both hold great

63

promise as breakthrough new energy forms. But neither is close to proving they work on any

scale or affordable price.

Fuel cell energy is right on our doorstep according to some proponents of this new technology.

But many questions still plague this new technology that was actually invented 161 years ago

and was put into space over 30 years ago.

The questions involve safety, cost, and the sheer availability of fuel to put into the cells. Natural

gas is the primary feedstock presumed to create the hydrogen to then create this new form of

energy. Given the other growth pressures which natural gas faces, the availability of spare

natural gas might be a foolish assumption.

Cold fusion might suddenly become a brand new energy source. But, little is yet know about

how it is even formed. Since it took 30 years to commercialize the atom, after it became a

viable weapon, it would be foolish for energy planners to assume something like cold fusion

could be developed into something significant in a far shorter time span. It is also worth noting

64

that even after nuclear became commercial, it took another 20 years before it grew to only 8%

of the worlds total energy mix.

When it comes to creating new energy, the only certainty we know, more than a century after

energy technology created the combustion engine and the refinery systems ability to crack oil

into finished products, along with the great strides of manufactured affordable electricity, is that

only ONE really new energy was commercialized in 100 years. And nuclear then began dying

before even reaching adolescence.

65

WE MUST NOW TAKE LIMITS TO ENERGY GROWTH SERIOUSLY

The population of the world is still on a projected growth path. Only widespread war or a

massive plague can turn back the fast paced growth still happening in so many developing parts

of the world. Hopefully, technological advances in water desalinization, agriculture and other

areas of possible limits will allow the world to grow while still avoiding the Limit risks which the

Club of Rome worried about some 30 years ago. But energy limits must be a genuine concern,

if the rich/poor gap is finally narrowed. Whether the world can continue its current growth path

and avoid a serious energy crunch, squeeze or even chronic shortages through 2010, let alone

2030, is an issue which got largely ignored over the past 30 years. Whether there is anyway to

guide the world to true global prosperity by 2050 or 2070 is an issue which should now be taxing

all the worlds best minds.

It is clear that the skeptics and scoffers of the Club of Romes The Limits to Growth got the real

message of The Limits to Growth wrong, at least from an energy perspective. They turned out

to be as wrong about The Limits to Growth as they were wrong about the entire energy picture as the 20st Century came to a close. These name-plate energy economists ended up spending

66

too much time criticizing this work and attributing doomsday dates that were never even part of

this written work. They then spent far too much time pontificating on how energy was gradually

becoming less important to the wonders of a New Economy and would obviously cost less as

time went by.

Instead of rolling up their collective sleeves to begin addressing serious energy issues, these

kibitzers spent their precious hours attacking the few voices of energy sanity. Over the years,

the energy economists incorrect dismissal of this important work was not only a mistake but

their criticism also turned somewhat mean-spirited and at times even shrill!

What a sad

conclusion for such a well-intended work to finally produce.

Lurking in the backdrop of this silly, misinformed chirping was a body of statistics, all in the

public domain, that were proving that many of the key issues raised by The Limits to Growth

were not only serious, but the magnitude of the problem was growing as the gap between the

rich and the poor widened and the poor population expanded at a much faster pace than the

rich.

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Perhaps the ultimate irony capping all the other mistakes which too many energy planners made as the 20th Century came to an end is that the work they lambasted so viciously turned

out to be true.

There is obviously no certainty that the world will really run out of any precious resource by

2030. There is also no magic to using 2030 as a doomsday date. The only reason I keyed

so many energy extrapolations to a 2030 date is that it doubles the timeframe already spent

since The Limits to Growth was first published. If you extend the time line towards 2050 or even

2070, the dates which the MIT models found too scary, and any of the current demographic,

industrialization or energy usage trends continue, the numbers this model creates are almost

too overwhelming to even comprehend. The feedback mechanism described by MITs System

Dynamics Model of the early 1970s is still alive and well. Before any source of energy finally

runs out, or the pollution such vast added volumes or energy use imply suddenly poisons the

earth, some natural break will undoubtedly stop the economic progress which devours a

precious and dwindling energy supply.

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Focus on a country like Nigeria, for instance.

If Nigerias rapid use of energy suddenly

transformed the country into an oil importer, the jolting impact this would likely have on its

economy would probably bring its growing prosperity to a halt, reversing its internal energy

consumption. Negative feedback does work. But these abrupt halts to further growth were

precisely what The Limits to Growth encouraged the world to find ways to avoid.

Examine carefully the demographics of the entire Middle East and ponder how any of these

countries can safely plan on being energy exporters through 2030, let alone 2050 to 2070. If

these countries finally use up so much energy that they have nothing left to export, is this the

final event which The Limits to Growth warned us about?

The Limits to Growth was never meant to be a doomsday book. Rather it was hoped that it

would trigger a change in the flow of human trends to avoid such a doomsday.

But, the

sponsors of this project were clear that it was simply a non-starter to leave the worlds wealth so

unevenly distributed.

They were equally clear that short of a world effort, todays (1972)

already explosive gaps and inequities will continue to grow. And the outcome of this trend can

only be a disaster.

69

They were also clear that the closer we got to the material limits to the planet, the more difficult

this problem would be to tackle. (The old French Lily Pond Riddle coming back to haunt us

once more.)

These civic-minded people who sponsored the modeling work and the authors who then wrote

the book were also convinced that the issues raised by The Limits to Growth had to be met by

our generation. The problems were too serious and the correction time too long to pass these

thorny issues onto a next generation.

The book closes on a poignant note: Our posture is one of very grave concern but not of

despairIt may be within our reach to provide reasonably large populations with a good

material life plus opportunities for limitless individual and social development.

Hopefully this optimism is still warranted, though the challenge has already been passed to a

new generation and NO progress has so far taken place.

70

It would be nave, in my opinion, to assume the gap between rich and poor could stay as it is

now, and even more nave to assume this gap can grow without finally creating massive civic

turmoil. If the gap gets too great, the poor will finally come over the walls of prosperity and

attempt to redistribute this wealth. History has shown this to be the case, time after time. Most

of our worst wars were not ideological battles but true fights over the redistribution of wealth.

But closing the rich/poor gap needs very carefully implementation, as the exponential changes

in both energy resources and a staggering number of other factors, including the pollution these

increases imply, will strain the worlds logistic and resources availability to its limits.

Phase One of the predicament of mankind never really made it to Phase Two. Instead, rather

than merely ignoring this work and forgetting its chilling conclusions if the issues raised were

forgotten, too many experts decided to use this thoughtful work as an easy target of

intellectual scorn.

As a serious student of energy for the past 30 years, and a strong believer that compounding

historical trends are often a far more reliable way to project the future than any alternate

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method, the world simply cannot continue the population growth in the poor parts of the world

and also have these impoverished people climb the ladder of affluence. The energy usage

these numbers imply do not match any sound plan for ever supplying the attendant energy this

scenario creates.

Is there time to begin the thoughtful work which the Club of Rome hoped would take place post

1972? I would hope so. But, another 10 years of neglect to these profound issues will probably

leave any satisfying solutions too late to make a difference. In hindsight, The Club of Rome

turned out to be right. We simply wasted 30 important years by ignoring this work.

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APPENDIX 1

Current Worldwide Energy Use

BOE Per Day (In Millions) OECD FSU Developing Countries Total 105 19 54 178 Oil Coal Natural Gas Nuclear Hydro Total Energy Mix (BOE In Millions) 72 44 43 14 5 178

Source: BP Energy Statistics.

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APPENDIX 2

Total Worldwide Energy Consumption

In Million Tons Oil Equivalent 1940 U.S. Western Europe USSR Rest Of World Total Million Barrels Of Oil Equivalent Per Day 600 400 125 300 1,425 1950 825 450 160 400 1,835 1960 1,100 700 475 925 3,200 1970 1,665 1,120 820 1,745 5,350 1980 1,850 1,280 1,170 2,600 6,900 1990 1,930 1,740 1,400 2,785 7,855 2000E 2,250 1,810 920 3,590 8,570

29,700

38,200

66,600

111,400

146,700

163,600

178,500

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APPENDIX 3

Middle East: The Sleeper In Energy Use

1970 Population Energy Consumption (Million Tons Oil Equivalent) BBOE/Day (In Millions Of Bbls) BOE Per Capita Per Year 60 66 1980 91 117 1990 132 212 2000 168 388 2030(E) 344 1,652

1,376

2,438

4,406

8,079

34,390

8.4

9.8

12.2

17.5

36.5 (E)

Source: Population: U.S. Bureau of Census. Energy Consumption: BP Amoco. (E): Extrapolates 2.5% per annum per capita increase 1970 - 2000 to 2030.

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APPENDIX 4

Some OECD Countries

1970 United States U.S. Population Energy Consumption Energy Demand Per Capita (BOE) United Kingdom U.K. Population Energy Consumption Energy Demand Per Capita (BOE) Spain Spain Population Energy Consumption Energy Demand Per Capita (BOE) 205 1,527 56.6 55.6 186.0 25.4 33.6 45.5 10.3 1980 228 1,851 61.7 56.3 203.8 27.5 37.5 76.5 15.5 1990 250 1,931 58.7 57.6 212.6 28.1 39.4 89.0 17.2 2000 276 2,249 61.9 59.5 226.9 29.0 40.0 121.5 23.1

_________________________ Assumes 1970 - 1972 = 5% per annum 1,864. Assumes 2000 = 102% of 1999.

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APPENDIX 5

Middle East Population

1970 Iran Iraq Saudi Arabia Yemen Syria Jordan Oman UAE Kuwait Qatar Israel Lebanon West Bank Total 28.9 9.4 6.1 6.3 6.2 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.1 2.9 2.3 0.7 60.0 1980 39.3 12.3 9.9 8.6 8.8 2.2 1.1 1.0 1.4 0.2 3.6 3.1 0.9 91.3 1990 55.7 18.1 15.8 12.0 12.4 3.2 1.8 1.9 2.0 0.5 4.5 3.2 1.3 132.4 2000 65.6 22.7 22.0 17.5 16.3 5.0 2.5 2.4 2.0 0.7 5.8 3.6 2.0 168.1

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APPENDIX 6

The Middle East Energy Supply

In Million Barrels Of Oil Equivalent Per Day 1970 Consumption Oil Natural Gas Coal Hydro Total Exports - Oil 935 367 -17 1,319 15,200 1,625 710 -21 2,356 11,600 3,390 1,770 48 21 5,229 14,200 4,554 3,351 119 21 8,045 18,700 26,400 10,000 --36,400 25,000 1980 1990 2000 2030 Est.

Source:

Historical: BP Amoco Energy Statistics. Futures Historical Extrapolation.

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APPENDIX 7

Barrels Of Oil Equivalent

(MM/Day)
Energy Mix (Ex-FSU) 1989 Total Energy Demand OECD FSU Rest Of World Energy Mix (Percent) Oil Natural Gas Coal Nuclear Hydrocarbon Total 162 MM/Day 92.0 28.6 41.4 64.3% 36.2% 47.3% 10.5% 3.8% 100.0% 1999 177.7 MM/Day 105.4 18.9 53.4 72.1% 43.0% 44.3% 13.6% 4.7% 100.0% Oil Natural Gas Coal Nuclear Hydrocarbon Total 1989 55.7% 24.3% 40.8% 9.3% 3.4% 100.0% 1999 68.3% 32.9% 40.8% 12.5% 4.3% 100.0%

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A COMPARISON OF THE LIMITS TO GROWTH WITH THIRTY YEARS OF REALITY

Socio-Economics and the Environment in Discussion CSIRO Working Paper Series 2008-09 Graham Turner

June 2008
ISSN: 1834-5638

Further information:

Clive Spash - www.clivespash.org Bev Rose - bev.rose@csiro.au

CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems GPO Box 284, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia www.csiro.au

CSIRO 2007. All rights reserved. This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cwlth), no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from the Commonwealth.

A Comparison of the Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality Graham Turner1

ABSTRACT In 1972, the Club of Romes infamous report The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972) presented some challenging scenarios for global sustainability, based on a system dynamics computer model to simulate the interactions of five global economic subsystems, namely: population, food production, industrial production, pollution, and consumption of non-renewable natural resources. Contrary to popular belief, The Limits to Growth scenarios by the team of analysts from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology did not predict world collapse by the end of the 20th Century. This paper focuses on a comparison of recently collated historical data for 19702000 with scenarios presented in the Limits to Growth. The analysis shows that 30 years of historical data compares favorably with key features of a business-as-usual scenario called the standard run scenario, which results in collapse of the global system midway through the 21st Century. The data does not compare well with other scenarios involving comprehensive use of technology or stabilizing behaviour and policies. The results indicate the particular importance of understanding and controlling global pollution.

Keywords:

integrated global model, limits to growth, scenarios, data comparison, model validation, collapse, pollution

CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems, GPO Box 284, CANBERRA ACT 2601, Australia

G. Turner

INTRODUCTION In 1972, a team of analysts from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) published The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972). This well-known and

controversial book documented for the general public the results of the MIT study carried out by Meadows et al., who had been commissioned by The Club of Rome to analyse the world problematique using a computer model called World3 developed at MIT. The World3 model permitted Meadows et al. to examine the interactions of five subsystems of the global economic system, namely: population, food production, industrial production, pollution, and consumption of non-renewable natural resources. The time scale for the model begins in the year 1900 and continues until 2100. output. A description of the background that led to the Limits to Growth (subsequently abbreviated as LtG) is given elsewhere (McCutcheon, 1979). This reference also briefly summarises the LtG publication (pp. 714). A detailed description of the Historical values to the year 1970 are broadly reproduced in the World3

model, the supporting data and an analysis of how the model behaves was also published (Meadows et al., 1974). The release of the LtG in 1972 had immediate and ongoing impacts. Environmental issues and the sustainability debate were further popularised as millions of copies were sold, and translated into 30 languages. Scientifically, it

introduced Jay Forrestors newly founded computational approach of system dynamics modelling, and quantitative scenario analysis, into the environmental discipline. By linking the world economy with the environment it was the first

integrated global model (Costanza et al., 2007). The salient message from the LtG modelling was that continued growth in the global economy would lead to planetary

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

limits being exceeded sometime in the 21st Century, most likely resulting in the collapse of the population and economic system; but also that collapse could be avoided with a combination of early changes in behaviour, policy and technology. Despite these major contributions, and dire warnings of overshoot and collapse, the LtG recommendations on fundamental changes of policy and behaviour for sustainability have not been taken up, as the authors recently acknowledge (Meadows et al., 2004). This is perhaps partly a result of sustained false statements that discredit the LtG. From the time of its publication to

contemporary times, the LtG has provoked many criticisms which falsely claim that the LtG predicted resources would be depleted and the world system would collapse by the end of the 20th Century. Such claims occur across a range of publication and media types, including scientific peer reviewed journals, books, educational material, national newspaper and magazine articles, and web sites (Turner, unpublished). This paper briefly addresses these claims, showing them to be false. The main purpose of this paper however, is to compare LtG scenario outputs of the World3 model produced in 1974 (the second edition of LtG) with 30 years of observed data covering 1970 to 2000. This comparison is made to distinguish

between scenarios in terms of approximate magnitudes and trends of key variables, and is therefore commensurate with the purpose of the LtG modeling, i.e. to understand different global economic behaviour modes rather than being strictly predictive. The World3 model was not intended to be predictive or for making detailed forecasts, but to provide a means for better understanding the behaviour of the world economic system. In this first simple world model, we are interested only in the broad behavior modes of the population-capital system. (Meadows et al., 1972,
2

G. Turner

p.91). Meadows et al. developed this understanding by experimenting with various settings of parameters reflecting different scenarios, and carrying out detailed sensitivity analysis, much of which is described in (Meadows et al., 1974). The output graphs produced from the World3 model are predictive only in the most limited sense of the word. These graphs are not exact predictions of the values of the variables at any particular year in the future. They are indications of the systems behavioral tendencies only. (Meadows et al., 1972. pp. 9293). A brief review is given in the next section of the LtG model, the output variables that will be compared with observed data, and the scenarios used in the comparison. The sources, uncertainties and applicability of the historical data are described in the third section, and the data compared with the LtG scenario outputs. The comparison is discussed further in the fourth section. There are sufficiently large distinctions between the model output scenarios over this 30-year period to be able to: identify some scenarios appearing more likely than others, and therefore the extent to which a global sustainable pathway has been followed; and identify the main areas of uncertainty and key areas for research and monitoring. THE LIMITS TO GROWTH MODEL AND OUTPUT The LtG Model There are four key elements to understanding the constraints and behaviour of the world system that was captured in the LtG study. It is the combination of these elements in the one study that gives the LtG analysis its strength above other comparable and critical work.

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

The first involves the existence of feedback loops, both positive and negative. When positive and negative feedback loops are balanced a steady state outcome results; however, when one loop dominates an unstable state is the result, such as the simple case of exponential growth when there is a dominant positive feedback. When the dominance of the feedback loops depends on the level of the variable in question, then it is possible to produce oscillations in the variable over time. A second key element is the presence of resources, such as agricultural land, whose function may be eroded as a result of the functioning of the economic system. The modeled resources can also recover their function, and the rate of recovery relative to degradation rates affects when thresholds or limits are exceeded as well as the magnitude of potential collapse. The third key element is the presence of delays in the signals from one part of the world system to another. For instance, the effects of increasing pollution levels may not be recognised on life expectancy or agricultural production for some decades. This is important because unless the effects are anticipated and acted on in advance, the increasing levels may grow to an extent that prohibits or constrains feasible solutions whether technological, social or otherwise. Treating the world economic system as a complete system of sub-systems is the fourth key element. When considering the challenges of an individual sector such as energy or agriculture on its own it is relatively easy to propose mitigating solutions. However, the solutions rarely come without implications for other sectors. The real challenge then becomes solving issues in multiple sectors concurrently. The World3 model was highly aggregated, treating variables as either totals, such as population being the total world population, or appropriate averages, such

G. Turner

as industrial output per capita. No spatial or socio-economic disaggregation was directly employed in the model structure, although the values of parameters were informed by available data at suitable levels of disaggregation. The LtG project was one of the early applications of computer based system dynamics. Causal links were made mathematically to reflect the influence of one variable on another, both within and between various sectors of the global economic system. In this way, positive and negative feedback loops were established. The LtG Output Variables to be Compared with Data For each scenario, the output presented from the World3 model of LtG covered eight variables: global population; crude birth rate; crude death rate; services per capita; food per capita; industrial output per capita; non-renewable resources (fraction of 1900 reserves remaining); and persistent pollution (normalised against 1970 level). These are described below to clarify any issues of interpretation. Population The LtG World3 model simulates the global population as an aggregate total, using average birth and death parameters. Although this aggregate nature may

complicate interpretation of the simulations, it does not necessarily invalidate the results of the model as long as suitable values for parameters are used, as described in Meadows et al., 1974. Birth and Death Rates Birth and death rates in the LtG are simply the crude numbers of these events in each year per capita. Like the other LtG variables presented here, birth and death rates are endogenously calculated, but also influenced by exogenous parameters, such as desired family size.

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

Services Per Capita The LtG services per capita variable focuses on the health and educational contribution to the populace. Increasing services per capita were assumed in the LtG to raise life expectancy and lower the birth rate. Consequently it is not

appropriate to use observed data on the service sector as a whole (such as the proportion of world GDP that is attributed to the service sector) since such measures would encompass aspects that do not necessarily reflect health and educational benefits. For instance, increases in the tourism industry associated with greater travel by people in relatively wealthy countries could not be considered to contribute to longer lives and fewer children per family at a global level. Food Per Capita The issues regarding food per capita are similar to those for services in the sense that higher food per capita results in a healthier population. The LtG modelled food per capita in terms of a uniform measure expressed as kilograms of grain equivalent. Industrial Output Per Capita In the LtG study the industrial output per capita was used as a measure of the material wealth of the population, indicating the level of goods consumed by the population. This variable was also related to a number of components in the World3 model, such as capital made available for the provision of services and food production, resources consumed and pollution generated. Non-renewable Resources Non-renewable resources are expressed in the LtG World3 simulation as the fraction of non-renewable resources remaining, treating this as an aggregate. The LtG defines a non-renewable resource (Meadows et al., 1974, p.371) as a mineral or fossil-fuel commodity that (1) is essential to industrial production processes and (2)
6

G. Turner

is regenerated on a time scale that is long compared with the 200-year time horizon of the model2. The fraction of non-renewable resources remaining is more difficult than demographic variables to quantify with measured data, since the fraction of what remains relies on estimates of what was originally in the ground. The LtG acknowledged this uncertainty and used a range of estimates, starting with a resource base with a static reserve index of 250 years in 1970 (which was approximately equivalent to that of iron), and increasing this ten-fold. Before proceeding to describe the available data below there are several aspects to non-renewable resources that should be outlined, namely the concepts of: ultimate resource base; extraction effort; aggregation of all minerals and fuels into one variable; and resource substitution. The key quantity that creates the greatest degree of uncertainty in this analysis is the estimate of the original quantity of resources in the ground available for extraction and use over the 200 year timeframe of the LtG simulation irrespective of the extraction technology available3. This quantity, the ultimate resource or

resource base (Rogner, 1997; McCabe, 1998), is always greater than estimates of reserves, which are essentially the resources that have been discovered (or anticipated near-term discoveries) that can be extracted economically using

The LtG definition did not include agricultural material inputs such as phosphorus and potassium, presumably so that the effect of resource constraint on the industrial sector could be isolated and understood.

The World3 calculations actually used the resources in 1900 as the quantity of original resources, which is a very good approximation to the ultimate resource since a negligible amount was extracted prior to 1900. This is particularly true owing to the large uncertainties regarding estimates of the ultimate resource.

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

contemporary techniques; estimates of reserves generally increase cumulatively over time toward the ultimate resource as more discoveries are made or other techniques become economic. Estimates of the ultimate resource also vary

depending on assumptions about relevant geophysics or long-term extraction possibilities. The approach in this paper is to determine from published literature, upper and lower estimates of the ultimate resource that span a suitably wide range. Then it is reasonably straightforward to obtain the fraction of the non-renewable resource remaining, since there is relatively good data on the cumulative quantity of the resource that has been consumed over time. Closely related to the estimate of ultimate resource is the issue of extraction effort, i.e. the capital and operational inputs required to extract the resources. For instance, while it is in principle possible to identify truly massive resources of minerals if this includes all molecules that are distributed in dilute concentrations in the crust of the earth (Interfutures, 1979), to do so on the basis of any technological extraction process for the foreseeable future would be prohibitively expensive (not just in economic cost but also in terms of energy, water and other material requirements) (Meadows et al., 1992). Consequently, such in principle resource estimates are not included in the analysis presented here, since they are unlikely to contribute to the resource base in the timeframe covered by the World3 model. The extraction effort associated with the resource base is explicitly included in the World3 model, implemented so that increasing capital and operating inputs are required as the fraction of non-renewable resources remaining (i.e. the portion of the ultimate resource yet to be extracted) decreases. In general this is because further extraction takes place with resources of lower grade ores and reduced accessibility. The LtG modeling incorporates an allocation of 5% of the industrial capital to
8

G. Turner

extraction of resources, and remains at this level until nearly half the resource base is consumed (see Figure 5.18 of Meadows et al., 1974). This steady efficiency is in recognition of potential technological improvements in resource discovery and extraction. However, as the resources remaining drops below 50% the LtG modeling assumes that the fraction of capital required rises steeply (for instance, at 25% of resources remaining, 60% of capital is diverted for use in the resource sector). This relation was based on data associated with accessing resources of increasing scarcity, such as US oil exploration costs. Sensitivity analysis in the LtG project showed that as long as there is increasing resource usage (at about 4% pa), even large errors in the fraction of capital allocated to resources cause only a small error in the timing of the eventual increase in resource costs (Meadows et al., 1974, p.398). A potentially confounding issue is the aggregate nature of the non-renewable resource variable in the LtG simulation. Resources are not considered separately, but as an aggregate. If there is little substitutability between resources then the aggregate measure of the non-renewable resources remaining is determined by the resource in shortest supply because economic growth within the model is affected by the increasing extraction effort associated with this resource. If there is unlimited substitutability then the aggregate measure is determined by the sum of all resources including the most readily available resource because as other resources are diminished the industrial process can switch to more available resources without (in this case) significant impact. Persistent Pollution The final variable for comparisonpersistent pollutionis a difficult variable to quantify with appropriate data. Few measurements of pollutants amounts (volumes

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

or concentrations) were found that span the last three decades and match the LtG criteria for this variable, namely: arising from industrial or agricultural production; distributed globally; persist for long periods (in the order of decades or more); and damage ecological processes, ultimately leading to reduction of human life expectancy and agricultural production. Aside from data availability, comparison with the World3 model output is complicated by the necessity of relating absolute pollution levels to damage of ecological processes. This aspect is explored further in the discussion comparing data with model output. LtG Scenarios To permit the design and testing of various scenarios (in Meadows et al., 1972), a selection of variables were established as exogenous parameters. These could be set at different values throughout the time period of the simulation, allowing the study of the effects of different policies, technology and behaviour. Exogenous variables were varied to create different scenarios, and endogenous parameters were varied to determine the sensitivity of the model output to key factors and uncertainties. Three key scenarios from the LtG4 are compared in this paper with data: standard run (Figure 35 in the LtG); comprehensive technology (Figure 42 in the LtG); and the

The scenario graphs are from the second edition published in 1974. 10

G. Turner

stabilized world (Figure 47 in the LtG). The three scenarios effectively span the extremes of technological and social

responses as investigated in the LtG.

The output from these scenarios is

reproduced in Figure 1. The graphs show the output variables described above on normalized scales, over a two century timescale (19002100). FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE The standard run represents a business-as-usual situation where

parameters reflecting physical, economic and social relationships were maintained in the World3 model at values consistent with the period 19001970. The LtG

standard run scenario (and nearly all other scenarios) shows continuing growth in the economic system throughout the 20th Century and into the early decades of the 21st Century. However, the simulations suggest signs of increasing environmental pressure at the start of the 21st Century (eg. resources diminishing, pollution increasing exponentially, growth slowing in food, services and material wealth per capita). The simulation of this scenario results in overshoot and collapse of the global system about mid-way through the 21st Century due to a combination of diminishing resources and increasing ecological damage due to pollution. The comprehensive technology approach attempts to solve sustainability issues with a broad range of purely technological solutions. This scenario

incorporates levels of resources that are effectively unlimited, 75% of materials are recycled, pollution generation is reduced to 25% of its 1970 value, agricultural land yields are doubled, and birth control is available world-wide. These efforts delay the collapse of the global system to the latter part of the 21st Century, when the growth in economic activity has outstripped the gains in efficiency and pollution control.

11

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

For the stabilized world scenario, both technological solutions and deliberate social policies are implemented to achieve equilibrium states for key factors including population, material wealth, food and services per capita. Examples of actions

implemented in the World3 model include: perfect birth control and desired family size of two children; preference for consumption of services and health facilities and less toward material goods; pollution control technology; maintenance of agricultural land through diversion of capital from industrial use; and increased lifetime of industrial capital. The LtG authors explicitly emphasised uncertainty about the timing and extent of any overshoot and collapse of the global system. Nevertheless, substantial

sensitivity analysis (Meadows et al., 1974) showed that the general behaviour (if not the detail) of overshoot and collapse persists even when large changes to numerous parameters are made (such as the relationship of health and the environmental impacts with increasing pollution). Previous Reviews of LtG from an Historical Perspective Numerous reviews of LtG appeared mostly in the decade of years following the publication of the original report (Weitzman, 1992; Hardin and Berry, 1972). Since these reviews were made relatively shortly after the 1972 publication there was little scope for analysing the LtG scenarios against actual world developments and the reviews therefore focused on technical issues associated with the modelling approach. Somewhat surprisingly very few reviews of the LtG modelling have been made in recent years using the benefit of hindsight (Costanza et al., 2007).

Perhaps this can be attributed to the effectiveness of the number of criticisms attempting to discredit the LtG on the basis of present availability of resources
12

G. Turner

(Turner, unpublished). A common claim made about LtG is that the 1972 publication predicted that resources would be depleted and the world system would collapse by the end of the 20th Century. Since any such collapse has not occurred or been imminent, the claims either infer or explicitly state that the LtG is flawed. In contrast, few publications have noted the falsity of these criticisms (eg. Norton, 2003; Lowe, 2002; Meadows, 2007). Shortly after the LtG appeared, The New York Times Sunday Book Review magazine published a general critique by three economists of the LtG and of two earlier books by Jay Forrester (Passell et al., 1972). Among a series of incorrect statements, they attributed the LtG with the statement that World reserves of vital materials (silver, tungsten, mercury, etc.) are exhausted within 40 years, which is clearly attributed in the LtG to a US Bureau of Mines publication. Passell et al. also state all the simulations based on the Meadows world model invariably end in collapse (Meadows, 2007). Neither of these statements is borne out in the LtG, as can be seen by the scenarios reproduced in this paper. Nevertheless, it appears that these criticisms have been promulgated widely (Turner, unpublished). Some critiques, such as that in (Lomborg, 2001) and (McCabe, 1998), specifically identify a Table (number 4) of non-renewable natural resources and inappropriately select data (from column 5) that fits their criticism while ignoring other data (column 6) that illustrates extended resource lifetimes due to expanded reserves. Other notable references include places of high profile or influence, such as presentations to the UK Royal Society of Arts (Ridley, 2001), and educational material for children (Sanera and Shaw, 1996) and university economic students (Jackson and McIver, 2004). Similarly, the false claims have also been adopted by sceptical, independent or environmentally aware people and organizations. For

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A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

example, in its Global Environment Outlook (GEO3, Ch.1 pp. 23) (UNEP, 2002) the United Nations Environment Programme quotes the LtG as concluding world collapse by the year 2000. Inaccurate and exaggerated statements such as the following from a book (Moffatt et al., 2001) on sustainable development do not help to maintain a clear and logical analysis: Some earlier estimates from computer simulation models such as the discredited limits to growth modelssuggested that during the next 250 years (i.e. by about 2195) the human population and most other life forms will cease to exist. In reality, the LtG scenarios finished in 2100, and the simulations did not indicate that the human population will cease to exist, but rather that a dramatic decline in numbers might result. Some studies that are relevant to the historical review of LtG in this paper are summarised below. While all are useful additions to the sustainability debate for various reasons, none explicitly compare a comprehensive set of observed historical data with the original LtG analysis. Several of the original LtG authors published two revisions: 20 and 30 years after the original study. Beyond the Limits (Meadows et al., 1992) and Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update (Meadows et al., 2004) are updates of the original work using better data that had become available in the intervening years. They determined that the three overriding conclusions from the original work were still valid, and needed to be strengthened [pp. xiv-xvi]. In Beyond the Limits for example, updates were made using empirical data and relatively minor changes were made to seven parameters. In some cases, such as agriculture and population, errors in two parameters had opposite effects that tended to cancel out, with the result that the model output of the original study remained in reasonable agreement with historical data. The most obvious example
14

G. Turner

of this is in the birth and death rates (actually underlying parameters) producing the same aggregate population as originally calculated. In addition to updating

parameter values, Meadows et al. also changed how new technologies were implemented, from being driven exogenously to being determined by an adaptive structure within the system dynamic model that sought to achieve a system goal (such as a desired level of persistent pollution). However, this was a feature

explored in the original work and published in the accompanying technical report in 1974 (Meadows et al., 1974). With these changes Meadows et al. re-ran the World3 model over the same time period (1900 to 2100) as the original study. The model output was presented graphically in a manner similar to the 1972 publication. Consequently, they did not compare the historical data over the period 19702000 with the original simulations published (in Meadows et al., 1972). One of the original authors also published a review paper (Randers, 2000), stating Interestingly, history since 1970 has shown that the surprise free scenario the standard run of Limits to Growth has proved to be a good description of actual developments this far. Data is not presented to accompany this view, instead the paper focuses on the continuing relevance of feedback loops. In an energy white paper, Simmons (Simmons, 2000) notes how accurate many of the trend extrapolations are 30 years after the original LtG publication. He specifically presents global population figures, and generally reviews the production and consumption of energy for broad comparison with the LtG. In 2001 a special issue of Futures was published with articles focused on the LtG (Cole and Masini, 2001). Although this issue had a retrospective aspect, it was

15

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

oriented to social impacts of the LtG and did not compare historical data with the LtG simulations. A good summary of the LtG scenarios is provided by Jancovici available on the Internet (Jancovici, 2003). Some historical data is presented, such as population growth and concentrations of global air pollutants, and general observations about driving forces related to the standard run scenario of LtG. comparisons with the output of LtG scenarios were not made. OBSERVED DATA AND COMPARISON WITH LTG SCENARIO OUTPUTS In this paper, independent historical data generally covering the period 1970 to 2000 are compared with the output of the World3 simulation (Meadows et al., 1972). Publicly available sources were used, such as Worldwatch Institutes Vital Signs (Brown et al., 2002), World Resource Institute Earthwatch database (WRI, 2002) and UN publications (UN, 2001a). There are no other publications that the author is aware of that compare independent historical data with the original World3 outputs (Costanza et al., 2007). This includes revisions by several of the original LtG However, specific

authors 20 and 30 years later (Meadows et al., 1992; Meadows et al., 2004), which were implemented by updating model settings. Although it should be possible to also compare the World3 output over 1900 to 1970 with historical data, this would not provide a good test of the LtG analysis since the World3 model was calibrated by data for 19001970, and therefore historical data is not necessarily independent of that used by the model. In keeping with the nature of the LtG modeling and accuracy of the global data, a simple graphical and quantitative comparison is made between the observed data and the modeled output of the three scenarios. This comparison may provide

16

G. Turner

insight into the validity of the LtG World3 model, as a Predictive Validation (or Positive Economics) technique (Sargent, 1998). In the Discussion section, the

comparison is summarized using the root mean square deviation (RMSD) for each variable, for each scenario. However, the extent of any model validation is

constrained since the comparison with data is complicated by the reported model output being limited to the set of scenarios previously published. Lack of agreement between data and model output may arise if the assumptions embodied in the settings of the exogenous parameters in a scenario are not commensurate with the evolution of the global system from 1970 to 2000. The comparison presented here is as much a test of the scenarios as it is of the model. Further statistical analysis (such as Graphical Residual Analysis, Degenerate Tests, or Traces (Sargent, 1998)) could be considered beneficial in the context of more detailed data and global models, particularly if random variations are consequently introduced. The variables used for comparison are those that were displayed in the LtG output graphs, described above. These variables collectively represent the state of the global system as calculated in the World3 model. The following sub-sections detail the data used for the comparison, and explore the comparison between data and LtG model output. Careful consideration of what constitutes appropriate data was required since the concepts (or level of aggregation) of several of the LtG variables requires interpretation. For example, the persistent pollution variable is meaningful when

considered in terms of the effect that the level of total global pollution has on the human or environmental system. Details on the source of observed data are

provided to aid further independent comparisons. Estimates of uncertainty or ranges

17

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

of alternative data are given. Observed data have generally been normalized to the LtG output at 1970. Following a description of the observed data, a graphical comparison with the LtG scenario output is provided. The LtG model output for each scenario is shown in each Figure using open symbols (standard run with open diamonds comprehensive technology with open triangles squares ,

, and stabilized world with open . In each graph the

), compared with observed data as solid circles

shaded portion shows the period 19001970 over which the World3 simulations were calibrated with historical data available then, and the model output over 1900 1970 is shown with open circles Population Data Total global population was obtained from the on-line EarthTrends database of the World Resources Institute (http://www.wri.org/) (WRI, 2002). The source of this .

population data was the: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, 2002. World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision. Dataset on CD-ROM. New York: United Nations. Among the data presented in this paper, global population is likely to be one of the more accurate, being based on a process of regular censuses. There will be some degree of error due to issues such as some countries not undertaking censuses (for example during 19851994 202 of 237 countries or areas conducted a census (UN, 2001b)) and limitations in the census reporting mechanisms. However, global population data is widely reported and referenced without significant variance and any errors will be negligible with respect to the precision of the World3 model output. The observed data was normalized at 1970 to be equal to the World3 output.
18

G. Turner

Population Comparison Observed global population (WRI, 2002) using UN data closely agrees with the population for the standard run scenario, as shown in Figure. 2. However, as shown next, this is a result of compensating discrepancies in the birth and death rates. Comparison with the comprehensive technology scenario is even better, while the stabilized world population is significantly lower (about 25%) than the observed population. FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE Birth and Death Rates Data Birth and death rates were obtained from the on-line EarthTrends database of the World Resources Institute (http://www.wri.org/) (WRI, 2002). The source of the

crude birth rate was given as the: United Nations (U.N.) Population Division, Annual Populations 19502050 (The 1998 Revision), on diskette (U.N., New York, 1999). For the death rate, the reported source was the same as for total population (above). Both birth and death rates have been normalized to the LtG World3 output at the year 1955, rather than 1970 since a departure between the observed data and the World3 output for the crude death rate should be made explicit for proper comparison. Birth & Death Rates Comparison Both the observed birth and death rates drop rapidly (Figure 3 and Figure 4), though the death rate has a saturating trend. The rate of decrease of both variables is such that the overall rate of growth of the population remains as calculated in the World3 standard run. The comprehensive technology scenario has a good agreement with birth rates, while the stabilized world scenario involves birth rates that fall

19

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

substantially faster than the observed data. All of the scenarios show death rates that fall over time (until later this century), but are higher than the observed data for most of the period of comparison. The death rate in the stabilized world scenario appears to approximate the observed data with an offset of about two decades. FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE The net birth rate (i.e. the difference between the crude birth and death rates) is shown in Figure 5 for both the observed data and the World3 standard run scenario. Simply extrapolating trends for the latest observed data suggest that birth rates may equal death rates in about 2030 give or take a decade, at which time the population would stabilise. In this case, the population would peak at a value higher than that of the standard run scenario. FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE Services Per Capita Data Several data measures have been used here to compare with the World3 model of services (per capita) provided to the global populace. Literacy and electricity data were used for comparison with the LtG output because of the relevance to health and educational contribution to the populace. Electricity consumed (per capita)

globally and the literacy rate (as a %) for both adults and youths were obtained from the WRI EarthTrends database. These latter two data sets were available only from 1980 onwards and were sourced from the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics, Literacy and Non Formal Education Sector (2002). For the graphical comparisons, the literacy data was

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G. Turner

normalized to the LtG value at 1980, and electricity per capita normalized at 1970. No attempt was made to aggregate the observed data into one data set. Uncertainty ranges are likely to be potentially greater than 10% since this data will combine the uncertainty of global population estimates with that of literacy rates or electricity consumption. Literacy rates in particular will be subject to errors associated with survey methods taken across numerous countries. Using both

electricity and literacy measurements without combining them provides an explicit indication of the degree of uncertainty in measurements of services per capita: by the year 2000 these data are some 20% divergent. Services Per Capita Comparison The comparison between observed and modeled services per capita illustrated in Figure 6 is mixed. The observed data on adult and juvenile literacy per capita (lower services curves) shows significantly lower growth than modeled services in Figure 6 (and in the other scenarios). For electricity, the services per capita for the standard run scenario is close to the observed data. In this case, the modeled services per capita is growing in a near-linear manner between 1970 and 2000 (subsequently saturating after 2000) whereas all observed data indicate diminishing growth already. FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE The comprehensive technology and stabilized world scenarios do not compare well with the observed data, significantly over-estimating services per capita. In the stabilized world scenario however, the saturating trend of the

modeled services per capita roughly approximates that of electricity per capita. The modeled output is a result of simulating deliberate policies of directing preferences toward services, among other things, whilst constraining system growth that would

21

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

otherwise lead to deleterious effects. In the comprehensive technology scenario by contrast, the large compounding growth in the World3 model output results in services per capita being some 35% higher than the observed electricity per capita and 80% higher than literacy rates. Food Per Capita Data For the observed data on food per capita it is appropriate to use the average supply per person of total energy content in food, obtained as kilocalories per capita per day from the WRI EarthTrends database which identifies the source as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United NationsFAOSTAT on-line statistical service, Rome, 2002. Using this data set is preferable to using selected food types (such as meat, grain and fish) since these entail more specific issues of distribution and use (eg. grain production may or may not include supply of grain to meat production). Nevertheless, using other data sets results in similar trends and

magnitudes (eg. see world grain production per capita (Lomborg, 2001, Figure 50), and world meat production per capita (Brown et al., 2002, p. 29). Of course, the supply of the energy content of food is not itself a complete measure of the nutritional contribution to humans of agricultural production, but it is a necessary component for which there is good data. The observed data was normalized to the LtG value at 1970 and observed data from 1960 was also included. In the case of food, in contrast to services, the observed data is arguably more precise given that there are considerable efforts to record agricultural production. Accompanying notes to the data source state: data from the FAO on food supply are governed by established accounting practices and are generally consider to be reliable; and data are available for most countries and regions from 1961. They also note that this data refers only to supply and should not be used as
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G. Turner

a measure of consumption. For the purposes of comparing global averages, this means that the observed data is an effective upper limit for comparison with the food per capita variable. Food Per Capita Comparison The observed food per capita (average supply per person of total energy content in food, (WRI, 2002) using FAO data) shows signs of diminished growth (Figure 7), most similar to that in the standard run scenarioby year 2000 there is only about 5% difference between observed and modeled data. Comparisons with other data sets provide similar indications: global meat production per capita has increased approximately linearly by 40% (Brown et al., 2002); world grain production per capita peaked in the 1980s and has increased only a few percent since 1970; and a smooth curve of the developing countries grain production per capita has increased about 20% (Lomborg, 2001). FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE The food per capita output of the comprehensive technology and stabilized world scenarios are substantially higher than the observed data. Any of the

scenarios that include pollution control and increased agricultural productivity (such as the comprehensive technology scenario) show food per capita increasing at a compounding rate of growth to levels well beyond that observed. This indicates that this combination of technological initiatives is not being implemented or realised at a rate that is greater than the population growth rate. The stabilised world scenario shows a higher level of food per capita than the observed data, due to the simulation of soil enrichment and preservation in the scenario. This scenario also diverts capital to food production even if this is

23

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

uneconomic so that sufficient food is available for all people (where the population has been stabilised at less than the current world population). Industrial Output Per Capita Data Recorded data for industrial output (Meadows et al., 1992, p.5) was obtained directly from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division figures, which are provided as a global aggregate (and for regions) (UN, 2001a). Several

yearbooks were used to cover the period 19701999. The data is presented as Index numbers of industrial production. This data source over earlier years was used by the LtG study to help establish the historical simulation relating to industrial output per capita (Meadows et al., 1974). It is unclear what level of uncertainty is associated with this data, but the per capita output will have at least the same relative error as the population total. The observed data was normalized to the LtG value at 1970. Industrial Output Per Capita Comparison The standard run scenario produces an industrial output per capita that is very close (eg. within 15% at the year 2000) to the observed data (UN statistics on industrial output (UN, 2001a)) in Figure 8. Except for the time period 19801984, there is a very close match between the rate of increase in the simulated and observed data; the difference may be due to the oil shock of the early 1980s, producing a slow-down in industrial output. Evidently the oil shocks in the 1970s (or those of 1990 and 2000) did not impact on industrial output to the same degree. Other research may shed light on the reason for the different impacts, including the role of real price increases of oil, creation of strategic petroleum reserves, early fuel efficiency gains, and development of other sources/locations of oil and alternative fuels. Rather ironically, the relatively quick recovery from the early 1970s oil shocks
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G. Turner

may have counteracted the initial public concern about sustainability raised by the LtG when published at about the same time (Simmons, 2000). FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE The application of technological improvements in all sectors of the World3 model in the comprehensive technology scenario results in rapidly accelerating growth of material wealth and capital substantially beyond that observed. In the stabilized world scenario, industrial output per capita is brought toward an asymptote through policies that direct excess industrial capability to producing consumption goods rather than re-investing in further capital growth, and a preference for services over material goods. While the industrial output per capita is similar to that observed at year 2000, the decreasing trend toward stabilization contrasts with continued growth in the observed data. Non-renewable Resources Data In short, the approach taken here used upper and lower bounds to the observed data. These bounds were based on high and low estimates of the ultimate fossil-fuel resources; mineral resources are broadly considered here to be unlimited. This

approach aligns with what might be considered the position of the critics of LtG and therefore presents a demanding test of the comparison between the observed data and the World3 output. To account for substitutability between resources a simple and robust approach has been adopted. First, it is assumed here that metals and minerals will

25

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

not substitute for bulk energy resources such as fossil fuels5 A brief survey of the literature (including that of some decades ago (Khan et al., 1976; Interfutures, 1979; Meadows et al., 1992; Meadows et al., 1972; Meadows et al., 1974)) on reserves and resource base for non-fuel materials illustrates that many of the common metals are available in substantial abundance eg. iron and aluminium. Typically the ratio of reserves to production rates (or static reserve index) is some hundreds of years. For some other metals, eg. nickel and lead, more recent examination of the trend in reserve estimates indicate the situation may be more constrained (Andersson, 2001), but there remain possibilities for substituting other metals and materials for at least some of the more constrained metals (Khan et al., 1976). On the basis of these general evaluations, the analysis here assumes that non-fuel materials will not create resource constraints. Therefore, the upper and lower bounds for the observed data on nonrenewable resources presented in this paper are a direct result of high and low estimates of the ultimate resource obtained from differing opinions of ultimate fossilfuel resources, as described below. Compared with metals and minerals, the situation for energy resources is arguably more constrained. Estimates of the ultimate energy resource depend on opinions about the degree to which non-conventional and potentially politically sensitive resources are included in the estimates. Broad figures are presented

below that provide reasonable upper and lower bounds, although it is beyond the scope and requirements of the analysis in this paper to undertake a comprehensive

The chemical potential implicit in fuel cells can be used to generate energy, however the potential of most minerals is low as they are often oxidised. Hydrogen fuel cells are currently being proposed as a potential supply of bulk energy from fuel cells, and apart from the use of renewable energy the most likely means of production of the hydrogen fuel is from fossil-fuels or nuclear energy. 26

G. Turner

literature review on energy resourcesgiven the purpose of the LtG study and corresponding level of modeling precision it is appropriate to provide estimates specified to one significant figure (and even simply to orders of magnitude). This is also consistent with the high degree of uncertainty surrounding energy resource estimates. A lower bound for energy resources can be constructed that includes conventional oil and gas, development of non-conventional oil and gas, high-quality coal (assumed equivalent to oil in energy), and non-breeder nuclear fission, but omits extensive coal resources and speculative sources such as methane hydrates and nuclear fusion. This lower bound assumes that further substantial exploitation

of coal or adoption of breeder technology for nuclear fission is limited by global political sensitivity, and that technological advances are made in the extraction of the currently dominant energy sources (oil and gas) but not in other speculative sources (or means of eliminating pollution, such as carbon sequestration). It is on this basis that full coal resources have been omitted in the lower bound estimate, consistent with this large resource being undeveloped due to environmental concerns. It is reasonable to include the non-conventional resources in the lower bound since the LtG simulation incorporates the requirement for significant extraction efforts that might be associated with these resources. With each of the energy resources included in the lower bound contributing roughly 10,000 EJ (approximately equivalent to 2000 Gboe (giga barrels of oil equivalent; see Table 1), the lower bound for the energy resource base sums to about 60,000 EJ (30%). To put this in perspective, the cumulative consumption of energy to-date amounts to roughly 10-20,000 EJ (Grbler, 1998, Figure 6.18).

27

A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

An upper bound to the energy resource base is suggested in this paper that is essentially founded on the ultimate coal resource, being in the range of 100,000 200,000 EJ. The uncertainty range in this figure (i.e. 100,000 EJ) is sufficient to include the assumption that conventional oil and gas also continue to be part of the future energy mix and are therefore included in the upper bound estimate for the energy resource base. TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. If it is assumed that energy sources are made available through technological advances on energy sources such as breeder-style nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, or methane hydrates, then for all intents and purposes the non-renewable resource base becomes unlimited. Similarly, if it is assumed that renewable energy sources such as solar energy are developed to replace non-renewable sources then this is broadly equivalent in the LtG model to an unlimited non-renewable resource base6. The LtG scenarios that incorporate unlimited resources show that limits are consequently reached in other sectors of the world system. Assuming that energy resources are not completely unlimited, the analysis presented here uses an upper and lower limit for the original resource base of 150,000 and 60,000 EJ respectively7. Having these bounds, the fraction of nonrenewable resources remaining is determined by subtracting the cumulative production of resources from the original resource base. Production data has been obtained from the Worldwatch Institutes Vital Signs (Brown et al., 2002), which has

This simple assumption ignores issues that essentially depend on the efficiency and rate of energy delivery to the economic system, and analysis indicates that these aspects may be significantly limiting to the operation of a modern economy on renewable energy.
7

The upper limit is an average of the range in ultimate resources of coal. 28

G. Turner

compiled the data from several sources: UN, BP, DOE, IEA and press reports. There is negligible difference (roughly 10% variation on year 2000 cumulative production) with data from other sources, eg. IIASA (see (Grbler, 1998) Figures 6.18 and 6.19, data available from the Internet) and World Resource Institute Earthwatch database (WRI, 2002). Non-renewable Resources Comparison As shown in Figure 9, the observed data on the fraction of non-renewable resources remaining varies between the upper and lower estimates of 96% and 87% in 1970, decreasing to 91% and 76% respectively in the year 2000. These values are

sufficiently high that the extraction effort assumed in the LtG remains relatively minor, and therefore capital is not significantly diverted from the agricultural and industrial sectors. The range in the observed data bounds all of the World3 scenario outputs. A noticeable increase in the capital required would appear in about 2030 using a simple extrapolation of the lower bound of observed data on non-renewable resources and applying the LtG assumptions for capital requirements. FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE In the case of the standard run scenario, the lower bound at the year 2000 level is about 5% above the modeled level, and the rate of decrease for observed resources remaining is not as rapid as that of the World3 output. There is very good agreement between the time series of the upper estimate of observed resources remaining and the World3 output for the comprehensive technology scenario. The stabilized world scenario shows almost linearly decreasing resources, at a level between the upper and lower estimates of observed data.

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A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

Persistent Pollution Data In keeping with the LtG properties for persistent pollution, the most reliable and relevant quantity appears to be atmospheric greenhouse gases, in particular CO2 levels. This data was obtained from the Worldwatch Institutes Vital Signs (Brown et al., 2002), which has compiled the data from several sources: UN, BP, DOE, IEA and press reports. It compares well with other sources, such as Figure 133 of (Lomborg, 2001). Ideally the observed data would be the sum of all persistent pollutants, each weighted by an appropriate factor for the longevity and ultimate ecological impact of the pollutant. Other potential components of persistent pollution include heavy

metals, radioactive wastes, persistent organic pollutants (such as PCBs), NOx, SOx, and ozone depleting substances. Generally, these suffer from: a lack of suitably long time series data; globally aggregated figures, or; are not expressed as a relative or absolute amount of the pollutant. In the case of ozone depleting substances, typically data is either presented as concentrations of separate CFC gases (eg. WRI EarthTrends database) or as annual emissions (eg. Lomborg, 2001 Figure 143 or Grbler, 1998 Figure 6.7), which requires knowledge of atmospheric dynamics such as residence times to be able to infer the cumulative atmospheric concentration. Given the difficulty of obtaining suitable data on other pollutants, the approach taken was to use atmospheric CO2 levels relative to 1900 levels as a measure of persistent pollution. The 1900 level of about 300 ppm was subtracted from the

reported total CO2 concentration because the LtG simulation assumes zero global pollution in 1900. This offset data (i.e. CO2 concentration less 300 ppm) was The offset CO2 levels grow in a slowly

normalized to the LtG value at 1970.

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G. Turner

compounding fashion (11.5% pa) from 1970 to year 2000, increasing by a factor of 2.7 times the 1970 value. Persistent Pollution Comparison In the standard run scenario pollution has increased from 1970 by more than a factor of three by year 2000. Since these increases are from relatively low levels, the difference between observed and modeled levels of persistent pollution at year 2000 is about 15% in the standard run scenario, Figure 10 (and any scenario that does not employ enhanced pollution control or stabilising policies). Due to pollution control technology and resource efficiencies, both the comprehensive technology scenario and stabilized world scenarios produce pollution levels lower than half the observed levels of atmospheric CO2. FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE DISCUSSION The good general comparison of the observed data with the LtG standard run scenario is summarized in Table 2 and Figure 11. This table shows the difference at year 2000 of both the value and the rate of change of the scenario variable relative to the value and rate of change of the observed data. The use of these two

measures is suited to the smoothly varying time-series which generally are either concave up or down (i.e. approximately second degree polynomials) over the time period of the comparison. Shaded cells in the table highlight those percentage

differences which are greater than 20% for the value at 2000, and 50% for the rate of change. Differences below these levels are judged to be within typical uncertainty bounds of the data and model outputs. TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

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A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE A more general comparison of data and model output over the time-series is given in Figure 11 by the normalized root mean square deviation (RMSD) for each variable, for each scenario. The deviation is the difference between the observed data and the model output at each 5-year time-step. To remove scale effects the RMSD has been normalized to the mean of the observed data for each variable (i.e. it is a co-efficient of variation). The standard run scenario is in substantially better agreement with the observed data than either alternative scenario as shown by the generally smaller normalized RMSD values for the standard run (where all normalized RMSD values, expect death rate, are below 20%). Generally, the stabilized world and comprehensive technology scenarios over-estimate food, services and material goods for the population. Population is under-estimated by the stabilized world scenario. All scenarios match the

remaining non-renewable resources to varying extents. Global persistent pollution is under-estimated by both the stabilized world and comprehensive technology scenarios. While the comparison between observed pollution level and the different scenarios is instructive, it is worthwhile to consider the ultimate impact of pollution. At two or three times the 1970 levels of global pollutioni.e. observed data and standard run scenario output at 2000the impacts on health and agriculture are assumed in World3 to be very low, only becoming substantial at significantly higher levels. For example, at 40 times the 1970 levels of pollution the World3 model assumes a 10% reduction in average life expectancy, and this accelerates nonlinearly as pollution increases (Meadows et al., 1974).

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Such an impact response function qualitatively reflects concerns raised by some climate scientists that dangerous anthropogenic interference may occur at global temperature increases as little as 1C above current global temperature (Hansen, 2003), though Hansen (and others) (Schneider and Lane, 2006) note that other scientists estimate the critical threshold level may be 2C or more. Continuation of recent growth rates of CO2 of about 1-1.5% p.a. may result in an approximate doubling of CO2 concentration by 2050 which may cause an increase in global temperature of 2C, and therefore possible dangerous climate change. To compare the LtG scenarios with those of the IPCC, a range of possible CO2 levels at 2050 are indicated by the vertical bar on the pollution graph Figure 10): 460 ppm (lower end of the bar) is estimated to result from low annual emissions scenarios (such as the IPCC B2 scenario); while 560 ppm (upper end) is possible under high growth scenarios (such as IS92a and A1F1 scenarios) (Solomon et al., 2007). The levels of pollution calculated in the LtG scenarios near mid-century are broadly in keeping with respective scenarios of the IPCC and associated environmental impacts, though the LtG pollution levels are 12 decades in advance of the respective IPCC scenarios. More recent research suggests that annual

greenhouse gas emissions are rising more quickly than the IPCC scenarios (Raupach et al., 2007), and could double by 2030 (Garnaut et al., 2008, draft). This would bring the potential future CO2 levels into close agreement with the relevant LtG scenarios (560 ppm and standard run, and 460 ppm and comprehensive technology). At current pollution levels, the LtG appears to over-estimate the impact (eg. 0.2% reduction in life expectancy). This may be one reason for the higher level of the modeled crude death rate compared with observed data in the standard run

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A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

(see Figure 4), though drawing a firm conclusion requires a detailed understanding of other responses, such as the improvement in health from services and food per capita, and complicated interactions among the factors in the system dynamics of the World3 model. To undertake such an examination at this time may not be justified, since data on such impacts is extremely limited. Additionally, the World3 model was designed for highlighting potential dynamics of the global systemthe aggregate nature of the model was not intended for making precise predictions but understanding the degree to which technological and behavioural changes can influence global dynamics. In keeping with this purpose, we draw broad conclusions below about the likely trajectory of the global system. More generally, even though the comparison of scenario outputs with historical data cannot be construed as providing absolute confirmation of the model, if there were fundamental flaws in the World3 model then scenario outputs from the model would be unlikely to match the long time-series data as well as they do. This follows from the multiple interactions in the model between the demographic, industrial, agricultural, services, resources and environmental components. These interactions are likely to cause any significant flaw in one part of the model to be propagated into other outputs, resulting in multiple discrepancies with the historical data. Consequently, the good comparison of scenario outputs with historical data provides a degree of validation of the World3 model, and emphasizes the likelihood of the global system reproducing the underlying dynamics of the standard run scenario. Full confirmation that these dynamics lead to overshoot and collapse requires either that this event occurs (which is clearly undesirable), or that details of thresholds and impact response functions in the LtG model are judged in advance to be sufficiently accurate. The parallels described above between
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G. Turner

pollution in the LtG standard run and dangerous climate change impacts from further greenhouse emissions, as well as the extensive agreement of observed data with the standard run scenario output, provide considerable but not complete confirmation of the overshoot and collapse dynamics. The comparison presented here also emphasizes that the LtG did not predict collapse of the global system by 2000, contrary to pervasive but incorrect claims. In fact, all LtG scenarios show the global economic system growing at the year 2000. Furthermore, the general trends and interactions involved in the standard run scenario resonate with contemporary environmental and economic pressures, notably peak oil, climate change and constrained food production. As further

growth occurs in the standard run scenario under business-as-usual settings, the attempts of the World3 model to alleviate pressures in one sector of the global system by technological means generally results in increasing pressures in other sectors, often resulting in a vicious cycle or positive feedback. Stressful signs of this may be apparent now, as the following examples illustrate. Reduced crop

production has been blamed on newly introduced bio-fuels displacing crops, extreme weather conditions possibly associated with early climate change impacts, and growing demand for meat-based diets (Ki-Moon, 2008). The overall system-wide effect of some bio-fuels in reducing greenhouse gases is also in contention, when factors such as fertilizer, new infrastructure, land-clearing (Searchinger et al., 2008; Fargione et al., 2008) and transport requirements are included. Bio-fuels may also increase pressures on water resources, deplete soil nutrients and increase destruction of native forests (UN-Energy, 2007). Efforts to provide water security such as recycling water or desalination require greater energy use than more

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A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

conventional means, further increasing the demand for resources and production of greenhouse gases. Nor have efficiency gains generally resulted in overall decrease of pressures, but instead are likely to have contributed to increased pressure due to the rebound effect or Jevons paradox, as efficiency contributes to economic growth (see eg. (Jevons, 1865; Polimeni and Polimeni, 2006; Huesemann, 2003; Herring, 2006; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Wackernagel and Rees, 1997; Homer-Dixon, 2006)). A most notable example is the overall reduction of carbon intensity of the economy almost continuously for well over a century, while the rate of carbon emissions has not decreased but instead grown exponentially (Grbler, 1998). This general feature of undue reliance on technological solutions was explored in more complex dynamic scenarios using the World3 model (Meadows et al., 1974). The LtG scenarios also provide some indication of the change in consumption (as well as technological progress) that may be required to achieve a sustainable global system. The stabilized world scenario presents a sustainable global

average per capita level of material wealth as approximately equal to contemporary levels (see Figure 8). Currently most of this wealth is enjoyed by roughly one quarter or less of the global population. Assuming that this total level of material wealth were distributed evenly across a large fraction of the future global population (say 9 billion people) compared with less than 1.5 billion people in developed countries, requires an average per capita material wealth about 1/6th of current levels in developed countries. Note that the stabilized world scenario also incorporates

higher average per capita services and food than the contemporary average, though equitable global distribution would also involve some reduction in these levels for people in developed countries.
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G. Turner

CONCLUSION Appropriate and publicly available global data covering 19702000 has been collected on the five main sub-systems simulated by the Limits to Growth World3 model: population, food production, industrial production, pollution and consumption of non-renewable resources. In the style of predictive validation, this data has been compared with three key scenarios from the original LtG publication (Meadows et al., 1972). This comparison provides a relatively rare opportunity to evaluate the output of a global model against observed and independent data. Given the high profile of the LtG and the implications of their findings it is surprising that such a comparison has not been made previously. This may be due to the effectiveness of the many false criticisms attempting to discredit the LtG. As shown, the observed historical data for 19702000 most closely matches the simulated results of the LtG standard run scenario for almost all the outputs reported; this scenario results in global collapse before the middle of this century. The comparison is well within uncertainty bounds of nearly all the data in terms of both magnitude and the trends over time. Given the complexity of numerous

feedbacks between sectors incorporated in the LtG World3 model, it is instructive that the historical data compares so favorably with the model output. By comparison, the comprehensive technology scenario is overly optimistic in growth rates of factors such as food, industrial output and services per capita, and global persistent pollution. Similarly, significant departures in the trajectory of key factors such as population, food and services per capita and global persistent pollution are evident between the data and the stabilized world scenario.

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A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

Global pollution has an important role in the LtG modeling, the scenario outcomes, and in this data comparison. Fortunately, uncertainty about the

relationship between the level of pollution and ultimate impacts on ecological systems and human health is diminishing, particularly regarding greenhouse gases and climate change impacts. In addition to the data-based corroboration presented here, contemporary issues such as peak oil, climate change, and food and water security resonate strongly with the feedback dynamics of overshoot and collapse displayed in the LtG standard run scenario (and similar scenarios). Unless the LtG is invalidated by other scientific research, the data comparison presented here lends support to the conclusion from the LtG that the global system is on an unsustainable trajectory unless there is substantial and rapid reduction in consumptive behaviour, in combination with technological progress.

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REFERENCES Andersson, B.A. (2001) Department of Physical Resource Theory, Chalmers University of Technology and Gteborg University, Gteborg. Brown, L.R., Abramovitz, J.N., Assadourian, E., Dodson, J., Dunn, S., Flavin, C., French, H., Gardner, G., Halweil, B., Huvane, K., Hwang, A., Larsen, J., Lenssen, N., Mastny, L., McGinn, A.P., Nierenberg, D., Postel, S., Renner, M., Roodman, D.M., Sampat, P., Saoshiro, U., Scholand, M. and Sheehan, M.O. (2002) Vital Signs 2002: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Cole, S. and Masini, E.B. (2001) Introduction - Limits beyond the millennium: a retro-prospective on The limits to growth. Futures 33: 1-5. Costanza, R., Leemans, R., Boumans, R. and Gaddis, E. (2007) Integrated Global Models. In Sustainability or Collapse? An Integrated History and Future of People on Earth. W. Steffen (ed.). Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 417-446. Fargione, J., Hill, J., Tilman, D., Polasky, S. and Hawthorne, P. (2008) Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt 10.1126/science.1152747. Science 319: 1235-1238. Garnaut, R., Howes, S., Jotzo, F. and Sheehan, P. (2008, draft) Emissions in the Platinum Age: The Implications of Rapid Development for Climate Change Mitigation. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (1991) Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge MA and London UK: MIT Press. Grbler, A. (1998) Technology and Global Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hansen, J. (2003) Can we defuse the global warming <http://naturalscience.com/ns/articles/01-16/ns_jeh.html> time bomb?

Hardin, G. and Berry, R.S. (1972) Limits to Growth: Two Views. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 28: 22-27. Herring, H. (2006) Energy efficiency-a critical view. Energy 31: 10-20. Homer-Dixon, T. (2006) The Upside of Down-Catastrophe, Creativity and the Renewal of Civilization. Washington: Island Press. Huesemann, M.H. (2003) The limits of technological solutions to sustainable development. Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy 5: 21-34. Interfutures (1979) Facing the future: mastering the probable and managing the unpredictable. Washington, D.C.: OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). Jackson, J. and McIver, R. (2004) Macroeconomics. New York: McGraw Hill. Jancovici, J.M. (2003) What was there in the famous Report to the Club of Rome? <http://www.manicore.com/anglais/documentation_a/club_rome_a.html> Jevons, W.S. (1865) The Coal Question; An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the Nation, and the Probable Exhaustion of Our Coal Mines. London: Macmillan and Co.
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Khan, H., Brown, W. and Martel, L. (1976) The Next 200 Years. London: Abacus. Ki-Moon, B. (2008) Opportunity in Crisis - Inaugural lecture of the Geneva Lecture Series. United Nations, Geneva (Switzerland). <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26395&Cr=food&Cr1=crisis> Lomborg, B. (2001) The Sceptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lowe, I. (2002) A Sustainable Debate. New Scientist 2369: 56. McCabe, P.J. (1998) Energy Resources-Cornucopia or Empty Barrel? Bulletin 82: 2110-2134. AAPG

McCutcheon, R. (1979) Limits of a Modern World: A Study of the Limits to Growth Debat. London: Butterworths. Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L. and Randers, J. (1992) Beyond the Limits: Global Collapse or a Sustainable Future. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J. and Behrens III, W.W. (1972) The Limits to Growth: a Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind. New York: Universe Books. Meadows, D.H., Randers, J. and Meadows, D.L. (2004) Limits to Growth: The 30Year Update. White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing Co. Meadows, D.L. (2007) Evaluating Past Forecasts: Reflections on One Critique of The Limits to Growth. In Sustainability or Collapse? An Integrated History and Future of People on Earth. R. Costanza, L. Grqumlich and W. Steffen (eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 399-415. Meadows, D.L., Behrens III, W.W., Meadows, D.H., Naill, R.F., Randers, J. and Zahn, E.K.O. (1974) Dynamics of Growth in a Finite World. Massachusetts: Wright-Allen Press, Inc. Moffatt, I., Hanley, N. and Wilson, M.D. (2001) Measuring and Modelling Sustainable Development. New York: The Parthenon Publishing Group. Norton, J. (2003) A limitless myth. <http://info-pollution.com/limits.htm> Passell, P., Roberts, M. and Ross, L. (1972) In New York Times Sunday Book Review. Polimeni, J.M. and Polimeni, R.I. (2006) Jevons' Paradox and the myth of technological innovation. Ecological Complexity 3: 344-353. Randers, J. (2000) From limits to growth to sustainable development or SD (sustainable development) in a SD (system dynamics) perspective. System Dynamics Review 16. Raupach, M.R., Marland, G., Ciais, P., Le Quere, C., Canadell, J.G., Klepper, G. and Field, C.B. (2007) Global and regional drivers of accelerating CO2 emissions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) of the United States of America 104: 1028810293. Ridley, M. (2001) Technology and the Environment: The Case for Optimism. Prince Philip Lecture delivered to the Royal Society of Arts, 8 March 2001 with HRH Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, in the Chair

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Rogner, H.H. (1997) An Assessment of World Hydrocarbon Resources. Annual. Review of. Energy and the Enviroment 22: 217262. Sanera, M. and Shaw, J.S. (1996) Facts, Not Fear: Teaching Children about the Environment. Washington, DC: Regnery Publications. Sargent, R.G. (1998) Verification and Validation of Simulation Models. In Winter Simulation Conference: Proceedings of the 30th Conference on Winter Simulation. D.J. Medeiros, E.F. Watson, J.F. Carson and M.S. Manivannan (eds.). Washington D.C.: IEEE Computer Society Press, 121-130. Schneider, S.H. and Lane, J. (2006) An Overview of Dangerous Climate Change. In Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change. H.J. Schellnhuber, W. Cramer, N. Nakicenovic, T. Wigley and G. Yohe (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 7-23. Searchinger, T., Heimlich, R., Houghton, R.A., Dong, F., Elobeid, A., Fabiosa, J., Tokgoz, S., Hayes, D. and Yu, T-H. (2008) Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change 10.1126/science.1151861. Science 319: 1238-1240. Simmons, M.R. (2000) Revisiting The Limits to Growth: Could The Club of Rome Have Been Correct, After All? An Energy White Paper. <http://greatchange.org/ov-simmons,club_of_rome_revisted.html> Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Marquis, M., Averyt, K., Tignor, M.M.B., Miller, H. R. and Chin, Z. (eds.) (2007) IPCC Fourth Assessment Report of Working Group 1: Climate Change 2007 - The Physical Science Basis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Turner, G.M. (unpublished) A review of claims made against The Limits to Growth about its prediction of global collapse. United Nations (2001a) Statistical Yearbook, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistical Division. New York: United Nations. United Nations (2001b) World Population Monitoring 2001: Population, Environment and Development, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. New York: United Nations. UN-Energy (2007) Sustainable Bioenergy: A Framework for Decision Makers. United Nations. United Nations Energy Programme (UNEP) (2002) Global Environment Outlook 3: Past, Present and Future Perspectives. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. Wackernagel, M. and Rees, W.E. (1997) Perceptual and structural barriers to investing in natural capital: Economics from an ecological footprint perspective. Ecological Economics 20: 3-24. Weitzman, M.L. (1992) Comments and Discussion (on Lethal Model 2: The Limits to Growth Revisisted by William D. Nordhaus. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2: 50-54. World Resources Institute (WRI) (2002) EarthTrends database. World Resources Institute. <http://earthtrends.wri.org/>

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A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

Figure 1. Output from the LtG modelling for three scenarios ((a) standard run, (b) comprehensive technology, and (c) stabilized world) that effectively span the technological and social responses explored in the LtG

(a) Standard Run

(b) Comprehensive Technology

(c) Stabilised World

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Figure 2. Comparison of observed data (solid circles ) for global population with the LtG model output for each scenario (standard run with open diamonds , comprehensive technology with open triangles , and stabilized world with open squares ). The calibrated model output over 19001970 is shown with open circles

Figure 3. Comparison of observed data (solid circles ) for crude birth rates with the LtG model output for each scenario (standard run with open diamonds , comprehensive technology with open triangles , and stabilized world with open squares ). The calibrated model output over 19001970 is shown with open circles

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A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

Figure 4. Comparison of observed data (solid circles ) for crude death rates with the LtG model output for each scenario (standard run with open diamonds , comprehensive technology with open triangles , and stabilized world with open squares ). The calibrated model output over 19001970 is shown with open circles

Figure 5. Observed (solid symbols) and World3 calculated (open symbols) net birth rates (the crude birth rate less the crude death rate)

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Figure 6. Comparison of observed data (solid circles ) for services per capita (upper: electricity; middle: adult literacy %; lower: youth literacy %) with the LtG model output for each scenario (standard run with open diamonds , comprehensive technology with open triangles , and stabilized world with open squares ). The calibrated model output over 1900 1970 is shown with open circles

Figure 7. Comparison of observed data (solid circles ) for food per capita with the LtG model output for each scenario (standard run with open diamonds , comprehensive technology with open triangles , and stabilized world with open squares ). The calibrated model output over 1900 1970 is shown with open circles

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A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

Figure 8. Comparison of observed data (solid circles ) for industrial output per capita with the LtG model output for each scenario (standard run with open diamonds , comprehensive technology with open triangles , and stabilized world with open squares ). The calibrated model output over 19001970 is shown with open circles

Figure 9. Comparison of observed data (solid circles ) for non-renewable resources remaining with the LtG model output for each scenario (standard run with open diamonds , comprehensive technology with open triangles , and stabilized world with open squares ). The calibrated model output over 19001970 is shown with open circles

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Figure 10. Comparison of observed data (solid circles ) for global persistent pollution with the LtG model output for each scenario (standard run with open diamonds , comprehensive technology with open triangles , and stabilized world with open squares ). The calibrated model output over 19001970 is shown with open circles . Separate points at 2050 show IPCC estimates of possible upper and lower CO2 levels at 2050 (from A1F1 and B2 scenarios), corresponding to 560 and 460 ppm respectively

Figure 11. Normalised root mean square deviation for each LtG output compared with the observed data, for each scenario. Closer agreement between data and model output is indicated by smaller RMSD

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A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality

Table 1. Fuel

Collated estimates of ultimate resources of primary energy Ultimate resource Estimate in estimate joules Reference

Conventional Oil 2000 G barrels 300 Gtoe 22.5 G barrels 420 Gtoe 2000 Gboe 2400 Gtoe 6750 Gtoe 10 x 1021 (Bentley, 2002) (Rogner, 1997) (McCabe, 1998) (Rogner, 1997; Grubler, 1998) (Bentley, 2002) (Khan et al., 1976) (Rogner, 1997; Grubler, 1998) (Interfutures, 1979)

Gas

20 x 1021 10 x 1021 10 x 1021 100-200 x 1021 300 x 1021

Coal Nonconventional Oil

7000 G barrels 30-2000 Quad 520 Gtoe 450 Gtoe 1450 Gboe not applicable 100 Gtoe 300 TW-y

40 x 1021 20 x 1021 10 x 1021 20 x 1021 5 x 1021 9.5 x 1021

(Bentley, 2002) (Khan et al., 1976) (Rogner, 1997; Grubler, 1998) (Grubler, 1998) (Bentley, 2002)

Gas Coal Nuclear fission, non-breeder

(Interfutures, 1979) (Hoffert et al., 2002)

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Table 2.

Values and rates of change of scenario variables compared with the data at year 2000 for three scenarios. Percent differences are with respect to the observed data, and positive when the scenario values (or rate of change) are greater than the observed data. Shaded cells indicate differences of more than 20% in value, or greater than 50% for rates of change

Scenario

% difference at 2000 relative to Population observed data value 0 25

Crude birth rate

Non Crude death renewable rate resources 40 70 -25 to -5 80 to 415

Services per Food per capita capita

Industrial output per capita 5 10

Persistent pollution

15 -15

-5 to 30 25 to 470

-5 -30

15 80

Standard Run

rate of change

value Comprehensive Technology rate of change

0 10

5 0

-10 250

0 to 30 -15 to -75

35 to 80 360 to 1970

100 170

35 65

-55 -155

value Stabilized World rate of change

-25 -70

-30 -75

0 130

-10 to 20 15 to -65

45 to 90 20 to 450

25 -70

10 -125

-55 -155

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