CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY

Terrorism has struck all through history and around the world. Even in ancient Roman times, emperors such as Tiberius and Caligula dealt with terrorism by using

banishment, and execution towards those who opposed their rule. Later in the 1860's a terrorist group called the Ku Klux Klan was formed by Southerners to terrify former slaves and prevent them from voting or run for office. In the 19th century, Western Europeans, Russians, and Americans

adopted terrorism, and believed that the best way to get what they wanted was to assassinate people holding high positions of power. Terrorism went from numerous attacks in the 20th century, to less frequent but more destructive assaults in the 21st century. The threat of terrorism has now become more deadly. In the 20th century, terrorism went through some
1

great changes. The use of new technology such as automatic weapons and electrically bursting explosives encouraged terrorists to act violently and provided them with an easier way of attacking. At the time, attacks were mainly from groups trying to undermine or overthrow existing political institutions. However, today terrorism exists with different causes and purposes in mind. It has been used in anticolonial conflicts such as in Ireland, Britain, Algeria and France. It is used when settling conflicts between different groups in possession of homeland such as Palestine & Israel. It is also used in religious disagreements in the case of the Catholics & Protestants in Northern Ireland and in internal conflicts between revolutionary forces and established

governments, for example: Malaysia, Argentina, Iran, and Nicaragua.1 The rise of guerrilla tactics by non-state actors in the last half of the twentieth century was due to several factors. These included the flowering of ethnic nationalism (e.g. Irish, Basque, and Zionist), anti-colonial sentiments in the vast
2

British, French and other empires, and new ideologies such as communism. Terrorist groups with nationalist agendas have formed in every part of the world. For example, the Irish Republican Army grew from the quest by Irish Catholics to form an independent republic, rather than being part of Great Britain. Similarly, the Kurds, a distinct ethnic and linguistic group in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, have sought national autonomy since the beginning of the 20th Century. The Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), formed in the 1970s, uses terrorist tactics to announce its goal of a Kurdish state. The Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are members of the ethnic Tamil minority. They use suicide bombing and other lethal tactics to wage a battle for independence against the Sinhalese majority government.2 International terrorism became a prominent issue in the late 1960s, when hijacking became a favored tactic. In 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked an El Al Flight. Twenty years later, the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, shocked the world. The era
3

also gave us our contemporary sense of terrorism as highly theatrical, symbolic acts of violence by organized groups with specific political grievances. The bloody events at the 1972 Munich Olympics were politically motivated. Black September, a Palestinian group, kidnapped and killed Israeli athletes preparing to compete. Black September's political goal was negotiating the release of Palestinian prisoners. They used spectacular tactics to bring international attention to their national cause. Munich radically changed the United States' handling of terrorism: "The terms counterterrorism and international terrorism formally entered the

Washington political lexicon," according to counterterrorism expert Timothy Naftali. Terrorists also took advantage of the black market in Soviet-produced light weaponry, such as AK47 assault rifles created in the wake of the Soviet Union's 1989 collapse. Most terrorist groups justified violence with a deep belief in the necessity and justice of their cause. Terrorism in the United States also emerged. Groups such as the Weathermen grew out of the non-violent group Students

for a Democratic Society. They turned to violent tactics, from rioting to setting off bombs, to protest the Vietnam War.3 Religiously motivated terrorism is considered the most alarming terrorist threat today. Groups that justify their violence on Islamic grounds- Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah come to mind first. But Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and other religions have given rise to their own forms of militant extremism. In the view of religion scholar Karen Armstrong this turn represents terrorists' departure from any real religious precepts. Muhammad Atta, the architect of the 9/11 attacks, and "the Egyptian hijacker who was driving the first plane, was a near alcoholic and was drinking vodka before he boarded the aircraft." Alcohol would be strictly off limits for a highly observant Muslim. Atta, and perhaps many others, are not simply orthodox believers turned violent, but rather violent extremists who manipulate religious concepts for their own purposes. Terrorism in Latin America is essentially a product of class conflict. Until recently, nearly all Latin American
5

nations were controlled by corrupt authoritarian regimes who gave little consideration to the welfare of their people. The resulta majority of Latin Americans live in poverty. The undereducated and impoverished people were very

receptive to the egalitarian Marxist, Leninist and Maoist philosophies espoused by extremists. Nearly every Latin American nation has had, or currently has, an active guerrilla or terrorist insurgency. The driving force behind most of these groups has been a desire to reorganize society along socialist lines, remove foreign business interests and

redistribute land and wealth. Terrorist acts or the threat of such action have been in existence for millennia. Despite having a history longer than the modern nation-state, the use of terror by governments and those that contest their power remains poorly understood. While the meaning of the word terror itself is clear, when it is applied to acts and actors in the real world it becomes confused. Part of this is due to the use of terror tactics by actors at all levels in the social and political environment. Is the Unabomber, with his

solo

campaign

of

terror,

criminal,

terrorist,

or

revolutionary?4 Assassinations, bombings, hijackings, diplomatic

kidnappings -- terrorism is the most publicized form of political violence. The history of terrorism goes back a very long time, but the very fact that there is such a history has frequently been ignored, even suppressed. This may be because terrorism has not appeared with equal intensity at all times. When terrorism reappeared in the late twentieth century after a period of relative calm, there was the tendency to regard it as a new phenomenon, without precedent. The psychological study of terrorism has never been much in fashion. But this neglect has left a number of crucial questions unanswered. Among these is why some people who share the same convictions turn to terrorism and others do not. International terrorism has long been recognized as a foreign and domestic security threat. The tragic events of September 11 in New York, the Washington, D.C., area, and
7

Pennsylvania have dramatically re-energized the nations focus and resolve on terrorism. Available policy options range from diplomacy, international cooperation, and

constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force. The September 11th terrorist incidents in the United States, the subsequent anthrax attacks, as well as bombings of the U.S.S. Cole, Oklahoma City, World Trade Center in 1993, and of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, have brought the issue of terrorism to the forefront of American public interest.5

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

This research work is basically to examine the United States interventionist policy in the Middle East (study of post September 11, 2001 and terror policy). It seeks to examine terrorism in the Middle East and the steps taken by the United States of America to curb and deter terrorists. It also explores the reason why individuals and nations carry out terrorism while taking a look at who the victims and
8

terrorists are, how they sustain their evil deeds and how they get support from different parts of the globe. Although the ultimate results of the U.S. campaign against terrorism remain unclear, what is clear is that governments must now account for many new terrorist threats to their national security. The research is to examine the United States

Interventionist policy in the Middle East while basing the study on the post September 11, 2001 and terror policy of the U.S.A in the Middle East with a huge focus on terrorism.

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The September 11, 2001 terrorists attack on the United States of America has put a strain in the relationship between the United States and the countries in the Middle East. International terrorism has been geographically widespread and has also become a regular occurrence. It is therefore the objective of this research to look at some of these issues.
a.

An appraisal of the United States Post September 11, 2001

9

and terror policy of the United States in the Middle East.

b.

To examine the extent that terrorism has gone in making

the international community to live in fear in this era of unprecedented metamorphosis. c. To find out the extent that the United States of America is

willing to go to combat terrorism in the world (the Middle East in particular). d. To analyze the effects of the attacks on the United States of

America by terrorists and how that event has gone a long way in changing the international community.

1.4

SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF STUDY

This research work is restrictedly limited to the United

States interventionist policy in the Middle East (study of post September 11, 2001 and terror policy of the United States in the Middle East). This research is limited within the time scope of 2001 till present. Every study and research has been narrowed to this period and as a result, the researcher has been focused on the events and documentary within the period under study to
10

be able to achieve a desired result. Terrorism is being used as a variable in this research. The geographical location here is the Middle East, which cuts across three continents (Africa, Europe and Asia) as well as North America (The United States of America).

1.5

SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
Much has been said about terrorism in the Middle East and the unrests that have sprang up as a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorists attack on the United States of America. This research will help trace the history of terrorism in the Middle East and how it has gone a long way in shaping the foreign policy of the United States of America. The importance of this study lies in its success in bringing out those fundamental reasons that prompted terrorists to attack American interests anywhere in the world. This research will help explain the true meaning of terrorism and the United States interventionist policy in the Middle East.
11

1.6

METHODOLOGY OF STUDY
Sources of Data In carrying out this research, the researcher basically used

1.6.1

secondary sources of collection, which are all written records about terrorism in the Middle East and the United States interventionist policy since September 11, 2001. There is also the use of internet and media for information to do justice to this work. This information is subjected to personal judgment and theoretical assessments for analysis.

1.6.2

Techniques of data analysis The researcher tried to find out in relationship between the

behavior of nations in the international arena and power theory. The researcher was able to do this by looking at actors in the international system and the extent they are willing to go just to achieve their goals with power being the driving force.

1.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

12

Chapter one through the introduction and background of study, gives a brief introduction to the fight against terrorism. It also looks at the fight against terrorism before September 11, the United States fight against terror in the Middle East through the Statement of Problem. The scope and limitation looks terrorism as a variable with the Middle East and United States of America being the geographical positions of the events that are being treated in this research. International terrorism has long been recognized as a foreign and domestic security threat. The tragic events of September 11 in New York, the Washington, D.C., area, and Pennsylvania have dramatically re-energized the nations focus and resolve on terrorism. Available policy options range from diplomacy, international cooperation, and

constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force. Chapter two is a review of relevant literature and theoretical framework. In this section, the writer did his best to find out what have been said about the subject matter and related analysis by authors and writers before and after
13

the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.This chapter concerns itself with Essentials of Power Politics; Impossible Neutrality and the Meta-theoretical Dependence of

Explanatory Concepts; Reflexivity Loops in International Relations: Conceptual Power Analysis as Part of (Power) Politics; The second dimension of power: non-decision making and the mobilization of bias; and Theoretical Framework. Chapter three deals with the Foreign Policy of the United States of America before September 11th 2001 end of the Cold War and United States Foreign Policy and the fight against terrorism. This chapter looks at the foreign policy that the United States of America had in place before the attack on the Twin Towers on September 11th 2001 and how the attacks went a long way in helping the shape the present day foreign policy of the United States of America. More light is also shed on the present day fight against terrorism. Chapter four deals with the United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East, post September 11th anti terror
14

policy, terrorism in the Middle East and United States Interventionist policy. This chapter deals with the

relationship that exists between the United States of America and countries in the Middle East and how the United States anti terror policy affects the countries in this geographical location. It also takes a look at how the United States has intervened in Middle East affairs through her interventionist policy. Since the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001, the face of U.S. counterterrorism has changed considerably, with the signing of the Patriot Act as well as a number of other measures. Chapter five summarizes and concludes the research. This chapter attempts to show the reasons for the terrorist attacks on America especially the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It also specifically provided a summary of an account of the after-effect on the Middle East of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on America. This chapter also focuses on the self-acclaimed police country of the world (America) and steps taken to curb terrorism
15

globally by supporting the fight against terrorism in many parts of the world.

ENDNOTES
16

1.

Fawcett,L. P. The International Relations of the Middle East,

(Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 284.

2.

Lesch, D. W. The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassesment, 2003), pp. 88 & 94. (Westview Press,

3.

Gettleman, M, E, Schaar, The Middle East and Islamic World Reader, (Grove Press, 2003) p. 248 Billon, P. From Free oil to 'Freedom Oil': Terrorism, War and United States Geopolitics in the Persian Gulf (Oxford University Press, 2002.) pp. 109 & 115. Rugh, W. A American Encounters with Arabs: The Soft Power of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East, (Praeger Publishers, 1998). pp 89-90.

4.

5.

17

CHAPTER TWO
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter will concern itself with the review of literature available on the topic under study. In this section, the writer will endeavor to find out what have been said about the subject matter and related analysis by authors and writers. 2.1.1 Essentials of Power Politics The concepts of power and politics are entwined/interdependent in the sense that politics - whether of the specifically governmental kind (political parties, pressure groups, etc.), the economic kind (bureaucracies, the

organization of the workplace into social hierarchies based upon status, etc.) or the interpersonal (relations between males and females, children and adults, etc) - involves the exercising of power. What we have to begin by doing, therefore, is to define the concept of power (and understand the differing dimensions/aspects of power - coercive power, types of authority and so forth) and relate it to such ideas as:
18

The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 in New York City, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania is not the first of the beginning of terrorism in America in particular and the world in general. Terrorists activities before September 11, 2001 have been taking place in different parts of the world through different methodologies. For example, since 1948, Palestinians have faced on-going terrorism from Israel. Hundreds of villages have been obliterated and literally wiped out from the map. Tens of thousands of homes have been bombed, bull-dozed or dynamited during peace time.1 Tens of thousands of men, women and children have been killed. Even greater numbers have been blinded, crippled, disfigured and maimed and hundreds of thousands have also been imprisoned and/or tortured. The Palestinians and many of their Arab allies have been the target of a half of a century of unrelenting Israeli terrorism. According to De Reyner: In addition, America has been attacking countries that support the Palestinian cause. It becomes justified therefore
19

that America has to be attacked because of its sympathy for Israel who are the worst enemy of the Palestinians. In one of his interviews with the ABC television and BBC news during the Clinton Administration, Osama Bin Laden clearly stated why he opposed America: 2.1.2 Impossible Neutrality and the Meta-theoretical

Dependence of Explanatory Concepts Showing the dilemmas a conceptual analysis runs into when it is conceived in terms of variable construction is but a first step in undermining the positivist understanding of conceptual analysis. As I will try to show in the following section, it is often impossible to isolate concepts from the theories in which they are embedded and which constitute part of their very meaning. As a result, the analysis of concepts such as power cannot be used as a mere means for explanation, wherein they would neutrally assess the

salience of competing theories. When Max Weber put a lengthy introduction to basic sociological concepts at the start of his Economy and Society, this was not just a
20

technical and definitional basis for his theory, but already part of it, result of much of his earlier analysis. The relation between these concepts provided the framework of his sociological work. As Martin Bulmer writes, concepts such as the protestant ethic or marginal utility derive their meaning from the part they play in the theory in which they are embedded, and from the role in that theory itself. As a result, a conceptual analysis which isolates one concept necessarily slides into the task of assessing a whole theory. When Max Weber put a lengthy introduction to basic sociological concepts at the start of his Economy and Society, this was not just a technical and definitional basis for his theory, but already part of it.2 It is known that Israel has targeted and assassinated thousands of Palestinian leaders. Every Palestinian suffers physically, emotionally or psychologically at the hands of the Israelis. This includes scholars, businessmen, philosophers, poets, religious leaders and that inspires or tries to inspire the Palestinian people to patriotism. These atrocities have occurred all over the world even in the United States. In the
21

process, they have killed many thousands of women and children. The other reason for the hatred and attack on America by the Arabs is the fact that Israels former Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon is one of the worlds most blood-stained terrorists. For example, he is believed to be responsible for the cold blooded slaughter of at least 1,500 men, women and children in the Beirut refugee camps of Chatila and Sabra. Even a formal Israeli Commission found Sharon personally responsible for the Lebanese massacre. In 1982, Israels defense Minister, Sharon directed Israels invasion of Lebanon and the carpet bombing and devastation of the city of Beirut. In Lebanon, five times more women and children died than the number of those that died in the September 2001 New York terrorists attack. This terror bombing was carried out by Jews using jet fighters and bombs supplied by the United States.3

22

2.1.3

Reflexivity

Loops

in

International

Relations:

Conceptual Power Analysis as Part of (Power) Politics A conceptual analysis which focuses on the

performative character of some concepts implies a series of reflexive links. A conceptual analysis of power in terms of its meaning is part of the social construction of knowledge; moreover, the definition/assignation of power is itself an exercise of power, or political, and hence part of the social construction of reality. As the following two illustrations will indicate, the very definition of power is a political

intervention. This reflexive feature of power has been at the origin of some of the newer power conceptualizations in International Relations. It does, for instance, help to account for two components in Susan Stranges concept of structural

power.65 First, Strange created this concept in the context of a perceived US decline. Thus the incapacity of the US to keep the fixed exchange rate system or to manage the international perceived economy in better power.
23

found In

justification words,

in

a US

decline

other

the

government may have been willing, but no longer able, to provide the public goods it used to provide. Strange tried to argue that the declining provision had less to do with declining power than with shifting interests unconnected to power. To do this, her concept of structural power casts a wider net (her four structures) that encompasses areas in which the US is not clearly seen to be declining. As a result, the US has to justify its action with means other than the excuse of lacking power. Second, Stranges concept of structural power also includes non-intentional effects.

Whether the Fed intended to hurt anyone is less important than that it did. By making actors also aware of the unintended effects of their action, they are asked to take this into account next time. They become potentially liable to the question of why, now aware of the effects, action had not changed. Having a broader concept of power asks for more issues to be factored into political decisions and actions (exactly as in Connollys analysis).4 But such a link between knowledge, power and politics is also visible in the daily practices of diplomacy. Here it is
24

less

the

performative

aspect

of

language

than

the

relationship between knowledge and conventions which directly intervenes into politics. Again, the definition of power has an effect on politics. Despite claims to the contrary, power is not especially fungible; i.e., resources effective in one area might not necessarily be so elsewhere. In more technical terms, power does not do for politics what money does for economics since it does not provide a standard measure with which a particular resource can be exchanged with another one. Yet, given the special role great power status plays in international affairs, diplomats need to make up indicators for overall power. Given the need to trade gains and losses so as (not) to upset the ranking of power (also achieved through politics of

compensation), diplomats have to come to agree on what counts before they can start counting. Taking this link for granted. Daniel Frei had early on urged scientists to help politicians in this task. Yet, there is still no neutral solution in sight. Indeed, the very definition of power is so contentious
25

precisely because of its political consequences. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union resisted those definitions of power whose stress on non-military factors would imply a decline in its status. Similarly, in the recent controversy about soft and hard (coercive) power, deciding what power really means has obvious political implications. Focusing more on the military side and hence stressing an

unprecedented preponderance of the US military made it possible to ask the US to push its advantages further (since it is possible), and at times even stress the duty of the US to intervene given its capacities (which relates back to the performative argument above). Or, stressing US soft power and its potential decline, analysts could advocate a much more prudent and varied foreign policy strategy sensitive to claims of legitimacy and cultural attraction (whether or not the legitimacy crisis is simply an effect of poor public diplomacy or of a more fundamental origin). Or, finally, insisting on the unipolarity of the present international system, such a power statement mobilizes a justification for leadership and responsibility which, in turn, can justify the
26

inescapable, and hence excusable, nature of unilateralism (and a consensus on multi-polarity does the opposite).5

2.1.4 The second dimension of power: non-decision making and the mobilization of bias As a remedy to these conceptual shortcomings of the decision-making method Bachrach and Baratz offer the concept of non-decision making as the second face of power. According to this notion to the extent that a person or groupconsciously or unconsciouslycreates or

reinforces barriers to the public airing of political conflicts, that person or group has power. With respect to problems of the one-dimensional version of the decision-making method in identifying important or key issues, Bachrach and Baratz stress the importance of an analysis of the

mobilization of bias. By this they mean the dominant values and the political myths, rituals, and institutional practices which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others.6

27

The making

conceptual on the one

distinction hand and

between the

non-decision of the

working

mobilization of bias on the other does not appear very clear-cut. Bachrach and Baratz seem to treat the

mobilization of bias as a more general problem, of which non-decision making is but one aspect, when they describe non-decision making as the primary method for sustaining a given mobilization of bias. However, the theoretical and methodological

implications of the concept of non-decision making cannot be overestimated. This two-dimensional view of power underscores the crucial importance of identifying potential issues which non-decision making prevents from being actual. It is thus concerned with the determination and composition of the political agenda. In his Preface to Democratic Theory Dahl himself describes the agenda setting dimension as a definitional characteristic of

polyarchy: Any member who perceives a set of alternatives, at least one of which he regards as preferable to any of the alternatives presently scheduled, can insert his preferred
28

alternative(s) among those scheduled for voting. Obviously this precondition of polyarchal rule is violated by the existence of mechanisms for excluding certain issues. Moreover, the concept, far from being an instance of a paranoid conspiracy theory, is commonly known and widely accepted in the literature, though often described in different terms.7

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework on which this research is based is basically power politics. Power politics is a state of international relations in which sovereigns protect their own interests by threatening one another with military, economic, or political aggression. Power can be referred to as the ability to get ones wishes carried out despite opposition or the ability to influence the actions of others in accordance with ones own ends. Power politics is essentially a way of understanding the world of international relations: nations compete for the world's resources and it is to a nation's advantage to be manifestly able to harm others. It
29

prioritizes national self-interest over the interest of other nations or the international community. Techniques of power politics include, but are not limited to, conspicuous nuclear development, pre-emptive strike,

blackmail, the massing of military units on a border, the imposition of tariffs or economic sanctions, bait and bleed and bloodletting, hard and soft balancing, buck passing, covert operations, shock and awe and asymmetric warfare.8 Scholars have maintained that the international system consists of actors (both states and non-states) and the nature of the anarchical international system creates a setting in which self- interested actors pursue their diplomatic goals by, if necessary, using power to ensure that their goals prevail over the goals of others. Ray Ofoegbu regards power framework as (i) Actors capabilities to alter or influence in the policies priorities and choice of other actors, (ii) Actors capacity to realize its vital goal in the international system. From the above premises, it is obvious that power is invariably an inextricable aspect of democracy. It may or may
30

not be exercised but it influences attitude, roles, political, physical and socio-cultural facts. The United States interventionist policy in the Middle East has been largely influenced by power capability. This research is therefore committed to the United States interventionist policy in the Middle East vis--vis power theory. The concept of the State in modern, industrialized, societies is crucial to an understanding of the nature and distribution of power in society, if only because it plays such a large, over-bearing, part in our lives.9 The term power can be understood to equal national capabilities. Power is a political resource, which

encompasses the sum of the various attributes of a state that enable it to achieve its goals even when they clash with the goals of other international actors. Power is multifaceted. It includes tangible elements, such as numbers of weapons; it also includes intangible elements such as public morale. Power politics is diplomacy in which the nations threaten to use force in order to obtain their objectives. On
31

the level of international politics, power can take many forms, from moral suasion to the carrot of economic benefits to the stick of sanctions or military force. "Power politics" is one of the more equivocal terms in the lexicon of

international affairs. In common usage, including that of politicians, it often is value-laden, usually in a negative sense. It implies using coercionforce or threats of forceto impose one's will upon others. However, in academic usage, especially among scholars specializing in the history and theory of international relations, it is more often treated as a neutral phenomenon, descriptive of special or general characteristics of international politics. Further semantic or linguistic confusion results from the divergent shades of meaning that attach to the words in languages of Western scholarship such as German, English, and French. Among these three languages there is no precise equivalent for the phrase "power politics." Thus one can define power politics both as a term commonly used in political rhetoric and a theoretical description of how states interact in pursuit of their interests in the international arena.10
32

ENDNOTES
1.

Begin, M. The Revolt: The Story of the Irgu, (Tel Aviv Hadar Publishers, 1964) p.162.
2.

Roger, I. J. State Power and Industry Influence: American

Foreign Oil Policy, (Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 168.

3. 4. 5.

Ibid, p. 19 Ibid, p.62 Bleckman, B. Force Without War: U.S. armed Forces As a Political Instrument, (The Brookings Institution Press, 1978) p. 14 Diehl, P.F. The Politics of Global Governance, (Lynne Press, 1997). p. 25.
7. 8. 9.

6.

Ibid. p 70. Ibid. p. 73. Ibid. p. 81.

33

10

Ibid, p. 85.

CHAPTER THREE
An Overview of Terrorism 3.1 FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

The US was not always keen to play a global role. After gaining its independence from Britain, the US sought to limit its involvement in international affairs and avoid competition with foreign powers. In particular, a clear majority of the Founding Fathers of the new republic insisted that America should avoid involvement in the political intrigues and power
34

rivalries of Europe. (One can imagine how shocked they would be today to learn of the global involvement of the US from Afghanistan to Argentina, from Kosovo to Korea.) In his farewell address in 1796, President George Washington set out guidelines for American foreign policy that found widespread approval. The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations but to have with them as little political connections as possible. It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.1 In the aftermath of the Civil War, in which over half a million Americans lost their lives, the US concentrated on rebuilding the devastated south, expanding its economy, and healing social divisions. But as the turn of the century approached, the US began to flex its muscles. It started to construct a formidable navy and simultaneously began to push its weight around in the Caribbean and Pacific. In 1898 it provoked a conflict with Spain over Cuba and then in the same year proceeded to establish colonial rule in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines.2
35

The First World War intervention in 1917 was decisive in securing an allied victory but the US rejected the League of Nations and reverted to isolationism and protectionist economic policies in the inter-war years. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 catapulted the US into the Second World War and again its intervention was decisive in ensuring allied victory. Wilson made much of Americas idealist traditions setting out in 1918 fourteen points or principles that should guide US policy. These included a call for open diplomacy, self-determination, general

disarmament, and the abandonment of the balance of power principle in favor of a system of collective security. His opponents argued that the US should look after its own interests and not become involved in settling disputes around the world. Despite his huge personal efforts Wilson was unable to convince the Senate, or a majority of Americans, that they should become permanently involved in world affairs through the League of Nations. His

unwillingness to compromise on the treatys provisions, as some senators demanded, was also a serious error.3
36

The twentieth century was the American century. Since 1945, America has enjoyed, and continues to enjoy, a unique role in the world as the pre-eminent political, military, and economic power. The contemporary debates on what global role the US should play are rooted in American history. A large majority of the Founding Fathers did not wish the US to become involved in global affairs. Blessed by geographical position and abundant natural resources, the US maintained a low foreign policy profile during its first hundred years. The gradual expansion of territory during the nineteenth century was followed by an imperial scramble at the turn of the century. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson represented competing visions of realism and idealism. This policy of non -entanglement or

isolationism from other countries thus has a long historical tradition. Apart from broad agreement on isolationism, there was no consensus among the Founding Fathers as to what principles should guide US foreign policy. Indeed the differences between the idealists and realists led to rival
37

ideological camps that persist to this day. In the idealist camp were the likes of Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson, who believed that the new nation could and should make a sharp break with the past and conduct a foreign policy guided by law and reason, not power politics. Jefferson claimed that power and force had been legitimate principles in the past, but that in the new era of democracy and law, relations between nations should be guided by a code of morality.4 Developing a foreign policy for the new republic entailed reconciling not just the divide between idealists and realists, but also the competing interests of the countrys different regions. Northerners were interested in developing an industrial base and therefore sought tariffs (taxes on imports) to protect their manufactured goods. Southerners depended heavily upon the export of cotton and other crops and thus opposed the protective tariffs sought by the north. In addition to divergent foreign trade policy priorities of the north and south, there were also fundamental social and

38

cultural differences (e.g. over the issue of slavery) that culminated in the Civil War of 18615. After 1945, the US began a massive global

engagement and arms build-up to ensure containment of communism. There was broad bipartisan support for US foreign policy during the Cold War. Superpower rivalry dominated international politics. The Vietnam War divided America and colored later thinking about military

interventions. Twenty-five years after rejecting the League of Nations, the US Senate ratified almost without objection (89 2 votes) Americas entry into another global collective security organization, the United Nations (UN). This striking turnaround in American policy was the product of years of careful planning and shrewd political maneuvering by President Franklin Roosevelt to build domestic support for Americas participation in a postwar security system. The US had again remained neutral at the onset of the Second World War but Roosevelt made clear his sympathy for Britain and its allies fighting against Nazi Germany. It was not until the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in President Harry
39

Truman, who recognized the need to build on the new consensus that Roosevelt had created in order to secure domestic support to oppose communism, took up the containment idea.5 In a speech to a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, the President laid down the policy that became known as the Truman Doctrine. It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms . . . if we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our nation. This was a blanket commitment by the American President that would define US foreign policy for the next forty-five years. Many countries have ethnic, racial, religious, or other cultural groups that have emotional or political ties to another country. A country like the United States, made up of mostly immigrants, is populated by many who maintain a level of identification with their African, Cuban, Irish,
40

Mexican, Polish, and other heritages and who are active on behalf of policies that favor their ancestral homes.6

3.2 END OF THE COLD WAR AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
The US occupies a unique position in world affairs. Never in history has a country dominated the international scene to the extent that the US does today. No matter what the indicator military power, economic strength, political influence, technological prowess, and cultural model the US is in a league of its own. It is the only nation on earth able to project power in every part of the world, and since 1990 it has been involved in resolving conflicts on every continent. As former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright stated in 1996, the US is the indispensable nation whose work never stops. There are, however, very different images of this indispensable nation around the world, ranging from admiration to envy and hatred. Until 9/11 there was little consensus on what the US should do with its power. There was also remarkably little
41

debate on the priorities of US foreign policy and whether the US was developing the right instruments to further its external interests. The Republican chairman of the House International Relations Committee (HIRC), Henry Hyde, voiced a widespread concern on the occasion of Secretary of State Colin Powells first testimony before the committee on 7 March 2001.
The principal problem [for the US] is that we have no longterm strategy, no practical plan for shaping the future. The fall of the Soviet empire has removed the central organizing principle of our foreign policy for the past halfcentury. For all our undoubted power, we often seem to be at the mercy of the currents, carried downstream toward an uncertain destination instead of moving toward one of our own. We must resist the temptation of believing that we can fix every problem.7

Six months after Hyde spoke, the US was faced with a new enemy Al Qaeda. The devastating attacks in New York and Washington were to lead to a fundamental change in American foreign policy. The post-Cold War era ended on 9/11. The Bush administration henceforth only had one priority the war on terrorism. Containment was dismissed
42

as a guiding principle. Pre-emptive strikes moved to the top of available policy instruments. The President divided the world into those who are with us and those who are against us. The US was no longer a reluctant hegemony nor a reluctant sheriff. The US-led victory over communism had helped to create an impression at home that the stakes involved in foreign and security policy issues were reduced. 9/11 witnessed an upsurge in interest about foreign policy, Islam and the wider Middle East. Globalization also brought changes to the political forces in favor of free trade and tore down barriers between foreign and domestic policy. Meanwhile the shift in population to the south and southwest of the US as well as the rapidly expanding access to information, from CNN to the internet, led to an increase in the number of players outside the traditional East Coast establishment that had controlled US foreign policy for decades. In the post-Cold War era, one could speak of a democratization of the foreign policy process in America. The Cold War era saw massive expansion in national security structures and huge budgets for military and
43

intelligence communities. The end of the Cold War was due to freedom and independence movements in Eastern

Europe, the internal collapse of the Soviet Union, and US arms spending during the Reagan presidency. No country can escape its geography and history when it comes to establishing its foreign policy principles and priorities. The US is not just a country; it is a continent, protected by two vast oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific. Of course, even its geographical advantages cannot protect the US from

terrorist attacks but the enormous size of the US, plus its population and economic base, give it a unique position in the world. True, there are countries larger in size (Russia, Canada) and population (China, India) but no other country enjoys the panoply of resources that befit the term superpower or hyper power. The European Union (EU) is already an economic superpower but it is far from being a political and military superpower like the US. Like all other countries, the US has always acted in defense of its national interests but a continuous thread of idealism has also found a place in American foreign policy.8
44

Throughout its history the US has viewed itself as having a unique mission in the world, to promote its values of freedom, independence, and democracy and its market economy or capitalist economic system. Other countries, including all other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), France, the UK, Russia and China, share, or shared in the past, their own messianic vision. Few have been in a position to promote their values abroad to the same extent as the US, especially in the latter half of the twentieth century. The 1990s were the climax of the American century. Not only had the US won the Cold War but its economy raced ahead of other industrial nations and its culture and technology had spread to every corner of the globe. Whether studying in China, Russia, Brazil, India or Germany, students were likely to be using Microsoft, listening to Madonna, watching Tom Cruise, drinking Coke and eating Big Macs.9 At the start of a new millennium, with a new administration taking over in Washington, there were many debates on the future direction of American foreign policy. A
45

host of reports poured out of Congress, think tanks, and various national commissions seeking to define American external interests and priorities. A central theme of this debate was whether the US should use its extraordinary power only to protect vital American interests, about which there was no consensus, or whether it should play a wider role in the world. In general, those on the left argued that values (e.g. promotion of democracy, protection of human rights) were vital to American interests while those on the right were more skeptical of a values approach to foreign policy. Strangely, at this unique historical moment, there was very little discussion about the external spending priorities of the US nor about the most appropriate instruments the US should be using and developing to maintain its global position. Neither was there any

substantive discussion on the kind of image that the US projected abroad. This changed, however, in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.10

46

The divisions between and within political parties on foreign policy reflected a lack of consensus on what role the US should seek to play in the post-Cold War world. These differences, however, are not new. To some extent they were masked by the largely bipartisan foreign policy approach during the Cold War but divisions over foreign policy have been the norm throughout American history. A brief survey is revealing of such differences.

3.3 THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

International terrorism threatens the United States, its allies and interests, and the world community. Defeating the terrorist enemy requires sound policies, concerted U.S. Government effort and international cooperation. The

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the abortive attack (possibly aimed at the White House or Camp David) that resulted in the crash of a jetliner in Pennsylvania has resulted in a new and extraordinary emphasis on combating terrorism.

47

Deterrence and the Reduction of Vulnerabilities. Issued by Clinton on June 21, 1995, just two months after the Oklahoma City bombing, PDD 39 was titled "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism." Its purpose was to provide guidelines for deterring terrorism on America's shores, as well as terrorism against Americans and allies abroad. PDD 39 ordered the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, and Treasury, to enact measures to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorism. Also critical in this regard are the General Accounting Office (GAO), whose responsibilities include national preparedness, and the General Services Administration (GSA), which, as overseer of government building projects, has been

increasingly tasked toward providing structural protections against attacks such as those at Oklahoma City or the World Trade Center. The directive, only part of which has been declassified, also addressed deterrence of terrorism. It called for the
48

return of indicted terrorists to the United States for prosecution, and presented measures (classified as of 2003) for dealing with states that support terrorism. In PDD 62, issued on May 22, 1998, Clinton established the National Coordinator for Security, while Infrastructure PDD 63 Protection the and

Counterterrorism,

created

Critical

Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO). Although the functions of CIAO and the national coordinator were similar, they reported along quite different chains of command. Whereas CIAO, now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was then part of the Department of Commerce, the national coordinator reported to the National Security Council (NSC). Given the fact that the NSC is the president's advisory board on national security affairs, this fact signaled the importance of the new national coordinator. During the last ten days key administration officials, particularly President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary
49

of

State

Colin

Powell,

had

repeatedly emphasized that their long-term objective is the destruction of terrorism a goal to be achieved by the death or apprehension of terrorists, the destruction of their infrastructure and support base, and retaliation against states that aid or harbor terrorists. U.S. policy toward international terrorism contains a significant military component, reflected in current U.S. operations in Afghanistan and (on a smaller scale) the Philippines and in planned deployments of U.S. forces to Yemen and the former Soviet republic of Georgia. President Bush had expressed a willingness to provide military aid to governments everywhere in the fight against terrorism. Important issues for Congress include whether the

Administration is providing sufficient information about the long-term goals and costs of its military strategy and whether military force is necessarily an effective antiterrorism instrument in some circumstances. A modern trend in terrorism is toward loosely organized, self-financed, international networks of terrorists.
11

50

ENDNOTES
1.

Selig, A. The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York: The Free Press, 1957), p.13. Ibid p. 42. Julian, Z. Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security - From World War II to the War on Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2009) pp. 49-50. Rugh, W. A American Encounters with Arabs: The Soft Power of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East, (Praeger Publishers, 1998). pp 89-90.
51

2. 3.

4.

5.

Bleckman, B. Force Without War: U.S. armed Forces As a Political Instrument, (The Brookings Institution Press, 1978) p. 249. Fiscus, J. War and Conflict in the Middle East: The Suez Crisis, (The Rosen Publishers Group, 2004), p. 5. Selig, A. The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York: The Free Press, 1957), p. 24. Lesch, D. W. The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassesment, 2003), p. 70. Ibid. p. 95. Fawcett, L. P. The International Relations of the Middle (Westview Press,

6.

7.

8.

9. 10.

East, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 87

11. Fiscus,

J. War and Conflict in the Middle East: The Suez

Crisis, (The Rosen Publishers Group, 2004), pp. 55-57.

CHAPTER FOUR
UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN POLICY IN THE

4.1 POST SEPTEMBER 11TH ANTI TERROR POLICY

The foundation of the United States counter-terrorism policy, according to the U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counter terrorism, are embodied in four principles:
52

i. ii. iii.

The

government

makes

no

concessions

to

or

agreements with terrorists; Terrorists must be brought to justice for their crimes; States that sponsor terrorists and terrorism must be isolated and pressured so as to force a change of behavior; iv. And the counterterrorism capabilities of countries allied with the United States, and those that require assistance in fighting terrorism, must be bolstered. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the face of U.S. counterterrorism has changed considerably, with the signing of the Patriot Act as well as a number of other measures. Among these is a refocusing of the nation's leading law enforcement organization, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), toward a mission increasingly concerned with counter-terrorism. These four principles provide a framework for U.S. policy. For example, when President George W. Bush sent U.S. troops into combat in Afghanistan in October 2001, and in Iraq in March 2003, this action was in line with the third principle, pressuring nations that support terrorism. Yet, even before
53

September 2001, these principles were in place, and have guided the policy of successive administrations, whether controlled by Republicans or Democrats. The Patriot Act. The leading statement of deterrence policy since September 2001, is the Patriot Act, which Bush signed into law on October 26, just six weeks after the attacks. The law contained changes to some 15 different statutes, and its provisions collectively gave the Justice Department and its agencies a number of new powers in intelligence-gathering and criminal procedure against drug trafficking, immigration violations, organized criminal

activity, money laundering, and terrorism and terrorism related acts themselves. Among its specific provisions, the Patriot Act gave increased authority to intercept communications related to an expanded list to of terrorism-related pursue crimes; terrorists allowed on the

investigators

aggressively

Internet; provided new subpoena power to obtain financial information; reduced bureaucracy by allowing investigators
54

to use a single court order for tracing a communication nationwide; and encouraged sharing of information between local law enforcement and the Intelligence Community. The Patriot Act also provided for the creation of a "terrorist exclusion list" (TEL). Members of organizations listed on the TEL may be prevented from entering the country, and in certain circumstances may be deported. Before the Secretary of State places an organization on the TEL, he or she must find that its members commit or incite terrorist activity, gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity, or provide material support to further terrorist activity. Assignments for Specific Agencies. In its provisions for responding to terrorism, PDD 39 designated the State Department as the lead agency for attacks on civilians outside of the United States. It also established the State Department Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) and the FBI's Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST).

55

The directive gave the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) authority to deal with "air piracy," and assigned authority over hijackings to the Department of Justice, working in concert with the departments of State, Defense, and Transportation. That particular part of PDD 39 has been superseded by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). Signed into law by President Bush on November 19, 2001, the ATSA created the Transportation Security

Administration (TSA), now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In its consequence management provisions, PDD 39 gave the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) the responsibility of developing an overall federal response plan, and ensuring that states developed their own plans. This provision of PDD 39 is just one of many statements of policy on the coordination of consequence management

responsibilities, which involve an array of departments, agencies, and offices, most notably FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Coast Guard.
56

Nearly a decade earlier, for instance, Congress in 1986 passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act (EPCRA), which established guidelines for

assistance of local communities by federal agencies in the event of a toxic chemical spill or related incident. EPCRA also provides a framework for action both by citizens and state governments. Since the time of its passage, EPCRA and similar provisions have been increasingly understood to deal also with terrorist incidents, which may involve unleashing of lethal substances. Similarly, in 1985, a FEMA committee had drawn up the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), a blueprint for the response of the U.S. federal government to a radiological emergencythat is, a crisis involving the release of nuclear radiation. The FRERP is an agreement among 17 federal agencies, key among which are FEMA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Departments of Energy and Defense, and the EPA.

57

Also important is the Coast Guard, which, in addition to protecting ports and shorelines, operates the National Response Center. The latter is the sole national point of contact for reports of oil spills, as well information regarding discharges of chemical, radiological, and biological

discharges into the environment. Agencies tasked for counter-terrorism. Myriad government intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies have a counterterrorism function. Most obvious among these are various components of the U.S. military, most notably Delta Force and Seal Team Six. These special teams, along with the larger Special Operations Command, are the "muscle" of U.S. counter-terrorism. Highly trained and well-equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry, airborne insertion equipment, and other forms of technology, elite counterterrorist teams are capable of rescuing hostages and eliminating terrorists in situations for which inappropriate. regular military forces would be

58

Equally

vital

is

the

work

of

the

Coordinator

for

Counterterrorism. In accordance with the fourth major principle of U.S. counterterrorism policy, the coordinator is charged by the Secretary of State with coordinating efforts to improve cooperation between the U.S. government and its foreign counterparts in battling terrorism. An ambassador, the coordinator is the primary functionary of the federal government for developing and implementing America's counterterrorism policy. DCI Counter-terrorist Center. In an entirely different wing of government is the DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC). Though part of the CIA, the CTC is under more direct control by the DCI than are most CIA activities, a sign of the significance attached to counterterrorism. During the mid-1980s, a panel led by thenVice President George Bush studied U.S. efforts against terrorism and concluded that, while U.S. agencies collected information on foreign terrorism, they did not aggressively operate to disrupt terrorist activities.

59

The mission of the CTC is to assist the DCI in coordinating the counterterrorism efforts of the Intelligence Community by implementing a comprehensive

counterterrorist operations program, and by exploiting all sources of intelligence to produce in-depth analyses of terror groups and their state supporters. CTC collects information on these groups, and when it has credible information of a threat, issues warnings. Alongside it is the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, an Intelligence

Community board that assists the DCI in coordinating intelligence-gathering efforts against terrorists. In the 1990s, the CTC began working closely with the FBI, and in 1996 they exchanged senior-level officers to manage the

counterterrorist offices of both agencies. Prior to September 2001, the mission of the FBI had been strictly that of a law-enforcement agency, but in the wake of September 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III refocused the bureau's efforts toward counterterrorism. In December 2001, Mueller
60

announced plans to reorganize headquarters by creating new counterterrorism, cybercrimes, and counterintelligence divisions, by modernizing information systems, and

emphasizing relationships with local first responders. By the Spring of 2002, criticism of Mueller's plans was on the rise, with detractors maintaining that the measures were not thorough enough. To this end, Mueller announced a number of new reforms. These included the hiring of 400 more analysts, including 25 from the CIA; the retasking of 480 special agents from white-collar and violent crimes to counterterrorism; the creation of an intelligence office; development of terrorism expert support teams to work with the bureau's 56 field offices; recruitment of Arabic speakers and others fluent in Middle Eastern and South Asian languages; creation of a joint terrorism task force to coordinate with the CIA and other federal agencies; and the improvement of financial analysis and other forms of strategic analysis directed toward terrorist groups.

61

In January 2003, President Bush announced plans to create a new counterterrorism intelligence center that would bring together intelligence collected domestically with that gathered overseas. This idea had been in development for some time, but one major issue of dispute was the question of which agency, the FBI or CIA, should manage the new center. One proposal put forward at the time involved the expansion of the DCI Counterterrorist Center, the oldest office of its kind. In February, Bush unveiled the

organizational blueprint for the new unit, which would bring together FBI and CIA efforts under the aegis of a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, headed by the CIA. The modern western world had never witnessed an attack on the US as profound, momentous and devastatingly spectacular as those of September 11 2001. Not only were the attacks instantly televised for a disbelieving global audience, but the fact that the September 11 attacks struck New York and Washington, the two capitals of

Globalization explains not only why Americans were so

62

deeply shocked and moved but also why the rest of the world was to such a degree. The US in the early 21st century may have exercised, and continued to exercise, an

unchecked global hyper-puissance, but its circumstances alone are revolutionary, not its actions. Geopolitical

challenges in South Asia and the Middle East dominate US foreign policy. Obamas new approaches to Afghanistan, the Iran nuclear crisis, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have failed to translate into policy success so far. Tough choices lie ahead, as he needs to reconcile policies on Afghanistan and Pakistan, reassess engagement with Iran, and decide about more robust mediation in the Middle East conflict. Preparing to exit from Iraq is an additional challenge. The scope for progress remains slim, with domestic issues likely to increasingly dominate Obamas agenda in 2010.

Policy Tools
63

Instruments used by the U.S. government to combat international terrorism are described briefly below. Diplomacy/Constructive Engagement Use of diplomacy to help create a global anti-terror coalition is a central component of the Bush Administration response to September 11 events. To date, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council has condemned the attacks in a unanimous declaration, and NATO Secretary General George Robertson has characterized the attacks, in terms of Article V (mutual defense provisions) of the NATO Treaty, as an attack on all members of the NATO alliance. Some argue that diplomacy holds little hope of success against

determined terrorists or the countries that support them. However, in most cases, diplomatic measures are considered least likely to widen the conflict and therefore are usually tried first. In incidents of international terrorism by sub-national groups, implementing a policy response of constructive engagement is complicated by the lack of existing channels and mutually accepted
64

rules

of

conduct

between

governmental entities and the group in question. In some instances, as was the case with the PLO, legislation may specifically prohibit official contact with a terrorist

organization or its members. Yet for groups that are wellentrenched in a nations political fabric and culture,

engaging the group might be preferable to trying to exterminate it. Increasingly, governments appear to be pursuing policies which involve verbal contact and even direct negotiations with terrorist groups or their

representatives. On a different level, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration clearly has explored the possibility of enlisting state sponsors of terrorism, such as Libya and Sudan, in a broader Islamic coalition against Al Qaeda and its followers. The United States also has held discussions with Iran concerning formation of a post-Taliban coalition government in Afghanistan. To some critics,

though, such initiatives detract from the imperative of taking a principled stand against international terrorism in all its guises. The media remain powerful forces in confrontations
65

between terrorists and governments. Appealing to, and influencing, public opinion may impact not only the actions of governments but also those of groups engaged in terrorist acts. From the terrorist perspective, media coverage is an important measure of the success of a terrorist act or campaign. In hostage-type incidents, where the media may provide the only independent means a terrorist has of knowing the chain of events set in motion, coverage can complicate rescue efforts. Governments can use the media in an effort to arouse world opinion against the country or group using terrorist tactics. Public diplomacy and the media can be used to mobilize public opinion in other countries to pressure governments to take action against terrorism. An example would be to mobilize the tourist industry to pressure governments into participating in sanctions against a terrorist state. Economic Sanctions Sanctions regimes can be essentially unilateral such as U.S. bans on trade and investment relations with Cuba and Iran or multilateral, such as that mandated in response
66

to the Pan Am 103 bombing. In the past, use of economic sanctions was usually predicated upon identification of a nation as an active supporter or sponsor of international terrorism. Yet sanctions also can be used to target assets of terrorist groups themselves. On September 23, 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 freezing the assets of 27 individuals and organizations known to be affiliated with bin Ladens network and giving the Secretary of the Treasury broad powers to impose sanctions on banks around the world that provide these entities access to the international financial system. By late October 2002,

according to the U.S. Treasury Department, the freeze list had expanded to include 243 designated financiers of terror. In addition, on September 28, 2001 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 which requires all states to limit the ability of terrorists and terrorist organizations to operate internationally by freezing their assets and denying them safe haven. The Security Council also set up a Counter Terrorism Committee to oversee implementation of

Resolution 1373. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1390 of

67

January 16, 2002, obligated member states to freeze funds of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

associated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. As of late November 2002, approximately $121 million in terrorist funds had been frozen worldwide as a result of these initiatives, although only $19 million of these funds have been blocked since January, according to U.S. and U.N. financial data. The effects of the above-described economic measures, though, are uncertain because much of the flow of terrorist funds takes place outside of formal banking channels (in elusive hawala chains of money brokers). Alternatively, a wide variety of international banks in the Persian Gulf is used to manipulate and transfer funds through business fronts owned by Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, much of Al Qaedas money is believed to be held not in banks but in untraceable assets such as gold and diamonds. Also, some observers have noted that lethal terrorist operations are relatively inexpensive. Current

estimates of the cost of carrying out the September 11 attacks range from $300,000 to $500,000. With respect to
68

nation-states, economic sanctions fall into six categories: restrictions on trading, technology transfer, foreign

assistance, export credits and guarantees, foreign exchange and capital transactions, and economic access. Sanctions may include a total or partial trade embargo, an embargo on financial transactions, suspension of foreign aid, restrictions on aircraft or ship traffic, or abrogation of a friendship, commerce, and navigation treaty. Sanctions usually require the cooperation of other countries to be effective, and such cooperation is not always forthcoming. Furthermore,

sanctions provide no effective defense against possible clandestine transfers of WMD materials, components, or finished weapons either between states or from states (or entities within them) to terrorists groups. The President of the United States has a variety of laws at his disposal, but the broadest in its potential scope is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The Act permits imposition of restrictions on economic relations once the President has declared a national emergency because of a threat to the U.S. national security, foreign policy, or
69

economy. While the sanctions authorized must deal directly with the threat responsible for the emergency, the President can regulate imports, exports, and all types of financial transactions, such as the transfer of funds, foreign

exchange, credit, and securities, between the United States and the country in question. Specific authority for the Libyan trade embargo is in Section 503 of the International Trade and Security Act of 1985, while Section 505 of the Act authorizes the banning of imports of goods and services from any country supporting terrorism. Other major laws that can be used against countries supporting terrorism are the Export Administration Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and specific items or provisions of foreign assistance legislation. P.L. 104-132 prohibits the sale of arms to any country the President certifies is not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. The seven terrorist list countries and Afghanistan are currently on this list. The law also requires that aid be withheld to any nation providing lethal military aid a country on the terrorism list.

70

Economic Inducements Possible counter-terrorism initiatives might include efforts to change economic and social conditions that provide a breeding ground for terrorists. It has been noted that most terrorists worldwide are unemployed or

underemployed with virtually nonexistent prospects for economic targeted advancement. assistance Some to analysts reduce believe poverty that and

programs

ignorance (which might also include supporting secular educational alternatives to the Madrassahs Islamic

religious schools) can make a difference in lifestyles and attitudes and diminish the appeal of extremist groups. A further rationale might be to project a more positive image of the United States in terrorism-prone lands. Critics, though, argue that severe economic conditions are not the sole or even the main motivational factors driving the emergence of terrorism, stressing that resentment against a particular country or political order and religious fanaticism also are important motivations. Osama bin Ladens large personal
71

fortune and his far-flung business empire would seem to contradict economic deprivation explanations of terrorism. Similarly, all of the 15 Saudi Arabian hijackers implicated in the September 11 attacks were from middle-class families or well-connected ones. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization (ETA) in Spain is a relatively well-heeled terrorist organization. Possibly, ambient economic conditions partly explain certain kinds of terrorist behavior in specific situations (such as suicide bombings in Israel), but political factors clearly play a significant role here as well. Covert Action Intelligence gathering, infiltration of terrorist groups, and military operations involve a variety of clandestine or so called covert activities. Much of this activity is of a passive monitoring nature aimed at determining the strategic intentions, capabilities and vulnerabilities of terrorist

organizations. A more active form of covert activity occurs during events such as a hostage crisis or hijacking when a foreign country may quietly request advice, equipment, or technical support during the conduct of operations, with no
72

public credit to be given the providing country. Covert action may also seek to exploit vulnerabilities of terrorist

organizations, for example, by spreading disinformation about leaders, encouraging defections, promoting divisions between political and military factions, or exploiting conflicts between organizations. Many experts believe that the events of September 11 signified an intelligence failure of major proportions and that better intelligence on the inner workings of terrorist organizations restriction on could use have of prevented to the attack. Past such

informants

penetrate

organizations was cited as a factor in the failure. Addressing this concern, Section 403 of the Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act directs the Director of Central Intelligence to rescind 1995 guidelines involving foreign assets or sources with known human rights violations and to issue new ones facilitating intelligence gathering from human sources relating to indications and warnings of plans and intentions of hostile actors and events. Some nations have periodically gone
73

beyond monitoring or covert support activities and resorted to unconventional methods beyond their territory for the express purpose of neutralizing individual terrorists and/or thwarting preplanned attacks. Examples of activities might run the gamut from intercepting or sabotaging delivery of funding or weapons to a terrorist group to destroying a terrorists embryonic WMD production facilities to seizing and transporting a wanted terrorist to stand trial for assassination or murder. Arguably, such activity might be justified as preemptive self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. charter. Assassination is specifically prohibited by U.S.

executive order, but in the 107th Congress, the USA PATRIOT Act enacted in October 2001 contained a number of

provisions related to terrorism. It gave law enforcement increased authority to investigate suspected terrorists, including enhanced surveillance procedures such as roving wiretaps; it provided for strengthened controls on

international money laundering and financing of terrorism; it improved measures for strengthening of defenses along the
74

U.S. northern border, said to be an important conduit for terrorists; and it authorized disclosure of foreign intelligence information obtained in criminal investigations to intelligence and national security officials.

THE ANTI-TERROR POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST -Pakistan and Afghanistan Pakistan has always been important for the political, social and economic life in Afghanistan. Pakistan has complicated ties with the Taliban in Afghanistan. In 1997, Pakistan took the lead among the international community to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan and provided them with financial and technical support and assistance. At that time, there were many Pakistani fighters alongside the Taliban resulting in

diplomatic isolation by Western and neighboring countries. Pakistan also suffered economically because of the

smuggling on its western border. United Nations passed two sanctions against the Taliban, which intensified international pressure on Pakistan. After the 9/11 incident, the Pakistan
75

government abandoned the policy of defending Taliban and supported the US against Taliban. Becoming a frontline ally of the US in its war against terror, Pakistan put an end to the 7 years of cooperation with the Taliban. After eight years of United States-led war in Afghanistan the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated even further. The exacerbating situation urged the new US President Obama to review the Bush administration's strategy in Afghanistan. By the end of March 2009, the United States introduced a new strategy in Afghanistan, thereby making important adjustments in the US war on terror: the focus of anti-terrorism will be transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan. One significant feature of the new strategy is that Pakistan became the key focus. The US president said, "Afghanistan's future will inevitably be linked with its neighbor Pakistan." Under the new strategy, the United States would demand the urgent assistance from Pakistan. The new strategy proposed to launch a trilateral dialogue between the U S, Pakistan and Afghanistan so as to strengthen intelligence sharing and military cooperation in North-West Frontier
76

region of Pakistan, and to focus on issues of the three countries' common concern, such as trade, energy and economic development. The new strategy, it is claimed, would endeavor to bring Pakistan and Afghanistan closer. Early in May 2009 in Washington, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding, and the agreement for transit trade between the two countries will be extended by the end of 2009 that was expected to clear the obstacles for transit trade and enhance economic and trade relations between the two countries. In the three years before the attacks of September 11, Pakistan received approximately $9 million in American military aid. In the three years after, the number increased to $4.2 billion, making it the country with the maximum funding post 9/11. Such a huge inflow of funds has raised concerns in the Indian press that these funds were given without any accountability, as the end uses not being documented, and that large portions were used to suppress civilians' human rights and to purchase weapons to contain domestic problems like the Balochistan unrest. Pakistan has
77

stated that India has been supporting terror groups within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan with the aim of creating unrest within the country. In 2001, the United States spent less than two months to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However after eight years, the Taliban have never disappeared. The Taliban along Pak-Afghan border seemed to have gone through the most difficult times. The New strategy of the US takes the border region as the core of anti-terrorism in South Asian region. For Pakistan, the expansion of Taliban in its territory is an unprecedented threat. However, after the eight-year experience, the Taliban have also been exploring a deal with a comprehensive tactical combat. The US may not be able to achieve the desired objectives. The PakAfghan relations and the future of Pakistan in the US-led war on terror under the new strategy are faced with many challenges. How to achieve "Pak-Afghan joint anti-terrorism" is to be tested. No matter whether the Obama Government has geo-political purposes or not, the new strategy will bring about its inevitable geo-political consequences. How to
78

coordinate the interests and concerns from neighboring countries would surely be an uphill task for the US administration in the near future.

-Lebanon On May 20, 2007, a conflict began in north Lebanon after fighting broke out between Fatah al-Islam, an Islamist militant organization, and the Lebanese Armed Forces in Nahr al-Bared, a Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli. The conflict evolved mostly around the Siege of Nahr el-Bared, but minor clashes also occurred in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon and several bombings took place in and around Lebanon's capital, Beirut. Fatah-al-Islam has been described as a militant mujahid movement that draws inspiration from al-Qaeda. The US provided military aid to the Lebanese government during the conflict. On September 7, 2007, Lebanese government forces captured the camp and declared victory. -Yemen
79

The United States has also conducted a series of military strikes on al-Qaeda militants in Yemen since the War on Terror began Yemen has a weak central government and a powerful tribal system that leaves large lawless areas open for militant training and operations. Al-Qaida has a strong presence in the country. The US, in an effort to support Yemeni counter-terrorism efforts, has increased their military aid package to Yemen from less than $11 million in 2006 to more than $70 million in 2009, as well as providing up to $121 million for development over the next three years.

-The Arab States of the Persian Gulf The presence of vast energy resources and location at the center of the Middle East account for the Gulfs geostrategic importance and its attraction to major powers. U.S. involvement and military presence dates back to the early part of the last century, and includes a host of political, economic, and geo-strategic objectives. Prior to the Gulf War, U.S. military presence was largely over the horizon, accommodating the sensitivities of local culture. After 1991,
80

it remained deliberately low profile, and yet U.S. presence was criticized due to local perceptions of misconstrued U.S. policies that are harmful to Arab and Muslim interests. The September 11 attack on the United States and subsequent events associated with the war on terrorism have

exacerbated negative public attitudes about U.S. policies and engagement in the region. Simultaneously, however, the traditional regimes of the Gulf countries continue to welcome U.S. engagement, regarding it as the cornerstone for the region. Access to oil, security of Israel, and stability and security of the region are identified as perennial U.S. interests. It is argued that U.S. policies for the Gulf are affected by developments elsewhere in the Middle East and often lead to the charge of double standards and bias. The U.S. handling of the peace process and its support for Israel are contrasted with how the United States implements the dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran. U.S. security strategy for the Gulf and
81

the

defense

cooperative

agreements it has with Gulf Cooperation Council members that authorize its military presence are detailed. Forward presence and the pre-positioning of equipment are the linchpins of U.S. deterrence strategy and U.S. ability to enforce the United Nations (U.N.) mandated sanctions against Iraq. The U.S.-Egyptian relationship is rooted in strategic calculation. It bolsters peace between Egypt and Israel and makes possible broader peace in the region. The U.S.-Egyptian relationship has helped Egypt modernize its military and has added weight to its position as a stabilizing regional force. America's support has also strengthened Egypt's economy. As has been true for the past two decades, a moderate Egypt is the key to peace and stability in the Middle East and a strong U.S.-Egyptian relationship is essential to securing American presence in the region. Washington has lost sight of what the Middle East would look like without a strong U.S.-Egyptian relationship. A nuclearinclined or -armed Egypt, ambiguous on the issue of terror, uncertain on peace with Israel, and disinclined to negotiate would drastically recast the management of the Middle East.
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Since September 11, it has become all too clear that U.S.Egyptian ties are in trouble. Although the Egyptian

government has stood firmly with the United States, the U.S. Congress has grown increasingly critical in its support for Egypt. Congress questions the line that Egypt has taken with Israel, its position on terrorism, issues of human rights, and economic and political reform. The foundation of the U.SEgypt relationship is political and military. It is political in the sense that Egypt is the most powerful moderate, balancing voice in the Arab world, Its position in the region is critical to peace between Arab states and Israel, Egypt's political clout shapes outlooks and guides agendas in the region, Cairo's diplomatic corps has significant influence in regional and multinational bodies. More broadly, the U.S.-Egyptian

defense relationship sends a signal of domestic moderation and deterrence to the region. The Egyptian military is deeply opposed to Islamic political radicalism. Over flight rights, the sharing of intelligence and military perceptions in the region, transit through the Suez Canal, military supply, etc., demonstrate the important
83

nature

of

the

military

relationship, especially during times of war. Egypt hosts Operation Bright Star, the largest military exercise the United States conducts in the world. These maneuvers send a strong signal to the region of the close ties the U.S. shares with Egypt and its ability to quickly deploy American military power during times of crisis. Egypt has been cast as an obstructionist force in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the U.S.-led war against terrorism. In fact, Egypt has worked quietly and consistently for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and for an expansion of the Arab world's acceptance of Israel. Frustration, however, is understandable in the United States-the relationship began with the expectation that peace in the region would have been achieved years ago. Egypt has consistently made clear its belief that there must be progress toward Palestinian statehood; where it sees that progress checked, Egypt is outspoken and its criticism has been interpreted in many American circles as obstructionist. The United States gives aid to Egypt. One of the pillars of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship is the near $2 billion of U.S.
84

economic and military aid given yearly. Many believe that the U.S. investment in Egypt should compel the Egyptian government to accommodate American views on the region, particularly with regard to Egypt's relationship with Israel-or at the very least moderate the harsh rhetoric. Moreover, some in the United States question the benefits of aid to Egypt, pointing to its lagging political and economic reforms and poor human rights record. American assistance has contributed to Egypt's stability and gives the United States considerable influence in key decisions about Egyptian policies. Using military supply or assistance as direct, visible leverage is extremely dangerous, reinforcing the impression on the Egyptian street that its government is subservient to the United States. Such signals weaken the ability of the United States to pursue mutually beneficial initiatives. U.S. aid to Egypt was originally targeted for specific purposes and, in many ways, continues to successfully address significant U.S. political goals: consolidating the EgyptianIsraeli peace agreement and strengthening U.S.-Egyptian ties. In reality American aid is a two-edged sword that must
85

be viewed judiciously. It reinforces the American voice in Egyptian councils, but it cannot replace a consensus on political and economic objectives. The war on terrorism is regarded by Islamic radicals as a clash of civilizations. However, others in the region are calling for a dialogue of civilizations to contain the

phenomenon of terrorism. The Bush administration, in prosecuting the war on terrorism, discovered a link to the festering Middle East conflict just as the former Bush administration was exposed during the Gulf War to the same conflict. Until September 11, the size, posture, and mission of U.S. military presence in the Gulf were appropriate for the assumed threat perception. The on-going war on terrorism and future regional security realignments that could emerge may impact the nature of U.S. military presence. This presence, however, must continue to be low-key for cultural and political reasons. Given the negative popular attitudes stemming from U.S. regional policies, force protection measures become a priority. It should be noted that, while
86

many

Arabs

and

Muslims

oppose

U.S.

policies,

the

overwhelming majority of them also oppose terrorism and the kind of political vision and government style as proposed and practiced by bin Laden and the Taliban. This fact presents the United States with solid opportunities to be effective should it succeed in convincing the majority of the regions people that its policies region is are judicious to and

evenhanded.

The

Gulf

likely

remain

fundamentally unstable for several decades to come. Iran can be a source of instability insofar as it regards itself as the dominant Gulf power that is entitled to a commensurate role in the region. Sharing major maritime oil and gas fields with the littoral Gulf States means that Iran and the Arab sheikdoms have potential friction points. U.S. military presence, especially naval and air force capabilities, in several of the Gulf countries is a critical check to Iranian ambitions and possible adventurism. 4.2 TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Over the past 50 years, the Middle East has been a hub of tension and insecurity. Traditionally, threats to global peace and security ensued from wars and crises among regional states which thereby engaged the international system. Presently, threats to global security are considered in the context of global terrorism. September 11, 2001 has introduced a new approach to dealing with terrorism. In this approach, the West is determined to eradicate the root causes of new terrorism outside of its boundaries. Since global terrorism stems from the Middle East, exploring the correlation between regional issues and new terrorism is of great importance. As a whole, the roots of new terrorism have undoubtedly been associated with problems of the Middle East. If new terrorism was conceived in the region, one needs to consider the unique political, economic, cultural and religious characteristics which frame it on the one hand and the approach of the global system to dealing with these issues on the other. Terrorism has always existed throughout the world. What is new is that terrorism has acquired an international
88

dimension with its own specific definition, which increases its importance within the global community. Introducing a new nature and definition, September 11 undoubtedly marked a turning point in terrorist activities. Old terrorism had internal or regional dimensions, functioning in specific spatial and time domains, and had less negative impact on the international community. In contrast, new terrorism acts beyond national and regional boundaries, has global impact and constitutes a direct threat to global peace and security. International security, long threatened by wars and tensions among nations, is presently endangered by an unknown, complex, and unconventional force. This by no means suggests an easy resolution. In contrast with old terrorism, the new kind of terrorism has no individual, nationalistic, or state-sponsored characteristics. It occurs in many countries and is supported by a global network. The hub of new terrorism is the Middle East, its driving force is Sunni Islamic radicalism, and its representative is Al-Qaeda. Its main aims are as follows: 1. To destabilize international security;
89

2. To delegitimize Western culture and values; and thereby, 3. To create a new balance of power between the West and the Islamic World. As a result of these aims and characteristics, new terrorism is more ferocious and less tolerant. It stems from a radicalism which originates in the political, cultural and economic dissatisfaction with the policies of the global community within the nations of the Middle East. The type of terrorism recurred to by Al-Qaeda appeals to the hearts and minds of individuals to act for an idealistic end. As we are not safe, no one would have the right to be safe in the world, they argue. Accordingly, current suicide attackers fight for their faith and most importantly Allahs satisfaction, as they are certain that they will be blessed by God. Finally, new terrorism is a tactic that is supported by a worldwide network. Considered in this way, no eradication of todays terrorism will succeed unless the root causes of its

90

emergence on the one hand, and the motives of its adherents on the other, are identified and addressed. In the context of the Middle East, new terrorism no doubt stems from a collective sense of historical injustice, political subservience, and a pervasive sense of social humiliation inflicted by the global powers and their allies. These political, cultural and psychological complexities operate cumulatively to trigger the axis of global terrorism. Hence, without solving the existing problems in the region, no abolition of new terrorism is feasible. With the advent of the September 11 events, the two subjects of new terrorism and Middle Eastern studies have emerged as two substantial components of international security studies. In other words, the subject of terrorism as the crucial threatening factor to international peace and security and as the major challenge facing the global community has acquired great importance. The question that arises here is why new terrorism has emerged in the Middle East. To find a sensible answer, one should consider multiple contributing
91

factors. Although the unique political, cultural and economic characteristics of Middle Eastern societies (i.e. their cultural ethnic fragmentation, religious confrontations, traditional communities, the occurrence of the wars, etc.) provided a platform, the author maintains that, in dealing with the regional issues, the policies of the global community have played the major role for the development of new terrorism. In the contemporary history of the Middle East, Britain and the United States have respectively shaped the policies of the global system. As for the British colonialist policies, it is imperative to understand that the political map and ethnic boundaries of the region were drawn in accordance with the demands of British foreign policy in the first half of the 20th century. The devastating British policies based on securing British national interests have more than anything resulted in unrealistic territorial divisions and the consequent

establishment of artificial states. As a result, no distinctly Arab or non-Arab state can be found today in the region without serious difficulty. Given these policies, the second half of the century witnessed numerous wars and crises and
92

thus more ethnic and religious fragmentation in the region. The outcome was the enduring existence of authoritarian regimes which by enjoying the support of the global community have been able to suppress their national demands for political openness, fair distribution of power, and a competitive position in the globalised economy as the prerequisites for any democratization process. As for the role of the United States following the British withdrawal from the region in 1971, more complexity and tension has

undoubtedly been brought into the region. In order to secure US national interests as US leaders have recently confessed the requests of the people from the Middle East for democratization have long been sacrificed in order to achieve stability in the region. Over the past three decades, US policies aimed at preserving stability have contributed to the halting of any democratization efforts. These stabilityseeking policies have been based on two strategic pillars: the control of energy sources and the termination of the Arab-Israeli peace process.

93

Achieving

the

first

goal,

US

foreign

policy

has

manifested itself in two primary ways: support of autocratic regimes and military presence. After the first Persian Gulf War, arms transfers and diplomatic and economic support systems continue to play a substantial role in keeping autocratic regimes in power thereby strengthening regional stability. By virtue of their empowerment, these regimes have been able to carry out internal repression. Opposition groups have not been allowed to compete in an open political process and there has been no democratic

distribution of power. As a result of this policy, many Arabs today regard the US as guilty of delaying the creation of political openness. Over the past years, demands to establish real parliamentary systems have been foiled. The result is the emergence of extremism on the one hand, and the creation of a specific power-base on the other hand, which in turn has encouraged new levels of extremism. US policy in the region in the early 1980s also played a part in creating the initial conditions for radicalism to develop. For example, Washington backed Sunni radical
94

groups against the Soviet army in Afghanistan as a means of limiting the influence of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The result of that policy today is Al-Qaeda and new terrorism. Supportive US policy towards the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid 1990s provided Al-Qaeda with the opportunity to organize, recruit, and train operatives in preparation for terrorist activities around the world. US support for regional regimes has moreover created a kind of power-base which by its nature undermines work towards democratization. As a result of these supportive policies we witness the existence of unusual authoritarian regimes along with distinctive closed power circuits in the region which are monopolized, unbalanced, unlimited, and offer advantages to those who are loyal to the core of the system. With the existence of these kinds of power bases, there is less chance for any democratization process. Such a process could only occur at the determination of those in power, not by the will of the people. As for US military presence, the first Persian Gulf War enabled the establishment of several permanent US military
95

bases. This presence has continued and has become an important component in the forging of political alliances between the US and various Middle Eastern regimes. Although these regimes were grateful for this strong US presence during the 1990s, it is now felt that the American intervention was not in accordance with international law, nor did it facilitate self-determination or the development of human rights. Rather, it protected US access to, and control of, energy resources and was in essence purely self interested in order to preserve stability in the region. US policy caused the new wave of religious extremism by creating dissatisfaction, distrust and a popular negative reaction against US military presence and its intervention in the internal affairs of the nations of the region. Ironically, this increase in tension and violence has itself become the main obstacle to further democratization. As regards termination of the Arab-Israeli Peace

Process, in order to preserve stability US policies have always favored Israel as the counter-weight to the regional powers. Over the past decade the United States has not
96

been a fair mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict: biased US policy has created enormous resentment as diplomatic, financial, and military support for the Israeli regime and its humiliating attitude to the Palestinians has continued. The failure of the US to be a fair mediator means that Arab feelings towards it are rapidly worsening. This growing Arab frustration is thought of as the primary catalyst of the move towards extremism and of attempts to obtain rights through armed struggle or even sometimes through terrorist activity. As the Iraq case displays, some segments of more politicized and radicalized In Algeria, political violence and random killings

continued on a large scale around the county, causing major loss of life. Car bombs targeting Algerian municipalities, press center, schools and cafes were set off regularly. Indiscriminate checkpoints occurrences. or killing in of civilians towns at were the false highway daily of

outlying often

almost

Terrorists

targeted

families

members of government security services.

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In Lebanon, the security situation improved as the government continued its efforts to expand the rule of law to more of the country. Lebanese courts are increasingly active in prosecuting terrorists. One was convicted of terrorist attacks on Kuwaiti interests in Beirut in the early 1990s, and two others for the car-bombing death of the brother of a senior Hezbollah official. A military appeals court upheld the conviction of the murdered of a French military attach killed in 1986, and another court extradited to Germany a man accused in the 1986 bombing of the La Belle discotheque in Berlin.

4.3 UNITED STATES INTERVENTIONIST POLICY

98

The movement of the United States from an isolationist foreign policy to one of intervention was a major ideological change for a country mostly used to looking inward. This change was most distinct during and immediately after WWII, and had worldwide implications. It will be argued that the policy was a clear progression, and was due to several linked factors. These were the primacy of U.S. interests, the strong leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt (who was clearly not isolationist), the changing public mood, the increasing influence of the military, and the perceived threat of Communism, particularly from the Soviets. The changes in the 1930's and 40's will be discussed to see how they came about before concluding with their result - the liberal consensus. It will be argued that the consensus was not in reality the 'golden age' it was purported to be. All of these factors can be tied to the one issue of protection of U.S. interests. The U.S. had developed isolationism to protect their interests, but as the world grew smaller these in turn were
99

threatened by the forces of fascism and communism. Despite isolationism supposedly representing the 'historic American way', the U.S. had in fact been intervening since the 1890's in places diverse as the Philippines, Siberia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico. The end of the Cold War has made the world more disorderly and so has multiplied the opportunities for American military intervention abroad. The end of the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union has also, however, reduced what the American public is willing to pay, in lives and treasure, to support such interventions. That is the lesson of Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. Among the instruments discussed are economic sanctions, interference with information networks, and -- a new entry in the dictionary of military oxymoron that already includes "peace enforcement" and "friendly fire" -- nonlethal weapons. United States interventionist policy also includes covert actions to topple foreign governments that have been opposed to the United States. In 1953 the CIA, working with
100

the British government, endorsed the military in a coup d'tat against the anti-British government of Iran led by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh who had attempted to nationalize Iran's oil, threatening the interests of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The US has intervened in the affairs of other countries through a number of secret operations. The U.S. government has conducted a number of covert operations in an effort to topple foreign governments, including both democratically-elected governments and

authoritarian regimes. Both Republican and Democratic presidents who, since the 1950s, have often considered used military intervention as a tactic of foreign policy, including in major cases: (in some cases the policies were continued by subsequent presidents.)

President Harry S. Truman's 1947 decision to NOT intervene militarily in the Chinese Civil War. President Harry S. Truman's 1950 intervention in Korea to stop the Communist invasion of South Korea, at UN direction

101

President Dwight D. Eisenhower 1954 decision to NOT intervene to support the French in Vietnam. President John F. Kennedy's intervention in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion. President Lyndon B. Johnson's intervention in Dominican Republic President Lyndon B. Johnson's intervention in Vietnam President Ronald Reagan's 1983 intervention in Grenada President George H. W. Bush's 1989 intervention in Panama to arrest General Manuel Noriega President George H. W. Bush's 1991 intervention in Kuwait to liberate it from Iraqi occupiers, at UN direction President George H. W. Bush's 1992 intervention in Somalia for humanitarian reasons, as directed by the UN Security Council President Bill Clinton's 1994 decision NOT to intervene in the Rwanda genocide President Bill Clinton's 1995 intervention in Bosnia, via NATO to prevent ethnic cleansing President Bill Clinton's 1999 intervention in Kosovo and attacks on Serbia with NATO involvement President George W. Bush's 2001 intervention in Afghanistan against the Taliban following the September 11 attacks. President George W. Bush's 2003 invasion of Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein

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President Barack Obama's involvement in enforcing the Libyan no-fly zone

4.4 FINDINGS
Since there are common factors, it ought to be possible to define terrorism. In the 1960s the UN General Assembly embarked on an attempt to do this. Initially little progress was made, partly because many states were reluctant to go far along the road of outlawing terrorism unless at the same time the 'causes of terrorism' were addressed. Other states saw this approach as implying that terrorism was a response to real grievances, and thereby insinuating that it was justified. Thus the main emphasis at the UN was on limited practical measures. In a series of 12 international

conventions drawn up between 1963 and 1999, particular terrorist actions, such as aircraft hijacking and diplomatic hostage-taking, were prohibited. As the 1990s progressed, and concern about terrorism increased, the UN General Assembly embarked on discussions about defining and
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outlawing terrorism generally. Its Legal Committee issued a rough draft of a convention, which:
Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be used to justify them.8

There are still disagreements between states about this draft convention. Even if it is eventually agreed, there is a difference between agreement on the general principle of outlawing terrorism and its application to particular facts. The labeling of individuals and movements as 'terrorist' will remain complicated and highly political. Two key questions arise: (1) Is it reliance on terror that truly distinguishes a movement from its political opponents? (2) Even if parts of a movement have employed terrorist methods, is 'terrorist' an accurate description of the movement as a whole, made up of many different wings, and employing many different modes of action?
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Terrorism is not new, and even though it has been used since the beginning of recorded history, it can be relatively hard to define. Terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable

abomination. Obviously, a lot depends on whose point of view is being represented. Terrorism has often been an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to the secretive nature and small size of terrorist organizations, they often offer opponents no clear

organization to defend against or to deter. That is why preemption is being considered to be so important. In some cases, terrorism has been a means to carry on a conflict without the adversary realizing the nature of the threat, mistaking terrorism for criminal activity. Because of these characteristics, terrorism has become increasingly common among those pursuing extreme goals throughout the world. But despite its popularity, terrorism can be a nebulous
105

concept.

Even

within

the

U.S.

Government,

agencies

responsible for different functions in the ongoing fight against terrorism use different definitions.9 The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Within this definition, there are three key elementsviolence, fear, and intimidationand each

element produces terror in its victims. The FBI uses this: "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in

furtherance of political or social objectives." The U.S. Department of State defines "terrorism" to be "premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-

combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. Outside
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the United States Government, there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasized in definitions. The United Nations produced this definition in 1992; "An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action,

employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons,

whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets." The most commonly accepted academic definition starts with the U.N. definition quoted above, and adds two sentences totaling another 77 words on the end; containing such verbose concepts as "message generators" and 'violence based communication processes." Less specific and considerably less verbose, the British Government definition of 1974 is"the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public, in fear."10 Every terrorist needs a particular cause to justify the use of terror tactics both to his own psyche and to the
107

audience he hopes reach. Most terrorists are not deranged or psychotic individuals. From their point of view, terror tactics are logical, valid activities to achieve a particular goal. These individuals do not consider themselves insane nor do they want the world to consider them insane. The modern wave of global terrorism that began in the second half of the 20th century is rooted in specific economic, social and political grievances. The validity of these grievances is of course debatable. Terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim. The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draw the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. The terrorists plan their attack to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what they oppose. The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the publics or governments reaction to the act. For example, in 1972 at the Munich Olympics, the Black September Organization killed 11 Israelis. The Israelis were
108

the immediate victims. But the true target was the estimated 1 billion people watching the televised event.11 The Black September Organization used the high visibility of the Olympics to publicize its views on the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Similarly, in October 1983, Middle Eastern terrorists bombed the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters at Beirut International Airport. Their immediate victims were the 241 U.S. military personnel who were killed and over 100 others who were wounded. Their true target was the American people and the U.S. Congress. Their one act of violence influenced the United States decision to withdraw the Marines from Beirut and was therefore considered a terrorist success. There are three perspectives of terrorism: the terrorists, the victims, and the general publics. The phrase one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter is a view terrorists

themselves would accept. Terrorists do not see themselves as evil. They believe they are legitimate combatants, fighting for what they believe in, by whatever means
109

possible. A victim of a terrorist act sees the terrorist as a criminal with no regard for human life. The general publics view is the most unstable. The terrorists take great pains to foster a Robin Hood image in hope of swaying the general publics point of view toward their cause. This sympathetic view of terrorism has become an integral part of their psychological vigorously.12 warfare and needs to be countered

ENDNOTES
1.

Chaliand Gerard, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). p.7.

2. Ibid, p. 15.
3.

Kaplan Robert, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, (New York: Picador, 2005) p.37.

4. Ibid, pp. 49-50.

5.

Jacob Alfred,

Early History of Terrorism , (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1988) pp 19-20. 6. Ibid, p. 41.

110

7.

Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 6.

8.

Hoffman Bruce,

Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1988) p. 4.

9.

Ross Jeffrey Ian, Political Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach, (New York: Peter Lang Press, 2006) p.34

10. Sageman

Mark, Understanding Terror Networks, University

of Pennsylvania Press) p. 166.

11. Shabad

Francisco, Political Violence in a Democratic State,

(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) pp. 467 & 470.
12.

Sageman Mark, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press) p. 187.

CHAPTER FIVE
5.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is unrealistic to solve a profound cultural-political problem by military means. The war on terrorism cannot be won with traditional warfare, but must be won politically with
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long-term plans. The root causes of new terrorism originate in the problems of the region, notably created by the policies of global governance. The two principles of stability and democratization essential for eradicating new terrorism have diverged. Ironically, in the current state of the Middle East any effort toward democratization needs stability and security, and any stability in turn needs democratization. Global governance needs to help to create a calm regional environment in which democratic change can occur. In contrast, the almost three-year long global presence in the region has intensified insecurity and fragmentation and hence fuelled terrorist activities. The current overwhelming military presence leaves no chance for such developments. It must be recognized that any change in the region must come from within the societies. No example of imposed democracy has been successful in the world, since it needs to be offered in compromise with the national

characteristics. A stable, democratic and prosperous Middle East depends on fair and just global governance, working with all the regional societies, not by one power alone.
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Whereas conducting the current type of war on terrorism may in the short term lead to some achievement in halting or reducing terrorist activities, it will cause more complexity in long term.1 The war that began with the September 11 atrocity is an internal war in the international reactionary camp. This camp, led by the USA, announced its existence with Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the 2nd World War. It has been unrivalled after the fall of the Berlin wall until now. Thatcherism, Reaganism, the World Bank, IMF, CNN, BBC, religion, nationalism, ethnicism, political Islam, the doctrine of cultural relativism, NATO, Taliban, Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran are all different parts of this international camp. This camp was essentially shaped in order to guarantee the hegemony of a newly developed imperialism after the 2nd World War to confront the Eastern Bloc and smash the Socialist and Left movement globally. Terrorism has been an intrinsic characteristic of this camp. Multiply September 11 by thousands and you will arrive at Hiroshima
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and Nagasaki. If the massacre of civilians and innocent people signifies terrorism, then the bombing of Vietnamese villages, organising Pinochets coup and the genocide of the Left in Chile, the bloody suppression of Palestinians, the killing of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children through economic sanctions, bringing Taliban to power in

Afghanistan and bringing political Islam to centre stage as well as many other acts of USA and NATO foreign policy are part of the track record of international terrorism. September 11 was neither the first nor the most atrocious act of terrorism. This time however, innocent people in the US were its victims. The dagger that the USA had essentially sharpened against the Left was on this occasion used against the people of America.2 Near the end of the Cold War, the USA government and its allies in NATO brought political Islam to centre stage in order to confront the Soviet Union and smash the Left in Middle Eastern countries. In particular, the Islamic Republic in Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan came to power with
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these

very

objectives

in

mind

and

with

the

West's

endorsement and support. The experience of these two countries clearly demonstrates that terrorism is the only way that political Islam can relate to the contemporary world and be relevant. The inhuman and ultra-reactionary capacity of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic in Iran, including genocide, torture, flogging, stoning and imposing unrestricted rightlessness on women, is part of political Islam's meaning in today's world. Islam without terrorism loses its political meaning and relevance.3 After the fall of the Soviet Union, political Islam's role not only did not end, but rather on the contrary, a post Cold War world provided a suitable swamp for its development. With the fall of the Eastern Bloc, the world turned to the Right. The most Right wing and reactionary doctrines in the West - those championed by Thatcherism and Reaganism became sole contenders and brought all the historical filth to the surface with them. The Left was isolated and its enemies -those that progressive humanity had fought against since
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the French revolution - began thriving. Religious, nationalist, ethnic and racist movements emerged everywhere. There began a rapid regression not only at the level of politics but also in philosophy, art, culture, education, print media and mass media. September 11 could only have taken place in the context of such a swamp.

Bush and USA officials claim that the reason behind this atrocity was the perpetrators enmity with contemporary civilization, but in fact, terrorism today is the result of the Wests retreat from contemporary civilization. Civilization without secularism, equality and freedom is not civilization; rather it is contemporary reaction. The war that has begun is in fact a war between NATOs modern reaction and political Islams Stone Age reaction. In fact, September 11 is the result and consequence of the blending and confluence of these two terrorisms. The New York explosion gave domestic meaning to the USA and NATOs foreign policy on the one hand and removed Islamic
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terrorism from the framework of domestic politics in the countries of its sphere of influence in the Middle East, specifically in Iran and Afghanistan, and gave it an

international dimension on the other. The people of America and the West suddenly realized what dreadful internal consequences and meaning their governments foreign policies could have. They also saw themselves alongside and in solidarity with people living under the yoke of political Islam in a country such as Afghanistan. Today, this situation has opened ears in the West. People are asking why and looking for answers. The media wants to find answers in the Koran, theology and Islamic studies in the East and the West. They have once again exhumed the erstwhile debate about the clash of

civilizations and the meaning of Jihad, suicide, etc. in Islam and begun holding conferences and round tables. This nonsense does not convince anyone. This is no longer the war in the Gulf, Bosnia or Somalia. This time the catastrophe
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has occurred in America itself and the people of America have been its direct victims. American society is searching for answers because it wants to feel secure, wants to live and does not want to have the fear of biological and germ terrorism hanging over its head. American society is now compelled to understand the world; it has paid a heavy price to learn the direct relevance of occurrences across the waters to its daily life.4 The USA war in Afghanistan is not answering anyone either. This is not the solution, it is part of the problem; people are beginning to understand this. Today, more than ever, public opinion is ready to listen to the political truth about the contemporary world. Only the Left can be the amplifier of this truth. It must be explained to people thirsting for the truth that this is a war of brutality not a clash of civilizations. The record and relationship of Islamic and USA terrorism must be exposed for public opinion. The banner of secularism and the separation of religion from the state must be raised. We must stand against nationalism. It
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must be shown to all that USA nationalism is as ugly and horrendous as Islamic terrorism. We must shake people out of their nationalist and religious identities and address their humanity. That mournful mother in New York who says: I do not wish this for anyone in the world is doing just that. We must speak of the calamity of living under the yoke of Islamic terrorism in Iran and Afghanistan to those who have opened their eyes after the New York catastrophe. We must discredit the thesis of cultural relativism. We must confront the camp of internationalist reaction. We must show that NATOs war in Afghanistan is not the solution for terrorism but rather escalates it. We must directly and completely smash political Islam. The isolation of attributes or traits shared by terrorists is a formidable task because there are probably as many variations among terrorists as there may be similarities. Efforts by scholars to create a profile of a "typical" terrorist have had mixed success, if any, and the assumption that there is such a profile has not been proven. Behavioral
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scientists attempting to understand the psychology of individuals drawn to this violent political behavior have not succeeded in identifying a unique "terrorist mindset." People who have joined terrorist groups have come from a wide range of cultures, nationalities, and ideological causes, all strata of society, and diverse professions. Their personalities and characteristics are as diverse as those of people in the general population. There seems to be general agreement among psychologists that there is no particular psychological attribute that can be used to describe the terrorist or any "personality" that is distinctive of terrorists.5 The diversity of terrorist groups, each with members of widely divergent national and socio-cultural backgrounds, contexts, and goals, underscores the hazards of making generalizations and developing a profile of members of individual groups or of terrorists in general. Post cautions that efforts to provide an overall "terrorist profile" are misleading: "There are nearly as many variants of

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personality who become involved in terrorist pursuits as there are variants of personality." All Americans can now take satisfaction in what is surely a defining moment. After nearly a decade-long manhunt, Osama bin Laden is dead. Its a proud moment, in fact. Soon after it was reported, the news of bin Ladens death was marked by a chorus of cheers and celebration, reminding us all that the memory of Sept. 11 is as vivid today, almost 10 years later, as it was in the days after the attack. The operation that targeted bin Laden was the product of tireless work and personal sacrifice. American special operations forces showed their efficiency and

precision, not just by killing bin Laden inside a guarded compound, but by extracting his body without taking a single casualty. They deserve great credit and thanks for what they did, along with every other American who has contributed to the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bin Ladens death is an important benchmark in what will continue to be a

dangerous fight against an enemy that is committed to our

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destruction. Justice has been served, but the overall threat still remains.6

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Since many attacks, including September 11, have been perpetrated by Muslim suicide terrorists, many

presume suicide terrorism must be a function of Islamic fundamentalism. This presumed connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism is misleading and may be encouraging domestic and foreign policies that are likely to worsen America's situation. Political Islam developed on the USA and NATOs general anti-Left strategy but its atrocities belong directly to it alone. The crimes committed by the Taliban in

Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic in Iran and the Islamic movement in the Middle East and North Africa in general must be widely exposed and explained. We must especially
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explain that political Islam - be it in government, the opposition, fundamentalist or moderate - means nothing but brutality and backwardness. Suicide terrorism rarely occurs as an isolated or random event. Instead the attacks tend to occur in coherent, organized, strategic campaigns that terrorist groups use for political, and mainly secular, purposes. A foreign military presence also appears to be a necessary condition for suicide terrorism. The case of Hezbollah is noteworthy. Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 with 78,000 combat troops, and Hezbollah was born one month later. More recently, Israel unilaterally abandoned territory in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and has built a security fence. The result is that attacks against Israel are down 90 percent. As Israel is withdrawing from Gaza and says it will withdraw from more of the West Bank, Palestinians have started turning in members of Hamas when they were not before. As Israel reverses certain pressures, suicide attacks have decreased.

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Democracies vulnerable to

are

viewed

as

soft

and

especially the target

coercive

pressure;

therefore

societies of every suicide terrorist attack has been a democracy. The U.S.-led war on terrorism is going badly because it is being waged on a faulty premise. That premise is that suicide terrorism is mainly a product of Islamic

fundamentalism. The main cause of suicide terrorism against the United States is the stationing of American combat forces on the Arabian Peninsula starting in the early 1990s. Today, over 140,000 American combat forces are on the Arabian Peninsula. As the American force presence has grown, so has suicide terrorism by al-Qaeda. A major goal of Osama bin Laden is to compel the United States to leave the Arabian Peninsula. Between 1995 and 2004, seventy-one individuals killed themselves for bin Laden. The largest number, thirty four, came from Saudi Arabia, and the majority came from the Persian Gulf, where the United States began to stationing combat forces in 1990.
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6

That said, the United States should not cut and run from the Arabian Peninsula. Access to oil is an important strategic interest. Going forward, the Bush administration should concentrate on three things: (1) Al-Qaeda must be the top U.S. priority; (2) the United States should completely transfer the responsibility of securing Iraq to the Iraqi government; and (3) Over the next three years, the United States should switch to offshore balancing, a strategy the United States has used in the past and can use again as the war on terror goes forward.

ENDNOTES
1. Richard Russell, American Diplomatic Realism: A Tradition

Practised and Preached by George F. Kennan, (Oxford University Press, 2000) pp 57 & 83.
2. James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process

(Oxford University Press, 2009) pp.7 & 8.

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3. Meernik, James, United States Military Intervention and the

Promotion of Democracy. Journal of Peace Research 391 & 402.

4. Ibid, pp. 425-426. 5. Ibid, p. 438. 6. Hermann Margaret, The U.S. Use of Military Intervention to

Promote

Democracy:

Evaluating

the

Record.

(Oxford

University Press, 2005) p. 91

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