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SCIENCE DIRRCT.

PERGAMON

Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823-831 www.elsevier.corn/iocate/actaastro

EVOLVING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF SPACEFLIGHT IN AMERICAN CULTURE R.D. Launius* National Aeronautics and Space Administration washitlgtoxl, DC
AbTct There is a belief that exists in the United States aboutpublic support for NASA activities. The s belief is almost universally held that NASA and the causeof spaceexploration enjoyed outstanding public supportand confidencein the 1960sduring the eraofApolloandthatpublicsupportwanedinthe post-ApolIo only to sinkto quitelow depths in rra, the decadeof the 1990s.Thesebeliefs are predicated on anecdotalevidencethat should not be discounted, but empirical evidence gleanedt%om public opinion polling data suggestthat someof theseconceptions are totally incorrect and othen are either incomplete or more nuancedthan previously believed.This paper exploresevolution of public supportfor space explorationsince the 1960s.Using polling data from avarietyofsourcesitpresentstre&overtimeand oflbrs commentson the meaningof public perceptionsfor the evolution of spacepolicy and the developmentof spaceexploration in the United States. Publishedby Elsevier ScienceLtd. @ottanttoexpknespace.Thedecisiontolxoceed withApoUowasnotmadebeamseitwasenormously Pogr-;w&P~3 lhesearemanyotherobsetv&onsemagingtiom thisreview.Someoflhemareconhadictorytothe genelaI~gs-aboveahoutsuppartfbr Apollo. They inch& the following l The American public has long held generally positive attitudestoward the spaceprogram but is not very fkmihar with its details. l Over the history of the spaceage,an averageof more than 60 percentof thosepolled rated the job done by NASA as either excellent or good l Most Amekans have shown supportfor space exploration and view it as importantover the years,but also believe that federalmoney could be.better spenton other programs. l Most are also in favor of NASA as an organimio~ hut are relatively unfamiliar with the majority of its activities and objectives. l Thesepolls also suggesthistorically close relationshipsbetweenpublic perceptionsof NASA and spa&light depictionsin popular culture, especiallyfihn. Theseimagesfrom popular culture, coupledwith real-world accomplishments spaceflight,work togetherto in createpowerful visions afkting the public consciousness. IheCiOOdNewS Overall there is very good news for NASA and the causeof spaceexploration The public has always, insothr as data exists, accordedNASA a quite favorable rating. This is unusuaJ most for Federalagencies,as the low opinion held by the public for such organirations as the.hrtemal Revenue Service,the Environmental ProtectionAgency, and Health and Human Servicesattest For example,while Americansmay not know that much about the spaceprogram,they have a largely favorably opinion of it-over 70 percentW Y they have a fhvorable impression,comparedto less than 20 percentwho hold an unfavorableimP~siOn. And this tracks over the entire life of question,from

IfIhaveheardaonce,Ihavehearditah~ times,ifNASAjusthadthepopularsupporttbatit enjoyedddngthe 1!%OsallwouldbeweUlhis paperp?eamts analysisof public opinion polhng an dataintheunitedstnteeikonlthrougboutthehiatoryof theapaceage.Analyzingtbesepollsauowstheplotting oftrendsoverakmgperiodoftime.Thisstudyreveals several-~ insightsabout evolution of the spaceFor example,most peoplebelievethat ProjectApollo was -~bpopular,~*po~ donotsupportthkcontentionGmsiithroughout the196OsamajorityofAmericansdidnotbelieve Apollo was worth the cost,with the one exceptionto thisbemgapolltakenatthetimeoftheApoU0 11 lunar landingin July 1969.And consistently thmughoutthe decade4Sto60peramtofAmeriamsbelievedthattha government spendingtoo much on space. was Clearly,this datadoesnot supporta contentionthat most peopleappmvedof Apollo and thoughtit
l

Chief Historian,NASA.

0094-5765/03/$ - see front matter Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. doi: lO.l016/SOO94-5765(03)00119-X

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1978to the pE!SXlthl a set Of pOk COUdUCtCd ill 1gp5,1996, and 1997,an averageof 92 pementof thosepolled strongly agreedor somewhatagreed with the statement:The U.S. spaceprogram is somethingthis cotmtry can be proud ofn2 The Yankelovich polling organ&ion askedthe question,Pleasetell me how impormnt you believe the spaceprogram is to our country. Would you say that it is extremely important, very impottan~ somewhatimpor&@ not very important or not at all important?Figure 1 showsthe percentwho said extremely or tery important The percentof Americans who believed that the spaceprogram was extremely or very important to the country was 57 percent in 1999,the last year that this poll was taken. Although this chart shows consistentsuppo& in 1995 it depicts the beghming of consistentlyhigh marks for spaceflightafter severalyears of steadydecline. This rise in 1995may have been the result of the Shuttle/Mir docking missionsthat began in July of that year as well as the releaseof the ApolIo 13 feature film in the summerof 1995. Fiwre 1

workbg-classAmericanwhosePmpeCtiVe-S more Were commoninoursocktythanmanyobserverswere comfortablewith, O Connor - sd well how m0stAmeriC4mSrsp0xkiedt0thearhure0f cornpetencethatApolloengenderedHeobseavedthat he had a genuinefacsiile of the Apollo 14 insignia That sthe~dmtsetstheUSofAapartfiom...all them other losers.5 very specificterms,Archie In Bunker encapsulated everyonewhat set the United for Statesapart6omeveryothernationintheworkl, success spaceflight At a basic level Apollo provided in the impemsfor the perceptionof spaceflightas a great positivefor the nation Figure 2

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Tbesecondanecd0te,madetbirtyyearslater, suggeststhatIH3tmudlhaschiingedInthe~ produces nightly cable spatr a &rts Night, oneepisodeincludedsimplyasasidebaradiscumion ofspaceexpkMli&Thefictkmalspmtssimw s executivepmducer,IsaacJa&e,playedbyrenowned actorRobertGuiUaume,wastecovering%mastroke anddisengagedfiomthedaiIyhubbubofputting togetherthenightlyshow.Hisproduce,Dana Whit&r, playd by Felicity HufEnan, kept intemr@nghiminthisepisodeashewasreadinga
magwine about space expknation. Ihe exchange is

(Ill---so* ! 1sea me0 ~992 ISa9 199, lse31994 ,* 1997 lea9 / ls95 ,e?a In compiling data from several sourceson the quality of the work being done by NASA between 1988 and 1999,as shown in Figure 2, an averageof more than 60 percentof thosepolled rated the job being done by NASA as excellent or good.4 All of this suggeststhat the causeof spaceflight in general and NASA in particular enjoys relatively positive public perceptionsand has throughout its existence. Two anecdotes dtawn from televisionsituation comediessuggest overall positive conception. this First, inthedecadeofthe l%Os,thespaceprogrampmvided one of the leadingexamplesof a governmentprogram that worked. It impll public contidencein the &ii of governmentto accomplishgmat fests.Even as other governmentinitiatives failed, civilian spaceflights continuedto sucwxi. Actor Carroll O Connor perhaps saiditbestbj.anepisodeofAllintheFmniIyin 1971. Portrayingthe characterof Archie Bunker,the bigoted

telling.IsaactellSk,They reEalklngab0utbioe@M&lganimalsandteR&ormingMatS.WhetlI startedreport@Geminimissi~justwat&iuga Tiimcketlittoffwasasl&ttosee.Nowthey re &G&aacisobsesshlg&uttllisandhe;;grees.so Dallaaskswhy?Quietly,Isaacmsponsponds,BearuseI won live to seait. It is a touching conversation t about hopeandaspimtionsandmortalli&ations.Butmore thatltl@~JatTi%?i&kmshis-ihithhl the impmanw of spaceexpknation and in NASA to conductthis importat mission.You put an X anyplacein the So~System* he says,and the* engineersatNASAc&landaspacec&onit

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Nothing more elTixtively states public coufidence the s in NASA to carry out an exceptioually importanttask. At the same time, many Americaas hold seemi@& umtradictory attitudesonNASA aud space exphnatim Most are in fivor of space explorationaud viewitasimporBnt,butalsohekvethatFakal moneycouldhebetterspentonotherpro@ams.Most arealsoinfhvorofNASAasauorgani&ou,butare &tively u&milk with the majorityof its act&it& and objectives. Exrkdiu~~ the ConceutoiPo~ultq slmm for Prokct A&lo / The belief that Apollo enjoyedeuthusiastic support dmiugtbel%LkaudthatsomehowNASAhaslostits compassthere9&rejorshroadappeaIrighttothe presentlhisiSall~cooception,fotWitbOUt the adive agrement ofpolitical leaders at least sod publicacqtamnoexplomtioneffortmayhe susta&dforauyiengthofthne.7Popularsupportfor theKennedydeciGntoumkt&etheMconIaudings are,th@uf~paceivedassom&iugthatmustbe gaiuedforlbepRsentspaceexphXationagellda. Repea@yacharusofremorse fbr the lukewarm wN-m=+iayedbypiesaaspace~acZivitieSistb&wedwithaheavysighaudthe conclusion,if only our currenteffortshadthe same level of cumu&eut enjoyedby Apollo, all would he welLd WhilethereisreasontoheIievethisatsomebasic level, it is at besta simplistic and ultimately UIlSatiSfsCtOlY couclusiou.Indeed,the public support s forspacefkiinghasnzminedrema&ablystableat appmmly 80 percentin litvor of the statusquo siuce1%5,withonlyouesignikantdipiusupportin the early 1970s.However,respom~ to funding questkmson public opinion polls areextremely se&iv~toqnestionwordingandmustbeused ctauh~~ly.~For example,in the summerof 1965one thirdOftheW@f+=+JW&gthe-spaabudgct, whil~ckIy16perCentwantedto -it.overthe next tfneeandonehalf years,the mm&r for cutting sp&cespendingwentupto4o~wilhthcee prekinganiu~~iugto14pacentAtthe endofl%S,theNewYorkTimesreportedthatapoU condllctedin sixAme&an cities showedfive other pub& issues holdingpriority over &E&ISin outer space (Figure 3): Polls consistentlyrankedspaceflightnear thetopofthoseprogmmstohecutiuthefederalbudget (Figmv 41,&Meets ofthese citiesprtdkcd doing somahiagabout3andwaterpbll~~jobtraiuing for unskilledworkers,nationalbeautification, aud pmmy beforespeudingfederalIimds fm space.The following yearNewsweek echoedthe Timesstory, stating The U.S. spaceprogmm is in decline.The

Vietnam war and the desperate couditionsof the nation poor and its cities-which make spaceflight s seem,in comparison,like an embarrassing national self-indulgence-have combinedto drag down a proglam wherethe sky WILS longer the link no Figure 3

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Nor did hmar exploration in and of itself create much of a groundswell of support from the general public. The Americau public during the 1960slargely showedahesimqcytowcetheSovie@totbeMoou, as shownin Figure 5. Would you favor or opposeU.S. tOtklLlOOtl? govemmentspe&iugtoseml~ thesepollsasked,audiuvhtuaUyallcasesamajmity opposeddoing so, even duriug the height of Apollo. At only one point, C&tober1965,did eveu 50 perceutof the public supporthumanluuar exploration.In the postApollo era,the Al.nericanpublic has continuedto questionthe validity ofundertakiug humanexpeditions to the Moon. Figme 4 also showsthe resultof the re&utmtumtotheMoouwiththeClementiuespace probeiu1994,whichfollodevidenceofembeddedice atthepoles,andeveuthenthesupportforhuman explorationwas essentiallyequally divided 2 Fimrre4

j :. E I

Somemight concludekom theseopinion polls that eventhoughthe fbtxricau public in the abstmct may havebeenunsupportiveof human lunar

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e@)ration, that Reject Apolkas it was in &ebosomofAmerkanvirtue,advoCatedbythemost whoiesomeofas!ronauthemeqandhawl~edby everyonehm jonndsts to Msdison Avenue
ma&eW+ajoyedcoitsistentpopularity.Thereis someevideacetosuggest~butitis,onthemain, Imbue.

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the time of the Apollo 11 lunar landing.And eventhen only a me&y 53 percentagreedthat the resultjustified theexpense,despiithefkctthattbelandingwas perhapsthe most momentousevent in humanhistory sinceithecamethefirstinslaqeinwhichthehuaum racebecamebi+netary. The%slalidcsdonotdemonstrate aull qafied suppmtforNASA sef@ttorrachtheMooninthe 196hTheysuggesfinsteild,tilatthepoliticalclisis thatlnwghtpublicsuppoRtotileinitialhmarlJmding dezisionwasfleetingandwithinashortpekdthe malitionthatarmamcedithadtorec4msidertheir deckiiItalsosuggeststlmtthepublicwasnever enthusiic about hnmanlunar explomtioq and especiallysboutthecostsassociatedwithit.What cmthusiasm may haveenjoyed wanedover time, until it bytheendoftheApollopmgmminDecemk1972 onehastheimageoftheprogramassom&ingakinto alimpingmamthonersbaikgwitheverymuscleto reachthe !inish line beforecollapsing. Whither the &ace Shuttle? Inconhasttothelukewarmsupportthepublic showedfortheefWstolamiAmericansontheMoon, asshowninFigureS,thepublichasco~M&+~agmed thattheSpaceShuttleisagoodinvestment(seeFigure 7). l-hat doesnot directly tlatlslate, however,into 3 williQWontk~oftlqublictoflyin~,as shown in Figure 8. Fiasue7
6 TIE SPACE sIwlnEAQooDWVEST*ENT? I ,

AsshominthetoptrendlineinFigure6,when askedif* appved of Reject Apollo during the 196OsbetweenS8and78pacontofthepubtie routinelysaidyes.lIh?knvpohltscumein1%3-1964 wbentfiGsOvietUtlkRlpUblkaIllWW&thatitwaS llOtS&itlgtOtXCC?tklJ&dStStL?StOthSM~ biild-liUX?dlkItSittUlUCdOUtfiUYtlwnsbchev--and inearly1%7-1%8aRertheiIlvestigatioIlsofthe Apouo1fkethattookthelivesofttKeeastRXMs becamepublic and &owed how dedic$ the NASA safetyprogm~~beglillassmingquality.Tbehigll pqint&~,wneatthethnewhenmajor --===wreached,w=wtf= fktIUlZUkKiillgiIl1969.BUtwkllaskadifApollo wasworfhthecosfbetween35and45percent0ftbe public believedthat it was thmugh most of the history of the program.

The only point at which the opinion surveys

demomtrate that mm than 50 percent of the public

believedApollo was worth its exgmsecame in 1969at

While it is not specifically tied to thesepublic perceptions,some intemting conclusionsmay be offered about the SpaceShuttle program basedon thesesourcesandotberdataFirst,andcertaiolymost significant, most agreethat the SpaceShuttle is a magnificent machine. A massively complex system-with more&an 200,OOi) separate componentsthat must work in synchronizationwith

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each other and to specifications more exacting than any other technological system in humanhistorythe SpaceShuttle must be viewed as a triiumph of engineeringand excellencein technological management. Fiaure 8
WBlJc wuJNGNEss lo TRAvELIn SPACE I

i )O

Beta* of ita techuological magnificence,the SpaceShuttle has become an overwhehn&ly comma&@ symbol of American exceRe&ce the for world community. Ask almost anyoneoutside the United Stateswhat ingrediits they believe demonstrateAmerica superpowerstatusin the s world, and they will quickly mention the Space Shuttle-as well as NASA larger spaceexploration s program-asaconstantremhtderofwhat Americans canaccomplishwhentheyputtheirmindstoit 6 Secur& the SpaceShuttle has beenre4nahbly reliable over the course of its opuational history. One exceptionally c&s@ophic accidenf the Chailengef explosion that killed the crew of sevenon January 28, 1986, ruins an othemise exceptional reliability reami. Without minim&g that ttagic accident one is compelled to conchale that the vehicle has been significantly improved since 1986 as NASA engineers worked to coma designflaws and developmore effective opmationalprocdms. Upgrades many to compmem of the SpaceShuttleand #onal changestothemanagementsystemhaveledtothe implementa&m of a st&ngly more reliable vehicle thanwasflyingin1986.Ilteslmttleisthemostreliable launchsystemnowinserviceanywhereintbewoild, withasucceas-@failure ratio of greaterthan99. Thit@theSpaceShuttJeisalsoamaturesystem atthispointinitsaueerandthatisanimpor&nt&tor inthequalityofitspetfomtance over the last several years.At the end of the twentieth centmy, the Space Shuttle appropriately enjoys many of the same plaudits and suffers from some of the samecriticisms that have beenmade clear since not long after the program first began.It remains the only vehicle in the world with the dual capability to deliver and return

large payloadsto and ffom orbit. The design,uow more than two decadesold, is still state-of-the-artin many areas,including computerizedflight control, ahfiame design,electrical power systems,thermal protection system,and main engines.ts Finally, the SpaceShuttle has proven itself one of the most flexible spacevehicles ever flown Most assuredly,the tange of possibilities for operationsonorbit expanded dramatically with the launch of Columbia in I 98 1. With its large payload bay, satellite deployment,captureand return to Earth, and repair and redeploymentall for the first time became possibilities once the shuttle first flew. Requirements to perform thesetasks have ensuredtbat the crew of every shuttle mission has a much broaderrange of required activities itthan the pioneering astnma& of Gemini, Apollo, and even the Skylab the M-y& Programs. Despiithis, formostoftheshuttleera-1981 to the present-the public has believed that robotic spaceflightshould be pmmredmore aggressivelythan the humanpmgmm that relied on the shuttle. Between 1989 1997severalpolls askedthe and question,should the U.S. spaceprogmm concultrate on mmanned missions like planetary probesOrOlltllFUUlCdprognrmssuchaSthCspace shuttle?Consjstently u&l 1995the answercame back that more Americans thvored robotic missions over the shuttle flights. This changessuddenly in the summer of 1995and the public has favored human missions over probes since that time. This transformationis depicted in Figure 9.20 What actcounts this transformation?Several for potential explanationsare possible. One may be that forthefirsttimeinthesummerof1995dreSpace Shuttle dockedwith the Russianspacestation, Mir, aud begana s&s of cooperativemissions. The excitementof the Shuttle&fir program has sparkeda recognition of importance of human exploration in openingthe high &ontier of space.* But thereseemsto have beenmore to it than the ShuttleMir program. The pollsmts suggested that there seemsto have beena close relationship between public pemeptiousof NASA and spacetlight depictions in popular cultme. For example, Apollo 13 seemsto havebeenan important factor in the shift in favor of humanspaceflight over robotic missions in 1995.Coming out in the summer of 1995,it excited the public as the reality of human spaceflight had done for many years. Near-term science fiction films seemto havehelped sustainpublic enthusiasmfor
human spacefligh~ e.g., Armageddon, Deep Impact, Contact, Space Cowboys. These images from popular

culture, coupledwith real-world accomplishmentsin human exploration and developmentof space, worked togetherto createpowerful visions for the

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~enty-first centllry. ThW is reallynOtIling

VCQJ

unusualaboutthis connection.Political scientist Howard E. McCurdy and sociologist Constance Penley, amongothers,have drawn tight couuections beween t&r culture and public perceptionsof ?A spaceflight. Figure 9
I wlwTsHouloEETHE

PtUHARYEWMASS oFNAsAPRoGRms?

70.

official rememberedthat I reachedthe screamlevel at about 5 billion, referring to how much U.S. 9 politicians appearedwilling to spendon the station.24 As a result, NASA constantly soughtto reducethe cost of the station, but this proved to be a losing battle that led to constantcoritroversy,reviews, redesigns,and political hijhrks.z With thesediBiculties over the spaces&dim one would expectthat the public would turn agaiustthe projectSuch~notseemtobethecase.Whilethe poRiugdataisnottoosophistka@Figure10 sugges&thatevendmiugveaypublicproblemswith theprogmminthemid499Osthatthepublicsuppo@d the effix Fiaure 10
SUPPORT FOR SPACE SlATtON

Workinn for a Livine in Soace In the Stateof the Union Addressof 1984 PresidentRonald Reagauchallengedthe nation to build a spacestation.Reagantold Congressand the nation Yhat spdcliugecwomy spursiuitiatives, sumiseindu&es,andmakesolderonesmore competitive.He added Nowhereisthismmimpomutthauournext iiontierz space. Nowheredo we so effkctivety demo&de ourtechuologicalle&rGp and abilitytomakelikbe3ter4mEarihTheSpace AgeisbarelyaqmuterofacentmyoldBut aheadywe pushedcivil&ion forward with ve
OWi3dWCCSiIlSCieoceand~Ology.

Whetlaskedabouttherealityofcoopa;ltionwitb thefonaerSovietUnioninbuildingthespacestatiou, thereiseVenmOresupportFlXKtlthepoitlttMtthe SovietUnionbegantocolIapseinthemid19gOs,the public consistent&favoredlarge cooperativeprograms withtheRu&aus,asshowuiuFigmell.n Fiaure 11

OgprWties andjobs will multiply as we cross IKW t8xes~kls of lmowledgcanti reachdeeper iutotheunhown.... America hasalways beengmatestwhen wedaredt0.begre-a Wecanreachfor w agaiu. We can follow our dreamsto distantstars,living and working in spacefor peace@,economic,and scientific gain Tonight, I am dimcting NASA to develop a pemmmmUymatmedspacestationaudtodoit withiuadecade.Aspacestationwillpermit quautmnleapsiuourmaearchiuscierrce, communications,inmetals, and in lifesaving medicineswhich could be manufacturedonly in space.= And, as they say in sports,the crowd goes wild. Almost from the outset,the spacestation program was e~ntroverGaL Most oftk debate centeredon its costsversusits benetits. One NASA

ShouldWeGotoMam? Clearly, Apollo was the penultimate of * excitementfor the !Qaceage dking its first foIty years.Landing humans on the Moon had never been done before in human history and certainly that great

R.D. Lmnius /Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823-831

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accomplishment lasting importance.Space has enthusiasts to point to the bold decision of John like F. Kennedyand say somethinglike, If we just had a presidentwith the vision and foresight of John F. Kennedyto ammuncea bold spaceinitiative, and to supportthat kitiative, all would be well with NASA. The assumptionis that JFK Apollo s decisionwas the normative processin policy formulation and could and should be re~&ated by axeding p&dent? This is always invoked wheyver advocatesof Mars explorationconsiderthe political ciFarmstances uderwhichtheycvpenuion.whattheyfailto mcognbzaretheverynalco16warobjedivesthat ledKennedytohisdecision.Abseutthatcri&he wouldneverhavecow&edtoPrqjectApollo.Jnthe endauniquec&hmnceofpohticalnece&ty,perxmal lll&lWtd~~~ti6cltnd~lOgid %ity ,econon&prosp&y,andpublicmoodmade possi the 1961decisionto carry out a f-dble kxkinglunarhlndingp.~ For thoseadvocatinga humanMars mission the poUthI chdenge is datmting.For one thing, is muchSntherandmomdil5culttoreachthanthe Moon.WebavealsonotyetsenthumanstoMars, and the challengethat entds makesit emmnously mote problematical.The track record of robotic missionstoMars,outlhmdinFigure12,suggesmthe magnibde of hnpedimentsto the effort is at least an order of magnimdegreaterin cotnghxity, risk, and cost than returning to the Moon.
it It

expedition to Mars is quite simple. What political, military, sociak economic, or culturaJchallenge, sceriario,or emergencycan they envision to which the bestraponse would be a natiortal commitment on the part of the president and other electedofficials to send humansto Mars? The answerto that question will go far toward infotming the public debateand the presidentialcotnmitment to a &ture aggressive spacee~loration effort to go back to the Moon or on toMars. , Fiwre 13
SHOULD THE GOVERNblENT FUND HUMAN TRIPS TO MARS?

RoboticsMi!islcmsto~.

K%o-2002 onetinalobsavatiooiiomthisteviewofpohing data dates to the level of spendingfor NASA pmgrams.Withtheexceptionofaibwye8rsduringthe Apollo~tbeNASAbudgethashovetedataboutone percentofallnKmeyexpen&dbytheu.s.tmasmy.As showninFigure14,stabiihasbeenthenonnasthe annualNASAbmigethas&emema&goaeupor downill&?tiontothat~be&maPBllt thepublic spaoeptionofthisisquitedi&?e@as shown in Figme 15. Forexample,in 1997 the average estimateof NASA shareof the federal budgetby s th0sepo11edwas20percentHadthisbeentrue, NASA budgetin 1997 would have beenS328 s billion. of course,if NASA had that amount of money it would have beenable to go to Mars. It seemsobvious that most Americans have little conceptionof the amount of funding available to NASA. As a result there is a generalJackof understandingthat NASA has lessthan one percent of the Federalbudget each year, and that its shareof

HumanMatsmissionshaveaJsonevereqioyed muchsupport6umtheAme&anpublic.cbnsistcmly, asshowninFii13,morepeopkpouedhave opposedthemissionthansuppc&~itWiithat 1uk~supporttbe~selectedleadaswUl Accord@&, the advocatesofhuman explorationof Mgrs must appreciatethe historical issuesat play with the JFK decisionto move forward with Apollo. And using Apollo as a modeladdressed it was to a very specific political crisis as relating to U.S./Sovietcommor+one question for thoseseekinga decision to mount a human

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budget has been&inking since the early 1990~. Most Americans seemto believe that NASA has a lot of money, much more than it auuually receives. Turning around those false perceptionsoffimdiug is perhapsthe most seriouschallenge facing those who wish to gain greaterpublic support for space exploration.

Figure 14

Fimue 15
NASA S ESTYATED FEDERAL WARE BUDGET OF THE

In a set of Yankelovich polls conductedfor the Boeing Company betweenMay 1978and December 1997 the question was asked,To Agree: I approve of Americak current civilian spaceprograa On average68 percent of thosepolled agreedwith the statement Polls available in NASA Historical ReferenceCollection, NASA History Office, Washington, DC. 2 Ibid Ibid 4 Sourcesare ABUWP, CNN/uSAT, CBSNYT, Gallup, Media Geueral,and Yankelovich polls from 1988 to 1999.Copies available in NASA Historical ReferenceCollection.

li Carroll O Connor Obituary, On Moruing Edition, National Public Radio, June 22,200 1. This report by Andy Bowers is available on-hue at hrrtxtiwww nnr.orq, access& July 2,2001. 6 The Sweet Smell of Air, SpovrsNight, iirst aired January25,200O. StephenJ.Pyue,Space:AThirdGmatAgeof Diswvery," &ace Policy 4 (Au8ust 1988):187-99. 81hisissuehasbeeudissectediuJamesL.k&tan, &?liing outer space: &??medy,the Mea?& and Fudngfw Project ApolIo, 19614963 ( I Uu.iversityofAlabamaPmss, 1994);MarkE. Bymes, Politics andSpaaz image Making by NASA (New yo?k, Aaeger, 1994). 9 StephanieA. Roy, Elaine C. Gresham,and Carissa Bryce Christensen,The Complex Fabric of Public Ophion on Space,IAF-99-P.3.05, presemedat the Iuterua!io~IAsmmamdcaiFe&atiouammal meeting, Amsterdam, The Netherlands,October 5, 1999. Thesechiutsaretheresultof researchover time compiling polls iiom various sourcesshowing the public perceptionof NASA. While one may s questionthe validity of polls, they tend to show severaltrends@at offer veristilitude. Copies of all polls are available in the NASA Historical Refmnce Collection, NASA History Office, Wash&mu, DC. The Gallup PoiI: Public Opinion 19354971, m: 1959-1971,pp. 1952,2183-84,2209; New York Times, December3,1%7; Newsweekis quotedin Ad . ve History of NASA, chap. II, p. 48, NASA Historical RefereuceCollection. I2 This analysis is basedou a set of Gallup, Harris, NBC/A.smchd FWs, CBS/New York Times, and ABC/USA Today polls couductedthmughout the 196Os, copies available iu the NASA Historical ReferenceColkctiou. ThBa&ysisisbasedouasetofHarris,Media Gemal, NBUAssocii Press,NBC, Gallup, CBS/New York Times, and ABCIWP polls conductedbetweenthe 1980sand the present, available in the NASA Historical Reference Collection. This maIysis is based op a set of NBC/Associated Press,NBC,CBsMewYork T~~~s,ABCAVP, Harris, and Gallup polls conductedbetweenthe 1980sand the present,available in the NASA Historical ReibreuceColiec@m. Is See T.A. Hepperkii, ?%eSpaceshtmle Decision: NASA Questfw a Reusable s SpaceVehicle cwashington,DC NASA SP-422I,1 999),and T-A. Heppeuheimer,Deveiopmerrtof the SpaceShuttle, 1972-1981(History of the Space Shuttle, Volume2) (Washingtou,DCLSmithsonian Institution P&s, 2002).

R.D. Launius/Acta Astronautica 53 (2003) 823-831

831

I6 Roger D. Launius, Twenty Years On-Orbit: The

Space ShuttleLegacy,Space Times: Z?te Magazine of the American Astronautical Society 40 (May-June

American Imagination (Washington, DC: Smithsonian

institution Press,1997);ConstancePeniey,
NAWTREK: Popular Science andseX in America

2001): 7-10. B. PeterLeonard and William A. Kisko, Predicting Launch Vehicle Failure,Aerospace America, September 1989, pp. 3638,46; Robert G. Bramscher,A Survey of Launch Vehicle Failures,
Spac&ight 22 OJovernber-December 1980): 5 i-58;

(New York: Versa, 1997). zz Stateof the Union Message, January 25,1984, Public Papers of the Presiakn& of the UnitedStattx Ronatd Reagq 1984 (Washington, DC: Goxmnent Printing Offie, 1986),pp. 87-95. 24Quotedin Howard E. McCmdy, 27ze Space Station
Decision: incremental Politics and Technological Choice @Itbore.. MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversity

JamesA. Vedda, Long-tetm Visions for U.S. Space Policy, backgroundpaperprepan+ for the Subcommiaee National cSecmi& International on Affairs, and Criminal Justiceofthe House Committeeon GovernmentReform and Oversight May 1997,copy in author possession;Roger D. s Lamius and Lori B. Garver, Between a Rocket and a Hard Place:Episodesin the Evolution of Launch Vehicle Technology,IAA-oo-IAk22.02, paper presented 5 1sIJntemationalAstronautical at Congress, de Janeiro,Brazil, Get 2-6 2000. Rio Is John M. Logsdon, The SpaceShuttle Program: A Policy Failure,science 232 (30 May 1986): 10991105; Roger D. Launius, NASA: A H&tory of the US.
Civil Space Program (Malabar, FLz Krieger Pub. Co.,

1994),pp. 114-15. I9 The rangeof these missions is discussedin David M. Harland, TheSpace Shuttle: Roles, Missions and Accomplkhments (Chicester,Englaud: Wiley-Praxis, 1998). This anaiysisis basedon a set of Yankelovich, O ABUWP, and Gallup polls conductedbetween the 1980sand the present,available in the NASA Historical ReferenceCollection The Shuttle-Mir program has received considerable historical discussion.An ilhrstmted history, containing a CD/ROM with oral histories, documents, multimedia materials, is Clay and
Morgan, Shuttle-Mir: The U.S. andRussiaShare H&tory Highest Stage (Washington, DC: NASA SPs

Press 1990),p. 171. zsSeeMarcia S. Smith, Congressional Research Service, NASA SpaceStation Program:Evolution s and Current Status,testimony before the House ScienceCommittee,April 4,200l; NASA Advisory Council, Report of the Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force on the InternationalSpace Station,April 21,1998, both in NASA Historical ReferenceCollection. This data is from a set of Yankelovichpolls conductedfor the Boeing Companybetween1995 and 1997.Polls available in NASA Historical ReferenceCollection. 27This is basedon a set of Harris, NBC/Associated Press,Rockwell, and ABCiWP polls availablein the NASA Historical ReferenceCollection. 2sOn Kennedy decision see,John M. Logsdon, 7%e s
Decision to Go to the Moan: Project Apollo and the NationaI Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,

1970); David Baker, Keunedy and the Moon Goal: A Reassessmenf Space&# 36 (Octok 1994):34749; JohnM. Logsdon,An Apollo Perspective, Astronautics & Aeronautics, December1979,pp. 11217. 29Roger D. Launius, Apollo 11 at Twenty-Five,
Space Timex Magazine. qfthe American btronauticai Soci~ 33 (May/June1994): 12-15. j Asif A. Siddiqi,Deq Space Chronicle: Robotic Exp1oration Missians to the PIaneLv(WaSh&tOQ DC:

2001-4225,2001). Bryan Butrough Dragonry: s

NASA and the Crisis aboard the Mir (New York:

Ballinger Pub. Co., 1998),provides a journalistic analysisof the American-Russian cooperation in spacein the mid-1990s about the Mir spacestation. It was a dressrehearsalfor the two countries parme&p iu a new InteanariooalSpaceSmtion they were building back on Earth. On the summer docking mission seeRgger D. Launius, Making History in Space,PointingDirections for the Future: A Review of the RecentAUantisMir Docking Mission, Space Times: Magazine of the American Astronautical Society 34 (september-odober 1995):4-8. * SeeHowardE. McCurdy study, $mce and the s

NASA SP-20#2-4524,2002). Roger D. Lauuius,The Next-GenerationSpace Race: What LessonsCan FuturePresidents Learn fi-om JFK?essayon Space.com, October24,2000, available on-line at http://www.space.com/opinionscolumns/opi election_leaders.html, accessed 21,2002. July R This 0-n is basedon calculationsusing the budgetdata included in the annualAeronautics and Space Report of the President (Washi~@~r~,DC: NASA Report 2002), which containsthis information for each year since 1959.