GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230 FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly, prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. ISSUE: Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts. HELD: The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in the affirmative by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order, or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act. A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws. Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Natl Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal. HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists

that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. Petitioner assails respondents authorization of the importation of rice by the government from private sources on the ground that said act is violative of an Act prohibiting such importation by the RCA or any government agency. Respondent contends that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the instant petition. The SC held that petitioner has standing since in light of the policy of the government underlying the Act, which is to engage in the purchase of basic foods directly from tenants, farmers, growers in the Phil, petitioner is entitled to a chance to sell to the government the rice it now seeks to import. Said act of respondent thus deprives petitioner of this opportunity, amounting to an actual injury to petitioner. Moreover, public funds will be used to effect the purchase. Petitioner, as taxpayer, has sufficient interest and personality to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds. Exhaustion of administrative remedies: exceptions applicable to case at bar: The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable: 1. Where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or 2. Where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or 3. where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him or 4. Where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Main function of Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress, not to defeat the same. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of the veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. Jurisdiction; Power to invalidate treaties:--The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled the question of whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts in the affirmative, by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ or error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also when it runs counter to an act of Congress. ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ FACTS: 1. The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.

 A prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade Aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term. Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry. Provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business 2. Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons: It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process The subject of the Act is not expressed in the title The Act violates international and treaty obligations The provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession ISSUE: Whether or not the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws. HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted. RATIONALE: 1. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 2. The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike. 3. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. 4. Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act. 5. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency. 6. While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.

7. The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency. Kuroda vs. Jalandoni 83 Phil 171 FACTS: Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war. Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis The Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional. 2. Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3, Article 2 of the Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted principles of international law include those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abide by these principles and therefore have a right to try persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed against its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution. The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh FACTS: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. RATIONALE: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law; therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments. In the case of US vs. Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. THREE KINDS OF A DE FACTO GOVERNMENT 1. In a proper legal sense, a government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell the Protector. 2. One that is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force as the cases of Castine in Maine which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the US. 3. One that is established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state such as the government of the Southern Confederacy. ***But there is another description of government called also by publicists a government de facto but which might, perhaps be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. It is characterized by: 1. That its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government 2. That while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private residents who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by laws of the rightful government. Republic of Indonesia vs. James Vinzon G.R. No.154705. June 26, 2003 FACTS Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipments covered by the agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, who allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement. Petitioners claim that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement. On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, respondent filed a complaint in the (RTC) of Makati. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity. In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement: Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines. Respondents Opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister

Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortuous acts done with malice and bad faith. The trial court denied herein petitioners Motion to Dismiss. It likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration subsequently filed. The trial courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss was brought upto the Court of Appeals by herein petitioners in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Said petition alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit. On May 30, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision denying the petition for lack of merit. It denied herein petitioners motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement. RULING: The petition is impressed with merit. International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v. Viridian II, the practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would unduly vex the peace of nations. The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts juregestionis. In United States v. Ruiz, for instance, we held that the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station is an act jure imperii. On the other hand, we considered as an act jure gestionis the hiring of a cook in the recreation center catering to American servicemen and the general public at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, as well as the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City. Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii. Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it. Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this case. Respondent concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign function. On the other hand, he argues that the actual physical maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic mission, such as the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment, is no longer a sovereign function of the State. We disagree. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and

the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air con units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador. The Solicitor General submits that, the Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent, the Solicitor General states that it was not a waiver of their immunity from suit but a mere stipulation that in the event they do waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall govern the resolution of any legal action arising out of the agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be the agreed venue thereof. On the matter of whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private capacities, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides: 1. a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as private person and not on behalf of the sending State;(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in terminating the Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the exceptions provided in the abovementioned provision. The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein. The petition was GRANTED. Bank of America, NT vs. American Realty Corporation G.R. No. 133876, Dec. 29, 1999 When foreign laws, despite having been duly presented and proven, may not be given application FACTS: Petitioner Bank of America (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, USA while private respondent American Realty (ARC) is a domestic corporation. On numerous occasions, BANTSA and Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), organized under the laws of England, granted US Dollar loans to certain foreign corporate borrowers. These loans were later restructured, the restructured loans secured by two real estate mortgages with private respondent ARC as third-party mortgagor. When the corporate borrowers defaulted, BANTSA sued them for collection before foreign courts, without impleading ARC as party-defendant. While these civil suits are still pending before the foreign courts, BANTSA filed an extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines. The properties were sold at public auction, prompting ARC to file this action for damages against BANTSA. The trial court ruled in favor of ARC and this was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted waiver of the remedy of foreclosure Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and exemplary damages in favor of private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor, is proper HELD:

Available Remedies THEORIES OF PETITIONER: A waiver of the remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of 2 requisites: an ordinary civil action for collection should be filed and subsequently a final judgment be correspondingly rendered therein. Under English law, which according to petitioner is the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money. REMEDIES ARE ALTERNATIVE, NOT CUMULATIVE: A mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages over its properties as security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing so, private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of anothers obligation by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the principal contractloanremains to be primarily bound. It is only upon default of the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. In the instant case, petitioners contention that the requisites of filing the action for collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur, is untenable. PHILIPPINE LAW, NOT ENGLISH LAW, SHALL APPLY: In the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the matter. In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption. In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved xxx, said foreign law would still not find applicability. Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Clearly then, English Law is not applicable. Award of Damages As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is entitled to the award of actual or compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner BANTSA in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate mortgages constituted a clear violation of the rights of herein private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor.

SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Guerrero's Transport Services, Inc. V. Blaylock Transportation Services Employees Association-Kilusan (Btea-Kilusan), Labor Arbiter Francisco M. De Los Reyes and Jose Cruz FACTS In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a public bidding for a 5-year contract for the right to operate and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval base. This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, owner-operator of Guerreros Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero), over Concepcion Blayblock, the then incumbent concessionaire doing business under the name of Blayblock Transport Services Blayblock. Blayblocks 395 employees are members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union). When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to employ the members of the Union. Thus, the Union filed a complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US Base Agreement. The case was dismissed by the NLRC upon Guerreros MTD on jurisdictional grounds, there being no employeremployee relationship between the parties. Upon appeal, the Sec. of Labor remanded the case to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to absorb all complainants who filed their applications on or before the deadline set by Guerrero, except those who may have derogatory records w/ the US Naval Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed. Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision of the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC Resolution, & that any non-compliance was attributable to the individual complainants who failed to submit themselves for processing & examination. The Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals. The Union filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order wasnt appealed so it was declared final & executory. Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination of members of the Union who shall be reinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final. The agreement is deemed to have superseded the Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor ordered the absorption of 175 members of the Union subject to 2 conditions. ISSUE Whether or not the said members of the Union were entitled to be reinstated by Guerrero. RULING YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor Agreement, the US Armed Forces undertook, consistent w/ military requirements, "to provide security for employment, and, in the event certain services are contracted out, the US Armed Forces shall require the

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contractor or concessioner to give priority consideration to affected employees for employment. A treaty has 2 aspects as an international agreement between states, and as municipal law for the people of each state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid provision of the treaty enters into and forms part of the contract between Guerrero and the US Naval Base authorities. In view of said stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero) is, therefore, bound to give "priority" to the employment of the qualified employees of the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in recognition of such obligation that Guerrero entered into the aforementioned Compromise Agreement. Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination as to who of the members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by Guerrero, and that such determination shall be considered as final. The Sec. of Labor issued an Order directing the NLRC, through Labor Arbiter Francisco de los Reyes, to implement the absorption of the 175 members into Guerrero's Transport Services, subject to the following conditions: a) That they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock Transport Service at the time its concession expired; and b) That they should pass final screening and approval by the appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base concerned. For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure from the appropriate authorities of the U.S. naval Base at Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and approval, the names of the members of the Union. Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract and has the force and effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties and their privies. For it is settled that a compromise has, upon the parties, the effect and authority of res judicata and is enforceable by execution upon approval by the court. Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287Facts FACTS: On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) ---- requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature ---- is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight. HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

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"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. Mijares v. Ranada FACTS: Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid. ISSUE: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee. HELD: Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refer to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of

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pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is 7(b) (3), involving other actions not involving property. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in which the court described the factors to be used when considering the application of comity. Opinion of the Court No law has any effect beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which one nation shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon the comity of nations. Comity is neither a matter of absolute obligation, nor of mere courtesy and good will. It is a recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or other persons who are under the protection of its laws. The comity thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty. It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. But it contributes so largely to promote justice between individuals, and to produce a friendly intercourse between the sovereignty to which they belong, that courts of justice have continually acted upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of nations. It is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation, which is administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same reasoning, by which all other principles of municipal law are ascertained and guided.

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

People vs. Perfecto G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922 "The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force." public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. FACTS: This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery." Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. ISSUEs: Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American sovereignty Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel

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HELD: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. "From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks." DECISION: To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered. Arsadi Disomangcop & Ramir Dimalotang vs. DPWH Sec. Simeon Datumanong et al November 25, 2004; G.R. No. 149848: FACTS: Disomangcop and Dimalotang were district engineers of the 1st Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM. They are assailing the validity of RA 8999 & DO 119. RA 8999 created an engineering district in Lanao and DO 119 created an engineering district in Marawi. Disomangcop and Dimalotang argued that the creation of those engineering districts undermines the autonomy of ARMM hence the said RA and DO should be declared inoperative and unconstitutional. Disomangcop and Dimalotang sought to enjoin Datumanong as well as the Secretary of DBM from enforcing and releasing funds pursuant to the law. The Sol-Gen argued that the petitioners lack legal standing and that the said RA is constitutional pursuant to the undiminished power of Congress to enact laws for ARMM. In all, Sol-Gen attacks the institution of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not Disomangcop and Dimalotang have legal standing. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Disomangcop and Dimalotang and the SC held the said RA and DO to be inoperative. The SC noted that Disomangcop and Dimalotang do have the legal standing to initiate the case. Also, Disomangcop and Dimalotang were able to show the

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requisites of judicial review in order for a court of justice to take cognizance of this case. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of judicial power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. In sum, the following are the requisites for the exercise of judicial power 1. There must be an actual controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power/review. 2. The question before the court must be ripe for judicial adjudication. 3. The constitutional question (question of constitutionality) must be raised by the proper party. Proper party must have the standing to challenge (locus standi). 4. The constitutional question (question of constitutionality) must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. 5. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota (controversy which has begun) of the case. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw 27 February 1922 | Ponente: Malcolm Moros surrounded a boat, took its cargo, took two women and left it for it to sink. The marauders, Lol-lo and Saraw, who were in Tawi-Tawi, were arrested for piracy. They questioned the jurisdiction of the Philippines to the case, but the court ruled that piracy is a crime against all mankind, so every court also has jurisdiction to try these cases. In addition, the Spanish Penal Code is still in force in the Philippines. FACTS: On or about 30 June 1920: Two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession.-Boat 1 had one Dutch subject-Boat 2 had 11 men, women and children, likewise from Holland.-After several days, at 7pm, Boat 2 arrived in Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies.-Here, the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas, manned by 24 armed Moros.-The Moros first asked for food, but once in the boat, took all the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women.-The Moros took the 2 women with them, placed holes in the ship to let it sink, and left the people there.-After 11 days, the Moros arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession.-The two Moro marauders were identified as Lol-lo, as the one who raped one of the women, and Saraw.-While in Maruro, the two women were able to escape. One day, Lol-lo and Saraw went home to South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. Here, they were arrested and charged with piracy at the CFI. The Moros interposed a demurrer, saying that the charge was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, nor of any court in the Philippines. They were saying that the facts did not constitute a public offense under Philippine laws.The demurrer was overruled, and Lol-lo and Saraw were found guilty, and were both sentenced to life imprisonment, together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, two other defendants in another case. In addition to imprisonment, they were ordered to return the 39 sacks of copra they robbed, or to indemnify the offended parties924 rupees, and to pay one-half of the costs. ISSUE: Did the CFI in the Philippines have jurisdiction over Lol-lo and Saraw? YES. RATIONALE: First of all, the facts cant be disputed. All the elements of the crime of piracy were there.Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done amino furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. The CFI has jurisdiction because pirates are in law hostes humani generis.

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Piracy is a crime against all mankind, therefore, it can be punished in any competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found.-The jurisdiction of piracy has no territorial limits. The crime is against all mankind, so it is also punished by all.-It doesnt matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state. Those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes. ISSUE: Are the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with piracy still in force? YES. RATIONALE: Art. 153 of the Penal Code refers to the crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or subjects of another nation not war with Spain shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime is against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shell be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.Since Spain already ceded the Philippines to the US, the rule is that the political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. But corollary to this rule, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed.-The instructions of President McKinley on May 19, 1989 to General Wesley Merrit, Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, was clear that municipal laws that provide for the punishment of crime, are considered continuing in force so far as they are compatible with the new order of things until superseded.BACKGROUND ON THE LAWS OF PIRACY: The Spanish Penal Code was applicable to the Philippines because of Art. 156 of the Penal Code.-Grotius: Piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law. Piracy in the penal code as similar to the concepts of civil law, especially since the Penal Code found its inspiration from the Novelas, Partidas and Novisima Recopilacion.-The US Constitution itself defines and punishes piracy that whoever on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, shall be imprisoned for life. This definition rests its conception of piracy on the law of nations. This further shows that the Penal Code is not inconsistent with the provisions enforced in the US. Since by the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippines to the US, its logical that the construction of the Penal Code be changed simply to substitute Spain to United States, and Spaniards to citizens of the US and citizens of the Philippines.-Therefore, the Penal Code, specifically Art. 153 and 154 of the Penal Code were still in force in the Philippines at this time. JUDGMENT Piracy was committed with offense against chastity and abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. There are three aggravating circumstances the wrong done was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, advantage was taken of superior strength and ignominy. There is one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. But due to the horrible nature of the crime committed, the penalty imposed is the capital punishment. The punishment is unanimous for Lol-lo, who raped one of the women, but no unanimous as to Saraw. So only Lol-lo is sentenced to be hung until dead. As to Kinawalang and Maulanis, they shall indemnify the offended parties with 924 rupees, and half of the costs of both instances. Haw Pia vs. The China Banking Corporation G.R. No. L-554, 9 April 1948 FACTS: Haw Pia was indebted to the China Banking Corporation in the sum of P5,103.35 by way of overdraft. Said loan was secured by a mortgage of property. On different occasions during the Japanese occupation, Haw Pia paid the amount with interests to the defendant bank through the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd that was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as liquidator of the China Banking Corporation. Haw Pia instituted an action in the Court of

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First Instance of Manila against the China Banking Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of cancellation of the mortgage on the property described in the complaint, and to deliver to the said plaintiff the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47634 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, with the mortgage annotated therein already cancelled, as well as to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 for damages as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit. In its answer, the defendant-appellee China Banking Corporation made a demand from the plaintiff-appellant forth payment of the sum of P5,103.35 with interests representing the debt of the said appellant, and in the answer it set up a counter claim against the plaintiff-appellant demanding the payment, within 90 days from the latter tithe former by way of overdraft together with its interests at the rate of 9 additional sum of P1,500 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suits. After the hearing of the case, the trial court rendered a decision holding that, as there was no evidence presented to show that the defendant China Banking Corporation had authorized the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., to accept the payment of the plaintiff's debt to the said defendant, and said Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese invading army, was not authorized under the international law to liquidate the business of the China Banking Corporation, the payment has not extinguished the indebtedness of the plaintiff to the said defendant under article 1162 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: May the Japanese Military Administration order the liquidation or winding up of the business of banking institutions of enemies such as the China Banking Corporation? HELD: The defendant-appellee, China Banking Corporation, comes within the meaning of the word "enemy" as used in the Trading with Enemy Act of civilized countries, because not only it was controlled by Japan's enemies, but it was, besides, incorporated under the laws of a country with which Japan was at war. It is to be presumed that Japan, in sequestering and liquidating the China Banking Corporation, must have acted in accordance, either with her own Manual of the Army and Navy and Civil Affairs, or with her Trading with the Enemy Act, and even if not, it being permitted to the Allied Nations, specially the United states and England, to sequestrate, impound, and block enemy properties found within their own domain or in enemy territories occupied during the war by their armed forces, and it not being contrary to the Hague regulations or international law, Japan had also the right to do the same in the Philippines by virtue of the international law principle that what is permitted to one belligerent is also allowed to the other.

RECOGNITION
Republic Of The Philippines V. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas And Elizabeth Dimaano G.R. No. 104768, 21 July 2003, En Banc (Carpio, J.) The resulting government [from the EDSA Revolution] was a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law. The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (the PCGG), through the AFP AntiGraft board (the Board), investigated reports of unexplained wealth involving Major General Josephus Ramas (Ramas), the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. Pursuant to said investigation, the Constabulary raiding team served a search and seizure warrant on the premises of Ramas alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment stated in the warrant, items not included in the warrant, particularly,

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communications equipment, land titles, jewelry, and several thousands of cash in pesos and US dollars, were also seized. In its Resolution, the AFP Board reported that (1) Dimaano could not have used the said equipment without Ramas consent; and (2) Dimaano could not be the owner of the money because she has no visible source of income. The Board then concluded with a recommendation that Ramas be prosecuted for violation of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise known as the Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic or Petitioner) filed a Complaint against Ramas and Dimaano. On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private respondents and (2) the search and seizure conducted was illegal. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate Ramas and Dimaano; and 2. Whether or not the properties confiscated in Dimaanos house were illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. HELD: The PCGG, through the AFP Board can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the 2 categories mentioned in Section 2 of E.O No. 1, i.e.: AFP personnel who accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence; or: AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. In the case at bar, Petitioner does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore, the present controversy should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before PCGG could have jurisdiction. In this regard, Petitioner argues that Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos because he was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, which enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief. We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. In the case of Republic v. Migrinio, it was held that applying the rule in statutory construction of ejusdem generis, the term subordinate refers to one who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2. Applying the foregoing, Ramas position as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General does not make him a subordinate of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that he was a close associate of the former President, in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of the former President were close to him. Such close association is manifested either by his complicity with the former President in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by the former Presidents acquiescence in his own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.

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This, the PCGG failed to do. In fact, while the AFP Board Resolution states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379, said Resolution ends with a finding of violation of R.A. Nos. 3019 and 1379, without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily, its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose. Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that Ramas accumulated the properties in question in his capacity as a subordinate of his commander-in-chief. Such omission is fatal. It is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a subordinate of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all illgotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim also deserves no merit. Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the illgotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case. Petitioner argues that at the time the search and seizure was conducted, a revolutionary government was operative by virtue of Proclamation No. 1, which withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right. Petitioner is partly right in its arguments. The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. It was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, the resulting government was a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law. Thus, the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights. From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable.

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It has been said that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the right of individuals under the Declaration. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law. It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. Thus, during the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant. However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles confiscated. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano. Aniceto Alcantara vs. Director Of Prisons,

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This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence (CA- G.R. No. 790)and sentence the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of from four months four months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, nine months and three days of prison correccional. The sentence as modified became final on September 12, 1944, and June 23, 1945, petitioner commenced serving his sentence. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices constituted the majority which promulgated the decision in question. The petitioner does not question the validity of said decision on the strength of the Proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944, which according to our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5 (p. 113, ante), does not refer to judicial processes. In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court ruled that the socalled Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by the belligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those a political complexion. In that the same case this Court held that the Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same Court of Appeals existed prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37. The division of the Court of Appeals into several District Court of Appeals, and the reduction of the number of Justices sitting in each division, the regime of the so-called Republic effected no substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of such court, like those of the court which were continued during the Japanese occupation, were good and valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have a political complexion, as this court held in its decision in the abovementioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon supra, in accordance with the authorities therein cited. Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, as modified by the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable. A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offenses committed against belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security, of the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes against national security , such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant.

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RIGHTS OF STATES
Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 30SCRA968(1969) FACTS: A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching implications, is raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He would dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional function to tax. HELD: The Court held that nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty. It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." 7 A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory Laurel v. Misa, G.R. No. 77 Phil 856(1947) FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic. HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended

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allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign the Filipino people is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines. Holy See v. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524(1994) FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case N0.90-183 The order dated June 20 1991 denied the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September19, 1991 denied the motion for the reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order Petitioner was the Holy see who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented by the Papal Nuncio. Private Respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., us a domestic corporation engaged in the real Estate business. The petition was arose over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of the Petitioner(Holy See-Papal Nuncio). The said lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., Acting agent to the sellers. Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises. In view if the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to the private respondent, a dispute arose as to whom of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. . Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). ISSUES: 1.the annulment of the Deeds of the sale between petitioner and the PRC on hand; the reconveyance of the lots in questioned; specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners lot and damages 2.procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss 3.determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, HELD: This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii. The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or

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transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965. diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See. The issue of petitioner's non-suability - the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country;]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations. Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims The petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED Baer v. Tizon, G.R. No. L-24294, May 3, 1974 FACTS: Respondent Edgardo Gener filed a complaint for injunction against Donald Baer, Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo. He alleged that he was engaged in the business of and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his logging operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with his logging operations. A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge. Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. It was therein pointed out that he is the chief or head of an agency or instrumentality of the United States of America, with the subject matter of the action being official acts done by him for and in behalf of the United States of America. It was added that in directing the cessation of logging operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitioner was entirely within the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the security of the Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern and most important duty of the Commander of the Base.

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An opposition and reply to petitioner's motion to dismiss by respondent Gener was filed, relying on the principle that "a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government." Petitioner made a written offer of documentary evidence, directing immediate investigation of illegal timber cutting in Bataan and calling attention to the fact that the records of the office show no new renewal of timber license or temporary extension permits. Respondent Judge issued an order granting respondent Gener's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of immunity from suit without consent is applicable HELD: The action against petitioner Donald Baer being against the United States government, and therefore, covered by the principle of state immunity from suit. The solidity of the stand of petitioner is evident. What was sought by private respondent and what was granted by respondent Judge amounted to an interference with the performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. This point was made clear in these words:"Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the Philippine Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issue a Timber License to cut logs" inside a military base, the Bases Agreement subjects the exercise of rights under a timber license issued by the Philippine Government to the exercise by the United States of its rights, power and authority of control within the bases; and the findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an agency of both the Philippine and United States Governments, that "continued logging operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not be consistent with the security and operation of the Base," is conclusive upon the respondent Judge. The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against the sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most important public function of any government- the defense of the state is equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative act." "It is a widely accepted principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before the courts of another state or its own courts without its consent." Zapanta v. Local Civil Registrar, 237 SCRA 25(1994) FACTS: Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B. Zapanta. When Florencio died, the local civil registrar of Davao City issued a death certificate. However, she found that the name appearing therein was Flaviano Castro Zapanta albeit the date of death and all other circumstances and information reflected therein clearly and conclusively revealed that the person referred to therein was no other than her late husband, Florencio. Gliceria, therefore, filed a petition for correction of entry in the register of death. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the correction of the name Flaviano Castro Zapanta to Florencio B. Zapanta was not merely clerical but substantial in nature. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error HELD: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.

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The general perception was that the judicial proceeding under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, implemented by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, could only justify the correction of innocuous or clerical errors apparent on the face of the record and capable of being corrected by mere reference to it, such as misspellings and obvious mistakes. However, in later cases, the Court has held that it adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Adversary Proceeding, defined Blacks Law Dictionary defines adversary proceeding as follows: One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it... Thus, provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel has been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate. G.R. No. 85750 - the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) Case. FACTS AND ISSUE: As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's communist rule confronted the international community. In response to this crisis, on 23 February 1981, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan (Annex "A," Rollo, pp. 22-32). ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines, its activities are parallel to those of the International Committee for Migration (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) [DOLE Records of BLR Case No. A-2-62-87, ICMC v. Calleja, Vol. I]. On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity. On 5 February 1987, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal by TUPAS, Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), reversed the Med-Arbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. At that time, ICMC's request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEFORAF). Subsequently, however, on 15 July 1988, the Philippine Government, through the DEFORAF, granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC. (Annex "E", Petition, Rollo, pp. 41-43), infra.

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ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly granted but the same was denied by respondent BLR Director who, again, ordered the immediate conduct of a pre-election conference. ICMC's two Motions for Reconsideration were denied despite an opinion rendered by DEFORAF on 17 October 1988 that said BLR Order violated ICMC's diplomatic immunity. Thus, on 24 November 1988, ICMC filed the present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction assailing the BLR Order. On 28 November 1988, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the certification election. On 10 January 1989, the DEFORAF, through its Legal Adviser, retired Justice Jorge C.Coquia of the Court of Appeals, filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that, as the highest executive department with the competence and authority to act on matters involving diplomatic immunity and privileges, and tasked with the conduct of Philippine diplomatic and consular relations with foreign governments and UN organizations, it has a legal interest in the outcome of this case. Over the opposition of the Solicitor General, the Court allowed DEFORAF intervention. On 12 July 1989, the Second Division gave due course to the ICMC Petition and required the submittal of memoranda by the parties, which has been complied with. As initially stated, the issue is whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws. ICMC sustains the affirmative of the proposition citing (1) its Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine Government giving it the status of a specialized agency, (infra); (2) the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 91 on 17 May 1949 (the Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed by the President on 30 August 1949 and deposited with the UN on 20 March 1950) infra; and (3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Intervenor DEFORAF upholds ICMC's claim of diplomatic immunity and seeks an affirmance of the DEFORAF determination that the BLR Order for a certification election among the ICMC employees is violative of the diplomatic immunity of said organization. Respondent BLR Director, on the other hand, with whom the Solicitor General agrees, cites State policy and Philippine labor laws to justify its assailed Order, particularly, Article II, Section 18 and Article III, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution, infra; and Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, as amended, ibid. In addition, she contends that a certification election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary, fact-finding character. It is not a suit against ICMC, its property, funds or assets, but is the sole concern of the workers themselves. WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 85750 (the ICMC Case), the Petition is GRANTED, the Order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued is made PERMANENT. United States v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, Feb 26, 1990 FACTS: The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding. ISSUE: Is the doctrine of state immunity applicable in the cases at bar?

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HELD: A state may not be sued without its consent. This doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. The rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the sate enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. The USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) SYLLABUS The court notices judicially that the government of the United States recognized the government of Carranza as the de facto government of the Republic of Mexico on October 19, 1915, and as the de jure government on August 31, 1917. Semble, that the Hague Conventions, in view of their terms and international character, do not apply to a civil war, and that the regulations annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid such a military seizure and sale of private property as is involved in this case. The conduct of our foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative -- the political -- departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. Who is the sovereign de jure or de facto of a foreign territory is a political question the determination of which by the political departments of the government conclusively binds the judges. When a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political department of our government as the de jure government of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. The principle that the conduct of one questioned in the courts of another is as brought within the custody of a court as foreign country, for it rests at last upon and expediency. independent government cannot be successfully applicable to a case involving the title to property to claims for damages based upon acts done in a the highest considerations of international comity

In January, 1914, General Francisco Villa, while conducting independent operations as a duly commissioned military commander of the Carranza government, which had then made much progress in its revolution in Mexico, levied a military contribution, and, in enforcing it, seized and sold some hides then owned and possessed by a citizen of Mexico. Held that the act could not be reexamined and modified by a New Jersey court in replevin. FACTS:

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During the Mexican revolution, army commanders of the revolutionary forces imposed an assessment on wealthy land owners in each town they went to per an Executive order of the revolutionary leaders. Two land owners (plaintiffs in these consolidated cases) refused to pay the assessment and their property was expropriated and then after the revolution was sold to a third party. HOLDING: For reasons of international comity, courts in the United States will not examine the legitimacy of actions taken by another government in its territory. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) In response to a US sugar quota, Cuba expropriated Compania Azucarera VertientesCamaguey de Cuba (C.A.V.), in which mostly US citizens held stock. Its fully-owned subsidiary had contracted to sell sugar to Farr, Whitlock & Co., a U.S. commodities broker. Farr, Whitlock made a second contract with the Cuban government, then refused to take payments from its customers and refused to accept the sugar. Banco Nacional de Cuba had been assigned the Cuban government's rights under the second contract and sued Farr, Whitlock in US District Court. The Cuban government invoked the Act of State Doctrine, urging the US not to review its sovereign expropriation of property. The District Court gave summary judgment in favor of Farr, Whitlock because the expropriation invalid because it was motivated by a retaliatory and not a public purpose; it discriminated against American nationals; and it failed to provide adequate compensation. Should the Act of State Doctrine be invoked? HELD: Harlan, Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, Stewart, Goldberg: Yes. Precedent says that the Act of State doctrine applies, even if international law has been violated. International law does not require application of the Act of State doctrine. The interests of the state in dealing with international disputes are best addressed by the executive, not the judicial. The judicial branch does not negotiate with foreign countries, and judicial decisions might alter the flow of trade. Judicial decisions would not protect investors by enhancing trade in, for example, newly independent developing countries because judicial decisions are so sporadic. DISSENT WHITE: The Court should wait for the State Department to give an opinion and, if there is no objection, the Court should examine the case on its merits. The majority should not create new precedent by deciding 1) the examination of international law is for the executive branch and outside the realm of the courts; 2) that acts of a foreign state regarding property of aliens domestically is beyond the reach of the domestic courts; and 3) the courts must adjudicate a claim regarding foreign law if the claim is properly before it, and is thereby forced to rule and validate any lawless act. Underhill v. Hernandez 168 U.S. 250 (U.S. 1897) The Act of State doctrine was initially developed in the US in cases against officials or agents of foreign governments and applied as a corollary to the personal immunity of foreign sovereigns. This connection between the Act of State doctrine and sovereign immunity is evident from a 19th century American case, Underhill v. Hernandez 168 U.S. 250 (U.S. 1897) which established the doctrine. In Underhill v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court held that a citizen of the United States was not entitled to recover damages in a United States court from a Venezuelan Military General who refused to issue a passport to him because the acts of the General were held to be acts of the Venezuelan government. According to Fuller C.J., in a statement which has come to be known as the classic American statement of the Act of State doctrine: Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government

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of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. The decision in Underhill v. Hernandez strongly indicates that the doctrine had its origins in notions of sovereign equality and was based on the view that international law imposed limits on the ability of States to exercise jurisdiction over other States.

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