Unilat & Hard Power Good 06-07

Bing Debate 06-07 Matt Malia
Index
Unilateralism & Hard Power Good

Uniqueness: No Multilat Now......................................................................................................................................3 US Is Winning War In Iraq...........................................................................................................................................4 Unilat Key to Peace......................................................................................................................................................5 AT Multilat Key to Peace.............................................................................................................................................6 Multilat Kills Heg **Arms Sales**..............................................................................................................................7 Arms Sales Impact Extension.......................................................................................................................................8 Arms Sales Extension AT Small Arms Balance Peace.............................................................................................9 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Bolton**................................................................................................................10 Bolton Extension EU Link.......................................................................................................................................11 Bolton Extension Exceptionalism Key....................................................................................................................12 Bolton Extension Snowballs....................................................................................................................................13 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Cumbersome**......................................................................................................14 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (1 of 3)................................................................................15 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (2 of 3)................................................................................16 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (3 of 3)................................................................................17 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Public Support/Isolationism**..............................................................................18 **Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (1 of 2)**......................................................................19 **Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (2 of 2)**......................................................................20 AT Anti-Terror Cooperation Key...............................................................................................................................21 AT China Relations DA..............................................................................................................................................22 AT Dont Need Hard Power to Stop Terror...............................................................................................................23 AT EU Relations DA..................................................................................................................................................24 AT Fiscal Overstretch (1 of 2)....................................................................................................................................25 AT Fiscal Overstretch (2 of 2)....................................................................................................................................26 AT Force Overstretch.................................................................................................................................................27 AT Multilat Prevents Terror/Anti-Americanism........................................................................................................28 AT Should Cede to Europe/Legitimacy Good............................................................................................................29 Hard Power Key to Econ............................................................................................................................................30 Hard Power Key to Effective Multilat........................................................................................................................31 Hard Power Key to Peace (1 of 2)..............................................................................................................................32 Hard Power Key to Peace (2 of 2)..............................................................................................................................33 Hard Power Key to Soft Power..................................................................................................................................34 **Hard Power Is All That Matters (Soft Power Useless)**.......................................................................................35 AT Soft Power Key to Bases......................................................................................................................................36 AT Soft Power Prevents Terrorism............................................................................................................................37 AT Solf Power Solves NoKo......................................................................................................................................38 **Cant Solve Soft Power Anyway (1 of 2)**...........................................................................................................39 **Cant Solve Soft Power Anyway (2 of 2)**...........................................................................................................40 Preemption Prevents Prolif/Terror..............................................................................................................................41 Prolif Impact Extension..............................................................................................................................................42 AT Preemption Will Snowball into Bigger Wars.......................................................................................................43 Treaty Exceptionalism Key to Heg.............................................................................................................................44 UN Bad (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................45 UN Bad (2 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................46 Tax Cuts Trade-Off With Bush Doctrine...................................................................................................................47
Bing Debate 06-07
Unilat & Hard Power Good
Bing Debate 06-07
Uniqueness: No Multilat Now

(__) Bush administration is firmly committed to the Bush Doctrine recent rhetoric proves.
Philip H. Gordon, Aug 2006, senior fellow @ Brookings, The End of the Bush Revolution, Foreign Affairs 84.4, p proquest Reading over President George W. Bush's March 2006 National Security Strategy, one would be hard-pressed to find much evidence that the president has backed away from what has become known as the Bush doctrine. "America is at war," says the document; we will "fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country" and "support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture,"
with the ultimate goal of "ending tyranny in our world."
Talk to any senior administration official, and he or she will tell you that the president is as committed as ever to the "revolutionary" foreign policy principles he spelled out after 9/11: the United States is fighting a war on terror and must remain on the offensive and ready to act alone, U.S. power is the foundation of global order, and the spread of democracy and freedom is the key to a safer and more peaceful world. Bush reiterated such thinking in his 2006 State of the Union address, insisting that the U.S. will "act boldly in freedom's cause" and "never surrender to evil."
(__) The US has broken from multilateral constrains and international law.
David Henrickson, Summer 2005, prof @ Colorado College & leading member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, The
Curious Case of American Hegemony, World Policy Journal 22.2, p http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj05-2/hendrickson.html#author
The administration also argued that democratic government and the liberal ideals with which it was associated were of universal validity and that the United States has a right, perhaps even in some cases a duty, to impose such a government by force against tyrants. Though the administration insisted that the Iraq war was launched to safeguard American security, it was also continually represented as a noble cause. Never in history, proponents said, had so many been freed at so little cost. Bush also broke dramatically from the constraints of multilateral organizations, insisting that no foreign government could control the decisions of the United States in matters of war and peace. After it became apparent that the United States could probably get only 4 votes (out of 15) in the U.N. Security Council to approve the use of force against Iraq, one administration official said, "We
will want to make sure that the United States never gets caught again in a diplomatic choke
point in the Security Council or in NATO." (10) In keeping with this attitude, the administration had previously withdrawn from or scuttled a range of
international treaties, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. And why not? As John Bolton, the fox whom Bush nominated in 2005 to guard the U.N. henhouse, observed in 1999, "It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international
law even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do sobecause, over the long term, the goal of those who think that international law really means anything are those who want to constrict the United States." (11)
(__) Bush administration is ideologically opposed to multilateralism.

George Soros, 2004, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY, pp. 82 That is not how the Bush administration sees America's role in the world. It has a visceral aversion to all multilateral arrangements. It believes that international relations are purely relations of power, not law, and since America is the most powerful nation, multilateral treaties and institutions impose undue limitations on the exercise of American power. The only form of cooperation the Bush administration can live wit h is one in which the United States decides and others follow. This attitude has led to the Bush doctrine.
Bing Debate 06-07
US Is Winning War In Iraq

(__) The US is over-whelming winning the war in Iraq the insurgency poses no real threat to the establishment of legitimate government that the US has pursued.
Frederick W. Kagan, 8-8-2005, resident scholar @ American Enterprise Institute, Stay the Course, Mr. President, LA Times, p L/N the military situation in Iraq today is positive--far better than it ever was when we were fighting guerrillas in Vietnam, or when the Soviets were fighting the Afghan mujahedin, or in almost any other major insurgency of the 20th century. With few exceptions, the insurgents in Iraq are not able to undertake militarily meaningful attacks on U.S. troops. They cannot prevent U.S. forces from moving wherever they want in the country nor can they keep U.S. forces from carrying out the operations they choose to pursue aggressively. This situation contrasts markedly with both the Vietnam and Soviet-Afghan wars, in which insurgents actually besieged U.S. forces at Khe Sanh
Despite what you may have read, and isolated a large Soviet garrison at Khost for nearly the entire conflict, among other incidents. Yes, the Iraqi insurgents have inflicted a steady stream of casualties on U.S. troops with improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, and car bombs, but they are
not able to hold ground or attack prepared U.S. forces and fight them toe-to-toe as the North Vietnamese and mujahedin did regularly. Another piece of good news from Iraq is that the insurgents are offering a mainly nihilistic message. Most skillful revolutionaries promise concrete benefits from their victory. Insurgents frequently work not only to terrorize local villagers but to help improve their lives in small ways. The Iraqi insurgents offer only fear. They oppose formation of the new Iraqi government but have not offered any alternative. In January 2004, insurgent leader Abu Musab Zarqawi said, "We have declared a bitter war against the principle of democracy and all those who seek to enact it." Eight million Iraqis defied him and voted instead. Today, most Iraqis remain committed to finding a way to make the new government work. One reflection of this is that Iraqis continue to wait in long lines to join the nascent Iraqi army and police forces, despite a campaign by the insurgents to explode bombs at recruiting stations. Not all recruits are idealistic--many are simply seeking work or the prestige of being a member of the
army or police. But their presence at the recruiting stations proves that the insurgents have neither offered them an alternative, terrorized them sufficiently nor de-legitimized the government enough in their eyes to keep them away.
Perhaps the best news from the region these days is that the Iraqi army is finally producing units able to fight on their own.
According to Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, there are now more than 170,000 "trained and equipped" Iraqi police and military personnel, and more than 105 police and army battalions are "in the fight." Over the next few months, tens of thousands more Iraqi troops will be able to take the field in the struggle against
the insurgency. They should number around 250,000 by next summer. By waging a terrorist campaign, the insurgents have designed a war they can sustain for a long time. Obtaining explosives, making bombs and
setting them off does not require much skill, money or even courage. The next year will probably not see a significant reduction in the number of explosions, and it's possible, as the Palestinian intifada and the three-decade-long campaign of violence by the Irish Republican Army show, that this situation may last for many years. It is thus unwise to measure progress in Iraq by the number of deaths or bombs in a given period. Progress must instead be measured in the establishment of a stable
and legitimate government and the creation of state structures able to function even in the face of attacks.
One big problem, however, is the paucity of coalition troops. Commanders, as a result, are required to make hard choices among such critical tasks as sealing borders, keeping critical lines of communication clear, defending their own troops, training indigenous forces, clearing insurgent-infested areas and attacking promising insurgent targets.
If the U.S. were to keep its troop levels constant over the next 18 months, the manpower[sic] available to perform all of these critical tasks would increase dramatically as Iraqi forces became available to handle basic security functions.
Unfortunately, it does not appear that the Bush administration favors such a course. Repeated rumors--including a report about U.S. plans to withdraw, leaked by the British Ministry of Defense recently, and statements by the new U.S. ambassador to Iraq--indicate that the administration would prefer to pull U.S. troops out of Iraq as Iraqi forces become available in larger numbers. Understandable though that desire is, it is wrongheaded. Now, above all, is the moment when determination and perseverance are most needed. If the U.S. begins
pulling troops out prematurely, it runs the risk of allowing the insurgency to grow, perhaps becoming what it now is not--a real military threat to the government. If, on the other hand, Bush stays the course and pays the price for success, the prospects for winning will get better every day.
Bing Debate 06-07
Unilat Key to Peace

(__) American unilateralism is the exception to global norms unilateralism is key to maintaining peace abroad.
Robert Kagan, 2003, Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for Peace, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER, p. 75-76
The United States is already operating according to Cooper's double standard, for the very reasons he suggests. American leaders, too, believe
that global security
and a liberal order - as well as Europe's "postmodern" paradise cannot long survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous Hobbesian world that still flourishes outside Europe. What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role in bringing Europe into this Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible, it cannot enter the paradise itself. It The United States, with all its vast power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jon Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving most of the benefits to others.
mans[sic] the walls but cannot walk through the gate.
(__) Unilateralism is key to US balancing multiple conflict flashpoints it is the only way to ensure global peace.
Charles Krauthammer, Winter 2003, IR expert and winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," THE NATIONAL INTEREST, p L/N The form of realism that I am arguing for-call it the new unilateralism-is clear in its determination to self-consciously and confidently deploy American power in pursuit of those global ends. Note: global ends. There is a form of unilateralism that is devoted only to narrow American selfinterest and it has a name, too: It is called isolationism. Critics of the new unilateralism often confuse it with isolationism because both are prepared to unashamedly exercise American power. But isolationists oppose America acting as a unipolar power not because they disagree with the unilateral means, but because they deem the ends far too broad. Isolationists would abandon the larger world and use American power exclusively for the narrowest of American interests: manning Fortress America by defending the American homeland and putting up barriers to trade and immigration.
The new unilateralism defines American interests far beyond narrow self-defense. In particular, it identifies two other major interests, both global: extending the peace by advancing democracy and preserving the peace by acting as balancer of last resort. Britain was the balancer in Europe, joining the weaker coalition against the stronger to create equilibrium. America's unique global power allows it to be the balancer in every region. We balanced Iraq by supporting its weaker neighbors in the Gulf War. We balance China by supporting the ring of smaller states at its periphery (from South Korea to Taiwan, even to Vietnam). Our role in the Balkans was essentially to create a microbalance: to support the weaker Bosnian Muslims against their more dominant neighbors, and subsequently to support the weaker Albanian Kosovars against the Serbs. Of course, both of these tasks often advance American national interests as well. The promotion of democracy multiplies the number of nations
likely to be friendly to the nited tates, and regional equilibria produce stability that benefits a commercial republic like the United States. America's (intended) exertions on behalf of pre-emptive non-proliferation, too, are clearly in the interest of both the United States and the international system as a whole.
Bing Debate 06-07
AT Multilat Key to Peace

(__) Multilateralism is too slow to prevent conflict escalation.
Frank Schuller and Thomas Grant, 2003, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 79, p 39
The opposing principle, that of multilateralism, equally miscasts international policy in a world where circumstances may indeed warrant unilateral decisiveness. In the 1920s and 1930s, the League of Nations nurtured multilateral discussions, producing only futility. Rather than mounting individual effective actions against the provocations of Japanese empire-building in China, Italian aggression against Ethiopia or
Nazi trial runs for Blitzkrieg and Holocaust, European leaders endlessly consulted one another, grasping for a common denominator that no consultation would ever achieve. In current circumstances, some unilateral actions override soothing diplomatic nattering. The attacks of
11 September on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon count as an incident deserving of response regardless of the sentiments and sympathies of other nations. The United States, as the superior power in the world, must assume the responsibility of deploying its might for the benefit and welfare of itself and the rest of the world.
(__) Multilateralism is too slow and ineffective when action is needed multilat responses are never efficient.
Alexander A. Pikayev, March 2003, NUCLEAR ISSUES IN THE POST SEPTEMBER 11TH ERA, p http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/default.asp The United States, given its overwhelming economic, political and military supremacy, is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with a need of looking for consensus among dozens of countries as it is required by multilateral mechanisms. Very often, such consensus is very difficult to achieve, it requires long and painful negotiations, and the nature of the achieved multilateral deal could be far away from the original US expectations. In other words, Washington perceives multilateral regimes as very slow and often incapable to provide with resolute and efficient response when needed.
(__) Theres a bipartisan consensus that multilat cant provide peace. Business Week, 4-21-2003, p L/N
But if it is a mistake, it is an understandable one. The multinationalists have failed dismally to make a case for their approach to solving the world's problems. The truth is that the institutions and procedures of global multilateralism don't work very well. They rarely have. And it isn't just the Bush Administration, with its unilateral impulses, that thinks so. President Bill Clinton complained bitterly about the inability of the U.N. and NATO to act in Africa and
the Balkans to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing. And British Prime Minister Tony Blair has complained about the failure of multilateral institutions to solve problems.
(__) Multilat institutions have no resources. Washington Quarterly, Winter 2003, p proquest
Moreover, most people have unreal expectations of the power of global multilaterals. Such institutions are often extremely poorly resourced and, at the same time, badly overstretched. In addition, a great number of them suffer from low staff morale these days as well.
Bing Debate 06-07
Multilat Kills Heg **Arms Sales**

(__) Multilateralism is the prime motivator of US arms sales.
Lora Lumpe & Jeff Donarski, 1998, Consulting Senior Associate with the International Peace Research Institute and Member of the Advisory
Board for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project & Project Associate at the Arms Sales Monitoring Project @ the Federation of American Scientists, The Arms Trade Revealed, p http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/handbook/cover.html
Unfortunately, in the seven years since the Persian Gulf war (and the cold war) ended, the US government and other major arms exporting governments have apparently decided that no fundamental re-evaluation of the role of military force in international relations is advisable. Instead of placing greater emphasis on the rule of
law and non-military diplomacy during the past decade, the United States and other key military powers have increased their reliance on military force through UN operations and/or regional alliances. Multilateral military operations, and the need for interoperable fighting forces, now provide one of the principal justifications for arms exporting and military training-by the United States in particular.
B) Arms sales hurt US leadership by increasing proliferation and decreasing the effectiveness of the US military.
Lucien J. Dhooge, 1999, Assist Prof of Bus. Law @ U of the Pacific and LL.M. International and Comparative Law from Georgetown U Law Center, We Arm the World, 16 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 577, p L/N Even close allies of the United States have transferred weaponry without authorization. n778 For example, Israel is alleged to have incorporated U.S.
technology into its own weapons and exported those weapons without U.S. approval. n779 Included in these weapons are the Python 3 air-to-air missile based upon the U.S.-made AIM-9-L Sidewinder missile and the MAPATS anti-tank missile based upon the U.S.-produced TOW-2 missile. n780 Additionally, Israel allegedly cooperated with the former apartheid regime in South Africa regarding the development of ballistic missiles and transferred armaments in violation of U.S. law to Chile, Ethiopia, Thailand, and Venezuela. n781 Finally, in perhaps one of the most underreported recent news stories in the armaments field, Israel is alleged to have transferred U.S.produced weaponry to the Peoples' Republic of China, assisted the Chinese military in developing a laser-guided anti-tank missile, and improved the guidance system for the Chinese CSS-2 ballistic missile. n782 Ironically, the Peoples' Republic of China subsequently transferred several of these improved missiles to Saudi Arabia. n783 [*670] 3. Proliferation Through the Creation of Indigenous Armaments Industries
Arms transfers also increase proliferation by enhancing global weapons production capacity. By engaging in co-production and development, the United States is diffusing its production capacity and technology to other countries. n784 The United States has recognized the
negative impact of such transactions upon nonproliferation efforts, which is demonstrated by its requirements that the degree of protection afforded sensitive technology and the potential for unauthorized transfers and misuse be determined prior to the initiation of co-production and development activities. n785 Nevertheless, the
armament industries of U.S. allies in Europe as well as Israel, Brazil, Taiwan, and India have benefited from U.S. co-production and development transactions. n786 [continues]
4. Armament Exports and the "Boomerang Effect"
U.S. armaments exports also serve to enhance the capabilities of potential adversaries, thereby needlessly placing U.S. military personnel at risk. For example, the American forces that invaded Panama in December 1989 encountered a military that received 44% of its weapons from the United States between 1984 and 1989, and $ 33.5 million in U.S. military aid during the 1980s. n800 In addition, more than 6,600
Panamanian military personnel received training under the International Military Education and Training Program between 1950 and 1987 at a cost of $ 8.3 million. n801
In the Gulf War, the United Nations coalition encountered an Iraqi war machine equipped to a significant degree by the United States.
Bing Debate 06-07
Arms Sales Impact Extension

(__) American arms exports make mass human rights violations, regional conflicts and proliferation possible.
Lucien J. Dhooge, 1999, Assist Prof of Bus. Law @ U of the Pacific and LL.M. International and Comparative Law from Georgetown U Law Center, We Arm the World, 16 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 577, p L/N The United States supplanted the Soviet Union as the world's leading armament exporter in 1990. n27 Between 1985 and 1995, U.S. armament
exports totaled $ 157.3 billion and averaged $ 14.3 billion annually. n28 The United States sold $ 15.6 billion in armaments in 1995 which amount was three times that of the next supplier and 49% of the global marketplace. n29 These exports yielded $ 7.7 billion in profits to American defense contractors in 1996, an industry record and double the amount of profits earned by such contractors in 1985. n30 The second cause for the increase in armament transfers in 1995 was increasing demand in the developing world. Armament imports by developing countries increased by $ 5.6 billion in 1995 to $ 21.3 billion, an increase of 36%. n31 Between 1985 and 1995, the developing world imported $ 323 billion in armaments, with such imports averaging $ 29.3 billion annually. n32 The top five importers in 1995--Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand--purchased $ 13.9 billion in armaments that constituted 65% [*582] of global imports. n33 These imports constituted a combined 51% of the value of all imports for these countries. n34
These armament transfers have had a catastrophic effect upon the developing world. American armaments have been utilized in the commission of human rights violations committed throughout the world including Egypt and the Occupied Territories, East Timor, Turkey, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. Furthermore, American armaments have served to maintain repressive governments in the Middle East, Asia, and South America. Armament exports have also served to inflame regional tensions and increase proliferation through unauthorized transfers and creation of indigenous armaments industries. Finally, U.S. armament exports have retarded the economic development of some of its leading customers.
Bing Debate 06-07
Arms Sales Extension AT Small Arms Balance Peace

(__) Conventional arms are unable to provide consistent balancing inevitable asymmetries mean conventional arms only increase the risks of conflict.
Lora Lumpe & Jeff Donarski, 1998, Consulting Senior Associate with the International Peace Research Institute and Member of the Advisory
Board for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project & Project Associate at the Arms Sales Monitoring Project @ the Federation of American Scientists, The Arms Trade Revealed, p http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/handbook/cover.html
First, the United States-as noted above-is not the only arms supplier. American weapons shipments very often engender a response from other buyers and sellers. For example, the Pentagon has channeled billions of dollars of sophisticated weaponry to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates
in the 1990s, reputedly to help these countries deter attack by Iraq or Iran. At the same time, however, Iran's threat perception has increased accordingly, spurring Tehran to seek more weaponry. Because Iran (unlike Iraq) is not under a UN arms embargo, it finds willing suppliers-principally in China and Russia. Arms sales to Iran are then said to be "destabilizing" and to warrant more arms transfers from America, again in pursuit of an elusive strategic arms balance.
Granted, the ability to create regional balances is undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that the United States is arming both sides in many regional competitions-Greece and Turkey, Persian Gulf sheikdoms and Israel, Egypt and Israel, China (to a limited degree) and Taiwan. Until their recent nuclear tests,
the administration appeared ready to supply arms to both India and Pakistan. A second problem with this argument is the fundamental relationship of weapons to warfare.
Weapons are useful not only for self-defense, but also for aggression and repression. What is important, then, is the nature and stability of the regime to which the arms are flowing. US forces have been deployed several times recently to combat former US allies-and recipients of US weapons, technology and military training-in Panama,
Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Liberia. None of these states were democracies at the time of US arms supply, and all had egregious human rights records. A bill pending in Congress would attempt to keep the United States from making potentially disastrous exports by identifying characteristics of less stable governments. Under the "Code of Conduct" (see p. 83), the four conditions a country must meet in order to be eligible for US weapons are: democratic form of government; respect for basic human rights of citizens; non-aggression (against other states); and full participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The President may exempt a country which fails to meet these criteria, but he must notify Congress of the exemption before weapons could be exported. While this legislation might not block all dangerous sales, it would increase scrutiny on weapons supplied to those governments that may be less stable because of repressive or aggressive practices.
A third flaw with the balance of power rationale lies in the impossibility of establishing military parity among regional states that have a dramatic disparity in territory, population, financial resources and the possession of nuclear armaments. Most observers agree, for example, that
the Gulf monarchies lack the population, training and military tradition necessary to defend their territories. The former Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer, said that despite "long-term plans to expand their military with the purchase of equipment..., it is doubtful that the Saudis would be able to counter threats from Iran and Iraq completely." Similarly, in Southeast Asia, several states are justifying an expensive round of military purchases on the basis
of a need to deter Chinese adventurism. In reality, though, if China-the world's most populous state and a nuclear power-were determined to attack Singapore (for example), no amount of modern conventional weaponry could deter it. A better bet for Singapore would be to put its energy into strengthening diplomatic and legal means for heading off and resolving any future disputes.
Bing Debate 06-07
Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Bolton**

(__) The US only maintains its freedom of action by not giving into demands to abide by international norms and values this refusal to play the game is key to preserving US autonomy.
John R. Bolton, fall 2000, former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN, Should we take Global Governance Seriously? 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 205, p L/N
Although some regulatory schemes were adopted and some were not, the "code of conduct" approach largely failed in its broader objectives because the developed world, and the Reagan Administration in the United States in particular, simply refused to play the game. As a consequence, international regulatory efforts faded in the 1980s and 1990s, largely because they had failed to produce the expected bonanza of "free" resources and technology that the third world had been expecting. However, the underlying statist, regulatory impulse itself has not only not disappeared, but it has seized the
opportunity to resurrect itself as part of the larger impulse toward global governance that emerged during the 20th century's last decade. Although space constraints permit only brief mention of a few contemporary issues, there should be no doubt that, bagpipe-like, the field of substantive international regulatory policy is simply waiting for the breath of Globalist inspiration to expand again. Ever since the 1992 Conference on
Environment and Development (the "Rio Summit"), the environment has seen the largest increment of regulatory initiatives, including the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming. n46 But others are also hard at work. The WHO, for example, has progressed from breast-milk substitutes, and is currently considering adopting a Framework Convention on [*220] Tobacco Control. n47 The ILO is still negotiating conventions on labor standards, and the Clinton Administration has been hard at work attempting to persuade the Senate to ratify the extensive legislative backlog of existing conventions, several of which have been pending for decades. In short, for virtually every
area of public policy, there is a Globalist proposal, consistent with the overall objective of reducing individual nation-state autonomy, particularly that of the United States.
B) The internationalist agendas success will constrain US autonomy and freedom of action it would be the end of US heg.
John R. Bolton, fall 2000, former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN, Should we take Global Governance Seriously? 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 205, p L/N Globalism, in effect, represents a kind of worldwide cartelization of governments and interest groups. Even though its proponents purportedly
abjure global government as such (at least rhetorically, and only for now), the consequence is, for all practical purposes, the same. Should we, therefore, take global governance "seriously?" Sadly, the answer is yes, not only today but far into the foreseeable future. It is well past the point when the
costs to the United States-reduced constitutional autonomy, impaired popular sovereignty, reduction of our international power, and limitations on our domestic and foreign policy options and solutions--are far too great, and the current understanding of these costs far too limited to be acceptable. Whether we are ready or not, the debate over global governance, fought out at the confluence of constitutional theory and foreign policy, is the
unrestrained and uncritical acceptance of Globalist slogans ("global solutions for global problems") can be allowed to proceed. The
decisive issue facing the United States internationally.
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Bing Debate 06-07
Bolton Extension EU Link

(__) The EU seeks to constrain US heg European consolidation of power should be avoided to sustain US unipolarity.
European Union of the 1990s and the next decade has replaced the Developing World (and its NIEO and NWICO) as the leading source of substantive Globalist policy. Faced with sweeping international economic change, European Globalists have found that the international power of their states is too insignificant, their currencies too weak, and their social-democratic welfare systems too expensive to withstand. The European reaction, especially on the left, has been to aggregate state power through the EU mechanism, precisely the opposite of the [*221] instinctive Americanist inclination. For the Europeans, there is also a strong economic logic to an integrated continental market, as they have observed in the United States, but these compelling, indeed powerful, business reasons are also tinged with a discernable anti-Americanism, a desire to have a state strong enough to be a separate pillar in the world.
In many respects, the As political elites in Europe grow increasingly comfortable in ceding large areas of national competencies to EU mechanisms in Brussels, they have also felt more comfortable in propounding worldwide solutions consistent with the direction of EU policy. Thus, not content alone with transferring their own national
sovereignty to Brussels, they have also decided, in effect, to transfer some of ours to worldwide institutions and norms, thus making the
European Union a miniature precursor to global governance.
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Bing Debate 06-07
Bolton Extension Exceptionalism Key

(__) Multilateral decision-making is the easiest way for the internationalist agenda to become entrenched it removes important decisions from the sole authority of the US.
John R. Bolton, fall 2000, former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN, Should we take Global Governance Seriously? 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 205, p L/N To make "Our Global Neighborhood" hospitable, an important predicate is to restrain the use of force, not in the old-fashioned, balance-of-power way among nation states, but by constraining and limiting the nation-states themselves. Since decisions to use military force are the most important that any nation-state faces, limiting their decisions or transferring them to another source of authority is ultimately central to the diminution of sovereignty and the advance of global governance. Here is where the
A. The Use of Force: Legitimacy and Authority. Americanist-Globalist divide is the deepest.
(__) The internationalist agenda frowns at US heg it would seek to constrain the USs intervention capabilities.
Although two Americans were members of the Commission, n5 the report's anti-American tone is unmistakable, a fact we can and should legitimately consider in assessing the Globalist agenda. The Co-Chairmen[sic] say, for example, in abjuring "global government" that they seek to avoid a world that is "more accommodating to power [and] more hospitable to hegemonic ambition." n6 At a time when "hegemony," whether used in Beijing, Moscow
or Paris (or even by well-meaning Americans) is a code word for the United States, n7 the animus is clear. The Co-Chairmen[sic] pose as alternatives: (1) "going forward to a new era of security that responds to law and collective will and common responsibility"; or (2) "going backward to the spirit and methods of what one of our members described as the 'sheriff's posse'--dressed up to masquerade as global action." n8 Leaving aside apparently trivial problems such as how to measure the international "common will," the Co-Chairmen[sic] have taken direct aim at what the
[*208] nited tates did in the 1991-92 America's role in the post-Cold War world. n10
Persian Gulf War, n9 and at what was broadly believed by many Americans to be an accurate description of
(__) Internationalist NGOs will raise the costs of using US heg to unacceptable levels if theyre given the international credence needed to pursue prosecution of the US.
Indeed, complaints alleging that NATO in fact committed the crime of aggression have been submitted to the Prosecutor of one of the ICC's predecessor courts. Although the Prosecutor, in response to news reports, subsequently denied that she was conducting a "formal inquiry" into NATO's actions, her carefully worded statement only raised more questions about what she was actually doing. n18 Even her [*211] subsequent refusal to indict NATO officials does not finally resolve the matter. n19 NGOs
hoping to change Pentagon behavior as much as the international "rules" themselves, through the threat of prosecution, hope to constrain military operations, and thus lower the potential effectiveness of such actions, or raise the costs to successively more unacceptable levels by increasing the legal risks and liabilities perceived by top civilian and military planners of the United States and its allies undertaking military action.
(__) America is powerful because it maintains its exceptional nature. Economist, 11-8-2003, p L/N
On this view, America is not exceptional because it is powerful; America is powerful because it is exceptional. And because what makes America different also keeps it rich and powerful, an administration that encourages American wealth and power will tend to encourage intrinsic exceptionalism. Walter Russell Mead of the Council on Foreign Relations dubs this impulse "American revivalism". It is not an explicit ideology but a pattern of beliefs, attitudes and instincts.
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Bing Debate 06-07
Bolton Extension Snowballs

(__) Every time the US gives in to international pressure it sets a powerful precedent for future constraints on US power every instance is critical.
John R. Bolton, fall 2000, former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN, Should we take Global Governance Seriously? 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 205, p L/N The Globalists' second approach is specifically targeted against the United States, in an effort to bend our system into something more compatible with human rights and other standards more generally accepted elsewhere. This conscious effort at limiting "American exceptionalism" is consistent with the larger effort to constrain national autonomy because the United States as a whole is the most important skeptic of these efforts. Every time America is forced to bend its knee to international pressure, it sets a significant, and detrimental, precedent for all of the others.
13
Bing Debate 06-07
Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Cumbersome**

(__) Multilat ends effective military deployment.
Ekaterina Stepanova, 2003, senior researcher @ Center for International Security, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, UNILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, eds. Malone and Khong, p 190-1 Multilateralism slows down the use of force and, in this sense, is not a force multiplier; it also exacerbates the problem of optimal division of labor between participants. In addition, in cases that involve (or might involve) large-scale combat, multilateral coalition is not just supportive of, but often relies on, the exclusive military capabilities of
There are many technical problems associated with multilateral military actions:
the United States which gives Washington one more argument for keeping the unilateral option open.
(__) Multilateralism trades-off with American moral resolve.

Tobias Harris, 5-20-03, Editor of Concord Bridge Magazine, "Gulliver Unbound," Concord Bridge Magazine, p http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbmag/Articles/2003%20May/Gulliver%20unbound-%20May%202003.pdf
There are several possible explanations as to why force (or hard power) has become so objectionable to international opinion. Among these explanations is the development of an international norm against the aggressive use of force; a reply based on the impotency of much of the world in the face of Americas overwhelming military superiority; and anti-Americanism that has accompanied the unipolar moment, signifying that opposition is more to the American unilateral use of force rather than to any use of force per se. Reality probably lies somewhere in the midst of these options. Clearly the rise of legalized institutions within the Free World since the end of World War II has delegitimized the use of force, as nations have come to view institutions as more capable of resolving international disputes than force-ofarms. Force has become bte noire especially among the nations of Europe, who, through the European Union, have seen the supposed bounty of institutionalized multilateral cooperation. To them, force is the bluntest tool in the foreign policy toolbox, often causing more problems than it solves. Engagement and discussion are seen as softer tools that ensure an equitable outcome for those involved, forestalling war and its attendant train of miseries, including civilian casualties, refugee flows and economic disruption. The international community and many Americans view the associated costs of war as far outweighing any benefits of military action, and thus nations must go to great length to avoid international conflict. In short, multilateralism is Europeanism writ large, as pointed out by Robert Kagan in Of Paradise and Power. It is consensus-driven because, after all, consensus means no one loses. But consensus precludes the possibility
of firm moral positions, as decisions reflect the lowest-common denominator among actors. American foreign policy has long had a moralistic strain that seeks to improve the world, by force if necessary. Decisions are not made between two relatively equivalent choices but between what is right and wrong. Thus unless America can convince the international community to accept the virtues of its moral stances, multilateralism necessarily entails moral equivocation and watereddown positions.
14
Bing Debate 06-07
Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (1 of 3)

(__) Unilateralism is the best way to achieve international cooperation and maintain US power necessary to sustain unipolarity and freedom of action legitimizing multilateral constrains sets precedent for future constraints and does not ease anti-Americanism.
Charles Krauthammer, Winter 2003, IR expert and winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," THE NATIONAL INTEREST, p L/N
A THIRD critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists, who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and whose objections are practical. They are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. They value great power concert. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority, but because it spreads risk. In their view, a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares, sharing rulemaking functions with others.12
I have my doubts. The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get UN support, share decisionmaking, assemble a coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original acquiescence to the coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because the extremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by the details of our management of it. Pragmatic realists also value international support in the interest of sharing burdens, on the theory that sharing decision-making enlists others in our
own hegemonic enterprise and makes things less costly. If you are too vigorous in asserting yourself in the short-term, they argue, you are likely to injure yourself in the long-term when you encounter problems that require the full cooperation of other partners, such as counter-terrorism. As Brooks and Wohlforth put it, "Straining relationships now will lead only to a more challenging policy environment later on."13 If the concern about the new unilateralism is that American assertiveness be judiciously rationed, and that one needs to think long-term, it is hard to disagree. One does not go it alone or dictate terms on every issue. On some issues such as membership in and support of the WTO, where the long-term benefit both to the American national interest and global interests is demonstrable, one willingly constricts sovereignty. Trade agreements are easy calls, however, free trade being perhaps the only mathematically provable political good. Others require great skepticism. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, would have harmed the American economy while doing nothing for the global environment. (Increased emissions from China, India and Third World countries exempt from its provisions would have more than made up for American cuts.) Kyoto failed on its merits, but was nonetheless pushed because the rest of the world supported it. The
same case was made for the chemical and biological weapons treaties-sure, they are useless or worse, but why not give in there in order to build good will for future needs? But appeasing multilateralism does not assuage it; appeasement merely legitimizes it. Repeated acquiescence to provisions that America deems injurious reinforces the notion that legitimacy derives from international consensus, thus undermining America's future freedom of action-and thus contradicting the pragmatic realists' own goals.
America must be guided by its independent judgment, both about its own interest and about the global interest. Especially on matters of national security, war-making and the deployment of power, America should neither defer nor contract out decision-making, particularly when the concessions involve permanent structural constrictions such as those imposed by an International Criminal Court. Prudence, yes. No need to act the superpower in East Timor or Bosnia. But there is a need to do so in Afghanistan and in Iraq. No need to act the superpower on steel tariffs. But there is a need to do so on missile defense. The prudent exercise of power allows, indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. Arrogance and gratuitous high-handedness are counterproductive. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological good will buys. Countries will cooperate
with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating and multilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not a result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand", and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itself created a coalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing. Unilateralism does not mean seeking to act alone. One acts in concert with others if possible. Unilateralism simply means that one does not allow oneself to be hostage to others. No unilateralist would, say, reject Security Council support for an attack on Iraq. The nontrivial question that separates
unilateralism from multilateralism-and that tests the "pragmatic realists"-is this: What do you do if, at the end of the day, the Security Council refuses to back you? Do you allow yourself to be dictated to on issues of vital national-- and international-security?
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Bing Debate 06-07

(__) Multilateralism constrains US freedom of action by imposing norms and limitations that only apply to the US.
Charles Krauthaumer, April 2004, IR expert & winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD, p http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf Moral suasion is a farce. Why then this obsession with conventions, protocols, legalisms? Their obvious net effect is to temper American power. Who, after all, was really going to be most constrained by these treaties? The ABM amendments were aimed squarely at American advances and
strategic defenses, not at Russia, which lags hopelessly behind. The Kyoto Protocol exempted India and China. The nuclear test ban would have seriously degraded the American nuclear arsenal. And the land mine treaty (which the Clinton administration spent months negotiating but, in the end, met so much Pentagon resistance that even Clinton could not initial it) would have had a devastating impact on U.S. conventional forces, particularly at the DMZ in Korea.
But that, you see, is the whole point of the multilateral enterprise: To reduce American freedom of action by making it subservient to, dependent on, constricted by the willand interestsof other nations. To tie down Gulliver with a thousand strings. To domesticate the most
undomesticated, most outsized, national interest on the planetours.
Historically, multilateralism is a way for weak countries to multiply their power by attaching themselves to stronger ones. But multilateralism imposed on Great Powers, and particularly on a unipolar power, is intended to restrain that power. Which is precisely why
France is an ardent multilateralist. But why should America be? Why, in the end, does liberal internationalism want to tie down Gulliver, to blunt the pursuit of American national interests by making them subordinate to a myriad of other interests?
(__) Multilat constrains threaten to erode Americas ability to leverage military power and threaten the use of force not submitting to such constrains is key to maintaining US heg.
David B Rivkin Jr & Lee A Casey, Fall 2003, partners in the Washington, DC office of Baker & Hosteller LLP and write frequently on
international law and defense issues and both served in the Reagan and Bush, Sr. administrations, Leashing the Dogs of War, The National Interest 73, p proquest
These efforts have taken the form of multilateral conventions, such as the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) or the
1997 Ottawa anti-landmine convention, and of new interpretations of existing treaties (such as the UN Charter), or of customary norms. helped to negotiate a number of these treaties, it bellum and jus in bello
Although the United States has steadfastly rejected the most sweeping innovations, favoring instead more traditional jus ad
norms. In particular, the United States has clearly asserted that it will use force, where necessary, to defend its interests with or without UN Security Council approval, and has rejected agreements that could be interpreted as contrary to key aspects of U.S. military doctrine. This reticence is not part of a nefarious American effort to achieve immunity from international law, as critics have sometimes asserted. Unlike many countries, which embrace new international conventions with little intent to comply thereafter, the United States has always taken its obligations seriously-refusing, for example, to ratify treaties it does not plan to implement, whether because of policy or constitutional concerns. What the critics fail to realize is that binding international legal obligations must be based on the consent of the affected states. They cannot be
imposed. In eschewing many of the new international legal norms accepted by Europe, the United States has simply acted within its legal rights as an independent sovereign. Nor does the American refusal to follow Europe's lead in this area stem from any lack of humanitarian zeal. Rather, it can be traced to recognition by the United States that
the world remains a dangerous place, and that adoption of a "policing" model for warfare would hamper, if not cripple, America's ability to defend itself-and its allies. Peacetime norms, which guide the conduct of police and security establishments in modern democracies, are far more restrictive than
the laws of war because they operate in an environment in which the state has an effective monopoly on the lawful use of force, and in which the damage that any single individual or group can inflict is limited. The laws of war, by contrast, apply in a context in which the state does not have a monopoly on either the lawful right to use force or on the use of the most destructive weapons. War and peace remain different worlds, each with a unique logic and distinct imperatives that
require dissimilar rules. Accepting a "policing" model for warfare would undermine the key tenets of American strategic thinking. For starters, the fundamental American doctrine of "decisive force" would have to go. Any robust use of force is certain to cause some civilian casualties, and, under a model of armed conflict better suited to "managing" problems than winning wars, decisive force would be considered "excessive" and subject to sanction. Similarly, the high value the United States places on force protection would be suspect under these rules. Indeed, one of the principal allegations leveled against the United States is that it has improperly sought to shield its soldiers from the dangers of combat-for example, by operating its aircraft at heights well beyond the range of enemy air defenses, making it difficult in many cases to distinguish between military and civilian targets. Overall, the importance of this Euro-American doctrinal divergence cannot be overestimated. For the first time in
modern history, the principal military powers differ fundamentally over the proper rules governing warfare.
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Bing Debate 06-07

(__) US heg is guaranteed as long as the US does not bind itself to institutions that would limit US power.
Eliot A. Cohen, Jul/Aug 2004, Prof and Director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies @ JHUs School of Advanced International Studies, History and the Hyperpower, Foreign Affairs 83.4, p proquest
In the end, however, the applicability of a particular term (debates about empire tend to degenerate into semantic squabbles) does not matter. The
fact of the
overwhelming power of the United States does. No potential adversary comes close to it, and, for the moment, there is no question of a countervailing coalition to block, let alone replace, it. Its roots lie in a growing and extraordinarily productive population, a stable political system, and a military that is unsurpassable in the foreseeable future. And the United States will not, as some hope and others fear, bind itself to an international institutional and legal order that will domesticate and restrain it. If nothing else, domestic politics would prohibit it. No U.S. leader in the next decade or two will call for a dramatic reduction in defense spending or deny that this country must be the strongest in the world, ready to exert its power globally and act unilaterally if necessary.
(__) Unilateralism is key to global leadership and effective military action multilat would destroy that.
Ekaterina Stepanova, 2003, Research Associate at Carnegie Endowment for Peace, UNILATERALISM & US FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, ed. b. Malone and Khong, p 183-184 Retaining the capability to apply force unilaterally and demonstrating periodically the willingness to use it remains a cornerstone of the U.S. military strategy. For the United States, unilateralism in the use of force is first and foremost an essential element in a compelling demonstration of U.S. strategic independence and global leadership. Given U.S. military superiority and the significant technological gap that exists between the United States and even its closest Western allies, the U.S. political-military leadership often views unilateralism as a technical prerequisite for effective command and control of military action. More important, in a world more complex than the bipolarity of the Cold War, the political interests of countries tend to be diverse and fragmented, even within the Western community of nations. For the United States, even partial accommodation to these interests, which is essential for any multilateral cooperation, presents a number of serious political, military, and technical constraints in the use of force.
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Bing Debate 06-07
Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Public Support/Isolationism**

(__) Multilateralism stokes isolationism amongst the public that would end US global leadership.
Michla Pomerance, spring 2002, Professor of International Law @ Hebrew U, "U.S. Multilateralism, Left and Right," Orbis 46.2, p ScienceDirect The exercise of the requisite unilateralism in the launching of U.S.-led multilateral actions, resisting as needed the multilateral initiatives of others, does not equate to "isolationism." Only excessive concern about being "isolated" in multilateral arenas may induce a more isolationist American posture in one of two ways. First, it might spark the kind of sulking unilateral isolationist hangover which, scholars of the Realist school have noted, often follows periods of crusading interventionism. Second, and more probably, it could persuade Americans tired of leadership to revert to a multilateral isolationism, in which a virtuous but anodyne deferral to "world opinion" is used as an excuse to do nothing. Were either of these forms of isolationism to reemerge, the only winners would be dictators, rogues, and terrorists.
(__) Multilateralists cant maintain support for hegemony uniltateralists can.

Bruce W. Jentleson, Winter 2004, director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy & prof of public policy and PoliSci @ Duke and a senior
foreign policy adviser to presidential candidate Al Gore, Tough love Multilateralism, The Washington Quarterly, p proquest
To their credit, neoconservative foreign policy strategists know the power of a paradigm. They play on national pride by framing their policies in the overarching worldview of U.S. unipolarism and dominance. They advocate unilateralism as right and realist while dismissing multilateralism as naive and unrealistic, soft and weak. Although multilateralists have had some success in conveying the flaws of unilateralism, they have yet to make the positive case for multilateralism as a credible and preferable U.S. foreign policy strategy. Unless multilateralists stop preaching to the choir and start getting tough on themselves, addressing the weaknesses that still cause too many people to have too many doubts about multilateralisms viability as a realistic foreign policy strategy, they will not be trusted by the American public to conduct U.S. foreign policy in a dangerous world.
The broad unilateralism-multilateralism debate is about overarching ways of viewing the world and the role of the United States. The debate is important in and of itself in that it frames and at least partially shapes positions on specific policies. The dynamic also works in the opposite direction: general worldviews are shaped by positions on particular issues. Many issues come into play, including broad views of the United Nations, the global environment and the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and arms control and nonproliferation; but no issue is more central to the overall debate, and none more problematic for multilateralists, than the use of force. Whether Democrats trying to close the foreign policy confidence gap, Republicans battling within the Bush administration, or Europeans wary of the United States acting alone, multilateralists lack of credibility on the use of forcethe will to use it and the capacity to use it effectivelyis
their most damning weakness.
(__) Benefits of unilateralism are immediate and the costs long-term multilateralism means immediate costs with no public benefits.
Michael Hirsh, 2003, former editor of Newsweek and Senior editor of the Washington Bureau, At War With Ourselves, p 240-41
For a long time the Bush administrations back-and-forth policies continued to be defined by the tension between its powerful hegemonists including Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Wolfowitz, and its multilateralists, mainly Powell and his small band of loyal deputies. The hegemonists dominated thinking inside the White House not least because their views continued to earn the president high popularity ratings. Unilateralism, after all, is much easier to sell and so much conceptually cleaner than multilateralism. The benefits are immediate, including a strong leaderly image for the president, and the costs long-term and diffuse: the distant threat of weapons of mass destruction, the distant notion that Europe or China may tip into opposing US hegemony decades hence, the degree-by-degree warming of the globe, and so on. As for multilateralism, on the other hand, its benefits are long-term and diffuse, and its costs immediate: an image of
compromise and indecisveness.
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Bing Debate 06-07
**Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (1 of 2)**

(__) International cooperation has always been dependent on resolute unilateralism it spurs countries into action. Multilateralism first locks countries into inaction.
Michla Pomerance, spring 2002, Professor of International Law @ Hebrew U, "U.S. Multilateralism, Left and Right," Orbis 46.2, p ScienceDirect More fundamentally, those who have understood the concept of "multilateralism" best have always emphasized the dependence of multilateralism on unilateralism. Thus, the foremost American scholar of international organization, Inis Claude (author of Swords into Plowshares), has written that despite the worlds bias against unilateralism, "unilateralism is, in fact, indispensable to effective multilateralism."13 "Effective multilateralism starts with resolute unilateralism; the mission of the leader is not respectful deference to the majority but determined pulling and hauling at it."14 Or as Thomas Friedman wrote in 1995: If the Clinton foreign policy team has learned anything these past two years I hope it is this: there is no multilateralism without unilateralism. Unless you first show people that you are ready to go alone, you will never have partners to go with you . Repeat after me: The UN is us. The UN is us.15
From this perspective, the ones who were paying lip service to multilateralism were not Bush and his Republican followers, who understood this important lesson instinctively, but rather all those who insisted on untainted "humanitarian" motives for multilateral actions. Theirs was a prescription
for inaction and could provide its pretext. That multilateralism can readily serve as a restraint on U.S. power, as a reason and pretext for inaction, and as a conscience-soothing substitute for action is a lesson that Israel, for one, long ago learnedor should have learned. The events preceding the Six-Day War furnished one unforgettable illustration of the problem. While the Johnson administration vacillated, seeking to mobilize an unattainable multilateral naval task force to break the Egyptian blockade, the threat to Israels security was becoming more palpable daily. A less well-known, but not
less meaningful, lesson could be garnered from the subsequent scheme by Senator Fulbright for limiting (indeed, emasculating) Americas security commitment to Israel by anchoring it in a formal treaty placed in a multilateral casing. The United States would grant the guarantee bilaterally, but only to supplement and repeat a previously adopted UN Security Council resolution; and the guarantee would be implemented only multilaterally.16 In this respect, it may be noted that the disparate
perspectives of Right unilateralists and Left multilateralists may easily lead to similar results. The Right would more readily hesitate to grant commitments in the first place, while the Left would extend the commitments but, by placing them in a multilateral framework, later fail to implement them.
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Bing Debate 06-07
**Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (2 of 2)**

(__) Multilateralism is most effective when its motivated by an uncompromising unilateral stance the war on terror proves.
Michla Pomerance, spring 2002, Professor of International Law @ Hebrew U, "U.S. Multilateralism, Left and Right," Orbis 46.2, p ScienceDirect
But if Durban furnished ammunition for the Right multilateralist camp, did September 11 obliterate it and tilt the balance toward the Left multilateralist contentions, validating them retrospectively? Should one conclude (as did Thomas Friedman) that "the unilateralist message the Bush team sent from its first day in officeget rid of the climate treaty, forget the biological treaty, forget arms control, and if the world doesnt like it thats toughhas now come back to haunt us"?55 Would an earlier, more multilateralist approach by the Bush administration have more greatly facilitated the post-September 11 multilateral cooperation it so desperately sought? The assumption, though widely held, is unproven, unprovable, and highly improbable. Such international cooperation as was mustered by the administration in its counterterrorism campaign was motivated by an acknowledged convergence of interests in battling a scourge
from which no state was exempt and, in some cases no doubt, fear of incurring U.S. wrath. The Bush teams earlier unilateralist message was simply irrelevant. There was therefore no more need after September 11 than before to embrace multilateralism obsequiously rather than instrumentally. September 11 did not invalidate the occasional need for unilateral abstentionism. On the other hand, it accentuated yet again the dependence of multilateralism on unilateral American activism.
(__) Hard power and unilateralism is key to successful coalition-building which avoids the disads of multilateralism while incurring the benefits.
Charles Krauthammer, winter 2003, IR expert, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," The National Interest, p L/N
The prudent exercise of power allows, indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. Arrogance and gratuitous high-handedness are counterproductive. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological good will buys. Countries will cooperate with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the USS Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American
investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating and multilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not a result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand", and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itself created a coalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing.
20
Bing Debate 06-07
AT Anti-Terror Cooperation Key

(__) Global intelligence cooperation increases the risk of war on terror failures through bad info.
Steven E. Miller, winter 2002, director of the International Security Program @ JFK School of Government, Harvard, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, p proquest For one thing, the barriers to intensive intelligence collaboration are considerable. U.S. agencies are reluctant to share information with each other, much less with foreign governments and foreign intelligence bureaucracies. When sensitive information is involved, the police are out of
the loop, Congress is eyed warily, and other federal agencies are not routinely on the distribution list. Assessing the intimacy of information-sharing arrangements between governments is impossible for outsiders, but intelligence professionals suggest that
the United States does not share everything even with its closest allies
and that even states with close ties to the United States may not be enthusiastic or generous about turning over information to their U.S. counterparts. Washington was deeply frustrated, for example, that the government of Saudi Arabia was not more forthcoming in assisting the investigation of the 1996
terrorist attack on U.S. military personnel at Khobar Towers. Moreover, the current loose coalition that has formed in support of the U.S. battle with terrorism includes a motley collection of states-some that are close to the United States but many that are not. Indeed, many of the states that might be in the best position to possess and provide information about terrorist
activities in the Middle East or South Asia-such as Iran, Libya, and Syria-are states that have uneasy, or even hostile, relations with the
United States. The barriers to collaboration must be enormous in such cases, with reluctance likely in both directions to forging the most sensitive sorts of
concerns will inevitably arise that information is being manipulated, withheld, parceled out to maximize the price, shaded to advance the interests of the providing state, or even falsely manufactured. When genuine and useful information is provided, it may reflect only partial truths or be misleading and self-serving in some way.
ties between unfriendly states. In circumstances where deep trust between governments does not exist,
(__) Past intelligence cooperation didnt prevent terrorism.

Benjamin Barber, 2003, Sociologist, FEARS EMPIRE, p 202 Despite intelligence efforts and increased cooperation among national police and military intelligence services, in the period between the Afghanistan and Iraq operations there were deadly terrorist attacks against a synagogue in Bjerba, Tunisia , the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi, the American consulate in Karachi, a nightclub in Bali, and a hotel and an airplane in Kenya, killing 236 people in total and wounding many more while spreading fear in the ubiquitous world of soft targets.
(__) International anti-terror cooperation provides little benefit while only constraining US resources and freedom of action.
Steven E. Miller, winter 2002, director of the International Security Program @ JFK School of Government, Harvard, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, p proquest Washington is likely to view the coalition as a source of support and an instrument of U.S. policy, but others are likely to see it as a mechanism for influencing U.S. decisions or restraining U.S. action-a possibility that is mirrored in Bush administration concerns that the coalition might
shackle the United States. Further,
the United States will not find it easy to push its coalition partners to do things they do not want to do or
feel that they cannot do. Managing this coalition will be a demanding, messy, vexing, and occasionally fruitless exercise. The United States will undoubtedly continue the diplomatic maneuverings it thinks are necessary or desirable to permit and support its war against terrorism. This ungainly coalition, however, if it will be a true coalition, is unlikely to be so potent or so appealing an instrument that Washington is certain to sacrifice other policies comprehensively for its sake.
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Bing Debate 06-07
AT China Relations DA
(__) US-Sino relations will remain stable neither seeks to upset the other, there is no collision course.
Shannon Tow, Dec 2004, Research Assistant @ School of Political Science and International Studies @ U of Queensland, Contemporary Southeast Asia 26.3, p 434 Robert Ross. In his article "The Geography of Peace", Ross argues that as the two most geopolitically dominant regional actors, China and the United States preside over their own separate but complementary spheres of regional influence. He asserts that continental Southeast Asian states have aligned with China and maritime Southeast Asian states have aligned with the United States. The geographic position of China and the United States, and the evolution of their interests and military capabilities accordingly, make it unlikely that either country would seek to project power into the other's respective sphere. Ross therefore postulates that the emerging bipolar structure is likely to be a stable and enduring one. This portrayal of Sino-U.S. relations has been acknowledged by recent literature on Asia-Pacific security.
(__) China has responded favorably to the Bush Doctrine.

Peter Van Ness, winter 2005, visiting fellow in the Contemporary China Centre and lectures on security in the Department of IR @ Australian National U, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, p proquest
Clearly, China wants to avoid a conflict with the United States. The Japanese journalist Funabashi Yoichi quotes one Chinese think tank researcher as saying: We are studying the origin of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. Why did it happen? Was there no way to prevent it? Some see that a U.S.-China cold war is inevitable, but what can we do
Chinas strategic response to the Bush Doctrine is not confrontational toward the United States and does not require Chinas Asian neighbors to choose between Beijing and Washington, something none of them wants to have to do.26 Though it is not a design for what realists would call balancing against the United States, it challenges Washington to think and act in ways quite different from the policies prescribed by the Bush Doctrine
to prevent it? when trying to resolve problems in international relations.
(__) The US wont engage China in an Asian war neither actor wants to see conflict anyway.
Shannon Tow, Dec 2004, Research Assistant @ School of Political Science and International Studies @ U of Queensland, Contemporary Southeast Asia 26.3, p 434 A stable Southeast Asia is also desired by the United States. Americans are aware that China's cooperation is needed in areas of counterterrorism and missile proliferation. Washington, moreover, remains wary of U.S. engagement in any Asian land war. Thus while China and the United States compete for influence in each other's sphere by use of non-military means, neither has an incentive to resort to conflict. SinoAmerican compromises on regional issues of mutual interest throughout the 1990s play to Ross' argument that the Sino-U.S. relationship is an essentially stable one.
(__) China and the US both benefit from non-interference plus Chinas navy is old and cant make moves against the US.
Shannon Tow, Dec 2004, Research Assistant @ School of Political Science and International Studies @ U of Queensland, Contemporary Southeast Asia 26.3, p 434 Third, though the Sino-U.S. relationship is a competitive one, Ross argues that China and the United States' complementary geopolitical strengths simultaneously prevent them from forcefully interfering in one another's respective sphere of influence. Chinese naval capabilities remain limited due to ageing weapons systems, inferior technology and inadequate training of personnel. Furthermore, China is principally concerned with modernizing its economy and therefore desires regional stability in Southeast Asia.
22
Bing Debate 06-07
AT Dont Need Hard Power to Stop Terror

(__) Nye agrees: we cannot win the war on terror without hard power.
Joseph Nye, 3-10-05, Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard, BOSTON REVIEW, p L/N If the United States is going to win the struggle against terrorism, it will need learn again to combine soft power with hard power. Stephen Walt recognizes this, but he does not dwell on it, perhaps because his realist paradigm does not stress soft power. But better an intelligent, moderate, and mature realism than a truncated neoconservative Wilsonianism that stresses ideas but loses touch with reality.
23
Bing Debate 06-07
AT EU Relations DA
(__) Economic and security relations with Europe outweigh unilateralism.
Mohammed Ayoob, spring 2005, Prof of IR @ JMU, The Unipolar Concert, World Policy Journal 22, p proquest
An article in the New York Times on the eve of the 2004 U.S. presidential election began by asserting that the predominant view in Europe seemed to be that "no matter who wins ... the consequences for American-European relations will be bad" and that neither France nor Germany, the linchpins of the Continent's transatlantic relationship, would be willing to come to the aid of the United States in Iraq regardless of the outcome. (1) Analyses such as this one tend to portray America's relations
with major European powers in one-dimensional terms. They assume everything hinges on Iraq and ignore the dense web of interlocking security and economic interests that bind industrialized Western Europe and America together. As Harvard's Jospeh S. Nye, Jr. has said in
refuting the conservative political analyst Robert Kagan's assertion that when it comes to their approach to major strategic and international questions Europeans and Americans are from two different planets: "In their relations with each other all advanced democracies are from Venus."
(__) Disagreements are only over policy choice not the overall objectives and goals.
Mohammed Ayoob, spring 2005, Prof of IR @ JMU, The Unipolar Concert, World Policy Journal 22, p proquest Second, disagreements within the concert are often over policy choices, as opposed to fundamental rules of the system or basic objectives. Deterring and punishing "rogue" states and denying unconventional capabilities to those outside the club are shared objectives from which no member of the concert dissents. This was very clear in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. A reading of the U.N. Security Council debates on Iraq from
1991 to 2003 makes it obvious that there were hardly any differences among the club of powerful states on taking steps that would severely derogate Iraq's sovereignty and eventually bring about a regime change. The imposition of no-flight zones and invasive inspections under U.N. auspices between 1991 and 2003 clearly demonstrated this unity of purpose. The differences were over the tactics to achieve these ends. The same applies to the concert's objectives regarding Iran. The shared objective is to deny Iran nuclear weapons capabilities and to curb its regional influence; the debate is about how best to attain these goals.
(__) Engagement will prevent relations from failing in the future.

Rob de Wijk, winter 2004, prof of IR & director of the Clingendael Center for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands, Washington Quarterly, p proquest
Europe has already taken significant concrete steps toward creating a credible military component in Europe, specifically through the EUs European Capabilities Action Program (2001) and NATOs Prague Capabilities Commitment (2002). At the recommendation of representatives at the EUs 2002 Laeken summit, a task force is producing a defense book that looks into questions related to using hard power. In addition, in 2003 the EUs high representative for common foreign and
security policy, Javier Solana, presented a draft of a strategic concept,11 which is the equivalent of the U.S. national security strategy. Solanas strategy paper spells out Europes interests and the threats it faces and explicitly calls for expeditionary capabilities to protect those interests, stabilize regions, and combat terrorists. Significantly, the paper argues that [p]reemptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future,12 a position welcomed by the Bush administration. Indeed, Solana agreed that fighting terrorists abroad can increase security at home. The
strategy paper could play an important role in helping reconcile Europe and the United States and facilitate a sorely needed joint U.S.-European declaration of strategic partnership.
24
Bing Debate 06-07
AT Fiscal Overstretch (1 of 2)
(__) Empirically, fiscal overstretch can easily be remedied its exaggeration to claim that it would harm the US economy.
Inescapable signs of serious economic weakness emerged with the collapse of the stock market bubble and were exacerbated by the subsequent return of fiscal insolvency under the impetus of the Bush tax cuts and spending increases. The budget deficit, which was $412 billion in fiscal year 2004, was in nominal terms the largest ever and fell little short, as a percentage of GDP, of the deficits produced by the Reagan tax cuts of 1981. The Bush tax cuts produced a federal tax take of 16.3 percent of GDP in 2004, but spending remained stubbornly high at 19.8 percent of GDP. "Official projections score the fiscal imbalance at a cumulative $5 trillion over the next decade," writes the economist Fred Bergsten, "but exclude probable increases in overseas military and homeland-security expenditures, extension of the recent tax cuts and new entitlement increases." On current policies, as Bergsten notes, the budget deficit could approach $1 trillion per year. (43) The unwillingness to pay for what it wants and to
want only what it is willing to pay for is also apparent from the underfunding of the Bush Doctrine. Two neoconservatives, who insist that "it is impossible to have a Bush Doctrine world with Clinton-era defense budgets," estimate the deficit at $100 billion a year, and it would be undoubtedly larger yet if another major war were to be launched in the next few years. (44) These constraints should not be misconstrued; they are political, not economic, in character. The experience of the 1990s shows that the structural gap between expenditures and revenues can be overcome without serious cost, and it is in any case difficult to believe that the U.S. economy would tank even if federal tax revenues reached 25 percent of GDP. Still, Bush's sharp reduction in taxes is surely significant.
(__) Fiscal overstretch fears are exaggerated worst case scenario is that US consumers feel slight pressure, not collapse of heg.
David H. Levey, April 2005, recently retired after 19 years as Managing Director of Moody's Sovereign Ratings Service, The Overstretch Myth, Foreign Affairs 84.2, p proquest The U.S. economy, according to doubters, rests on an unsustainable accumulation of foreign debt. Fueled by government profligacy and low private
savings rates, the current account deficit--the difference between what U.S. residents spend abroad and what they earn abroad in a year--now stands at almost six percent of GDP; total net foreign liabilities are approaching a quarter of GDP. Sudden unwillingness by investors abroad to continue adding to their already large dollar assets, in this scenario, would set off a panic, causing the dollar to tank, interest rates to skyrocket, and the U.S. economy to descend into crisis, dragging the rest of the world down with it. Despite the persistence and pervasiveness of this doomsday prophecy, U.S. hegemony is in reality solidly grounded: it rests on an
economy that is continually extending its lead in the innovation and application of new technology, ensuring its continued appeal for foreign central banks and private investors. The dollar's role as the global monetary standard is not threatened, and the risk to U.S. financial stability posed by large foreign liabilities has been exaggerated. To be sure, the economy will at some point have to adjust to a decline in the dollar and a rise in interest rates. But these trends will at worst slow the growth of U.S. consumers' standard of living, not undermine the United States' role as global pacesetter. If anything, the world's appetite for U.S. assets bolsters U.S. predominance rather than undermines it.
25
Bing Debate 06-07
AT Fiscal Overstretch (2 of 2)
(__) Dollar collapse wouldnt trigger an investment withdrawal domestic investors would repatriate foreign holdings to secure the US economy. The end results would be a smaller US trade deficit, hegemony would not be harmed.
David H. Levey, April 2005, recently retired after 19 years as Managing Director of Moody's Sovereign Ratings Service, The Overstretch Myth, Foreign Affairs 84.2, p proquest
Whichever perspective on the current account one favors, the United States cannot escape a growing external debt. The "hegemony skeptics" fear such debt will lead to a collapse of the U.S. dollar triggered by a precipitous unloading of U.S. assets. Such a selloff could result--as in emerging-market crises--if investors suddenly conclude that U.S. foreign debt has become unsustainably large. A panicky "capital flight" would ensue, as investors raced for the exits to avoid the falling dollar and plunging stock and bond prices. But even if such a sharp break occurs--which is less likely than a gradual adjustment of exchange
rates and interest rates--market-based adjustments will mitigate the consequences. Responding to a relative price decline in U.S. assets and likely Federal Reserve action to raise interest rates, U.S. investors (arguably accompanied by bargain-hunting foreign investors) would repatriate some of their $4 trillion in foreign holdings in order to buy (now undervalued) assets, tempering the price decline for domestic stocks and bonds. A significant repatriation of funds would thus slow the pace of the dollar decline and the rise in rates. The ensuing recession, combined with the cheaper dollar, would eventually combine to improve the trade balance. Although the period of global rebalancing would be painful for U.S. consumers and workers, it would be even harder on the European and Japanese economies, with their propensity for deflation and stagnation. Such a transitory adjustment would be unpleasant, but it would not undermine the economic foundations of U.S. hegemony.
(__) Multiple economic factors check back fiscal overstretch the account deficit only proves the strong economic fundamentals of the US, not imminent collapse.
David H. Levey, April 2005, recently retired after 19 years as Managing Director of Moody's Sovereign Ratings Service, The Overstretch Myth, Foreign Affairs 84.2, p proquest Discussion of the United States' "net foreign debt" conjures up images of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey, evoking the currency collapses and economic crises they have suffered as models for a coming U.S. meltdown. There are key differences, however, between those emerging-market cases and the current condition of the global hegemon. The United States' external liabilities are denominated in its own currency, which remains the global monetary standard, and its economy remains on the frontier of global technological innovation, attracting foreign capital as well as immigrant labor with its rapid growth and the high returns it generates for investors. The statistic at the center of the foreign debt debate is the net international investment position (NIIP), the value of foreign assets owned by U.S. residents minus the value of U.S. assets owned by nonresidents. Until 1989, the United States was a creditor to the rest of the world; the NIIP peaked at almost
13 percent of GDP in 1980. But chronic current account deficits ever since have given the United States the largest net liabilities in world history. Since foreign claims on the United States ($10.5 trillion) exceed U.S. claims abroad ($7.9 trillion), the NIIP is now negative: -$2.6 trillion at the start of 2004, or -24 percent of GDP. Unpacking the NIIP gives a better sense of the risk it actually poses. It has two components: direct investment, the value of domestic operations directly controlled by a foreign company; and financial liabilities, the value of stocks, bonds, and bank deposits held overseas. At the start of 2004, foreign direct investment in the United States was $2.4 trillion, while U.S. direct investment abroad was about $2.7 trillion. (Direct investment is relatively stable, changing mostly in response to changes in expected long-term profitability.) Removing direct investment from the equation leaves $5.1 trillion in U.S.-held foreign financial assets versus $8.1 trillion in U.S. financial assets held by foreign investors. This last figure represents a whopping 74 percent of U.S. GDP--a statistic that would seem to give ample cause for alarm. But considering foreign ownership of U.S. financial assets as a percentage of GDP is less enlightening than comparing it to the total available stock of U.S. financial assets. At the start of 2004, total U.S. securities amounted to $33.4 trillion (some 50 percent of the world total). Foreign investors held more than 38 percent of the $4 trillion in U.S. Treasury bonds, but only 11 percent of the $6.1 trillion in agency bonds (such as those issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); 23 percent of the $6.5 trillion in corporate bonds; and 11 percent of the $15.5 trillion in equities outstanding. These foreign liabilities are the result of a string of current account deficits that have grown from 1.5 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s to an estimated 5.7 percent of GDP-about $650 billion--in 2004. Economists at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimate that ongoing deficits of 3 percent of GDP would bring the U.S. NIIP to -40 percent of GDP by 2010, and that it would eventually stabilize at around -63 percent.
If the deficit remains at today's level, they foresee the NIIP growing to -50 percent of GDP by 2010 and eventually to -100 percent. These estimates, however, fail to consider that future dollar depreciation and market adjustments in interest rates and asset prices will likely check the increase of the NIIP. Dollar depreciation against the euro and the yen in 2002 and 2003 kept the NIIP flat despite large current account deficits. The same result is likely for 2004 (final numbers will not be available until the end of June). Thus, although the NIIP will surely continue to grow for many years to come, its increase will be far less dramatic than many economists fear.
False Alarm The real question is just how much the United States' deteriorating NIIP threatens to undermine the economic foundations of U.S. hegemony. The precise answer depends on whether you explain current account deficits in terms of trade, domestic savings and investment, or the composition of global wealth. In each case, though, the
risks are far less dire than they are made out to be. And in many ways, chronic current account deficits reflect strong economic fundamentals rather than fatal structural flaws.
26
Bing Debate 06-07
AT Force Overstretch
(__) The US military advantages doesnt come from boots on the ground the level of sophistication prevents overstretch.
Suzanne Nossel, April 2004, Senior Fellow at the Security and Peace Institute and former Deputy to the Ambassador for UN Management and Reform, Smart Power, Foreign Affairs 83.2, p proquest As to the danger of overstretch, progressive policymakers should learn from the example of the U.S. military, which has long recognized that its comparative advantage comes not from size or firepower but from farsighted strategy, sophisticated intelligence, professionalism, and precise weaponry.
(__) Even if military power is overstretched our military cannot be overwhelmed and US heg would remain intact.
Eliot A. Cohen, Jul/Aug 2004, Prof and Director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies @ JHUs School of Advanced International Studies, History and the Hyperpower, Foreign Affairs 83.4, p proquest Put thus, U.S. military power seems to invite hubris. But again, viewed from within the picture appears different. Generals and admirals fret over forces stretched too thin, anticipate threats from unconventional and irregular opponents who will avoid U.S. strengths and seek out weaknesses, and worry that their political masters will succumb to the intoxication of great power or their fellow citizens will fail to understand the commitment of money and blood that any war requires. Such leaders understand better than their civilian superiors the fragility of great military strength. But that does not undermine the basic fact of U.S. predominance. Augustus lost his legions in the Teutoburger Wald, Disraeli his regiments at Isandhlwana -- in both cases, succumbing to primitive opponents inferior in weaponry and, according to the imperial powers, culture as well. Not even in Vietnam, where the odds of such a debacle's occurring were highest, did U.S. forces suffer a similar defeat. Today, the legions of the United States have no match, and the gap between them and other militaries is only growing.
(__) Unilateral preemption wont overstretch because it wont be used for more than terrorism.
Ivo H. Daalder, 2002, fellow @ Brookings Institute, THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: AN EVALUATION, p http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb109.htm In contrast, the Strategy envisions a much narrower role for preemption. It discusses preemption in the specific context of defeating terrorists and rogue states. It never suggests preemption has a role to play with respect to a rising China or any residual threat posed by Russia. Nor is the argument for preempting terrorists controversial. Law enforcement, covert operations, and intelligence gathering have always sought to preempt terrorist attacks, and such preemptive activities are well-established in international law. Clinton administration
officials partially justified the 1998 cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on preventative grounds. Instead, the debate in the United States has always been about whether the U.S. government is doing enough to stop terrorists preemptively, not whether it has to wait for them to attack before acting.
27
Bing Debate 06-07
AT Multilat Prevents Terror/Anti-Americanism

(__) 9-11 and anti-Americanism came from the multilateral world.
Charles Krauthammer, winter 2003, IR expert, NATIONAL INTEREST, p proquest
A third critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists, who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and whose objections are practical. They are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. They value great power concert. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority, but because it spreads risk. In their view, a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares, sharing rule
The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get UN support, share decision-making, assemble a coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original acquiescence to the coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because the extremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by the details of our management of it.
-making functions with others. I have my doubts.
(__) The international anti-terror coalition has grown stronger even with US unilateralism in place. DEFENSE NEWS, 12-28-05, p L/N
More importantly, even as Washington and Paris have lobbed spitballs at each other, the web of security commitments the United States has cultivated for the past 50 years has, far from contracting, expanded radically. With the eastward growth of NATO, new relationships with oncehostile states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Libya, and partnerships with other countries under threat by radical Islam, the U.S. alliance system is transforming in ways
Since the Sept. 11, attacks, the United States has been quietly working to develop new and stronger alliances where they matter most: with the governments and societies of the greater Middle East. In essence, just as al-Qaida has been said to "franchise" jihad - outsourcing the grunt work of suicide bombings to angry young locals from Turkey to Indonesia - the Pentagon is building a rival franchise in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, mobilizing and supporting locals willing to join the fight against radical Islam. Even as critics have deplored Bush's "with-us-or-against-us" rhetoric as simplistic and alienating, the fact remains that in grand strategic terms, almost the entire planet has chosen to be with us. Moscow, despite some grumbling, has acceded to U.S. counterterrorism alliances with former satellite states like Georgia; Washington has been able, miraculously, to strengthen its strategic partnerships with archrivals India and Pakistan simultaneously.
the White House itself may not fully appreciate.
(__) The animosity triggered by military force is short-lived and easy to resolve.
Frederick Kagan, summer 2005, resident scholar in defense and security studies @ AEI, The Wilson Quarterly 29.3, p proquest Though the use of force may stir anger and resentment in an enemy population and damage a state's position in the world community, history suggests that both the animosity and the damage may be more fleeting than many suppose, and that their scale and duration may depend on many elements other than the mere fact that force was used. By far the most important element is the acceptability of the peace conditions imposed by the victor after the struggle. If the victor can devise terms that most of its foes and the rest of the international community can accept, then the animosity is likely to fade quickly. And if acceptable terms are coupled with continued military power, then the prospects for a lasting and stable peace are excellent.
28
Bing Debate 06-07
AT Should Cede to Europe/Legitimacy Good

(__) US ceding power to Europe would do nothing it would not increase our legitimacy and it would only put global security at risk because Europe will not hold up its end.
Robert Kagan, 1-24-2004, Senior Asso.@ Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace, New York Times, p L/N
But can the United States cede some power to Europe without putting American security, and indeed Europe's and the entire liberal democratic world's security, at risk in
even with the best of intentions, the United States cannot enlist the cooperation of Europeans if there is no common assessment of the nature of global threats today, and of the means that must be employed to meet them. But it is precisely this gap in perception that has driven the United States and Europe apart in the post-cold-war world.
the process? Here lies the rub. For If it is true, as the British diplomat Robert Cooper suggests, that international legitimacy stems from shared values and a shared history, does such commonality still exist within the West now that the cold war has ended? For while the liberal trans-Atlantic community still shares much in common, the philosophical
schism on the fundamental questions of world order may now be overwhelming those commonalities. It is hard to imagine the crisis of legitimacy being resolved as long as this schism persists. For even if the United States were to fulfill its part of the bargain, and grant the Europeans the influence they crave, would the Europeans, with their very different perception of the world, fulfill theirs? As long as Europeans and Americans do not share a common view of the threat posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, [WMDs] they will not join in a common strategy. Nor will Europeans accord the United States legitimacy when it seeks to address those threats by itself, and by what it regards as sometimes the only means possible, force. And what, then, is the United States to do? Should Americans, in the interest of trans-Atlantic harmony, try to alter their perceptions of global threats to match that of their European friends? To do so would be irresponsible. Not only American security but the security of the liberal democratic world depends today, as it has depended for the past half-century, on American power. Even Europeans, in moments of clarity, know that is true. "The U.S. is the only truly global player," Joschka Fischer has declared, "and I must warn against underestimating its importance for peace and stability in the
world. And beware, too, of underestimating what the U.S. means for our own security."
29
Bing Debate 06-07
Hard Power Key to Econ

(__) Hard power is key to our economy entire sectors rely on a forward deployed stance.
Chalmers Johnson, 1-15-2004, president of the Japan Policy Institute and leading member of the American Empire Project which does in-depth research and analysis about US hegemony, Americas Empire of Bases, p AlterNet.org Our installations abroad bring profits to civilian industries, which design and manufacture weapons for the armed forces or, like the now well-publicized Kellogg, Brown & Root company, a subsidiary of the Halliburton Corporation of Houston, undertake contract services to build and maintain our far-flung outposts. One task of such contractors is to keep uniformed members of the imperium housed in comfortable quarters, well fed, amused, and supplied with enjoyable, affordable vacation facilities. Whole sectors of the American economy have come to rely on the military for sales. On the eve of our second war on Iraq, for example, while the Defense Department was ordering up an
extra ration of cruise missiles and depleted-uranium armor-piercing tank shells, it also acquired 273,000 bottles of Native Tan sunblock, almost triple its 1999 order and undoubtedly a boon to the supplier, Control Supply Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and its subcontractor, Sun Fun Products of Daytona Beach, Florida.
(__) US military hard power is key to the US economy by protecting corporations that operate abroad.
William A. Cook, 1-29-2004, Prof @ UCal La Verne, The New Nation, p http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/exec/view.cgi/10/7160/printer While Bush expounded on the virtues of America's presence across the world, noting that the US had "made military and moral commitments in Europe and Asia which protected free nations from aggression and created the conditions in which new democracies could flourish," he failed to mention that "expanding U.S. military presence worldwide only serves to reinforce the economic hegemony" that guarantees survival of the corporations that exploit the citizens of the undeveloped nation-states as they take control of that nation's natural resources ("Free Trade May Not Be Fair Trade," Roger Hollander, LA Times, Nov. 2003). Bush continues his exhortation of American largesse: "we also
provided inspiration for oppressed peoples." Indeed! How were the Palestinians inspired? Did our worship of Sharon's savagery inspire? Did our overwhelming financial support for his indomitable military force inspire? Did the Bush administration's incarceration of over 1,000 in Guantanamo without due process - no criminal charges, no consultation with lawyers, and no rights whatsoever - inspire? Did the occupation of Iraq preceded by an internationally illegal invasion inspire?
30
Bing Debate 06-07
Hard Power Key to Effective Multilat

(__) US hard power is key to making multilateral institutions effective.
Frederick Kagan, summer 2005, scholar in defense and security studies @ AEI, Wilson Quarterly 29.3, p proquest International organizations, especially those devoted to nonproliferation and peacekeeping, can succeed in difficult circumstances only when their efforts are supported by credible military means. Because such organizations help to identify current and future threats, and to galvanize international support behind the punishment of transgressors, the use of American power to support them is a good investment in long-term security. It may be that, in the end, as with Adolf Hitler and a few other die-hard aggressive leaders, there is no finding a peaceful solution with Kim Jong Il. Or it may be that some unforeseen change within North Korea will yield such an outcome. It is certain, however, that diplomatic approaches unsupported by military power will not make much of an impression on Pyongyang, and that the continued failure to support international
agencies charged with enforcing nonproliferation agreements will doom the cause of nonproliferation itself.
31
Bing Debate 06-07
Hard Power Key to Peace (1 of 2)

(__) American hard power ensures peace by making wars a useless activity.
JOSHUA MICAH MARSHALL, 2-2-2004, The New Yorker, p L/N
The Bush doctrine, with its tenets of 32reemptive war, regime change, and permanent American military primacy, promised a new global order. The best way to think of that order is by analogy with the internal organization of a nation-state. What makes a state a state is its monopoly over the legitimate use of force, which means that citizens dont have to worry about arming to defend themselves against each other. Instead, they can focus on productive pursuits like raising families, making money, and enjoying their leisure time. In the world of the Bush doctrine, states take the place of citizens. As the President told graduating cadets at West Point in 2002, America intends to
keep its military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace. In other words, if America has an effective monopoly on the exercise of military force, other countries should be able to set aside the distractions of arming and plotting against each other and put their energies into producing consumer electronics, textiles,
tea. What the Bush doctrine calls forparadoxically, given its proponentsis a form of world government.
(__) An assertive, hard-power centered, unilateral foreign policy is the only way to prevent potential challengers from rising and causing conflict.
Robert Kagan & William Kristol, 2004, sr assoc @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & chair of the project for the New American Century, The Neocon Reader, ed b Irwin Stelzer, p 67-68 A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with devastating effect to important regions of the world would make it less likely that challengers to regional stability would attempt to alter the status quo in their favor. It might even deter such challengers from undertaking expensive efforts to arm themselves in the first place. An America whose willingness to project force is in doubt, on the other hand, can only encourage such challenges. In Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East, the message we should be sending to potential foes is: Dont even think about it. That kind of deterrence offers the best recipe for lasting peace; it is much cheaper than fighting the wars that would follow should we fail to build such a deterrent capacity.
The ability to project force overseas, however, will increasingly be jeopardized over the coming years as smaller powers acquire weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to launch them at American forces, at our allies and at the American homeland. The sine qua non for a strategy of American global pre-eminence, therefore, is a missile defense system that can protect all three of these targets. Only a well-protected America will be capable of deterring and when necessary moving against rogue regimes when they rise to challenge regional stability. Only a United States reasonably well shielded from the blackmail of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons will be able to shape the international environment to suit its interests and principles.
With the necessary military strength, strong and well-led alliances, and adequate missile defense, the United States can set about making trouble for hostile and potentially hostile nations, rather than waiting for them to make trouble for us. Just as the most successful strategy in the Cold War combined containment of the Soviet Union with an effort to undermine the moral legitimacy of the Moscow regime, so in the post-Cold War era a principal aim of American foreign policy should be to bring about a change of regime in hostile nations in Baghdad and Belgrade, in Pyongyang and Beijing, and wherever tyrannical governments acquire the military power to threaten their neighbors, our allies and the United States itself.
(__) US military force credibility is key to global peace.

Charles Kupchan, 2003, prof or IR @ Georgetown, The End of the American Era, p 58-59 The relative stability of the current era sterns not just from the resources at the disposal of the United States, but also from its willingness to use them. The United States has been either minding the store or putting out fires in virtually every quarter of the globe. American forces preserve the uneasy peace in East Asia, guarding South Korea from the regime to the north, keeping the lid on tensions between China and Japan, and trying to support Taiwan's de facto independence without inciting Beijing. America still maintains a sizable troop presence in Europe to help ensure stability on the Continent. When the Balkans fell prey to ethnic conflict during the 1990s it was the
United States that eventually came to the rescue. The containment of Iraq throughout the past decade fell principally upon U .S.
shoulders. America led the charge against terrorist networks and their sponsors in Afghanistan in 2001. And in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Eritrea, and many other hot spots, Washington has been a central player in the search for peace.
32
Bing Debate 06-07
Hard Power Key to Peace (2 of 2)

(__) Military hard power prevents challengers to US unipolarity and removes the ambiguity that led to past wars.
William C. Wohlforth, Summer 1999, Ass. Prof of IR @ Georgetown, International Security 24.1, p proquest
Moreover, the power gap in the United States' favor is wider than any single measure can capture because the unipolar concentration of resources is symmetrical. Unlike
previous system leaders, the United States has commanding leads in all the elements of material power: economic, military, technological, and geographical. All the naval and commercial powers that most scholars identify as the hegemonic leaders of the past lacked military (especially landpower) capabilities commensurate with their global influence. Asymmetrical power portfolios generate ambiguity. When the leading state excels in the production of economic and naval capabilities but not conventional land power, it may seem simultaneously powerful and vulnerable. Such asymmetrical power portfolios create resentment among second-tier states that are powerful militarily but lack the great prestige the leading state's commercial and naval advantages bring. At the same time, they make the leader seem vulnerable to pressure from the one element of power in which it does not excel: military capabilities. The result is ambiguity about which state is more powerful, which is more secure, which is threatening which, and which might make a bid for hegemony.
(__) US deterrence and power prevent global conflict.

Charles Krauthaumer, April 2004, DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD, p http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf What does hold the international system together? What keeps it from degenerating into total anarchy? Not the phony security of treaties, not the best of goodwill among the nicer nations. In the unipolar world we inhabit, what stability we do enjoy today is owed to the overwhelming power and deterrent threat of the United States. If someone invades your house, you call the cops. Who do you call if someone invades your country? You dial Washington. In the unipolar world, the closest thing to a centralized authority, to an enforcer of norms, is AmericaAmerican power.
And ironically, American power is precisely what liberal internationalism wants to constrain and tie down and subsume in pursuit of some brave new Lockean world.
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Bing Debate 06-07
Hard Power Key to Soft Power

(__) Hard power is key to soft power the US cannot dictate the international agenda without it.
Joseph Nye, 2002, Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard, The Paradox of American Power, p 9 Of course, hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other. Both are aspects of the ability to achieve our purposes by affecting the behavior of others. Sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction. A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda as well as its attractiveness. And some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of invincibility or inevitability. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop such myths. Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for smaller states witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe. But soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century.
Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And some countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight, because of the incorporation of attractive causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping into their definitions of national interest. These are lessons that the unilateralists forget at their and our peril.
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Bing Debate 06-07
**Hard Power Is All That Matters (Soft Power Useless)**

(__) The currency of international politics no longer includes soft power hard power is the only factor that matters.
Thomas Weiss, Autumn 2003, prof of international studies @ CUNY, Washington Quarterly, p proquest Bipolarity has given way to what was supposed to be US primacy, but the demonstrated military prowess in the war on Iraq made it crystal clear that primacy was a vast understatement. Scholars discuss the nuances of economic and cultural leverage resulting from US soft power,13 but the hard currency of international politics undoubtedly remains military might. Before the war on Iraq, Washington was already spending more on its military than the next 15-25 countries combined (depending on who was counting); with an opening additional
More recently, a third problem has arisen: Washingtons emergence as what former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine aptly dubbed the hyper-puissane.
appropriation of $79 billion for the war, the United States now spends more than the rest of the worlds militaries combined.
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Bing Debate 06-07
AT Soft Power Key to Bases

(__) US already has an extensive network of bases.
Chalmers Johnson, 2004, president of the Japan Policy Institute and leading member of the American Empire Project which does indepth research and analysis about US hegemony, The Sorrows of Empire, p 1 As distinct from other peoples on this earth, most Americans do not recognize--or do not want to recognize-that the United States dominates the world through its military power. Due to government secrecy, they are often ignorant of the fact that their government garrisons the globe. They do not realize that a vast network of American military bases on every continent except America actually constitutes a new form of empire.
(__) US has increased relations with nations that have critical base locations with military-to-military interaction soft power isnt needed.
Bruno Tertrais, spring 2004, senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique and an associate researcher at the Centre dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, p proquest The United States has also developed closer relations with a diverse set of global actors that might be termed new friends. These states may have had preexisting relations with the United States but now find themselves drawn more closely to the United States largely because of the new strategic conditions of the war on terrorism. These new friends include India, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Bahrain, Jordan, and Singapore.
A few of these states have been designated as non-NATO strategic allies (Bahrain and the Philippines, for example) as a testament to their newly found significance for the United States. All of them represent critical regional access points for the U.S. military and other forms of presencesometimes in a strictly geographical sensein areas of potential instability and lawlessness, as well as sites that might be breeding grounds for terrorism. Military-to-
military interactions with each of these countries have increased sharply in the last few years, and the U.S. government has used several of these states as staging areas for operations against local terrorist groups.
(__) US doesnt need bases air superiority allows rapid deployment from North America.
Chalmers Johnson, 2004, president of the Japan Policy Institute and leading member of the American Empire Project which does indepth research and analysis about US hegemony, The Sorrows of Empire, p 24 During the second Iraq war, for example, the United States did not use its Persian Gulf and Central Asian bases except to launch bombers against Iraqi cities-an activity more akin to a training exercise, given American air superiority, than to anything that might be called combat. Virtually all of the actual fighting forces came from the homeland"-the Third Infantry Division from Fort Stewart, Georgia; the Fourth Infantry Division from Fort Hood, Texas; the First Marine Division from Camp Pendleton, California; and the l0lst Airborne Division from Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
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Bing Debate 06-07
AT Soft Power Prevents Terrorism

(__) American values with trigger terrorism regardless trading hard power for soft power only makes us more vulnerable.
Joseph Nye, 2002, Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, p x-xi Some Americans are tempted to believe that we could reduce these hatreds and our vulnerability if we would withdraw our troops, curtail our alliances, and follow a more isolationist foreign policy. But we would not remove our vulnerability. Not only are the terrorists who struck on September 11 dedicated to reducing can power, but in the words of Jordan's King Abdallah, "they want to break down the fabric of the U.S. They want to break down what America stands for." Even if we had a weaker foreign policy, such groups would resent the power of the American economy, which would still reach well beyond our shores. American corporations and citizens represent global capitalism, which is anathema to some. American popular culture has a global reach regardless of what we do. There is no escaping the influence of Hollywood, CNN, and the Internet. American films and television express freedom, individualism, and change (as well as sex and violence). Generally, the global reach of American culture helps to enhance our soft power-our cultural and ideological appeal. But not for everyone: Individualism and liberties are attractive to many people but repulsive to some, particularly fundamentalists. American feminism, open sexuality, and individual choices are profoundly subversive of patriarchal societies. One of the terrorist pilots is reported to have said that he did not like the United States because it is "too lax. I can go anywhere I want and they can't stop me." Some tyrants and fundamentalists will always hate us because of our values of openness opportunity, and we will have no choice but to deal with them through more effective counterterrorism policies.
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Bing Debate 06-07
AT Solf Power Solves NoKo

(__) Successful soft-line engagement with North Korea is empirically denied the states infrastructure prevents it from solving. Asia Today, March 2004, The Koreas: Moody's costs the options, p L/N
Despite agreeing to engage in talks, North Korea has not backed down from its threats. Moodys says an effective consensus remains elusive, evidently
because all States contiguous to North Korea fear the risks and consequences of a North Korean collapse. The burden of such a collapse would be huge on South Korea, and would cause considerable disruptions to the region.
Despite diplomatic efforts by the US, Japan and especially South Korea to engage North Korea over the past decade, it remains a highly insular State. North Korea is totalitarian, its political and economic power highly concentrated in a dynastic and insular leadership. Unlike Cuba, it does not have a civil society to press for change. It is probably wishful thinking to expect that the regime will undergo a process of spontaneous self-reform that accepts international conventions of behaviour governing not only nuclear non-proliferation, but also human rights and trade and investment, says Moodys.
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Bing Debate 06-07
**Cant Solve Soft Power Anyway (1 of 2)**

1) Too many domestic policies hurt soft power they cant solve.
Joseph Nye, summer 2004, Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard, Political Science Quarterly 19.2, p proquest Some domestic policies, such as capital punishment and the absence of gun controls, reduce the attractiveness of the United States to other countries but are the results of differences in values that may persist for some time. Other policies, such as the refusal to limit gasguzzling vehicles, damage the American reputation because they appear self-indulgent and demonstrate an unwillingness to consider the effects we are having on global climate change and other countries. Similarly, domestic agricultural subsidies that are structured in a way that protects wealthy farmers while we preach the virtue of free markets to poor countries appear hypocritical in the eyes of others. In a democracy, the "dog" of domestic politics is often too large to be wagged by the tail of foreign policy, but when we ignore the connections, our apparent hypocrisy is costly to our soft power.
2) US has rejected lots of treaties which prevents soft power: A) CTBT.

Joseph Nye, 1-3-2000, Dean of the JKF School of Government @ Harvard, New York Times, p L/N Whatever the balance of costs and benefits of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT], there was a significant cost to our soft power in the Senate's rejection of it and the manner of the rejection. Similarly, when we are seen as a bully that extends our laws (for example, on trade with Iran or Cuba) into the jurisdiction of our allies, we also diminish our soft power.
B) Human rights.
Joseph Nye, 2002, Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, p 153
How we behave at home also matters. Amnesty International is overly harsh in its declaration that "today the United States is as frequently an impediment to human rights as it is an advocate;' but by ignoring or refusing to ratify human rights treaties (such as those concerning economic, social, and cultural rights
and discrimination against ',.women), the United States under-cuts our soft power on these issues.
C) Kyoto.
Joseph Nye, winter 2003, Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, p L/N When President Bush announced peremptorily that the Kyoto Protocol on global climate change was dead because it was not in US interests, he essentially squandered US soft power and increased resentment in many parts of the world, particularly in Europe. It led to the United States being voted off the UN Human Rights Commission. If the United States had said instead that
Let me give you two examples from the current US administration. Kyoto was a flawed instrument and had worked for better means of addressing global climate change, it would not have wasted.
3) All of our soft power alt causalities come from Nye who is the preeminent expert on soft power we are by far the most qualified. Their evidence isnt comparative.
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Bing Debate 06-07
**Cant Solve Soft Power Anyway (2 of 2)**

(__) US has no soft power for multiple reasons they cannot overcome.
Philip H. Gordon, Aug 2006, senior fellow @ Brookings, The End of the Bush Revolution, Foreign Affairs 84.4, p proquest
The consequences of the war in
Iraq -- and of other U.S. policies on issues ranging from the Middle East to climate change, prisoner treatment, and
the International Criminal Court (ICC) -- have taken their toll on the United States' popularity in the world and thus on its ability to win over allies. Far from producing the expected "bandwagoning," the exercise of unilateral U.S. power has led to widespread hostility toward
the Bush administration and, in many cases, the United States itself. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, between 2002 and 2005 the percentage of people with a "favorable opinion" of the United States fell from 72 percent to 59 percent in Canada, 63 percent to 43
percent in France, 61 percent to 41 percent in Germany, 61 percent to 38 percent in Indonesia, 25 percent to 21 percent in Jordan, 79 percent to 62 percent in Poland, 61 percent to 52 percent in Russia, 30 percent to 23 percent in Turkey, and 75 percent to 55 percent in the United Kingdom. According to the same polls, the percentage of those who believed that the United States took their country's interests into account was 19 percent in Canada, 18 percent in France, 38 percent in Germany, 59 percent in Indonesia, 17 percent in Jordan, 20 percent in the Netherlands, 13 percent in Poland, 21 percent in Russia, 19 percent in Spain, 14 percent in Turkey, and 32 percent in the United Kingdom. Global support for U.S. policies has never been a prerequisite for U.S. activism, but it sure does not hurt.
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Bing Debate 06-07
Preemption Prevents Prolif/Terror

(__) Preemption is the only choice left to prevent prolif other methods have already failed.
Harry S. Laver, summer 2005, Ph.D. in history from UKentucky & taught military history @ West Point, Parameters 35.2, p 107
Leaving behind the definitions and semantics of international law raises the practical issue of applying a strategy of prevention in a world of WMD, terrorists, and the possible mixing of the two. Professor Jason Ellis, offering one perspective, maintains that preventive action should be part of a broader strategy
of counterproliferation. Past efforts at nonproliferation of WMD, including ballistic missiles, he argues, have failed, and the Bush Administration has adopted a proactive response to the "proliferation-terrorism nexus." By acting "offensively today to preclude the development and delivery of graver threats down the line," the Administration has the best chance of stopping or mitigating the effects of the WMD proliferation that has already occurred. The challenge will be "translating this strategic guidance into credible operational capabilities and plans."
(__) Preemption is the only effective way to prevent WMD prolif and terrorism by addressing undeterables and undetectables.
Charles Krauthaumer, April 2004, IR expert & winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD, p http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf
Now, those uneasy with American power have made these two means of wielding itpreemption and unilateralismthe focus of unrelenting criticism. The doctrine of preemption, in particular, has been widely attacked for violating international norms. What international norm? The one under which Israel was universally condemned even the Reagan administration joined the condemnation at the Security Council for preemptively destroying Iraqs Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981? Does anyone today doubt that it was the right thing to do, both strategically and morally? In a world of terrorists, terrorist states and weapons of mass destruction [WMDs], the option of preemption is especially necessary. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, with a stable nonsuicidal adversary, deterrence could work. Deterrence does not work against people who ache for heaven. It does not work against undeterrables. And it does not work against undetectables: nonsuicidal enemy regimes that might attack through clandestine meansa suitcase nuke or anonymously delivered anthrax. Against both
undeterrables and undetectables, preemption is the only possible strategy. Moreover, the doctrine of preemption against openly hostile states pursuing weapons of mass destruction [WMDs] is an improvement on classical deterrence. Traditionally, we deterred the use of WMDs by the threat of retaliation after wed been attackedand thats too late; the point of preemption is to deter the very acquisition of WMDs in the first place. Whether or not Iraq had large stockpiles of WMDs, the very fact that the United States overthrew a hostile regime that repeatedly refused to come clean on its weapons has had precisely this deterrent effect. We are safer today not just because Saddam is gone, but because Libya and any others contemplating trafficking with WMDs, havefor the first timeseen that it carries a cost, a very high cost.
(__) US preemption is key to enforce norms that prevent WMD prolif. Economist, 6-27-2002, p L/N
The scale of the outrage on September 11th made it inevitable that this would be seen as an act of war rather than mere criminality, and that the response would prove the awesome determination of the American armed forces. Moreover, even before September 11th, there was a strong view in the Bush administration
that the treaties and conventions governing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMDs] had failed. If you needed proof of that, look at Iraq. That view became even more prominent after al-Qaeda's attacks. These norms of good behavior had to be enforced with the threat of military power and even, if necessary, the use of it. Treaties, after all, are not legal documents but political ones; they register commitments made by governments but threaten no sanctions if those commitments are broken or abrogated, apart from disapproval. On this view, the punishment has to be meted out by the American sheriff.
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Bing Debate 06-07
Prolif Impact Extension

(__) WMD prolif is the single greatest threat to world peace and US security.
Charles Krauthammer, Winter 2003, IR expert and winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," THE NATIONAL INTEREST, p L/N THE AMERICAN hegemon has no great power enemies, an historical oddity of the first order. Yet it does face a serious threat to its dominance, indeed to its essential security. It comes from a source even more historically odd: an archipelago of rogue states (some connected with transnational terrorists) wielding weapons of mass destruction[WMDs]. The threat is not trivial. It is the single greatest danger to the United States because, for all of America's dominance, and for all of its recently demonstrated resilience, there is one thing it might not survive: decapitation. The detonation of a dozen nuclear weapons in major American cities, or the spreading of smallpox or anthrax throughout the general population, is an existential threat. It is perhaps the only realistic threat to America as a functioning hegemon, perhaps even to America as a functioning modern society.
It is of course banal to say that modern technology has shrunk the world. But the obvious corollary, that in a shrunken world the divide between regional superpowers and great powers is radically narrowed, is rarely drawn. Missiles shrink distance. Nuclear (or chemical or biological) devices multiply power. Both can be bought at market. Consequently the geopolitical map is irrevocably altered. Fifty years ago, Germany-centrally located, highly industrial and heavily populatedcould pose a threat to world security and to the other great powers. It was inconceivable that a relatively small Middle Eastern state with an almost entirely imported industrial base could do anything more than threaten its neighbors. The central truth of the coming era is that this is no longer the case: relatively small, peripheral
and backward states will be able to emerge rapidly as threats not only to regional, but to world, security.
Like unipolarity, this is historically unique. WMD are not new, nor are rogue states. Their conjunction is. We have had fifty years of experience with nuclear weapons-but in the context of bipolarity, which gave the system a predictable, if perilous, stability. We have just now entered an era in which the capacity for inflicting
mass death, and thus posing a threat both to world peace and to the dominant power, resides in small, peripheral states. What does this conjunction of unique circumstances-unipolarity and the proliferation of terrible weapons-- mean for American foreign policy? That the first and most urgent task is protection from these weapons. The catalyst for this realization was again September 11. Throughout the 1990s, it had been assumed that WMD posed no emergency because traditional concepts of deterrence would hold. September 11 revealed the possibility of future WMD-armed enemies both undeterrable and potentially undetectable. The 9/11 suicide bombers were undeterrable; the author of the subsequent anthrax attacks has proven undetectable. The possible alliance of rogue states with such undeterrables and undetectables-and the possible transfer to them of weapons of mass destruction-presents a new strategic situation that demands a new strategic doctrine.
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Bing Debate 06-07
AT Preemption Will Snowball into Bigger Wars

(__) Unilateral preemption wont snowball into larger conflict because its only applied for specific, pre-flagged situations.
Ivo H. Daalder, 2002, fellow @ Brookings Institute, THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: AN EVALUATION, p http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb109.htm In contrast, the Strategy envisions a much narrower role for preemption. It discusses preemption in the specific context of defeating terrorists and rogue states. It never suggests preemption has a role to play with respect to a rising China or any residual threat posed by Russia. Nor is the argument for preempting terrorists controversial. Law enforcement, covert operations, and intelligence gathering have always sought to preempt terrorist attacks, and such preemptive activities are well-established in international law. Clinton administration
officials partially justified the 1998 cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on preventative grounds. Instead, the debate in the United States has always been about whether the U.S. government is doing enough to stop terrorists preemptively, not whether it has to wait for them to attack before acting.
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Bing Debate 06-07
Treaty Exceptionalism Key to Heg

(__) The doctrine of compliance without ratification is key to maintaining unconstrained global leadership.
Harold Hongju Koh, May 2003, Prof of Interl Law @ Yale Law School & Assis Sec of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001, On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479, p L/N
This third face of American exceptionalism Louis Henkin long ago dubbed "America's flying buttress mentality." Why is it, he asked, that in the cathedral of international human rights, the United States is so often seen as a flying buttress, rather than a pillar, willing to stand outside the structure supporting it, [*1485] but unwilling to subject itself to the critical examination and rules of that structure? The short answer is that compliance without ratification gives a false sense of freedom.
By supporting and following the rules of the international realm most of the time, but always out of a sense of political prudence rather than legal obligation, the United States tries to have it both ways. On the one hand, it enjoys the appearance of compliance. On the other, it maintains the illusion of unfettered sovereignty. It is a bit like the driver who regularly breaks the speed limit but rarely gets a ticket, because he uses radar
detectors, cruise control, ham radios, and similar tricks to stay just this side of the law. He complies, but does not obey, because to obey visibly would mean surrendering his freedom and admitting to constraints, while appearing "free" better serves his self-image than the more sedate label of being law-abiding. n20
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Bing Debate 06-07
UN Bad (1 of 2)
(__) The UN creates a bad framework for global stability it creates and supports tyrannical governments, causes conflict and war, fosters corrupt bureaucracy, and is ineffective in peacekeeping.
Roger Scruton, 6-27-2003, prof of phil @ Birkbeck College in London and Boston U, The United States, the United Nations, and the
Future of the Nation-State, Heritage Lecture #794, p http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/HL794.cfm
We could move around the world, taking stock in this way of the various fragments of defunct empires and the muddled hinterlands where tribal and religious loyalties still take precedence over any political process, and come quickly to the conclusion that the United Nations, as currently constituted, has no real claim to represent the people of our planet. Ambassadors sent to the U.N. are sent by the people who have obtained power, by whatever means, in the territories recognized by that body as sovereign. But the processes that raised these territories to sovereignty often made little or no reference to the historical loyalties of the people who lived there and usually did nothing to guarantee that the rulers of those territories would have any real claim to represent those people or any real interest in doing so. In effect, the U.N. simply legitimizes whatever elites and tyrants have gained power over the particular "nations" named in its list. This doesn't mean that the U.N. has no useful function and cannot serve as a peace-keeping institution. But it does mean that it can also help to perpetuate unpeaceful forms of social order, and therefore in the long run contribute to local and regional conflicts. There is no doubt in my mind that the U.N. granted to the Soviet Union the kind of legitimacy that it could never have acquired through the conduct of its leadership, and enabled it to play a role on the world stage that it could not have played on the strength of its own miserable achievements. The Soviet Union used the U.N. and its ancillary institutions as a front. It supported the capture of the United Nations Association (an independent nonprofit organization which was founded to rally support for the international idea) by the peaceniks and encouraged the transformation of UNESCO into an instrument of leftist and anti-Western propaganda. It did not value the U.N. for its peace-keeping function but, on the contrary, recognized it only as a way to neutralize Western defenses and confer retrospective legitimacy on its own colonial ventures in Ethiopia, Angola, Yemen, and Afghanistan. In short, the U.N. was an integral component, in the Soviet view, of diplomacy as--to invert Clausewitz's famous dictum--war by other means. Likewise, the U.N. has helped the Arab despots to stay in power long after they could have been overthrown in a world that refused to recognize their legitimacy. When Syria can be a member of the Security Council, and when the U.N. Commissioner on Human Rights can be appointed by Colonel Ghaddhafi, even the most resolute defender of the U.N. institutions might begin to wonder whether everything has gone according to plan. Add to such anomalies the well-documented corruption of the U.N. bureaucracy1 and the seeming ineffectiveness or counterproductivity of U.N. resolutions in settling the conflicts of recent decades, and it is understandable that people should have begun to question whether we should go along with an institution whose claim to our respect is founded in so much wishful thinking and so few seeming achievements.
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Bing Debate 06-07
UN Bad (2 of 2)
(__) The UN has outlived its benefits and has become counter-productive new multilateral agreements should take its place.
What should we conclude concerning the future of the U.N.? It has probably outlasted what usefulness it had as a peace-keeping institution. Moreover, it has begun to impose intolerable burdens as old decisions, hardened into law, impact on new problems that they were not designed to solve. Its bureaucracies and subordinate networks are rife with corruption. And the major disputes between nationstates proceed outside its reach. A strong case could therefore be made for its abolition. Multilateral treaties agreed between individual states, securing areas of the globe against war, and guaranteeing mutual aid in times of crisis might be far more effective at doing the work for which the U.N. was designed.
(__) The nation-state notion that the UN forces the nations of the world to conform to justifies colonialism and causes mass genocide.
Because the U.N. was formed in the wake of colonization, and as part of an attempt to decolonize in a peaceful manner, we are forced to treat Nigeria, for example, as a single state and therefore as one among the many "united nations." Yet the country of Nigeria has been settled for centuries by three distinct peoples: the Yoruba, who inhabit the coastline; the Ibo of the internal regions; and the Hausa, who border the desert trade routes. These three groups are divided by territory, by language, and also by religion, the Hausa having been Islamized for a thousand years, acquiring with the religion the language, literature, and civilized ways that divided them starkly from the pagans to the south of them. Some try to understand this situation by contrasting nations with tribes, arguing that the nation is really a European idea, derived from patterns of settlement that are special to our continent and its diaspora, while elsewhere the tribe, conceived as an extended kinship group, is the natural form of social order. There is truth in this suggestion, but it is not the whole truth, as the example of Nigeria illustrates. Neither the Ibo nor the Yoruba see themselves as single tribes, even though there are tribal entities comprised within both groups. The two peoples are distinguished by territory, language, and inherited institutions, just like the nations of Europe. And although they are both now Christian, this is the result of colonization, which has imposed a common jurisdiction, common political institutions, and a single religious faith on people who, until the arrival of the Europeans, regarded each other as aliens. Equally instructive is the case of Rwanda, which existed for centuries as an independent kingdom. The people of Rwanda were divided not according to tribe, but according to function, the dominant minority--the Tutsi--raising cattle while the majority--the Hutu--tilled the land. These people have shared language, institutions, and political allegiance for long enough to constitute a territorial and political unity; but the effect of Belgian rule was to divide the Tutsi from the Hutu and elevate them into an administrative elite while undermining the authority of the Rwandan king and eventually engineering the coup that deposed him. Subsequent massacres of the Tutsi are perceived in the West as the result of tribal antagonisms too deeply rooted to yield to political solutions. In fact, they are the result of importing Western ideologies and class divisions into a society that had long ago risen above any merely tribal idea of membership.
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Bing Debate 06-07
Tax Cuts Trade-Off With Bush Doctrine

(__) Bush tax cuts trade-off with continued use of the Bush Doctrine.
Inescapable signs of serious economic weakness emerged with the collapse of the stock market bubble and were exacerbated by the subsequent return of fiscal insolvency under the impetus of the Bush tax cuts and spending increases. The budget deficit, which was $412 billion in fiscal year 2004, was in nominal terms the largest ever and fell little short, as a percentage of GDP, of the deficits produced by the Reagan tax cuts of 1981. The Bush tax cuts produced a federal tax take of 16.3 percent of
GDP in 2004, but spending remained stubbornly high at 19.8 percent of GDP. "Official projections score the fiscal imbalance at a cumulative $5 trillion over the next decade," writes the economist Fred Bergsten, "but exclude probable increases in overseas military and homeland-security expenditures, extension of the recent tax cuts and new entitlement increases." On current policies, as Bergsten notes, the budget deficit could approach $1 trillion per year. (43) The unwillingness to pay for what it wants and to want only what it is willing to pay for is also apparent from the underfunding of the Bush Doctrine. Two neoconservatives, who insist that "it is impossible to have a Bush Doctrine world with Clinton-era defense budgets," estimate the deficit at $100 billion a year, and it would be undoubtedly larger yet if another major war were to be launched in the next few years. (44)
These constraints should not be misconstrued; they are political, not economic, in character. The experience of the 1990s shows that the structural gap between expenditures and revenues can be overcome without serious cost, and it is in any case difficult to believe that the U.S. economy would tank even if federal tax revenues reached 25 percent of GDP. Still, Bush's sharp reduction in taxes is surely significant. If he is not willing to pay for his own doctrine, who will be? One cannot know how the contradiction between big government expenditures and small government tax revenues is going to be resolved, only that it has to be addressed. Unless Bush reneges on his promises regarding taxes, however, it will inevitably
constrain the substantial increases that neoconservatives believe are necessary to fund the Bush Doctrine. (45)
47

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Bing Debate 06-07 Matt Malia

Unilateralism & Hard Power Good

Bing Debate 06-07