PROTECTION, METERING, MONITORING AND CONTROL OF MEDIUM VOLTAGE POWER SYSTEMS

BRENT K. DUNCAN, P. E. MEMBER, IEEE Siemens Power Transmission & Distribution, Inc Distribution Products Division P.O. Box 29503 Raleigh, NC 27626-0503 USA brent.duncan@.siemens.com Abstract: Traditional practices for industrial and commercial medium voltage power systems to provide protection, metering, monitoring, control, power quality analysis, disturbance recording and automation have changed. The introduction of new multifunction numerical protection relays using the processing power of the present generation of microprocessors, have very high functionality. Many functions can be integrated into one device, allowing new power system problem solving capabilities while permitting significant cost savings as compared with discrete protective relays, instruments, meters, recorders and transducers of the past. This paper describes the vast capabilities and recent enhancements of these devices, which will be called Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) in this paper. Included are anecdotes obtained from an installation on a large industrial power system. Index Terms: Intelligent Electronic Device (IED), numerical, power distribution system protection, power system monitoring, power system metering, power transformer protection, protective relaying BRUCE G. BAILEY LIFE SENIOR MEMBER, IEEE Siemens Power Transmission & Distribution, Inc Apparatus Division (Retired) P.O. Box 29503 Raleigh, NC 27626-0503 USA bbiasicps@ieee.org This paper describes some applications of the available features of todays IEDs on a large industrial power system. II. STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENT ELECTRONIC DEVICES

The typical relay-panel for medium-voltage switchgear before 1980b incorporated single function protective relays, instruments, meters, and control switches, with the associated extensive wiring. In contrast, Fig. 1 shows the functions of a classical relay panel incorporated into one IED. The IED also provides several enhancements such as self and external circuit monitoring, real-time synchronization for event reporting, remote control, and reporting data to the system. The IED may include integral programmable logic controller (PLC) functionality to permit interactive protection schemes. Evolving PC based software tools for settings, metering, commissioning and testing features have added significant value to the new devices. A. Architecture The architecture of an IED defines the ease of use of the device regarding programming, commissioning and maintenance. Software Architecture defines the structure of independent protection, control, metering and communication functions, while the Hardware Architecture defines the adaptability of the hardware to future requirements. Fig. 2 depicts the architecture of an IED in use today. An example of good hardware architecture design is the use of an exchangeable communication module (Fig. 3) for different types of hardware connections (RS-232, RS-485, and fiber-optic) and for different communication protocols (Modbus, Profibus, DNP). Various protocols are required due to the history of IED development by various manufacturers. IEDs evolved before a consensus protocol for the industry could become a standard. Exchangeable communication modules are now available, which protect the value of an investment, and prepare systems for future expansion. By mounting the components on drawout printed circuit boards, access to the pin jumpers is made easy. The printed circuit board access can be done without disconnecting the wires to the terminals on the case, so the relay need not be removed from the panel or switchgear. This saves time, and eliminates the possibility of making a wiring error. With the increasing number of functions, a well-designed IED software-architecture can help engineers evaluate functions, program functions and commission the functions independently. For example, every function can be switched on and off. Thus, all functions except for the function to be

I. INTRODUCTION
The first Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) with microprocessor technology were introduced in the early 1980s. These IEDs started a protective relaying revolution, providing greater functionality, resulting in better problem solving capabilities, a higher level of reliability, and significant cost savings when compared with the traditional set of discrete devices for each function. The focus of the first generation numerical protective relays was to integrate several protective functions of a typical scheme, as well as metering, into one IED. [1] The present generation of IEDs adds many more protective functions, as well as event monitoring/oscillography, enhanced metering and high-speed communication capabilities. Remote control and remote data acquisition are now practical and easy to implement. When combined with user-friendly PC-based software tools to make settings, input-output configuration and fault analysis, the application of these complex IEDs becomes practical. Due to ease of use of the software, and the simple file controlling capability for documentation and reporting purposes, users and consultants have become enthusiastic about the benefits provided. Admittedly, there has been reluctance to install this new technology, this is changing as new generations of computer-literate engineers become responsible for selection of power system protection devices. [2]

0-7803-7771-0/03/$17.00 2003 IEEE.

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tested can be switched off during the commissioning phase. With dedicated inputs, outputs, PLC logic, and its own setting and event reporting features, a protective function is an independent embedded algorithm within an IED. This permits any digital input of the IED to be programmed to any input of a protective function, such as block, or switch on/off. Logic

outputs of protection functions like pickup, trip, and trip coil monitoring can be programmed to any physical output contact, such as alarm outputs, trip outputs, or LEDs. (Fig. 2).

Fig. 1: Functional Overview of a Modern Intelligent Electronic Device

Fig. 2: Architecture of a Power System IED

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Fig. 3: Communication Module

With the new IEDs, it is possible to design specific protection schemes and control sequences. Desired functions can be enabled from a menu, while other functions remain disabled. The user will not even see the settings and inputs/outputs of the functions which have not been enabled. For the commissioning and maintenance personnel, the disabled functions are transparent. Thus, users will focus on the required functions. B. Protection Functions Protection function characteristics are nothing new. They were defined by IEEE Standards based on the characteristics of induction disk relays. The microprocessor based device only emulates the physical behavior of the historical relay. The development of universal distribution system protection relays brings challenges. Multiple protective functions must be specified into one package to meet various users applications within the power distribution system. Options are provided, so that curves can be selected which will be compatible with both upstream and downstream protective devices. This has been achieved in new IEDs which are available for distribution system feeder protection. [3] C. Programmable Logic and Circuit Breaker Control With the integration of programmable logic functions into the IED, external auxiliary devices and even external Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are not necessary. Logical inputs and outputs of protection functions can be connected to AND gates, OR gates or flip-flops to obtain control schemes. In addition, circuit breaker control (Open/Close) can be enhanced with security interlocks. An example of the use of PLC capability is shown in Fig. 4. All of the logic functions required for a Main Tie Main automatic transfer scheme can be provided using the internal PLC. Each Main Circuit Breaker requires an IED for protective functions and metering, and the same IED can provide the PLC functions. This eliminates the use of several external auxiliary relays, timers and wiring, and external PLCs. Testing of the transfer scheme is enhanced, because the IED records the operation, and errors can be quickly eliminated. Fig.5: Programming Graphic Display using PC-Tools
Fig. 4: Use of Internal PLC Functionality for Automatic Transfer Scheme

In some IEDs, the integrated LCD display can be used for text and graphical information, as shown in Fig. 5. With PC Software Tools, the system one line configuration of the bus and circuit breaker, including disconnects, disconnecting switches, and current transformers can be programmed and displayed. Alternatively, symbols for a switchgear application with drawout circuit breaker can be displayed. The LCD display can be switched between text and graphics modes. For example, using the graphics mode, circuit breaker status, and the corresponding values of currents and voltages can be displayed with the system one line diagram. Text mode of the LCD display is used for viewing settings and detailed display of the metering values in primary or secondary units.

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D. Metering & Power Quality Analysis In the early IEDs, metering consisted of only the display of amperes. By providing voltage inputs, voltage based functions as well as calculated energy metering can now be included, with accuracy appropriate for in-plant metering. This eliminates the need for separate meters, yielding significant cost savings and wiring simplification. The metering serves several purposes: Metered values for commissioning and testing Load profile information Energy allocation to each circuit / process Continuous metering The metered rms values include positive, negative and zero sequence currents and voltages, and phase shift between measured values. For example, considering the case of transformer differential protection, phase polarity problems can be solved quickly using phase shift information between the currents of different windings. The availability of calculated differential and restraint values of the currents lead to intuitive understanding of common wiring problems. For many industrial applications, data for internal energy usage is required for better cost analysis of and allocation to different plant divisions and independent processes. While the metering of energy may not be as accurate as revenue metering, which uses high accuracy CTs and meters, it is usually acceptable for internal cost allocation purposes. Power information for system planning is available for resource planning. A typical example is the analysis of circuit loading over time. With the analysis of reactive power requirements, primary system design can be made adaptive to changing load requirements. By combining the internal PLC capability and metering functions within the IED, unique system requirements can be fulfilled. For example, a maximum demand penalty can be avoided by setting kVA and kW demand alarm levels that will initiate shedding of selected loads and/or switching of capacitor banks. E. Communication The communication capability of the new IEDs is a major benefit to the end user. A modern communication concept for an IED family should include the following features: Support of different protocols and bus structures, flexible and open communication architecture PC-communication port for Human-Machine Interface (HMI) Substation Integration/Automation port Direct Communication port to a second IED for protection Communication port for service Nothing is more important than open protocol architecture! A major step is the introduction of plug-in communication modules, (Fig. 3) which can be replaced in the field, if communication requirements change. Protocols like Modbus RTU, Modbus ASCII, DNP 3.0, Profibus (Fig. 6) and IEC 60870-5 are accepted communication protocols worldwide. Also, UCA-2 protocol may possibly be accepted as a standard in the US and Canadian markets. The feature of

exchangeable communication modules in the IEDs will protect the value of the investment until a worldwide standard protocol is adopted. If the plant decides to change the initial protocol, the IEDs can adapt by only replacing their communication modules.(Fig.3)

Fig. 6 Field Bus Architecture

The communication port for direct PC connection using the interface software is a standard RS-232 port. It is used to download settings and configuration data from a PC to the IED in the field, and also for local access to event reports and waveform capture buffers. The Substation Integration & Automation (SCADA) port is either an electrical (RS-232 or RS-485) or a fiber-optic communication channel, depending on the network architecture [4]. If remote access to the IEDs is desired, an independent communication port is an option. By connecting with a MODEM, remote access from office or home is possible, using the interface software shown in Fig. 1. F. Self-Monitoring and External Circuit Monitoring One major concern of users during the introduction of microprocessor-based devices was reliability. Users were concerned about putting all their eggs in one basket and losing all protection if an all-in-one electronic box malfunctions. This concern would have validity if the IEDs used technology of the past, and only replicated the functionality of single function relays. However, because IEDs use numerical (digital) technology, reduce internal analog components, include added functions, and provide advanced self-monitoring technology, these concerns are overcome. Field experience has proven this [9]. Self-monitoring programs can detect up to 98% of all IED-internal hardware and software problems, such as memory failure, microprocessor failure, and power supply condition. In addition, monitoring of external inputs, outputs, circuits, condition of dc power supply and circuit breaker components further extends the scope of protection. External circuit monitoring can include circuit breaker coil monitoring to detect

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an interrupt in both the trip and close paths. Also, voltage symmetry and current symmetry analysis can indicate VT and CT connection failures. Fig. 7 depicts an example of current sum monitoring. Using the sampled values of the phase currents, the calculated 3Io = IA+IB+IC is compared with the sampled 3Io current of the ground path. Under normal conditions, both currents are exactly the same. In case of an error in the IED-analog path (CT-short circuit, anti-aliasing filter, Sample & Hold, A/Dconverter failure), there will be a deviation between the calculated and measured zero sequence current. In this case, the IED can be programmed to block the protection modules, and send an alarm. One multifunction device which reports information about its condition can be more reliable and secure than a dozen devices which have no way of warning on line that they are defective. An I&CPS working group report has shown that protective relay IEDs of most manufactures are similar, and have the capabilities just described:[5]

Fig. 8: Configuration-Settings of an IED with Distribution Feeder Protection Functionality

Fig. 7: Monitoring of the Current Path G. Programming Software The programming software is the key-factor for increased efficiency for planning, programming, commissioning and testing of an IED. Settings, I/O programming, functional configuration and programmable logic functions can best be handled with an intuitive, easy-to-use PC program. With a PC or Notebook, the IEDs can be configured through one of the communication interfaces, and fault data can be extracted and visualized. Due to the high functionality and flexibility, a userfriendly IED should come with factory presettings, and the commissioning engineer should not need to change more than 20% of the default settings. Experience has shown that the efficiency of commissioning personnel increases when the instructions use self-explaining graphics supplemented with minimal plain text. Fig. 8 provides configuration settings of an IED with distribution feeder protection functionality. H. Features & Tools for Commissioning and Maintenance IEDs with internal tools can significantly reduce the testing and commissioning time. These tools can help commissioning engineers do their jobs precisely and quickly, while also documenting all parameters accurately, with time stamp. The time savings achieved depend on the training and experience of the commissioning engineer. Fig. 9 depicts an example of a menu window for commissioning and testing. Fig.9: Graphical User Interface Menu Example 1. Secondary injection testing of overcurrent functions has been necessary in the past, in order to calibrate the elements. With numerical IEDs, calibration is not necessary or possible. However, secondary current injection is still required by many users, to verify the programmed pickup, timing, output contacts, and settings. The test data will

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be captured in the logs, and can be printed out for the permanent file. Example 2: A test program can be customized to speed the functional testing of the more complex relays. This can be helpful if the IEDs include protective functions in addition to overcurrent (50, 51, 50N, 51N 50G, 51G), and/or multiple setting groups, internal logic schemes, multiple output and input contacts and trip coil monitoring. These extended capabilities must be tested or checked as part of the initial commissioning, in accordance with the manufacturers instruction manuals. [6] [7] Example 3: Phase polarity problems during commissioning of a transformer differential relay can be easily detected. The waveform capture buffer can be started using the keypad of the IED, and the original waveform of the transformer primary currents can be recorded. A short analysis in vector notation leads to correction of the phase polarity problem. Example 4: Corrective rather than periodic maintenance of numerical relays can be practiced. The associated system downtime needed for testing can be reduced. If the relay signals a failure, either the whole relay or a module in the relay must be replaced. Numerical relays continually monitor their own hardware and software. Exhaustive self-monitoring routines are carried out from current transformer circuits to trip coils. IEDs which are disabled due to loss of control power or a broken wire, faults in the CTs or wires will be immediately reported. If the installation includes communications so that the alarm will be responded to, service is only needed to make corrective action upon its occurrence. I. Features & Tools for Event Recording and Fault Analysis A detailed fault analysis with electromechanical relays was only possible by the installation of additional expensive fault recorders. Due to the nature of electromechanical relays without memory capabilities, a detailed reconstruction of the fault event was very complicated. With the first generation of microprocessor-based IEDs, basic event reporting was introduced. Today, event reporting and waveform capture analysis is a common capability of numerical IEDs. A modern IED should fulfill the following for a detailed, convenient and reliable fault analysis: All event reports and waveform capture data should be saved in nonvolatile memory. There should be a clear distinction between fault-or disturbance related event reports, (such as pickup and trip) and non-fault related events (such as change of settings, reception of data at digital inputs and communication ports). Non-fault events are considered general events. Events must be time-stamped, with a reference to a realtime clock. Synchronization of all real-time clocks is required to obtain sequential event operation. PC-tools for event data and waveform capture should reduce A. the fault analysis time up to 90%. Also, data file organization support is required by the program. With the features above, a fault analysis will also be convenient and possible even if the fault causes a complete blackout in the substation. The data saved in the IEDs can be downloaded to PCs for further

detailed analysis, such as comparison of event logs of IEDs in different locations for the same event.

III. POWER SYSTEM CONTROL

With growing numbers of installed IEDs on a plant power system, the user can realize the cost-saving potential and operating advantages of power system control and automation.[8] A recent cement mill power system installation can be used to demonstrate the value of power distribution system control and automation, as well as some unexpected benefits. The existing cement mill system has one service from the tie from a power company. To support an expansion to increased production of cement, a new power company service at 138kV was provided, and two 60MVA power transformers (connected in delta wye) were installed to step down to 35kV. The 2 - 60MVA transformers feed one lineup of 35kV outdoor substation switchgear that includes two transformer secondary circuit breakers, and a normally closed bus tie circuit breaker. One of the buses also has a main circuit breaker for the existing power company 35kV service. Each switchgear bus has two outgoing feeders to transformers supplying the old 4.16kV system, and one feeder to new 35kV distribution switchgear. The new distribution bus switchgear feeds several large variable speed drives at 35kV, as well as several new 10MVA, 35kV delta 4.16kV wye substations. These substations each include one or two 4.16kv Main circuit breakers, a Tie circuit breaker when applicable, (normally closed), and a number of latched contactors feeding motors and 480 volt substations. All circuit breakers and latched contactors include protection IEDs, so that the entire new system has the same hardware. As part of the mill expansion, cement mill process automation has been employed with a pre-engineered PLC system using Profibus DP protocol. During the conceptual stage it was decided to integrate the power distribution system into the same platform, to provide a central processor for power system metering and monitoring and to provide trip and event alarms. The first plan was to use digital power meters running Profibus DP to supply the power system data. After learning that protection IEDs are available which can provide the metering as well as the protective and alarm functions, it was decided to use the numerical protection IEDs for all 138kV, 35kV and 4.16kV protection applications, and communicate data from each IED over RS-485 or fiber optic cable to the cement mill process automation system. The electrical engineer now has a dedicated PLC and workstation which allows him to monitor and control the entire system, from 138kV to 480 Volts. During commissioning and startup, there were unusual conditions which the IEDs detected, which helped to avoid possible disasters. The following anecdotes describe some of these: A. In preparation for transferring the mill from the old power company 35 kV service to the new one, the mill project engineer programmed some temporary settings for the protection IEDs on the old 35 kV Main Breaker M1 and transformer secondary main circuit breakersT1 and T2. (Fig. 10) The directional overcurrent function for each phase and ground element (IEEE device 67/67N) was set to pickup at 40

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amperes of primary current, with considerable time delay. An LED was programmed for each phase and ground, so that they would indicate pickup as long as the condition persisted. When the new source was paralleled with the old source, (circuit breakers M1 and T1 closed) and the project engineer walked into the equipment room, and saw that the LED was lit on B phase of T1. This indicated there was current flowing into the mill in only two phases from the new system! A search was started for an open phase in the 35kV cement mill circuits. All cable terminations were secure. Eventually, the power company metering (PCM) cabinet containing the 38kV bar type metering CTs and VTs was opened. It was discovered that the bolted connection one end of the B phase metering CT primary was not connected, resulting in an open circuit! Had the relay not detected this, and corrective action take before opening the existing 35kV service breaker, the entire cement mill would have been single phased! The power company engineer commented; you folks must have a pretty smart relay. Our upstream relaying did not detect the open phase condition.

Fig. 11A: Oscillography during motor starting The figure also shows that the relay picked-up and later reset because of current flowing for a few cycles in the residual circuit of the current transformers. This suggests that a ground fault occurs during each start of the motor, and the ground fault element 50N/51N detected it. However, this current was actually produced because of additive harmonics in the starting current. To better understand this, the scale of the residual current data was increased, with the results shown in Fig. 11B.

PCM B PHASE OPEN

M1
CLOSED

T1
CLOSED 35 kV BUS 1 35 kV BUS 2

BT 1-2

Fig. 10: One Line Diagram B. An old 3500 HP synchronous motor driving a Finish Ball Mill was connected to one of the new 4160V buses via the original full voltage motor starter. Starting this motor had always caused a voltage dip which dimmed the lights for several seconds. The same dip was exhibited during starting after connecting to the new bus. In fact, it caused the IED relay on the backup Feeder Breaker to go into pickup, which triggered its oscillography. This gave a good picture of the stator current on start, as shown in Fig. 11A. The oscillography shows oscillations in the phase waveforms. Rotating a loaded ball mill requires a lot of torque until the charge starts to tumble freely. As the mill comes up to speed, torsional distortion may occur when the shaft reaches a resonant point. This can produce load oscillations that backfeed into the power system.

Fig. 11B: Oscillography with Scale Enhanced

A second identical 3500 HP motor was commissioned a few months after the first one, and similar oscillations were noted. The wave forms were compared using the peak-peak values, and they were similar, except that no residual current was present. When investigations found no electrical cause for the residual current when starting the first motor, the bearings were examined, and one is now being changed.

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C. Trip coil monitoring (IEEE function 74) was implemented on all of the IED relays, at negligible cost. The scheme using two binary inputs was selected, this monitors the trip circuit and trip coil of the circuit breaker in both the closed and open position. An alarm signal occurs whenever an open circuit occurs. Since commissioning, there have been no trip coil or circuit failures. However, it is comforting to know that this important protection is in place. D. The cement mill practice prior to the expansion project was to manually record power and energy readings for all medium voltage circuits, clip board style. This was provided to the accounting department on a monthly basis. With the implementation of cement mill expansion and power system automation, selected metered data for nearly 200 points is communicated over the RS-485 shielded twisted pair and/or fiber optic communication buses to a work station dedicated to the electrical power system. The data is now communicated to accounting monthly by the push of a button. This data is also useful to engineering for management of the power system.

[2] David S. Baker, et al, Application Considerations of Static Overcurrent Relays A Working Group Report, Conference Record 1997 IEEE Industrial & Commercial Power Systems Technical Conference, 97CH36040, p. 169-176. [3] Protection Systems Using Siemens publication SIP 2002. Numerical Protection Relays,

[4] Douglas Proudfoot and Dave Taylor, Distributed Information Management Systems How to Turn a Substation into a Database Server, SAAP-0014A 0999 [5] IEEE Industrial & Commercial Power Systems Dept. Working Group Report, Chuck Mozina, Chair, Testing and Commissioning of Multi-function Digital Relays. [6] James R. Closson and Michael W. Young, Commissioning Numerical Relays, Fifty-Fourth Annual Conference for Protective Relay Engineers, Texas A&M University College Station, Texas. [7] Wei-Jen Lee, Beyond the Normal Testing Procedure A Closer Look at the Microcomputer Based Relay, Conference Record 1997 IEEE Industrial & Commercial Power Systems Technical Conference, 97CH36040, p. 148-153. [8] Kenneth E. Nicholson, Richard L. Doughty, Luan Mane, Gregory Miranda, and Frank D. Pulaski, Cost Effective Power Management Systems IEEE Industry Applications Magazine, March/April 2000, p. 23-33. [9] Gerald F. Johnson, Reliability Considerations of Multifunction Protection IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, November/December 2002, Volume 38 Number 6 p. 1688-1700. Brent K. Duncan (M91) was born in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada in 1962. He graduated from the Electrical Engineering program of the University of New Brunswick in 1988 with a BSc-EE degree. In November of that year he joined Siemens Canada Ltd. as a Project Engineer. In 1993 he moved to the Protection and Control department as an Application Engineer. From 1996 to 1998 he reported as the Product Marketing Manager. From 1998 to present he has resided in Raleigh, North Carolina, and works in Power Transmission & Distribution as Senior Application Engineer in Protective Relays. Bruce G. Bailey (M55)(SM97)(LSM97), was born in Newport, Vermont, and received the BSEE degree from the University of Vermont in Burlington in 1954. He joined Allis-Chalmers, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin the same year. After 18 months on a graduate-training program, (interrupted by 18 months active duty in the U. S. Air Force), he joined the switchgear department of Allis-Chalmers. Bruce remained with the company as it became Siemens-Allis and is currently Siemens Power Transmission & Distribution, Inc. located in Raleigh, NC. He worked as an application engineer and application engineering manager for switchgear and substation products, including the associated instrumentation and protective relaying. He retired in June, 2001. Shortly after attending his first I&CPS conference, he assisted in preparation of the Ground Fault Protection Chapter of the original (1972) Edition of the IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, (Buff Book) ANSI/IEEE Std 242. Since then, he has been on various Protection Committee subcommittees and working groups associated with the preparation of the IEEE Recommended Practices for Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, including the Buff Book, Gray Book and Red Book and Blue Book.

V. CONCLUSION
Todays IEDs are now specified for most new medium voltage industrial power system projects, because of their multiple advantages: Integration of many functions into one numerical relay, resulting in lower cost, less wiring and testing, and reduced panel space Minimal maintenance/testing, due to integral selfmonitoring Drift (aging) of characteristics eliminated by fully digital processing Integrated add-on functions, such as load-monitoring and event/fault recording, and oscillography HMI for local keypad operation, with large LCD display to show settings, metering, event data and graphics Uploading and downloading of data and logs using a PC Communication ready, if a serial interface to a local or remote PC is implemented As a result, the use of Induction disc and static (solid state) discrete relays, meters and instruments has greatly diminished, and many existing installations have been retrofitted with new protection IEDs. To achieve these advantages, industrial plants must invest in their personnel to obtain the maximum benefit from the investment which has been made in the tools provided by the protection IEDs. Highly skilled and well-trained personnel will help keep the system running, clear system faults in a very short time and maintain the components in the proper manner to assure continuous power to the process.

REFERENCES
[1]
IEEE Std 242-2001, IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems

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