Individual Properties in Aristotle's "Categories" Author(s): R. E. Allen Source: Phronesis, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1969), pp.

31-39 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181823 . Accessed: 17/02/2011 12:02
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

http://www.jstor.org

Categories in Properties Aristotle's Individual

R. E. ALLEN

1. At Categories 1 a 23-29,1 Aristotle marks off a set of items which are present in but not predicable of a subject. Thus, for example, a
certain knowledge

the soul, and a certain white (-ro4i Xeux6v) present in a subject, the body; but neither is predicable of a subject. Such items are not predicable of a subject because they are particular or individual: ' -q ypOC[Lrxvnx and ro' rt ??ux6'v parallel o -d' &Avpmroq and 6o '7tro4 (lb4), which mean, respectively, 'a particular man' and rL Ia particular horse'; and Aristotle, after remarking that nothing prevents what is individual and one in number from being present in a subject (lb 7-8), cites as his example a certain knowledge of grammar. But what is individual and one in number is not predicable of a subject (lb6-7). However, not everything present in a subject is individual and one in number, for some things present in a subject are also prethus for example knowledge is in a dicable of a subject (la29-lb3); subject, the soul, and predicable of a subject, knowledge of grammar. These two sets of items, what is both predicable of and present in a subject, and what is present in but not predicable of a subject, correspond, respectively, to the genera or species of individuals in categories other than substance,2 and to the individuals themselves.3 What is present in a subject as individual and one in number is incapable of existing apart from the particular subject it is in; for at 1 a 24-25, Aristotle defines presence as follows: "By present in a subject I mean what is in something, not as a part, but as incapable of existing separately from what it is in." It would seem to follow from this that an item present in an individual subject is itself individual, and numerically distinct from items present in other individual subjects. Suppose this is so. Then if there are two pieces of chalk, A and B,
1
2

of grammar

(7 't ypo Cp-,urtxJ)

is present in a subject,

Line numbers cited from the Oxford text of L. Minio-Paluello. See 2a 27-34, 3a 14-17, and Topics 103b 20-34. 3 For discussion, see J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford, 1963, p. 74. I should like to acknowledge my debt in what follows to Professor Ackrill's valuable translation and notes.

31

and if they are of the same determinate shade of color, say, white, there will be a particular instance of white in A and a particular instance of white in B. Call those instances respectively s and t. Then s and t are the same in that they are instances of the same shade of color. But they are different in that they are themselves numerically different individuals, and this difference is to be explained by the fact that they are present in numerically different subjects: s is the white of A, and t is the white of B. Thus s and t are different members of the same species, the given shade of white, in a way precisely analogous to the way in in which A and B are members of the same species, chalk. This situation will obtain generally in categories other than substance; that is, it will obtain, not only for qualities such as colors, but for sizes, shapes, places, times, and so on for any items present in but not predicable of a subject. 2. At least in outline, the foregoing interpretation of particular properties in the Categories has been widely accepted.4 But it has recently been challenged by Professor Owen., Professor Owen agrees that items present in but not predicable of a subject are particular or individual, but holds that they are particular in being determinate in kind - in being, for example, particular shades of color, or particular sizes and shapes, and so forth. He therefore hold that the same individual property may be found in many subjects (p. 99):
To say that (a particular shade of pink) is a particular colour is to say that it, or its name, cannot be predicated: it is not to say that it cannot be found in more than one subject. Any particular shade of colour is of course reproducible. Any bit of linguistic knowledge can of course lodge in more than one head. Aristotle does not for a moment contemplate denying this. His commentators saddle him with the denial.

Specific identity in categories other than substance, then, implies numerical identity: given two pieces of chalk, A and B, and given that A and B are of exactly the same shade of white, then the white in A is one and the same as the white in B. This has been doubted, Professor
' See, for example: W. D. Ross, Aristotle, London, 1923, p. 24, n. 1; G. E. M. Anscombe, Three Philosophers, Oxford, 1963, pp. 8-10; J. L. Ackrill, op. cit., pp. 74-75; K. von Fritz, Phronesis ii (1958), pp. 72-3. 6 G. E. L. Owen, "Inherence", Phronesis x (1965), pp. 97-105.

32

Owen believes, only because Categories1 a 24-25 has been misunderstood (p. 104):
Aristotle says: "By 'in a subject' I mean what (a) is in something not as a part, (b) cannot exist separately from what it is in" ... Commentators hasten to supply the concrete instance: there is some colour in Socrates, so condition (b) must be read as requiring that that colour cannot exist apart from Socrates. That is, to use a handbook idiom, they read both (a) and (b) as governed by the same quantifier: if Z is in some subject, in the prescribed sense of 'in', there is an x such that Z is in x and Z is no part of x and Z cannot exist apart from x. But, condensed as Aristotle's formula is, it is open to another interpretation. It can indeed be read as saying, "Z is in something ... and Z could not exist without this thing to contain it", and Z but it can equally well be read as saying, "Z is in something... could not exist without something to contain it." That is, the phrase 'separately from what it is in' can be taken generally.

And Professor Owen supposes that because la24-25 can be taken generally, it should be. 3. His reason for supposing this is that he believes that the more usual account - or dogma, as he calls it - concerning particular properties in the Categoriesis incoherent. Unfortunately, his demonstration of this is likely to leave friends of the dogma unmoved. There is, for example, the objection which Professor Owen calls 'the paradox of the breakdown of categories' (p. 101):
The dogma says that each particular item in categories other than substance must be identified as the such-and-such quality (or quantity or whatever) of so-and-so. The consequence is that members of the subordinate categories are seconded in one sweep to the category of relative terms ... At any rate they satisfy Aristotle's criteria for relatives . .. quite as well as his own examples (8a 35-8b 15).

This argument, however, fails to distinguish 'dependent upon' from 'relative to', and it ignores the fact that dependence, in the Categories, is used as a syncategorematic notion, while relation is, of course, a category. But quite apart from this, those who think that a given instance of a property must be a relative may reflect on why Aristotle denies that head and hand are relatives. (8bl5ff.) Head and hand are not relatives because we can identify something as a head or hand without being able to say whose head or hand it is, though of course we know that it is the head or hand of some particular man. In just 33

the same way, surely, we can identify something as an instance of white without be able to say whose particular instance it is, though of course we know that it is the white in some particular thing. As we can say that there is one and only one x such that this is the head of x, so we can say that there is one and only one x such that this is the white in x, though we may in neither case be able to identify that x as distinct from other xes. But Aristotle understands by a relative a comparative term such as 'more beautiful than' or 'double of', and he claims of terms such as these that, "anyone who knows any relative definitely must know definitely that also in relation to which it is spoken of" (8b14-15, trans. Ackrill). Instances of properties, then, do not satisfy Aristotle's criterion for a relative any more than lheads and hands do, because it is not necessary, in order to identify something as a particular instance of a property, to identify the particular substance it is in. Nor do instances of properties satisfy the weaker, because more general, criterion for a relative offered at 6a36-b10: "We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else." But particular properties are not of, than, or in relation to (7tp6q)something else: they are in something else, and 'in', is not by Aristotle's test a relative. Then there is the objection which Professor Owen calls 'the paradox of implication' (p. 101):
If X is an individual, the statement that a particular Y (say a particular colour) is in X will not entail but actually preclude saying that Y without qualification is in X. You ask what colour there is in Socrates' body: I reply meticulously 'Socrates' pink' . . . If I say 'The colour in Socrates' body is pink', the dogma rules out what I say as ill-formed.

But the dogma in fact implies that 'the color in Socrates' body' and 'Socrates' pink' are referring expressions which index the same item, and that pink is a species or genus of the item so indexed. So 'the color in Socrates' body is Socrates' pink' is an identity statement, and 'The color in Socrates' body is pink' is a (well-formed) predicative statement. The paradox, on examination, vanishes.6
The dogma does indeed imply that the species pink cannot, in the technical sense, be either in Socrates or the pink in Socrates, since it can exist apart from the former, and is presumably predicable in name and definition of the latter. But then, no one would suppose that "The color in Socrates' body is pink" is equivalent to or implies "The species pink is in, and incapable of existing apart
6

34

Professor Owen's strongest argument is this. The dogma implies that the species and genera of instances of properties cannot be present in the individuals in which those instances are present; for the species and genera of instances, unlike the instances themselves, can exist apart from those individuals. But Professor Owen points to 2bl-3 as a violation of that rule, since Aristotle there remarks that "color is in body, consequently it is in a particular body; for if it were not in any of the individuals it would not be in body at all." Since 'color' here presumably refers to the genus, it would seem that Aristotle thought that genera, and by implication species, can be in individual substances after all. But there is another possibility. It is that the 'in' here is not the technical 'in' of presence, but an 'in' derived from it: why should not Aristotle assume that if S is predicable of x, and x is present in y, S is in y? The sense of 'in' here differs between its first and second occurrences, but the senses are related, in that the first must obtain if the second is assertible. This fits the argument of which 2bl-3 is a premise, for Aristotle is there maintaining (2a34-2b6C), among other things, that if there were not substances which are colored, there would be no color. It is perhaps too strong to describe Aristotle's use of 'in' here as careless, though it is certainly compressed:7 but then, philosophers have a right to a certain freedom of expression, so long as it does not obscure their arguments; and this particular argument is not obscure. For another example of compression, consider Aristotle's remark that the white which is present in a subject is assertible of that subject (2a31-32), a statement which taken literally is false, but which means, as the more precise account of 3 a 15-17 indicates, that the name 'white' is assertible of that subject in which the instance of white is present. 4. Professor Owen translates 1a25,
a&avxrov ywptc tvoat roi
?v

from, Socrates' body". To suppose this, one must first collapse the distinction between species and instances of species which the dogma insists on. It is thus the more difficult to understand why Professor Owen thinks the following a criticism of the dogma: "Perhaps, indeed, it is when the dogma is extended to other categories that it becomes a joke: so that two things cannot be said to have the same particular size when they are both six feet tall, or cannot be said to occupy the same particular place at different times" (p. 102). The dogma, of course, would suppose that 'a particular size' is ambiguous as between a particular instance of size (which no two things can share) and a particular species of size (which many things can share). Where is the joke? 7 Cf. Ackrill, op.cit., p. 83.

35

as CartLv (b) "cannot exist separately from what it is in." And he supposes that (b) means, or may mean, (b') "cannot exist without something to contain it." But it cannot mean this, for (b) and (b') are

not equivalent. It follows from the fact that Z cannot exist separately from what it is in that Z cannot exist without something to contain it. So (b') is implied by (b). But it does not follow from the fact that Z cannot exist without something to contain it that it cannot exist
separately from what it is in - it might pick up and go elsewhere, existing happily the while. So (b) is not implied by (b'). Professor Owen's interpretation, therefore, identifies what is meant by 1 a 24-25

with something which is implied by what is meant and is weaker than what is meant.8 It is a consequence of this that Professor Owen's interpretation requires a further relation supervening on presence and predicability. Suppose that Z is in x. Then Z is not predicableof x, and by Professor Owen's account, Z cannot exist apart from something. But these conlditions obtain whether or not Z is in x, since if Z is not in y, Z is not predicable of y and Z cannot exist apart from something. So presence and impredicability are necessary but not sufficient conditions for Z being in x, and therefore, if Z is in x, some further relation than presence and impredicability must obtain between x and Z. There is not the slightest sign of such a relation in Aristotle's text, which treats the division between presence and predicability as exhaustive.9
8 Notice that this difficulty arises, not from the dogma's interpretation of 1 a 25, but from Professor Owen's own translation of it - a translation which is surely correct. 9 Perhaps such a relation might he conjured out of IV tLVLin 1 a 24: the ground for saying that Z is in x in the technical Aristotelian sense will be that Z is in x in some other sense, presumably the ordinary language sense suggested by Professor Ackrill, e.g., 'heat in the water', 'courage in Socrates', This makes the assertion of the ordinary 'in' a condition for the assertion of the technical 'in'. (Ackrill, op.cit., p. 74) There are a variety of reasons for supposing that this view is incorrect; not the least of them is that Aristotle means to assert his 'in' through all the categories, whereas the relevant ordinary language 'in', though it applies with abstracts in the category of quality, does not in general apply to quantities, relatives, places, times, and so on - partly, no doubt, because there are usually no ordinary language abstracts which fit these categories. So it is doubtful that the ordinary language 'in,' or such congeners as Professor Ackrill suggests for it, is required for the assertion of the technical 'in.' But, if it is required, the technical 'in' is equally required for it: for if the scheme of the Categories is correct, the condition under which it will be true to say that there is courage

36

There is a further consequence of Professor Owen's interpretation: it collapses the division most basic to the scheme of the Categories, the distinction between presence and predicability. Some things, Aristotle says, are predicable of a subject but not present in a subject (la2-22); but if primary substances did not exist, neither what is present in a subject nor what is predicable of a subject would exist (2a34-2b6C). Therefore,what is predicableof a subject but not present in a subject satisfies ProfessorOwen'srule for being present in a subject, since it is not present in a subject as a part, and cannot exist separately from some subject.10But the claim that some things are predicableof but not present in a subject is central to Aristotle's account of substance. (Cf. 2a19-33, 3a7-21.) A further difficulty. Professor Owen's particular properties in categories other than substance are in fact universals. They are particular or &rotmc the sense that they are kto[Laet&n,determinants in rather than determinables, infimae species rather than subaltern in genera. Now, Aristotle does use the word &rop?ov this way;" but he in would not have supposed that things which are &toliov this way are one in number (tv 4pLOtLi), nor that individual men and horses (as distinct from the species man and horse) are in this way &'ToVov.12 are Yet, when he says that things which are 6to[Lovand gv mpLO.CpL not predicable of a subject (lb6-7), he means both that individual properties and that individual men and horses are not predicable of a subject. He is not, therefore, using &rotovin the sense required by ProfessorOwen'sinterpretation. A final point. Professor Owen's assumption that the same universal can be present in many subjects makes the scheme of the Categories prey to an Academic argument Aristotle knew well. That argument is the Dilemma of Participation, first formulated by Plato in the Parmenides (131a-c), and mentioned again in the Philebus (15b-c) as a notorious crux. In outline, the Dilemma is this: suppose that one characteristicis in many things. Then it will either be in each of those
in Socrates in the ordinary sense is precisely that there is courage in Socrates in the technical sense: the ordinary 'in' used to explicate the technical 'in' itself requires the technical 'in' as part of its explication. If, therefore, the criterion for presence is construed, not as inability to exist without some subject, but as inability to exist without being in some subject, the account is circular. 10 This criticism could he blunted if one could establish an 'in' distinct from the technical 'in' to serve as a foundation for it. It is doubtful (if the preceding note has any force) that this can succeed. I E.g. at Metaphysics V 1018b 6, VII 1034a 8. 1 See W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, vol. i., Oxford, 1924, p. 224.

37

things as a whole, or parts of it will be in each. If the former, "then what is one and the same will be present, at the same time and as a whole, in many things, and therefore, it will be separate from itself" (Parm. 131bl-2). If the latter, "then characteristics themselves are actually divided, and the things which partake of them partake of parts of them. . . (But we cannot say) that we can really divide one characteristic, and that it will still be one" (Parm. 131 c5-10). Aristotle's account in the Categories is so formulated as to provide a solution to this dilemma, a dilemma which his choice of vocabulary proves that he had clearly in mind; for why else should he have used the term O`ropLov, which literally means 'indivisible', to mean 'individual', and explained that the individual is impredicable? In the category of substance, the dilemma is solved in two ways: the species and genera predicable of substance are not in it, and since they are neither individual nor one in number the question of whether they are predicated as wholes or by parts does not arise. Nor, if the dogma Professor Owen criticises is true, does the dilemma apply in categories other than substance: for then what is in substance will be indivisible in the sense that it will not be found in more than one substance, and the species and genera of what is in substance will not themselves (in the technical sense) be in substance, nor in that of which they are predicated; and once again, since they are neither individual nor one in number, the question of whether they are predicated as wholes or parts will not arise. But if, as Professor Owen's account has it, what is present in substance is individual, numerically one, and present in many substances, the Dilemma of Participation applies in precisely the terms in which it is stated. Postscript Professor Owen's interpretation has the virtue of simplifying the ontology of the Categories by doing away with the cloud of particulars that most readers have found in categories other than substance. A world which can dispense with these extraneous particulars is a neater, and therefore a better world than one which cannot: entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. Supposing that Professor Owen's interpretation is mistaken, it remains worth asking why Aristotle should have been led to multiply particulars with so lavish a hand. He multiplied them because he supposed that predication, in its essential nature, is specific: to predicate is to say what a thinig is, 38

to answer the question n' ear'L- in short, to predicate a species, or less informatively a genus, of an individual. Behind this logical assumption lay two others which are broadly ontological: that species and genera can exist only if they have individual instances; and that species and genera are exclusive, in that no individual instance of one can be an instance of another. The species dog would not exist if there were no dogs, and no dog is a horse. Assuming that predication is essentially specific, Aristotle had to account for the fact that much predication is not specific. It is good to know that Socrates is a man or an animal. But it is often better - or at least more interesting - to know where he is, or what he is doing, or any of a variety of other things which do not directly indicate what he is, that is, indicate his genus or species. If predication is by nature specific, how are such predications as these to be explained? They may be explained if we extend the notion of specific predication beyond those natural kinds to which it naturally applies, and attempt to fit it to categories other than substance, where it less naturally applies.'3 But if there are species in categories other than substance, there must also be individual instances of those species; those instances will not run loose about the world, but be tied to primary substances as incapable of existing apart from them. Because of their tie, they will explain how things can be said non-specifically of primary substances: the substance will be named for what is in it. To say that Socrates is a man, then, is to say what he is; to say that he is just, or grammatical, is to say not what he is but what is in him. If Socrates is just, there is an individual instance of justice in Socrates - in him as incapable of existing apart from him. Because that instance is individual and one in number, it cannot be predicated of him; what can be predicated of him is the name of its species, or a paronym of that name. But it is the conjunction of Socrates and the justice in Socrates, of a separable and an inseparable individual, which is the fact which forms the truth-condition of the statement that Socrates is just. University of Toronto

18

See Topics 103b 20-34.

39