Kurt Zadek Lewin (September 9, 1890 - February 12, 1947) was a German-American psychologist, known as one of the modern

pioneers of social, organizational, and applied psychology.[1] Lewin (pronounced /lvin/ l-VEEN) is often recognized as the "founder of social psychology" and was one of the first to study group dynamics and organizational development.

Biography
In 1890, he was born into a Jewish family in Mogilno, Poland (then in County of Mogilno, province of Posen, Prussia). He was one of four children born into a middleclass family. His father owned a small general store and a farm.[2] The family moved to Berlin in 1905. In 1909, he entered the University of Freiburg to study medicine, but transferred to University of Munich to study biology. He became involved with the socialist movement and women's rights around this time.[2] He served in the German army when World War I began. Due to a war wound, he returned to the University of Berlin to complete his Ph.D., with Carl Stumpf (18481936) the supervisor of his doctoral thesis. Lewin had originally been involved with schools of behavioral psychology before changing directions in research and undertaking work with psychologists of the Gestalt school of psychology, including Max Wertheimer and Wolfgang Kohler. He also joined the Psychological Institute of the University of Berlin where he lectured and gave seminars on both philosophy and psychology[2]. Lewin often associated with the early Frankfurt School, originated by an influential group of largely Jewish Marxists at the Institute for Social Research in Germany. But when Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933 the Institute members had to disband, moving to England and then to America. In that year, he met with Eric Trist, of the London Tavistock Clinic. Trist was impressed with his theories and went on to use them in his studies on soldiers during the Second World War. Lewin emigrated to the United States in August 1933 and became a naturalized citizen in 1940. Earlier, he had spent six months as a visiting professor at Stanford in 1930[2], but on his immigration to the United States, Lewin worked at Cornell University and for the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station at the University of Iowa. Later, he went on to become director of the Center for Group Dynamics at MIT. While working at MIT in 1946, Lewin received a phone call from the Director of the Connecticut State Inter Racial Commission requesting help to find an effective way to combat religious and racial prejudices. He set up a workshop to conduct a 'change' experiment, which laid the foundations for what is now known as sensitivity training[3]. In 1947, this led to the establishment of the National Training Laboratories, at Bethel, Maine. Carl Rogers believed that sensitivity training is "perhaps the most significant social invention of this century." [4] Following WWII Lewin was involved in the psychological rehabilitation of former occupants of displaced persons camps with Dr. Jacob Fine at Harvard Medical School. When Eric Trist and A T M Wilson wrote to Lewin proposing a journal in partnership with their newly founded Tavistock Institute and his group at MIT, Lewin agreed. The

Tavistock journal, Human Relations, was founded with two early papers by Lewin entitled "Frontiers in Group Dynamics". Lewin taught for a time at Duke University.[5] Lewin died in Newtonville, Massachusetts of a heart-attack in 1947. He was buried in his home town.

Work
Lewin coined the notion of genidentity,[6] which has gained some importance in various theories of space-time and related fields. He also proposed Herbert Blumer's interactionist perspective of 1937 as an alternative to the nature versus nurture debate. Lewin suggested that neither nature (inborn tendencies) nor nurture (how experiences in life shape individuals) alone can account for individuals' behavior and personalities, but rather that both nature and nurture interact to shape each person. This idea was presented in the form of Lewin's Equation for behavior B=(P,E). Prominent psychologists mentored by Kurt Lewin included Leon Festinger (1919 1989), who became known for his cognitive dissonance theory (1956), environmental psychologist Roger Barker, Bluma Zeigarnik, and Morton Deutsch, the founder of modern conflict resolution theory and practice.

[edit] Force field analysis

Force field analysis provides a framework for looking at the factors (forces) that influence a situation, originally social situations. It looks at forces that are either driving movement toward a goal (helping forces) or blocking movement toward a goal (hindering forces). The principle, developed by Kurt Lewin, is a significant contribution to the fields of social science, psychology, social psychology, organizational development, process management, and change management.[7]

[edit] Action research

Lewin, then a professor at MIT, first coined the term action research in about 1944, and it appears in his 1946 paper Action Research and Minority Problems.[8] In that paper, he described action research as a comparative research on the conditions and effects of various forms of social action and research leading to social action that uses a spiral of steps, each of which is composed of a circle of planning, action, and factfinding about the result of the action.

[edit] Leadership climates

Lewin often characterized organizational management styles and cultures in terms of leadership climates defined by [9] (1) authoritarian, (2) democratic and (3) laissez-faire work environments. Authoritarian environments are characterized where the leader determines policy with techniques and steps for work tasks dictated by the leader in the division of labor. The leader is not necessarily hostile but is aloof from participation in work and commonly offers personal praise and criticism for the work done. Democratic climates are characterized where policy is determined through collective processes with decisions assisted by the leader. Before accomplishing tasks, perspectives are gained

from group discussion and technical advice from a leader. Members are given choices and collectively decide the division of labor. Praise and criticism in such an environment are objective, fact minded and given by a group member without necessarily having participated extensively in the actual work. Laissez-faire Environments give freedom to the group for policy determination without any participation from the leader. The leader remains uninvolved in work decisions unless asked, does not participate in the division of labor, and very infrequently gives praise. (Miner 2005: 39-40) [10]

[edit] Change process

An early model of change developed by Lewin described change as a three-stage process. The first stage he called "unfreezing". It involved overcoming inertia and dismantling the existing "mind set". Defense mechanisms have to be bypassed. In the second stage the change occurs. This is typically a period of confusion and transition. We are aware that the old ways are being challenged but we do not have a clear picture as to what we are replacing them with yet. The third and final stage he called "freezing". The new mindset is crystallizing and one's comfort level is returning to previous levels. This is often misquoted as "refreezing" (see Lewin K (1947) Frontiers in Group Dynamics).

[edit] Lewin's equation

The Lewin's Equation, B=(P,E), is a psychological equation of behavior developed by Kurt Lewin. It states that behavior is a function of the person and their environment [11]. The equation is the psychologist's most well known formula in social psychology, of which Lewin was a modern pioneer. When first presented in Lewin's book Principles of Topological Psychology, published in 1936, it contradicted most popular theories in that it gave importance to a person's momentary situation in understanding his or her behavior, rather than relying entirely on the past.[12]
Participant observation. Members had to participate emotionally in the group as well as observe themselves and the group objectively (op. cit.). Connecting concrete (emotional) experience and analytical detachment is not an easy task, and is liable to be resisted by many participants, but it was seen as a essential if people were to learn and develop. Cognitive aids. This particular aspect was drawn from developments in psychoeducational and cognitive-behavioural group therapy. It entailed the provision of models or organizing ideas through the medium brief lectures and handouts (and later things like film clips or video). Perhaps the best known of these was the Johari Window (named after, and developed by, Joe Luft and Harry Ingram). Yalom (1995: 490) comments, The use of such cognitive aids, lectures, reading assignments, and theory sessions demonstrates that the basic allegiance of the T-group was to the classroom rather than the consulting room. The participants were considered students; the task of the T-group was to facilitate learning for its members.

Action research Kurt Lewin is also generally credited as the person who coined the term action research. The research needed for social practice can best be characterized as research for social management or social engineering. It is a type of action-research, a comparative research on the conditions and effects of various forms of social action, and research leading to social action. Research that produces nothing but books will not suffice (Lewin 1946, reproduced in Lewin 1948: 202-3) His approach involves a spiral of steps, each of which is composed of a circle of planning, action and fact-finding about the result of the action (ibid.: 206). The basic cycle involves the following:

This is how Lewin describes the initial cycle: The first step then is to examine the idea carefully in the light of the means available. Frequently more fact-finding about the situation is required. If this first period of planning is successful, two items emerge: namely, an overall plan of how to reach the objective and secondly, a decision in regard to the first step of action. Usually this planning has also somewhat modified the original idea. (ibid.: 205) The next step is composed of a circle of planning, executing, and reconnaissance or fact finding for the purpose of evaluating the results of the second step, and preparing the rational basis for planning the third step, and for perhaps modifying again the overall plan (ibid.: 206). What we can see here is an approach to research that is oriented to problem-solving in social and organizational settings, and that has a form that parallels Deweys conception of learning from experience.

The approach, as presented, does take a fairly sequential form and it is open to literal interpretation. Following it can lead to practice that is correct rather than good as we will see. It can also be argued that model itself places insufficient emphasis on analysis at key points. Elliott (1991: 70), for example, believed that the basic model allows those who use it to assume that the general idea can be fixed in advance, that reconnaissance is merely fact-finding, and that implementation is a fairly straightforward process. As might be expected there was some questioning as to whether this was real research. There were questions around action researchs partisan nature the fact that it served particular causes. There were also questions concerning its rigour, and the training of those undertaking it. However, as Bogdan and Biklen (1992: 223) point out, research is a frame of mind a perspective that people take toward objects and activities. Once we have satisfied ourselves that the collection of information is systematic, and that any interpretations made have a proper regard for satisfying truth claims, then much of the critique aimed at action research disappears. In some of Lewins earlier work on action research (e.g. Lewin and Grabbe 1945) there was a tension between providing a rational basis for change through research, and the recognition that individuals are constrained in their ability to change by their cultural and social perceptions, and the systems of which they are a part. Having correct knowledge does not of itself lead to change, attention also needs to be paid to the matrix of cultural and psychic forces through which the subject is constituted (Winter 1987: 48). Action research did suffer a decline in favour during the 1960s because of its association with radical political activism (Stringer 1999: 9). However, it has subsequently gained a significant foothold both within the realm of community-based, and participatory action research; and as a form of practice oriented to the improvement of educative encounters (e.g. Carr and Kemmis 1986). The use of action research to deepen and develop classroom practice has grown into a strong tradition of practice (one of the first examples being the work of Stephen Corey in 1949). For some there is an insistence that action research must be collaborative and entail groupwork. Action research is a form of collective self-reflective enquiry undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own social or educational practices, as well as their understanding of those practices and the situations in which the practices are carried out The approach is only action research when it is collaborative, though it is important to realise that action research of the group is achieved through the critically examined action of individual group members. (Kemmis and McTaggart 1988: 5-6) Just why it must be collective is open to some question and debate (Webb 1996), but there is an important point here concerning the commitments and orientations of those involved in action research. One of the legacies Kurt Lewin left us is the action research spiral and with it there is the danger that action research becomes little more than a procedure. It is a mistake, according to McTaggart (1996: 248) to think that following the action research spiral constitutes doing action research. He continues, Action research is not a method or a procedure for research but a series of commitments to observe and problematize through practice a series of principles for conducting social enquiry. It is his argument that Lewin has been misunderstood or, rather, misused. When set in historical context, while Lewin does talk about action research as a method, he is stressing a contrast between this form of interpretative practice and more traditional empirical-analytic research. The notion of a spiral may be a useful teaching device but it is all too easily to slip into using it as the template for practice (McTaggart 1996: 249).

Conclusion As this brief cataloguing of his work shows, Lewin made defining contributions to a number of fields. He had a major impact on our appreciation of groups and how to work with them; he pioneered action research; he demonstrated that complex social phenomenon could be explored using controlled experiments; and he helped to move social psychology into a more rounded understanding of behaviour (being a function of people and the way they perceive the environment). This is a formidable achievement. Sixty years on, he still excites discussion and argument, and while we may want to qualify or rework various aspect of his work (and that of his associates) we are deeply indebted to him both for his insights and the way he tried to bring a commitment to democracy and justice to his work. The consistent theme in all Kurt Lewins work, according to David A. Kolb (1984: 9) was his concern for the integration of theory and practice. This was symbolized in his best known quotation: There is nothing so practical as a good theory (1951: 169). Its a lesson that we still need to learn.

First Contribution: Wilfred Carr This contribution begins with a critical historical review of the approaches taken by Tibble et al. in 1966 and by Hirst et al. in 1983. It challenges the twin assumptions of educational theory and also their

influential consequence that the study of education comprises, in the main, the four foundation disciplines of educational psychology, sociology of education, history of education and philosophy of education. In particular it argues that the two main tasks put forward by the dominant approaches to educational theory as envisaged by Hirst have identified crucial issues, but also that educational theory thus envisaged has misconceived these issues from the start. These two tasks are: (a) to identify epistemological foundations for the study of education that would enable educational practice to be built on rational principles that are more objective than inherited belief or unexamined practice; (b) to replace the context-dependent, subjective beliefs of practitioners with the context-free, objective knowledge generated by theory. Following these opening critiques Carrs contribution makes a critical appraisal of reflective practitioner and action research approaches that rose to prominence during the late 1980s as dissatisfaction with foundations approaches became more widespread. These new approaches gave prominence to practice rather than to theory and drew on a wide range of post-positivist or anti-positivist arguments. They produced a wide variety of orientations towards the study of education, most of which nevertheless shared a conception of theorising in education as a species of practical or personal theory; a kind that emerged through a process of selfreflective inquiry in which educational practitioners reflectively exposed and critically examined the theories implicit in their own everyday practice. Carr argues that, for all their merits, these new reflective approaches to the study of education lacked an epistemological acuity or precision that was evident in the earlier approaches of Hirst and Peters. For instance, practitioners frameworks of beliefs and understandings were granted the status of theory; or more precisely, there was frequently a failure to distinguish between practitioners articulation of beliefs that underlie their practice and their allegiance to some particular theory. Carrs arguments then focus on questions which the institutionalised history of the study of education has itself largely helped to eclipse. Such questions include: What are the epistemological sources of what has customarily been called educational theory? Does the widely-held view that theory should guide and inform practice apply at all, or apply differently, to the field of education? Should a practical activity like education be based on anything going by the name of theory? In pursuing these questions some key challenges posed by postfoundationalist insights are addressed. For instance, if, as postfoudationalism insists, there can be no perspective that is independent of a contextually-influenced interpretive standpoint, does this conclusion itself re-invent a new form of foundationalist educational theory? Carrs contribution will conclude not with definite answers to such challenges, but with some suggestions about how a more clearsighted living-with them might bring a greater degree of genuine enlightenment to how the study of a practical activity like education might be understood. w.carr@sheffield.ac.uk

Wilfred Carr Wilfred Carr, originally from England, born in Manchester, in an era of radical liberalism, ie, extreme conservatism. Communism is an example of radical left-wing extremism, while fascism is right-wing extremism. conceptosectores In the 1970's the radical concept in Europe is claimed by important sectors of the left. He is a professor of education at the University of Sheffield. trabajos He has published extensively on the relationship between theory and practice and the role of those involved in research and teacher training and action research. Among his titles we can say: "Philosophical styles and Educational Theory" (1979), Critical Theory of education: action research in teacher education (1988, in collaboration with Stephen Kemmis) Quality in Teaching: Arguments for a Reflective Profession (1989), "Education and democracy: the challenge postmodern" (1995). And Education, knowledge and the Strggle for Democracy (1995). It is considered one of contemporary philosophers of education. educativaconceptos "A theory for education. Towards a critical educational research", incorporates the concepts of enlightenment about the terms of pursuing an education and critical education, education and science.

Rescues the idea of change and continually review the theory and practice and vice versa and struggle for emancipatory ideals of rationality, justice and freedom is as Carr stresses the importance of education professionals must theorize the education as an everyday aspect to improve educational practice.

Lawrence Stenhouse (29 March 1926-1982) was a British educational thinker who sought to promote an active role for teachers in educational research and curriculum development. He was a founder member of the Centre for Applied Research in Education (CARE) at the University of East Anglia. He was educated at St Andrews University in Scotland. Stenhouse was particularly influential during the 1960s and 1970s. He helped to develop innovative classwork for secondary school pupils through the Schools Council Humanities Project. He also served as the President of the British Educational Research Association (BERA).
This form of words echoes those of Lawrence Stenhouse (1975) who produced one of the best-known explorations of a process model of curriculum theory and practice. He defined curriculum tentatively: 'A curriculum is an attempt to communicate the essential principles and features of an educational proposal in such a form that it is open to critical scrutiny and capable of effective translation into practice'. He suggests that a curriculum is rather like a recipe in cookery. It can be criticized on nutritional or gastronomic grounds - does it nourish the students and does it taste good? - and it can be criticized on the grounds of practicality - we can't get hold of six dozen larks' tongues and the grocer can't find any ground unicorn horn! A curriculum, like the recipe for a dish, is first imagined as a possibility, then the subject of experiment. The recipe offered publicly is in a sense a report on the experiment. Similarly, a curriculum should be grounded in practice. It is an attempt to describe the work observed in classrooms that it is adequately communicated to teachers and others. Finally, within limits, a recipe can varied according to taste. So can a curriculum. (Stenhouse 1975: 4-5) Stenhouse shifted the ground a little bit here. He was not saying that curriculum is the process, but rather the means by which the experience of attempting to put an educational proposal into practice is made available. The reason why he did this, I suspect, is that otherwise there is a danger of widening the meaning of the term so much that it embraces almost everything and hence means very little. For example, in a discussion of the so-called 'youth work curriculum' (Newman & Ingram 1989), the following definition was taken as a starting point: 'those processes which enhance or, if they go wrong, inhibit a person's learning'. This was then developed and a curriculum became: 'an organic process by which learning is offered, accepted and internalized' (Newman & Ingram 1989: 1). The problem with this sort of definition, as Robin Barrow (1984) points out, is that what this does is to widen the meaning of the term to such an extent that it just about becomes interchangeable with 'education' itself. More specifically, if curriculum is process then the word curriculum is redundant because process would do very nicely! The simple equation of curriculum with process is a very slap-happy basis on which to proceed. We also need to reflect on why curriculum theory and practice came into use by educators (as against policy-makers). It was essentially as a way of helping them to think about their work before, during and after interventions; as a means of enabling

educators to make judgments about the direction their work was taking. This is what Stenhouse was picking up on. Stenhouse on curriculum As a minimum, a curriculum should provide a basis for planning a course, studying it empirically and considering the grounds of its justification. It should offer: A. In planning: 1. Principle for the selection of content - what is to be learned and taught 2. Principles for the development of a teaching strategy - how it is to be learned and taught. 3. Principles for the making of decisions about sequence. 4. Principles on which to diagnose the strengths and weaknesses of individual students and differentiate the general principles 1, 2 and 3 above, to meet individual cases. B. In empirical study: 1. Principles on which to study and evaluate the progress of students. 2. Principles on which to study and evaluate the progress of teachers. 3. Guidance as to the feasibility of implementing the curriculum in varying school contexts, pupil contexts, environments and peer-group situations. 4. Information about the variability of effects in differing contexts and on different pupils and an understanding of the causes of the variation. C. In relation to justification: A formulation of the intention or aim of the curriculum which is accessible to critical scrutiny. Stenhouse 1975: 5 There are a number of contrasts in this model of curriculum theory and practice as compared with the product model. First, where the product model appeals to the workshop for a model, this process model looks to the world of experimentation. The idea is that of an educational science in which each classroom is a laboratory, each teacher a member of the scientific community... The crucial point is that the proposal is not to be regarded as an unqualified recommendation but rather as a provisional

specification claiming no more than to be worth putting to the test of practice, Such proposals claim to be intelligent rather than correct. (Stenhouse 1975: 142) Thus, in this sense, a curriculum is a particular form of specification about the practice of teaching. It is not a package of materials or a syllabus of ground to be covered. 'It is a way of translating any educational idea into a hypothesis testable in practice. It invites critical testing rather than acceptance' (Stenhouse 1975: 142). Second, and associated with the above, given the uniqueness of each classroom setting, it means that any proposal, even at school level, needs to be tested, and verified by each teacher in his/her classroom (ibid: 143). It is not like a curriculum package which is designed to be delivered almost anywhere. Third, outcomes are no longer the central and defining feature. Rather than tightly specifying behavioural objectives and methods in advance, what happens in this model of curriculum theory and practice is that content and means develop as teachers and students work together. Fourth, the learners in this model are not objects to be acted upon. They have a clear voice in the way that the sessions evolve. The focus is on interactions. This can mean that attention shifts from teaching to learning. The product model, by having a prespecified plan or programme, tends to direct attention to teaching. For example, how can this information be got over? A process approach to curriculum theory and practice, it is argued by writers like Grundy (1987), tends towards making the process of learning the central concern of the teacher. This is because this way of thinking emphasizes interpretation and meaning-making. As we have seen each classroom and each exchange is different and has to be made sense of. However, when we come to think about this way of approaching curriculum in practice, a number of possible problems do arise. The first is a problem for those who want some greater degree of uniformity in what is taught. This approach to the theory of curriculum, because it places meaning-making and thinking at its core and treats learners as subjects rather than objects, can lead to very different means being employed in classrooms and a high degree of variety in content. As Stenhouse comments, the process model is essentially a critical model, not a marking model. It can never be directed towards an examination as an objective without loss of quality, since the standards of the examination then override the standards immanent in the subject. This does not mean that students taught on the process model cannot be examined, but it does mean that the examinations must be taken in their stride as they pursue other aspirations. And if the examination is a by-product there is an implication that the quality the student shows in it must be an under-estimate of his real quality. It is hence rather difficult to get the weak student through an examination using a process model. Crammers cannot use it, since it depends upon a commitment to educational aims. (Stenhouse 1975: 95) To some extent variation is limited by factors such as public examinations. The exchange between students and teachers does not float free of the context in which it arises. At the end of the day many students and their families place a high premium on exam or subject success and this inevitably enters into the classroom. This highlights a second problem with the model we have just outlined - that it may not pay enough attention to the context in which learning takes place (more of this later). Third, there is the 'problem' of teachers. The major weakness and, indeed, strength of the process model is that it rests upon the quality of teachers. If they are not up to

much then there is no safety net in the form of prescribed curriculum materials. The approach is dependent upon the cultivation of wisdom and meaning-making in the classroom. If the teacher is not up to this, then there will be severe limitations on what can happen educationally. There have been some attempts to overcome this problem by developing materials and curriculum packages which focus more closely on the 'process of discovery' or 'problem-solving', for example in science. But there is a danger in this approach. Processes become reduced to sets of skills - for example, how to light a bunsen burner. When students are able to demonstrate certain skills, they are deemed to have completed the process. As Grundy comments, the actions have become the ends; the processes have become the product. Whether or not students are able to apply the skills to make sense of the world around them is somehow overlooked (Grundy 1987: 77). Fourth, we need to look back at our process model of curriculum theory and practice and what we have subsequently discussed, and return to Aristotle and to Freire. The model we have looked at here does not fully reflect the process explored earlier. In particular, it does not make explicit the commitments associated with phronesis. And it is to that we will now turn. Stenhouse, L. (1975) An Introduction to Curriculum Research and Development, London: Heinemann. 248 + viii pages. Classic statement of a process approach to the theory and practice of curriculum making. Chapters explore the nature of the curriculum problem; the content of education; teaching; the school as an institution; behavioural objectives and curriculum development; a critique of the objectives model; the process model; evaluation; a research model of curriculum development; the teacher as researcher; and the school and innovation.