ADMIN LAW

G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931 MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG Ostrand, J Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50) FACTS: This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court. ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent as cause of action HELD: Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.

Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank of the Phils. (G.R. No. L-46158, Nov. 28, 1986) Facts: During the period from December 28, 1962 to July 30, 1963, Tayug Rural Bank, Inc. obtained 13 loans from the Central Bank of the Philippines. The loans were all covered by corresponding promissory notes prescribing the terms and conditions of the aforesaid loans. No penal clause was included in the promissory notes. On December 23, 1964, the Central Bank issued Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8, informing all rural banks that an additional penalty interest rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum would be assessed on all past due loans beginning January 4, 1965. Said Memorandum Circular was actually enforced on all rural banks effective July 4, 1965.

The Central Bank justified the imposition of the penalty by stating that it was legally imposed under the provisions of Section 147 and 148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board on September 5, 1958, under authority of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended. Issue: Whether or not the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty? Held: No. Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 720 reads: SEC. 3. In furtherance of this policy, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the Philippines shall formulate the necessary rules and regulations governing the establishment and operatives of Rural Banks for the purpose of providing adequate credit facilities to small farmers and merchants, or to cooperatives of such farmers or merchants and to supervise the operation of such banks. Nowhere in any of the above-quoted pertinent provisions of R.A. 720 nor in any other provision of R.A. 720 for that matter, is the monetary Board authorized to mete out on rural banks an additional penalty rate on their past due accounts with Central Bank. While the Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition of administrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure supervisory in character. An administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not so provided in the law authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less one that is applied retroactively.

Powers of Administrative Agency: Sufficient Standard Test ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES, petitioner,

vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondent. FACTS: On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund. On 16 November 1995, PETITIONER filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its superior retirement plan. In support of said application, PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the Rules are invalid. In a letter dated 18 March 1996, the President and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF disapproved PETITIONER's application on the ground that the requirement that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase "and/or," and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law. PETITIONER's appeal with the HDMF Board of Trustees was denied for having been rendered moot and academic by Board Resolution No. 1208, Series of 1996, removing the availment of waiver of the mandatory coverage of the Pag-IBIG Fund, except for distressed employers. On 31 March 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. On motion by HDMF, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the coverage of employers and employees under the Home Development Mutual Fund is mandatory in character as clearly worded in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended

by R.A. No. 7742. There is no allegation that petitioner is a distressed employer to warrant its exemption from the Fund coverage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA No. 7742, and the subsequent repeal of Section 19 of PD No. 1752 are within the delegated power of the Board.

HELD: We find for the petitioner. It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 of RA No. 7742 and Section 13 of PD No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of PD No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of PD No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of

Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.

People vs. Maceren G.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977 Aquino J. Facts: On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.

Held: No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Metropolitan Traffic Command West Traffic District vs. Gonong GR No. 91023, July 13, 1990 Cruz, J. Atty. Dante David claims that the rear license plate of his car was removed by petitioner while his vehicle was parked in Escolta. He filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila. He questioned the petitioners act on the ground that not only was the car not illegally parked but that there was no law or ordinance authorizing such removal. The lower court ruled that LOI 43, which the defendant (petitioner) invoked, did not

empower it to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates or motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways. Moreover, the said LOI had been PD 1605. ISSUE: W/N petitioner is authorized to penalize traffic violations as such HELD: No. What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that stall on streets and highways and not those that are intentionally parked in a public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. In the case at bar, it is not alleged or shown that private respondents vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic. The charge against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no-parking area. The act, if true is a violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD 1605, which does not include removal and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle among the imposable penalties.

5. ABELLA VS. CSC Facts: -Abella, a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), as Department Manager of the Legal Services Dept. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager. -Before he retired, the CSC issued Memo Circ No.21 providing for the requisites for positions in the government to be classified under the Career Executive Service (CES). This circular provides the that incumbents in positions which are declared to be under CES who hold permanent appointments shall remain under permanent status. However, upon promotion or transfer to other CES position, they shall be under temporary status until they qualify.

-After Abellas retirement, he was issued by Subic Metropolitan Authority a permanent employment as Department Manager of the Labor and Employment Center. -However, petitioners appointment was not approved when submitted to the CSC Regional Office, on the ground that his eligibility was not appropriate. -Both the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals affirmed the disapproval by the CSC Regional Office -Abella went to the Supreme Court. One of the grounds he pointed out for questioning the disapproval of his appointment was that CSC failed to notify him of a hearing relating to the issuance of the challenged Circular. Issue: W/N a disapproval by the CSC of an appointment to a position under the CES requires notice of hearing Held: NO. The classification of positions in career service was a quasilegislative, not a quasi-judicial issuance. In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law are essential for the performance of this function. Thus, due process requirements (as enumerated in Ang Tibay Case) must be observed: 1. There must be a right to a hearing, including the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support thereof 2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented 3. the decision must have something to support itself 4. the evidence must be substantial 5. the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected 6. the tribunal must act on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinated in arriving at a decision, and

7. the tribunal should render its decision in such a manner that one can know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decision rendered. -On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulation within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to and hearing are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearting are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct. -The challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of departments, bureaus and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it had been issued as an incident of the administrative bodys power to issue guidelines for government officials to follow in performing their duties. -Also, the appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC merely examined the conformity of the appointment with the law and appointees possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

De Jesus vs. COA Facts: Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). They were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the President Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee. Meanwhile, RA 6758 took effect and provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. To implement it, DBM

issued CCC No. 10 discontinuing without qualification, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to COA, questioning the validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No.10 and that it is without force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette. Issue: Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is valid and enforceable. Held: Petition granted. DBM-CCC No. 10 is invalid. Rationale: Publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular. The purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. It is not merely an interpretative or internal regulation for it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in the newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines to the end that they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency. HONASAN vs. THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Before the Court is the motion filed by petitioner to cite respondent DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors (respondent for brevity) in contempt of court for alleged blatant disregard and defiance of the agreement of the parties with this Court to maintain the status quo

before the filing of their petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On September 22, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against respondents alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Panel for assuming jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on the charge of coup detat against petitioner. Respondents filed their respective comments and petitioner his reply thereto. An oral argument on the case was held on November 18, 2003. Parties submitted their respective memoranda as required by the Court. On April 13, 2004, the Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition and upholding the concurrent jurisdiction of the respondent to conduct the preliminary investigation. Petitioner received a copy of the decision on April 22, 2004, thus he has until May 7, 2004 to file his motion for reconsideration. On April 23, 2004, respondent issued its assailed order as follows: In the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 159747 dated 13 April 2004, confirming that this Investigating Panel has jurisdiction to investigate the instant complaint against respondent Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II, et al., and to afford respondent full opportunity to controvert the allegations of the complaint and to adduce evidence; Wherefore, in the interest of justice, respondent(s) thru counsel are hereby given a final extension of up to 3 May 2004 within which to file their counter-affidavit and controverting evidence furnishing with a copy thereof complainant with proof of service thereof to this Panel. Petitioner now comes before this Court with a motion to cite respondent in contempt alleging that the issuance of the assailed order

is in direct contravention and flagrant violation of the agreement of the parties as stated in the Courts Resolution dated November 18, 2003, which categorically provides: Further, it was agreed that the Department of Justice, with the assurance of the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, will maintain the STATUS QUO before the filing of the petition. Petitioner argues that he still has 15 days from receipt of the Courts decision to file a motion for reconsideration, i.e., until May 7, 2004, and therefore, until that period, the decision dated April 13, 2004 is not yet final and executory; he intends to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period; the assailed order requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit is premature and intended to pre-empt and render futile and nugatory any action of petitioner with respect to the Courts decision dated April 13, 2004, subverting his right to due process; the Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 has not lifted said directives to the parties to maintain the status quo nor did the decision automatically lift the status quo order; the submission of petitioners counter-affidavit would upset the status quo sought to be maintained; with the assailed order of the respondent panel requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit, the latter has belittled, degraded, obstructed and impeded the administration of justice and has wantonly defied the Courts authority; and the Panels order only confirms his fear that his preliminary investigation and detention are being railroaded. In its Comment, respondent contends that: contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a virtual defiance of the court; no such attitude or intent is discernible from its assailed action in proceeding with the preliminary investigation since the respondent issued the assailed Order in good faith and in the conscientious implementation of the Courts decision upholding the concurrent jurisdiction of the DOJ to investigate the charges against petitioner for the crime of coup detat; it has no

intention to willfully disregard the authority of the Court since the assailed order was promulgated in furtherance and in the exercise of their authority to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public officers and employees as mandated by the Constitution and laws as confirmed by the Courts decision dated April 13, 2004; the charges against petitioner was filed in August 2003 and the preliminary investigation was pending since then because of the jurisdictional issue raised before this Court which was decided on April 13, 2004; upon receipt of such decision, respondent issued the assailed order with the objective of resolving the investigation taking into account petitioners right to a speedy disposition of the case against him; the subject order was not in any manner effected to railroad petitioners arrest and detention but to serve his right to due process by giving him all the opportunity to controvert the accusations against him and to adduce evidence in his behalf; otherwise, the respondent could have immediately filed the information against petitioner the moment he failed to submit his counter-affidavit; as a manifestation of good faith, respondent desisted from further proceeding with the investigation and deferred any action until after the Courts decision on April 13, 2004; in contempt proceeding, intent, however, goes to the gravamen of the offense, and the good faith or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered; contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense, and doubts should be resolved in favor of the person against whom proceedings have been brought; and only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power to punish for contempt of court be exercised. We deny the motion to cite respondent Panel in contempt of court. Contempt of court is defined as disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and administration of law

into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice may falter or fail. Such power being drastic and extraordinary in its nature should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. In compliance with the Courts Resolution dated November 18, 2003, respondent had stopped from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation while the case is pending before the court. Respondent issued its assailed order requiring petitioner to submit his counteraffidavit after receipt of the Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 upholding respondents authority to conduct the preliminary investigation on the charge of coup detat against petitioner. Although the Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 is not yet final as of the date of the issuance of the said assailed order, the court finds no contemptuous intent on the part of respondent to impede the administration of justice. As respondent has explained in its Comment, the charges against petitioner was filed with the DOJ in August 2003 and since then, the preliminary investigation has been pending, thus with the Courts decision upholding their jurisdiction, respondent issued the assailed order taking into account petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case. Clearly, respondents intention is to give respondent all the opportunity to controvert the accusation against him and to adduce evidence in his behalf. The Court finds respondents explanation satisfactory and does not see the act of respondent as contumacious, as herein earlier defined by the Court.lawphil.net Petitioner asserts in his Motion that he received on April 22, 2004, a copy of the Courts decision upholding respondents authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and that he has until May 7, 2004 to file his motion for reconsideration. However, verification with the

Courts docket section reveals that petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration only on June 8, 2004, or thirty days late. The Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 has already attained finality as of May 8, 2004. Hence, there is no longer any impediment for respondent to proceed with the preliminary investigation and for petitioner to comply with the respondents order to submit his counter-affidavit. WHEREFORE, petitioners motion to cite respondent in contempt of court is DENIED. Respondent is required to give petitioner a fresh period from receipt of this Resolution to submit his counter-affidavit. SO ORDERED.

Lupangco v. Court of Appeals FACTS: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petition was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13, 1987. ISSUE: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination? HELD:The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are

co-equal bodies. The respondent court erred when it placed the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commission in the same category. As already mentioned, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo,this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit: In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned, there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. In view of the foregoing, we find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides: SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial

agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The contention is devoid of merit. In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the

Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC. vs. TRANSPORTATION 117 SCRA 597

BOARD OF

FACTS: The respondent Board of Transportation issued respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 prohibiting the operation of cars which were more than six years old. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. Petitioner Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Incorporated (TOMMI) claimed the prohibition violated procedural due process. ISSUE: Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned memorandum circular without notice and hearing violate petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process. RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the leeway accorded the Board of Transportation gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary

information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that a conference should first be called or that the persons who may be affected be required to submit position papers or other documents. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the memorandum circular does NOT violate due process. Previous notice and hearing are required for judicial and quasi- judicial proceedings but not for rules promulgated to govern future conduct.

PESIGAN VS. ANGELES 129 SCRA 174 (April 30, 1984) FACTS: Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents, Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.

HELD: EO 626-A should not be enforced against petitioner on April 2, 1982, because it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only 15 days thereafter as provided in Art. 2 of the Civil Code, and Sec. 11 of the Administrative Code. Pesigan v. Angeles PESIGAN V. ANGELES [129 S 174] - F: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu 10-wheeler truck in the evening of 4/2/82 26 carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur w/ P. Garcia, Batangas as destination. Inspite of the permit to transport and the health certificate and 3 other certificates of inspection, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by the town's police station commander and the provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was based on EO 626-A w/c provided for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another. The Pesigans filed against the two officials an action for replevin for the recovery of carabaos. The case was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Hence, this appeal under R 45 of the ROC. HELD: We hold that said EO should not be enforced against the Pesigans on 4/2/82 bec it is a penal regulation (the confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes EO 626-A a penal statute) published more than 2 mos. later in the OG dated 6/14/82. It became effective only 15 days thereafter as provided in Art. 2, NCC and Sec. 11 of the Revised Admin. Code.

The word "laws" in Art. 2 includes circulars and regulations w/c prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

ELECTION LAW

Penera v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et al. G.R. 181613 11 September 2009

Facts: The COMELEC disqualified petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for unlawfully engaging in election campaign before the start of the campaign period for the 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa 881 (the Omnibus Election Code). The COMELEC found that Penera and her party-mates, after filing their Certificates of Candidacy, conducted a motorcade through Sta. Monica and threw candies to onlookers,

aboard trucks festooned with balloons and banners bearing their names and pictures and the municipal positions for which they were seeking election, one of which trucks had a sound system that broadcast their intent to run in the 2007 elections. COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. He emphasized that under Section 15 of Republic Act 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is now considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Thus, before the start of the campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity because there is no candidate to speak of. Accordingly, Penera could not be disqualified for premature campaigning because the motorcade took place outside the campaign period when Penera was not yet a candidate. Sarmiento posited that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369, has practically made it impossible to commit premature campaigning at any time, and has, thus, effectively repealed Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Penera filed a Petition forCertiorari before the Supreme Court to nullify the disqualification. She argued that the evidence was grossly insufficient to warrant the COMELECs ruling. She maintained that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, and the supporters merely joined her and the other candidates. Issue: Whether or not Penera should be disqualified for engaging in election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Holding: (A) The Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Peneras Petition and affirmed her disqualification because: (1) Penera raised a question of fact. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and does not include a review of the tribunals

evaluation of the evidence. (2) The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. Evidence presented to the COMELEC, including Peneras own evidence and admissions, sufficiently established that Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs x x, participated in a motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers. With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera can hardly persuade the Court that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned. (T)he conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on *h+olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate*.+ x x The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether a voter, a candidate or a party, from engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period (except that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within 30 days before the campaign period and 45 days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election). And, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate declared by final decision to have engaged in premature campaigning shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Said candidate may also face criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262 of the same Code. Thus, Penera, who had been elected Mayor of Sta. Monica before the COMELEC rendered its decision, was disqualified

from holding the said office. The proclaimed Vice-Mayor was declared her rightful successor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code which provides that if the mayor fails to qualify or is removed from office, the vice-mayor shall become the mayor. (B) The Supreme Court disagreed with COMELEC Commissioner Sarmiento, saying that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. The Court gave the following reasons: (1) Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, did not expressly repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal may not be presumed. Implied repeals are disfavored, absent a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. When confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, courts should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. (2) There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both, to wit: (a) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether or not a voter or candidate from engaging in election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Thus, premature campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate. Accordingly, the declaration in Lanot vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 164858; 16 November 2006) that (w)hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits is an election campaign or partisan political activity by a candidate outside of the campaign period, is erroneous. (b) It is true that under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate before the start of the campaign period, even after the filing of his CoC. Nonetheless, upon the filing of his COC, such person already explicitly declares his intention to run as a candidate. When the campaign period starts and he proceeds with his candidacy, his intent turning into actuality, act/s constituting election

campaign or partisan activity under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (holding rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.), which he may have committed after filing his CoC and before the campaign period, can already be considered as the promotion of his election as a candidate, constituting premature campaigning, for which he may be disqualified. Conversely, if he withdraws his CoC before the campaign period, his act can no longer be viewed as for the promotion of his election, and there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate to begin with. Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his becoming a candidate (prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity. However, it is only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. (c) While a proviso in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, provides that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period, this does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed during the campaign period. Nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful. If the Court were to rule otherwise, not only will the prohibited act of premature campaigning be officially decriminalized, the significance of having a campaign period before the elections would also be negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of campaign war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy well ahead of everyone else, thus, undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections. Such is the very evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers could not have

intended to cause such an absurd situation. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 25 November 2009

Holding: Granting Peneras motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held that Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said (A) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed Decision) considered a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period. Thus, applying said law: (1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful. (2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election

offenses cannot be so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature. (B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness. (C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful. (D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early

deadline for filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate. When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Facts:

Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective. Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the

prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. Issue: whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press?

Held: Based on the above reasons (petitioner), yes, it constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. Section 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election seven (7) days before a local election. Because of tile preferred status of tile constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Any system of prior restraints of

expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy Presumption against its constitutional validity. The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for in enforcement of such restraint. Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, which gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like 5.4. For as we have pointed out in sustaining tile ban on media political advertisements, the grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply" as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities "public information campaigns and forums among candidates." MR JUSTICE KAPUNAN dissents. He rejects as inappropriate the test of clear and present danger for determining the validity of 5.4. Hence, while it may be useful for determining the validity of laws dealing with inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it may not be adequate for such regulations as the one in question. For such a test is concerned with questions of the gravity and imminence of the danger as basis for curtailing free speech, which is not the case of 5.4 and similar regulations. Instead, MR JUSTICE KAPUNAN purports to engage in a form of balancing by "weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights". The dissenting opinion simply concludes that the objectives of Section 5.4 are valid. It may be seen that its limiting impact on the rights of free speech and of the press is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. The dissent does not, however, show why, on balance, these considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression. As already stated, the purpose of Art. IX-C, 4 is to "ensure equal opportunity, time, and space and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore for public information campaigns and forums among candidates". Hence the validity of the

ban on media advertising. It is noteworthy that R.A. No. 9006, 14 has lifted the ban and now allows candidates to advertise their candidacies in print and broadcast media. Indeed, to sustain the ban on the publication of survey results would sanction the censorship of all speaking by candidates in an election on the ground that the usual bombasts and hyperbolic claims made during the campaigns can confuse voters and thus debase the electoral process. In sum, the dissent has engaged only in a balancing at the margin. This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the challenged legislation and leaves freedom of speech, expression, and the press, with little protection. Nor can the ban on election surveys be justified on the ground that there are other countries - 78, according to the Solicitor General, while the dissent cites 28 - which similarly impose restrictions on the publication of election surveys. At best this survey is inconclusive. In some countries, of which are no older nor more mature than the Philippines in political development, they do not restrict the publication of election survey results. The O 'Brien test could then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of 5.4. The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the

suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that "the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." The prohibition imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election. Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-

bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibited GRANTED and 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 24(h) of COMELEC Resolution 3636, March 1, 2001, are declared unconstitutional.

ABS CBN VS COMELEC FACTS: Comelec approved Resolution 98-1419 on April 21, 1998 which prohibited the conduct of exit polls. Petitioners questioned the validity of the resolution by filing a petition for certiorari in the SC. Solicitor General argued that case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust all available remedies by failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the Comelec. HELD: Considering that the resolution was issued only 20 days before the election and that the petitioners got a copy of it only on May 4, 1998, there was hardly any opportunity to move for reconsideration and to obtain and swift resolution in time for the May 11 elections. The petition also involves transcendental constitutional issues therefore, direct resort to SC is justified.

JUANITO C. PILAR v. COMELEC G.R. No. 115245/ 245 SCRA 759 July 11, 1995

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC in UND No. 94-040. Petitioner Pilar filed his COC for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days after, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2348, in turn implementing R.A. No. 7166 which provides that: Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "noncandidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost" COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final its first decision. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Did Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

HELD: No. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule. Also, Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."