Pragmatic Commitments to Naturalized Epistemology Author(s): Hangqing Cong, Xiaodong Cheng, Haidan Chen Source: Frontiers of Philosophy in China,

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Front.Philos. China (2006) 3: 477-490 DOI 10.1007/sl 1466-006-0020-9 I xLIRRJL4 :rIR IlI1l I

Cong Hangqing, Cheng Xiaodong

to naturalized commitments epistemology Pragmatic

2006 x HigherEducationPress and Springer-Verlag

Abstract This essay explores numerous and complicatednaturalizedepistemology against the backgroundof pragmatism.We distinguish three programmes of naturalizedepistemology: strong, moderate,and weak. By considering commitments of pragmatism on which different programmes depend, we point out the close-knit relationshipbetween pragmatismand naturalized epistemology. We also illustratethe essential origin of today's controversyover naturalizedepistemology and predictthe uptrendof naturalized epistemology. Keywords epistemology, naturalism,pragmatism There is immanentconnection between naturalizedepistemology and pragmatism. As the most widely known and influential school of philosophy in America, pragmatismsettles on the theoretical keynote and backgroundof naturalized epistemology. By analyzing the theoretical commitments affordedby differenttypes of pragmatismto naturalizedepistemology, we can better understand differenttypes of naturalizedepistemology and clarify the today's controversy over naturalized epistemology, and accordingly better predictthe uptrendof naturalizedepistemology.

I Three of programmesnaturalized epistemology

We can hardly give a brief and clear definition to naturalizedepistemology
Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu W Tr]Fffx (Philosophical Studies), 2005 (10) by Cong Hangqing,Cheng Xiaodong and Chen Haidan

(s), Cheng CongHangqing Xiaodong

Departmentof Philosophy, ZhejiangUniversity, Hangzhou 310028, China E-mail: science@zju.edu.cn

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because naturalismwould be an attitudeand approachratherthan a system

it's and in or doctrine: a philosophical methodology project nature. (Randall, naturalized as a methodology appears pp. 121-140) Usually, epistemology and whose or an inquiry are approach/programme, intension extension not as we as Therefore, will not badger straightforward traditional epistemology. in with conceptual issuesof naturalized but epistemology dispute, we're govia and its differing to present methodology essentialviewpoint clarifying ent types of naturalized We can see that althougha good epistemology. boost naturalized there'sstill broad epistemology, manyscholars nowadays on issues.Now we list threesuchfundamental divergence somefundamental of issues whichcan be used as measurements classifyingdifferent types of These issues centralizeon the relationship benaturalized epistemology. and that tweentraditional epistemology naturalized epistemology all typesof naturalized affront. Lookatthe Table1 below first: epistemology
Table 1
Types of naturalizedepistemology Parameter1: epistemology is a discipline of science + + + +
-

Strongprogramme1 (Si) 2 Strongprogramme (S2) Moderateprogramme1 (M1) 2 Moderateprogramme (M2) Weak programme1 (W1) 2 Weak programme (W2)

Parameter 2: natural science is the only source of epistemology +

-

Parameter 3: traditional epistemology can be superseded +

+
-

+ +
-

We treat three fundamentalissues as parameters.The basic viewpoint or standpointof differenttypes of naturalizedepistemologists is affected by the value "+" and "-" of these parameters.According to the divergence shown in answeringthe three fundamentalissues, we compartmentalize naturalized into three programmes.In each programme,there are two difepistemology ferent forms accordingto intension. For instance, S2 is weaker than Si.Different programmescorrespondto different types of naturalized epistemology.

II Strong and commitments programme Quine's

According to Table 1, naturalized epistemology is mainly considered as strong programme(S1 or S2 ) and the criticism to naturalizedepistemology points at the strong programme. This is because Quine, as the symbol of naturalized epistemology, is the proponent of the strong programme. The criticism of naturalizedepistemology is mainly associated with Quine's per-

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spective. In order showthe basic standpoint his strongprogramme, first to of let's and between analyzeQuine'sperspective thenlook at the close association and to illustrate the Quine'sstrongprogramme his own pragmatic thoughts maincommitments theoretical or to by support strongprogramme supplied his scientific pragmatism. Mostof today'snaturalized fromQuine's"Episepistemology originates reThis temologyNaturalized". seminalpaperbringsabout"thenaturalists In turn"andvigorousdevelopment naturalized of epistemology. the paper, Quinesaid: like of or Epistemology, something it, simplyfalls intoplaceas a chapter psychologyand hence of naturalscience. It studiesnatural phenomena, thatis, a physical human Thishuman is a subject. subject accorded certain in controlled of experimentally input-certainpatterns irradiation assorted for frequencies, instance-and in the fullnessof time the subjectdelivers as output description the threedimensional a of worldandits history.The we relation betweenthemeager is inputandtorrential output a relation are promotedto study for somewhatthe same reasonsthat have always prompted epistemology. (Quine, 82-83) pp. of Here,Quineapproves P1(valueof "+")in the firstplace.He treatsthe as and objectof epistemology a natural phenomenon, calls for an experimentalmethod the studyof epistemology "provide account a cerin to an of tain naturalphenomenon, namely,knowledgeitself." (Komrnblith, 161) p. traditional can Accordingly, epistemology no longerstandas "firstphilosoissues canbe settledin an experiential phy"andall epistemological way, so traditional can or of Quine'sapproval epistemology be eliminated replaced. to of P1is destined his approval P2. The responseto P2 lies in how we interpret science. Quineappears to "takefor granted the product naturalization enoughin common that of has with traditional to epistemology its name,"(Houkes,p. 254) andhe almost identifiesepistemologywith psychology.Furthermore, Quine's sense, in is science.So Quine'sresponse P2is alsoposito psychology almostnatural tive. However,some otherproponents strongprogramme of thinkthatscience is not equalto natural science,andthey validatethe methodof social sciencein the studyof epistemology.
Although it seems that Quine hesitates at P2, his main idea is to identify knowledge with Si as a kind of physical phenomena. This Quinean standpoint is called "physical school", representativesof which include R. Giere, P. Thagardand so on. They all claim that traditionallyepistemologicalissues

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can be settled by use of the latest productsof modern science, and then con-

fine science to physicalscience.Therefore, most of them construct episteon the basis of productsand standard physical of mologicalmethodology M. of science.However,proponents S2, including W. Wartofsky, Fuller S. and S. M. Downes,advocate epistemological inquiryfromsocial, historical andcultural as dimensions. Theyconsider knowledge a cultural phenomena, thusgain the name"cultural with the physicalschool school",who disagree on P2. It is notedthatthereis no fundamental betweenthe physidisagreements cal schoolandcultural schoolbecausetheybothbelongto strong programme. the accountmodel Although physicalschoolclaimsthatthe epistemological shouldbe constructed normalformof physicalscience,they do not enby and factors vice versa.Andthe standpoint tirelyexcludesocialandhistorical of the physicalor cultural schoolcanbe changed underdifferent background on factorsof normativeness becauseof attention commitments. instance, For andvalue,L. Laudan seemsto slide fromS2to themoderate and programme, H. Komblith, to his social account due underscientistic background, finally
slides from moderateprogrammeto S2.

has with Strong programme a close-knit relationship Quinean pragmatism.

WhetherS1 or S2, it obviously presents scientistic inclination,which accords

with Quinean Giventhe theoretical commitments Quinean pragmatism. by comes downwith strongscientisticinclinapragmatism, strongprogramme tion. Quineanpragmatism only suppliesbackground strongpronot for of commonstandpoints the different but schoolsof gramme, also represents strong programme.
According to the characterof Quineanpragmatism,we call it "Scientistic Pragmatism"(SP) for the moment. Commitmentsof Scientistic Pragmatism (CSP) to strongprogrammemainly include: CSP1: Commitment of Reduction Traditionalreductionismis of foundationalism,but Quine's reductionis a kind of "linguistic behaviorism".Firstly, Quine "regardsstimulus-response correlationsas the only available evidence for the state of the subject and treat the subject itself as a black box." (Houkes, p. 255) He uses the "stimulus-response" model to account meaning, and reduces the complicated process of cognition to the initial stage of meaning. Then, our language is partitioned into "occasional sentence", "standing sentence" and "eternal sentence" according to the extent of their correlationsto intense stimulus from close to distant. So logic and mathematicpropositions, which are not confrontedwith common experience, can be reducedto occasional sentences, which bear the meaning of intense stimulus. Therefore,this commitmentis a preconditionfor experimentalscience to replace traditionalepistemology.

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of CSP2: Commitment Fallibilism Fallibilism the "stimulus-response" and modelare impartible. According to Quinean that pragmatism, epistemic processes developreliable knowledge via severalinput-output coursescannotbe finishedat one time. Onlyby inof experience we avoid falsity and acquire can truth.Along creasinginput this way, Quineclaimedthe fallibilityandrevisability experimental of science andadmitted validityof historical the factorandevolutionist account. Thiscommitment of method. justifiesthe credibility the experimental of CSP3: Commitment Causationism Different fromlogicalempiricism, is as Quine'scausationism external, he not only rejectsmakingcausalinference logic functionin analyticphiby modelof syllogism.Quineeslosophy,but also deniesthe causalinference tablishescausation the relation on betweenexperiential inputandepistemic He thinksthat if we can insureenoughexperiential output. input,credible mustbe acquired. whatwe shoulddo is try hardto improve So knowledge the condition causalinference avoid fallacy,but not to find a priori of and
arguments. This commitment makes it possible for strong programme of

naturalized to epistemology deny all the a priorideductionof traditional epistemology. Holism CSP4:Confirmation Aftertraditional whether positivismwas attacked criticalrationalism, by can or the knowledge be confirmed notbecamea question. Quinerecognizes limitationof positivismand applies experiential holism to confirmation. can Accordingto confirmation holism, all the propositions be understood withinthe conceptual of system,so as to avoid the limitation inductiveor deductiveinference. WithinQuinean the of pragmatism, credibility knowledge rests on the validity of linguisticexpressionsand the relativityof or we physicalsensesystems,so if we understand accepta language, understandor acceptits conceptual is to system.This commitment necessary answer the doubtthat strongprogramme cannotbe justified,althoughsome still vagueness exists. It's clearthatQuine'scommitments abovelay a theoretical foundation for current criticism strongprogramme of can Furthermore, strongprogramme. to For finally attribute these four pragmaticcommitments. example,W. Houkesconsiders Quine'scommitments reduction that of deviatefromthe contentsand goals of traditional epistemological inquiry,as the goal of the Quine's naturalized epistemologyis just "clarifying relationbetween andverbaloutput, betweenevidenceandtheory". sensoryinput (Houkes, p. 257) D. Davidson thinks that although relationshipbetween stimulus-observationsentences is causal, it cannot be justified in an experiential

Kimalso criticizes he that is CSP3, argues knowledge a normaway. Jagwon

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tive conceptitself, but Quine'scommitment causationism aboutelimiof is natingnormativity. and so Currently, much criticismof CSP endangers strongprogramme For even the whole naturalized epistemology. example,B. Stroudand E. does not answerthe centralquestionof Sosa arguethatQuine'snaturalism traditional i.e., the doubtthat if scientifictheory can reach epistemology, facticityandindicateexternal reality,so CSP is helplessin the face of skepHoukesarguesthatthe contentsof (strong)naturalism ticism.Accordingly,
are quite different from that of traditionalepistemology so it cannot be the successor of traditional epistemology or at least it is not worth the name

Houkes'suggestion that,only whenwe changethe name is "epistemology". of naturalized can we settle its status.In this sense, S. Stich epistemology that will evenblithelypredicts epistemology end.(S. Stich,p. 89)

III Moderate and commitments programme Dewey's

encounters more and more of epistemology Strongprogramme naturalized The some of whichcomesfrommoderate criticism, programme. biggestdifand ference betweenthe moderate programme the strongone is thatalthough the former acknowledgesthe validity and necessity of the experiential
method in epistemic inquiry, it refuses to deny or discard concepts and methods of traditionalepistemology at all. To be brief, moderateprogramme disagrees with strongprogrammeaboutP3. R. Feldman's view is a representativeof moderateprogramme'sattitudes and standpoints on P3. He calls traditionalepistemology "armchairepistemology", which begins at hypothetic propositions and puts forward some analyses and principles, and then revises them in the light of potential counterexamples. So the prominence of traditional epistemology is analyzing epistemological concepts and formulating epistemic principles. He calls modem epistemology "methodological naturalism",which holds that all psychological results related to human cognition and reasoning are essential or helpful to the process of epistemic inquiry. Feldman oppugns the status of the strong programme.In his opinion, we cannot take naturalized epistemology (strong programme) for granted. Firstly, he points out that what naturalism concerns and what traditional epistemology does are different,only if epistemology is as broad a discipline as "the study of human knowledge", empirical study advocated by naturalism is relevant and legitimate. Second, the introduction of psychological concepts cannot justify naturalizedepistemology, for in fact psychological concepts are always being used in epistemology. Feldman argues that, al-

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it thoughmore and morepsychological conceptsenterepistemology, does not follow thatpsychological suchtheoryor thatepistemoloresultsimply to theirtheory; someepistemic gistsmustuse suchresults support theorycan scijustify itself, which can makesense withoutusing resultsfromnatural encelike psychology. Feldman'sconclusionis that "someprojectssome would Accordingly, call epistemological, such as the studyof humanknowledgeandreasoning or the effortto helppeopleto reasonbetter,undoubtedly require do empirical input.In spite of arguments the contrary, to there'snot muchreasonto thinkthat psychological resultswill play any significant role in effortsto construct abstract theories aboutor analysesof knowledge justiand general fication." science (Feldman, 184)Onthe one hand,he considers p. empirical on helpfulto epistemology; the otherhand,he triesto makeroomfor conof ceptual analyses and theoreticalabstraction traditional epistemology. Feldman and opposesKornblith's analogyof knowledge natural phenomena, and emphasizes highlights particularity knowledge.So his viewor the of of cannotrest on point towardsP3is that some propositions epistemology
empirical information,and traditionalepistemology cannot be replaced entirely. J. Capps holds a similar viewpoint. By comparingQuineanand Deweyan pragmatism, Capps suggests a return to Deweyan pragmatism,which not only contains the minimal commitmentsof a naturalizedepistemology, but also provides a response to objections to such an approach.According to Capps, moderateprogrammecan traceback to Deweyan pragmatism. The characterof Deweyan pragmatismis consistent with moderate programme, so his pragmatismcan give essential theoretic evidence or background commitments. Dewey uses the concept "situation"to set inquiry conditions and denies epistemic reduction and scientism of strong programme.TherebyDeweyan pragmatismcan justify naturalizedepistemology in a minimalisticway. which at least contains psychologiDewey's centralnotion is "situation", cal and social factors:as a result of biological and culturalframework,problems for inquiry arise, are classified and solved. Although the situation depends upon our own doing, it also carries certain factors that cannot be reduced entirelyto subjectivepsychological and social factors. It seems that Dewey anticipatedthe crux of Quine early. Dewey sets two conditions of inquirytheory: first, all kinds of inquiry differ only in degree, not in kind; second, logic forms originatefrom the process of solving certain or materialindeterminacy.The formeris the basic commitmentof naturalism, while the latterprevent Deweyan naturalismfrom being a "chapter" natuof ral science or descriptivescience.

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We can see that Dewey considers results of certain activity as some common sense, which provides evidence for abstractionof scientific theories,

of his is inclination. accordingly pragmatism characteristic commonsensical So Dewey's commitments moderate to can programme be called"Commitmentsof Commonsensical Pragmatism"(CCP): CCP1:Commitment CommonSense of commonsensical realism,the use of Accordingto Deweyanpragmatic, effectivelanguage of Our impliesa basic"theory the world". commonsense caninsurethatlinguistic is likelyto developtheoriesof theworld. expression Undergenericcommonsense, we all can expressthe relationship between and realityandtheoryvia language, thentranslate thingsoutsidethe human bodyintoobjectsof knowledge. of CCP2:Commitment Theorizing Aftertestingthe relationof objectandtheoryby commonsense, Dewey to of He commitment the relation theoretical provides activityandits results. thinksthatsome"theory theworld" necessarily of is priorto, andcontinuous It formsof theorizing. impliesthattheoretical forms with,moresophisticated are natural results of theoretical activity, which also embody of and self-development self-completion theory. of CCP3:Commitment Continuity is Now thatthe "theory the world" continuous of with moresophisticated is as with sciformsof theorizing, epistemology to be regarded continuous ence or as a chapter science.According Deweyanpragmatism, to certain of of results of activityprovideendless motivationfor abstraction scientific theory, so we can find continuitybetweenthem. In this sense, Dewey's commitment continuity be applied all aspectsof human of to can knowledge: and and Thereis continuity betweenphilosophy science,epistemology scietc. and ence,traditional naturalized epistemology, othercommitments unare Fromthe view of the moderate programme, andbasic commitments the strong of areunnecessary necessary, programme Undercommitments the modof for a defenseof naturalized epistemology. is theerateprogramme, naturalized epistemology neither"thereplacement sis", nor "thetransformational thesis",while it doesn'tdiscriminate against
various kinds of science. Naturalizing epistemology under this minimal manner clears the way for approachingquestions of truth and justification from a fresh direction, without making an unwarranteddetour through reductionismand foundationalism,as otherprogrammesof naturalismdo. Of course, for the sake of epistemic justification, Deweyan pragmatism contains certainmethodological presuppositions.Although this remedies the

and it of strongprogramme's ignorance justification normativeness, opensa to convenientdoor for the moderateprogramme slide to the weak pro-

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Anotherdeficiencyof Dewey's commitments that Dewey ciris gramme. cumvents fromthe view of commonsensical but skepticism pragmatism, his
non-foundationalapproachmakes it doubtful that naturalizedepistemology

is ableto answer questions Deweytriesto posedby traditional epistemology. avoid reductivescientismof the strongprogramme the one hand,and on avoidfoundationalism, and coherentism othermoremainstream approaches, whichhuntaftercertainty, the otherhand.Thismakeshis commonsension cal evidences ableto do as well as he wishes.In the face of thispredicanot on ment,Dewey mustconfessthat"wemaybase ourexpectations whatoccursin morescientificfields."(Capps, 657) p. To sum up, althoughthere are some difficultiesof the moderate prounderCCP,it's still the case thatmoderate is gramme programme moreacceptablethanstrongprogramme. Recently,many scholarsof epistemology
shouted out the slogan of "return Dewey", for they think that not only is it to

ableto clarifythe basiccommitments a naturalized of but epistemology, also makesthepointthatnothing moreis necessary order makesenseof our in to and epistemic scientific practice.

IV Weak and commitments programme Peirce's

Withinnaturalized the epistemology, most drasticcriticismto Quine'sapWhether or W2,its disagreements W1 proachis fromthe weakprogramme. with the strongprogramme aboutfundamental issues are prodigious. we If treatstrong as thenweakprogramme be readas can programme an extreme, another extreme. it's the casethattheradical If attitude strongprogramme of
rendersit to be misunderstoodas post-modernism,then the drastic degree to which the weak programmecriticizes the strong programmedisplays a certain a prioriflavor. The proponents of weak programmedo not deny the role of empirical science in epistemic studies, but they disagree drastically with the strong programme about P1. They refuse to treat naturalized epistemology as a common discipline of science, ratherthey try to defend epistemology as the guide of science. Therefore, they drastically reject elimination of logic, mathematicand metaphysic propositions.Not only do they confess the validity of some concepts and propositions out of experience, but they think these concepts and propositionsconstitutethe so-called "a prioriknowledge", which is beyond the study of empiricalscience. G. Rey is a representativeof weak programme.Firstly, he claims to be a naturalist himself, and confesses the necessity and validity of empirical methods in epistemic inquiry. However, Rey also finds some ambiguity in

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of commitments, Quine'spragmatic especiallythe commitment fallibilism and confirmation holism. Accordingly, arguesthat naturalized he epistecannotget rid of a prioriknowledge,for thereare no fundamental mology or differencesbetween traditionallogic, mathematics, metaphysicsand to physics,biology or daily-lifebelief, they are revisableaccording experience. Rey's strategyis advocatinga priori via experience.He claims that or "whether not thereis a prioriknowledgeis an empirical issue","it may fact well turnout to be a naturalistic thatwe humans possessa prioriknowlof of edge in a number areas." (Rey, p. 25) As a matter fact,the a prioriin Rey's sense is a certainstrategyof justification, just similarto Kuhn's whichcan So "paradigm". the a priorican be revisedin light of experience, rather thandenialof the a priori, like the be considered advancement as just physics. changeof the normalformposedby Einstein'sspaceandquantum canreasonably negativereto this a priori Rey give According justification, sponseto P1andP3. It is clearthatRey's conceptof a prioriis different fromthatof traditional at Justin this sense,M. DevittthinksthatRey is not a naturalist philosophy. methodfromtime to time does not make all, because"usingthe empirical to (Devitt,p. 47) We can see that,according our common you a naturalist." a naturalist no alof naturalized has (viz. Si), understanding epistemology method. ternative the empirical but that His to H. Fieldargues logic is a priori. reasonis clear:in order reason the inferences anythingby evidence,we have to use logic; logic licenses fromevidenceto conclusion so mustcomefirst.(Devitt,p. 57) Fromhis and we of pragmatism, do have reason to use logic knowledge, perspective in to whichis the a priori thisweaksenseaccording Field'sdefinition. the to disinterests response P2, Whilethe moderate deliberately programme into school"(M1)and theweakprogramme seemsto be partitioned "physical
"culturalschool" (M2) in the light of differentresponses to P2. The common a empirical study through knowledge pointof M1andM2 is advocating priori so as to resist strong programmeor moderateprogramme.For instance, D. Cummins, who seems to belong to the "physical school", asserts that "we predict that priorknowledge concerningalternativepossibilities to the causal scenarios described by causal conditionals would influence people's interpretationsof the conditions."(Cumminset al., p. 276) In comparingnaturalistic epistemology with Hermeneutic Epistemology, K. Lennon advocates replacing a priori with immanence while admitting that "reason has remained immanent or transcendent"(Lenon, p. 257). Accordingly we think Lenon belongs to the "culturalschool". Compared with Quine's and Dewey's commitments of pragmatism,the

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weakprogramme tracedirectly Peirce'spragmatism. a prioriflacan to The

vor presentedby Peirce's pragmatismmake it possible to give background

commitments theoreticsupport the weak programme. analyzing or to By Peirce'commitments, can betterunderstand we fundamental characters and essential contents theweakprogramme. of Peirceis honored the initiator pragmatism, posed an important as of who influence DeweyandQuine.As to naturalized on epistemology, owingto the discontentment rebound the strong and of of programme whichQuineis the turn representative, manyscholars nowadays to go underPeirce'spragmatic commitments the hope of constructing in naturalistic epistemologyof the weakprogramme. Peircerebuilds Kant'stranscendental through semiotics,and gives logic newjustification the validityof impersonal of His knowledge. inquiry logic is differentfrom that of Dewey's: Dewey establishesnaturalconnections betweenconditions outcomes inquiry, and of whilePeirceestablishes logical betweenhow to indicateand what to indicate.AlthoughPeirce necessity abandonstraditional dogmatism,he still lays a credible foundationfor of knowledge through linguistic "community intercourse". It is clearthatPeircetriesto balancetraditional and metaphysics modern science.His pragmatism presentsan obviousa prioriflavorthatwe call "A PrioriPragmatism" the moment.Commitments A PrioriPragmatism for of to naturalized aremainlyas follows: (CAP) epistemology CAP1:Commitment Foundation of In Peirce'sopinion,although hopelessfor traditional it's to epistemology credible foundationwithin individuals(no matterwhetherthis develop foundation self-awareness logic laws),it's possibleto findsuchfoundais or tionwithinlinguistic of "community intercourse". Actually,suchfoundation is a certain of justification, whichreplaces transcendental deduction strategy or induction with a priori traditional justification, accordingly epistemology is justifiedonceagainin the development modemscience. of of CAP2: Commitment Consistency Anotherimportant commitment defend a priorijustificationis the to commitment consistency. of to According Peirce'ssemiotics,such consisis not only embodiedin consistency betweenthing and thing or betency tweensymbolandsymbol,butalso embodied consistency in betweenobject andsymbol.Of course,as a pragmatist, Peircedoes not admitany correlationbetweenconceptandobject.His trueintention in the linguisticconlies indication objectrather of thanthe obsistencyexpressed interpersonal by of jective community conceptin self-awareness. (Apel,p. 96) Such consisor tencyis a priori preexistent. Withinthe domainof epistemology, we treatQuine'scommitments if as

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seemto be thatof"royalthatof "revolutionist", Peirce'scommitments then ist".By usingthe strategy justification CAP,Peircemakesit possibleto of of to retainthe priority epistemology of compared science,whichprovidesan for denyingPi andthen impellingtheoreticsupport the weak programme's is does P3.However,Peirce'sa priori justification open:his pragmatism not and indeedtries to find valid acresultsof natural science, deny empirical domain. countof scienceout of the empirical of someproponents the moderate UnderPeirce'spragmatic commitments, or to the weakprogramme even some new formsof often slide programme Peirce's to metaphysics.Compared Quineanand Deweyan pragmatism, the Therefore, philosophy. pragmatism keeps closercontactwithtraditional and betweenthe weak programme naturalized of epistemology boundary In is traditional ambiguous. this sense,weakprogramme epistemology rather even pushedout of the domainof naturalistic is subjectto be reproached, To epistemology. be brief, we do not have much reasonto be optimistic of abouttheperspective theweakprogramme.

V The of epistemology uptrend naturalized

Outsidethe domainof naturalized manyscholarscriticizeor epistemology, We attackthe projectof naturalized drastically. need to point epistemology the Of out againthatthe criticism mainlytargets strongprogramme. course, the commonstatusof the different such criticismendangers types of naturalized epistemology at the same time. For instance, it is pointed out that

towardstraditional or Quine'sattitudeof reduction transformation epistehis epistemolsuspicionor denialof traditional mologypremised thorough sciencethatcouldsupport the ogy. So, Quinedid not referto any empirical is of claimthatconsequences Hume'sthesiscanbe avoidedif epistemology fromdespair" and is naturalized, his argument simply"theargument (Shatz, that beA. p. 117).Accordingly, Kertiszargues thereis no cleardistinction "his conclusionthat traditional and tween Quine's arguments skepticism: is shouldbe discarded validexactlyas long as traditional episepistemology problem temologyexists"(Kertisz,p. 274). Kertiszcalls such fundamental "theparadox naturalized of epistemology". In fact, why not such paradoxis also the paradoxof traditional epistethe hereis how we understand notionsof "tradimology?The crucialmatter Here we also see the intensereboundof the strong tional"and "natural". As of naturalized sections, epistemology. we can see in previous programme differenttypes of naturalized commitments, epistegoing with pragmatic is mologycan convertto each other,andsuch a conversion an embodiment

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of the rebound the strongprogramme. sumup the conversion difof We of as follows: ferent typesof naturalized epistemology
Moderate Weak Strong Programme Programme Programme
CCP CAP

$1x--x--M1
CCP

2 2

CAP

Fig. 1

can to and According Fig. 1, the strongprogramme moderate programme of convertto one another underconditions CCPand CSP;similarly, weak and can to under programme moderate programme be converted one another conditions CCP and CAP;however,owing to theirextremeness, of strong andweakprogramme to one another cannotconvert programme directly.It is reasonable inferthat,as the pressure to withinandoutsidethe domainof naturalized both strongprogramme weak proand increases, epistemology will to underconditions CCP,i.e., of gramme convert moderate programme If naturalized on shouldconverge moderate epistemology programme. thisis right, the notion of naturalized epistemologyin common sense will be of changed,and the pragmatic background naturalized epistemologyas mainstream also be shifted.As a resultof that,the basic standpoint will is to goingto shiftfromradical moderate. It is still notablethatthe radicalstandpoint earlyprogramme of seemsto be necessaryor inevitable the development naturalized to of epistemology. In orderto be clearlydistinguished the fromtraditional epistemology, mark of the decisiveturning seemsdoomed to awayfromtraditional epistemology be the initiation the strongprogramme. of naturalized Therefore, epistemology gives us an extremelydestructive impression. Especially,the revolucausesmuchcriticismor tionarycharacter presented strongprogramme by Withthe strongprogramme attack. to transferring the moderate programme underthe changed of pragmatism, constructive the significance background of naturalized on shouldemerge,and epistemology rebuilding epistemology
it is hoped that the controversyover naturalizedepistemology will be settled

in the future.

References
Apel, Karl-Otto, Towards a Transformationof Philosophy, trans. by Sun Zhouxing and Lu Xinghua, Shanghai:ShanghaiTranslationPublishingHouse, 1997 Capps, John, Quine and Pragmatic Naturalized Epistemology, Transactions of Charles

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