Walter Emil Kaegi

Two Notes on Heraclius

In: Revue des études byzantines, tome 37, 1979. pp. 221-227.

Abstract
REB 37 1979 France p. 221-227
W. E. Kaegi, Jr, Two Notes on Heraclius. — The author concludes that a letter from the senate of Constantinople to the Persian
King Chosroes II in 615 contains an allusion to the continuing resistance of Komentiolos, brother of Phocas, after the execution of
Phocas in October, 610. The letter provides additional proof of the importance of the revolt in inhibiting attempts to arrange peace
between Chosroes and Heraclius. The author also suggests that a possible inspiration for some of Heraclius 's strategy against
the Persians was a neglected composition that John Lydus attributed to Emperor Constantine I.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Kaegi Walter Emil. Two Notes on Heraclius. In: Revue des études byzantines, tome 37, 1979. pp. 221-227.

http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/rebyz_0766-5598_1979_num_37_1_2096
 TWO NOTES ON HERACLIUS

Walter Emil KAEGI, Jr

I. Another allusion to the resistance of Komentiolos

The Chronicon Paschale contains the text of an official Byzantine letter,

which was ostensibly written on behalf of the senate, to the Persian King
Chosroes II, asking for peace between the Byzantine and Persian Empires1.
615 is the date in the Chronicon Paschale, a sensible one that gains additional
credibility from the contemporaneity of that source, although it is also
possible to make a case for 61 62. The military situation was serious. The
Persian General Shahin, who had penetrated as far as Chalcedon, conferred
with and accepted gifts from Heraclius and then explained to him that
he did not have the authority to make peace, however, that Heraclius
could secure peace by sending an embassy to Chosroes himself. Heraclius
accordingly sent the following envoys with the letter : Olympios, the Praetor
ian Prefect, Leontios, the Prefect of the City, and Anastasios, the presbyter
and synkellos of St Sophia. The letter contains an elaborate introduction
and a summary of the events that led to the accession of Heraclius
(Phocas's corruption of the Byzantine army in Thrace, his murder of Mauri
ce, the deterioration of the empire under Phocas, and the successful re-

1. Chronicon Paschale : Bonn, p. 707-709.

2. On the chronology of the letter : Chronicon Paschale (Bonn, p. 705-707). Also,
A. Stratos, To Βυζάντιον στον Ζ' αιώνα, Ι, Athens 1965, p. 248-251, 283-293 ; F. Dölger,
Regesten, n° 166 ; Ν. Η. Baynes, The Military Operations of the Emperor Heraclius,
The United Service Magazine, N.S. 47, 1913, p. 318-320.
222 w. ε. KAEGi, jr

bellion against Phocas by the elder Heraclius) and then makes an apology3 :
και μετά τον του τυράννου θάνατον βουληθέντος του ημών βασιλέως τους
ιδίους λαβείν συγγενείς και προς τον οίκεΐον έν 'Αφρική έπαναζεΰξαι πατέρα,
προτρέψαντός τε ημάς δν θ-έλομεν έπιλέξασθαι βασιλέα, μόλις ταΐς αιτήσεσιν
ημών πεισ&εις κατεδέξατο την βασιλείαν, και δια την κρατούσαν έν ταΖς
δύο πολιτείαις ταραχήν, ετι δε και την έμφύλιον στάσιν, ουκ εσχε καιρόν,
δπερ έχρήν πραχ&ήναι, του δια πρεσβείας την όφειλομένην τιμήν τω ύπερό-
γκω κράτει της υμετέρας γαλήνης προσαγαγεΐν. The embassy ultimately
failed to bring peace; its fate and the subsequent military and diplo
matic events are outside of the scope of this brief investigation4.
The revelation of a hitherto unknown resistance in Asia Minor against
Heraclius by Komentiolos, brother of Phocas, in late 610 after the execution
of Phocas in Constantinople on 5 October by the victorious Heraclius,
explains the above phrase ετι δε και την έμφύλιον στάσιν in the letter.
The letter apologizes for Heraclius 's inability to send the customary embassy
to Chosroes announcing his accession to the Byzantine throne (5 October
610) after the execution of Phocas, « because of the confusion that prevailed
between the two states, and still more because there was domestic insur
rection, he did not have the opportunity to do what was obligatory, to
send the due honor through an embassy to the great majesty of your
serenity.» For F. Dölger, writing in 1924, «was hiermit gemeint ist, ist
nicht klar»5. N. H. Baynes believed that in fact there had been a previous
unsuccessful embassy from Heraclius, that the phrasing of the letter « is
rather to be taken as a skilful palliation of the contemptuous treatment
which that embassy had received at the hands of Chosroes »6.
The publication of previously unedited sections of the life of St Theodore
of Sykeon (d. 613) permits the elucidation of the passage. The revolt of
General Komentiolos at Ankyra, or, more precisely, his continuation
of hostilities against Heraclius in Asia Minor — his forces extended their

3. Chronicon Paschale : Bonn, p. 708. This most reliable official document expressly
conflicts with but is more believable than the statement of Agapius de Menbidj (Kitab
al-'Unvan : A. A. Vasiliev, PO 8, 1912, p. 450), that Heraclius sent an embassy in the
first year of his reign to the King of Persia, but the king refused to accept it. The Chronicon
Paschale is more authoritative. There is no doubt, however, that Heraclius wanted peace
with Persia in 610-611.
4. Nicephorus, Hstoria : C. de Boor, Leipzig 1880, p. 15. On the failure of the embassy
and the inaccuracy of Nicephorus : A. Stratos, op. cit., I, p. 289-293 ; Ν. Η. Baynes,
art. cit., p. 318.
5. F. Dölger, Regesten, n° 166. A. Pernice (Uimperatore Eraclio, Florence 1905,
p. 72) translated as « i rivolgimenti politici ».
6. Ν. Η. Baynes, art. cit., p. 318 n.
 TWO NOTES ON HERACLIUS 223

control into Bithynia — for a short time after 5 October 610 surely was
the εμφύλιος στάσις to which the senate's letter referred7. Komentiolos's
assassination terminated these hostilities, probably late in 610 or possibly
early in 61 18. But in that brief period Komentiolos's control of Asia Minor
prevented Heraclius from establishing communications with Chosroes,
Critical time was lost. In 611 a massive Persian offensive cracked Byzantine
defenses on the eastern frontier and thereby permitted a breakthrough9.
It is conceivable that no Byzantine embassy from Heraclius had established
contact with the Persians before 615, because it is uncertain how much
time was necessary to reestablish governmental authority in Anatolia and
among the troops on the eastern front. It is possible that the Persians had
determined to exploit the civil dissension and had so advanced their
military preparations that any embassy was impracticable in 611 before
the commencement of their offensive ; henceforth, negotiations would have
been almost impossible.
The letter does not contain any explicit reference to Komentiolos, but
the allusion to « domestic insurrection » confirms the importance of his
resistance, which the Life of St Theodore labeled an ανταρσία and τήν
μελετωμένην... τυραννίδα10. At any rate, the resistance of Komentiolos
lasted sufficiently long to hinder the restoration of diplomatic relations
with Persia at the beginning of Heraclius's reign. The letter is official
confirmation of the embarrassing timing of the actions of Komentiolos :
it delayed Heraclius's consolidation of authority after his enthronement
at Constantinople. An unstated reality that emerges from the letter's
reference to the εμφύλιος στάσις is that not only diplomatic but also
military concerns were affected by Komentiolos's prolonging of the cause
of Phocas. If Heraclius was unable to establish diplomatic contact with
the Persians because of Komentiolos, he was also unable, at that critical
time before the Persian offensive, to organize a coherent and effective
defense of the eastern front against the Persians. The Persian offensive

7. Vie de Théodore de Sykéôn, c. 152-153 : A.-J. Festugière, I, Brussels 1970, p. 122-

123. For analysis, W. E. Kaegi, Jr, New Evidence on the Early Reign of Heraclius,
BZ 66, 1973, p. 308-330.
8. Vie de Théodore de Sykéôn, c. 152-153 : A.-J. Festugière, p. 123 ; W. E. Kaegi, Jr,
art. cit., p. 316-317.
9. Theophanes, Chronographia, A.M. 6102 : C. de Boor, p. 299 ; Agapius de Menbedj,
Kitab al-'Unvan : A. A. Vasiliev, PO 8, 1912, p. 450; N. H. Baynes, art. cit., p. 36-37;
A. Stratos, op. cit., I, p. 253-254, 256-257.
10. Vie de Théodore de Sykéôn, c. 152, line 19, and 153, line 57 : A.-J. Festugière,
p. 122 and 123.
224 w. ε. KAEGi, Jr

of 611 owed much of its success to Komentiolos's resistance to Heraclius

late in 610. Heraclius had lost precious time. I had conjectured that such
was the case when I published my study of the new evidence in the Festu-
gière edition of the Life of St Theodore of Sykeon, but I was unaware at
that time of this passage in the Chronicon Paschale. It is not surprising
that there is another trace of evidence about the resistance of Komentiolos
other than the indirect testimony of the coinage and George of Pisidia11.
Although indirect, this allusion in the Chronicon Paschale reconfirms the
gravity and complexity of the political and military situation at the com
mencement of the reign of Heraclius.

II. An inspiration for Heraclius's Persian strategy?

It is impossible to determine what were the military writings that

Heraclius consulted in the winter of 621-622 when he was planning his
strategy against the Persians. His court poet George of Pisidia12 vaguely
recounts that,
κράτιστε, συλλέγων βλον
τόν νουν σεαυτου και σχολή σοφή τρέφων
πάσας άνέγνως <τας> διατάξεις των νόμων
τας εξ δπλων και πραγμάτων ώρισμένας.
One first thinks of the Strategicon of Mauricius, which was certainly
written between 580 and 635, and possibly after 619 in the reign of Heraclius
himself, perhaps even at his direction, according to one theory13. It is

11. My conjecture : W. E. Kaegi, Jr, art. cit., p. 323. The numismatic and poetic
indications are discussed ibidem, p. 317-318. It is unlikely that the serious Jewish
disturbances at Antioch early in the reign of Heraclius would have prevented Heraclius
from attempting to establish diplomatic relations with Chosroes, but they also were
a disturbing factor : Michael the Syrian, Chronique, 10. 25 (J.-B. Chabot, II, Paris
1901, p. 379 : «Les Perses pillèrent... Et les Romains se complaisaient à répandre le
sang et à se massacrer les uns les autres ! C'est pourquoi, les Juifs qui étaient à Antioche
excitèrent des troubles... »). These troubles would not have physically blocked commun
ications with Persia. There were reports of Jewish unrest at Tyre (Eutychius, Annales :
PG 111, 1084-1085). But these events probably occurred late in the reign of Phocas
anyway : J. Starr, Byzantine Jewry on the Eve of the Arab Conquest (565-638), Journal
of the Palestine Oriental Society 15, 1935, p. 284-285. The principal primary source for
dating to the reign of Phocas is Theophanes, Chronographia, A.M. 6201 : C. de Boor,
p. 296-297.
12. George of Pisidia, Heraclias II, lines 118-121, in his Poemi, I, Panegirici epici :
A. Pertusi, Ettal 1960, p. 256.
13. Mauricius, Strategicon, publ. under the title Ar ta Militär à: H. Mihaescu,
 TWO NOTES ON HERACLIUS 225

entirely possible, although impossible to prove, that Heradius also directly

consulted, or used summaries of, two tracts on fighting the Persians
that John Lydus mentioned in the middle of the sixth century in his De
magistratibus populi romani: a lost composition attributed to no less
than Emperor Constantine I and the De hello Parthico of Cornelius Celsus,
a prolific writer of the Julio-CIaudian period. According to Lydus, the only
source on both of these treatises, both advocated an unexpected and sudden
strike — a blitz — as the only effective strategy against the Persians14 :
σκεπτόμενος, ώς αύτδς δ βασιλεύς έν τοις εαυτού λέγει συγγράμμασι,
Πέρσαις άδοκήτως έπελ&εΐν. ήπίστατο γαρ Κωνσταντίνος, πολύς ων έν
τε παιδεύσει λόγων καΐ συνασκήσει δπλων — ουδέ γάρ, ει μή καθ·' έκατέραν
παίδευσιν ετυχέ τις διαπρεπών, βασιλεύς 'Ρωμαίων προεχειρίζετο — ,
μή είναι ράδιον άλλως καταπολεμηθηναι Πέρσας, μή εξαπίνης αύτοΐς
έπιχεομένης εφόδου, καΐ συγγραφήν περί τούτου μονήρη Κέλσος δ 'Ρωμαίος
τακτικός άπ[ο]λέλοιπε σαφώς άναδιδάσκων, ώς ούκ άλλως Πέρσαι 'Ρωμαίοις
παραστήσονται, <εί> μή αιφνιδίως εις τήν εκείνων χώραν 'Ρωμαίοι γνόφου
δίκην ένσκήψουσιν, αίτίαν ούκ Ιξω λόγου παρασχόμενος· ή δέ τοιαύτη εστίν.
Περσών δ δήμος δλος και σύμπαν απλώς τδ έθ-νος είωθ-εν επί πόλεμον
όρμάν, ώς και 'Ρωμαίοι πρδ της Μαρίου των λεγομένων λεγιώνων διατάξεως.

Bucharest 1970. Special section on how to fight the Persians : Strategicon, 11. 1 (H.
Mihaescu, p. 262-268). On the date of the Strategicon : H. Mihaescu, Prolégomènes
à une édition critique des ΤΑΚΤΙΚΑ-ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΑ de Maurice-Urbicius, RESEE 5,
1967, p. 401-417 ; H. Mihaescu, Einleitung zu meiner Maurikios-Ausgabe, Byzantina
6, 1974, p. 193-213 ; Α. J. Toynbee, Constantine Porphyrogenitus and His World, Oxford
1973, p. 613-618. For a dating after 619, see the important remarks of E. Darko, Influences
touraniennes sur l'évolution de l'art militaire des Grecs, des Romains et des Byzantins,
Byz. 12, 1937, p. 119-125.
14. Ioannes Lydus, De magistratibus populi romani, 3, 33-34 : R. Wuensch, Leipzig
1903, p. 121-122. This appears to be the unique reference to a treatise on fighting the
Persians that was written by Constantine I. It is possible that he wrote a composition
or memorandum, or commissioned someone to write one for him, on the topic, in
connection with an expedition that he was planning to lead against the Persians shortly
before his death in 337 ; Constantinus rerum dominus extremo uitae suae tempore expe-
ditionem parauit in Persas : Festus, Breviarium, 26 (J. W. Eadie, London 1967, p. 66) ;
and Eusebius, De vita Constantini, 4. 56 (I. A. Heikel, Leipzig 1902, p. 140) : έπί Πέρσας
στρατεύειν ώρματο. Also : Ammianus Marcelunus, 25. 4. 23. On the background :
E. Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire, I, Paris 1959, p. 130 ; A. Piganiol, UEmpire Chrétien,
Paris 1947, p. 56-57 ; B. Stallknecht, Untersuchungen zur römischen Aussenpolitik in
der Spätantike (306-395 n. Chr.), Bonn 1969, p. 35-41. On Cornelius Celsus, see W.
Krenkel, Zu den Artes des Celsus, Philologus 103, 1959, p. 114-129, esp. 119-122;
W. Krenkel, A. Cornelius Celsus, Argentea Aetas in Memoriam Entii V. Marmorale,
Genoa 1973, p. 17-28, esp. p. 24-25, but contra, Κ. Barwïck, Die Enzyklopädie des
Cornelius Celsus, Philologus 104, 1960, p. 236-249, esp. p. 236-239. On the sources of
Lydus in general : Klotz, s.v. Lydos (7), RE 26, 1927, p. 2212-2215.

is
226 w. ε. KAEGi, Jr

διχοτομουντες οδν άνθρωπον αυτοί δια μέσου των δύο του σώματος τομών
διαβιβάζουσι τον στρατόν. δήλον γάρ, ώς ούχ ώρισμένα ουδέ εύτρεπή*
στρατεύματα τρέφουσιν οι Πέρσαι, ώς έτοιμους είναι πρδς τας μάχας,
ώσπερ οι 'Ρωμαίοι, χρόνου δει τοίνυν αύτοϊς εις παρασκευήν στρατού
και δαπάνης απόχρωσης τω πολέμω* ώστε άρμόδιόν φησιν ό Κέλσος άδο-
κήτως αύτοϊς έπελθ·εΐν και μάλιστα δια της Κολχίδος τα προοίμια της
εφόδου λαμβανούσης* Λαζικήν αυτήν εξ ήγεμόνος έπιφημίζουσιν οί καθ·' ήμας.
It is noteworthy that John Lydus advocated — scholars debate whether or
not he was citing Celsus here — the use of Colchis or Lazica as the base
for such a rapid strike against the Persians. The record of the Byzantine
involvement in Lazica during the reign of Justinian provided much more
recent and relevant materials, including examples of successes and reverses
on the local military situation; however, those campaigns had not been
the decisive area of Byzantine-Persian conflict15. If Heraclius consulted
any military treatises that had as their specific subject the ways in which to
fight the Persians, the works cited by Lydus just a few generations earlier
would very probably have been among the repertory of available titles.
A treatise whose author was said to be Constantine I would have held
special attraction and authority. To judge from Lydus, the theses of these
compositions about the effectiveness of a sudden and unexpected thrust,
and in particular the advice to make the thrust from Lazica, were prophetic
of the strategy that Heraclius implemented in 623, 624, 625 and 62716.
There is no evidence that Heraclius possessed a reading knowledge of
Latin, but he would have had access to those who could read or digest
Celsus for him. These works were available to and known to officials in
Constantinople a few generations before Heraclius. The actual details of
those treatises would have been out of date in the early seventh century.
Even if the strategic plans of Heraclius owed something to either one or
both of these earlier works, and I stress that this is a suggestion or conjecture
— to emphasize the kinds of writings which were available to official
circles — his borrowings and adaptations would have in no way diminished
his military accomplishments against the Sassanids. His was the more
difficult task of successfully applying learned theories to the challenging

15. For the campaigns, E. Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire, II, Paris 1949, p. 267-271,
294-295, 492-493, 504-521, 811-813; Β. Rubin, Das Zeitalter Iustinians, I, Berlin 1960,
p. 335-360.
16. The best survey remains that of N. H. Baynes, art. cit., p. 401-412, 665-679. Note
the terminology of Nicephorus (Historia : C. de Boor, p. 15) in his account of 626 :
ΚαΙ άπάρας δια τοϋ Ευξείνου έπειρατο δια Λαζικής εις τήν Περσικήν εισβαλεϊν.
 TWO NOTES ON HERACLIUS 227

realities of the seventh century which no strategist of the first or fourth

century could have imagined17.

17. Heraclius surely knew some Latin from his military service, because it was still
the language of the military commands at the beginning of his reign, as is evident from
the Mauricius Strategicon. He probably learned some written Latin while he was in
Africa with his father, the Exarch. On Heraclius and Persia : I. Shahîd, The Iranian
Factor in Byzantium during the Reign of Heraclius, DOP 26, 1972, p. 295-320. I also
wish to thank Professor Shahîd for some advice on this paper.