North American Philosophical Publications

Moral Community and Animal Rights Author(s): Steve F. Sapontzis Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 1985), pp. 251-257 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014103 . Accessed: 05/10/2011 01:14
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American

Philosophical

Quarterly

Volume

22, Number

3, July 1985

MORAL COMMUNITY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS

Steve F. Sapontzis

TN this paper I discuss three possible justifications -^ for what I believe to to be the basic objection moral rights to non-human beings; "But extending they're just animals!" Many people who are well about not only the physical but also the and social interests of animals still psychological in treating animals as resources for feel justified fulfilling human interests. This is because animals of fundamental lack that something supposedly worth which calls for respect and not merely moral informed for humane treatment and slaughter. It is three interpretations of that morally signif? I want to consider here. icant something which These three interpretations all involve the idea that in some kind of moral only those who participate community with us can be entitled to moral rights against us. These three interpretations are the major of the following arguments against animal rights: Al :Only those who respect themoral rights of others are entitled to moral rights, ("the reciprocity
requirement")

that moral

talk of

"liberating" "rights" to them

attitude toward animals them as beings who must be treated humanely but resources for who are, nonetheless, fundamentally to an attitude which human interests fulfilling interest regards animals as fellow creatures whose in an enjoyable, life must be respected satisfying and protected in the way basic human interests are basic animal Currently, respected and protected. in life and liberty, are routinely interests, e.g., some of to satisfy human sacrificed interests, are in hunting and gourmet cooking, which, e.g., far from basic; the primary purpose of extending moral rights to animals would be to insure that for fulfilling their interests could be sacrificed human interests only in the sorts of situations and to the sorts of principles which justify according the interests of some humans to fulfill sacrificing the interests of others.4 I. The Reciprocity Requirement

and extending animals our refers to changing from one which regards

premises

A2: Animals cannot respect moral rights. A3: Therefore, animals cannot be entitled
rights.1

to moral

Bl: Only moral

("the B2: B3:

agents are entitled

to moral rights.

agency requirement") cannot Animals be moral Therefore, rights.2 animals cannot

This requirement is based on one interpretation of the correlation between rights and duties. This interpretation is number (3) on W. D. Ross' famous list of possible interpretations of that correlation: (3) A right of A against B implies a duty of A to B.... What is meant by (3) is that A's having a right to have a certain act done to him by B implies a duty for A to do another act to B, which act may be either a similar act (as where the right of having the truth told to one implies the duty of telling the truth) or a different sort of act (as where the right to obedience implies the duty of governing well).5 When belief this correlation is coupled with the common that animals are incapable of recognizing and it quickly follows that animals acting on duties, are incapable of having moral rights. The most obvious response to this argument is that our common practice shows that being able to
251

agents. be entitled

to moral

Cl: One is entitled to moral rights against others on the basis of his (capacity for) familial, personal,
political, relations economic, requirement") etc., relations to them, ("the

C2: Animals
humans.

cannot enter into such relations with animals cannot be entitled

humans.3

C3: Therefore,
rights against

to moral

I will take up each of these arguments in turn. But before doing so, Iwant briefly to indicate what I think animal rights are about, so that it will be clear to what the above are objections. I believe

252

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY B's liberty to be thus restricted without A's liberty also being similarly (or otherwise appropriately) restricted. For example, if A has a right to the fruits of his labor, then B is obligated (ce ter is paribus) not to go into A's field and take his corn. It would

recognize and act on duties is not a necessary con? dition for having moral rights. Infants and the brain damaged, and senile are severely retarded, not regarded as resources for fulfilling the interests of normal humans (even though they could provide research). In spite outstanding material for medical of their inability to recognize and act on duties, their interests are protected by moral rights.6 How? ever, while this "argument from marginal cases" strongly suggests that our attachment to our species is stronger than our commitment to the reciprocity it is neither particularly requirement, telling nor insightful. It is not particularly the following revision

be manifestly unfair, then, for A not to be obligated to respect B's right to the fruits of his labor and to remain free to go into B's field and take his corn. Thus, with the commonly fairness, coupled that "a right of A against B accepted principle implies a duty of B to A" ( (1) on Ross' list), to respect the moral requires that one is obligated to respect rights of others only if they are obligated

if we make telling because in our formulation of the requirement, reciprocity nearly all the marginal cases can be easily and reasonably accommodated: AT: Only those who do, will be able to, are to a threshold degree able to, may again be able to, or did respect themoral rights of others are entitled
to moral rights.

his moral rights. The Achilles heel of that argument is that it cannot provide a basis for the obligations of the to the powerless. The argument presumes powerful is powerful to interfere with B's enough and that he can inhibit that power in well-being for B's inhibiting his power to interfere exchange with A's well-being. But what if A is blind, sickly, malnourished, timid, squeamish, poor, ignorant, a or otherwise unable to pose kindhearted, weakling, a threat to B's well-being? B cannot be obligated to inhibit his power to interfere through exchange with A's well-being when A has no power to inter? fere with B which he can inhibit in return. Thus, if reciprocity were a necessary condition for having moral from rights, the weak would be excluded moral rights against the strong. having The reciprocity requirement implies that only those strong enough to pose a threat to us can gain moral rights against us. Such aMachiavellian view of moral rights fits ill with our common morality. of the basic purposes of moral rights is to protect the weak against the strong, so that the can have a fair chance of fulfilling weak their interests. To the extent that a theory of moral rights cannot provide a basis for this function, it is surely a few mar? for we are not discussing inadequate, One ginal cases here but a primary, pervasive purpose of moral rights. In order to remedy this inadequacy, we may note that just as there is a strong intuitive appeal to the so there is a strong intui? requirement, reciprocity tive appeal, again based on fairness, to limiting the application of that requirement by having different for A's having moral rights against requirements that A

the cases, remaining marginal namely, from severely, incurably retarded or psychopathic a very small, sequestered birth, constitute group can be treated as "honorary rights-holders" which out of deference to the feelings of species affinity most all of us share. This special treatment of these isolated cases does not compromise uncommon, the reciprocity requirement, for that requirement is intended for common cases. Just as giving women and children first place in the lifeboats does not imply that they normally have superior rights to so making a few, extraordinary people hon? men, orary rights-holders rocity requirement situations. Morally which our common moral principles must be super? we cannot infer from our prac? seded; consequently, tice in such special cases to what our common moral from marginal cases is not particu? it does not come to grips larly insightful because reason why the reciprocity with the requirement has such intuitive appeal. I think the reason behind this appeal is not species prejudice but a matter of fairness: A's having a right against B is correlated with B's having a duty to A; itwould be unfair for principles This argument are. does not imply that the recip? is not being observed in normal cases are situations in special

The

MORAL COMMUNITY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS as he is and against those who are as powerful than he is. If those who are vastly more powerful then if B gives up A and B are equally powerful, a power which A does not reciprocate, he will be for fulfilling in the competition at a disadvantage is needed here to prevent interests. Reciprocity sort of and to insure an intuitive exploitation when the weak equality of opportunity. However, are dealing with the strong, the situation is reversed. the In order to prevent the strong from exploiting weak and to insure that the weak have a fair chance of fulfilling their interests, what is required is that the strong inhibit their power over the weak and/or that the weak be given additional power against the strong. Giving moral rights to the weak, with correlative tive duties duties for the strong but without correla? for the weak, would help accomplish respect. We

253

can earn the respect embodied inmoral rights only by being (capable of being) moral agents, because respect, being the highest of moral must be reserved for the acknowledgements, in highest of values, and as Kant said, "Nothing even beyond the world?indeed, the nothing world?can called
w///."8

good

possibly without

be conceived qualification

which except

could be a good

Kant believed that since animals lack practical reason, they are merely creatures of nature excluded from the community of moral agents, or "kingdom of ends," and may, therefore, be regarded as mere means to human satisfaction. Others have disag? reed: Hume thought it so evident that animals have reason that he declared practical to spend time defending ridiculous Darwin thought that animals exhibit of virtues, at least some of which it would be that they do;9 a great variety

this. If this distinction is correct and the reciprocity does not apply to dealings between the requirement then the reciprocity strong and the weak, require? ment generally does not apply to dealings between humans and animals and, therefore, generally does not pose an obstacle to extending moral rights to are vastly more powerful animals. Humans than animals. No animal preys on us or ordinarily human threatens lives; no animal ordinarily to imprison us, to take our territory, to our societies, to cause us pain, or otherwise destroy to interfere with our fulfilling our basic interests.7 On the other hand, we routinely do all these things to animals. So, if fairness is the goal, what is needed is not that animals agree to treat us "as well as" we treat them; what is needed is to protect animals from human exploitation. Extending moral rights to animals would help accomplish this. threatens II. The Agency Requirement

contemporary naturalists also believe they have observed;10 and even Harry Truman declared, "If you want a true friend in this life, get a dog!" So, that animals cannot meet

the agency requirement is not obvious. since I and others have elsewhere exten? However, the ability of animals to meet this sively discussed I want here to discuss the agency requirement,11 from the same perspective from which requirement we viewed the reciprocity requirement, namely, the goals of morality. Thoroughly settling this issue is certainly out of the question here, but enough can be said briefly to establish a reasonable presumption against the and to indicate where the agency requirement burden of proof lies. We have already noted that the weak and insuring that all have a protecting fair chance of fulfilling their interests are goals of to the contrary notwithstanding, Kant morality. minimizing suffering and increasing enjoyment of and satisfaction with life are also goals of common morality. Finally, promoting and rewarding virtues are also such as integrity, courage, and compassion of common How the agency goals morality. of these three families requirement impacts common moral goals will give a substantial indica? tion of its moral The worth. in directly virtues: for) have their functions agency requirement and rewarding (the capacity promoting the (potentially) virtuous will only that of accomplishing

This that only moral maintains requirement agents are entitled to moral rights. "Having a right to" something is in the same family as being able to claim something "as one's due," being "entitled to" it, being "owed" it, "meriting" it, "deserving" it, and having "earned" it. These phrases suggest that in order to have rights we must do something like pass a test, achieve a certain standing, or attain a plateau to which the appropriate is response

254

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY this world humans, the clearly moral agents, namely, are vastly more powerful than the sup? moral non-moral agents, encouraging as resources to regard non-moral agents

ful? interests protected by moral rights. However, this third family of moral goals does not filling since those capable require the agency requirement, as being of being moral agents can be recognized of superior worth even if those who are not capable of being moral agents are accorded moral rights. agents (assuming liberating non-moral Although that is what animals are) would prohibit routinely not prohibit it would their interests, sacrificing the interests of moral agents fulfilling giving those of non-moral agents priority over fulfilling such as the traditional in non-routine situations, agents "burning building" examples. Giving not pride of place in our hierarchy of values need involve extending to them something like the divine so that they may dispose of non right of kings, moral agents in the way serfs could be disposed of for their master's benefit. Like the rulers in Plato's to and moral agents may be entitled Republic, for which the rights and responsibilities receive them without their special talents qualify being or even allowed to be tyrants over those encouraged who do not share their talents. and the suffering minimizing with of all beings the happiness maximizing interests should be most readily accomplished by to the impartial consideration rejecting obstacles of the interests of all, and the agency requirement have ques? is such an obstacle. Some philosophers utilitarian calculus tioned whether a species-neutral would really call for an end to treating animals as Intuitively, several billion birds and resources.12 However, and trillions of fish are slaughtered annu? mammals ally just in the United States, and in virtually all cases there are non-animal alternatives for fulfilling the human needs for which these animals lose the remainder of their potentially happy lives. These facts put the burden of proof squarely on those who would counter the intuitive and contend that utility may be maximized by treating animals as resources. To date, this burden has not been met; so, we may that the utili? intuitions and conclude of moral goals would be more effec? tarian family the agency requirement.13 tively pursued without the weak and the goals of protecting Similarly, their interests all a fair chance at fulfilling giving could be more effectively pursued by extending moral rights to all beings with interests. Since in follow our moral

posedly agents rather than corrects the disparities of exacerbates in our world. So, once again, common moral power be more could effectively by pursued goals the agency requirement. rejecting Itmight be countered that our power over animals use of them to satisfy our and our consequent an unfair advantage interests do not constitute Since we are moral correction. needing moral and they are not, we are entitled to have agents over that power them and to exercise power of course) to our advantage. (humanely, In response, we may note that it is rather strange to say that our ability to judge and act disinteres?

the impunity tedly entitles us to disregard with the power that moral interests of others. Intuitively, is the power to agents ought to have and exercise the out moral and to establish carry judgements in the world. Once again, it is of morality reign not the power of the feudal lord to use others (humanely, of course) as he pleased but something of like the restricted, counter-balanced power which is the power befit? Plato's philosopher-kings ting moral agents. Only Kant's "holy will," a being in the who cannot be tempted from or mistaken of the good, is worthy of having and exer? pursuit over others. Con? uninhibited power cising it remains arbitrary that other beings sequently, with interests are so vastly weaker than we are that from being their interests they cannot protect sacrificed by us. In order to provide these routinely their interests, we others a fair chance at fulfilling our self-interested need to inhibit, not rationalize, is such exercise of power. The agency requirement a rationalization. Thus, none of our three families of common and two moral goals needs the agency requirement, it. of them would be more readily attained without The tradition cited earlier in favor of this to these in comparison is lightweight requirement reasons against it.While Kant provides a substan? tive argument for treating all moral agents as ends that only the he merely in themselves, presumes interests of moral agents should be protected against no one has routine sacrifice. To my knowledge, linguistic

MORAL COMMUNITY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS of the agency justification provided a substantive This may be due to coupling the intui? requirement. tive appeal of the idea that those who have acted to have (some of) their rights immorally deserve taken away (at least temporarily) with a failure to distinguish clearly between immoral and non-moral agents, thereby leaving looking intuitively further justification. for the until a substantive omission, justification the arguments just is provided, agency requirement indicate that being (capable of being) a developed moral agent should not be a requirement for having moral rights. III. The Relations This Requirement the agency requirement and in need of no acceptable the reason for this Whatever human interests which

255

do not sanction the routine more interests. Consequently, of giving priority to fulfilling to justify withholding human interests is needed moral rights from animals?especially, since, as we have already seen, common moral goals would be more readily attained through extending moral sacrifice of animal than a justification to the argument response for the relations requirement is that it is as mistaken as common is abstract about morality One of the primary functions of egalitarianism. of moral rights, is to inhibit morality, especially favoritism based on familial, personal, etc., rela? a we have developed tions. To accomplish this, "justice is blind" family of moral imperatives: "take a disinterested viewpoint," "give equal considera? tion to all concerned," your "try to universalize "disregard (as if behind 'a veil of ignor? and so forth. This ance') individual differences," is as much a part of family of moral imperatives as are the relational priorities common morality noted above. For example, while a father is justified actions," in giving priority to fulfilling the interests of his in doing so by child, he would not be justified taking food from another needy child, enslaving a stranger, or killing a business competitor. A father can be morally criticized even for using his dis? cretionary income to purchase luxuries for his child while contributing nothing to help starving children in addition to in other parts of the world. Thus, common mor? relational rights and responsibilities, ality also contains egalitarian rights and respon? the with the latter counter-balancing sibilities, former by restricting the ways in which relational priorities may be pursued, imposing impartial obli? gations on us, requiring us to add a disinterested of what is right, and appraisal to our judgements so forth. The advocates of the relations requirement seek to incorporate common egalitarian principles into are that these principles their theory by claiming on the capacity humans have to enter into based etc., relations with any other political, personal, human and the fact that today we do have political and economic relations with people throughout the world. In these two ways we form a global, human it is claimed, creates the moral community which, rights to animals. A more fundamental

requirement derives from one of the tradi? to both utilitarianism and Kan? tional objections tianism: the universal egalitarianism they profess to common morality and uncon? is both unfaithful vincing as a goal for moral reform. In common to give morality we are not under an obligation to everyone. We are not only equal consideration permitted but even obligated to give priority to the and interests of our families, friends, colleagues, these non and a world from which compatriots, egalitarian commitments were abolished would not a be enhanced but impoverished. Consequently, must moral theory based on universal impartiality Moral rights and be artificial and unconvincing. are not based on abstract principles responsibilities but on our living together, entering into familial, etc., relations with economic, personal, political, each other, and, in general, being involved in each other's lives. It follows that since animals cannot enter into these relations with us, we are not only to fulfilling in giving human justified priority to do so. interests but even obligated An obvious response to this argument is that we can have personal, and quasi extended-familial, economic relations with animals, and even if the more extensive relations we can have with humans to this theory, justify our giving would, according to fulfilling human interests, they do not priority justify our treating animals as resources for human as we have already This is because, satisfaction. are ways of giving priority to fulfilling seen, there

256

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY are already enjoyed by of one's interests which If equality and priority can interweave humans. to form a practicable morality when dealing with inter human relations, they can do so when dealing with relations between humans and animals. Perhaps Peter Singer's clarion call for "equal consideration on this of interests"14 has caused misunderstanding if we remember that such phrases point. However, as "all men are created equal," "equal standing before the law," and "equal opportunity for all" have become standard parts of our moral tradition without denying that "charity begins at home" and similar traditional such misun? priorities, should simply fade away. derstanding IV. Conclusion There is no denying that for the reasons cited in and relations agency, support of the reciprocity, animals cannot enter fully into the requirements, that humans can enjoy with each other. community that this incapacity justifies treating ani? However, mals as resources for human satisfaction is neither nor established for self-evident the arguments by that inference which have been offered to date. The that that arguments offered here do not demonstrate inference could not be justified, but I think they is do show that until (if ever) such justification that inference should be rejected. provided, Most people, philosophers included, seem to feel that we are obviously justified in sacrificing animals as resources for human satisfaction and, con? that calls for liberating animals from sequently, such treatment must be wrong. Anti-animal rights arguments are attempts to justify that feeling. The arguments of this paper have tried to combat that the proposed justifi? feeling not just by criticizing that liberating cations for it but also by emphasizing animals is at least strongly suggested by a variety concerns which also have strong intuitive I would In closing, like to quote a few appeal. I think, sentences James which, from William of advocates express the feeling which motivates animal rights: "Take any demand, however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make. it not, for its own sake, to be satisfied? If Ought of moral
not, prove why not."15

we have against and to rights and responsibilities all humans?but, of course, not to animals, since lack this capacity and are not partners in our they global politics and economy. I This analysis simply does not ring true. When contribute to charities helping starving children in Asia or refuse to purchase products made in South it is not at all because Asian children or Africa, blacks are my partners in a global South African economy or because Imay come to have personal or political relations with them. I contribute and boycott because I recognize a need I can help meet In so far as and an injustice I can help combat. there is a sense of community my underlying or linguistic actions, it is not a political, economic, but, roughly, a sense that we are all community vulnerable, suffering beings and ought to help each other out. It is not being part of a global community to all humans; that creates our moral obligations it is feeling that "we're all in the same boat" rather, and morally bound to each other that gives us a sense of being part of a global, moral community. Thus, at the global level, the relations theory has the relation between morality and community back? it does not succeed in incor? wards. Consequently, the common egalitarian principles which porating our counter-balance etc., familial, political, priorities. If our sense of a global, moral community derives from our ability to be moved by and feel obligated then that to help relieve the suffering of others, are unable to enter fully into familial, animals etc., relations with us does not preclude economic, their entering into a global, moral community with us and benefitting from having moral rights against us. It would be our inability to feel moved by and to help relieve the suffering of animals obligated which would prevent the extension of moral rights to animals on the grounds of this sort of community. the existence of the animal rights move? However, ment shows that we are capable of being so moved and feeling so obligated. of is a weave The fabric of common morality contrary forces; arguments for animal rights need to make not deny this nor otherwise attempt common morality out to be simpler than it is. This is because what is being sought for animals are the same basic moral rights against the routine sacrifice California State University, Hayward

Received

February

21,

1984

MORAL COMMUNITY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS

257

NOTES
1. See Richard 1 (1979), pp. 251-68. Steinbock, and the Idea of Equality," Philosophy, "Speciesism to equal justice" in Sect 77, "The Basis for being "entitled 1971). vol 53 vol 53 (1978), (1978), pp. 465-79, pp. 501-21. and Leslie Francis and Richard vol 53 (1978), pp. 249-56. John Rawls of Justice suggests pp. A. Watson, 088-129; "Self-Consciousness and L. B. Cebik, of Nonhuman and the Rights Animals and Nature," Environmental vol. Ethics, Have Rights? No and Yes," 12 (1981), "Can Animals The Philosophical vol. Forum,

2. See Bonnie an agency Harvard

requirement University

of Equality,"

of A Theory

(Cambridge:

Press,

3. See Cora Diamond, Norman, 4. P has refers other "Some

and Eating People," Philosophy, "Eating Meat Are More than Others," Animals Philosophy, Equal (will affect,

an interest in x if and only if x affects to pleasure fit and feeling and pain, feeling to or detract from contribute feelings which

"animal" refers to all and only rights literature, of the term. See my "The Moral of Interests," Environmental than the biological Ethics, understanding Significance Needs and Language," Ethics and Animals, and "Interests and Animals, vol 4 (1983), pp. 38-49. pp. 345-58, 5. The Right 6. Some and the Good claim (Oxford: The Clarendon and marginal Press, 1930), p. 48. rights;

would of well-being. of well-being" affect) P's feelings "Feelings and depression, and frustration, of fulfillment and the many feelings with life. In this paper, as throughout the enjoyment of or satisfaction the animal a more non-human with is almost limited use interests, which beings certainly ill, elation vol. 4 (1982),

There

philosophers people vol 64 (1955), The Philosophical Review, Any Natural Rights?," as resources that infants and marginal sacrificed people may be routinely from the perspective people; of what animal infants 7. That and marginal some animals under the difference

that infants

do not have morale pp. 175-91.

However,

viewed

for fulfilling are seeking for animals, these rightists here is merely terminological. be used among

H. L. A. Hart, "Are for example, these philosophers would not agree the interests of normal humans. Consequently, see, philosophers are extending moral rights to

be considered no more telling

interests cannot threaten human occasionally for moral the requirements rights and obligations than for them. animals against of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. L. A. tr. Lewis Selby-Bigge White Beck

as an objection as too weak to regarding to animals case arguments are the equally powerful. Marginal

8. Foundations 9. A Treatise

(Indianapolis: Clarendon

Bobbs-Merrill, Press, studies 1888), cited p.

1959), 176.

p. 9.

of Human

Nature,

(Oxford: of Man and

The

III and IV of Darwin's The Descent 10. See Chapters Press, (Ithaca; Cornell University 1978). 11. See Mary 45-52,

the ethological

inMary

Midgley's

Beast

and Man

pp.

Beast American and Man, Moral my "Are Animals Midgley, Beings?," (Oxford: Oxford Stephen R. L. Clark, The Nature of the Beast University Be Moral Agents?," Ethics and Animals, vol 4 (1983), "Can Animals pp. 50-61. 12. See, 13. The for example, R. G. Frey, Rights, Killing and Suffering (Oxford: Blackwell,

Philosophical Press, 1982),

Quarterly, and Lawrence

vol E.

17 (1980), Johnson,

1983),

pp.

197-203. animals Since are replaced this argument Ethics and Animals

so far to these facts is the so-called response argument:" only at all plausible "replacement slaughtered bred just for that purpose; does not cause a loss of happiness in the animal world. so, slaughter by animals has been adequately rebutted elsewhere, I shall not deal with it here. See my "On Being Morally Expendable," vol. 3 (1982), pp. 58-72, and George P. Cave, "On the Irreplaceability of Animal B. Pluhar, Life," Evelyn and James E. White, "Are Sentient Beings Are Replaceable?," of his Animal Hafner all in Ethics and Animals, (New York: Co., vol Avon 3 (1982), Books, pp. 1975).

"On Replaceability,"

91-117.

14. See Chapter 15. Essays

1, "All Animals ed. A.

Equal,"

Liberation Publishing

in Pragmatism,

Castell

(New York:

1948),

p. 73.