PROJECT REPORT

A STUDY ON FIVE WORLD FAMOUS AIRLINE DISASTER

A STUDY ON FIVE WORLD FAMOUS AIRLINE DISASTER

PROJECT REPORT

Submitted by: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx DIPLOMA IN AIRPORT MANAGEMENT GUIDERS ACADEMY, KOCHI - 16

SEPTEMBER 2011

DECLARATION

I affirm that the project work titled A STUDY ON FIVE WORLD FAMOUS AIRLINE DISASTER is the original work carried out by me. It has not formed the part of any other project work submitted for award of any degree or diploma, either in this or any other institutions.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxx Place: xxxxxxxxxxx Date: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

With great pleasure, I am presenting this project entitled "A STUDY ON FIVE WORLD FAMOUS AIRLINE DISASTER". A Project of this dimension would not have been possible without the sincere help and earnest support provided to me from all sources that was approached. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

INTRODUCTION

An aviation

accident is

defined

in

the Convention

on

International

Civil

Aviation Annex 13 as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, in which a person is fatally or seriously injured, the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure or the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible. The first fatal aviation accident occurred in a Wright Model A aircraft at Fort Myer, Virginia, USA, on September 17, 1908, resulting in injury to the pilot, Orville Wright and death of the passenger, Thomas Selfridge An aviation incident is also defined there as an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations. An accident in which the damage to the aircraft is such that it must be written off, or in which the plane is destroyed is called a hull loss accident.

WHAT MAY BE THE REASONS FOR ANY AIR CRASH?

There are many explanations for an airplane crash. Usually the crash is a result of more than 2 reasons. Just like a car accident, it usually occurs when one driver is distracted and the other driver is speeding and the roads are slippery with rain. The general categories for airplane crashes include: Weather - Poor visibility. Icing conditions. Some pilots are not trained or equipped to fly at night and find themselves having to continue flying to reach an airport after it gets dark. An example of this John Kennedy's plane that was lost at night in the ocean near Marthar's Vineyard. Mechanical - This can be a failure of a part during normal service. Most aircraft systems have built-in redundancy so that a failure of one part will not create an unsafe condition. Some mechanical failures is due to bad maintenance; such as someone forgetting to tighten a bolt. Pilot Error - this can vary from not paying attention to his instruments or watching for other a/c. People are only human so many accidents are attributed to poor judegment of the pilot. For example; the weather may be getting bad but the pilot chooses to fly into the storm. Larger passenger airliners have 2 or more flight crew which helps eliminate some human errors. Air Traffic Controller - Sometimes the traffic controller gives the "Clear to Takeoff" or similar instructions that result in an accident. Cockpit Management - Airlines now stress that the Pilot In Command should keep control of the situation and accept inputs from his crew without judging them. If the Pilot In Command begins to ignore or judge the recommendations of the crew, the crew will not function as a team and someone will over-look something that will lead to an accident.

Fuel Starvation - This is really a subset of Pilot Error but it can be the result of several factors.

MUNICH AIR DISASTER

The Munich air disaster occurred on 6 February 1958, when British European AirwaysFlight 609 crashed on its third attempt to take off from a slush-covered runway at Munich-Riem Airport in Munich, West Germany. On board the plane was the Manchester Unitedfootball team, nicknamed the "Busby Babes", along with a number of supporters and journalists. Twenty of the 44 people on board the aircraft died in the crash. The injured, some of whom had been knocked unconscious, were taken to the Rechts der Isar Hospital in Munich where three more died, resulting in a total of 23 fatalities with 21 survivors.

The team was returning from a European Cup match in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, against Red Star Belgrade, but had to make a stop in Munich for refuelling, as a nonstop trip from Belgrade to Manchester was out of the "Elizabethan" class Airspeed Ambassador aircraft's range. After refuelling, the pilots, Captains James Thain and Kenneth Rayment, attempted to take off twice, but had to abandon both attempts due to boost surging in the port engine. Fearing that they would get too far behind schedule, Captain Thain rejected an overnight stay in Munich in favour of a third take-off attempt. By the time of the third attempt, it had begun to snow, causing a layer of slush to build up at the end of the runway. When the aircraft hit the slush, it lost velocity, making take-off impossible. It ploughed through a fence past the end of the runway, before the port wing hit a nearby house and was torn off. Fearing that the aircraft might explode, Captain Thain set about getting the surviving passengers as far away as possible. Despite this, Manchester United goalkeeper Harry Gregg remained behind to pull survivors from the wreckage.

An investigation by the West German airport authorities originally blamed Captain Thain for the crash, claiming that he had failed to de-ice the wings of the aircraft,

despite statements to the contrary from eyewitnesses. It was later established that the crash had, in fact, been caused by the build-up of slush on the runway, which had resulted in the aircraft being unable to achieve take-off velocity; Thain's name was eventually cleared in 1968, ten years after the incident.

At the time of the disaster, Manchester United were trying to become only the third club to win three successive English league titles; they were six points behind League leadersWolverhampton Wanderers with 14 games to go. They were also holders of the Charity Shield and had just advanced into their second successive European Cup semi-final. The team were also on an 11-match unbeaten run, and had booked their place in the Fifth Round of the FA Cup two weeks previously.

Munich air disaster

An Airspeed Ambassador similar to the one involved in the crash Accident summary Date Type Site 6 February 1958 Take-off failure Munich, West Germany

480734.09N 114039.98E Passengers Crew Injuries Fatalities Survivors Aircraft type Aircraft name Operator Tail number Flight origin 38 6 19 23 21 Airspeed AS-57 Ambassador Lord Burghley British European Airways G-ALZU Belgrade Airport, SFR Yugoslavia Munich-Riem Airport, West Germany Destination Manchester Airport, England

Stopover

Background

The Airspeed Ambassador G-ALZU at Riem airport before take-off In April 1955, UEFA established the European Cup, a football competition for the champion clubs of UEFA-affiliated nations, to begin in the 195556 season. However, the English league winners, Chelsea, were denied entry by the Football League's secretary Alan Hardaker, who believed it was in the best interests of English football and football in general for them not to enter. The following season, the English league was won by Manchester United, managed by Matt Busby. Originally, the Football League again denied entry to the European Cup, but Busby and his chairman, Harold Hardman, with the help of the Football Association's chairman Stanley Rous, defied the league and United became the first English team to venture into Europe. The Manchester United management had taken a chance, and it had paid off, with the team known as the "Busby Babes" for their youth proving the Football League wrong by reaching the semi-finals of the 195657 competition, being knocked out by eventual winners Real Madrid. Winning the First Division title again that season meant that they secured qualification for the 195758 tournaments, and their successful cup run in 195657 meant that they were one of the favourites to win it. Domestic league matches were played on Saturdays and European matches were played midweek, so, although air travel was risky at the time, it was the only practical choice if United were

to fulfil their league fixtures, which they would have to do if they were to avoid proving Alan Hardaker right. After overcoming Shamrock Rovers and Dukla Prague in the preliminary round and the first round respectively, Manchester United were drawn with Red Star

Belgrade of Yugoslavia for the quarter-finals. After beating the Yugoslavians 21 at Old Trafford on 21 January 1958, the club was scheduled to travel to Yugoslavia for the return leg on 5 February. On the way back from Prague in the previous round, fog over England prevented the team from flying back to Manchester, so they hastily made arrangements to fly to Amsterdam before taking the ferry from the Hook of Holland to Harwich and then the train up to Manchester. The trip took its toll on the players and they were only able to scrape a 33 draw with Birmingham City at St Andrew's three days later. Eager not to miss any of their Football League fixtures in the future, and also not to have to go through such a difficult trip again, the club chartered a plane through British European Airways from Manchester to Belgrade for the away leg against Red Star. The match itself was drawn 33, but it was enough to send United to the semifinals. The takeoff from Belgrade was delayed for an hour as United outside

rightJohnny Berry had lost his passport, then the plane made a planned stop in Munich to refuel, landing at 13:15 GMT. Crash

The Airspeed Ambassador G-ALZUburning at Munich Captain James Thain, the pilot, had flown the "Elizabethan" class Airspeed Ambassador (registration G-ALZU) out to Belgrade, but handed the controls to his co-pilot, Captain Kenneth Rayment, for the return journey. At 14:19 GMT, the control tower at Munich airport was told that the plane was ready to take off, and they were given clearance to attempt take-off due to expire at 14:31. Captain Rayment abandoned the take off after Captain Thain had noticed the port boost pressure gauge fluctuating as the plane reached full power and the engine sounded odd while accelerating. A second attempt was made three minutes later, but, 40 seconds into the procedure, this too was called off before the plane got off the ground. The reason given for the failed attempts was that the engines had been running on an over-rich mixture, causing the engines to overaccelerate, a common problem for the Elizabethan-class plane. After the second failure, all the passengers were told to disembark from the plane and they retreated to the airport lounge. By then, it had started to snow heavily, and it looked unlikely that the plane would be making the return journey that day. Manchester United's Duncan Edwards took the opportunity to send a telegram ahead to his landlady in Manchester. It read: "All flights cancelled, flying tomorrow. Duncan." Captain Thain informed the station engineer, Bill Black, about the problem with the boost surging in the port engine, and Black suggested that since the immediate solution of opening the engine throttle more slowly had not worked, the only remaining option would be to hold the plane in Munich overnight for engine retuning. Thain was anxious to stay on schedule and suggested that opening the throttle even more slowly would suffice. This would mean that the plane would not achieve take-off velocity until further down the runway, but with the runway being almost 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) long, Thain believed that this should not pose a problem. Therefore, despite the snow, the passengers were called back out to the plane just 15 minutes after leaving it. A few of the players were not confident fliers, particularly Liam Whelan, who was heard to say "This may be death, but I'm ready" shortly before take off. Others, including Duncan Edwards, Tommy Taylor, Mark Jones, Eddie Colman and Frank Swift moved to the back of the plane, believing it to be safer. Once everyone was back on board, Captains Thain and Rayment got the plane moving again for a third take off

attempt at 14:56. At 14:59, they reached the runway holding point, where they received clearance to line up ready for take-off. On the runway, the final cockpit checks were carried out and at 15:02, they were contacted to tell them that their take-off clearance would expire at 15:04. After discussion, the pilots agreed that they would attempt takeoff, but they would keep a close watch on the instruments in case of any more surging in the engines. At 15:03, they contacted the control tower to inform them of their decision.

American newsreel footage reporting the crash Captain Rayment slowly moved the throttle forward, as agreed, and released the brakes; the plane began to accelerate, and radio officer Bill Rodgers radioed the control tower with the message "Zulu Uniform rolling". As the plane gathered speed, throwing up slush as it went, Captain Thain called out the velocities in ten-knot increments. At 85 knots, the port engine began to surge again, and he pulled back marginally on the port throttle before gingerly pushing it forward again. Once the plane reached 117 knots (217 km/h), he announced "V1", indicating that they had reached the velocity at which it was no longer safe to abort the take off, and Captain Rayment listened out for the call of "V2" (9 knots (220 km/h)), the minimum speed required to get the plane off the ground. When Thain glanced back down to the airspeed indicator, expecting the needle

to continue to rise, it fluctuated at around 117 knots before suddenly dropping back down to 112 knots (207 km/h), and then 105 knots (194 km/h). Rayment shouted "Christ, we won't make it!", as Thain looked up to see what lay ahead of them. The plane skidded off the end of the runway and, out of control, crashed into the fence surrounding the airport and then across a road before its port wing was torn off as it caught a house, home to a family of six. The father and eldest daughter were away at the time, and the mother and the other three children narrowly escaped with their lives as the house caught fire. Part of the plane's tail was torn off too, before the left side of the cockpit hit a tree. The right side of the fuselage hit a wooden hut, inside which was a truck filled with tyres and fuel, which exploded. Twenty passengers died on board, and there were three subsequent deaths. Upon seeing the flames licking up around the cockpit, Captain Thain feared that the burning fuel might make the aircraft explode and instructed his crew to evacuate the area. The stewardesses, Rosemary Cheverton and Margaret Bellis, were the first to leave through a blown-out emergency window in the galley, and they were followed by radio officer Bill Rodgers. Thain shouted to Rayment to get out of his seat, but Rayment was trapped in his seat by the crumpled fuselage. Rayment told Thain to go on without him. Thain clambered out of the galley window. Upon reaching the ground, he saw that flames were growing under the starboard wing, which still had an intact fuel tank containing 500 imperial gallons (2,300 L) of fuel. He shouted to his crew to get as far away as possible and climbed back into the aircraft to retrieve two handheld fire extinguishers, stopping momentarily to tell Rayment that he would be back for him when the fires had been dealt with. Meanwhile, inside the passenger cabin, Manchester United goalkeeper Harry Gregg was regaining consciousness, thinking that he was dead. He felt blood running down his face and he "didn't dare put [his] hand up. [He] thought the top of [his] head had been taken off, like a hard boiled egg." Just above him, a shaft of light was shining into the cabin, so Gregg made his way towards it and kicked the hole wide enough for him to escape through.

Investigation Although the crash was originally blamed on pilot error, it was subsequently found to have been caused by the build-up of slush towards the end of the runway, causing deceleration of the aircraft and preventing safe flying speed from being attained. During the take off, the aircraft had attained a speed of 117 knots (217 km/h), but, on entering the slush, speed dropped to 105 knots (194 km/h), too slow for the plane to leave the ground, with not enough runway remaining to abort the take off. Aircraft with tailwheel undercarriages had not been greatly affected by slush, due to the geometry of these undercarriages in relation to the aircraft's centre of gravity,[citation needed] but newer types, such as the Ambassador, with nose wheel landing-gear and the main wheels behind the centre of gravity, were found to be vulnerable. The accident resulted in the instigation of operating limits for the amount of slush build-up permitted on runways. Despite this conclusion, the German airport authorities (who were legally responsible for the state of the airport's runways, but generally unaware of the danger of slush on runways for aircraft like the Ambassador) took legal action against Captain Thain, as the one pilot who had survived the crash. They claimed that he had taken off without deicing the wings and that responsibility for the accident was his alone, despite several witnesses stating that this was not so. The basis of the German authorities' case relied on a photograph of the aircraft (published in several newspapers) taken shortly before take off, that appeared to show snow on the upper wing surfaces. When the original negative was examined, however, no snow or ice could be seen, the "snow" having been due to the published pictures being produced from a copy negative.[citation
needed]

The witnesses were not called to the German inquiry and proceedings against

Thain dragged on until 1968, when he was finally cleared of any responsibility for the crash. As the official cause, British authorities recorded a build-up of melting snow on the runway which prevented the Elizabethan from reaching the required take-off speed. Thain, having been dismissed by BEA shortly after the accident and never re-engaged, retired and returned to run his poultry farm in Berkshire. He died of a heart attack at the age of 53, in 1975

Aftermath Seven of Manchester United's players died immediately, and Duncan Edwards died from his injuries on 21 February at the Rechts der Isar Hospital in Munich. Johnny Berry and Jackie Blanchflower were both injured so severely that they never played again. Matt Busby was seriously injured and had to stay in hospital for more than two months after the crash, and was read his Last Rites twice. After being discharged from hospital, he went to Switzerland to recuperate in Interlaken. At times, he felt like giving up on football entirely, until he was told by his wife, Jean, "You know Matt, the lads would have wanted you to carry on." That statement lifted Busby from his depression, and he returned by land to Manchester, before watching his team play in the 1958 FA Cup Final. Meanwhile, there was speculation that the club would fold, but a threadbare United team completed the 195758 season, with Busby's assistant Jimmy Murphy standing in as manager; he had not travelled to Belgrade as he was in Cardiff managing the Welsh national team at the time. A team largely made up of reserve and youth team players beat Sheffield Wednesday 30 in the first match after the disaster. The programme for that match showed simply a blank space where each United player's name should have been. Following the loss of so many players in the crash, United were desperate to find replacements with experience, so Murphy turned to players like Ernie Taylor (signed for 8,000 from Blackpool) and Stan Crowther, the Aston Villa wing half who had played against United in the 1957 FA Cup Final. There were changes amongst the backroom staff at the club too, following the deaths of secretary Walter Crickmer and coaches Tom Curryand Bert Whalley. United goalkeeper Les Olive, still registered as a player at the time of the disaster, retired from playing and took over from Crickmer as club secretary,] while another former United goalkeeper, Jack Crompton, took over coaching duties after United chairmanHarold Hardman had negotiated with Crompton's thenemployers Luton Town for his release. United only won one league game after the crash, causing their title challenge to collapse and they fell to ninth place in the league. They did manage to reach the final of the FA Cup, however, losing 20 to Bolton Wanderers, and even managed to

beat Milan at Old Trafford in the semi-finals of the European Cup, only to lose 40 at the San Siro. Real Madrid, who went on to win the trophy for the third year running, suggested that Manchester United be awarded the trophy for that year a suggestion supported by Red Star Belgrade but this failed to materialise. Busby resumed managerial duties the next season (195859), and eventually built a second generation of Busby Babes, including George Best and Denis Law, that ten years later won the European Cup, beating Benfica. Bobby Charlton and Bill Foulkes were the only two crash survivors who lined up in that team. Memorials Old Trafford

Commemorative plaque in the Munich Tunnel at Old Trafford The first memorials at Old Trafford to the lost players and staff were unveiled on 25 February 1960. The first, a plaque in the shape of the stadium with the image of a green pitch, inscribed with the names of the victims in black and gold glass, was placed above the entrance to the directors' box. Above the plaque was a teak carving of a player and a supporter, heads bowed either side of a wreath and a football inscribed with the date

"1958". The plaque was designed by Manchester architect J. Vipond and constructed by Messrs Jaconello (Manchester) Ltd. at a cost of 2,100, and unveiled by Matt Busby. Also unveiled that day was a memorial to the members of the press who died at Munich, which consisted of a bronze plaque that named the eight lost journalists. The unveiling was performed by Munich survivor Frank Taylor on behalf of the Football Writers' Association. The original plaque was stolen in the 1980s and replaced by a replica now located behind the counter in the press entrance. The final memorial was the Munich clock, a simple two-faced clock paid for by the Ground Committee and attached to the south-east corner of the stadium, with the date "Feb 6th 1958" at the top of both faces and "Munich" at the bottom. The clock has remained in the same position since it was first installed. The clock was unveiled on 25 February 1960 by Dan Marsden, the chairman of the Ground Committee. When the stadium underwent renovations in the mid 1970s, it became necessary to move the plaque from the directors' entrance to allow the necessary changes. However, it was not possible to remove the plaque without damaging it, so the decision was taken to simply wall up the old memorial within the Main Stand and commission a new one. The replacement plaque was simpler than the original, now consisting simply of a slate pitch with the names inscribed upon it, and was installed in 1976. A third version of the memorial, more like the original than the second in that it included the stands around the slate pitch and the figures above it, was installed in 1996, coinciding with the erection of the statue of Matt Busby, who had unveiled the original memorial. This third version was constructed by stonemasons Mather and Ellis from Trafford Park, and the second was put into storage. It is currently awaiting new display panels before being placed into the club museum's Munich display. The third plaque and the statue of Busby were originally located on the north side of the East Stand, but the statue was moved to the front of the East Stand and the plaque to the south side of the stand after the stand's expansion in 2000.

Munich

Wooden memorial There are also two memorials in Germany. First, in the village of Trudering, on the corner of Karotschstrae and Emplstrae, there is a small wooden memorial depicting Jesus on the Cross, decorated by a stone trough filled with flowers. The trough bears a plaque with the inscription: "Im Gedenken an die Opfer der Flugzeugkatastrophe am 6.2.1958 unter denen sich auch ein Teil der Fuballmannschaft von Manchester United befand, sowie allen Verkehrstoten der Gemeinde Trudering" (English: In memory of the victims of the air disaster of 6.2.1958 including members of the football team of Manchester United as well as all the traffic victims from the municipality of Trudering).

Memorial stone On 22 September 2004, a dark blue granite plaque set in a sandstone border was unveiled in the vicinity of the old Munich Airport on the corner of Rappenweg and Emplstrae, just metres from the wooden memorial. It reads, in both English and German, "In memory of all those who lost their lives here in the Munich air disaster on the 6 February 1958". Underneath is a plaque expressing United's gratitude to the municipality of Munich and its people. The new memorial was funded by Manchester United themselves and the unveiling was attended by club officials, including chief executive David Gill, manager Alex Ferguson and director Bobby Charlton, a survivor of the disaster himself. On 24 April 2008, the town council of Munich decided to name the site where the memorial stone is placed "Manchesterplatz" (English: Manchester Square). 40th anniversary In late 1997, John Doherty approached United chairman Martin Edwards on behalf of the Manchester United Former Players' Association to request a testimonial for those

victims of the Munich disaster both the survivors and the dependants of the ones who were lost. Edwards was hesitant, but a benefit match was eventually sanctioned for a date as close to the 40th anniversary of the disaster as possible. Red Star Belgrade and Bayern Munich were touted as possible opponents for the match, and fans purchased tickets without the opponents even having been decided. However, in the midst of the preparations, former United player Eric Cantona, who had retired from football to pursue a career in film in the summer of 1997, expressed an interest in returning to Manchester United for a farewell match. Edwards, ever the businessman, took the opportunity to combine the two events into one. From then on, it seemed to some that the match had ceased to be primarily a tribute to the Busby Babes and more about Cantona. Due to Cantona's new acting career, his schedule meant that he would not be available in February and the match was moved to 18 August, with the opposition to be a European XI chosen by Cantona himself. Martin Edwards was criticised for turning the match into a publicity stunt, while Elizabeth Wood, the divorced wife of Munich survivor Ray Wood, compared the treatment of the Munich victims to that of "dancing bears at the circus". Nevertheless, the match earned 47,000 for each of the victims' families, while Eric Cantona recouped over 90,000 in expenses directly from the testimonial fund, rather than from the club. The club has also received criticism from some quarters for its poor treatment of the survivors: Johnny Berry was forced to leave the apartment he rented from the club to make way for a new player. On 7 February 1998, United played Bolton Wanderers at Old Trafford in the Premier League just a day after the 40th anniversary of the disaster. The match kicked off at 3:15 p.m. to allow a minute's silence to be observed at 3:06 p.m. Representatives from both teams laid floral tributes to those who lost their lives, with crash survivor and United director Bobby Charlton being joined by Bolton president Nat Lofthouse in leading out the two teams.[citation needed]

50th anniversary

Old Trafford's Munich Tunnel, unveiled in 2008 on the 50th anniversary of the disaster. A memorial service was held at Old Trafford on 6 February 2008. At the conclusion of the service, the surviving members of the 1958 team were the guests of honour at a ceremony to rename the tunnel under the stadium's South Stand as the "Munich Tunnel", which features an exhibition about the Busby Babes. On 6 February 2008, the England national football team took on Switzerland at Wembley Stadium. Before the game, pictures of the players who lost their lives at Munich were displayed on big screens, and England players wore black armbands. There was also a tribute to the Busby Babes in the match programme. Originally, a minute's silence was not to have been observed on the day, due to the Football Association's fears that the silence would not be respected by fans of Manchester United's rivals. However, they then agreed that a minute's silence should be held. In the event, it was generally well-observed, but a small number of supporters made whistles and cat-calls and the referee cut the silence short after less than 30 seconds.

Commemorative scarves laid out on the back of every seat prior to the game On 10 February 2008, at the derby match between Manchester United and Manchester City at Old Trafford, both teams were led onto the pitch by a lone piper playing "The Red Flag", and the managers Alex Ferguson and Sven-Gran Eriksson each laid a wreath in the centre circle. This was followed by a minute silence, which, despite previous concerns, was respected by all the fans. Kevin Parker, secretary of Manchester City's supporters club, had originally suggested a minute's applause instead of a minute's silence, so as to drown out anyone who would disrupt the silence, but this was rejected by the Manchester United management as inappropriate. United played in strips reminiscent of those worn by the 1958 team, numbered 111 with no advertising on the front or players' names on the back, while City removed sponsors' logos from their kit and the image of a small black ribbon was embroidered to the right shoulder; both teams wore black armbands in tribute to the victims of the Munich disaster. Manchester City won 21 thanks to first half goals from Darius Vassell and debutantBenjani. Fans in attendance were given commemorative scarves in red and white for the United fans, and blue and white for the City fans which were held up during the silence.

2000 Australia Beechcraft King Air crash

Sierra Kilo Charlie was the call sign for chartered Beechcraft 200 Super King Air which, on September 4, 2000, crashed near Mount Isa, Queensland, Australia. The flight plan of the aircraft called for the pilot to fly between Perth, Western Australia, and the mining town of Leonora, Western Australia. During the flight, the aircraft climbed above its assigned altitude. When air traffic control (ATC) contacted the pilot, the pilot's speech had become significantly impaired and he was unable to respond to instructions. Three aircraft intercepted the Beechcraft but were unable to make radio contact. The aircraft continued flying on a straight heading for five hours before running out of fuel and crashing near Mount Isa, Queensland. The incident became known in the media as the "Ghost Flight" A subsequent investigation concluded the pilot and the passengers had become incapacitated and had been suffering from hypoxia, a lack of oxygen to the body, meaning the pilot would have been unable to operate the aircraft. Towards the end of the flight, the left engine began to be starved of fuel and the aircraft impacted with the ground. The accident report said due to the damage to the aircraft upon impact with the ground, investigators were unable to conclude if any of the eight aboard used the oxygen system. The final report, issued by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) did not come to a conclusion as to what caused the occupants to become incapacitated. A number of safety recommendations were made following the accident.

Background The aircraft involved in the accident was a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air, registration VH-SKC,serial number BB-47, manufactured in 1975. The aircraft had been in service for a total for 18,771 hours before the accident. The amount of air passed into the cabin is controlled by bleed airvalves on the engines. The positions of the bleed air valves can be altered on the flight deck. According to the accident report, "The aircraft was not tted with a high cabin altitude aural warning device, nor was it required to be." The aircraft was fitted with an emergency oxygen systeman oxygen tank which could supply oxygen to the crew (through two masks located in the cockpit) and passengers (through masks which would drop down from the ceiling of the cabin). Accident investigators concluded the aircraft was airworthy at the time the accident occurred, and a pilot who had flown the aircraft several hours before the accident flight took off said the aircraft functioned normally. "The maintenance release was current and an examination of the aircrafts maintenance records found no recurring maintenance problems that may have been factors in the accident," the accident report stated.

Accident On September 4, 2000, the aircraft chartered by mining company Sons of Gwalia, departedPerth, Western Australia, for the mining town of Leonora, Western Australia, transporting seven workers to Gwalia Gold Mine. The aircraft took off from Perth at 1009 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), and one minute later was cleared by ATC to climb to FL130 (13,000 feet (4,000 m)). Five minutes later, at 1015, the aircraft was cleared to ascend to its cruising altitude of FL250 (25,000 feet (7,600 m)); the pilot was told to ascend to FL160 by the time it was 36 nmi (67 km) from Perth. The pilot acknowledged this transmission. Five minutes later, at 1020, as the aircraft passed through FL156 (15,600 feet (4,800 m)) it was cleared to waypoint DEBRA; the pilot acknowledged this. At approximately 1033 the aircraft ascended through FL256 (25,600 feet (7,800 m)) and ATC requested the pilot to confirm the altitude of the aircraft. Sierra Kilo Charlie umstandby," the pilot said. This was the final spoken transmission from the aircraft, and the altitude of the aircraft continued to increase. According to the accident report, transmissions from the aircraft thereafter were only open-microphone transmissions, sounds of what is believed to be standard background noise produced by the engines, a person breathing, "one unintelligible syllable" and "two chime-like tones, similar to those generated by electronic devices." ATC attempted to regain contact with the aircraft as the transmissions occurred. "Sierra Kilo Charlie Sierra Kilo Charlie Melbourne Centre if receiving this transmission squawk ident" the controller in contact with the aircraft said at 1040. At 1041, the controller asked again, "Sierra Kilo Charlie only receiving open mike from you. Would you contact me on one two ve decimal two." the aircraft fly near the Beechcraft to observe the situation aboard. The flight crew of the jet said the Beechcraft had levelled off at FL343 (34,300 feet (10,500 m)), and there

was no movement on the flight deck or in the cabin. They added the conditions made it difficult to make observations of the situation of the Beechcraft. Two other aircraft were then told to intercept and monitor the Beechcraft; they sighted it in theNorthern Territory, northwest of Alice Springs. The flight crews of the aircraft reported the Beechcraft was making a steady descent. Both aircraft followed the Beechcraft during the descent. The airspeed of the Beechcraft increased during the descent. "Although its external lights were on, nothing could be seen inside the cabin" the accident report stated. "The crews of the chase aircraft attempted to contact the pilot of the Beechcraft by radio but they did not receive a response." At 1510, the aircraft turned left through 90 degrees as it descended through FL50 (5,000 feet (1,500 m)). The aircraft impacted with the ground near Mount Isa, Queensland. Upon impact the aircraft broke up; all seven passengers and the pilot were killed.

Investigation The accident was investigated by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), a federal body responsible for investigating transportation accidents in Australia. The final accident report was published in March 2001. The report was unable to make a definitive conclusion as to the cause of the crash. The report found all those aboard the aircraft, including the pilot, had likely become incapacitated and begun suffering from hypoxia. Hypoxia is a lack of oxygen to body tissues and organs including the brain, heart and lungs, which can occur if an aircraft flying at high altitude becomes depressurized. When affected by hypoxia, a person may initially lose judgement and suffer impaired vision. "Simple tasks become extraordinarily difficult and performance fails," a report on hypoxia states. "As hypoxia continues, you become semiconscious. After you lose consciousness entirely, you have only minutes to live, depending on the altitude." The accident report stated, "After the aircraft climbed above the assigned altitude of FL250, the speech and breathing patterns of the pilot, evidenced during the radio transmissions, displayed changes consistent with hypoxia." Investigators were, however, unable to conclusively dismiss toxic fumes as the cause. "The incapacitation

of the pilot and passengers was probably due to hypobaric hypoxia because of the high cabin altitude and their not receiving supplemental oxygen" the report said, adding, "The reasons for the pilot and passengers not receiving supplemental oxygen [from the oxygen tank aboard the aircraft] could not be determined." The ATSB found it likely that the autopilot was engaged, and this caused the aircraft to fly on a straight heading; the vertical path of the aircraft indicated climb power had been set before the occupants of the aircraft were incapacitated. "The design of the aircraft systems were such that, with the autopilot engaged, the engines would continue to operate and the aircraft would continue to y without human input until it was disrupted by other events, such as collision or fuel exhaustion," according to the accident report. It was suggested that, towards to the end of the flight, the fuel tank for the left engine on the aircraft was almost empty. "The near exhaustion of fuel in the left wing tanks may have produced at least one, and probably several, momentary losses of left engine power shortly before all power was lost" the report said. "The aircraft yawed and rolled towards the left engine, as was observed shortly before the aircraft collided with the ground." The accident report said due to the damage to the aircraft upon impact with the ground, investigators were unable to conclude if any of the eight aboard used the oxygen system. However, the report stated "The absence of a distress radio call, or an attempt to descend the aircraft, and the likelihood that the pilot did not don his oxygen mask, suggested that the pilot was unaware that the aircraft was unpressurised or depressurising." The passengers, the report added, were also likely not wearing their oxygen masks, as there was no noise recorded on the ATC transmissions indicating they were attempting to assist the pilot. Investigators were not able to determine what caused the depressurisation of the aircraft, but stated likely causes included either an incorrect switch selection due to pilot error or a mechanical failure in the aircraft pressurization system. The air traffic control recordings suggested it was unlikely a rapid decompression had occurred. "During an explosive or rapid depressurisation of a pressurised aircraft, however, the noise, pressure changes, temperature changes and draughts within the cabin would have

alerted the occupants that a substantial failure had occurred," the report added. The document listed the two main factors in the accident as, Aftermath The flight deck of the Beechcraft Super King Air has visual warning if cabin altitude is too high.[22] It is likely the pilot of the accident aircraft was suffering from hypoxia and did not notice the visual warning. In the aftermath of an incident in 1999 involving the pilot of a Beechcraft Super King Air suffering hypoxia, the ATSB published Report 199902928 and recommended an aural warning be fitted on the flight deck, in addition to the visual warning, on all Beechcraft Super King Air aircraft. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) issued a notice to owners of pressurised aircraft registered in Australia recommending installation of an aural warning, but did not make it mandatory. The notice said, "The benefit to your pilots and passengers lies in the reduction in risk of an uncommanded depressurisation leading to an incident or fatal accident. The benefit is much greater than the cost of purchase and installation of one of these low-cost systems." When the air traffic controller responsible for the Beechcraft received the openmicrophone transmissions, he alerted his supervisor that he was concerned the pilot could be suffering from hypoxia. The controller and his supervisor completed the standard checklist which, at the time, did not include a procedure to follow in the case of incapacitation or hypoxia. In the aftermath of the accident, the checklist was changed to "incorporate procedures to be followed by air trafc controllers, when a controller suspects that a pilot has been affected by hypoxia."

Accident summary Date Type Site September 4, 2000 Crew incapacitation Mount Isa, Queensland,Australia Passengers Crew Fatalities Survivors Aircraft type 7 1 8 (all) 0 Beechcraft 200 Super King Air Tail number Flight origin Destination VH-SKC Perth, Western Australia Leonora, Western Australia

Air France Flight 4590 Air France Flight 4590 was a Concorde flight operated by Air France which was scheduled to run from Charles de Gaulle International Airport near Paris, to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City. On 25 July 2000, it crashed in Gonesse, France. All one hundred passengers and nine crew members on board the flight died. On the ground, four people were killed with one left injured. The flight was chartered by German company Peter Deilmann Cruises. All passengers were on their way to board the cruise ship MS Deutschland in New York City for a 16day cruise to South America. This was Concorde's only accident in which fatalities occurred. It was the beginning of the end for Concorde as an airliner; the type was retired three years later.

Event summary Post-accident investigation revealed that the aircraft was just at, if not exceeding, maximum weight for ambient temperature and other conditions, and up to one ton over maximum structural weight. As it left the gate, it was loaded such that the centre of gravity was excessively aft.]Fuel transfer during taxi may have overfilled number five wing tank. A twelve inch spacer that keeps the left main landing gear in alignment had not been replaced after recent maintenance, though the 2002 French Bureau Enquetes-

Accidents investigation concluded that this did not contribute to the accident. The wind at the airport was light and variable that day, and was reported to the cockpit crew as an eight knot tailwind as they lined up on runway 26R. Over an hour delayed, the crew proceeded with take-off. Five minutes before that decision, a Continental Airlines DC-10 departing for Newark, New Jersey, had lost a titanium alloy strip, 435 millimetres (17.1 in) long and about 29 millimetres (1.1 in) to 34 millimetres (1.3 in) wide, during takeoff from the same runway. During the Concorde's subsequent take-off run, this piece of debris, still lying on the runway, cut a tyre causing rupture and tyre debris to be hurled by centrifugal force. A large chunk of this debris (4.5 kilograms or 9.9 pounds) struck the underside of the aircraft's wing structure at an estimated speed of 500 kilometres per hour (310 mph). Although it did not directly puncture any of the fuel tanks, it sent out a pressure shockwave that eventually ruptured the number five fuel tank at the weakest point, just above the landing gear. Leaking fuel gushing out from the bottom of the wing was most likely to have been ignited by an electric arc in the landing gear bay or through contact with severed electrical cables. At the point of ignition, engines one and two both surged and lost all power, but engine one slowly recovered over the next few seconds. A large plume of flame developed; the Flight Engineer then shut down engine two, in response to a fire warning and the Captain's command. Having passed V1 speed, the crew continued the take-off but the plane did not gain enough airspeed with the three remaining engines, because the severed electrical cables prevented the retraction of the undercarriage. The aircraft was unable to climb or accelerate, and it maintained a speed of 200 knots (370 km/h; 230 mph) at an altitude of 60 metres (200 ft). The fire caused damage to the port wing, and it began to disintegrate melted by the extremely high temperatures. Engine number one surged again, but this time failed to recover. Due to the asymmetric thrust, the starboard wing lifted, banking the aircraft to over 100 degrees. The crew reduced the power on engines three and four in an attempt to level the aircraft, but with falling airspeed they lost control, crashing into the Htelissimo Les Relais Bleus Hotel near the airport.

The crew was trying to divert to nearby Le Bourget Airport, but accident investigators stated that a safe landing, given the aircraft's flight path, would have been highly unlikely. As the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript recorded it, the last intelligible words of the crew were (translated into English): Co-pilot: "Le Bourget, Le Bourget, Le Bourget." Pilot: "Too late (unclear)." Control tower: "Fire service leader, correction, the Concorde is returning to runway zero nine in the opposite direction." Pilot: "No time, no (unclear)." Co-pilot: "Negative, we're trying Le Bourget" (four switching sounds). Co-pilot: "No (unclear)."

Passenger and crew fatalities

A memorial to the crash All passengers and the crew were killed in the incident. Most of the passengers were German tourists en route to New York for a cruise.

Nationality

Passengers

Crew

Total

Germany

96

96

France

Denmark

Austria

United States

Total

100

109

Concorde grounded The Concorde had been the safest working passenger airliner in the world according to passenger deaths per distance travelled. The crash of a Concorde was the beginning of the end of the aircraft's career. A few days after the crash, all Concordes were grounded, pending an investigation into the cause of the crash and possible remedies. Air France Concorde F-BVFC was allowed to return to its home base from its stranded position in New York without passengers.[citation needed] Air France's Concorde operation had been a money-losing venture, but had been kept in service as a matter of national pride (by contrast, British Airways claimed a profit on its Concorde operations. Revenue service was resumed in 2001, until the remaining aircraft were retired in 2003.

Accident investigation

A DC-10 similar to the one that dropped the metal piece The official investigation was conducted by France's accident investigation bureau, the BEA, and it was published on 14 December 2004. Only 1 video was found of the flight. Conclusions The investigators concluded that:

The aircraft was overloaded by about a ton above the maximum safe take off

weight.

After reaching take-off speed, the tyre of the number 2 wheel was cut by a metal

strip lying on the runway, which came from the thrust reverser cowl door of the number 3 engine of a Continental Airlines DC-10 that had taken off from the runway several minutes before. This strip was installed in violation of the manufacturer's rules[citation
needed]

The aircraft was airworthy and the crew were qualified. The landing gear that

later failed to retract had not shown serious problems in the past. Despite the crew being trained and certified, no plan existed for the simultaneous failure of two engines on the runway, as it was considered highly unlikely.

Aborting the take-off would have led to a high-speed runway excursion and

collapse of the landing gear, which also would have caused the aircraft to crash.

While two of the engines had problems and one of them was shut down, the

damage to the plane's structure was so severe that the crash would have been inevitable, even with the engines operating normally. Previous tyre incidents In November 1981, the American NTSB sent a letter of concern, which included safety recommendations for the Concorde, to the French BEA. This communiqu was the result of the NTSB's investigations of four Air France Concorde incidents, during a 20 month period, fromJuly 1979, through February 1981. The NTSB described those incidents as "potentially catastrophic", because they were caused by blown tyres during take-off. The NTSB also expressed concern about the lack of adequate remedies, on the part of the French, as well as improper crew responses to those incidents.

13 June 1979: The number 5 and 6 tyres blew out during a take-off from

Washington, D.C. Dulles Airport. Shrapnel thrown from the tyres and rims damaged number 2 engine, punctured three fuel tanks, severed several hydraulic lines and electrical wires, in addition to tearing a large hole on the top of the wing, over the wheel well area.

21 July 1979: Another blown tyre incident, during take-off from Dulles Airport.

After that second incident the "French director general of civil aviation issued an air worthiness directive and Air France issued a Technical Information Update, each calling for revised procedures. These included required inspection of each wheel and tyre for condition, pressure and temperature prior to each take-off. In addition, crews were advised that landing gear should not be raised when a wheel/tyre problem is suspected."

October 1979: Tyres number 7 and 8 failed during a take-off from New York's

JFK Airport. In spite of the well-publicized danger from the previous incidents, the crew ignored the new safety recommendations and raised the landing gear and continued to Paris. There was no subsequent investigation by the French BEA or the NTSB of that incident.

February 1981: While en-route from Mexico City to Paris, Air France (F-BTSD)

blew more tyres during another take-off at Dulles Airport. Once again, the crew disregarded the new procedures by raising the landing gear. The blown tyres caused engine damage which forced the flight to land at New York JFK Airport. The NTSB's investigation found that there had been no preparation of the passengers for a possible emergency landing and evacuation. The CVR was also found to have been inoperative for several flights, including one which followed a layover in Paris. To save on weight, Concorde was designed to take off without the assistance of flaps or slats. That required a significantly higher air and tyre speed, during the takeoff roll, which imposed a much greater centripetal force load on the tyres. That higher speed increased the risk of tyre explosion during take-off. When the tyres did explode, much greater kinetic energy was carried by the resulting shrapnel travelling at great speeds tangentially from the rims (the kinetic energy of an object being directly proportional to the square of its speed), increasing the risk of serious damage to the aircraft. A thicker skin on the bottom side of the wings could have prevented serious damage from an exploding tyre, but that would have added too much weight, cancelling out most of the advantage of not having flaps or slats. Alternative theories British investigators and former French Concorde pilots looked at several other possibilities that the report ignored, including an unbalanced weight distribution in the fuel tanks and loose landing gear. They came to the conclusion that the Concorde veered off course on the runway, which reduced take-off speed below the crucial minimum. The aircraft had passed close to a Boeing 747 carrying French

President Jacques Chirac who was returning from the 26th G8 summit meeting in Okinawa, Japan, which was much further down the runway than the Concorde's usual take-off point; only then did it strike the metal strip from the DC-10

The Concorde was overweight for the given conditions, with an excessively aft centre of gravity and taking off downwind. When it stood at the end of the runway, ready to roll, it was over its approved maximum take-off weight for the given conditions. The Concorde was missing the crucial spacer from the left main landing-gear beam that would have made for a snug-fitting pivot. This compromised the alignment of the landing gear and the wobbling beam and gears allowing three degrees of movement possible in any direction. The uneven load on the left leg's three remaining tyres skewed the landing gear, with the scuff marks of four tyres on the runway showing that the plane was veering to the left.[27]

Modifications and revival The accident led to modifications being made to Concorde, including more secure electrical controls, Kevlar lining to the fuel tanks, and specially developed, burstresistant tyres. The new-style tyres would be another contribution to future aircraft development. The crash of the Air France Concorde nonetheless proved to be the beginning of the end for the type. Just before service resumed, the 11 September 2001 attacks took place, resulting in a marked drop in customer numbers, and contributing to the eventual end of Concorde flights.[29] Air France stopped flights in May 2003, while British Airways ended its Concorde flights in October 2003. In June 2010, two groups were attempting to revive Concorde for "Heritage" flights in time for the 2012 Olympics. The British Save Concorde Group, SCG, and French group Olympus 593 were attempting to get four Rolls-Royce Olympus engines running smoothly at Le Bourget Air and Space Museum in France. Criminal investigation On 10 March 2005, French authorities began a criminal investigation of Continental Airlines, whose plane dropped the debris on the runway.[31] In September 2005, Henri Perrier, the former head of the Concorde division at Arospatiale, and Jacques Herubel, the Concorde chief engineer, came under

investigation for negligence: a report stated that the company had more than 70 incidents involving Concorde tyres between 1979 and 2000, but had failed to take appropriate steps based upon these incidents. On 12 March 2008, Bernard Farret, a deputy prosecutor in Pontoise, outside Paris, asked judges to bring manslaughter charges against Continental Airlines and four individuals:

John Taylor, a Continental mechanic Stanley Ford, a Continental maintenance manager Henri Perrier of Arospatiale Claude Frantzen, a former employee of the French airline regulator.

Charges against Jacques Herubel were reported to have been dropped, but on 3 July 2008, confirmation of the trial, including Herubel, was published.] The trial started on 2 February 2010. Also facing fines or a custodial sentence were the designers of the plane, who prosecutors say knew that the plane's fuel tanks could be susceptible to damage from foreign objects, as well as a French official responsible for the regulation of the plane's safety. Continental denied the charges, and claimed in court that the aircraft was already on fire when it passed over the titanium strip. On 6 December 2010, Continental Airlines was found criminally responsible for the disaster by a Parisian court and was fined 200,000 ($271,628) and ordered to pay Air France 1 million. Continental mechanic John Taylor was given a 15-month suspended sentence, while another airline operative and three French officials were cleared of all charges. The court ruled that the crash resulted from a piece of metal from a Continental jet that was left on the runway; the object punctured a tyre on the Concorde and then ruptured a fuel tank. Another Continental employee, Stanley Ford, was found not guilty Continental's lawyer, Olivier Metzner, said it would appeal the verdict. The court also ruled that Continental would have to pay 70% of any compensation claims. As Air France has paid out 100 million to the families of the victims, Continental could be made to pay its share of that compensation payout.

American Airlines Flight 587,

an Airbus A300, crashed into the Belle Harbor neighborhood of Queens, a borough of New York City, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport on November 12, 2001. This is the second deadliest U.S. aviation accident to date, after American Airlines Flight 191. With 260 fatalities on board and 5 on the ground, this accident has the third highest death toll of any accident involving an Airbus A300. Iran Air Flight 655 and China Airlines Flight 140 had higher fatalities. The accident took place two months after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in Manhattan. Several factors, such as the date, time, aircraft size, airline, eyewitness accounts, and location in New York, raised concerns that the crash was caused by another terrorist attack. Al-Qaeda listed the crash among its successes, and a Canadian militant cooperating with authorities suggested that it had been brought down with a shoe bomb. Nonetheless, terrorism was officially ruled out as the cause by the National Transportation Safety Board, which instead attributed the disaster to the first officer's overuse of rudder controls in response to wake turbulence.

Accident summary Date Type November 12, 2001 Pilot error in response to wake turbulence Queens, New York City, New York 251 9 1 (ground) 265 (including 5 on the ground) Survivors Aircraft type Operator Tail number Flight origin 0 Airbus A300-600 American Airlines N14053 John F. Kennedy International Airport Las Amricas International Airport,Dominican

Site

Passengers Crew Injuries Fatalities

Destination

Republic

Summary On November 12, 2001, about 09:16 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an AirbusA300-605R delivered in 1987 and powered by two General Electric CF6-80C2A5, N14053, crashed into Belle Harbor, a New York City residential area, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Amricas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crew members, seven flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the plane. Ed States served as the captain, and Sten Molin served as the first officer. The plane's vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and fell into Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The plane's engines subsequently separated in flight and fell several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the plane and 5 people on the ground died, and the impact forces and a post-crash fire destroyed the plane. Flight 587 operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident.

Investigation The A300-600, which took off minutes after a Japan Airlines Boeing 747 on the same runway, flew into the larger jet's wake, an area of turbulent air. The first officer

attempted to keep the plane upright with aggressive rudder inputs. The strength of the air flowing against the moving rudder stressed the aircraft's vertical stabilizer and eventually snapped it off entirely, causing the aircraft to lose control and crash. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that the enormous stress on the rudder was due to the first officer's "unnecessary and excessive" rudder inputs, and not the wake turbulence caused by the 747. The NTSB further stated "if the first officer had stopped making additional inputs, the aircraft would have stabilized". Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 sensitive rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Training Program Investigators were concerned in regard to the manner in which the vertical stabilizer separated. The vertical stabilizer is connected to the fuselage with six attaching points. Each point has two sets of attachment lugs, one made of composite material, another of aluminum, all connected by a titanium bolt; damage analysis showed that the bolts and aluminum lugs were intact, but not the composite lugs. This, coupled with two events earlier in the life of the aircraft, namely delamination in part of the vertical stabilizer prior to its delivery from the manufacturer and an encounter with heavy turbulence in 1994, caused investigators to examine the use of composites.] The possibility that the composite materials might not be as strong as previously supposed was a cause of concern because they are used in other areas of the plane, including the engine mounting and the wings. Tests carried out on the vertical stabilizers from the accident aircraft, and from another similar aircraft, found that the strength of the composite material had not been compromised, and the NTSB concluded that the material had failed because it had been stressed beyond its design limit, despite ten previous recorded incidents where A300 tail fins had been stressed beyond their design limitation in which none resulted in the separation of the vertical stabilizer in-flight. The official NTSB report of October 26, 2004 stated that the cause of the crash was the overuse of the rudder to counter wake turbulence] The crash was witnessed by hundreds of people, 349 of whom gave accounts of what they saw to the NTSB. About half (52%) reported a fire or explosion before the plane

hit the ground. Others stated that they saw a wing detach from the aircraft, whereas in fact it was the vertical stabilizer. After the crash, Floyd Bennett Field's empty hangars were used as a makeshift morgue for the identification of crash victims.

Aftermath Since the NTSB's report, American Airlines has modified its pilot training program. Training methods have been reviewed and changed as a result of the accident, as previous training methods may have contributed to the accident. Previous simulator

training did not properly reflect "the actual large build-up in sideslip angle and side loads that would accompany such rudder inputs in an actual airplane", according to the NTSB final report. Flight 587 no longer exists. The flight route designations of flights between Kennedy Airport and Las Amricas Airport are now 619, 635 and 789. American Airlines retired all its Airbus A300-600 Aircraft from service eight years after the accident (and 21 years in service) in August, 2009, with its last flight, flight 1908 from Miami to New York-JFK operating on August 24, 2009.

Cause

Terrorist claims

Because the crash was two months after the September 11 attacks and occurred in New York, several major buildings including the Empire State Building and the United Nations Headquarterswere evacuated. In the months after the crash, rumors were suggesting that it had been destroyed in a terrorist plot, with a shoe bomb similar to the one found on Richard Reid.[14][15] In May 2002, Mohammed Jabarah agreed to cooperate with investigators as part of a plea bargain. Among the details he gave authorities, was that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's lieutenant had told him that Reid and Abderraouf Jdey had both been enlisted by the al-Qaeda chief to carry out identical shoe-bombing plots as part of a second wave of attacks against the United States, and that Jdey had successfully blown up Flight 587, while Reid had been stymied. Nicholas Stix of Middle American News recounted the mutually contradictory theories that the NTSB had floated immediately following the crash, the statements made by retired fire fighters and police officers who had witnessed the crash, and the history of similar crashes, and concluded that the agency was frantically seeking to calm a public whose faith in commercial aviation had hit rock bottom.

National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the cause of the crash was overuse of the rudder mechanism.

NTSB findings

According to the official accident report, after the first officer made his initial rudder pedal input, he made a series of alternating full rudder inputs. This led to increasing sideslip angles. The resulting hazardous sideslip angle led to extremely high aerodynamic loads that resulted in separation of the vertical stabilizer. If the first officer had stopped making these inputs at any time before the vertical stabilizer separation, the natural stability of the airplane would have returned the sideslip angle to near 0, and the accident would have been avoided. The airplane performance study indicated that when the vertical stabilizer separation began, the aerodynamic loads were about two times the loads defined by the design envelope. It can be determined that the vertical stabilizer's structural performance was consistent with design specifications and exceeded certification requirements. Contributing factors include the following: First, the first officer's predisposition to overreact to wake turbulence; second, the training provided by American Airlines that could have encouraged pilots to make large flight control inputs; third, the first officer likely did not understand an airplane's response to large rudder inputs at high airspeeds or the mechanism by which the rudder rolls a transport-category airplane; finally, light rudder pedal forces and small pedal displacement of the A300-600 rudder pedal system increased the airplane's susceptibility to a rudder misuse. Airbus and American are currently disputing the extent to which the two parties are responsible for the disaster. American charges that the crash was mostly Airbus' fault because the A300 was designed with unusually sensitive rudder controls. Most aircraft require increased pressure on the rudder pedals to achieve the same amount of rudder control at a higher speed. The Airbus A300 and later A310 do not operate on a fly-bywire flight control system, instead using conventional mechanical flight controls. The NTSB determined that "because of its high sensitivity, the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher speeds". The Allied Pilots Association, in its submission to the NTSB, argued that the unusual sensitivity of the rudder mechanism amounted to a design flaw which Airbus

should have communicated to the airline, and pointed to ten previous incidents in which A300 tail fins had been stressed beyond their design limitation. Airbus charges that the crash was mostly American's fault because the airline did not train its pilots properly about the characteristics of the rudder. Aircraft tail fins are designed to withstand full rudder deflection in one direction at maneuvering speed. They are not usually designed to withstand an abrupt shift in rudder from one direction to the other. Most American pilots believed that the tail fin could withstand any rudder movement at maneuvering speed. The NTSB indicated that American Airlines' Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program tended to exaggerate the effects of wake turbulence on large aircraft. Therefore, pilots were being trained to react more aggressively than was necessary.

Victims

Victims' nationalities[24]

Nationality

Passengers

Crew

Total

United States

176

185

Dominican Republic

68

68

Republic of China (Taiwan)

France

Haiti

Israel

United Kingdom

1[note 1]

Total

251

260

All 260 people aboard the plane died, along with 5 people on the ground. Relatives gathered at Las Americas International Airport. The airport created a private area for relatives wishing to receive news about Flight 587. Some relatives arrived at the airport to meet passengers, unaware that the flight had crashed. One of the passengers killed on the flight was Hilda Yolanda Mayol, a 26-year-old American woman on her way to vacation in her native Dominican Republic. Two months earlier, on September 11, Mayol worked at a restaurant on the ground floor of the World Trade Center and escaped before the building collapsed. New York Yankee infielder Enrique Wilson was scheduled to be on the flight. However, after the Yankees lost the 2001 World Series to the Arizona Diamondbacks, negating any victory parade in New York, Wilson flew home a few days earlier and was not on the flight. Around 90% of the passengers on the flight were of Dominican descent. The Guardian describes the flight as having "cult status" in Washington Heights, a Dominican area of Manhattan. Belkis Lora, sister of crash victim Jose Lora, said, "Every Dominican in New York has either taken that flight or knows someone who has. It gets you there early. At home there are songs about it."

Memorial

A memorial was constructed in Rockaway Park, Belle Harbor's neighboring community, in memory of the 265 victims of the crash at Beach 116th Street, a major commercial street in the area. It was dedicated on November 12, 2006, the fifth anniversary of the incident, in a ceremony attended by Mayor of New York City Michael Bloomberg. The memorial wall, designed by Dominican artist Freddy Rodrguez and Situ Studio, has windows and a doorway looking towards the nearby Atlantic Ocean and angled towards the Dominican Republic. It is inscribed with the names of the victims.[ Atop the memorial is a quote, in both Spanish and English, from Dominican poet Pedro Mir, reading "Despus no quiero ms que paz." (Translation: "Afterwards I want only peace.") In a ceremony held on May 6, 2007, at Woodlawn Cemetery in the Bronx, 889 unidentified fragments of human remains of the victims of the crash were entombed in a group of four mausoleum crypts.

Singapore Airlines Flight 006

Singapore Airlines Flight 006 (SQ006) was a scheduled passenger flight from Singapore Changi Airport to Los Angeles International Airport via Chiang Kaishek Airport (now Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport) in Taiwan. On 31 October 2000, at 15:17 UTC, 23:17 Taipeilocal time, a Boeing 747-412 on the route attempted to take off from the wrong runway in Taipei during a typhoon, destroying the aircraft and killing 83 of the 179 occupants. SQ006 was the first fatal crash of a Singapore Airlines aircraft; prior to the SQ006 crash, the sole fatal incident involving SIA was the crash of SilkAir Flight 185, operated by subsidiary SilkAir.

Crash

The path of Typhoon Xangsane

At 15:00 UTC, 23:00 Taipei local time on 31 October 2000, 9V-SPK, a Boeing 747400delivered on 21 January 1997, left Bay B5 during heavy rain caused by Typhoon Xangsane. At 23:05:57, the CKS Airport cleared the aircraft to taxi to runway 05L via "taxiway Sierra Sierra West Cross" and "November Papa". At 23:15:22, the airport cleared the aircraft to takeoff at 05L. Many carriers in Southeast and East Asia take off during inclement weather. 9V-SPK had its last maintenance check on 16 September 2000, and had no defects. After a six-second hold, at 23:16:36, the crew attempted takeoff on runway 05R, which had been closed for repairs, instead of the assigned runway 05L (which runs parallel to 05R). The captain, Foong Chee Kong, correctly heard that he needed to take off at 05L, but he turned 215 metres (705 ft) too soon and lined up with 05R. The airport was not equipped with ASDA, a ground radar which allows the airport controllers to monitor aircraft movements on the ground.

Diagram of Chiang Kai-shek International Airport (now Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport) and the taxi path of Singapore Airlines Flight 006. The dotted green line indicates the correct path to Runway 05L. The yellow arrow indicates the path to Runway 05R. The red path indicates the fatal takeoff path. Due to poor visibility in the heavy rain, the flight crew did not see that construction equipment, including two excavators, two vibrating rollers, one small bulldozer, and

one air compressor, had been parked on runway 05R. In addition, the runway contained concrete jersey barriers and pits.About 41 seconds later, the aircraft collided with the machinery and broke into pieces. The fuselage was torn in two, and the engines and landing gear separated. A crane tore the left wing from the aircraft, forcing the jet back on to the ground. The nose struck a scoop loader. A large fire followed, destroying the forward section of the fuselage and the wings. 79 of 159 passengers and 4 of 20 crew members died in the accident. Many of the dead were seated in the middle section of the aircraft; the fuel stored in the wings exploded and sent balls of flame through that section. At 23:17:36, the emergency bell sounded. 41 fire fighting vehicles, 58 ambulances, 9 lighting units, and 4,336 personnel were dispatched to assist survivors and extinguish the fire. Chemical extinguishing agents rained on the aircraft at about three minutes after the impact. At 23:35, roughly 10 minutes after the impact, the fire was brought under control. At 23:40, non-airport ambulances and emergency vehicles from other agencies congregated at the north gate. At 00:00 Taipei time on 1 November, the fire was mostly extinguished and the front part of the aircraft was destroyed. Authorities established a temporary command centre. Immediate news reports incorrectly stated that the Singapore Airlines jet hit one or two aircraft on the tarmac, with one being a China Airlines jet "2601TW"; no other aircraft were involved in the Singapore crash. A passenger of China Airlines Flight 004 recorded a video of Singapore Airlines Flight 006 on fire.

Casualties

Rescuers retrieving a casualty from the wreckage. 179 passengers and crew,were including 3 children and 3 infants, were on the aircraft at the time of the crash. Of the 179 occupants, 83 were killed, 39 suffered from serious injuries, 32 had minor injuries, while 25 were uninjured. Amongst those who perished, there were 4 crew members. 79 passengers and crew died on impact and immediately after the crash and 2 passengers died at a hospital. The passengers mostly consisted of Taiwanese and Americans.

Nationalities of passengers and crew Nationality Passengers Crew Total

Total

Killed

Total

Killed

Total

Killed

Australia

Cambodia

Canada

Germany

India

11

10

11

10

Indonesia

Ireland

Japan

Malaysia

Mexico

Netherlands

New Zealand

Philippines

Singapore

11

17

28

12

Spain

Republic of China (Taiwan)

55

26

57

26

Thailand

United Kingdom

United States

47

24

47

24

Vietnam

Total

159

79

20

179

83

Amongst the Singaporeans who perished were Mrs. Elma Thwaites, mother of Singapore Turf Club horse-trainer Malcolm Thwaites, Dr. Sung Kah Kay, assistant professor of the National University of Singapore's Department of Computer Science, and Captain Lim Kim Hock, a Republic of Singapore Air Force pilot on his way to the Air National Guard to attend the Advanced Fighter Weapons Instructor Course. In addition, four of the dead were Motorola employees. Sung's wife, Jennifer Loo (a.k.a. Loo Tak Wing), also died on the flight. Amongst perished passengers of other nationalities were the president and two vice presidents of Buena Park, California-based Ameripec Inc. Kevin Rice, a professor at UC Davis, survived the crash with more than 12% of his body burned, as did John

Diaz, a vice president of MP3.com, who survived the crash with injuries not related to burns. William Wang, who later founded Vizio, survived with only carbon monoxide poisoning." Origin of passengers and crew and types of injuries sustained

Diagram of 9V-SPK illustrating crew and passenger seat locations, lack of injury, severity of injuries, and deaths. The captain, relief pilot, Ng Kheng Leng, and co-pilot, Latiff Cyrano, originated from Singapore on the 30 October SQ 006, rested at a hotel in Taipei, and boarded the 31 October SQ 006. The crew consisted of 12 males and 8 females. Of the flight crew, 2 males and 2 females died.]The co-pilot received minor injuries. The pilot and relief pilot sustained no injuries. Of the 17 cabin crew members, 4 died, 4 received serious injuries, and 9 received minor injuries. Of the passengers, 79 died, 35 received serious injuries, 22 received minor injuries, and 23 were uninjured. The aircraft had 5 first-class passengers, 28 business-class passengers (9 on lower deck and 19 on upper deck), and 126 economy-class passengers. Of the first class passengers, 1 received a minor injury and 4 received no injuries. Of the business-class passengers, 14 (2 on lower deck, 12 on upper deck) died, 2 (1 on lower deck, 1 on upper deck) received serious injuries, 7 (2 on lower deck, 5 on upper deck) received

minor injuries, and 8 (4 on lower deck, 4 on upper deck) were uninjured. Of the economy class passengers, 65 died, 33 received serious injuries, 14 received minor injuries, and 11 were uninjured. The lower deck passengers who died were seated in rows 22 through 38. 64 of 76 passengers in the forward economy section were killed by the explosion of the centre fuel tank, which resulted in intense fire. In the upper deck of the business class section, 12 of 19 passengers and 1 of 2 flight attendants died due to smoke inhalation and fire; 10 bodies, originating from the upper deck of business class, were found between the stairwell and the 2L exit on the main deck. All passengers in the aft economy section survived. Of the passengers on the TPE-LAX leg, 77 flew from Singapore and 82 flew from Taipei. Of the passengers originating from Singapore, 37 died. Of the passengers originating from Taipei, 42 died Of the three male passengers identified as infants, including two Indians originated from Singapore and one Taiwanese originated from Taipei, all three died. The Department of Forensic Pathology Institute of Foreign Medicine, Ministry of Justice performed seven autopsies. One person died from impact injuries, and six people died from severe burns. Many passengers on the flight sustained burns since jet fuel splashed onto the passengers. Lin Ming-liang, a 45-year old Taiwanese passenger bearing burns to more than 86% of his body, died of his injuries at Chang Gung Memorial Hospital, Linkou, Taipei County (now New Taipei City) on Sunday 5 November 2000. Lee Suet Yee, a hospitalized Singaporean woman bearing burns to 95% of her body, died of her injuries in a Taiwanese hospital on 24 November 2000. Diaz did not receive burns; he received lung damage and "body shock," which resulted in compressed joints with soft tissue damage.When Diaz appeared on Oprah Winfrey's show, he used a walker. A Taiwanese couple who survived the incident stated that they chose to fly Singapore Airlines because of the airline's safety record.

Investigation findings

SQ006 9V-SPK; the broken off tail section of the aircraft. An investigation into the accident was conducted by the Aviation Safety Council (ASC) of the Republic of China. The final report was issued by the ASC on 24 April 2002. In the report section "Findings Related to Probable Causes," which detailed factors that played a major role in the circumstances leading to the accident, it was stated that the flight crew did not review the taxi route, despite having all the relevant charts, and as a result did not know the aircraft had entered the wrong runway. Upon entering the wrong runway, the flight crew had neglected to check the paravisual display (PVD) and the primary flight display (PFD), which would have indicated that the aircraft was lined up on the wrong runway. According to the ASC, these errors, coupled with the imminent arrival of the typhoon and the poor weather conditions, caused the flight crew to lose situational awareness and led them to attempt to take off from the wrong runway.

Notification of details Immediately after the accident occurred, James Boyd, a Singapore Airlines spokesperson in Los Angeles, stated that no fatalities occurred in the crash; the airline statement revised to state that fatalities occurred. The airline initially stated that reports of the aircraft taking the wrong runway were untrue before the fact that the wrong runway was used was proven true. Khan Mahmood, an Atlanta man whose sister and parents died on SQ006, criticised the airline for taking too much time to notify relatives. A counseling center opened at Los Angeles International Airport to deal with relatives of passengers. Relatives of victims provided blood samples in order to identify bodies.

Contesting investigation findings The report by ASC was deemed controversial by Singapore's Ministry of Communications & Information Technology (now Ministry of Transport), Singapore Airlines and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), among others.[citation needed] Singaporean officials protested that the report did not present a full account of the incident and was incomplete, as responsibility for the accident appeared to have been placed mainly on the flight crew of SQ006, while other equally valid contributing factors had been played down. The team from Singapore that participated in the investigation felt that the lighting and signage at the airport did not measure up to international standards. Some critical lights were missing or not working. No barriers or markings were put up at the start of the closed runway, which would have alerted the flight crew that they were on the wrong runway. The Singapore team felt that these two factors were given less weight than was proper, as another flight crew had almost made the same mistake of using runway 05R to take off days before the accident.[citation needed]

Singapore Airlines also issued a statement after the release of the ASC report. In their statement, Singapore Airlines reiterated the points brought up by the Singapore investigators and added that air traffic control (ATC) did not follow their own procedure when they gave clearance for SQ006 to take off despite ATC's not being able to see the aircraft. Singapore Airlines also clarified that the paravisual display (PVD) was meant to help the flight crew maintain the runway centreline in poor visibility, rather than to identify the runway in use. The statement by Kay Yong ( Rng Ki), managing director of the Republic of China's Aviation Safety Council, implied that pilot errorplayed a major role in the crash of the Boeing 747-400, which led to the deaths of 83 people. He stated that the airport should have placed markers stating that the runway was closed to takeoffs and landings. In general, airport runways that are closed are not normally lighted, to make it clear they are not in use. At Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport, a single switch controlled green lights on the common taxiway to both runways and on the centreline of runway 05R. Civil Aeronautics Administration Deputy Director Chang Kuo-cheng said runway 05L was fully lit on Tuesday night by white and yellow lights and only the green centreline lighting was illuminated on closed runway 05R. On the taxiway to the runways, four large signs point the way to runway 05L, he added, and he refused to state explicitly that pilot error was the primary cause of the mix-up.[citation needed] Runway 05R was not blocked off by barriers because part of the strip was used by landing planes to taxi back to the airport terminal. The pilot confirmed twice with the control tower that he was on the correct runway; controllers did not know the plane had actually gone on to the wrong runway because the airport lacked ground radar and the plane was out of sight of the tower at the time of its takeoff.[citation needed]

Actions of flight crew and flight attendants Steven Courtney and John D. Wiggans, survivors of the crash, stated in a USA Today article that the staff were unable to help the passengers escape from the aircraft due to being frozen by fear and/or due to lack of competence in emergency procedures; Wiggans was seated in the upper deck business class area. The Straits Times carried

reports of flight attendants saving lives of passengers. One story from the newspaper stated that Irene Ang (a.k.a. Ang Miau Lee) escaped the crash, ran back into the aircraft to attempt to save passengers, and died. The Australian reported that some flight attendants helped passengers and some flight attendants fled the aircraft before all passengers were accounted for. Genevieve Jiang of The Electric New Paper stated that the pilots attempted to help the passengers.] The Taiwanese report stated that the relief pilot (Crew Member 3, or CM-3) said in an interview that he was the first to leave the cockpit and the last to leave the aircraft . A passenger sitting in seat 17A stated that the Right Upper Deck Door flight attendant directed him to the main deck via the stairs. The flight attendant died . Upper deck passengers and flight attendants stated that the Crew-In-Charge flight attendant (CIC) traveled upstairs after the first impact; the Crew-In-Charge flight attendant died The 3R and 3L flight attendants died; they were seated in the middle of the aircraft Aftermath

A Singapore Airlines Boeing 747-400 in its normal livery. Following the crash of SQ006, the airline removed the tropical livery given to SPK's sister ship.

After the release of the ASC report, Republic of China public prosecutors called upon the flight crew of SQ006 to return to the ROC for questioning and the three-member crew complied. Rumours abounded during that period that the pilots might be detained in the ROC and charged with negligence. IFALPA had previously stated that it would advise its members of the difficulties of operating into the ROC if the flight crew of SQ006 were prosecuted. The prosecutors did not press charges and the flight crew were allowed to leave the ROC.[citation needed] Singapore Airlines changed the flight route designation to SQ030 immediately after the incident, and then later to SQ028. The TPE-LAX route was operated by Boeing 777 aircraft until its demise on October 1, 2008. Flights to Los Angeles are now served with a stop over in Tokyo's Narita Airport. The accident aircraft 9V-SPK was painted in Singapore Airlines special promotion livery, a scheme called "Tropical", at the time of the accident. The special livery was intended to promote Singapore Airlines new first class and new business class products. After the accident, 9V-SPK's sister aircraft, 9V-SPL, the only other aircraft painted with the promotional livery, was immediately removed from service and repainted withstandard Singapore Airlines livery. No special promotion livery has been introduced on any Singapore Airlines's aircraft since the accident. Dozens of survivors and relatives of those killed filed lawsuits against the airline and ROC authorities. Singapore Airlines denied culpability and the captain and first officer were subsequently fired by the airline. The Association of Asian American Yale Alumni named the Tina E. Yeh Community Service Fellowship program after Tina Eugenia Yeh, an American who boarded SQ006 in Taipei and died. Runway 05R at TPE has been converted to taxiway NC and runway 05L has been renamed to runway 05.

Repatriation and distribution of bodies

Rows of coffins and grieving kin of the deceased. By 8 November 2000, several bodies were scheduled to be repatriated. Of the bodies:

19, including 14 Americans, 3 Taiwanese, and 2 Indians, were repatriated to the

United States

13, including 11 Singaporeans, 1 British, and 1 American, were repatriated to

Singapore

10, including 8 Indians and 2 Americans, were repatriated to India 4 were repatriated to Malaysia ] 3 Americans were repatriated to Canada 1 was repatriated to Indonesia 1 was repatriated to Japan 1 was repatriated to the Netherlands 1 was repatriated to the United Kingdom 1 was repatriated to Vietnam

The bodies of 14 Taiwanese passengers remained in Taipei to be collected by relatives.

Hospitalization and release of survivors By 2 November 2000, 40 passengers and crew were hospitalized, of whom 11 were later released that night. On 5 November 2000, 34 passengers and crew remained hospitalized. 64 were discharged from the hospitals. Lin Ming-liang, a Taiwanese passenger, died that day. On 8 November 2000, 14 passengers and crew remained hospitalized: 20 in the Republic of China (Taiwan), 3 in Singapore and 1 in United States. 73 survivors, 40 who were not hospitalized and 33 who were discharged, had either returned home or continued with their travel. Lee Suet Yee, a Singaporean woman hospitalized in Taipei on 8 November, died on 24 November 2000.