Midterms Cases

Persons Midterms Cases/Espinosa, Maria Ana, E/A2015
Case Overview of Due Process and Equal Protection Clause Overview of Due Process and Equal Protection Clause Civil Personality (Concepts and Classes of Persons) Civil Personality (Concepts and Classes of Persons) Civil Personality (Concepts and Classes of Persons) Griswold v Connecticut Important Events Appellants gave information, instruction and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception which is alleged to be against the General statutes of Connecticut Appellee after delivering a lecture on overpopulation and contraception, he handed a contraceptive to a young woman. Wife had 3 counts of abortion. Husband sues physician for lack of knowledge on the 3rd abortion Accused Baldesco killed a family. While the case was still on trial, Baldesco died. Questions who died first from the war, the wife or the son on the first marriage. Decision/ Doctrine PENUMBRA - peripheral rights that are necessary to secure the specific rights - specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have PENUMBRAS formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Eistenstadt v Baird
1. Appellee has standing to assert rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives 2. Statute could not be upheld as deterrent to fornication, or as a health measure, or as simply a prohibition on contraception, and the statute, by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who were similarly situated, violated the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. Art. 40 CC Birth determines personality, but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the ff article. - unborn fetus without personality - parents of unborn fetus cannot sue on its behalf - parents can claim only moral damages Art. 37 CC Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is only lost through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. The death of the accused extinguishes his penal liability but his civil liability remains to be determined which can be recovered from his estate. Art. 43 CC If there is doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to other. Rule 131, Sec 3 (jj) Except for purposes of succession, when 2 persons perish in the SAME CALAMITY, such as wreck battle or conflagration and it is not shown who died first and there are not particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes according to the ff rules: 1. if both were under 15, the older 2. if both were above 60, the younger 3. if one is under 15, the other is above 60, the former 4. both over 15 but under 60, if both sexes, the male; if not, the older 5. one under 15 or over 60, the other in between those ages, the latter To prove insanity, it must be shown that it is: 1. habitual 2. constituted a veritable mental perturbation 3. the insanity was the sole reason of the execution of the crime Presumption of mental capacity capacity to act must be presumed to attach to every person who has not been previously declared to be incapable, and to continue until the contrary Is proven. ESTOPPEL Contracts effected by minors who have already passed the ages of puberty and adolescence and are near the adult age when they pretend to have already reached their majority, while in fact they have not, is valid, and they cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or to seek their annulment. The judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors property nor the rules laid down in consonance therewtith. The contract executed by a minor is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards said minor.
Geluz v CA
People v Tirol
Joaquin v Navarro
Civil Personality (Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon) Civil Personality (Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon) Civil
Standard Oil v Arenas
Appellant allegedly gave out bonds while suffering from monomania.
Mercado v Espiritu
Children sold their land by representing themselves as already at the age of majority when they were in fact, minors
Bambalan v
Plaintiff, who is a minor, sold

Personality (Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon) Civil Personality (Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon) Civil Personality (Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon) Pre-Marital Controversy (Breach of Promise to Marry) Maramba the land due to intimidation made upon his mother by the defendant. Mother and his 2 kids, who were minors then, acquired loan to survive the war. The minor pretended to be of age, to obtain loan, which they used for necessaries during the war. Son want to declare his father as a prodigal and he is declared as the guardian the guardian. Man ran away from the marriage due to mothers opposition. Doctrine of estoppel is not applicable because minor did not pretend to be of age. His minority is known to the purchaser.
Braganza v Villa Abrille
Art. 1489 CC All persons who are authorized in this code to obligate themselves, may enter into a contract of sale, saving the modifications contained in the ff. articles. Where necessaries are sold and delivered to a minor or other person without capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. Necessaries are those referred in Art 290.
Martinez v Martinez
PRODIGALITY in order to render a person legally unfit to administer his own affair his acts of prodigality must show a morbid mind and a disposition to spend or waste the estate so as to expose his family to want or to deprive his forced heirs of their inheritances.
Wassmer v Velez
Art. 21 CC- Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Breach of promise to marry mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is contrary to good customs. Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded in an actionable breach of promise suit Seduction more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage, it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which woman has yielded. In this case, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Acknowledgement of paternity- the acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied by the production of more than one document of indubitable authenticity, containing, all together, the admission of the father recognizing a particular child as of his paternity, the admissions of one writing being supplemented by those of another. Heartbalm statute- designed to do away with excessive claims for damages, claims coercive by their very nature and, all too frequently, fraudulent in character; the purpose was to prevent the recovery of damages based upon confused feelings, sentimental bruises, blighted affections, wounded pride, mental anguish and social humiliation. Heartbalm act does not preclude an action for restitution of specific property or money transferred in reliance on various false and fraudulent representations, apart from any promise to marry, as to their intended use. Marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, and consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state control by the 10th amendment. The meaning of Equal Protection Clause, is only the state penal laws containing an interracial element as part of the definition of the offense must apply equally to whites and negroes. The right to marry is important to everyone. The state should prove that there are compelling state interests to be protected at that the means employed is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. There are other less intruding means to achieve the state interest of lessening the number of public wards. The statute is underinclusive because it does not limit other future possible financial commitments aside from that of marriage. It is also overbroad because there are instances where the new spouse can improve the affected persons financial situation.
Pre-Marital Controversy (Breach of Promise to Marry) Pre-Marital Controversy (Breach of Promise to Marry) Pre-Marital Controversy (Breach of Promise to Marry) Definition and Nature of Marriage Definition and Nature of Marriage
Tanjanco v CA
De Jesus v Syquia
Man got woman pregnant. Pregnancy made her resign her job and unable to support herself. Man refused to marry her. Mother asks court for the recognition of her children with the defendant Woman made the man spend a lot to renovate her house, due to a promise that she will marry him. She did not marry him. White husband married to colored wife filed motion on the unconstitutionality of the statute denying interracial marriages. Statute prohibition on persons with court orders to support illegitimate children from marrying without proof that they have made support payments. A man who was unable to make any support
Piccininni v Hajus
Loving v Virginia
Zablocki v Redhail

payments to his illegitimate child was denied a marriage license solely on this ground. Without a marriage license, the man cannot contract a valid marriage in his state Wife agrees to pay the husband $300 until they dont desire the agreement anymore in exchange of giving up husbands work to accompany the wife in her travels. SC of Illinois refused to grant a woman a license to practice law in the courts of that state Woman refuses to take the surname of her husband after marriage.
Definition and Nature of Marriage (Marriage Models) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Marriage Models) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Challenges to the Traditional Marriage Model) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Challenges to the Traditional Marriage Model) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Challenges to the Traditional Marriage Model) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Requisite of Marriage) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Requisites of Marriage) Definition and Nature of
Graham v Graham
It is beyond the capacity of a married woman to make such contract. The limitation applies to contracts of married women with their husbands as well as third parties. Marriage is not merely a private contract between the parties, but creates a status in which the state is vitally interested and under which certain rights and duties incident to the relationship come into being, irrespective of the wishes of the parties. A bargain between married persons or persons contemplating marriage to change the essential incidents of marriage is illegal. Married women is incapable, without her husbands consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on her or him. This very incapacity was once circumstance which the SC of Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman incompetent fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and counselor. A woman has freedom of choice, she may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname of the husband. So long as a persons name remains constant and consistent, and unless and until changed in the prescribed manner and absent any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, the state has no legitimate concern.
Bradwell v The State
Dunn v Palermo
In Re Santiago
Selanova v Mendoza
Attorney charged with malpractice by telling a couple to prepare an ordinary contract of separation and giving each other right to remarry. Estranged husband and wife assumed contract to be valid and remarry other people. Judge charged of gross ignorance of the law for ratifiying a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife. Two women were refused to be given a marriage license. They contend that it deprived them of: 1. right to marry, 2. Right of association, 3. Right to free exercise of religion Same sex couples were denied marriage licenses
Marriage cannot be terminated by a simple contract.
Art 221 CC The ff shall be void and no effect: 1. any contract for personal separation between husband and wife 2. every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife. Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. Marriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman and we have presented with no authority to the contrary. A license to enter into a status or a relationship which the parties are incapable of achieving is a nullity.
Jones v Hallahan
Goodridge v Department of Public Health Silverio v Republic
Marriage licensing statutes were not susceptible of interpretation permitting qualified same sex couples to obtain marriage licenses
Gay who had sex change in Thailand wanted to change
Art 376 CC No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

Marriage (Requisites of Marriage) his first name and sex in his birth certificate. RA 9048 Sec 1 Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error or Change of First Name or Nickname no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. Sec 4 Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname the petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the ff cases: 1. petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce 2. the new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly know by that first name or nickname in the community 3. the change will avoid confusion The state has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. Petitioner failed to show any prejudice he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Art 407 CC Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. These acts and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Art 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or implied. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such pesons, like respondent, is fixed. In the absence of a law on that matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The manner in which the appellant dealt with the girl after the marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention of her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoes.
Definition and Nature of Marriage (Requisites of Marriage)
Republic v Cagandahan
Definition and Nature of Marriage (Requisites of Marriage) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Requisites of Marriage) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Requisites of Marriage)
People v Santiago
A girl who developed secondary male characteristics and diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) filed a petition to change his name from Jennifer to Jeff and gender from female to male Accused rape his niece, married her after and sent her home. Woman was 7 months pregnant by another man when she married the husband. Man misrepresented himself to be of majority age when he married the woman.
Buccat v Mangonon de Buccat Eigenmann v Guerra
Art 1431 CC through estoppels an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. Man is now precluded, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel from asserting or proving otherwise. What the law declares as null and void are marriages solemnized without a marriage license. A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained. The written and sworn consent pertains only to the issuance of the marriage license and such formal requisite is not essential to the validity of a marriage solemnized under a license, provided that the requisites for a valid marriage are present. Consent may be given in any form, written, oral, implied (presence during wedding) Art. 41 FC A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
Definition and Nature of
Navarro v Domagtoy
Judge was charged of gross misconduct for

Marriage (Requisites of Marriage) 1. solemnizing marriage despite the husband showing only an affidavit of the absence of the 1st wife 2. solemnizing marriage outside his territorial jurisdiction had been absent for 4 consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Art 391 CC, an absence of 2 years shall be sufficient. For the purposes of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Summary proceeding is a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated in the FC to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provision of law. Art 3 FC formal requisite is authority of solemnizing officer Art 7 FC marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction Art 8 FC directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Art 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. A marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. A judge who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in wedding only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Art 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Sec 29, Rule 132 Rules of Court Proof of lack of record A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. The certification issued by the Civil Registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Sec 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue a marriage license.
Aranes v Occiano
Judge solemnized marriage 1. without marriage license 2. outside his territorial jurisdiction
Republic v CA and Angelina M. Castro
Woman seeking declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage. Certification from civil registrar was issued: marriage license cannot be located and does not appear from our records. Judge solemnized marriage without a marriage license, assuring the woman that it will be released in 10 days. Marriage license was not released. Accused charged with parricide for killing his wife but claims that it is only homicide because they were not legally and validly married
Definition and Nature of Marriage (Requisites of Marriage) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Requisites of Marriage)
Moreno v Bernabe
Absence of said requisite will make the marriage void ab initio
People v Borromeo
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of marriage. Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The presumption of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. And the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said

in a church wedding ceremony. Judge solemnized without marriage license and failed to transmit a copy of marriage contract signed by him and the parties to the office of the Civil Registrar within 15 days from the date of solemnization. No marriage license because did not attend Family Planning Seminar. Parties married twice without marriage license. The alleged marriage licence procured in Carmona, Cavite appearing in the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident there and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar. Secret marriage was celebrated by the parties. marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. (compared to Republic v CA and Alcantara v Alcantara?) Marriage is void ab initio for missing an essential requisite.
Seguisabal v Cabrera
Alcantara v Alcantara
Marriage solemnized before FC, CC is in effect in this case. The law requires that the absence of marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. In this case, the marriage contract reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Requisites of the celebration of marriage. 1. both parties appeared before the judge of peace 2. both parties, the judge and two witnesses signed the marriage contract Rules on articulo mortis The mere fact that the parish pries failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites. Art 21 CC Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof.
Definition and Nature of Marriage (Requisites of Marriage) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Requisites of Marriage)
Martinez v Tan
Madridejo v de Leon
Man and woman were married in articulo mortis. Woman has a son in previous marriage. Woman also has a son in the subsequent marriage.
Definition and Nature of Marriage (Presumption of Marriage) Definition and Nature of Marriage (Presumption of Marriage)
Trinidad v CA
Son claiming the validity of the marriage of his parents by preponderant evidence.
Two kinds of acknowledgement: voluntary and compulsory. Sec 3(aa), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents marriage. Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party. Art 6 FC the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Sec 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court Original document must be produced; exceptions when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself except in the ff cases: (a) when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror
Vda de Jacob v CA
Widow tries to prove validity of marriage but could not present the original copy of the Marriage Contract because it was lost by the solemnizing officer. She presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed marriage contract.

Sec 5, Rule 130 When the document is unavailable When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the evidences presented such as the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and affidavit of officiating priest as well as petitioners own declaration in court. Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding. Precedent of Republic v CA, Angelina Castro probative value of certification of civil registry office Implied from the certification that the office of the local civil registrar could not exert its best effort to locate and determine the existence of marriage license due to its loaded work and the employee handling it has retired. Certification failed to state with certainty whether or not such license was issued. Sec 3, Rule 131 of the rules of court on the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumption by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his 1st spouse illegal and void from its performance and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. Conviction of bigamy of husband was best proof of marriage with 1st wife. The marriage to 2nd wife is null and void and correction of the erroneous entry in death certificate may be made.
Definition and Nature of Marriage (Presumption of Marriage)
Sevilla v Cardenas
Man claims that he married woman due to machination, duress and intimidation of her father. Certification of Local Civil Registrar: No marriage license were ever issued by this office. Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you full force locating Man contracted 2nd marriage during subsistence of 1st marriage Man contracted 2nd marriage during subsistence of 1st marriage. 1st wife files case to correct entry in death certificate as lawful wife. Man files annulment because woman has subsisting marriage. Woman claims the first marriage is obtained by force. Woman charge man, member of IBP, with grossly immoral conduct for contracting 2nd marriage. Man said that her 1st marriage was void because she has subsisting marriage too. Complainant living together with De Castro. Respondent cohabited with De Castro without complainants knowledge. Respondent prevented complainant from
Void and Voidable Marriages (Void Marriages) Void and Voidable Marriages (Void Marriages) Void and Voidable Marriages (Void Marriages) Void and Voidable Marriages (Void Marriages)
People v Mendoza
Tolentino v Paras
Wiegel v Sempio-Diy
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, thee marriage will not be void but merely voidable, and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent, she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID. (Maams note: Sempio-Diy applied FC even if it not existent yet because she is aware of eventual enactment of such. She said it was unfair thus she contests the decision.) The conduct of Jordan Terre, respondent, in inveigling complainant to contract a 2nd marriage with him; in abandoning complainant after she cared for him ands supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting 2nd marriage while 1st marriage was still subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct
Terre v Terre
Void and Voidable Marriages (Void Marriages)
Atienza v Brillantes
Art 40 FC the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Under FC, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a 2nd marriage. Respondent argues that Art 40 FC does not apply to him because 1st marriage took place before FC.

visiting his own house and children. Respondent was previously married but he claims that it was null due to absence of license. Void and Voidable Marriages (Void Marriages) BorjaManzano v Sanchez Judge charged of gross ignorance of the law for contracting marriage when both parties stated in the marriage contract that they were both separated. They merely showed affidavit that they were previously married but left their families and dont cohabit with previous spouse anymore. Art 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the FC regardless of the date of 1st marriage. Art 256 FC said article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights or acquired rights in accordance with the C or other laws. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art 40 to his case. Art 34 FC no license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. All the requisites must concur to ratify marital cohabitation. 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least 5 years before the marriage. 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of the marriage. 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least 5 years and are without legal impediment to marry each other. 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. Art 40 states that a judicial declaration is still necessary before any party can marry again, otherwise, 2nd marriage will be void. However, the marriage took place before promulgation of Wiegel v Sempoi-Diy and before effectivity of FC. Hence the doctrine of Odayat v Amante applies in favor of respondent. Odayat v Amante- no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.
Void and Voidable Marriages (Void Marriages)
Apiag v Cantero
Void and Voidable Marriages (Art 36)
Santos v BediaSantos
Woman files charges against husband (judge) for leaving them after having 2 children with her. Judge contracted 2nd marriage. Judge claims that the 1st marriage was only a drama marriage to appease their parents but they never lived together. Couple married. Woman went to US as nurse and did not return to her husband for 5 years. Man files nullity under Art 36 FC.
Art 36 FC A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such capacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The case is history of the debate of justices about psychological incapacity. - not pertaining to defects in mental faculties vitiating consent but lack of appreciation of ones marital obligations. - should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. - enough to show that at the time of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. - in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of celebration of marriage - must be characterized by (a) gravity must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in the marriage; (b) juridical antecedence must be rooted in the history antedating the marriage although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage (c) incurability cure would be beyond the means of the party involved It is not enough to prove that parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness. Pscyhological incapacity must be more than a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in now wise constitutes
Void and Voidable Marriages (Art 36)
Republic v CA, Molina
Woman files nullity under Art 36 due to mans immaturity and irresponsibility

psychological incapacity. Guidance for Art 36: 1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a. medically or clinically identifies b. alleged in the complaint c. sufficiently proven by experts d. clearly explained in the decision 3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage 4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage 6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Art 68 to 71 FC as regards husband and wife as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 FC in regards parents and children. 7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive should be given great respect by our courts. 8. 8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Assessment of psychiatrist was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondents. Psychologist had no personal knowledge of the facts. A medical examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding a psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination. Husband presented 2 psychiatrists who based their findings on the case record, respondents testimony and affidavit of petitioner. Marriage is null and void due to the psychiatrists findings. Marcos v Marcos personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. Marcos v Marcos if the totalities of evidence presented are enough to sustain a finding of psychogical incapacity, there is no need to resort to the actual medical examination of the person concerned. However, it would strengthen petitioners claim of respondents psychological incapacity. While the examination by a physician of a person to declare him or her psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified. Not well proven by the wife. Personality disorder as one of the reasons of psychological incapacity Court became less rigid in considering the set of rules set for Art 36. Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina case unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours with another. Two psychiatrists have contradicting psychological evaluations.
Void and Voidable Marriages (Art 36) Void and Voidable Marriages (Art 36)
Tsoi v CA
Husband refuses to have sex with wife. Husband complains wifes 1. lack of attention to children 2. immaturity 3. lack of an intention of procreative sexuality Husband files for annulment due to wifes persistent lying about herself and other people Husband brought a 15-year old boy in their honeymoon.
Choa v Choa
Void and Voidable Marriages (Art 36) Void and Voidable Marriages (Art 36)
Antonio v Reyes
Dimayuga v Laurena
Void and Voidable Marriages (Art 36) Void and Voidable Marriages (Art 36) Void and Voidable
Te v Te
Woman does not allow man to leave their house if he doesnt marry her. Uncle showed his guns. Wife complains husbands 1. alcoholism 2. violent nature 3. compulsive gambling habit 4. irresponsibility and immaturity Arranged marriage of the couple. 10 years after
Ting v VelezTing
Suazo v Suazo
The lack of probative value of psychological report and the psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of wifes testimony. However she merely testified on husbands habitual drunkenness, gambling and

Marriages (Art 36) Void and Voidable Marriages (Period to File Action of Raise Defense) Void and Voidable Marriages (Effects of Nullity) separation, woman files for annulment Petitioner claims that marriage of his brother and woman is void ab initio (no marriage license). He claims that he is entitled to of the real property making him a party of interest to impugn the validity of the marriage. Husband killed wife. After 20 months, remarried without license only affidavit that they have been cohabiting for 5 years. other instances that occurred after marriage. She declared that husband showed no sign of violent behavior indicative of a personality disorder. The marriage was contracted before FC, the old CC was in effect. The rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage had absolutely no application to the petitioner. Old CC contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage and when.
Ablaza v Republic
Ninal v Badayog
Two marriages involved solemnized before FC, CC is in effect. Art 76 CC man and woman who had lived together and exclusively with each as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least 5 years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment. This 5-year period should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no 3rd party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. Art 40 FC the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. solely is meant to qualify final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. One can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property. Validity of void marriage may be attacked collaterally. Court finds the child as mans illegitimate daughter and therefore entitled to support. There is a fit between the states interest and the means employed to achieve it. The illegitimacy of the child and the denial of marriage are at most temporary because once the minors reach age of majority, they can get married without parental consent.
Void and Voidable Marriages (Effects of Nullity)
Domingo v CA
Wife worked in Saudi, husband is dependent on her. Husband contracted previous marriage and still having affairs with other women. Husband is the administrator of wifes property.
Void and Voidable Marriages (Effects of Nullity) Void and Voidable Marriages (Grounds for Annulment) Void and Voidable Marriages (Grounds for Annulment) Void and Voidable Marriages (Grounds for Annulment)
De Castro v Assidao-de Castro Moe v Dinkins
Woman claims support for her and her child. Man denies it because their marriage is void ab initio. Statute prohibition on marriage of minors without a parental consent. Minors with an illegitimate child wanted to get married but failed to get parental consent and were not issued a license Husband wants to annul marriage because wife is insane. Granddaughter claims right to the estate of her grandmother. Grandfather assails validity of marriage of son and wife. Court held it void but only voidable, on grounds of insanity.
Katipunan v Tenorio
A declaration of nullity should be established clearly, unequivocally and convincingly. Under the law, insanity of one of the spouses which occurred after the celebration of the marriage, cannot constitute a cause of nullity.
Suntay v CojuangcoSuntay
A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Art 89 CC Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction.

Void and Voidable Marriages (Grounds for Annulment) Void and Voidable Marriages (Grounds for Annulment) Void and Voidable Marriages (Grounds for Annulment) Void and Voidable Marriages (Grounds for Annulment) Void and Voidable Marriages (Grounds for Annulment) Void and Voidable Marriages (Marriages when 1 Spouse is Absent) Void and Voidable Marriages (Marriages when 1 Spouse is Absent) Aquino v Delizo Wife concealed from husband that she was 5 months pregnant by her brother-inlaw during the time of marriage. Husband divulged to wife that he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative to force her to file for a petition to annul the marriage. Husband claims that he married wife because of force. Father threatened him with balisong, uncle threatened him he could not be admitted to the bar on the ground of immorality. Husband files annulment because vagina of wife is too small. Wife refuses to undergo physical examination. Wife had tumor in ovaries, removal of said organ rendered wife incapable of procreation Daughter of first marriage assails validity of 2nd marriage of mother. Claims that the 2nd marriage was contracted less than 7 years from publication. SSS awarded benefits of deceased husband to 1st wife who was declared presumptively dead. Art 85, par 4 CC concealment of the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage Case denied. Pregnancy is not readily apparent at 4 months, especially she was naturally plump or fat. Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment, and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. The threat to obstruct his admission to the bar, by filing charges against him for immorality, is not such a duress as to constitute a reason for annulling the marriage. And where a man marries under the threat of, or constraint from, a lawful prosecution for seduction or bastardy, he cannot avoid the marriage on the ground of duress.
Anaya v Palaroan
Ruiz v Atienza
Jimenez v Republic
women of this country are by nature, coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled by a competent authority. This the court may do without doing violence to and infringing upon her constitutional right. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. Impotency is not the ability to procreate but the ability to copulate. Defect must be one of copulation, not of reproduction. A temporary or occasional incapacity for copulation is not a ground for decree of nullity. The defect must be permanent and lasting. For celebration of civil marriages, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the 2nd marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Art 42 FC The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding article shall be automatically terminated upon the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the facts and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the spouses of the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interest person, with due notice to the spouses of subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the facts of reappearance being judicially determined in case such facts are disputed. If the absentee reappears but no step is taken to terminate subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. CC applies because marriage is in 1971. In civil code, the presumption of death is established by law, and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Proof of well-founded belief is also not required.
Sarao v Guevara
Jones v Hortiguela
SSS v De Bailon
Void and Voidable Marriages (Marriages when 1 Spouse is Absent)
Valdez v Republic
Woman separated from his husband. Remarried on the belief that 1st husband is dead. Husband cannot obtain naturalization because wifes 1st marriage is subsisting. Wife file for declaration of presumptive death of 1st husband.

Void and Voidable Marriages (Effects of Pending Action/Decree) Yu v Yu Husband and wife quarrels over custody of daughter. Declaration of nullity filed both in Pasig and Pasay RTC. Art 49 FC During the pendency of action, and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the court shall provide for the support of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children. The court shall give ultimate consideration for the moral and material welfare of the common children, and take into consideration their choice of parents with whom they wish to remain in accordance with title IX. The court shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. By petitioners filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. Motion was denied because the 1st marriage was also in accordance with the CC and not exclusively in accordance with PD 1083 or the Code of Personal Muslim Laws. The case would only fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places where there are Sharia courts. But in places where there are no sharia courts, the instant case could properly be filed before the RTC.
Void and Voidable Marriages (Jurisdiction)
Tamano v Ortiz
Legal Separation (Grounds) Legal Separation (Grounds) Legal Separation (Grounds) Legal Separation (Grounds)
People v Zapata and Bondoc Munoz v del Barrio Gandionco v Penaranda Lapuz v Eufemio
Man contracted 2nd marriage during subsistence of 1st marriage. 1st wife and son claim that the marriage was bigamous. 2nd wife that it is not because the 1st marriage was done in Mulim rites and sharia courts have jurisdiction over the matter not RTC. Man charged his wife and her paramour of the crime of adultery twice, one after the other. Wife files for legal separation due to maltreatment of husband. Wife filed for legal separation on the grounds of concubinage. A criminal case was also filed. Wife died while the case for legal separation is pending. Her father substituted her in the case.
Adultery is a crime of result not of tendency. It is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. There is no constitutional provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime. Maam Beth: not granted because only used fists and not weapon? When you have Mikko or Paus fists, those are weapons! Intent to kill must be established with clear and convincing evidence. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead or simultaneously with the criminal action because such action is not to enforce civil liability arising from the offense but intend to live separately with the legal consequences. Death of the plaintiff before decree of legal separation abates the action. There is no more need for legal separation because the marriage is already dissolved by the death of one of the parties. An action for legal separation is purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself. A claim to right is not extinguished after a party dies, In order for desertion of one spouse to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights with intention to perpetual separation. For abuse to exist, there must be an act willfully performed and with utter disregard of the partnership bythe husband that would be prejudicial to the wife, evidenced by the repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions. Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witness testimony as biased and unworthy of credence and a witness relationship to one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony. Conduct of husband and the evidence in this case warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
Legal Separation (Grounds) Legal Separation (Grounds) Legal Separation (Defenses)
Dela Cruz v Dela Cruz
Wife files for legal separation due to abandonment by husband and abuse of power of administration of CPG. Man maltreats her wife. Hit her and pointed a gun at her. Hurts kids with belt buckle. Husband left wife, then come back and file adultery against wife. After completing her sentence, she begged for husbands forgiveness but husband refused. She went to her paramour and husband did not assert his rights. Left for Hawaii, went back and filed adultery to obtain
Ong v Ong People v Sansano

divorce. Legal Separation (Grounds) Ocampo v Florenciano Wife had illicit relation so she was sent in Manila. She had illicit relations with other men. Husband said hell file for legal separation, wife agreed as long as she wont be charged of adultery. Wife is charged of adultery on 3 different instances. Testimony based on house maids and detectives. Husband and wife separated and executed an agreement allowing each other to have another mate and no one will file any charge. Husband left wife. Witnesses said that he is living with another woman. Wife and the kids begged husband to return but he refused and said he cant leave the other woman. Wife files for legal separation. She also filed for return of her paraphernal and exclusive property under the administration of husband. Wife filed petition for legal separation in another province not the domicile of the husband. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment of files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiffs demand. This did not happen in the instant case because there is evidence independent of wifes statement. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendants confession. Neither is there collusion, it happens when the parties arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of adultery really happened according to the evidence. He threw no protection around his wife, instead he left her in danger. It seemed like Mr. Sargent wanted his wife to commit adultery. Art 100 CC legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Having condoned and consented in writing, the plaintiff is undeserving of courts sympathy. In the eyes of the law, the wife only became cognizant of the infidelity of husband when he admitted it directly to his wife. Thats when the period of prescription starts and not when she only acquired information from other people.
Legal Separation (Grounds) Legal Separation (Grounds) Legal Separation (When to file/try Actions)
Sargent v Sargent Matubis v Praxedes
Contreras v Macaraig
Legal Separation (Grounds) Legal Separation (Effects of Filing a Petition) Legal Separation (Effects of Filing a Petition) Legal Separation (Effects of Decree)
SomosaRamos v Vamenta, Jr. De la Vina v Villareal
Art 103 CC preventing the hearing of a case before 6 months since the filing of the petition is not an absolute bar. Art 104 CC allows spouses after filing for legal separation to live separately and manage their respective property. Wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband where the theoretical unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by legal separation or divorce. In this case, the husband ejected wife from conjugal home, under no other circumstances could a wife be more justified in establishing a separate residence from that of her husband. To continue living with him would be a condonation. In order to protect the interest of the wife, the husbands power of administration be curtailed, during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is concerned. Alleged adultery of the wife must be established by competent evidence. The mere allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right to receive support pendent lite.
Reyes v Ines-Luciano
Banez v Banez
Legal Separation
La Rue v La Rue
Wife files for legal separation because of an attempt to her life. Husband claims that case must be dismissed because she committed adultery with her physician. Decree of legal separation awarded conjugal abode to wife who had 2 houses in the US. Wife filed a motion for execution pending appeal and protested that the husbands failure to file a record on appeal for that particular action merits a dismissal of his appeal Wife was a household when she divorced her husband.
Execution of pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ. The effects of legal separation such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the AC or CP, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals. Based on the doctrine of equitable distribution, a spouse who economically contributed to the familys acquisition of property is entitled to claim an interest in such property in a proceeding for divorce. Homemaker

(Effects of Decree) The divorce only awarded wife alimony and allowance for health insurance. The divorce did not provide for any distribution of the marital assets. Custody of children was awarded to husband. Wife asked for to bring the kids to Manila for their grandfathers burial. Wife did not return the kids. Laperal filed a petition asking to be allowed to change her name and/or permitted to resume using her maiden name after being legally separated from her husband. To continue using her maiden name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. A Filipina obtained a divorce from her foreign spouse abroad. The foreigner acknowledged that he and the Filipina had no community property in the divorce proceedings. When he came back to the Philippines, he filed a suit claiming that the Filipinas business was conjugal property A Filipino couple obtained a divorce abroad. Wifes citizenship at the time the divorce was obtained has not been established. Husband contracted a second marriage after obtaining a divorce from his first wife. In his will, the husband left the entire estate to his second wife. He was already a US citizen at the time of: the divorce from his first wife, the marriage to his second wife, the execution of the will, and his death A Filipino was divorced from his Australian wife and services are also considered economic contributions because the husband, as breadwinner, can focus on his job instead of worrying about household chores. Factors for equitable distribution regarding homemaker services: (1)Age (2)earning power (3)separate property (4)length of marriage (5)quality The judge merely enforced a decision that is final and executory. Petitioner cannot question the authority of the husband to ask for the children because she doesnt have their custody. She merely obtained his permission to bring them to Manila. Although she is free to seek a review of the order or decision awarding the custody of the minors to him, and to ask that they be placed under her charge. Art 372: When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. The language of the statute is mandatory. This is because her married status is unaffected by the separation. Applying Rule 103, Change of Name, on legal separation alone, is not sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner.
Legal Separation (Effects of Decree) Legal Separation (Effects of Decree)
Matute v Macadaeg
Laperal v Republic
Divorce (Foreign Divorces)
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have not standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain that petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wifes obligations under Art 109 CC cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petition could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.Thus the case must be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in order to know the citizenship of the petitioner at the time of the divorce. Following the doctrine in Quita, citizenship at the time the divorce was obtained determines its validity. Since the husband was already a US citizen even before he had obtained the divorce, there is no more question about its validity. However, it is not clear whether US divorce laws allow a husband to leave his entire estate to the second wife. For this reason, the case needs to be remanded. The divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. The effects of the divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Quita v. Dandan
Llorente v. CA
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132: a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of

Garcia v. Recio eventually married a Filipina. the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (1) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (2) authenticated by the seal of his office. There are 2 kinds of divorce: absolute and limited. In absolute divorce, the marriage ties are severed, allowing the parties to remarry. In limited divorce, however, the marriage ties are still in full force. There was no evidence to show that the Filipino had obtained an absolute divorce from his Australian wife. Aside from this, some absolute divorces still restrict remarriage for a certain period of time. Foreign law, like any other fact, must be alleged and proved. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by court, party pleading must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to foreign law. There is no sufficient evidence at hand in the case at bar.
Republic v. Obercido
Corpuz v. Sto Tomas
Husband discovered that wife had been naturalized, obtained divorce in US and married a foreigner. Husband files for authority to remarry Petitioner former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship and married a Filipina. Filipina cheated on him and he sought divorce in Canada. He then wanted to marry another and submitted the decree to civil registry which was denied due to lack of judicial recognition.
Yasin v. Sharia District Court
A Muslim woman was divorced from her husband and she filed a petition to resume use of her maiden name.
The alien spouse can claim NO RIGHT under the Par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The true and real name of a person is that which appears on the birth certificate. A married woman is not obliged to assume her husbands name. The choice of which name to employ is completely up to her. Because Muslim divorces are recognized here, the wife may resume use of her maiden name since the marital bond has severed. NOTES: - Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, as follows: Art. 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by: (a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq); (c) Judicial decree (faskh). - Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086 provides: Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it become irrevocable, shall have the following effects: (a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this Code - The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda (Art. 56, PD 1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of the marriage by divorce (Art. 57[b], PD 1083). Since Art. 213 does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation, the tender-years principle provided in the article is also applicable to de facto separation. Art 213. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Use of word shall and Rule 99 of Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. Prohibits in no
Perez v. CA
Husband and wife were separated in fact because wife wants to work as nurse in US while husband, a doctor, wants to stay in the

Philippines. They had a 1 year-old son that was left with the father. Mother asks for the childs custody. Members of Jehovahs Witnesses who were separated in fact from their respective spouses were living together as husband and wife. Lawyer-husband abandoned his family for another woman but continued to provide for them Wife left the conjugal home because husband wanted her to perform unchaste acts and maltreated her whenever she refused to do so Husband was indicted for rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife uncertain terms separation of mother and child below seven years unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by court. Ex: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habital drunkenness, drg addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with communicable disease However, their arrangement is approved by their religious sect. The only justification for a restraint on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a clear and present danger of substantive evil which the state has the right to prevent. Although the religious sanction gives a sense of normalcy and legality to their union, this does not change laws on marriage. They still need to validate their relationship in order to avail of the benefits that only a marriage can afford them. Maam Beth: The court did not say the marriage is legal, they merely said it is not immoral. Being able to provide for the familys needs is not enough. Evidence shows he abandoned his family and this removed him from a position to be a good husband and father. Spouses have an obligation not only to render mutual help and support but also to live together and observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. Lawyerhusband deserves to be disbarred The marital obligation to cohabit includes normal sexual intercourse only. The duty to live together cannot be separated from the duty to mutual love, respect and fidelity. The wife is entitled to support because she left with justifiable cause. The law will not allow the husband to terminate his duty to support the wife by his own wrongful acts which led her to leave the conjugal home Theories which justify the marital exemption for rape can no longer be accepted as valid since there have been changes in womens rights and the status of women in marriage. There is no reason why a woman, in contracting a marriage, should surrender laws which protect her from the ultimate violation of self which occurs in rape. 3 theories: 1. Lord Hales Contractual Theoryhusband cannot be guilty of raping his wife because the wife has given up herself to the husband upon marriage 2. Wife as the husbands chattel or property 3. Unity of Person Theorylegal existence of a woman is consolidated into that of her husband. Because there is only one legal being, husband cannot be convicted of raping himself. The equal protection clause is also applicable to discriminatory governmental action in administration and enforcement of the law. Police action is one of these. A man is not allowed to physically abuse a woman merely because he is her husband. Similarly, a police officer may not knowingly refrain from interference in such violence simply because the assaulter and his victim are married to each other. The equal protection clause is not restricted to racial discriminations. It also involves alien-based classifications. For this reason, the distinction between married and non-married persons similarly situated violates the equal protection clause. There is no rational basis for the distinction between marital and nonmarital rape. Rape is a degrading, violent act which violates the physical integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychological harm. A married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman. There is also no rational relationship between allowing a husband to rape his wife and protecting marital privacy as well as encouraging reconciliation. Aside from this, it is the violent act of rape which disrupts a marriage, not the subsequent attempt of the wife to seek protection through the criminal justice system. If the marriage has already reached the point where intercourse is accomplished by violent assault, it is doubtful that there is anything left to reconcile. Claims that marital rape is a difficult crime to prove because lack of consent has to be shown and that it can lead to fabricated complaints by vindictive wives are untenable. Lack of consent is always difficult to prove. There is no greater possibility of married women making fabricated complaints than unmarried women. The wifes acts of her refusal to perform her marital duties, denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husbands feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy (Art. 21, CC). The grant of moral damages, however, is not an effect of legal separation but rather a result of her wrongful acts.
Estrada v. Escritor
Narag v. Narag
Goitia v. Campos Rueda
Warren v. State
Thurman v. City of Torrington
Wife was being assaulted by the husband but the city did not offer her any police protection
People v. Liberta
Statute exemption for marital rape. Husband was convicted of rape and sodomy in the first degree of his wife. Done in the hotel while son was watching.
Tenchavez v. Escano
Husband and wife had a secret marriage. Wife abandoned husband without justifiable cause and obtained

a divorce abroad in order to remarry. Wife was forced to leave the conjugal home because of the husbands infidelity Husbands son from a first marriage impregnated wifes daughter from a first marriage. Wife left the conjugal home. Husband threatened her with violence if she would return The couple lived with the husbands parents but the wife cannot get along with them. When the couple went to the wifes hometown, she did not go back with him. Husband offered to move intoa place of their own but she still refused to cohabit
Dadivas de Villanueva v. Villanueva
Garcia v. Santos
The wife is entitled to support because she left with justifiable cause.The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable. The husband cannot relieve himself of the duty to support his wife by his own wrongful acts. The wife is entitled to support because she left with justifiable cause. To keep the 2 young people under the same roof will only give them the opportunity to continue their illicit relations which would create an embarrassing situation for the wife. Under these circumstances, to compel the wife to cohabit with her husband can only lead to further quarrels.
Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng
Art 299 CC The person obliged to give support may, at his option, fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in his house the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. The defendant elects to perform his obligation by the 2nd means allowed him by law. In giving the obligor the option to fulfill his duty, it provides for only one occasion when the 2nd alternative could not be availed of, when there is moral or legal obstacle thereto. The court does not think that misunderstanding with in-laws, who may be considered 3rd party to the marriage, is the moral or legal obstacle that the lawmaker contemplated in the drafting of said provisions. But even granting arguendo that it might be illegal for him to persist on living with his parents over the objection of his wife, this argument becomes moot in view of defendants manifestation that he is willing to establish a residence separate from his parents, if plaintiff so desires. The cause of their living apart seems to be the absence of love on the part of the wife sufficient to make her bear the inconvenience caused by the mother-in-law, and the absence of love also on the part of the husband to impel him to remove that inconvenience and leave his mother for his wife. It is true that the wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish his residence (Art. 58 CC) but such right does not include that of compelling his wife to live with her mother-in-law, if the latter and the wife cannot get along together. The spouses are living in the same house. There is no reason why the wife should be granted separate maintenance. Furthermore, the living standards of a family are a concern of the household and not of the courts. As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife, it may be said that the husband is legally supporting his wife.
Del Rosario v. Del Rosario
The couple lived with the husbands mother but the wife cannot get along with her. Husband refuses to live separately from his mother
McGuire v. McGuire
Pelayo v. Lauron
Husband was too frugal (i.e. would only give the wife small amounts, had not taken her to the movies for 12 years, refused to install modern facilities in their toilet and bath) Parents-in-law called a doctor to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth. Doctor sued the parents-inlaw for payment
Art. 1090 and 1091 CC, Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special law are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. Art 142 and 143 CC, the rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. The in-laws are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and on the

other hand, it does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind themselves. Three factors in determining who the primary caretaker is: 1. economic stability (or the desire to remain employed, not larger salary) 2. constant factor in childrens lives 3. ability to control anger In awarding custody of the children, the court must take into consideration who the primary caretaker had been throughout the childrens life and not only the years immediately preceding the divorce or separation. No marriage between the man and the woman had ever taken place because the man had a prior subsisting marriage. Because there is no marriage between them, it is not proper for the woman to use the mans name or to continue representing herself as his wife. The law authorizes a married woman to use the surname of her husband. Impliedly, it excludes others from doing likewise.
Young v. Hector
Architect-husband and lawyer-wife obtained a divorce
Silva v. Peralta
Tolentino v. CA
Yasin v. Sharia District Court Perez v. Tuazon de Perez Arroyo v. Vazquez de Arroyo
A woman contracted marriage with a man who had a prior subsisting marriage. The man later left for the US and obtained a divorce from his first wife but remarried another. Woman continued using the mans surname to the second wifes objections Ex-wife continued using her ex-husbands surname even after an absolute divorce had been granted to them. Husband remarried and the present wife objected to the ex-wifes use of the husbands surname A Muslim woman was divorced from her husband and she filed a petition to resume use of her maiden name Husband filed a petition to have his wife declared a prodigal and be placed under Guardianship Wife left the conjugal home without justifiable cause and filed for support. Husband asked the court to compel his wife to return
The effects of absolute divorce are similar to those of the death of the spouse where there is a severance of valid marriage ties. Since a widow is allowed to use the name of her deceased husband, so may an ex-wife use the name of her ex-husband. Elements of usurpation of status not present in this case: 1. Actual use of anothers surname by the defendant 2. Such use is unauthorized 3. Use of name is to designate personality The true and real name of a person is that which appears on the birth certificate. A married woman is not obliged to assume her husbands name. The choice of which name to employ is completely up to her. Because Muslim divorces are recognized here, the wife may resume use of her maiden name since the marital bond has already been severed. The Domestic Relations Court has jurisdiction over the matter. Material injury does not refer to economic injury or damage, but to personal (i.e. physical or moral) injury.
Consortium is a purely personal right. Hence, it is not within the power of the courts to order the wife to return to the conjugal home under pain of contempt. The most they can do is admonish her to return. A spouse who left the conjugal home without justifiable cause is not entitled to support.

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