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Reference ID 10HANOI11

Created 2010-01-27 02:55

Released 2011-08-30 01:44

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

Origin Embassy Hanoi

VZCZCXRO8782 OO RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHPB DE RUEHHI #0011/01 0270256 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O R 270255Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY HANOI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0786 INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMCSUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0057 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0418 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000011

SENSITIVE SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/27 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECON SENV MARR CH VM SUBJECT: internal politics? How much influence does China have over Vietnam's

REF: A) 09 HANOI 413, 417, 537; B) 09 HANOI 809, 823, 881 C) 09 HANOI 672; D) 09 HANOI 897 E) 08 HCMC 815, 596, 09 HANOI 805, 807, 926; F) 09 HANOI 1094 G) HANOI 7; H) 09 HANOI 330, 899; I) 09 HANOI 927; J) 09 HANOI 909

CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Michalak, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

1. (C) SUMMARY: pervasive in

Animosity

toward

China,

heartfelt

and

the most routine of times, appears to have taken on an added urgency in the wake of sensitive border negotiations, protracted controversy over Chinese investment in bauxite mining projects in the Central Highlands, and China's imposition this summer of a unilateral "fishing ban" in the South China Sea. of A wide range

contacts, particularly in the Western-oriented intellectual and dissident community, insist that China wields an inordinate and growing felt sway over Vietnamese decision-making, with influence

on issues such as the control of information on territorial disputes; resource, environmental, and energy strategy; and personnel decisions in advance of Vietnam's 2011 Party Congress. Some insist that "pro-China" forces in the Vietnamese security services are behind the recent crackdown on political dissent, acting at the behest of Beijing. prosaic. The reality is much more

Given its proximity, size, and economic might, China remains a predominant necessarily constrains Vietnam's consideration options. for Vietnam's does not, leadership however, and

Beijing

dictate

internal policies.

END SUMMARY.

The Panda's Long Paw

--------------------

2. (C) oriented

Over

the

past

several

months,

Vietnam's

Western-

intellectual, journalistic, and dissident communities have ratcheted up their criticism of China, taking particular aim at what they Vietnam's describe as Beijing's inordinate influence over

internal decision-making.

Spurred initially by an unprecedented

barrage of public/online opposition to Chinese involvement in bauxite development in the Central Highlands (ref A), critics were further incensed by the PRC's enforcement this summer of its unilateral "fishing ban" in the South China Sea. Concerns about

China's influence have been amplified in advance of the Eleventh Party Congress Vietnam's in January 2011, with different members of

Politburo whispered to be under Beijing's sway.

This past year,

General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, PM Nguyen Tan Dung, Standing Secretary Truong Tan Sang, National Assembly Chair Nguyen Phu Trong, Hanoi Party Chief Pham Quang Nghi, and propaganda czar To Huy Rua have inconsistently all been characterized -variously and

-- as Beijing's man in Hanoi.

These are not innocent,

disinterested sentiment

statements.

Given

the

depth

of

anti-China

in Vietnam, a pro-China label is hardly an advantage; rather, it can be used as a political cudgel, as we saw at the height of the bauxite controversy.

3.

(C) Among many of our contacts it is taken as an article of

faith that China will try to dictate the leadership succession in 2011 (ref represents B). Vu Thu Thanh, a former MFA official who

the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council in Hanoi, contends that China would use this year's ASEAN meetings in Hanoi to shape the Party Congress, particularly on personnel matters. Thanh's former colleagues assume in the MFA and counterparts in other ministries

that China keeps files on rising cadre, encouraging the careers of those who appear to be in sync ideologically and subverting those it disapproves, connected he insisted. Nguyen Tran Bat, the well-

chairman of the InvestConsult Group, similarly asserted that "everyone" in government is suspicious of China's intelligence services, which Bat claimed are pervasive in Vietnam and weigh in on promotion decisions. Thanh's brother Nguyen Tran Khanh, who

handles the company's business in HCMC, was even more direct,

HANOI 00000011

002 OF 004

asserting members

that

China

exploits

the

greed

of

individual

CPV

by providing opportunities for personal gain.

Neither Thanh nor

Bat could provide specific examples -- nor could anyone else -but the belief National is widespread that China exercises influence.

Assembly Representative Nguyen Lan Dung, who serves on the Vietnam-China Parliamentary Caucus, was skeptical of any direct Chinese role in personnel matters, though he noted that the fact that the effect notion is out there likely has a "self-censoring"

on decisions.

And Sharp, Pointy Teeth

-----------------------

4. (C) More ominously, several of our contacts assert that China is behind Vietnam's recent crackdown on human rights (ref C), just as they have long blamed China for "exporting" environmental pollution to Vietnam. Deputy Secretary leading At a lunch hosted by the Ambassador for (ref D), the editor of Vietnam's

Steinberg

online news service, VietnamNet, Nguyen Anh Toan, and Hanoi

University Law Professor Hoang Ngoc Giao complained that Vietnam had acquiesced to demands from Chinese diplomats in Hanoi that journalists responsible for articles critical of China be fired. Senior economist Le Dang Doanh pointed to swift action by the MPS to clamp down on a group of youths who unveiled T-shirts saying "The Spratleys Belong to Vietnam" at the 2009 National Day celebrations as an act of Chinese perfidy. of Similarly, several

Vietnam's political blogs blamed China for the conviction last year of blogger charges, Dieu Cay on politically motivated tax evasion

as well as the detention in August of bloggers known for antiChina views who had "plotted" to distribute T-shirts proclaiming Vietnam's ownership of the Paracels/Spratleys (ref E).

5.

(C) Conspiracy theories abound. the Ministry of

The most fully articulated General Department II

point to ("GDII"),

Defense's

a shadowy intelligence service headed by the influential and (critics say) pro-China Vice Defense Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh. Several of these theories are conjoined in an omnibus treatment compiled by the former Bangkok Bureau Chief for the Far Eastern Economic Review in an article published online for the Asia Times (http://www.atimes.com/ atimes/China/KI12Ad04.html). In it, the

author quotes a senior member of the exiled dissident political party Viet Tan who asserts that GDII is "one of the primary means

for China to assert influence in Vietnam."

GDII is certainly

suspect, having been involved in a Watergate-style wiretapping scandal of former General Secretary Le Kha Phieu's Politburo rivals in the 1990s; and General Vinh's father in law, General Dung Vu Ching (who in intelligence), his day also headed Vietnam's military

is infamous for his efforts to slander Vietnam War hero General Vo Nguyen Giap and the reformist former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet as CIA spies. What is much less apparent -- asserted but not The article cites Carlyle a Thayer in

substantiated -- is the link to China. Australian describing Defense University

scholar in

the wiretapping commentary, Thayer himself stooge. (See

scandal; discounts

however, speculation

separate CDII is

online China's

that

http://www.scribd.com/doc/19695242/Thayer-Vie Intellig ence-in-Domestic-Affairs.)

tnam-Military-

6.

(C) General Vinh is no soft touch.

At a press conference

unveiling Vietnam's 2009 Defense White Paper, Vinh identified "pernicious democracy efforts to use the mantle of human rights and

to encourage anti-Party and anti-State forces" as a security challenge second only to the effects of the global economic downturn. candidly At the same time, however, Vinh also mentioned

the possibility of military conflict with China over the South China Sea though -a topic usually avoided in public comments --

he was at pains to sound diplomatic.

In a meeting the following

week with the Ambassador and a visiting delegation from the U.S.-China Congressional Commission, General Vinh presented a

HANOI 00000011

003 OF 004

mostly benign picture of China's influence, emphasizing that China's economic success provided substantial opportunities for Vietnam and could be a force for regional stability. Again,

however, he did not shy away from the more threatening aspects of China's diplomatic, economic, and military rise. Vinh expressly rejected China's expansive claims in the South China Sea and, when pressed, insisted that Vietnam "knows how to fight and to win" and would "do what is necessary" to safeguard its territory. are These

views firmly in line with Vietnam's pragmatic approach to China (ref F) Defense, and echo the tone taken by Vietnam's Minister of

Phung Quang Thanh, in his December 2009 visit to the United States: if Vinh is China's shill, he hides it well.

Similarities in Political Structure, Culture, and Perspective

--------------------------------------------- ----------------

7. (C) Vietnam

There

are,

to

be

sure,

clear

similarities

in

how

and China's Party/state structures approach dissent (there are also differences too: on religion, for example, Vietnam has generally taken a more relaxed stance and is not listed as a Country of Particular largely Concern. Ref G). These systems, similarities, shared however,

reflect cognate perspectives,

political

ideological

and, with these, a common obsession with internal stability and regime security. from "Peaceful evolution" may be a term borrowed

Chinese political campaigns of the early 1990s, but Vietnam's hardliners do not need China to tell them to be paranoid, as even a cursory glance at the CPV's most recent internal screed, Decree 34, makes plain (ref H). the As the former chair of China Studies at

Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Nguyen Huy Quy, put it, Vietnam and China are members of a very small number of capitalistoriented Communist countries, and this gives their leaders ample common ground.

10

8. (C) To put things differently: It is true that many of those caught up in Vietnam's current crackdown expressed anti-China views; it is also true that Vietnam's relationship with China is a fraught subject. It does not, though, follow that Vietnam is

necessarily acting on China's instruction in suppressing dissent or that there is a secretive pro-China cabal. enough There is reason

domestically for Vietnam's leaders to want to keep the lid on -popular ill will, though initially directed at Beijing, could easily turn in a less welcome direction. The issue is control.

Vietnam's state-controlled media itself frequently publishes language sharply critical of China, and a prominent editor of the Party's official website, Dao Duy Quat, was publicly reprimanded in September for not inserting the appropriate "tough" language in an article about chivalrously blamed on his mushroom's" Chinese naval exercises The slogans (an on oversight blogger he

secretary).

"mama

dissident T-shirts simply (and smartly) repeated official pronouncements. neither China does not dictate Vietnam's line, but

does Vietnam's public.

9.

(C) And then there is corruption.

Allegations on the blogs

that PM's Dung's support on bauxite were bought with Chinese money

11

are fanciful; however, Khanh of InvestConsult is probably not far off the mark when he complains of shady dealings. There is a

larger nexus between ideological hardliners such as Rua (ref I) and "non-partisan," Party but corrupt political magnates such as HCMC

Boss Le Thanh Hai, which reinforces China's interests, even if China does not dictate terms. the Rua and his ilk aim to preserve

vanguard position of the Communist Party, a perspective they share with China's political leaders. Others, a majority perhaps, oppose

reform because it threatens access to patronage -- another structural feature shared with China. participant's interest, are acting according Again, though, the to their (narrow) self-

not on China's orders.

HANOI 00000011

004 OF 004

The Nature of China's influence

-------------------------------

10. (or

(C) None of this is to imply that Vietnam's leaders can Beijing. To the contrary: Basic structural

do) ignore asymmetries

12

in the There

relationship from

continually

constrain

Hanoi's and

options. on the

is pressure Vietnamese

China,

continually

applied,

side, lessons learned.

(China's ambassador to Vietnam, Sun

Guoxiang, told the Ambassador that the pace of visits is so intense that officials below the rank of vice minister do not even merit a control officer, and there are important visits conducted at the provincial level that do not even involve the PRC Embassy.) Asked directly, Vietnamese influenced officials flatly deny that they are

by China -- but one can imagine, for example, that the same Vietnamese officials that shut down access to FaceBook (ref J) are eagerly observing China's reaction to Google, just as an earlier generation of economic policymakers drew from China's experience with agricultural reform and export-processing zones. here readily brother) admit to an "em-anh" (younger Officials elder

brother

relationship with China.

The point is, rather, that Beijing's

influence is much less direct than critics assert, and it is constantly refracted through the lens of domestic interests, intrigue, and pride. with How Vietnam should deal most effectively

China is a subject of considerable internal division, but this is a debate that goes well beyond a putative battle between pro- and anti-China factions. for It is all too easy -- for us as well as

critical voices within Vietnam -- to point the finger at China. In

13

the end, Vietnam remains resolutely independent, and with this comes ownership of its own successes and failings.

11.

(U) This cable was coordinated with ConGen HCMC.

Michalak

VIETNAMSRELATIONSWITHCHINAANDNORTHKOREA:THENEXTFIVEYEARS
CarlyleA.Thayer March2,2010 ThisreportpresentsaforwardlookinganalysisoflikelyVietnameseforeignpolicy initiativestowardsChinaoverthenextfiveyears.Itexplorestwomajorquestions.What isHanoiseekingtogainfromdiplomatic,militaryandeconomicexchangeswithBeijing? WhatsortofinfluencedoesChinaassertoverVietnam?

Background
InJanuary1950,boththePeoplesRepublicofChinaextendeddiplomaticrecognitionto Vietnams fledgling communist regime, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (later renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam). China supported the Vietnamese communists in their successful resistance to French colonialism. Relations were described as close as lips and teeth. China also provided material and personnel supporttoNorthVietnamduringtheVietnamWar(196573). Hanois relations with Beijing deteriorated during the Cambodian conflict (197991). WhenVietnaminvadedCambodiaChinaretaliatedbyattackingVietnamandproviding militarysupporttotheKhmerRouge. Vietnam and China normalized diplomatic relations in 1991 after an international conferenceinParisreachedacomprehensivepoliticalsettlementinCambodia.InMarch 1999, a summit meeting of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) adopted a fourteencharacter guideline calling for longterm, stable, futureorientated, goodneighborly and allround cooperative relations. The following year at a summit meeting of state presidents, China and VietnamcodifiedbilateralrelationsinaJointStatementforComprehensiveCooperation

intheNewCentury.Thisdocumentservedasaframeworkforlongtermstatetostate relations. In 2006, Vietnam and China agreed to coordinate all aspects of their bilateral relationshipthroughaJointSteeringCommitteeonBilateralCooperationwhichmeton anannualbasisatdeputyprimeministerlevel.InJune2008,followinganothersummit ofpartyleadersinBeijing,bilateralrelationswereraisedtothatofstrategicpartners, andayearlaterthiswasupgradedtoastrategiccooperativepartnership.Atthethird meetingoftheJointSteeringCommitteeinMarch2009,VietnamandChinasetupahot linetodealwithurgentissues(particularlyclashesintheSouthChinaSea). In sum, SinoVietnamese relations have been structured through the framework of a longtermcooperationagreement,aJointSteeringCommitteeonBilateralCooperation, and regular highlevel summit meetings between party and state leaders. This has resulted in a dense network of agreements between party, state, military and mass organizations at all levels. In 2009, Vietnam and China exchanged 267 delegations of which108wereatdeputyministerlevelorhigher.

VietnamandChina:AsymmetricRelations
The relationship between Vietnam and China is a highly asymmetric one in all dimensions of power. Vietnam, with a population of 89 million, ranks as the worlds thirteenth most populous country, yet it is only a middle sized Chinese province by comparison.ThemajorstrategicpreoccupationoftheVietnameseleadershipishowto

use the levers of diplomacy, military ties and economic relations to maintain their autonomyandindependenceandpreventfrombeingpulledintoChinasorbit. Vietnamuseshighlevelpartyandstatevisitsasadiplomatictooltocodifyitsrelations with China. Vietnam has negotiated a web of joint statements, agreements, and treaties in order to make Chinese behavior more predictable and less likely to harm Vietnamsnationalinterests. Vietnam has built on the normalization of political relations through a diplomatic strategy that stresses the legacy of past close relations and mutual benefit over contemporary differences. A prime example may be found in Vietnams approach to managing territorial disputes with China. Vietnam obtained Chinese agreement to detach these issues from highlevel consideration and to relegate them to technical workinggroups,andtosolvetheeasierproblemsbeforethemoredifficult.Vietnams diplomaticstrategyemphasizedcommoninterests,suchasmakingthelandbordersafe andsecuresothatbothsidescouldbenefitfromcrossbordertrade.Asaresultatreaty onthelandborderandagreementdemarcatingtheGulfofTonkinwerereached. Over the next five years Vietnam will set a priority on ensuring that its territorial conflictswithChinaintheSouthChinaSeaarekeptpeacefulandthatamodusvivendiis worked out to jointly exploit the resources of the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea.Vietnamwillrelyprimarilyondiplomacy,butitwillalsobackthisupwithenhanced maritimedefensecapabilities.

Vietnam will pursue three strategies. First, it will continue bilateral negotiations with Chinatoconcludeanagreementontheprinciplestogoverntheiractionsincontested waters. Discussions are already in train. Once agreement is reached Vietnam will explorewithChinathepossibilitiesofjointdevelopmentinlesssensitiveareas. Vietnamssecondstrategywillbetopromotemultilateraleffortstomaintainpeaceand stabilityintheSouthChinaSea.Vietnamwillseektoinvolveotherforeigncompaniesin joint development in order to ensure that their home governments have a continuing interest in stability in this region. The challenge for Vietnam will be to work out how much foreign involvement China will tolerate. Vietnam will also seek to upgrade ASEANs 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea into a more bindingCodeofConduct.AsASEANChairin2010Vietnamhasawindowofopportunity topromoteanASEANChinaCodeofConductintheSouthChinaSea. Vietnams third strategy will be to develop sufficient military capacity to deter China from using force. For example, Vietnam will take delivery of six Kiloclass submarines fromRussiaoverasixyearperiod.Vietnamwillalsodevelopintegratedorjointairnaval forcesandcommandheadquarters.Thisisadefensivestrategyaimedatareadenial. VietnamsmilitaryrelationswithChinaareatanascentstage.Overthenextfiveyears Vietnam will seek to gradually expand defense cooperation for political and practical reasons. Vietnam will seek enhanced military ties with China as a form of confidence building,butalsoasameanstodevelopinfluencewiththePeoplesLiberationArmy,an importantactorinChinaspoliticalsystem.Confidencebuildingmeasureswilltakethe

formofbordersecuritycooperationinremoteareas,increasednavalportvisits,1search andrescueexercisesandsteppedupjointnavalpatrolstoprotectfisheriesintheGulfof TonkinandlatertheSouthChinaSea. On the practical side, Vietnam will seek to build on recent agreements to expand training exchanges at all levels and to promote cooperation by national defense industries in military technology, light arms and ammunition production. Vietnam will seek material benefits from defense cooperation; but will use military relations with ChinaaspoliticalcoverforenhancedmilitarytieswiththeUnitedStates.Vietnamwill alsoseektoshapeitsdefenserelationswithChinathroughmultilateralchannelssuchas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting with dialogue partners. This process has just got off the groundandVietnam,asASEANChairfor2010,isplanningtohostitsfirstmeeting. When Vietnam normalized relations with China smuggling became a major issue as ChinesegoodsfloodedintoVietnamsdomesticmarket.Theopeningofthelandfrontier quicklyledtoincreasedcrossbordertradeandgreaterautonomyforlocalgovernment authorities.RegularizingtradewithChinahasservedtoreinforceHanoisauthorityover thelocalities.Since1991,tradebetweenChinaandVietnamhasgrownastronomically. ChinaisnowVietnamslargesttradingpartner.ChinasuppliesVietnamwithmachinery, refined oil and steel. In return, Vietnam supplies China with unrefined oil, coal and rubber. The single most important issue in the trade relationship is the imbalance in 1Sincenormalizationin1991,thePeoplesLiberationArmyNavyhasmadeonlythree portcallstoVietnam,andtheVietnamesenavyhasvisitedChinaonlyonce.

Chinas favor ($11.1 billion in 2008). In 2008, China exported $15.7 billion worth of goodstoVietnam,whileVietnammanagedtoexportonly$4.6billiontoChina. Chinastradesurplushasfiguredateveryhighlevelsummitinrecentyears.Partyand state leaders agree that efforts should be make to make it more balanced. But how? RestrictingChineseimportsisnotonthecards.ThestructureofVietnameseexportshad changed little over the years and no major change is expected in the coming years. Vietnamesedomesticmanufacturerscannotproducequalitygoodsthatarecompetitive in the Chinese market place. Vietnamese leaders have called for increased Chinese investment;althoughChinahasrespondedthetotalamountofinvestment($3billion)is modestwhencomparedtootherforeigninvestors. Future trade between China and Vietnam will be influenced by the ASEANChina Free Trade Agreement that took effect in January 2010. Chinese tariffs will be lowered makingiteasierforVietnamtosellitsgoodsinChina.AndVietnamwillalsobeableto take part in a regional division of labor by producing components for assembly elsewherewithinthefreetradearea.ForVietnamtofullytakeadvantageofthesetrade opportunities it will have to get its domestic house in order and make Vietnamese businessesmorecompetitiveintheChinesemarket. VietnamsmassivetradedeficitwithChinamustbeplacedinthecontextofVietnams current trade deficit of $19 billion with the rest of the world (2009). Vietnam needs continuedaccesstomarketsintheUnitedStateswhereithasa$9billionsurplus(2009).

In addition to the economic benefits of trade, there are also geostrategic considerations at play. The growth of trade has been accompanied by a massive upgrading and construction of infrastructure roads, bridges, railways much of it fundedbytheAsianDevelopmentBankandWorldBankaspartoftheGreaterMekong Subregion.IncreasinglymainlandSoutheastAsiaisbeinglinkedtosouthwesternChina. In addition, Vietnam and China are promoting the development of the two corridors and one economic beltway linking southern China, Hainan island and northern Vietnam. From Hanois point of view, this not only serves Vietnams development needs, but also enmeshes China and provides Beijing incentives for cooperative behavior. Vietnam utilizes diplomatic, military and economic means to achieve the strategic objective of obtaining Chinas acknowledgment of Vietnams independence and autonomyinreturnforwhichVietnamrecognizesChinasregionalprimacy. China asserts considerable direct and indirect influence on Vietnam. Probably no majordecisionofanynatureismadeinHanoiwithouttakingChineseinterestsand likely responses into account. China exerts direct pressure through highlevel meetings by national leaders. Partytoparty relations represent a special conduit for Chinese influence. Vietnams model of economic development borrows heavily butnotexclusivelyfromChineseexperience.Vietnameseforeignpolicyalsoinfused mimics Chinese formulations, such as the general strategic trend in Asia Pacific is oneofpeace,cooperationanddevelopment.HanoialsoadaptsChineseideologyto its own needs, such as the threat of peaceful evolution. Entire Chinese books on

thesubjecthavebeentranslatedintoVietnameseandmadecompulsoryreadingfor Central Committee members and delegates to national party congresses. The slow pace of U.S.Vietnam militarytomilitary relations can be attributed in part to concernsaboutChinasreaction.The2009DefenseWhitepapermakesnomention ofthe1979borderwarwithChinasoasnottooffendBeijing.TheChineseEmbassy regularly intervenes to protest any publication or action that is seen as infringing Chinesesovereignty,especiallyintheSouthChinaSea.Nootherforeignstateisas assertiveorinfluentialinHanoithanChina.

VIETNAMSRELATIONSWITHCHINA:THENEXTFIVEYEARS
CarlyleA.Thayer

March27,2010 Vietnams management of relations with China has always been the prerogative of a small groupwithinthepartyandstateelite.Vietnamselitehasnotalwaysbeenunifiedonhowto managerelationswithitsnorthernneighbor.Historicallyinternalpartycontentiononrelations with China has been insulated from the general public through party discipline and strict controls on the media and publishing industry. Since 2007, the emergence of an antiChina backlashamongawideningcircleofVietnamspoliticalelitehasbrokenthroughthisinsulation andposedtwomajordifficultiesfortheVietnameseleadership. 1. The first difficulty is gaining consensus within the party Central Committee about the best waytorespondtoChinasincreasinglyassertiveactionsintheSouthChinaSea. InJanuary2007,thepartyCentralCommitteesfourthplenumresolvedtodrawupanational Maritime Strategy Towards the Year 2020 to integrate economic development of coastal areas with the exploitation of marine resources in the East Sea. Vietnamese economists estimated that by 2020, the marine economy would contribute up to 55 percent of GDP and between 5560 percent of exports. Vietnams maritime development strategy was completed during 2007 but was not released publicly. According to a very senior party official, Chinese intelligenceacquireda copy of this classified document and then began to apply pressure on foreign companies, such as ExxonMobil and Indias ONGC, that were likely to be involved in

developing Vietnams maritime sector. These companies were warned that their commercial interestsinChinawouldsufferiftheydevelopedareasclaimedbyChina. Chinas actions impacted negatively on Vietnamese party conservatives who had gained influence during the global financial crisis by touting the Chinese economic model and the threatofpeacefulevolution.Prior to2007, partyconservativessupportedproChinapolicies and put a brake on foreign policyinitiatives towards closer securityrelations with the United States.After2007,partyconservativessupportedselfhelppoliciesindefensethroughmajor equipmentprocurements(KiloclasssubmarinesandSu30multirolefighters)andcontinuedto warnofthethreatofpeacefulevolutionindomesticaffairs. ThekeydifficultyinforginginternalpartyconsensusliesintheextenttowhichVietnamshould movebeyondselfhelptosolicitingexternalsupportfromtheUnitedStatesandothercountries tocounterChineseassertiveness.Developingdefenseandsecurityties(asdistinctfrompolitical anddiplomaticrelations)withtheU.S.islikelytobethemostcontentiousforeignpolicyissue tobeconsideredinadvanceoftheforthcomingeleventhnationalpartycongress. 2. The second difficulty for Vietnam relates to the domestic management of rising antiChina sentiment. In short, how should the regime harness rising patriotic antiChina sentiment to buttressonepartyrulewithoutoverplayingtheirhandandprovokingsanctionsfromChina. In 2007, student demonstrations elicited a protest from the Chinese Embassy. Vietnam respondedbyassuringChina(andallASEANambassadors)thattheprotestswerespontaneous andnotofficiallysanctioned.Chinahaskeptupitsdiplomaticpressurebycontinuallylodging

objectionstoanyactionthatchallengesChinesesovereigntyintheSouthChinaSea,including revisionsinprovincialhistorytextbooksandpressreporting. The emergence of antiChina student protests in 2007 presented Vietnamese leaders with a unique dilemma. Should they suppress independent political activity? Or should they harness thestudentsnationalismtobolsterregimelegitimacy? The Vietnamese state routinely exercises censorship over media reporting that could harm relations with China. This policy is pragmatic but it is also shaped by repeated Chinese diplomaticinterventionsprotestinganyslightsonChinesesovereigntyingeneralandtheSouth ChinaSeainparticular.In2007,Vietnamesestudentswereabletodemonstratethattheycould bypassstatecontrolsoverthemediatoobtainindependentinformationonChineseactionsin theSouthChinaSea.Notonlythat,butthestudentsalsodemonstratedtheywereabletouse cellphonesandinternetchatroomstocreateanetworkandorganizepublicdemonstrations completewithcolorcodedtshirts(bearingthegoldstaronaredbackground). ThedilemmaforVietnameseauthoritieswashowtorespondtostudentprotests.Clearly,the governmentcouldnotbeseenasrepressingactionsthatwerewidelyviewedaspatrioticbya growing number of Vietnams political elite. But from the point of view of officialdom, if studentswerepermittedtoindependentlyaccessinformation,formnetworks,andstagepublic protestsagainstChina,wherewouldthislead?Indeed,in2006politicalactivistsformedapro democracy network known as Bloc 8406 on the same basis. Vietnamese authorities quietly clampeddownonstudentactivismbysendingsecurityofficialstouniversitiesandcollegesto warn administrators and the students involved of the consequences of further protests.

Propaganda sessions were held in party cells and units to reinforce the partys line towards China. ThestudentdemonstrationsspecificallyprotestedChineseactionsintheSouthChinaSeaand werenotovertlycriticalofgovernmentpolicy.Someforeignaffairsofficialsprivatelywelcomed the student protests as strengthening their hand in negotiations with China. But security officials showed no sympathy when political dissidents expanded their agenda by criticizing Chinadomestichumanrightsrecordandraisingquestionsaboutthegovernmentshandlingof relations with China on Vietnamese language blog sites. Vietnamese security officials moved swiftly to repress such actions, especially when dissidents sought to disrupt the carrying of ChinasOlympictorchthroughHoChiMinhCity. In200809,VietnamsdomesticantiChinabacklashspreadfromthepoliticalfringetoawider circle of the political elite who not only criticized Chinese actions but also began to question theirgovernmentshandlingofrelationswithChina.Twodevelopmentsspurredthisshift.The first was related to the governments decision to grant a Chinese company rights to mine bauxiteoreintheCentralHighlands.Whatbeganasaprotestaboutenvironmentalprotection quicklybecamehighlypoliticalwhennationalsecurityconcernswereraisedbynolessafigure thanGeneralVoNguyenGiap.GeneralGiapsintervention,intheformofthreeopenlettersto party and state leaders, served as a catalyst for other retired highranking state, military and partyofficialstovoicesimilarconcerns.TheseviewswerewidelycirculatedinVietnamoverthe internetandinphotocopyform. The second development to elicit an antiChina response in Vietnam arose from increased ChineseassertivenessintheSouthChinaSea,especiallytheaggressivemannerinwhichChina

enforced its unilateral fishing ban in MayAugust 2009 at the expense of Vietnams domestic fishing industry. AntiChina sentiment thus spread from the political elite to fishing communitiesalongthecoast.Provincialofficialsreportedexpressedfrustrationatthecentral governments inability to secure the quick release of fishermen held in detention on Hainan island.Fourprominentbloggersweredetainedandquestionedabouttheirinternetsiteswhen theypostedcommentary,interalia,criticizingVietnamshandlingofrelationswithChina. The spreading antiChina backlash resulted in pressures on the national leadership to take action to stand up to China. These pressures were amplified by overseas Vietnamese who criticized the Hanoi government for not doing enough to defend Vietnamese sovereignty. In sum, the Vietnamese regime found that its appeal to nationalism as one of the basis of its legitimacywasbeingundermined.Theregimerespondedbychangingitsmediastrategytogive more coverage to the governments diplomatic protests to China, by publicizing stories that documentedVietnamslonghistoricalclaimstotheSouthChinaSeaandtheviewsofforeign analysts sympathetic to Vietnam. The press also was permitted to report on the negative impactofChinasunilateralfishingbanonthedomesticfleetattheheightoftheVietnamese fishingseason.In2009,however,whentwoVietnamesepaperspublishedretrospectaccounts ofthe2007antiChinaprotestsanddescribedthestudentsaspatriotstheyweretemporarily shutdown. DespiteattemptsbytheVietnameseregimetocooptantiChinapatriotismforitsownends, the nationalist genie may be out of the bottle. In August 2009, when Chinese netizens published an invasion plan on the internet showing how China could attack and conquer Vietnaminanamphibiousinvasion,Vietnamesenetizensfiredsalvosintocyberspacedefending

theircountryssovereignty.Areviewofsomeofthemoreaccessiblewebsiteindicateshitsin the tens of thousands. Later in the year security officials blocked Facebook and imposed restrictions on Twitter and YouTube in part to restrict discussion of Vietnams relations with China. Conclusion It is clear that a loose network has emerged in Vietnam among university students and the politicalelitethatisunitedbyitsconcernsoverChinasthreattoVietnamsterritorialintegrity and sovereignty. The network can be expected to be activated in response to any action by Chinathatthreatenstheseinterests. Vietnams oneparty state rests on multiple sources of legitimacy (rationallegal, economic performanceandnationalism).Sincelate2007risingantiChinesepatriotismhasopenedanew front in challenges to the legitimacy of Vietnams oneparty state. The antiChina backlash quickly spread from the political fringe to the center of the political elite (intellectuals, journalists,academics,retiredofficials,bloggers,unionleaders,retiredseniormilitaryandparty officials, National Assembly deputies and party members) who began to question the states perceivedinadequateresponsetoChinesederogationofVietnamesesovereigntyandnational security.Insum,theVietnamesepartystatesclaimtonationalismasoneofthemainstaysof regime legitimacy has come under challenge over its handling of relations with China (with respecttobauxiteminingintheCentralHighlandsandChineseassertivenessintheSouthChina Sea).TheemergenceofpopularopinionaddsanewdimensiontothefunctioningofVietnams onepartystate.

ChinasConduitsfor InfluenceontheVietnam CommunistParty C i tP t

ProfessorCarlThayer Professor Carl Thayer September6,2011

InterpretingVietnamesePolitics Interpreting Vietnamese Politics

STRATFOR factionalinfightingreChina Long Le three groupings that differ on what LongLe threegroupingsthatdifferonwhat issocialistorientation AlexVuving modernisers,antiimperialists l d l andrentseekers

STRATFOR
internal power struggle involving links to internalpowerstruggleinvolvinglinksto China Economic reforms centred around Prime Economicreformscentred aroundPrime Mnister NguyenTanDungversusconservative PolitburomemberswithlinkstoChina Politburo members with links to China
BusinessMonitorInternational,ChinaRelations AtHeadOfPowerStruggle, Asia Monitor 20(11) At Head Of Power Struggle AsiaMonitor,20(11), November2009.SoutheastAsia,12.

LongLe
Threegroupsdifferonsocialistorientation St t h ld l d Stateshouldleadsociety statefirst i t t t fi t
SupportedbyStateOwnedEnterprisesandthe military ilit

Integrationwithglobaleconomy
EncourageForeignDirectInvestmentand entrepreneurship

Integrationwithglobalcommunity
Investinhumanresources,promotenew industriesthatmeetinternationalstandards

AlexanderVuving Alexander Alexander Vuving

RegimeConservatives Modernizers RentSeekers Rent Seekers

Sino VietnameseRelations SinoVietnamese Relations

Mature Asymmery
Acknowledge A k l d ment of China pre-eminence Acknowledge ment of Vietnams autonomy

VietNam Viet Nam

Asymmetric Relations

$11billion deficit withChina with China

Economic andTrade Relations

$9 billion $9billion surplus withthe US

Longterm Agreements

Defence ties

JointSteering Committee

Economic relations

Highlevel partyvisits party visits

Highlevel High level statevisits

ConduitsforChineseInfluence Conduits for Chinese Influence

ChineseEmbassy humanintelligence Chinese Embassy human intelligence Suborningborderprovinceofficials MilitaryRegionsalongborder Economicinducements jointventures Economic inducements joint ventures StudentsstudyinginChina(civilianand military) humanintelligence Party media Partymedia

InfluencePoints:Party to Party Influence Points: PartytoParty

Visitsbypartyleaders Visits by party leaders CentralCommitteecommissionsvisits Ideologicalseminars GeneralPoliticalDepartment(army) General Political Department (army) GeneralDirectorateII(military intelligence) Ministry of Public Security MinistryofPublicSecurity

InfluencePoints:Militaryto MilitaryRelations
Highlevelvisits
DefenceMinisters,ChiefofGeneralStaffetc.

Navalportvisits Jointnavalexercises Joint naval exercises ProfessionalMilitaryEducationandTraining Armssales Nationaldefenceindustrycooperation

Cooperation and Struggle CooperationandStruggle