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Due to the enormous cost, both financial and reputational, of the increased need for public money to be used to support the largest too big to fail banks and others, the UK authorities have decided that they need to have better control over any possible future institution that falls upon hard times.
Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 3 So who will qualify as members of this elite club? ................................................................ 5 Where next?............................................................................................................................. 6 Recovery Plans what is needed? .................................................................................... 8 Resolution Planning what is needed? ........................................................................... 9 Bailing In.............................................................................................................................. 11
The Financial Services Authority invites comments on this Consultation Paper. Comments should be sent by 9 November 2011. Full Text of the Consultation Paper CP 11/16 can be downloaded as a PDF document from here Comments may be sent by electronic submission using the form on the FSAs website at: www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Policy/CP/2011/cp11_16_response.shtml.
Following the demise of some of the most prestigious financial institutions in recent history, due to the recent financial crisis, issues concerning the recovery and resolution of banks and other significant financial institutions in the UK have been highlighted. Due to the enormous cost, both financial and reputational, of the increased need for public money to be used to support the largest too big to fail banks and others, the UK authorities have decided that they need to have better control over any possible future institution that falls upon hard times. On reviewing the level of control that the UK authorities hold, t his then spawned the realisation that there was a further need, an obvious hole in previous planning. Clearly they needed more effective tools and information to enable the orderly resolution of financial institutions without needing to resort to taxpayer support. Not only were the authorities keen see the potential plans that firms would use on the rocky road to the summit of breakdown and insolvency (predicted by many pundits in the press) but they were keen to see the firms identify and understand their own plans to recover from situations of severe stress. Following the Turner Review Conference in 2009 the UK authorities started a pilot RRP project initially involving four and ultimately involving six of the largest UK firms.
RRPs have two aspects. The first, Recovery requires affected firms to identify options to recover their financial strength and viability should a firm come under severe stress. This is work that should be conducted in detail, providing a menu of options under differing situations and the likely solutions that may be available. Secondly, Resolution planning requires firms to submit detailed information about their business and operational structure in the form of a Resolution Pack. The authorities will then write their resolution plans for them, so that they know precisely what, how and when to instruct the Insolvency Practitioner (IP) to do if the time comes to wind down the firm. So essentially, the RRPs aim to ensure that financial institutions: assess and document the recovery options which they believe would normally be available to them in a range of severe stress situations; enable these recovery options to be identified and mobilised quickly and effectively; and supply the regulatory authorities with information and analysis on their businesses, organisation and structures to enable the authorities to ensure that an orderly resolution could be carried out by the authorities should it become necessary. So who is this going to affect? This Consultation Paper (CP) should be read by: all FSA-authorised banks and building societies; significant investment firms; and all firms subject to the FSAs client asset custody rules and investment business client money rules. Although principally intended for policymakers and a wider range of authorised firms, such as insurers, the minimal limit is a 730K CAD firm however it may well become extended to other categories of firms over time, after consultation, as usual.
Additionally this is likely to be of interest to policymakers and practitioners involved in the resolution of failed firms, as it discusses the existence and removal of barriers to resolution and the potential costs to taxpayers of a firms failure. New Legislation is planned to be enacted under which the FSA will be reformed into the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). It is therefore expected that the bulk of the preparation of RRPs will have been implemented by the FSA before the PRA takes on responsibility for supervising the relevant firms. Although welcoming discussion, the formal consultation on rules for RRPs and for the CMA proposals found in the CASS Resolution Pack (CASS RP). There are a number of documents which have been published alongside this paper: The proposed Handbook text for RRPs the CASS RP, (see Annex 4) a guidance pack on how firms should complete their RRPs, and; several other annexes including the cost benefit analysis and compatibility statement.
It is very likely in the early iterations that cases are considered where the firm does not currently have credible options to enable it to recover from extreme stress situations. In such cases the Recovery Plan should indicate the preparation measures (and a timetable for such measures) that the firm will take to create such options. There are obviously going to be cases of globally significant financial institutions (G-SIFIs), and in these events the Recovery Plan will also assist discussions among international regulators led by the home authority using the Crisis Management Groups (CMGs), established under the guidance of the Financial Stability Board (FSB). Recovery Plans will help to reassure host 4
regulators that the firm could deal effectively with difficult circumstances. This cooperation should help to discourage host and home regulators from taking pre-emptive actions to protect national interests which could be to the detriment of wider global interests.
Also there is the likelihood of international impacts and given the financial and operational interdependencies often found in most financial services group, consideration will be expected, when providing resolution analysis to the authorities, how all significant members of the group (both regulated and unregulated) could be resolved. Recovery Plans should similarly address all significant parts of a group.
Where next?
On the 12 th September 2011 the Independent Commissions of Banking (ICB) published its final report recommending far-reaching changes to all banks headquartered in the U.K. In the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008, the 5-member ICB was charged with the responsibility of understanding how stable and competitive the financial system is in the U.K., and for suggesting how to handle banks that were too big to fall. In April this year, the ICB expressed the need to implement measures which would make banks capable of absorbing losses while curbing their incentives for excessive risk-taking. The final report just builds on the draft proposal to achieve this. The ICB report itemises a set of reasons justifying the need to separate a banks retail and investment banking operations. The list includes reducing the risks on retail customers from volatile investment banking businesses, making it easier and less expensive to bail out banks in trouble and aiding the process of monitoring banks by introducing more transparency. The relief for U.K. banks is that the ICB report stops short of recommending a complete separation of investment banking and retail operations. It instead proposes steps to ring-fence various essential retail banking functions in banks, defining what activities should be or should not be permitted inside the ring-fence. And the ICB report acknowledges the impact of this ring-fencing on the banks. The direct operational costs for banks are expected to increase due to the proposed changes with additional increases to the cost of capital and funding for banks. The increased capital requirements for banks would further push costs higher. Estimates peg the additional costs to the countrys biggest banks to be 7 billion (U$11 billion) annually. With direct and far reaching consequences and a recommendation to ensure proposed changes are in place by 2019, the ICB has shaken up the U.K. banking sector. When the changes are called into law would determine how the banks respond with drastic measures like shifting headquarters also not ruled out completely. The next development for RRPs is the G20 meeting in November. Then there will be further consultation document in 1Q12 and final rules are expected in 2Q12 with earliest submissions around June 2012. RRPs complement existing policies with respect to capital, liquidity and stress testing. They are also consistent with the proposed PRA Proactive Intervention Framework (PIF). As I mentioned earlier, the aim is for the RRP policy set out in the CP is to come into effect 6
during the first quarter of 2012. In due course, RRP policy as it relates to deposit-takers and systemic investment firms will fall under the remit of the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). The CASS RP policy is expected to come into effect six months after the publication of the relevant PS. As stated firms in scope for the CASS RP will include some firms that are also in scope for the rest of the RRP policy and some that are not. The Bank of England and FSA set out in the joint paper, The Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority: Our approach to banking supervision , the PRAs role will be to contribute to the promotion of the stability of the UK financial system. It will have a single objective to promote the safety and soundness of regulated firms, including seeking to minimise any adverse effects of firm failure on the UK financial system and by ensuring that firms carry on their business in a way that avoids adverse effects on the system. As recognised in its statutory objective, it will not be the PRAs role to ensure that no PRA-authorised firm fails.
The FSAs policy on reverse stress testing used as a risk tool, requires a firm to explicitly identify and assess the scenarios that are most likely to cause its business model to fail, after considering existing, realistic management actions. Where those tests reveal that business failure will occur within the firms existing risk appetite or tolerance, the firm will be required to identify and adopt effective arrangements, processes, systems or other measures to try to prevent those risks from crystallising. Given the roles of reverse stress testing in improving a firms contingency planning as well as in preventing it from failing, there are clear links between reverse stress testing and the RRP requirements. In practice, the development of a firms RRP will inform its reverse stress testing planning and vice-versa, providing the glue to connect all the risk reporting tools together.
For a detailed explanation of the expected components of Recovery Plans, see modules 1 and 2 of the RRP Guide.
For any Recovery Plan to be considered robust, it is likely to be necessary for firms to consider radical choices which change the structure of their businesses. These choices are likely to include, but are not limited to, disposal options for part of a firms business or even selling the firm itself. Although it may be difficult accurately to assess the value of such options, firms should be able to provide some broad estimates. Consideration of such options and how they might be executed will form an important part of most Recovery Plans, particularly those of the larger firms. When considering potential disposal options, consideration should be given to the long-term viability of the firm post-transaction. The Resolution Plan is prepared by the authorities based on the Resolution Pack containing extensive information and analysis provided by the firms. Modules 3 to 6 of the RRP Guide explain the work that firms must do. For the Handbook text on Resolution Packs see FINMAR 4.3. A key part of the firms work is a separation or wind -down plan for deposittaking and other critical economic functions. Firms will be expected to identify barriers to resolution and propose changes to remove those barriers. The Resolution Pack must be reviewed at least annually and the board will be responsible for ensuring there are processes in place to produce timely and accurate data. The Resolution Pack must be updated on an ongoing basis to reflect any material developments in a firms business.
Economic functions
These refer to the services delivered by a firm and will not always necessarily correspond directly to legal entities within a firms group structure. It may also not be clearly mapped to the business units operated by the firm. What is required is that firms should explain how the 9
economic functions they provide map to the business units through which the group may organise itself. Consequently a further mapping will be necessary to understand how these business units map to the legal entity structure of the group. Typical Economic Functions the financial services sector provides three high-level services to the real economy: payment services, to facilitate transactions between agents in the real economy; intermediation of credit and capital, to allow agents in the real economy to save, invest and borrow efficiently; and risk management products and services, to facilitate risk pooling and protect agents against adverse events. These high-level services can then be broken down into separate economic functions which firms perform. For example, (i) current accounts facilitate the provision of payment services; (ii) mortgage lending contributes to the intermediation of credit; and (iii) market -making activities contribute to the provision of risk management. Sometimes, an economic function may support the provision of more than one of the high-level services to the real economy. Examples of economic functions are as follows: retail current accounts including overdrafts; 10 retail savings/time accounts; retail lending: mortgages/other secured; retail lending: unsecured personal loans; retail lending: credit cards issuance and underwriting; corporate deposits; corporate lending; long-term capital investment; credit card merchant acquiring/services; payment services; clearing services; cash services; third-party services; derivatives; securities financing; trading portfolio; equity and debt capital markets; asset management; brokerage; custody services; prime brokerage and related securities services; general insurance, re-insurance, underwriting and/or broking services; life, pensions, investments and annuities
Bailing In
What is bail-in?
The term Bail-in is provided in this documentation and it usually refers to a process of internal recapitalisation that is triggered once a firm has reached the point of non-viability. There is an automatic Loss imposed on certain of a firms direct stakeholders of a firm by a process of bailing-in, either by writing down their claims or by converting them to equity. As a result, the firm is recapitalised from within and the need for new capital resources to be provided by the public sector (i.e. a bail-out) is avoided. Whilst it all seems a very straightforward arrangement, Bail-in will almost always need to be accompanied by changes in the firms senior management. Coupled with this would be the adoption of a new business plan that addresses the causes of the firms failure. A vital objective of the bail-in process is to secure the continued existence of at least a part or even the entire firm on a going concern basis. If this can be done then disruption of services to customers of the firm should be minimised, while its shareholders and uninsured creditors are subject to going concern losses rather than the much larger gone concern losses that they would suffer if the firm went into insolvency or liquidation. Full details of the Bail-In can be found in Chapter 11 of the CP11/16.
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