Contents Summary Recommendations Chapters: I II Introduction Setting the Scene a. The Governance White Paper b.

The European Parliament c. The Laeken Declaration and the Convention III Democratic Legitimacy a. Turnout at European Parliament Elections b. Intentions to Vote and actual Turnout c. Voting behaviour d. Conclusions IV Under-Information a. b. c. d. Key Features European Identity Young People Applicant Countries

V EU Communication Programmes a. The PRINCE Programme (Priority Information for the Citizens of Europe) b. Innovations c. Results VI Conclusions a. The Right to Information a New Article in the Treaty of Rome b. The Role of the Institutions c. Outline Strategy for informing the Citizen about the EU Annex - Background

Tables and Charts Table 1 Table 2 elections Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 European Parliament election - 1999 European Parliament : intention to vote in June 2004 Awareness of citizens right feeling informed about citizens rights Feeling informed about enlargement Support for the single currency

About the author Richard Upson worked in the Internal Market Directorate General of the European Commission between 1995 and 1999 as head of the Citizens First information programme; earlier, he had been closely involved in planning the management of the EU internal market. He was formerly an assistant director at the UK Department of Trade and Industry and at the Office of Fair Trading. He wtites in a personal capacity.

Summary The Commission's Governance White Paper of July 2001 did not focus sufficiently on the urgent need for citizens to be informed about the EU. There is clear evidence to demonstrate that people are not well informed about the facts concerning the European Union in several important respects: - the European institutions - the existence and exercise of their rights and obligations in the EU - the facts behind the challenges facing the EU. It is also clear that people want to be better informed. The system of European Governance should be improved by including a right for people to be informed about the factual aspects of the EU. This right should be included in the Treaty of Rome, thereby ensuring that a permanent communication system is established to overcome the problem of under-information. There is a direct link between the degree to which people feel informed about the EU and their likelihood to vote for the one directly elected EU body, the European Parliament. The paper proposes that a major effort to inform people would help to improve the democratic legitimacy of the EU, particularly as reflected in the voting participation at the next European Parliament elections (June 2004). Information for citizens about the EU should be factual and non-propagandist. The Commission has a major responsibility for communicating this information because, as it alone is the guardian of the Treaty, it has a responsibility to ensure the complete impartiality of the material and of the way in which it is communicated. The provision of such information should be kept separate from other communication policies which deal with current political issues and proposals.

Recommendations 1 The Treaty of Rome should be amended to include the right of citizens to be informed in a factual and non-propagandist way about the European Union. The Convention on the Future of Europe should recommend the inclusion of this right in the Treaty. 2 The Commission's review of the White Paper provides an ideal opportunity for the Commission to reconsider and come forward with an effective long term strategy to meet the needs of people for information about the EU. Details of this strategy could be announced in the Commission's next policy statement on information and communication policy. 3 The Commission should, in particular, establish a permanent campaign to communicate factual information about the EU to people which includes use of the mass media, particularly television, which is the medium through which most people expect to receive information about the EU. Greater use should be made of NGOs to relay factual information about the EU. 4 The campaign should include clear and measurable aims. The top priority is to increase the level of awareness and understanding of the general public about their individual and collective rights and obligations under the acquis communautaire. 5 The Parliament should use this campaign as a basis for encouraging people to vote in the June 2004 elections in greater numbers, thereby reversing the downward trend in the participation rate in voting. The Parliament should work to demonstrate that people see it as a major forum for democratic debate. 6 The Commission should establish a unit to identify people's unmet demands for factual information about the EU and to evaluate the most effective way of communicating with citizens. This unit should propose suitable actions under the PRINCE programme to help support the active exercise by people of their EU citizenship.

I INTRODUCTION 1.1 This paper has been commissioned by the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS), with support from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, as a response to the Commission's White Paper on European Governance, published on 25 July 2001. A first draft was discussed at the ECAS Conference on European Governance on 26 October 2001. Since The White Paper appeared, the governance agenda has gathered speed, in particular through the Laeken Declaration of December 2001, which paved the way for the opening of the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe on 28 February 2002. In the field of EU information and communication policy, the Parliament's Resolution of 13 March 2002 underlines the importance of information as a means of supporting the process of democratic legitimacy. However, the White Paper, together with the working papers published on the Europa website, is the single most comprehensive analysis of the difficulties arising from the way in which the Community operates and is the starting point for this paper. 1.2 The other introductory remarks concern definitions and sources. This paper is concerned exclusively with the provision of information in the sense of factual, non-propagandist material as a means of helping people exercise their democratic rights. Other types of information in the public realm relate to the expression of political stands over current issues, on which it is natural to expect sharp divergences of view between political parties, governments and institutions, as well as citizens. These two levels should be kept separate, with the former being a public service function which provides impartial information to help people participate in the more political debates. On terminology, this paper takes "information" to be the content of what is communicated, while "communication" concerns the way in which that content is put out to people, and the extent to which people may respond. Reference is made to the regular Eurobarometer surveys of public opinion the EU which are organised by the Commission. Each survey is carried out by independent public opinion research organisations and comprises 15,000 face to face interviews with a random sample of respondents. The sample is selected to be representative of the population in each country, and each survey contains some questions which are repeated on a regular basis in order to provide systematic data about the extent to which attitudes are changing about various aspects of the EU. The results are published in paper format and are also available on the Europa website. Where reference is made to the surveys, the date of the fieldwork is given together with the number of the survey (eg EB52).

II SETTING THE SCENE A. The Governance White Paper 2.1 This section examines what the Commission says in its White Paper about communication with the citizen. It states that "people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are simply not interested in them", and that this problem "is particularly acute at the level of the European Union". It believes that "many people are losing confidence in a poorly understood and complex system", noting that "Member States do not communicate well about what the Union is doing". It recognises that people need "to see what it [the EU] does and what it stands for" and, in particular, recommends that EU policy making - and the delivery of the resulting policies - should be opened up, so as to "help people see how Member States, by acting together within the EU, can tackle their concerns". 2.2 Certain action points in the White Paper address the need for direct contact with the citizen. a. There is a commitment to greater openness to be implemented through the provision of more up to date, on-line material about the preparation of policy, the establishment of a more systematic dialogue with regional and local government, better consultation through effective partnerships with associations which are representative of civil society, and greater connection with European and international networks of interest groups; b. There is recognition that complaints from citizens about the unsatisfactory application of EU rules (infringements) must be taken seriously.

For its part the Commission will try to maximise the impact of its work in dealing with complaints by introducing a system of prioritisation, with the first in the list of priorities being transposition. Prioritisation "will maximise the impact of the Commission's work as guardian of the Treaty". While the role of the EU Ombudsman and the Petitions' Committee of the European Parliament is recognised, the aim is less to strengthen them than to improve the application of EU rules at national level. The suggestion is that both these bodies should be complemented by means of "creating networks of similar exisiting bodies in the Member States capable of dealing with disputes involving citizens and EU issues".

c. The need to communicate is mentioned. The White Paper says that "the institutions should....together with the Member States....actively communicate about what the EU does and the decisions it takes". This appears to be confined to the need to explain day to day top-level action to the media in as clear a manner as

possible. Overall, however, the approach of the White paper to EU information is to treat it as one of those policies for which responsibility is devolved to others, with only a modest role for the Commission itself. The White Paper accepts that the institutions themselves are intrinsically remote from the general public, and that the best way to ensure greater awareness of the EU is to persuade more national, regional and local "actors" to get involved in the policy making and implementation process. It goes on: "the greater the participation in EU policies of national and regional actors, the more they will be prepared to inform the public about these policies". 2.3 Little is said about the need to build a European political identity. This approach reflects the line of thinking in a background report of the Governance Team (Working Group 1A) which states that "there is little European political consciousness", and "there is an absence of European political culture". Moreover, in a Communication on information and communication policy issued by the Commission on 27 June 2001 (slightly in advance of the Governance White Paper), it is stated that "a European public does not exist today for most purposes". (Chapter IVb below comments on this assertion.) 2.4 This approach to information policy is "minimalist" in that it leaves the initiative to devolved actors, and also confines the Commission's role to the backroom. The consequence of this approach appears to be that the Commission believes that it can rely on a relatively narrow range of core communication tools, in particular that it can concentrate on internet-based information and feedback. Both the Communication of 27 June and the report of Working Group 1A speak warmly in terms of the Europa website as a source of information and for the Commission to initiate contact with interest groups and people through e-mail networks, as well as using the web as a source of feedback to help the policy process. The implication is that it is for other actors - in particular the Member States - to use other more wide-ranging communication tools to keep people informed of EU developments and to keep in touch with their opinions. It is odd that the Commission seems to be asking one set of (national) bodies which the public distrusts to communicate messages about the EU. 2.5 As the next section makes clear, however, this approach runs counter not only to the findings of many studies (including those commissioned for the Governance White Paper), but also marks a break with the Commission's effort during the 1990s to develop an EU communication policy more closely related to answering the basic questions of the average citizen about the EU (see Chapter V). 2.6 There is a striking - and controversial - absence from the White Paper of EU citizenship. The tone of the paper implies a firm acceptance that the focus of people's allegiance is national (and regional), and that the EU needs to act to ensure that the results can be perceived at those levels. Almost nothing is said about the possibility that people might understand more about the EU if the rights which they derive from the EU were consolidated and extended, for example through the proactive development of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

2.7 The Annex sets out the uncertainty of the present Commission's attitude to information and communication policy since it took office in 1999. Although it initially pruned the resources available to informing citizens about the EU, an internal reorganisation took place in early 2001, the first fruit of which was the Communication of 27 June on A New Framework for Co-operation on Activities concerning the Information and Communication Policy of the European Union. The aim of this framework, which is to seek support for a new inter-institutional arrangement to help bridge the gap between the EU and the public, is welcome as it belatedly recognises the importance of involving the Parliament in policies designed to inform the citizen. On the other hand, the framework says nothing about the content of an information and communication strategy. Its message is to make the case that the institutions do in fact have a duty to inform and communicate, which they should fulfil, while leaving the development of the strategy as such to emerge from the wider discussions on governance. A second Communication, which is expected to deal with content, is expected in June 2002. B. The European Parliament 2.8 Since early in the life of the Prodi Commission, the European Parliament has been asking the Commission for an information and communication strategy. The Parliament's impatience was embodied in its Resolution of 14 March 2001, which pointed out the difficulties which had arisen from the Commission's decision in 1999 (as explained in the annex) to disperse its information and communication functions among the various Directorates-General. In its contribution to the report of the Parliament's Culture Committee of 25 February 2002, the Budget Committee made the point even more clearly: the Commission's attitude to setting up a joint strategy with the European Parliament in the area of information and communication had been marked by "years of reluctance and inefficiency". 2.9 The Resolution adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2002 is its response to the Commission's Communication of 27 June 2001. In effect, it adopts the report of the Culture Committee and welcomes the beginnings of a change of heart by the Commission, in particular its intention to secure better cooperation between the Parliament and the Commission. 2.10 In a long list of proposals, the Resolution stresses the need for impartial information, and for a joint Commission/Parliament awareness raising campaign in the run-up to the elections in June 2004. It also proposes that a distinction should be made between information on issues close to the everyday lives of citizens ("top priority") and major issues facing the EU ("additional but important"). It is also seeking synergy with the Commission to avoid duplication of effort (as, for example, through the co-location of Commission and Parliament offices as "Europe Houses" in the Member States).

C. The Laeken Declaration and the Convention 2.11 The Declaration on The Future of the European Union issued by the European Council on 15 December 2001 (the "Laeken Declaration") sets out the issues to be considered by the Convention on the Future of Europe, whose first meeting was held on 28 February 2002. The document records that "twenty years ago, with the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the Community's democratic legitimacy, which until then had lain with the Council alone, was considerably strengthened". It proceeds, under the heading of "More democracy, transparency and efficiency in the EU" to state that "the European Union derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it projects....[and] also from democratic, transparent and efficient institutions". 2.12 A large number of questions are listed for the Convention to consider, including whether the President of the Commission should be directly elected, how members of the European Parliament should be elected, the possibility that the powers of the Parliament and/or the Council could be strengthened, and whether there should be greater transparency in terms of access to Council meetings and documents. It should also be noted that the Declaration remarks that "national parliaments also contribute towards the legitimacy of the European project", and a range of possibilities is listed in relation their future role. 2.13 The Declaration conveys a persistent concern about the need for greater democratic scrutiny of the European project. Nonetheless, there is no reference to the need to secure an improvement in legitimacy by reversing the downward trend in people's participation in the elections for the only European institution that is directly elected, namely the Parliament. In the midst of a very institutional approach to the issues, the need to inform citizens about the EU is remarkable by its absence from the Declaration. It is to be hoped that the Convention will correct this omission.

III DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY A. Turnout at European Elections 3.1 One of the most striking features of the European Union is that in June 1999 only 49% of those eligible to vote did in fact vote in the European Parliament elections, despite the fact that in certain countries voting is compulsory. The voting rate has fallen continuously since direct elections were introduced in 1979 (66% 1979, 61% 1984, 59% 1989, 57% 1994). Table I shows that the proportion of people who voted in 1999 varied widely between the fifteen countries, for example voting figures were high in those few countries where voting is compulsory Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg. The important point, however, is that turnout for EP elections is much lower than for any national election, and a good deal lower than many local/regional elections. For example, comparison can, be made between the turnout for the European Parliament elections in France - 46.8%, Germany - 45.2%, Netherlands - 29.9%, and UK - 24.0%, with the turnout in 2001 for the municipal elections in France (70%), national elections in Italy in (80%), and regional elections in the Basque provinces (80%), and even the rather low rate in the UK June 2001 national elections (59%). B. Intentions to vote and actual turnout 3.2 The intentions to vote recorded by the Eurobarometer survey for March/April 1999 (EB51) a couple of months before the elections show that the overall actual turnout (49%) was considerably less than predicted by Eurobarometer (67%). If this level of intention to vote could be achieved, it would confer more legitimacy on the European Parliament and the EU in general. Moreover, the relatively high level of voting intention in itself suggests that it is mistaken to interpret the European Parliament elections as a sort of verdict on each county's national government which is of secondary importance compared to national elections. 3.3 The reasons for such a divergence between the intentions to vote and the actual turnout are worth examining. In the period before the 1999 elections successive Eurobarometer surveys reported relatively high voting intentions with little change between surveys. In other words, it is not the case that there was a downward trend in voting intentions before the elections. In October/November 1999, Eurobarometer (EB52) asked about voting intentions for the next European Parliament - 2004 - elections, only to find that, as before the 1999 elections, a similarly high proportion said they would vote. (Details in Table II). There is therefore no reassurance to be taken from the apparently high intentions to vote when looking ahead to the 2004 elections.

C. Voting Behaviour 3.4 The degree of variation between countries in respect of people's intention to vote was similar to the variations which actually occurred (see Table I) suggesting that there was a common factor(s) which restricted the level of turnout. The lower than expected turnout calls for an examination of the Eurobarometer analyses of voters' and non-voters' behaviour and intentions. 3.5 Looking first at objective characteristics, successive surveys in recent years find similar levels of voting intentions between men and women. They also find broadly similar results across the age groups, although the EB52 analysis of respondents' recall of their actual behaviour at the 1999 elections shows that the older age groups are more likely to have voted. There is however some doubt concerning this conclusion because the data for the 15-24 age group is difficult to interpret on grounds that a sizeable proportion of that age group are not eligible or not registered to vote. Significant differences are however found in respect to socio-economic groups, with managers and the self-employed being more likely to vote than those in manual jobs and the unemployed, and there is also a distinction in respect of educational qualifications where those with qualifications acquired from age 20 onwards being more likely to vote than those with qualifications obtained up to age 20. 3.6 Looking at the more subjective factors, i.e. those based on people's own perceptions or attitudes, it is clear that support for or opposition to the EU appears to affect voting intentions. In November-December 2000 (EB54) an assessment was made of those who have never voted in an EP election: 38% of abstainers regard their country's membership of the EU as a bad thing, while 21% of abstainers support their country's membership of the EU. In the EB52 analysis of actual election behaviour, those who place high trust in EU institutions, or would like to see a more important role for the EU and/or EP, or think EU membership a good thing for their country, were more likely to have voted than those who do not support the EU. 3.7 Another attitudinal factor is the degree to which people feel well informed about the EU. It is striking that successive Eurobarometer surveys show that those who fell well informed have high intentions to vote, while those who do not feel well informed are much less likely to express an interest in voting. In EB54, the analysis of voting intentions for 2004 show that those with a low self-perceived knowledge of the EU have a likelihood to vote score of 5.9 out of a possible 10, while those with a high knowledge have a likelihood to vote score of 8.3. The EB54 analysis of abstention shows that of those who have never voted in EP elections, 39% have a low self-perceived knowledge of the EU while 14% have a high knowledge of the EU.

D. Conclusions 3.8 Many of these socio-economic and attitudinal factors overlap, showing that those with more education, who are also more likely to be in better jobs, and to favour the EU, will tend to vote in EP elections compared to other people who do not share these characteristics. The important point, however, is that the perception of being poorly informed about the EU affects all socio-economic groups and varieties of attitudes, and is a major influence which holds people back from voting. 3.9 This conclusion is underlined in the report on EB51, where reference is made to a special survey of reasons why people decide not to vote. It states: "The most widely affirmed reason is not feeling well enough informed to go and vote (61%), followed by not having sufficient knowledge about the role, the importance and the power of the European Parliament (59%)". The result is that one of the building blocks of democracy is largely absent at the EU level. It is as if people are saying "as I am not sufficiently informed, I do not feel able to vote in European elections".

IV

UNDER-INFORMATION

A. Key Features 4.1 The Eurobarometer surveys contain several indicators of the extent to which people are not well informed about the EU. (i) The Eurobarometer report for November/December 2000 (EB54) stated that "the lack of knowledge and misperception about how the EU budget is spent continues to be widespread". It found that 31% of respondents did not know what most of the budget is spent on, and 30% thought that most is spent on the cost of officials, meetings and buildings. In fact 44% goes on agriculture, and 40% goes on the structural funds. It is of concern "that people who feel they know a lot about the EU are not much less likely to think that most of the Union's budget is spent on administrative costs than people who feel they know very little about the EU". (ii) Like several preceding surveys, the Eurobarometer survey for April/May 2001 (EB55) reported on the extent to which people have heard of the EU institutions. The highest level of awareness is recorded for the European Parliament (89%), followed by the Commission and the Central Bank; the average level of awareness for the nine institutions was 55%. In this case, however, as the Eurobarometer commentary states, "the more people feel they know about the EU, the more likely it is that they have heard of the EU institutions". It is worth noting that while those with a low self-perceived knowledge level have a low recognition of the institutions, this is not the case in respect of the EP: 82% of this group have heard of it. (iii) Another area in which under-information can be gauged through the EB surveys is citizens' rights. The Eurobarometer survey for April/June 1997 (EB47) asked if people had heard of eleven specific rights from which they benefited as EU citizens, and also if they felt that they knew enough about each of them. For all the eleven rights taken together, the average awareness was only 34% (see Table/chart III), with living and studying at about 50% and voting rights in local and European Parliament elections down at 23-25%. Those who had heard of these rights were asked if they knew enough about them or not. EB47 reported "On average two in three of those having heard about the various rights say they would like to know more" (see Table/chart IV). This is clear evidence that there is widespread lack of awareness, and that even the minority who are aware of the rights in question feel they do not know enough. (iv) The feeling of being under informed spills over into impending EU events such as enlargement, where "the results show that only 18% of EU citizens feel very well or well informed about enlargement, with 78% feeling not very well or not at all well informed" (EB55) (see Chart V).

(v) Another indicator of the way in which being under informed holds people back from involving themselves in the EU is shown by people's interest in participating in a "dialogue" on Europe. The report for EB55 found "that 26% of EU citizens would be interested in taking part in discussions about Europe, while 62% say they are not interested". The report continues: "Respondents who did not wish to take part in discussions were shown a ... list of six possible explanations for their lack of interest. This reveals that the most important reason why people do not wish to take part is that they feel do not know enough about the EU (41%)". 4.2 A most revealing study, published in the context of the Governance White Paper, concerned a qualitative study (based on discussion groups) of the public's attitude to and expectations of the EU (June 2001). The importance of the study is that it reinforces the conclusions which can be derived from the more traditional sample survey approach long used by Eurobarometer. Some of the key points include: a deterioration of the image of the EU in recent years knowledge of the EU , and in particular of its institutions, is quite weak, most notably in the larger Member States such information as people do acquire about the EU tends to come from the media, there is low awareness of information put out by the EU or national authorities the more "northern" member States are broadly resistant to enlargement there is a strong desire for more information about the EU, concentrating on how Community activities concern each country and individuals in their daily lives, and on acquiring a better general knowledge of EU affairs. 4.3 The conclusions to be drawn from both these sources (Eurobarometer, para 4.1, and the discussion groups, para 4.2) are that there is a profound degree of under-information: most people do not have a practical understanding of what the EU actually provides for them, nor how it works; in addition, however, it is clear that people would like to be informed about the EU: there is an unmet demand for more information. B. European Identity 5.1 The Governance White Paper, and the Laeken Declaration, appear to underestimate the extent to which people see themselves as having a European identity and, by implication, to have a reduced expectation of the extent to which people wish to be able to express themselves at a European level. The findings of the Eurobarometer surveys support the idea that territorial and cultural identity in modern Europe involves a multi-layered perception for most (though not all) people. In the Eurobarometer survey for October/November 2001 (EB56), 53% of respondents see themselves as having a European identity and, not unexpectedly, for nearly all of them it lies alongside their national identity. Those who perceive

only a national identity account for 44% of respondents. For young people, the balance towards European identity is more marked, the proportions being 59% and 38% respectively. 5.2 Another indicator of European identity can be obtained by asking people about whether they prefer various issues to be handled by their national government or jointly in the EU. In EB56 people were asked about 26 issues and for 18 of them they expressed a preference for joint dealing at EU level. 5.3 The implication is that people expect that the EU should be active on many essential issues. Under-information is prevalent and the voting rate is low. Thus people tend not to be aware of how the EU can (and when it should) help to deal with problems which national governments alone cannot resolve, which in turn means that they are less likely to perceive the issues on which they could bring pressure to bear to ensure that fuller consideration is given to the range of possibilities available at EU-level. 5.4 The following topics are among those which have been the subject of considerable treatment in the media over the past year or so: climate change, Kyoto energy use, petrol prices immigration and asylum animal and food safety (BSE, Foot and Mouth) bio-engineering (GMOs) maritime safety globalisation/world trade reorganisation of multinationals/redundancies e-commerce 5.5 All of them have a substantial component where the EU has competence, often where the European Parliament has the final say in the adoption of legislation. It would, however, take another study to demonstrate that most national media give relatively little coverage to the possibility of EU-level action in areas such as these, their emphasis being on individual countries pursuing their own policies. Even without that degree of proof, the point for this paper is that unless people have better access to the purely factual background to what the EU has done and the scope for EU action, little improvement can expected in the democratic legitimacy of the EU, particularly of the European Parliament. 5.6 Against this backgound, it is little surprise to find that people are often doubtful about the benefits of the EU, and sceptical about the impact on them of the challenges ahead for the EU. The high degree of abstention in the Irish referendum (June 2001) underlines the point; if referendums were held in the other EU countries, what would the results be? 5.7 Perhaps the most curious aspect of this situation is that a large proportion of

people want to know more about their EU rights, and would like to be able to have some say in the process of deciding what action should take place at which level (whether at EU level, an/or at national, regional, or local level). C. Young People 6.1 In discussions on the issue of citizens information, it is often remaked that young people have different attitudes and need to be communicated with in a special way compared to people in older age groups. 6.2 The evidence for the 15-24 year age group from various Eurobarometer surveys does no more than lend mild support to this view. 6.3 The survey data show that interest in political matters is less marked among younger people, and this would appear to be related to the apparently lower voting turnout noted in paragraph 3.4. This is also the case in respect of levels of awareness of EU institutions. Nonetheless the young have more positive attitudes about support for EU membership and the degree to which their country benefits from its membership than their elders and this translates into a mildly greater preference for EU-level action (rather than national governments acting alone) in several policy areas. According to the Eurobarometer for Autumn 1991 (EB36), this generational distinction was also identifiable then. It is not however clear how far this more positive attitude persists as young people get older. 6.4 Perhaps the most revealing finding in EB55 (April/May 2001) is that when people are asked about which sources they use when looking for information about the EU, 65% give TV as their main source; for young people it is very little different - 60%. The use of daily newspapers as a source of EU information (33% for the young as compared to 41%) and of radio (21% as compared to 28%) is somewhat less than for the older age groups, while their preparedness to use the internet as a source is higher than in the rest of the population (23% as compared to an average of 11%). This suggests that while a more varied media mix and style may well be appropriate for young people, the underlying effectiveness of TV as a medium remains a keystone for them as for the rest of the population. D. Applicant Countries 7.1 As noted in para 4.1 (iv) above, most people in the EU do not feel informed about enlargement, and not surprisingly there is certainly widespread concern about its impact. Only 44% of people asked in the Eurobarometer survey at the end of 2000 (EB54, November/December 2000) were in favour of enlargement, while 35% were against: in several countries the proportion against was quite pronounced - Germany, France, Austria, UK. In considering the degree of priority to be attached to a range of EU actions, the Eurobarometer for April/May 2002 (EB55) reported that only 29% of people thought that welcoming new member countries was a priority, while 58% thought it was not.

7.2 In the applicant countries themselves, the picture is not so much brighter. According to the first Eurobarometer survey dedicated to the applicant countries, which reported in December 2001, while there is a broad measure of support in each country for entry into the EU, most people do not feel informed about enlargement (only 28% of people in applicant countries claim to feel well informed) nor about the process of enlargement (only 29% well informed). 7.3 It would appear that there is not a great risk of negative votes in the applicant country referendums. Of greater concern in the longer term is the impact of the objective set by the European Council at Gteborg (June 2000), for the applicant countries that are ready, "that they should participate in the European Parliament elections of 2004 as members". The level of under-information in the applicant countries runs the risk of producing a rather low turnout.

V EU COMMUNICATION PROGRAMMES A. The PRINCE Programme 8.1 It is worth considering the range of communication tools which the Commission has at its disposal, many of which were developed - and their effectiveness proved - in the later 1990s. 8.2 The PRINCE (PRiority INformation for the Citizens of Europe) programme was instigated by the Parliament in the face of Council opposition in 1995, and comprised three elements aimed at the general public: Citizens First/Citoyens d'Europe, designed to increase the knowledge of personal rights and opportunities in the Internal Market, thereby putting in place a building block for the other two campaigns: Building Europe Together, which aimed at a wider understanding of the Amsterdam Treaty and current EU issues; Euro - the Single Currency, which established the groundwork for the later phases of the campaign which concluded early in 2002. 8.3 All these campaigns involved the use of national mass media to communicate their message, including public service advertising slots, paid advertising spots (where public service access was not available or to supplement it), and through programme content. They also used dedicated websites, supported by a widespread distribution of paper-based material to reach out to the large proportion of people who have no access to the internet or who do not use it for accessing EU information. 8.4 All of this apparently top-down activity was discussed with the Member States, to ensure that the material reflected national characteristics. The impact was enhanced by the parallel efforts of the Commission's Representative Offices in Member States, together with the Parliament's Offices, to ensure a fully decentralised support activity in each of the fifteen countries. Most Member States provided complementary action, either directly or through agreements ("conventions") with the Commission. There was also widespread involvement of NGOs throughout the EU, mostly through 50% financed projects which aimed at deepening the personal interest of people in the factual material associated with each campaign. 8.5 Behind the use of advertising in the mass media lay the recognition that it is very difficult to ensure that EU messages are carried in the normal editorial content of national press and TV channels, which inevitably have a national focus that often obscures the EU-wide nature of the issues involved. It is also important to bear in mind that there is no TV channel devoted to EU affairs apart from

Euronews, which is only available in certain countries and languages by satellite, and thus has only a limited viewership, and that the download of EU news is available through Europe by Satellite (EbS) is primarily for use by broadcasters. 8.6 The Euro campaign succeeded because: the product was clear, a deadline for its launch as coinage was definite, and all those involved (particularly the 12 Member States concerned) wanted the product to succeed; the Commission played a major role, both in terms of spending its own PRINCE budget and in terms of triggering more than equivalent sums from each of the twelve governments. The Commission therefore maintained an overall control of the consistency of the national campaigns. 8.7 During the Euro campaign, the Commission and the Member States worked on the basis of a separation of tasks whereby the Member States purchased advertising space from national media, while the Commission dealt with transnational media such as certain TV channels (TV5, MTV, Euronews, BBC World, CNN, etc), and international NGOs and associations. Support was given by the European Central Bank, which invested 80m euro in its own campaign, of which more than half involved television time. 8.8 In terms of expenditure, however, the PRINCE programme was crucial: between 1995 and 2001, the Commission devoted 500 million euros to the campaign, of which one-third went on television spots (directly, and under conventions with the Member States). 8.9 The visibility of the PRINCE programme is nowadays less than in previous years. As the Euro campaign is almost complete, expenditure is expected to decline from the 2002 level of 40 million euros. The campaigns which are currently under way concern the enlargement of the EU, the dialogue on Europe a debate on the EU, and work in the field of justice and home affairs. All of these campaigns are likely to be low key and decentralised; none of them are expected to use the mass media to attract a wide audience. It is possible that the Commission is concerned at the risk of running into criticism as a result of producing factual material which some people may nonetheless find controversial (see the comment at para 8.12). B. Innovations 8.10 Several innovations from the early PRINCE programme have since been put on a permanent footing. They include: the use of an 11 language call centre, pioneeded during the Citizens First campaign, whose function included the mailing of factual brochures and the

provision of substantive replies to queries from individuals about how to exercise their rights and take advantage of their opportunities in the EU (eg recognition of diplomas, obtaining social security, etc). the retention of the name "Europe Direct", which is a brand name for the service to help citizens find out information about the EU. On the Europe Direct website it offers itself to the public in the following terms: "If you're looking for information about the EU, it can sometimes be difficult to know exactly where to find what you need. Europe Direct cuts the run-around by acting as your first point of contact....". It offers free telephone helplines in each member State, a direct response service via e-mail, and links to information and advice facilities at national, regional and local level. . the collection of feedback in the sense that the questions asked by citizens can be assessed to identify problems which suggest that EU legislation needs improvement or that its application at national level is unsatisfactory. C. Results 8.11 No comprehensive results of this major communication effort have been published. In Single Market News, published by the Internal Market Directorate General of the Commission, certain details are, however, available. For example, during an active period for the Citizens First campaign (between October 1997 and May 1998), the proportion of people across the EU who said they felt well informed about their rights to work, live and study in another EU country rose from 17.6% to 22.2%. Perhaps more interestingly, in the same period, the proportion who thought (rightly) that a work permit was not needed to work in another EU country rose from 36% to 54%, while those who knew of their right to vote in local elections in another EU country rose from 42% to 50%. Such evidence as there is from subsequent Eurobarometer surveys suggests that these proportions have fallen, partly because the Commission has ceased to invest in campaigns designed to reach the ordinary person.

8.12 As regards the Euro campaign, the chart at annex (see Table/Chart VI) , which gives the results of successive Eurobarometer surveys, shows that knowledge of the euro improved very gradually over time. In one sense this is to be expected because the inevitability of the 1.1.2002 deadline implied that the effort at creating awareness would have its maximum effect shortly before that date. In another sense, it reinforces the results of the Citizens First programme (see para 8.6 above) which suggest that an improvement in the levels of knowledge of people about the EU is a gradual process. One conclusion to be drawn is that any programme designed to create awareness of EU matters needs to carried out on a permanent basis. 8.13 A good deal of what is covered in this paper concerns the wide range of material concerning the EU. Another result of the PRINCE campaigns is that the

Commission demonstrated that three different levels of information could be treated in a factual and non-propagandist way: - material about the European institutions themselves - the existence and exercise of the collective and individual rights and obligations which flow from the acquis - the facts behind the adopted policies of the Union. While this sort of information may not always be uncontroversial, in the sense that some part of a national audience may not wish others to be informed about EU policies or opportunities which they do not support, this is no reason not to make it available. The crucial criterion is that the information is correct and impartial, not that it is uncontroversial.

X CONCLUSIONS A. The Right to Information a New Article in the Treaty of Rome 9.1 Most people need and want factual information about the EU, its activities, and their part in it and that, without prejudice to the activities of national authorities in this field, they are content to have that information provided by the Commission. 9.2 A new Treaty article should therefore be promoted to provide a legal basis for the citizen to be informed about their individual and collective rights and responsibilities in the EU and about the facts behind the challenges facing the EU. The article would need to make clear that the information should be limited to material which is non-political, factual and non-propagandist, and that the citizen would have the right to obtain rapid answers to factual questions. 9.3 The following text would extend the provisions of the Treaty which deal with citizenship to give people the assurance that they can rely on being provided with the essential information to enable them to participate actively in the Union, in particular to exercise their rights and fulfil their duties as citizens of the Union, including the use of their right to vote for a member of the European Parliament. New Treaty Article An addition to the Citizenship Part of the Treaty establishing the European Community 1. All citizens of the Union, and all natural persons residing in a Member State, shall be informed about their individual and collective rights and obligations resulting from the policies adopted in the acquis communautaire, and about the facts behind changes to these policies. Community policy on informing citizens shall therefore contribute to the advancement of citizens' practical understanding and participation in the Union and its institutions. 2. Action by the Community, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed at producing factual and non-propagandist information, expressed in clear and understandable language, about the acquis communautaire and its development, the measures which implement it, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights; providing and disseminating this information by all available means in a socially balanced and non-discriminatory way, taking account of available impartial data about the extent to which citizens are accurately

informed about the acquis. 9.4 In addition to the main arguments of this paper, there are several more technical points to be made in favour of such a Treaty change. (i) The absence of a specific legal basis for providing information about the EU is a barrier to progress. While the Commission has a wide-ranging power under Article 211 of the Treaty "to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market" by "[ensuring] that the provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions are applied...", this is not strong enough by itself to give a budgetary justification for the provision of information which cannot also be justified by other provisions of the Treaty. In practice, low key information work carried out by the Commission is not contested, but larger more adventurous programmes usually run up against Council rejection which only the Parliament can over-ride. The notable example of successful parliamentary pressure is the PRINCE programme, which began in 1996 and whose main component in recent years has been the Euro campaign. (ii) Subsidiarity can also be a stumbling block to the information work carried out by the Commission in Member States, because it is too often assumed that only national authorities have the right to inform their own citizens about the EU. This ignores the fact that the Commission is best placed to produce accurate information about EU rights and obligations as a result of its role as guardian of the Treaty, identify the needs for information across the Union on the basis of socioeconomic data about the extent to which people are informed about the EU, coordinate EU-wide campaigns which are more cost-effective than a set of 15 separately organised promotions. (iii) Lack of continuity. The lesson from the major information campaigns undertaken in recent years is that, apart from the Euro campaign, they have primarily been organised as knee-jerk reactions rather than as a part of a measured approach to communication. For example, the difficulties encountered in the passage of the Maastricht Treaty in several Member States led to the rushed inception of the original PRINCE programme in 1996. A Treaty article which laid a direct obligation on the Community to meet the needs of people for information about the acquis would overcome the need for the institutions to re-invent the wheel each time there is a crisis of confidence. B. The role of the institutions 10.1 The experience of the PRINCE programme confirms that the Commission has a unique role in the field of EU information and communication which flows from its responsibility as guarantor of citizens' EU rights.

10.2 The Commission's role of guarantor arises both because it is responsible for initiating legislative proposals from which citizens stand to benefit and for checking that EU law is implemented and respected, in particular through the infringement procedure. No other institution has these responsibilities; indeed the others depend on the Commission to carry them out. While the Member States are responsible for transposing Union legislation, and for informing their populations accordingly, the Commission is the arbiter, subject to the Court, of the rights conferred and the obligations created across the Union by EU legislation. 10.3 The position of the Commission in relation to the acquis communautaire will not change in the future, even though it is possible that the Convention on the Future of Europe and the subsequent IGC might limit the powers of the Commission in other fields. The Commission is therefore in a unique situation as regards to communication with the citizen about the factual basis of the EU, and will remain so. It should therefore play a significant and visible part in the process of ensuring that people are aware of the availability of factual information about the EU. 10.4 The Parliament's role lies more in validating the long term objectives of the Commission's programmes for communicating with citizens (the machinery for this already exists in the form of the inter-institutional group on information and communication which is co-chaired by the Parliament and the Commission). The Parliament is dependent on the success of campaigns which aim at informing people about the institutions, the rights and duties they have as a result of the acquis, and about the challenges ahead for the EU, because they are so closely linked to the health of representative democracy at the EU level. The Parliament can ensure that the Commission delivers citizen-friendly information policies by setting conditions for the release of the annual budget for information and communication. For example, it has for several years granted the first part of the annual PRINCE budget, making the release of the reserve subject to approval of the Commission's detailed plans. The Parliament can also build on such campaigns by ensuring that funding is available for local action to be taken, for example by municipalities and NGOs, which encourage a wide debate on European issues. 10.5 The Council, through the Member States, has a duty to inform each country's citizens about the EU and the challenges ahead; indeed the conclusions of the European Council at Nice (December 2000) call upon the Member States to actively stimulate the debate on the future of the EU. The recently created futurum website (part of europa) gives details of the activity being undertaken by member states, which varies a great deal from one country to another. While the Governance White Paper is right to emphasise the role of national activity in creating a better informed populace, it seems to overlook the fact that, in practice, the performance of Member States in informing their citizens is very uneven, and

the experience of the PRINCE programme suggests that they will perform much better when the Commission is seen to be running campaigns across the EU as a whole. C. Outline Strategy for Informing the Citizen about the EU 11.1 In its review of the White Paper on Governance the Commission should accept that information and communication is a key element in the EU system of governance, and that the responsibility for well-informed debate based on impartial and reliable factual material is therefore very much a core function of the Commission. 11.2. The Commission should also confirm that it continues to accept the distinction between the press handling of key day to day events and the presentation of factual material about the EU to the general public. Its second statement on information and communication policy (due in June 2002) should also contain the following elements of communication strategy.

Recognise the role of the Commission to deliver information directly to the public across the EU, both because of its intrinsic quality of impartiality and accuracy (reflecting the Commission's role as guardian of the Treaty), and because of the effect it has in spurring other authorities, such as Member States, into action. Identify the core factual material. The material is that which relates to helping people see how they are affected by the EU, and how they can exercise their rights as well as how they can express their views. It would include details of EU citizenship, rights and opportunities flowing from the completion of the Single Market, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the impact of the acquis, and also the facts behind key EU policies along the lines of the list in para 5.4. Set targets which are to be achieved by strategy of informing the general public. These should include a quantitative objective to raise the awareness of EU rights and issues among the general population, as one of the means of generating greater interest in the elections for the European Parliament in June 2004, and thus an improvement in the voting participation rate compared to 1999. A related, and very significant target, should be to ensure that as many citizens who live in another EU country actually exercise their right to vote in the next European Parliament elections. In 1999, only 9% of such citizens were registered to vote. Identify the target population, which should be as large as possible. All the survey data shows that there are unacceptable levels of under-information in all Member States and across all age groups and social/educational classes.

Select the communication tools to be used, according to their coverage of and impact on the target population. The lessons of the early PRINCE programme should be applied: - get best value for money by using the most effective medium, usually television - through public service advertising and paid spots - reinforce activity on television through advertising in the print media - avoid detailed and time-consuming campaigns targeted at relatively small groups - provide a firm support through websites - handle questions and feedback from citizens: the existing mechanism of the Europe Direct call centre and website should be developed. Ensure that the campaign is permanent so that it enables the Commission to ensure that the citizen has a clear and positive recall of the effort being made to provide reliable facts and figures about the way that the EU affects peoples lives. It takes time to build up such a "brand image" in a media saturated world. Seek the support of as many NGOs as possible. A first step would be to review the evidence from the PRINCE programme of the results achieved from granting financial help to hundreds of NGO-led projects. Such a review should identify the the types of project which are cost-effective, and they could be encouraged in the future as a means of providing a nonpropagandist means of relaying useful material about the EU. The Commission should establish a consultative panel whereby NGOs could put forward suggestions about how best to ensure a wide partnership with civil society across the EU before invitations to tender are issued.

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ANNEX Background A1 The Commission which took office in September 1999 has not yet identified a communication strategy which is designed to overcome the apathy about the EU which is apparent in many parts of the Union. A2 From its early days, the Prodi Commission identified the main information and communication issue as the handling of news in order to secure better press coverage of EU affairs. This is an essential aim, particularly in the light of the very negative image which the Commission had acquired from the events surrounding the collective resignation of the Santer college in March 1999. A3 Press handling should not, however, be confused with the different aim of communicating with the general public about the EU. Even if the objective of securing better press coverage is achieved, it is unlikely to have much impact on the general public. This is partly because only a small proportion of the population take a close interest in EU policy matters, for example only 19% of people in the EU "pay a lot of attention to news about the European Union in comparison to other news topics" according to the Eurobarometer survey for April/May 2001 (EB55). It also arises because most of the reporting of EU matters is in the hands of the national media whose stance is rarely to view things through EU eyes. A3 Although the Commission recognises in the White Paper the importance of communication with the general public, and its link to the democratic deficit, its actions have until recently been characterised by too much uncertainty and hesitation. A4 The main problem has been a lack of continuity. An initial decision, taken in 1999, was to decentralise the responsibility for information and communication, breaking up the former Directorate General X (responsible for information), with only press handling remaining under central control. It also seemed that part of the role of the Commission's Representative Offices in Member States had been put in doubt, as they were for a time instructed not to deal with the general public any longer. A5 This period of uncertainty has been characterised by a retreat from the more pro-active approach to communicating with EU citizens which had been developed during the 1990s (see Chapter V above). Nonetheless, several important information and communication activities have been continued or initiated. There has, in particular, been a continuation of the long-running campaign to prepare for the changeover to the Euro, which was driven by an unavoidable deadline and which concentrated on the mechanics of the changeover rather than on enabling people to understand more about the EU.

In addition, the pressure of events has led to two communication initiatives. Firstly, the run-up to the Nice Council saw the creation of the Commission's web-based Dialogue 2000. This has been developed into the "Future of Europe" initiative, centred on the futurum website, as a response to the Nice conclusion to have a "great debate" about the future of Europe. This website will make an important contribution to the work of the Convention. In addition, a strategy for communication to provide information about enlargement was adopted in May 2000, and not before time to judge from the significant proportion of people who are apathetic about enlargement, and even hostile to it. It forms part of the current PRINCE programme, the emphasis being to carry it out on a decentralised basis in each country (see also para 8.9). A6 In response to the Parliament's criticisms of its absence of an information and communication strategy, noted in para 2.9, the Commission announced a reorganisation which put some elements of communication policy back together with press relations under a combined Press and Communication Directorate General. The functions of this expanded DG are less wide-ranging than the former DGX but do provide for some coordination of the Commission's information and communication activities. In particular, the new DG is responsible for the Europa website and publications as well as the Europe Direct service (see papa 8.7), and supports the Commissioner who participates in the discussions of the InterInstitutional Group (i.e. with the Parliament) on information and communication matters.

Tables and Charts Table 1 Table 2 elections Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 European Parliament election - 1999 European Parliament: intention to vote in June 2004 Awareness of citizens rights feeling informed about citizens rights Feeling informed about enlargement Support for the single currency