G.R. No.

L-23326

December 18, 1965

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PIO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO, and ROMAN OZAETA, petitioners, vs. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA and JOSE AVILES, respondents. Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero H. Laurel and Felixberto M. Serrano for themselves and for other petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. REGALA, J.: We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress)." The suit was instituted by the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a non-profit civic organization, duly incorporated under Philippine laws, by way of a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent disbursing officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office from paying the said retirement and vacation gratuities." It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for the retirement of the members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and void. The challenge to the constitutionality of the law is centered on the following propositions:

1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. 2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. 3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. 4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The text of Republic Act No. 3836 The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads: AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETYSIX:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred eighty-six, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is further amended to read as follows: "(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has rendered at least twenty years of service. The benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal contributions plus interest and the payment of the corresponding employer's premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof, without interest, be only a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, based on the highest rate received, but not to exceed twenty-four months: Provided, That the retiring officer or employee has been in the service of the said employer or office for at least four years immediately preceding his retirement. "Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House of Representatives and to an elective officer of either House of the Congress, regardless of age, provided that in the case of a Senator or Member, he must have served at least twelve years as a Senator and/or as a member of the House of Representatives, and, in the case of an elective officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years, not less than four years of which must have been rendered as such elective officer: Provided, That the gratuity payable to a retiring senator, member of the House of Representatives, or elective officer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the government and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be neither liable to attachment or

execution nor refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree. "This gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which is hereby authorized to provide the necessary appropriation or pay the same from any unexpended items of appropriations or savings in its appropriations or saving in its appropriations. "Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under this subsection shall be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which they may have to their credit at the time of retirement." SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June 22, 1963. The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the respondent, filed its answer on September 8, 1964, and contends, by way of special and affirmative defenses that: 1. The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. 2. The title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of Section 21, Article VI, of the Constitution that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 3. The law in question does not constitute legislation.

4. Certain indispensable parties, specifically the elected officers of Congress who are authorized to approve vouchers for payments for funds under the law in question, and the claimants to the vouchers to be presented for payment under said items, were not included in the petition. 5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit. 6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary. A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836 Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which was introduced by Congressmen Marcial R. Pimentel of Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third District of Leyte, on May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was referred to the Committee on Civil Service. which on the following May 8, submitted its REPORT No. 3129, recommending approval of the bill with amendments, among others, that the word "TWENTY" in the bill as filed representing the number of years that a senator or member must serve in Congress to entitle him to retirement under the bill must be reduced to "TWELVE" years, and that the following words were inserted, namely, "AND THE SAME (referring to gratuity) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF REINSTATEMENT OR REELECTION OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the proposed amendments was approved on second reading. It was passed on third reading on May 13, 1963, and on the same day was sent to the Senate, which, in turn, on May 23, 1963, passed it without amendment. The bill was finally approved on June 22, 1963. As explained in the EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others

The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 of C.A. 186, as amended, will enable them to retire voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a minimum of twenty years as a Member of Congress. This gratuity will insure the security of the family of the retiring member of Congress with the latter engaging in other activities which may detract from his exalted position and usefulness as lawmaker. It is expected that with this assurance of security for his loved ones, deserving and well-intentioned but poor men will be attracted to serve their people in Congress. As finally approved, the law (Subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives and an elective officer of either House of Congress to retire regardless of age. To be eligible for retirement, he must have served for at least twelve years as such Senator and/or as member of the House of Representatives. For an elective officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years, of which not less than four years must have been rendered as such elective officer. The gratuity payable by the employer or office concerned is equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the government. Said gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree. First legal point personality of the Petitioner to bring suit. The first point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has a standing to institute this action. This Court has not hesitated to examine past decisions involving this matter. This Court has repeatedly held that when the petitioner, like in this case, is composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to bring this suit. (Pascual v. Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales v. Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802 [1963]).

The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-profit, civic organization composed of several leaders from all walks of life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the Constitution. In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual v. Secretary, supra, this Court stated, among other things, that "there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of the taxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misappropriation of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of the taxpayers."1 This legislation (Republic Act 3836) involves the disbursement of public funds. We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case ofMassachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, holding that: ... the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is very different. His interest in the moneys of the Treasury partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of equity. The general view in the United States, which is followed here, is stated in the American Jurisprudence, thus In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public

moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis supplied.) As far as the first point is concerned, We hold, therefore, that the contention of the Solicitor General is untenable. Second legal point Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in Art. VI, section 14 of the Constitution. The first constitutional question is whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads as follows: The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos (emphasis supplied) Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies some limitations and prohibitions upon the members of Congress, to wit: 1. They may not hold any other office or employment in the Government without forfeiting their respective seats;

2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to any civil office which may have been created or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased while they were members of Congress; (Section 16, Article VI, Constitution) 3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise; 4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an adverse party; 5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and 6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an officer or employee of the Government is accused. (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution) In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits members of Congress to have any special interest in any specific business which will directly or indirectly be favored by any law or resolution authored by them during their term of office. It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with these limitations and prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical demonstration or application of the principle of the and balances which is one of the peculiar characteristics of our Constitution. In the light of this background, can We conclude that Congress can validly enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to its members, without violating the provisions in the aforementioned Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the compensation act including other emoluments? It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly (unicameral body) was fixed at P5,000.00 per annum each. This was

raised to P7,200 per annum by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional amendment, when the unicameral body, the National Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of two bodies, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act 4143, the salary for the Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for each of them; and for the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to P40,000.00 per annum each. Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum, but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p. 187) This goes to show how zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in guarding against the temptation for members of Congress to increase their salaries. However, the original strict prohibition was modified by the subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments were approved in 19402 The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other emoluments." This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefits as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments." Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded "emolument" as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as

compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.3 In another set of cases, "emolument" has been defined as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services, or which is annexed to the possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites; advantage, gain, public or private." The gain, profit or advantage which is contemplated in the definition or significance of the word "emolument" as applied to public officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain, profit, or advantage which is pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers' League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d. 897, 90l.: 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767) In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright v. Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391, affirmed 234 N.Y. 548, 138 N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions and retirement allowances are part of compensation of public officials; otherwise their payment would be unconstitutional. In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N.W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used in Article 4, section 9, of the Constitution of Minnesota, providing that no Senator or Representative shall hold any office, the emoluments of which have been increased during the session of the Legislature of which he was a member, until after the expiration of his term of office in the Legislature, the word "emoluments" does not refer to the fixed salary alone, but includes fees and compensation as the incumbent of the office is by law entitled to receive because he holds such office and performed some service required of the occupant thereof." From the decisions of these cases, it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder,

without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. Third Legal Point Whether or not the law in question violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said Republic Act 3836 are patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, part. 1.) In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such as the governors of provinces and the members of the provincial boards, and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities. The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fully explained by Us in the case ofPeople v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that the classification to be reasonable must be based upon substantial distinctions which make real differences and must be germane to the purposes of the law. As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition), p. 1937, the principle of the requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons similarly situated. Why limit the application of the benefits of Republic Act 3836 to the elected members of Congress? We feel that the classification here is not reasonable. (See also Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law [1938-62], p. 789; The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.) Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement benefits after serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and employees are given

retirement benefits after serving for at least twenty years. In fact, the original bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of service. In the third place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years' salary. Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an employee who had been retired and reappointed is suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836. Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement laws have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the System.4 The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far as Members of Congress are concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers of each House, such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-arms. Under Republic Act 3836, the Secretaries and Sergeants-atarms of each House are given the benefits of retirement without having served for twenty years as required with other officers and employees of the Government. Fourth Legal Point Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act. Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836 complies with the requirement of paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally. It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress. It is claimed that petitioner learned of this law for the first time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer of the House, testified on January 30, 1964, before Justice Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case, and he revealed that in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement law for its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1964-65, Republic Act No. 4164, provides: 13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3836: PROVIDED, That no portion of this Appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall have been paid P210,000.00. In the appropriations for the House of Representatives the following items appear: 7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the House of Representatives, as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 P300,000.00 8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,300,000.00.

In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item appears in the appropriations for the Senate: 13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1616: PROVIDED, That no portion of this appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall have been paid P100,000.00. It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 19651966, the item in the Senate for P210,000.00 to implement Republic Act 3836 was eliminated. In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966), the following items appear: 7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the House Of Representatives as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,200,000.00. 8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,700,000.00. It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186. On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To

provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members. Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should be expressed in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. 1, p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965], p. 119) With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases: The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of the content. (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535) The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than technical, construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject. (Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)

The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and explained inCentral Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the Public Land Act, was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or whether its provisions also extended to agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to lands of the public domain as indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this provision of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not conforming to this constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164;5 See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.) In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more than one subject. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby declared null and void, in so far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional. The restraining order issued in our resolution on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur. Barrera, J., took no part.

Philconsa vs Gimenez case digest Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional. HELD: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads: "The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven

thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos." When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other emoluments". This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments." "Emolument" as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites." It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval

of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC. Lidasan vs COMELEC Case Digest Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur," was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato. ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato - to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill? HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own

province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

G.R. No. L-28089

October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Suntay for petitioner. Barrios and Fule for respondent. SANCHEZ, J.: The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition. On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads: Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.

Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials. Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which are: For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato. Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant

Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court." This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified. 1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."2 It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5 Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all

the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6 In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines: The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. xxx xxx xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7 With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur,"

read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790. Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." This posture we must say but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact. Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that

this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa. As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case: It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage. . . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.

A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262. The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading."9 Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10 We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void. 2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur. We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus: . . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,

conditional, or connected, must fall with them,11 In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus: The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .12 Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative. Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13 Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income.

It was apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads: The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality. This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy. When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios not nine barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine of the original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches

judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will. Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14 3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real party in interest. Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony. The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15 Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them;

he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress. For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes. No costs allowed. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.1 This provision is similar to those found in the Constitution of many American States. It is aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.2 Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the members of the legislature as well as the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill. It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The construction must be reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its subject find expression in its title.3 The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in 1938, construing a provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,4 held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007, the Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however, vigorously dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act was reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal with reorganization but with taxation. While the case ofGovernment vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare majority of four justices against three, the present trend seems to be that the constitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test as indicated in the majority opinion penned by

Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as desired by the majority headed by Justice Laurel. Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,5up to and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6 the opinion coming from Justice Concepcion. It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the grounds on which the invalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was predicated was the violation of the above constitutional provision. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we noted, the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to a subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and appointive officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note that there was no abandonment of the principle of liberality. Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally." It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to the indictment that the constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one subject which should be expressed in his title was not met. The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.

Separate Opinions FERNANDO, J., dissenting: With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I find myself unable to give my assent. Hence these few words to express my stand. Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such statute barrios found in two other municipalities of another province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the insubstantial doubts about its validity must be construed as not including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.

It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the opinions coming from jurists illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the citation from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary and far from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem controlling, as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted. Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That itself would not have given rise to a constitutional question considering the broad, well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial and municipal boundaries. What justified resort to this Court was the congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios in two municipalities located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur. To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that. This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principles underlying precedents, which if not precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v. Agregado,8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code were interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." In Sanchez v. Lyon Construction,9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above principle gained acceptance at a much earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re Guaria:10"In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to

give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an invalid law." American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone, construed statutes "with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to [their] validity."11 From the pen of the articulate jurist, Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution must be given the meaning that may fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by another." His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above pronouncement of Stone and two other former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and cases cited." The prevailing doctrine then as set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision,13 is that courts "have consistently sought an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the judiciary favors "that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater change of surviving the test of constitutionality."14

It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a legislative measure, in the language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to construction free from such peril."15 Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril of nullity. So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations clearly brought to light in the opinion of the Court.

People vs. Purisima, No. L -47757-61, January 28, 1980 FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately, before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground Lack of essential elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to constitute the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the intent of the accused are irrelevant since its is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the law itself. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9 also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute. People v Echavez, 95 SCRA 663 (1980) Facts: Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed separate informations against sixteen people for squatting which was punishable under PD No. 772. FIve of the informations were raffled to Judge Vicente Echavez, Jr. The Judge dismissed the five informations before the accused could be arraigned. One of the Judge's grounds for the dismissal was that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered. Issues: Whether PD No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. Ruling/Held: No. The court ruled that PD No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

AQUINO, J.:p The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides: SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.) The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen informations, reads: That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of

Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic) Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively). Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted. The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does

G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents.

not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit. We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by wellto-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. The preamble of the decree is quoted below: WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country; WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice. It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order. On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law provides: SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provision of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the corresponding applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to commit such acts. Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule ofejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50). WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-239 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. APOLONIO CARLOS, defendant-appellant. Vicente J. Francisco, Felicisimo Ocampo and Alberto V. Francisco for appellant. Office of the First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Tomacruz for appellee. , J.: The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People's Court and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P7,000, and costs. The findings of the People's Court are not assigned as errors or disputed. The lower court found that one day in July or August, 1944, about two or three o'clock in the morning, a truck pulled up to the curb in front of a house on Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where one Martin Mateo lived. From the truck the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted together with members of the Japanese military police and pointed Martin Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's house to his Japanese companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's dwelling first and Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier, bound their

hands, and put them in the truck. Along with other persons who had been rounded up in the other places and who had been kept in the truck while it was parked, they were taken to Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and from which they were released six days later. The reason for the arrest and maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had refused to divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who was a guerrilla and who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was arrested and tortured because he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at least suspected. The defendant in this instance invokes only questions of law. He assigns four alleged errors, viz.: I. The lower court erred in not holding that the accused cannot be convicted of the offense of treason committed against the government of the United States and of the Philippines, because it is a settled principle in international law that in a territory actually under the authority of the enemy, all laws of political complexion of the previous government are suspended, and are without force and inasmuch as the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines defining and penalyzing the crime of treason are all of political complexion, they were suspended and had no binding effect whatsoever upon the inhabitants in the said occupied territories. II. The People's Court erred in not declaring the accused could not have violated the Philippine law on treason, because it is also a settled principle in international law that in such occupied territories all laws inconsistent with the occupation are being likewise suspended and without force and effect over the inhabitants, and since the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines defining and penalyzing treason against the said government are by their very nature evidently inconsistent with the said occupation of the Philippines by the Imperial Japanese forces, the said laws must be deemed as having been suspended and without force and effect upon the Filipinos, during the said occupation. III. The People's Court erred in not holding that the accused herein cannot be convicted of the crime of treason committed against the government of the

United States and of the Philippines, because it is settled principle in international law that once the territory is so occupied by the enemy, the allegiance is as a legal obligation distinguishable and distinguished from loyalty of the inhabitants therein to the former government or governments is temporarily suspended, and it being necessary and essential for the commission of the offense of treason against the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines that the supposed offender should owe allegiance to said government at the time of the alleged offense, it follows that the accused cannot possibly be chargeable with treason against the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines for acts allegedly committed by him in the territory of the Philippines actually occupied by the Japanese during said occupation. IV. The decision rendered in this case should be reversed and, set aside, because the law creating the People's Court is unconstitutional AR3M. The questions propounded in the first, second and third assignments of error were squarely raised and decided in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (77 Phil. 856). That decision controls this appeal so far as the pleas of suspended allegiance and change of sovereignty are concerned. On the strength thereof, the first three assignments of error must be overruled 4jCgnAFcMK. The fourth assignment of error attacks the law creating the People's Court as unconstitutional. Numerous provisions of the People's Court Act are singled out as contrary to the Organic Law. But in formulating many of his propositions the appellant has not indicated the reasons or the authorities which sustain them. We shall dispose of them as briefly as they are presented. For better understanding, we shall reproduce the appellant's propositions and will comment on them separately uV6MI. The brief says: (a) It (People's Court Act) contains provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) The first proviso of section 2 thereof, which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to try and decide cases of crimes against national security

committed during the second world war not filed within six months, notwithstanding the fact that according to its title, the People's Court is precisely created for that purpose, and impliedly, the People's Court jurisdiction in regard to said crimes is exclusive; (2) The second proviso of the same section which grants the People's Court jurisdiction to convict and sentence those accused therein even of crimes other than those against national security, although its title does not in any way indicate that such jurisdiction over other crimes would be granted to the said court; (3) Section 14 thereof, which adds to the disqualifications of Justice of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution, a matter not indicated in any manner in its title; (4) The first proviso of action 19 thereof, which changes the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail although its title speaks only of the creation of the People's Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors; and (5) The second proviso of the same section, which suspends the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law, which is not referred to in its title expressly or by implication. The People's Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason case. The various provisos mentioned, in our opinion, are allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People's Court Act; they are subordinate to its end. The multitude of matters which the legislation, by its nature, has to embrace would make mention of all of them in the title of the act cumbersome. It is not necessary, and the Congress is not expected, to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634.) The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title. The brief says: (b) It deprives persons similarly situated of the equal protection of the laws inasmuch as:

(1) Only those political offenders against whom cases are filed within six months from the passage of the law are to be tried in the People's Court, while others are to be tried in the Courts of First Instance; (2) Political offenders accused in the People's Court are denied preliminary examination and/or investigation whereas the others who shall be entitled thereto; (3) Political offenders accused in the People's Court have limited right to appeal, while those who may be accused of the same crimes in the Courts of First Instance have absolute right of appeal inasmuch as under section 13 of the law, Rules 42 and 46 of the Rules of Court are made applicable to the latter; (4) Appeals in the case involving persons who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof are to heard and decided by a substantially different Supreme Court, thus causing lack of informity in rulings over the same subject; (5) The first proviso of section 19 thereof prescribes a different rule as to the granting of release on bail only with respect to the political offenders detained by the United States Army and released to the Commonwealth of the Philippines but not as to others political offenders accused or accusable of the same crimes; and (6) The second proviso of section 19 thereof suspends article 125 of the Revised Penal Code only as to those political detainees released by the United States Army to the Commonwealth of the Philippines or, at most, only to those accused or accusable of the crimes specified in the law and not as to all persons accused or accusable of crimes against national security committed during the second world war, much less to all offenders, notwithstanding the fact that there is no reasonable and real difference among said groups of offenders. (1) The People's Court is a court of special and restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency and national security. It was devised to operate for a limited period only, a limitation imposed by economic necessity and other factors of public

policy. Obviously, the main concerning the creation of a special court was the trial and and disposition of the cases, numbering over 6,000, of accused who were being held by the United States military authorities and who were to be turned over to the Commonwealth Government. It was presumed that there were other cases of treason not included in this number cases which might not be discovered until years afterward , and the possibility was not overlooked that even some of the cases which the United States Army was on the eve of placing under the jurisdiction of the Philippine Government could not be filed and submitted for trial within a foreseeable future owing to lack of readily available evidence, absence of witnesses, or other causes. On the other hand, considerations of economy and public interests forbade maintenance of the People's Court for an indefinite period. Under the circumstances, it was necessary that a provision be made requiring that only cases which could be brought to court within six months and which were deemed enough to occupy the attention of the People's Court within the limited time of its life, should be cognizable by it, and the rest should be instituted in the proper Courts of First Instance. Such provision is not an arbitrary and international discrimination, and does not work as a deprivation of the right to equal protection of the laws. Both in privileges or advantages conferred, if any, and in liabilities imposed, if any, person under equal circumstances are treated alike. It does not deprive appellant of the protection enjoyed by others failing within his class. The equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution "does not prevent a state or municipality from adjusting its legislation to differences in situations and making a discrimination or distinction in its legislation in respect of things that are different, provided that the discrimination or distinction has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense, that is, outside of the wide discretion which the legislative body may exercise." (16 C.J.S., 997.) Moreover, with its associate feature the People's Court is designed to extend greater protection to persons charged with collaboration with the enemy. If others are prosecuted before a Court of First Instance, they and not the appellant should have cause to complain of discrimination. (2) Section 22 in denying preliminary investigation to persons accused before the People's Court is justified

by the conditions prevailing when the law was enacted. In view of the great number of prisoners then under detention and the length of time and amount of labor that would be consumed if so many prisoners were allowed the right to have preliminary investigation, considered with the necessity of disposing of these cases at the earliest possible dates in the interest of the public and of the accused themselves, it was not an unwise measure which dispensed with such investigation in such cases. Preliminary investigation, it must be remembered, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. For the rest, the constitutional prohibition against discrimination among defendants placed in the same situation and condition is not infringed. (3) For the same reasons stated before, this contention cannot be upheld. There is a rational basis for the distinction. The employment of two modes of appellate procedure in the two classes of cases involved are, in our opinion, suitably adapted to the differences, in their composition, between the courts from which the appeals are taken. The People's Court is a collegiate court whereas the Court of First Instance is presided over by a single judge. Appeal is not a constitutional but statutory right. The admitted fact that there is no discrimination among appeals from the same court or class of court saves the provision objected to from being unconstitutional. (4) This objection does not seem to fall within the subject of constitutional guarantee against deprivation of equal protection of the laws. Be that as it may, we find no merit in the appellant's contention. The disqualification under the People's Court Act of some or a majority of the members of this Court and their substitution by justices of the Court of Appeals or judges of the Courts of First Instance do not make the Supreme Court, as thus constituted, a new court in the eyes of the law. A court is an entity possessing a personality separate and distinct from the men who compose or sit on it. This objection is no more valid than that of a party in an ordinary action who protests that his case is heard by a Supreme Court which, by reason of disability of a majority of its regular members, is made up mostly of judges from outside. As to the "lack of uniformity in rulings over the same subject," it need only be said that the Constitution does not insure uniformity of judicial decisions; neither does it assure immunity from judicial error m31aqEx3.

(5) and (6) The two provisos in section 19 do no constitute denial of equal protection of the laws. The distinction made by these provisos between two sets of accused in the "granting or release on bail" and in the application of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code are not arbitrary or fanciful calculated to favor or prejudice one or the other class. This point was discussed at length and made clear in Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil. 372), in which this Court explained the reasons which necessitated the extension to six months of the authorized detention of persons charged with treason before filing of information. The provisos rest "on some real and substantial difference or distinction bearing a just and fair relation to the legislation." (16 C.J.S., 998.) The brief says: "(c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon specific, known and identified individuals or group of individual, the penalty of detention and imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months without any form of judicial trial or procedure." "The bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial." (Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall., 232, etc.) Detention of a prisoner for a period not exceeding six months pending investigation or trial is not a punishment but a necessary extension of the well-recognized power to hold the criminal suspected for investigation. This proviso was held by this Court to be justified and reasonable under existing circumstances in Laurel vs. Misa, supra. The brief says: "(d) Section 2 thereof which purports to define the jurisdiction of the People's Court constitutes an invalid and void delegation of legislative power which is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines by the Constitution, in so far as said section virtually leaves unqualifiedly in the discretion of the Solicitor General and/or the Office of Special Prosecutors the power to determine the actual cases over which the People's Court shall have jurisdiction." Granting the correctness of the premise of this proposition, it does not follow that the authority vested

in the Solicitor General amounts to a delegation of legislative power. We do not think that the power to institute certain cases in one court or another in the discretion of the prosecuting attorney is an exercise of legislative power. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, V. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comr's [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, cited in Taada on the constitution of the Philippines, p. 291.) The brief says: "(e) Sections 1, 4 and 18 thereof abridge, limit and curtail the power of appointment of the President or the Chief Executive in that (1) Section 1 practically leaves the President with such a very small field of choice in the appointment of the members of the court that he can hardly use his discretion in regard thereto; and (4) Sections 4 and 18 actually designate and appoint the persons who will occupy the positions left vacant by those appointed to the People's Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors respectively. The power to create offices and courts is vested in the legislative department. Subject to constitutional restrictions, the Congress may determine on the eligibility and qualification of officers and provide the method for filing them. We find no valid objection on constitutional ground to a law which directs that a special temporary court should be filled by appointment by the Chief Executive himself from among judges already on the bench and/or other quasi-judicial officers. As to outsiders who might have to be appointed by reason of insufficiency of qualified men already in the service, the Chief Executive is left with a wide field of choice. The theory that "sections 4 and 18 actually designate and appoint the persons who will occupy the positions left vacant by those appointed to the People's Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors respectively" loses sight of the fact that the positions referred to are, as a matter of fact, vacant only in theory, and for the duration of the People's Court, and that the law

does no more than say that after those judges and officers shall have accomplished their work, they shall go back to their permanent posts jONNgNMK. The brief says: "(f) The said law provides for the designation and/or transfer of judges appointed for particular districts to another place outside of their respective districts without the consent of the Supreme Court." Section 7 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that "no judge appointed for a particular district shall be designated or transferred to another district without the approval of the Supreme Court. The Congress shall by law determine the residence of judges of the inferior courts." This constitutional provision, as its language clearly states, refers to transfers from one judicial district to another. It does not prohibit the appointment or designation of a judge from being appointed temporarily or permanently with his consent to a court of different grade and make-up, such as the People's Court. The brief says: "(g) Sections 13 and 19 thereof prescribed rules of procedure regarding appeal and bail which violate the rule of uniformity of rules for all courts of the same grade established in the Constitution." It is the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court which are required by section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution to be uniform for all courts of the same grade. The People's Court is not a court of the same grade, considering many of its special features, and its purposes, as the Court of First Instance or any other existing court in the Philippines, so that the adoption of special rules of procedure for said court different from those applicable to Courts of First Instance is not violative of this constitutional mandate. More than this, the last sentence of the section expressly authorizes the Congress "to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines." The brief says: "(h) It is destructive of the independence of the

judiciary and thereby violates the constitutional provision that the Philippines is a republican state because: (1) By creating a special court with jurisdiction over cases which were already within the jurisdiction of the existing Courts of First Instance without any real necessity and urgent justification, considering that the persons involved in said cases were more or less known and identified at the time of the creation of said special court, the law establishes a precedent under which the legislature may at any time remove from the jurisdiction of existing courts cases involving definite or specific individuals or groups of individuals to serve any purpose which said legislature or the legislators composing the same may wish to accomplish, either to the benefit or damage of said individuals or groups of individuals; (2) By limiting the choice of the judges to compose the People's Court to those who did not hold any position in the Philippine Executive Commission and/or the so-called Republic of the Philippines, the law makes a classification that has absolutely no rational basis inasmuch as the reason for discriminating against those who served in said governments, which is, that they might be prejudiced or influenced in favor of the accused exists in equal measure for those who did not serve, in the sense that they may likewise be prejudiced or influenced against the accused; and (3) In leaving practically in the hands of the Solicitor General the absolute right to choose, in which court he shall prosecute the cases contemplated by the law, and in providing that the judges of the People's Court shall be chosen from a limited group of the judges of the Court of First Instance, etc., the law does not leave a wide room for the play of external factors in the administration of justice to those concerned but also destroys the confidence of the people in the judiciary smwgmu. (1 and 2) These objections go to the wisdom of the law and to matters of policy. This being so, it is enough that the Congress deemed it necessary to incorporate these provisions in Commonwealth Act No. 682. It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and

exclusively a legislative concern. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 661.) (3) This proposition is covered by and answered in our comment on paragraph (d) of the brief. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against appellant. Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur. Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur in the result

.R. No. L-16950

December 22, 1961

SIMEON T. GARCIA, petitioner-appellee, vs. ARTURO B. PASCUAL, Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, EULOGIO STA. MARIA, Municipal Treasurer of said municipality and the MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE, NUEVA ECIJA,respondents-appellants. Cezar Francisco for petitioner-appellee. Cirilo V. Soriano for respondents-appellants. LABRADOR, J.: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Hon. Felix B. Makasiar, presiding, declaring the appointment of petitioner-appellee, Simeon T. Garcia as clerk of court of the justice of the peace court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija valid, and, ordering the respondents Municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, Arturo B. Pascual and Eulogio Sta. Maria, Mayor and Treasurer, respectively of said Municipality, to approve the vouchers of petitionerappellee covering his period of service, as well as to pay petitioner's salary from July 1, 1958 and directing the respondent municipality to provide for the necessary appropriations therefore. Simeon T. Garcia filed a petition for mandamus on September 11, 1958, which was amended on June 15, 1959. The facts involved in this case may be

briefly stated as follows: the acting justice of the peace of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija appointed petitioner Simeon T. Garcia, junior typist civil service eligible, as clerk of the justice of the peace court of said municipality on July 1, 1958. This appointment was approved by the Department of Justice. On July 7, 1958, the acting justice of the peace forwarded the appointment, duly approved by the department and the Civil Service Commission, to the municipal treasurer. The petitioner submitted certain vouchers supporting his daily time record, duly approved by the acting justice of the peace, for payment, but the treasurer returned the vouchers with the information that they be first approved by the municipal mayor before payment could be made. The vouchers were submitted to the mayor but the latter did not want to approve them. The reason of the mayor was an opinion of the provincial fiscal, that Rep. Act No. 1551 has repealed Section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act. Section 75 of the judiciary act provides that the justices of the peace of first class municipalities may have clerks of the court and other necessary employees at the expense of said municipalities, which clerks of court and employees shall be appointed by the respective justices of the peace. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 1551, which is claimed to have repealed section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296, provides Hereafter, all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall, subject to the civil service law, be appointed by the municipal mayor upon the recommendation of the corresponding chief of office. Provided, that in case of disagreement between the chief of office concerned and the municipal Mayor, the matter shall be submitted for action to the proper provincial department head whose decision shall be final.... The judge below ruled that said Rep. Act No. 1551 did not expressly repeal section 75 of the Judiciary Act and that the two laws, although apparently in conflict with each other, may be reconciled, following the principle of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. The judge

further ruled that there being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court of the justice of the peace the power to appoint should not be considered lodged in said mayor. Lastly, the judge held that the intent of the law in placing the appointment of clerks in the justice of the peace is to prevent the clerks from the importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics. On this appeal appellants insist that the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1551 repealed the provisions of section 75 of the Judiciary Act because section 1 of Rep. Act No. 1551 provides that all employees whose salaries are paid by the general funds of the municipality shall be appointed by the mayor upon recommendation of the chief of office, so that, as the clerk of court of the justice of the peace is paid out of the general funds of the municipality the power to appoint the said clerk should be lodged in the mayor as with all other subordinate officials of the municipality. We find no merit on the above contention. In the first place, justices of the peace are appointed by the President of the Philippines, in the same manner as judges of superior courts, in pursuance of the separation of powers among the three departments of the government. The independence of the judiciary from the other departments of the government is one of the fundamental principles established by the Constitution. This independence will be greatly hampered if subordinate officials of the courts are subject to appointment by the head of the municipality province. A cursory reading of the provisions of Rep. No. 1551 clearly shows that what it intended to be made subject to appointment by the municipal mayor are subordinate officials in the municipality, like employees in the executive branch and employees in the municipal council or board. There is no reason why said act, as a general law, may be considered as having repealed the specific provisions of section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296.lawphil.net A substantially similar rule prevails in cases where the two conflicting provisions are found in different statutes relating to the same subject. It is an established rule in the construction of statutes that a subsequent act treating a subject in general terms, and not expressly contradicting the provisions of

a prior special statute, is not to be considered as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all. Hence, where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the same matter, and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special act must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to general act, as the legislature is not presumed to have intended a conflict. Thus, when the provisions of a general law, applicable to the entire state, are repugnant to the provisions of a previously enacted special law, applicable in a particular locality only, the passage of such general law does not operate to modify or repeal the special law, either wholly or in part, unless such modification or repeal is provided for in express words, or arises by necessary implication. (pp. 328-329. Black on Interpretation of Laws.) Another ground for the legal conclusion arrived at by the court below is that the Secretary of Justice, in an opinion dated June 7, 1957, Opinion No. 122, has already held that section 75 of the Judiciary Act has not been repealed by Rep. Act No. 1551. The Secretary of Justice is the legal adviser of the government and his opinions override those of provincial fiscals who are his subordinates. His opinions although not law, should be given great weight, which in this case is the correct interpretation of the laws involved. For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from should be, as is it is hereby, affirmed with costs against the appellants.