ARTICLE XII REPUBLIC vs. ESTONILO, G.R. No. 157306, Nov.

25, 2005 Facts: Petitioner, in her application, claimed that a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 was previously owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty on June 14, 1954. After due notice and publication of said application, the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director of the Bureau of Lands filed its opposition alleging that Lot 4318 cannot be registered pursuant to PP No. 265, which declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army. Issue: Does the public Land Act require a judicial order to create a military reservation? Ruling: Yes. Petitioner argues that the Public Land Act does not require a judicial order to create a military reservation. The provision requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights means that persons claiming rights over the reserved land are not precluded from proving their claims. It is contended further that respondents were afforded due process when their application for registration of title to Lot 4318 was heard by the lower courts. The Court agrees with petitioner. The segregation of land for a public purpose is governed by the Public Land Act in Sections 53, 83, 86, and 87. In these provisions, only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate a piece of land for a public purpose. It must be noted that while Sec. 53 grants authority to the director of lands through the Solicitor General to file a petition against claimants of the reserved land, the filing of that petition is not mandatory. The director of lands is required to file a petition only whenever in the opinion of the President public interest requires it. Magalona vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, Aug. 16, 2011 Facts: In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046, demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic state, following the framing of the UNCLOS I. However the breadth of the territorial sea was left undetermined, and R.A. 3046 remained unchanged for five decades. In 2009, it was amended by R.A. 9522 to make it complaint with the terms of the UNCLOS III, so that one baseline was shortened, basepoint locations were optimized and the Kalayaan Islands and the Scarborough Shoal were classified as regimes of islands. Petitioners, all law professors, students and a legislator, assail R.A. 9522s constitutionality on the grounds that it reduces Philippine maritime territory, in violation of Article 1 of the Constitution, and opens the countrys internal waters to maritime passage, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security. Issue: Is R.A. 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law, violative of Sec. 2, par. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution? Held: No. The provisions that petitioners site, which are the protection of maritime wealth (Par. 2, Sec. 2, Art. XII) and subsistence fishermen (Sec. 7, Art. XIII) are not violated by R.A. 9522. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within. It is binding on the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of the UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will reject and refuse to be bound by it. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within the EEZ up to 200 nautical miles. It however preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

SAAD versus Republic FACTS: The instant petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals which invalidated the sale of the Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu to petitioner. SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title [No.] 0-6667 to the Register of Deeds of Cebu City which was ordered to cancel OCT [No.] 0-6667 and all other transfer certificates of title that may have been subsequently issued. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming insufficiency of evidence and failure to consider pertinent laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE: What is the Regalian Doctrine? RULING: The Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's property regime. Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. In instances where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of the public domain is found under private ownership, the Government is allowed by law to file an action for reversion, which is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. Sec. of DENR vs. YAP, G.R. No. 167707, Oct. 8, 2008 Facts: On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land for protection purposes and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land as alienable and disposable. The Proclamation likewise provided for a 15 meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. Issue: IS PP No. 1065 classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable), valid and constitutional? Ruling: Yes. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, PGMA merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition. Apex Mining vs. SMGM, G.R. No. 152613, Nov. 20, 2009 Facts: SMGM Corporation assailed the Courts decision, which held that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SMGM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the permit, that the same shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of MCC or its agents. Since SMGM did not submit evidence that it was a designated agent of MMC, the former cannot be considered as an agent of the latter that can use EP 133 and benefit from it. The assailed decision also upheld the validity of PP No. 297. In view of this, and considering that under Sec. 5, R.A. 7942, mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having been overtaken by the said proclamation.

Thus it was held that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area. Issue: Is PP No. 297, declaring the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as a mineral reservation, valid and constitutional on the ground that it lacks the concurrence of Congress as mandated by Sec. 4, Art. XII of the Constitution? Held: The presumption of its constitutionality stands inasmuch as the parties in the instant cases did not question its validity, much less present any evidence to prove that it is unconstitutional. Proclamation No. 297 is in harmony with Art. XII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. SMGM asserts that Art. XII, Sec. 4 bars the President from excluding forest reserves/reservations and proclaiming the same as mineral reservations, since the power to de-classify belongs to Congress. SEM does not allege nor present any evidence that Congress had already enacted a statute determining with specific limits forest lands and national parks. Considering the absence of such law, Proclamation No. 297 could not have violated Section 4, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. In addition, there is nothing in the constitutional provision that prohibits the President from declaring a forest land as an environmentally critical area and from regulating the mining operations therein by declaring it as a mineral reservation in order to prevent the further degradation of the forest environment and to resolve the health and peace and order problems that beset the area. A closer examination of Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution and Proclamation No. 297 reveals that there is nothing contradictory between the two. Proclamation No. 297, a measure to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental protection, jibes with the constitutional policy of preserving and protecting the forest lands from being further devastated by denudation. In other words, the proclamation in question is in line with Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution, as the former fosters the preservation of the forest environment of the Diwalwal area and is aimed at preventing the further degradation of the same. Matthews vs. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009 Facts: In June 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor married Joselyn C. Taylor, a 17-year old Filipina. A year later, Joselyn bought a 1,294 sq. m. lot in Boracay. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. In 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. A month later, Joselyn entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered without his consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Issue: Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wife over a land bought during their marriage? Ruling: Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition is sustained. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. BORROMEO vs. DESCALLAR, G.R. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009

Facts: Jambrich, an Austrian, and his Filipina girlffirend, Descallar, bought a house and lot in Mandaue City. The Deed of Sale showed the two as buyers but the Register of Deeds erased the name of Jambrich since an alien cannot acquire alienable land and registered the land only in the name of Descallar alone. Later on the two separated. Jambrich then sold his rights and interest in the Mandaue property to Borromeo. Descallar refused to turn over the property. Borromeo sued Descallar and produced Jambrich as witness that Descallar was only working as a waitress with an income of P 1,000 a month and living in squatter area in Cebu. The money for the purchase all came from Jambrich. Even granting that Jambrich and Descallar bought the property while they were living in, Descallar was then married to another person. In such adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists. Issue: What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were title? Held: The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no coownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the parties to prove their actual contributions in the acquisition of the property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. It is also setted that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The mere possession of a title does not make one a true owner of a property. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties, having no income of her own. While the acquisition and purchase of Jambrich of the properties were void ab initio since they were contrary to the Constitution, he being a foreigner, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. Espina vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 143855, Sept. 21, 2010 Facts: In 2000, Pres. Estrada signed into law R.A. 8762, or the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. Under R.A. 8762, foreigners and natural-born citizens who have previously lost their citizenship but now reside in the Philippines are allowed to engage in the retail trade business, the latter having the same rights as Filipino citizens. Petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives, assailed the constitutionality of the law on the grounds that it runs afoul of Sec. 9, 19 and 20 of Art. II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under to control of Filipinos, and to protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies. Issue: Does R.A. 8762 (Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000) violate the constitutional mandate on Filipinization of areas of investments? Held: As the Court held in Tanada vs. Angara, the provisions of Art. II are not self-executing and failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to cause of action in courts. While Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign

investments, goods, and services. W hile it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. Francisco vs. TRB, G.R. No. 166910, Oct. 19, 2010 Facts: In 1977, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1112, authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on public improvements. It acknowledged the huge financial requirements and the need to tap into the resources of the private sector to implement the program. In order to attract the private sector, P.D. 1112 created the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) and allowed the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements, allowing a reasonable rate of ROI. P.D. 1113 was also issued, granting to PNCC a franchise to construct toll facilities with a right to collect fees as the TRB may fix. TRB and PNCC signed an agreement for the operation of the expressway. In 1983, PNCC was granted a franchise over MMEX. As stated in the previous P.D.s PNCC may sell its franchise upon the Presidents approval, then came the 1987 Constittution with its franchise provision. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Sections 3 (a) and (d) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 8 (b) of P.D. 1894 insofar as they vested the TRB, on one hand, toll operation awarding power while, on the other hand, granting it also the power to issue, modify and promulgate toll rate charges. The TRB, so petitioners bemoan, cannot be an awarding party of a TOA and, at the same time, be the regulator of the toll way industry and an adjudicator of rate exactions disputes. Issue: Is the authority to grant public utility franchise an exclusive legislative power? Can it be delegated? Is a congressional franchise necessary before a public utility may operate? Held: A franchise is basically a legislative grant of a special privilege to a person, which includes not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of statute, but also those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchise has been delegated by Congress. The power to authorize and control a public utility is admittedly a prerogative that stems from the Legislature. Any suggestion, however, that only Congress has the authority to grant a public utility franchise is less than accurate. As stressed in Albano v. Reyeas, there is nothing in the Constitution remotely indicating the necessity of a congressional franchise before each and every public utility may operate. That the Constitution provides that the issuance of a franchise, certificate or other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress does not necessarily imply that only Congress has the power to grant such authorization. In such a case, therefore, a special franchise directly emanating from Congress is not necessary if the law already specifically authorizes an administrative body to grant a franchise or to award a contract. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some administrative agencies. GAMBOA vs. TEVES, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011 Facts: In 1928, PLDT was granted frnachise and the right to engage in the telecommunications business. In 1969, GTE sold 26% of PLDT common shares to PTIC. In 1977, PHI became owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC, which were sequestered by PCGG in 1986, and later declared to be owned by the RP. In 2006, IPC sold the shares through public bidding, won by Parallax, with a bid of Php25.6billion. First Pacific, who acquired the remaining 54% stock of PTIC in 1999, announced that it would buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by matching the bid price of Parallax, but failed to do so before the deadline set by IPC. Thereafter, First Pacific, through MPAH, entered into a conditional sale and purchase agreement. With the sale, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increase from 30.7% to 37%, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to 81.47%, violating Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution.

Issue: Is Sec. 11, Art. XII enabling or self-executing? Does the term capital in Sec. 11 refer to the total common shares only or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility? Held: The Court agrees with petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention. The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares,41 and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares. Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. DCCO vs. COA, G.R. No. 182722, Jan. 22, 2010 Facts: DCCO is a credit cooperative duly registered with and regulated by the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), established in 1968 to increase the income and purchasing power of the members, among others. In 2001, BIR examined petitioners books of accounts and records for all internal revenue taxes for 1999-2000. In 2002, petitioner protested upon receiving two pre-assessment notices for deficiency withholding taxes for 1999-2000, which cover the payments of the honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial services, legal and professional fees, and interest on savings and time deposits of its members. DCCO informed BIR it would pay deficiency withholding taxes in 1999 and 2000, excluding penalties and interest, and that it would avail of the VAAP. DCCO availed the VAAP and paid the amounts corresponding to the withholding taxes for 1999-2000 respectively. It was ordered to pay the deficiency, inclusive of penalties for 1999 and 2000. Issue: Is Art. 61 of R.A. 9520, which exempts deposits of members of cooperatives from final taxes, valid and constitutional? Held: The tax exmeption in R.A. 6938 was retained in R.A. 9520, the only difference being that Art. 61 of R.A. 9520 now expressly states that transactions of members with the cooperatives are not subject to any taxes and fees. This amendment in Article 61 of R.A. 9520, specifically providing that members of cooperatives are not subject to final taxes on their deposits, affirms the interpretation of the BIR that Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC does not apply to cooperatives and confirms that such ruling carries out the legislative intent. The re-enactment of a statute substantially unchanged is persuasive indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior executive construction. Moreover, our Constitution guarantees the protection of cooperatives. Section 15, Article XII of the Constitution considers cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic development. At the same time, Section 10 of Article II of the Constitution declares that it is a policy of the State to promote social justice in all phases of national development. In relation thereto, Section 2 of Article XIII of the Constitution states that the promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. Bearing in mind the foregoing provisions, we find that an interpretation exempting the members of cooperatives from the imposition of the final tax under Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC is more in keeping with the letter and spirit of our Constitution. All told, we hold that petitioner is not liable to pay the assessed

deficiency withholding taxes on interest from the savings and time deposits of its members, as well as the delinquency interest of 20% per annum. BSP vs. COA, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011 Facts: The COA issued a resolution in 1999 defining its policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippine, which was created as a public corporation, and that in BSP vs. NLRC, the SC ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a GOCC within the meaning of Art. IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution, and that the BSP is regarded as a government instrumentality under the Administrative Code. For the purposes of audit supervision, the BSP shall be classified among the government corporations to be audited by employing the team audit approach. The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter signed by then BSP National President Jejomar C. Binay, saying that it is not subject to the COAs jurisdiction. Issue: Does the test of economic viability apply to public corporations dealing with governmental functions? Held: Art. XII, Sec. 16 bans the creation of private corporations by special law, but the said constitutional provision should not be construed so as to prohibit the creation of public corporations or a corporate agency or instrumentality of the government intended to serve a public interest or purpose. This should not be measured on the basis of economic viability, but according to the public interest or purpose it serves as envisioned by par. 2, Art. 44 of the Civil Code, and of the Administrative Code. The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as "public corporations." These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices. 1998 BAR. Express your agreement or disagreement with any of the following statements. Begin your answer with the statement: "I AGREE" or "I DISAGREE" as the case may be. (1) Anyone, whether Individual, corporation or association, qualified to acquire private lands is also qualified to acquire public lands in the Philippines. (2) A religious corporation is qualified to have lands in the Philippines on which it may build its church and make other improvements provided these are actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes. (3) A religious corporation cannot lease private lands In the Philippines. (4) A religious corporation can acquire private lands in the Philippines provided all its members are citizens of the Philippines. (5) A foreign corporation can only lease private lands in the Philippines. SUGGESTED ANSWER. (1) I disagree. Under Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution, a corporation or association which is sixty percent owned by Filipino citizens can acquire private land, because it can lease public land and can therefore hold public land. However, it cannot acquire public land. Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, private corporations and associations can only lease and cannot acquire public land. Under Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution, a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship may acquire private land only and cannot acquire public land. (2) I disagree. The mere fact that a corporation is religious does not entitle it to own public land. As held In Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58, 61, land tenure is not indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession of worship. The religious corporation can own private land

only if it is at least sixty per cent owned by Filipino citizens. (3) I disagree. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 471, corporations and associations owned by aliens are allowed to lease private lands up to twenty-five years, renewable for another period of twenty-five years upon agreement of the lessor and the lessee. Hence, even if the religious corporation is owned by aliens, it can lease private lands. (4) I disagree. For a corporation to qualify to acquire private lands in the Philippines, under Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution in relation to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, only sixty per cent (60%) of the corporation is required to be owned by Filipino citizens for it to qualify to acquire private lands. (5) I agree. A foreign corporation can lease private lands only and cannot lease public land. Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, the exploration, development and utilization of public lands may be undertaken through co-production. Joint venture or production-sharing agreements only with Filipino citizen or corporations or associations which are at least sixty per cent owned by Filipino citizen. 2000 BAR. Andy Lim, an ethnic Chinese, became a naturalized Filipino in 1935. But later he lost his Filipino citizenship when he became a citizen of Canada in 1971. Wanting the best of both worlds, he bought, in 1987, a residential lot in Forbes Park and a commercial lot in Binondo. Are these sales valid? Why? SUGGESTED ANSWER. No, the sales are not valid. Under Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution, only a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who lost his Philippine citizenship may acquire private land. Since Andy Lim was a former naturalized Filipino citizen, he is not qualified to acquire private lands. 2004 BAR. EAP is a government corporation created for the purpose of reclaiming lands including foreshore and submerged areas, as well as to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. A law was passed transferring title to EAP of lands already reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of MM Bay, particularly the so-called Liberty Islands, as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Titles were duly issued in EAP's name. Subsequently, EAP entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with ARI, a private foreign corporation, to develop Liberty Islands. Additionally, the JVA provided for the reclamation of 250 hectares of submerged land in the area surrounding Liberty Islands. EAP agreed to sell and transfer to ARI a portion of Liberty Islands and a portion of the area to be reclaimed as the consideration for ARI's role and participation in the joint venture, upon approval by the Office of the President. Is there any constitutional obstacle to the sale and transfer by EAP to ARI of both portions as provided for in the JVA? SUGGESTED ANSWER. ARI cannot acquire a portion of Liberty Islands because, although EAP has title to Liberty Islands and thus such lands are alienable and disposable land, they cannot be sold, only leased, to private corporations. The portion of the area to be reclaimed cannot be sold and transferred to ARI because the seabed is inalienable land of the public domain. (Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, [2002]). 2006 BAR. State whether or not the following laws are constitutional. Explain briefly. A law prohibiting Chinese citizens from engaging in retail trade. SUGGESTED ANSWER. The law is invalid as it singles out and deprives Chinese citizens from engaging in retail trade. In Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957, the court held that the Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." Thus, the court ruled therein that the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in

the retail trade. In the case at bar, the law discriminates only against Chinese citizens and thus violates the equal protection clause. 2006 BAR. State whether or not the law is constitutional. Explain briefly. A law creating a state corporation to exploit, develop, and utilize compressed natural gas. SUGGESTED ANSWER. The law is valid as under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. It is also provided that the State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture or sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations, at least 60%Filipino-owned. Furthermore, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, according to terms and conditions provided by law. A state corporation, unlike a private corporation, may be created by special law and placed under the control of the President, subject to such conditions as the creating statute may provide. 2009 BAR. True or False. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than 2 sentences. SUGGESTED ANSWER.