Japan Neg Master File

LRHS Debate Neg V. (1.
0)
Kuwait Presence Good Joshua/Sam
Okinawa Japan Neg Master File

Inherency Withdraw Not Inevitable................................................................................................................. 4 Solvency Solvency.......................................................................................................................................... 6 No Solvency- Base can't move ....................................................................................................... 7 No Solvency- Helicopters ............................................................................................................... 8 Base Good Bases Good- East Asian Stability ................................................................................................. 10 Bases Good- Deterrence (1/2) ....................................................................................................... 14 Bases Good- Deterrence (2/2) ....................................................................................................... 15 Bases Good- Disaster Relief ......................................................................................................... 16 Bases Good- Asian Peace ............................................................................................................. 17 Bases Good- North Korea Deterrence .......................................................................................... 18 Bases Good- Japanese Soft Power ................................................................................................ 19 Bases Good- China Relations ....................................................................................................... 21 Location Key (1/2) ........................................................................................................................ 22 Location Key (2/2) ........................................................................................................................ 23 Hegemony 1NC Hegemony Bad Advantage 1/4............................................................................................. 25 Withdrawal Kills Hegemony ........................................................................................................ 29 A2: Hegemony Unsustainable ...................................................................................................... 30 A2: Hegemony Collapse Inevitable 1/2 ........................................................................................ 31 Troop Presence Good Conflict Escalation ................................................................................. 33 Hegemony Good Asian Stability ............................................................................................... 34 Hegemony Good China Modernization ..................................................................................... 35 Hegemony Good Taiwan War ................................................................................................... 36 Hegemony Good Sino-Japanese War ........................................................................................ 37 F-22 1NC F-22 Advantage 1/3 .............................................................................................................. 39 F-35 Preferred50 US Wont Sell ............................................................................................................................... 43 China Relations Sino-Japanese Relations High....................................................................................................... 45 Sino-Japanese Relations High....................................................................................................... 47 Tensions Now Taiwan ............................................................................................................... 48 Sino-Japanese Tensions Now Public Opinion ........................................................................... 49 Sino-Japanese Tensions Now Energy ........................................................................................ 50 Sino-Japanese Tensions Now Military*** ................................................................................ 51 AT: Sino-Japanese Relations Stable ............................................................................................. 52 1
LRHS Debate Neg V. (1.0)
Ext China-US-Japan Alliance Zero-Sum ................................................................................... 53 AT: US-Japanese Relations Low .................................................................................................. 54 Chinese Multilateralism Solves Containment ............................................................................... 55 Sino-Japanese Relations Good Energy ...................................................................................... 56 Ext Relations Key to Energy...................................................................................................... 57 AT: Japan Multilateral Now/Strong Regional Ties Now ............................................................. 58 Adventurism A2: Adventurism Advantage ........................................................................................................ 60 Deficits A2: Deficits Advantage (1/2) ........................................................................................................ 62 A2: Deficits Advantage (2/2) ........................................................................................................ 63 Environment Dugong Frontline (1/2) ................................................................................................................. 65 Dugong Frontline (2/2) ................................................................................................................. 66 AT: Dugong Advantage ................................................................................................................ 67 AT: Dugong .................................................................................................................................. 68 Dugong: Alt Cause (Bycatch) ....................................................................................................... 69 Dugong: Alt Cause- Dredging ...................................................................................................... 70 Dugong: Alt Cause (Hunting) ....................................................................................................... 71 No Extinction: Australia/Diverse .................................................................................................. 72 Economy AT: Econ....82 Kans economic reforms wont help economy ............................................................................. 75 Kans economic reforms wont help economy ............................................................................. 76 Japan economy recovering now .................................................................................................... 77 Alliance AT: Alliance...........87 AT: Alliance...88 Other AT: Futenma Key to Relations ..................................................................................................... 82 AT: Oppression ............................................................................................................................. 83 AT: Global Instability (1/2) .......................................................................................................... 84
***Inherency***
Withdraw Not Inevitable

No plans for the US to currently withdraw Thompson, 10 (Mark, June 10, Why Japan and the U.S. Can't Live Without Okinawa Time Magazine,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1994798,00.html)
The U.S. made clear shortly after Hatoyama's election that it had no intention of retreating from East Asia. Last October, Defense Secretary Robert Gates called the Marines' continued presence on Okinawa the "linchpin" of Washington's East Asian strategy. "This may not be the perfect alternative for anyone," he said in Japan, "but it is the best alternative
for everyone." In February, Lieut. General Keith Stalder, who commands Marines in the Pacific, put it more bluntly. "All of my Marines on Okinawa are willing to die if it is necessary for the security of Japan," he told a Tokyo audience. "Japan does not have a reciprocal obligation to defend the United States, but it absolutely must provide the bases and training that U.S. forces need." That U.S. security umbrella, he pointedly added, "has brought Japan and the entire region unprecedented wealth and social
advancement."
***Solvency***
Solvency
Insiders agreethey cant solvelogistics and politics. Reuters, 10, Japan PM Seeks to Quell Okanawan Anger over U.S. Base, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65M0TS20100623 cp
Hatoyama had raised the hopes of Okinawa residents before the DPJ's landslide election win last year that Futenma could be moved off the island, but he failed to find a replacement site elsewhere in Japan or outside the country. Washington and Tokyo have agreed to work out by the end of August a detailed plan, including a relocation site, but Japan's defense minister has already expressed doubts over how smoothly the deal can be implemented. An election for the governor of Okinawa is due in November and the result could also affect the airbase deal, coming near the time when Obama is expected to visit
Japan for an Asia-Pacific leaders' summit.
No Solvency- Base can't move

No solvency- Impossible to move the marines off the island Dallas News 5/4 (Moving US base off Okinawa, Japan, 'impossible',
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/050410dnintjapanmilitary.4baa89f.html, May, 4, 2010)
TOKYO Japan's prime minister said Tuesday that it will be impossible to move all parts of a key U.S. Marine base out of Okinawa, breaking with past promises to relocate the facility outside the southern island. It was the first time since Yukio Hatoyama became prime minister in September that he officially acknowledged that at least part of Futenma U.S. Marine Corps airfield would remain in Okinawa, which hosts more than half the 47,000 American troops based in Japan under a security
pact. Hatoyama had frozen a 2006 agreement with the U.S. on moving Futenma to a less crowded part of the island, saying instead he wanted to move it off Okinawa entirely straining ties with Washington. "Realistically speaking, it is impossible. We're facing a
situation that is realistically difficult to move everything out of the prefecture," he said Tuesday on his first trip to Okinawa as prime minister. Hatoyama asked residents to be open to a government plan that would keep some of Futenma's functions on the island, while possibly moving other functions outside the island . "We must ask the people of
Okinawa to share the burden," he said. Hatoyama's comments, which come just weeks before his self-declared end-of-May deadline for reaching a decision on the issue, essentially signals that he is shifting back toward the 2006 agreement, forged between Washington and the previous conservative Tokyo government. Yet he faces strong local opposition to keeping Futenma on the island. Late last month, about 90,000 people gathered in the town of Yomitan to protest the proposed move. Earlier this year, an anti-base candidate was elected mayor of the northern town of Nago, the proposed site for the airfield's move. Hatoyama was expected to present to Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima and other local officials a government plan that roughly follows the 2006 deal to move Futenma to a location near Camp Schwab on the island's northeastern coast. The government is also considering moving some of Futenma's functions to Tokunoshima island, north of Okinawa, but residents held a massive protest this month and local officials rejected Tokyo's request for talks.
No Solvency- Helicopters
Helicopters are critical to Marine effectiveness Stadler, 2/17( Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo
American Center) As I travel around Asia, I get questions about what I mean by training with our helicopters. People ask, "How hard is it to get on and off a helicopter?" Well, to answer that question specifically, it can actually be very difficult to get on and off a helicopter if people are shooting at you, or if there is a food riot in the area, or if you are having to climb down a long rope suspended from a hovering aircraft. But our
helicopters do much more than move people and supplies. Our combat helicopters provide close air support by attacking enemy positions that endanger troops on the ground. Surveillance helicopters provide navigational and targeting support. Heavy lift helicopters carry suspended pallets of life saving supplies, and then lower those pallets to Marines waiting on the ground.In other words, our helicopters are integral to everything we do when we respond to both humanitarian and security situations. Those responses require skill and precision.Our ground forces must train consistently with the helicopters that support them. Otherwise, when we respond to a contingency, mistakes will happen, the mission may fail, and people will die.The helicopter is to the Marine as the horse was to the cavalryman of the old west- the horse did everything for and with him. He lived, slept, ate, fought, trained and died with his horse. Without it, he was not a cavalryman at all and could not perform his mission
***Base Good***
Bases Good- East Asian Stability

Okinawa Military base key to peace and prosperity in east asia East West Center 3/13 (Regional Security and Okinawa in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ewc-inwashington/events/previous-events-2010/march-9-regional-security-and-okinawa-in-the-us-japan-alliance/)
Finally, Mr. Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Affairs, reviewed the current status of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the prospects for the future. He pointed out that much of the positive change in Asia, including economic growth and the development of democracy, is due to the role of the Alliance in maintaining peace and stability in the region. He explained that the presence of American troops in Okinawa continues to serve as a deterrent and an important part of regional peace. The current questions over American bases in Okinawa have no easy answers, but he explained that the United States, Japan, and the people of Okinawa should continue to investigate a sustainable and mutually beneficial way to resolve the concerns.
Removing troops from okinawa causes asian power vacuum Auer, 98 (James Auer, James E. Auer is the Director of the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at the Vanderbilt Institute for
Public Policy Studies, letters)
Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon ("The Marines Should Come Home," spring issue) argue that the rape of a 12-year-old Japanese girl by U.S. servicemen stationed in Okinawa reveals a fragility in the US.-Japan alliance and that the alliance needs rethinking. But their solution, to withdraw the Okinawan-based Marines of the US. Seventh Fleet, the core of the U.S.-Japan Security treaty's credibility, is mistaken. Mochizuki and O'Hanlon can talk all they want of technological changes that make the deployment of Marines in Okinawa an anachronism, but to remove them because of an aberrant crime while Japan's ability to assist the U.S. in a crisis is doubtful; while North Korea shows no understanding of what has happened in the former Soviet Union and else where and has forces deployed close to the DMZ; and while the future of China post-Deng Xiaoping is extremely uncertain, could promote a power vacuum and would provoke anxiety in Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia. I agree that
the alliance needs reexamination but the reason is the end of the Cold War, during which, owing to geography, Japan could con tribute meaningfully by deterring Soviet military power without deploying military forces far outside Japanese territory. A lively debate is now ongoing in Japan about whether or not collective self defense is permissible and whether Japan's current or modernized Self-Defense Forces (not offensive ones) can operate outside Japan. If the result is positive, which is now likely within a decade, such a policy would be supported by the Japanese public and by Japan's Asian neighbors, especially if Japan stays within the Security Treaty and UN peace keeping frameworks. Under such a policy, for example, Japan could have sent several destroyers with the USS Independence to maintain freedom of the seas near Taiwan (and thus near Japan too) last March. China would have com plained loudly, but would not China have respected joint action by the two largest economies in the world even more than unilateral U.S. action? If China believes it can successfully prevent the United States and Japan from acting together to maintain stability in the economic center of the world, will China be motivated toward a peaceful course or to ward intimidation? When the United States and Japan last declared their determination to act together, in June 1981, the result was Soviet restructuring rather than aggression. If Japan clarifies its right to exercise collective self-defense, the need to keep the Seventh Fleet (and its Oki nawa-based Marines) at present strength for the indefinite future will lessen. Until then, precipitous action should be avoided.
US Presence key to peace and stability Kapoor 6/10 (Rajesh Kapoor, Dr. Rajesh Kapoor is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, the relevance
of Okinawa,http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheStrategicRelevanceofOkinawa_rkapoor_100610)
Notwithstanding popular criticism and opposition, the US-Japan security alliance and the presence of USFJ remain vital to Japanese foreign and security policies. The relocation of USFJ facilities and troops outside Japan may create an imbalance between the two countries over sharing responsibilities under the terms of the security treaty.
It is an obligation for the US to defend Japan under Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty, while Japan is obliged to provide the use of facilities and areas in Japan under Article 6 of the treaty. This treaty is quite unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which provides only for shared defence by the contracting states. USFJ also acts as an effective deterrent against any armed
aggression. In case attack takes place, the US is bound to protect Japan and even send reinforcements for which the bases are extremely important. In a nutshell, the USFJ is essential for the security of Japan and the presence of US troops in Japan has ensured peace and stability in the region.USFJ in Okinawa might not be welcomed by the people of Okinawa, but Okinawa will remain strategically important for the US. Given the covert
security threat from China and overtly manifested threat from North Korea, Japan will always choose in favour of hosting US bases in Okinawa.
10
LRHS Debate Neg V. (1.0) Okinawa is key to preventing East Asian conflict Dobson 98 (Lt. Col Robert Dobson, USMC Federal Executive Fellow, brookings, letters)
According to Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon ("The Marines Should Come Home," spring issue) Okinawa-based U.S. Marines "are not central ... to the U.S. role in Asia." I disagree. Strategically, Okinawa is of immense value. Within a 2,000 nautical mile arc of Okinawa are
Singapore, Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City, Manilla, Taipei, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo. U.S. Marines on Okinawa are transportable anywhere in the East Asia Pacific theater, immediately available air or sealift, thereby preserving limited strategic airlift and sealift for the important flow of additional forces and supplies from the continental United States. If the Okinawa-based Marines were sent home, in theater response time would be greatly delayed. More than 5,000 strategic airlift sorties would be required to move the Marines and their equipment into theater. Strategic airlift, al ready double-counted in support of current two major regional contingency war plans, would be largely unavailable, necessitating a 30-day ship transit from the west coast to the Pacific theater. Okinawa also has tremendous strategic value as a forward logistic base. White Beach Naval Station can simultaneously load 7 amphibious ships (2 large deck and 5 smaller ships). More than 50 million gallons of fuel can be stored on Okinawa. More than 5,000 pieces of equipment are stored in more than 55,000 square feet of warehouse space. Okinawa's strategic value can be realized only if general purpose forces are stationed there, ready for immediate use. Only thus can essentialinfrastructure be kept available and ready Permanently stationed forces maintain support and basing that are vital in time of crisis and conflict. The Okinawa-based Third Marine Expeditionary Force is perfectly suited to support our evolving security requirements in the East Asia-Pacific. Current U.S.-Japanese security arrangements require the Japanese to provide for island defense and sea lane control out to 1,000 nautical miles. Japan is protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. U.S. forces in Japan (including Marines on Okinawa) provide for expanded island defense and a power projection capability. Most experts agree that future conflicts in the Pacific will involve the defense or seizure of key sea lanes to guarantee the uninterrupted flow of strategic raw materials. Several sea lanes are now disputed territories. U.S. Marine forces, fighting as part of a joint or combined Naval force, task organized and self sustainable, are especially suited for a wide variety of missions in a maritime theater, including seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and sea lanes, amphibious operations, conventional operations ashore, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, non combatant evacuation, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. U.S. Marines remain a key element of a naval force in a maritime theater of operations. There are now 22 disputed regions in the Pacific. As recent events in China and Taiwan prove, these disputed regions are areas of likely conflict. In this uncertain world, it's hard to know where and how a force will be used. General purpose U.S. Marines may be used to separate combatants or to rein force a regional ally. Therefore, maintaining a rapidly deploy able, flexible, self-sustaining general purpose force serves our best interests and creates dilem mas for potential adversaries. While U.S. Army forces in South Korea remain focused there, the general purpose U.S. Marine forces on Okinawa are immediately available to the the greater commander for short-notice crisis response missions. In February 1995, part of my battalion (3rd Bn, 7th Mir), then deployed to Okinawa, assisted in
the amphibious withdrawal of UNOSOM II personnel from Somalia by carrying out amphibious landings, relief-in-place of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Italian forces, and concluded with an amphibious withdrawal under pressure. Furthermore, Okinawa based Marines
participate in more than 70 combined and bilateral exercises a year. The exercises, conducted with Japan, Russia, Thailand, Philippines, South Korea, Australia and many other East Asia-Pacific countries, enhance host nation capabilities, foster regional co operation and integration, and give form and substance to our bilateral security commitments. Collectively, the 18,000 U.S. Marines in Okinawa serve, during times of peace, to increase the defense capabilities of our friends and demonstrate our continued commitment to de fend common interests. Redeploying them to the United States would be inconsistent with our mutual security objectives of preventing the emergence of a hostile regional power, keeping the sea lanes open, and maintaining commercial and economic access to the region. It would also re quire Japan to modify its constitution and create a Japanese power projection capability. Without question, bringing the Marines home would be viewed by other countries in the region as a lessening of U.S. commitment and a heightening of Japan's potential military posture. Such a situation would fracture our delicate regional bilateral alliance structure.
11
Weakening US military presence in Okinawa leads to the destabilization of the region Stadler, 2/17( Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo
American Center) Potential enemies of Japan and the U.S. are watching to see if there are chinks in this Alliance, because if it can be weakened today, maybe it can be weakened further tomorrow. Our friends, those who share our values of liberty and our respect for human rights,
are also watching. They want to remain firmly in our corner, but if they begin to suspect that our Alliance is not as strong as it once was, or that the United States is not as able as it was to ensure security in East Asia, one of two things is going to happen. Either those countries are going to drastically increase their defense budgets to make up for their lack of faith in the Alliance's ability to defend them, leading to a regional arms race, or those nations will look for another country, and another political philosophy, to partner with. Either of those developments would be very dangerous for Japan and a serious threat to the prosperity and stability of the region. The world is watching to see how committed the U.S. and Japan are to regional security and to a 50-year old Alliance. This is a national security issue for the Asia-Pacific region, not a local issue. For me, as the Commander of Marine Forces Pacific, it is an operational issue. For the U.S. and Japan it is a vital regional stability issue - the greater good of many nations. It is an Alliance issue. An economic prosperity issue. It is about our collective futures in the most important region on earth. It is not just about a local basing issue. People ask me occasionally if I am worried about some of the current discussions in Japan. I am not. I know that two nations who share our core values will find a way to sustain 10,000 U.S. Marines on Okinawa with the capabilities they require, while enabling the residents there more fully to benefit from the peace and prosperity that all of us have worked so hard for. I know indeed I am convinced - that one of the greatest and most important Alliances in history will be even stronger in years to come than it is today, and that the U.S.-Japan Alliance will continue to be the cornerstone of our security policy in Asia and beyond. Thank you.
Okinawa military base is critical to East Asian security Axe 6/28 (David Axe,David Axe is an independent military correspondent based in South Carolina. He has reported from Iraq, Afghanistan,
East Timor, Lebanon, Somalia, Chad and other conflict zones. Axe is the author of the graphic novels WAR FIX and WAR IS BORING and the nonfiction books ARMY 101 and FROM A TO B. He blogs at www.warisboring.com., why allies need US Base, http://thediplomat.com/author/david/) A gray US Air Force tanker banks sharply toward the runway, its four turbofans screaming as it flares for landing. As its tires hit the runway they give off a bluish smoke through which the outline of a US Navy maritime patrol plane taxiing on the tarmac becomes visible.Its the
patrol planes turn now, and it accelerates, its propellers grinding the air, to take its place in a long line of aircraft waiting to take off from the Kadena Air Base, the largest part of what is arguably the most vital military complex in the Pacific for the United States and its closest regional allies.An explosive political drama that reached its climax earlier this month underscored the importance of Kadena and the surrounding bases. On June 2, Japanese Prime
Minister Yukio Hatoyama stepped down after weeks of tumbling public support for his administration. The reasonthe ongoing uncertainty over the future of US forces in Japan.During the general election campaign last year, Hatoyama had vowed to reconsider a 2006 deal over the relocation of US Marines from the Futenma Air Station, a smaller base just south of Kadena. After strongly hinting that he would abandon the 2006 deal, Hatoyama announced in late May his continued support for the existing agreement reached under the previous Liberal Democratic Party administration.Under this agreement, the Marines would eventually relocate their airstrip to a less-populated part of the island prefecture. But many Okinawans oppose any US military presence there at all. US basesand Futenma, especiallyhave generally been unpopular among the now largely pacifist Japanese public, particularly Okinawans. In 1995, three US servicemen from Futenma abducted and raped a local schoolgirl, further stoking opposition to the base. And aircraft crashes are another safety concern, especially as Kadena and Futenma have between them several hundred US military aircraft permanently based at facilities surrounded by densely populated residential neighbourhoods.The decision to stick with the 2006 deal represented the belated recognition on Hatoyamas part that
there was no other good option for the strategically-vital Marine presence and for the US-Japanese alliance in general, according to Michael Auslin, an Asia expert with the American Enterprise Institute. In that context, the prime
ministers vague election promise to Okinawan base-detractors was a miscalculation.So, will the Futenma dispute also prove the undoing of Hatoyamas successor, Naoto Kan, who has so far stayed quiet on the base issue? If anything, the crisis over Futenma underscored
the lasting, even growing, importance of US military facilities in Okinawanot only for the United States, but also for Japan and other US allies. As Chinas economic and military rise continues and tensions mount over North Koreas nuclear programme and its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship, the US and its Asian allies need Okinawa more than ever.The US, South Korea and Australia have been very vocal to Japan, saying, Hey, be careful what youre doing, Sheila Smith, an analyst with the Council on Foreign Relations, says. This isnt a good moment to be taking large numbers of US forces out of Japan.Aside from US forces in South Korea (which are exclusively focused on the North Korean land threat) there are just two significant concentrations of US troops in East Asia: in Okinawa and on the Pacific island of Guam. Okinawa lies just an hours flight time from both the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan; Guam, by contrast, is 1000 miles from any potential theatre of war.It may be easier for us to be there [in Guam],
12
Card Continued
as far as the diplomatic issue is concerned, says Air Force spokesman John Monroe. But if were in Guam, were out of the fight due to the distance. For combat forces to be capable of reacting quickly to the most likely crises, Okinawa is the only realistic option.Without its 2 Okinawan air bases and their 3 roughly 10,000-foot runways, the US military and by extension, US allieswould depend almost entirely on a handful of US aircraft carriers for bringing to bear aerial firepower in East Asia. That might be a realistic option, except that China has lately deployed several new classes of anti-ship weaponry specifically meant for sinking US carriers, including the widely-feared DF-21 ballistic missile and a flotilla of stealthy fast-attack vessels.In recognition of Okinawas growing importance, the Pentagon has spent billions of dollars in the past decade modernizing forces and facilities on the island. The US Army deployed Patriot air-defence missiles capable of shooting down enemy aircraft as well as ballistic missiles, a favourite weapon of both China and North Korea. Kadena got extensive new storage bunkers for bombs, missiles and spare parts, allowing the base to support potentially hundreds of aircraft flown in from the United States during an emergency. In 2007, the US Air Force began stationing Global Hawk long-range spy drones and F-22 Raptor stealth fighters at Kadena.The Raptors represent perhaps the greatest improvement. Indeed, in the minds of US planners, in many ways Okinawas most important function is to support the F-22s. In a 2009 study examining a simulated air war pitting the United States and Taiwan against China, the California-based think-tank RAND concluded that a wing of F-22s could shoot down 27 Chinese fighters for every Raptor lost in the air.F-22s flying from Okinawa could also clear the way for air strikes on ground targets in China or North Korea, according to Lieutenant Colonel Wade Tolliver, commander of the 27th Fighter Squadron, an F-22 unit based in Virginia that routinely sends Raptors to Kadena. There are a lot of countries out there that have developed highly integrated air-defence systems, Tolliver says. What we need to do is take some of our assets that have special capabilitiesand we need to roll back those integrated air defence systems so we can bring in our joint forces. The bases ability to host F-22s and follow-on aircraft is probably the most important thing about Kadena, Monroe says. Because of our capability to stage forces out of herethis is a huge runwaywe do believe we have unmatched air power.All this planning for air wars with China and North Korea doesnt mean that planners in the United States, Japan or anywhere else believe such conflict is inevitable. Pyongyang remains predictable only in its volatility, but Washington, Tokyo and Beijing are all working hard to forge peaceful and lasting ties. The strategic uncertainty is in the margins. Theres no question you want to engage China, but (we should) hedge against an uncertain future, Nicholas Szechenyi of the Center for Strategic and International Studies says.Its as a hedge that Okinawa remains indispensable to the US and its alliesso much so that the shared international need for the islands bases must trump any Japanese domestic political calculations. Hatoyama ignored that truth at the expense of his job. The
question now is will Kan?
13
Bases Good- Deterrence (1/2)

Bases in Okinawa key for our pacific deterrence policy The Japan Times 2/18 (Top marine says okinawa bases are vital, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20100218a3.html,
Feb 18, 2010) The U.S. bases in Okinawa are strategically necessary and marines are prepared to die to protect Japan, the commander of the U.S. Marine Corps of the Pacific said Wednesday in Tokyo.During a speech hosted by the Tokyo American Center in Minato Ward, Lt. Gen. Keith Stalder said the U.S. understands that the alliance is not symmetrical, as Japan bears no responsibility to protect the United States, but it does shoulder the obligation of providing bases to U.S. forces."I want to make this clear all of the marines standing in this room, all of my marines on Okinawa are willing to die if necessary for the security of Japan," Stalder said. "That is our role in the alliance. Japan does not have a reciprocal obligation to defend the United States, but it absolutely must provide the bases and training that U.S. forces need."Marking the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, top Japanese and U.S. officials have been engaged in a series of discussions to deepen bilateral ties. But at the same time, the Hatoyama administration's decision to review the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from Ginowan, Okinawa, has strained relations.Foreign governments are watching to see whether the United States-Japan
alliance is strong enough to find a solution to the current issues again and ensure that the awesome deterring power of the U.S. Marine Corps remains based on Okinawa for decades to come," Stalder said. "Potential enemies of Japan and the U.S. are watching . . . because if (the alliance) can be weakened today, perhaps it can be weakened further tomorrow."Japan agreed with the U.S. in 2006 to move the Futenma aircraft operations, mainly chopper, to Camp Schwab in farther north on Okinawa Island, in the Henoko district of Nago.Stalder declined comment on alternative plans that have been floated, including moving Futenma's operations to Guam, but he stressed the importance of the bases in Okinawa and said marine helicopters must remain close to the ground forces."In order to fulfill our alliance responsibilities to defend Japan, the Marine Corps, the expeditionary, rapidly deployable branch of the U.S. military and the only forward-deployed and available U.S. ground force between Hawaii and India, must be based on Okinawa and must have its helicopters near its ground forces," he said.
American presence is critical to deter and defeat all Asian threats Stadler, 2/17( Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo
American Center) If there is one thing history has taught me, it's how un-proficient we are at predicting what the "next big threat" will be. Since we are proven to be so bad at predicting future threats, we must strive to be adaptive and ready for a wide variety of scenarios .How do we maintain
security in an unpredictable world? We make it clear that we will protect our and our allies' interests. Our capabilities and readiness must be absolutely unmistakable. If potential troublemakers are convinced the price to pay for misbehavior will be high, perhaps the threats will never develop in the first place.How do we know how many antagonists in this region decided not to get too far out of line because they were worried about how the U.S., based nearby in Japan, would respond? The number, I suspect, is significant. Threats exist, and our Alliance exists to deter and defeat the threats. How do we do that? Well, the U.S. military does it by being present, capable, and well intentioned. Present means we are in the neighborhood, day-in and day-out. We know our way around, we know the local customs, we have friends in the local militaries, and we train for local conditions. That's being present.As far as capable, that means that we can do what we need to do. We have the right people, equipment, and transportation to do our jobs, and everyone, especially the bad guys, knows it.And well intentioned means that we will be fair. The United States military is an impartial presence in the area, forming relationships with dozens of countries, promising to be there when we're needed, bringing some old enemies and competitors closer together.
The United States military has no interest in Asia beyond encouraging security. That makes us powerful, because our multitude of bilateral relationships forms an equilibrium that allows the region to move forward .But what happens if you disturb that equilibrium? What happens if people think you are less present than you once were, or less capable, or less willing? The equilibrium could lose balance, countries
could look for other ways to feel secure, and the loser, first and foremost, would be Japan, the richest country in Asia.
14
Bases Good- Deterrence (2/2)

Ground Forces are key to deter Stadler, 2/17 ( Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo
American Center)
There are some in Japan who say that the Navy that is based here is enough of a deterrent force. As someone who has served deployments on aircraft carriers, let me say that the technology at the disposal of the U.S. Navy is both sophisticated and devastating to adversaries.Our outstanding sailors and naval aviators are a key component of deterrence in this region, but they are limited by what they can accomplish from the sea and using their aircraft.And then there is the Air Force. Some of you know, I'm a fighter pilot. I flew F-4s and F-18s for most of my career, and I still take a helicopter up once in a while. The capabilities of our aircraft are stunning. The combat power of the U.S. Air Force, particularly when it combines efforts with the Japan Air Self Defense Force, is breathtaking. And yet, if we have learned nothing else over the last 50 years, it is that air power and sea power alone are inadequate to fight wars, and are inadequate as deterrents. In the days immediately following the attack on the World Trade Center, operations in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban were of necessity conducted exclusively with air power. Air power was able to destroy all Taliban and Al Qaeda targets, but it had no effect on the willingness of the enemy to discontinue fighting. U.S. ground forces were required to defeat the Taliban government. And regardless of what you may think about the Iraq conflict, and I realize there are different opinions in this room, certainly a lesson from Iraq is the limits of air and sea power. Only ground forces were able to defeat Saddam Hussein's forces in Iraq. Ladies and gentlemen,
in the Asia Pacific, U.S. ground forces are Marines. The U.S. army maintains soldiers in the Republic of Korea, but those soldiers are not expeditionary for the purpose of responding to emergencies elsewhere. They are largely dedicated to remaining on the Korean Peninsula in support of the combined defense. This means the only deployable U.S. ground forces between Hawaii and India are
the U.S. Marines on Okinawa. Those are the ground forces assigned to defend Japan and to maintain security in East Asia. The notion that "we like the Alliance but we don't need or want ground forces" won't work.It is impossible to deter, defend and defeat without the ability to deploy ground forces rapidly in times of crisis. The U.S. cannot meet its Alliance obligation to defend Japan and maintain regional peace and security without ground forces equipped with the appropriate capabilities and training. Without expeditionary ground forces, the deterrent power of our Alliance would be greatly weakened.
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Bases Good- Disaster Relief

U.S. Military Base in Okinawa critical for disaster relief saving hundreds of thousands of lives The Japan Times 2/10 (Top marine says okinawa bases are vital, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20100218a3.html, Feb 18,
2010)
Stalder also pointed out that the presence of U.S. forces in Okinawa is about more than deterrence because it also involves disaster relief missions. He estimated hundreds of thousands of lives were saved in the last 50 years because of the U.S. bases in Okinawa."Okinawa is in the center of an earthquake-cyclone region. There is probably nowhere better in the world than which to dispatch marines to natural disasters," he said. "Hours matter during such tragedies. Time saved means lives spared in the aftermath of these terrible events."
American Forces In Okinawa Critical for Disaster Relief Stadler, 2/17( Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific,
American Center)
Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo
One more thing about ground forces. Their mission is not just about conflicts. Look at Haiti today. Think of the response when Mount Pinatubo blew up in the Philippines, or the efforts after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Recall responses to cyclones in Bangladesh and Burma. Central to all these humanitarian relief efforts was the Marine Corps. May I interject here how proud the Marine Corps is to be operating with the Japan Self Defense Force in Haiti at this very moment. That your government was willing to send your forces half way around the world
to help people in urgent need sends a powerful message about the values of the people of Japan.Every time the Third Marine Expeditionary Force deploys on a humanitarian assistance mission, we are assisted by the citizens of Okinawa. Our bases in Okinawa make these
life-saving missions possible, and have resulted in perhaps hundreds of thousands of lives being saved in the last fifty years. Geography matters. Okinawa is in the center of an earthquake and cyclone region. There is probably nowhere better in the world from which to dispatch Marines to natural disasters. Hours matter during such tragedies. Timed saved means lives spared in the aftermath of these terrible events. Humanitarian assistance is also a key means of supporting stability. Disaster relief missions often involve assisting poorer governments lacking the capacity or capability to manage a crisis. By helping those governments meet needs and rebuild lives, we contribute to political stability that sustains economic growth throughout the wider region.Looking to the next 50 years of our Alliance, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief is an area where the U.S. and Japan have great potential to unite our capabilities and make a difference in the lives of millions of people, as we strengthen peace and stability. Humanitarian assistance is important because it enhances political stability, reinforces to the world our fundamental values, and provides an answer to our enemies who lie about our intentions. But it also reinforces deterrence.
16
Bases Good- Asian Peace

American Military presence critical to Asian peace prosperity Stadler, 2/17 ( Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo
American Center) And what made the Asian economic miracle possible? I submit that the single most important contributor to the Asian transformation of the last 50 years was peace. With the exception of the Vietnam conflict and isolated - though truly tragic - outbreaks of localized violence, the last 50 years have seen unprecedented levels of peace and security in East Asia. The knowledge that the United States was present in Asia, and that the U.S., through its security Alliance with Japan, was committed to maintaining stability in the region, allowed East Asian countries, including Japan, to focus their national wealth and human capital on development, rather than on defense. Make no
mistake. The prosperity that Asia knows today would not have been possible without the calm security environment encouraged by our Alliance. As I said, I am in Tokyo this week first and foremost to thank Japan. But I am also here, as I am every few months, to have sobering conversations with your country's military and civilian leaders. While the threats to the peace and security of East Asia today are in some ways different from those of 1960, they are still profound. Let us start with North Korea. I need not explain to a Japanese audience why and how North Korea is a threat. That so many of your citizens have been imperiled or harmed by North Korea's predatory practices over several decades is evidence enough of the dangerous behavior of that country. North Korea maintains one of the world's largest armies, it is actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and its missile program is a real danger to Japan.
17
Bases Good- North Korea Deterrence

Okinawa is critical to deter North Korea Stadler, 2/17 ( Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo
American Center) While the threats to the peace and security of East Asia today are in some ways different from those of 1960, they are still profound. Let us start with North Korea. I need not explain to a Japanese audience why and how North Korea is a threat. That so many of your citizens have been imperiled or harmed by North Korea's predatory practices over several decades is evidence enough of the dangerous behavior of that country. North Korea maintains one of the world's largest armies, it is actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and its missile program is a real danger to Japan.When you put North Korea's provocative behavior together with its missiles, and then realize
Pyongyang says it is capable of producing nuclear devices, the sobering reality of the present day security situation is quite clear. As you know, the United States bases about 28,500 military personnel in the Republic of Korea as a deterrent to cross border attacks and to train with the Korean military.Were there ever a security emergency in the area, or an outbreak of full scale hostilities, the U.S. and other countries would augment those forces to provide support and specialized capabilities.I should point out here that one of Third Marine Expeditionary Force's roles would be to help ensure the security of civilians in the Republic of Korea, including the large number of Japanese citizens there.Some recent press stories in the U.S. claim that the Marines are on Okinawa primarily to prepare to fight in Korea. That assertion is of course untrue. Okinawa Marines train to respond to dozens of different emergencies and contingencies.Nevertheless, the fact is that the presence of quickly deployable, superbly trained and equipped, highly mobile Marines on Okinawa is a strong deterrent to the North Korean regime. That deterrence benefits two countries more than any other - the Republic of Korea, and Japan.
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Bases Good- Japanese Soft Power

Our presence in Japan is key to Japanese softpower Stadler, 2/17 Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo
American Center)
It is our presence here that creates the equilibrium that has served Asia so well. It is our presence here that balances influences from competitors and potential adversaries. And it is our presence here that has allowed Japan to focus its resources on diplomatic and economic power - what we sometimes call soft power - and to dedicate over 99% of its Gross Domestic Product to non-defense expenditures.Which brings us to the foundation of our Alliance, the core of the agreement between our two countries. When we strip all the other, very important cooperative efforts away, the bedrock of our Alliance is quite basic: Our Treaty commitment to Japan means that whenever a soldier, marine, sailor, or airman swears an oath to support and defend our Constitution of the United States, that person takes on the obligation to defend Japan if it is ever attacked. Our service members are prepared to risk their lives in defense of Japan. Unlike in NATO, Japan does not have a reciprocal obligation to defend the United States. The United States fully understands and accepts this asymmetry, but it is important to remind ourselves that it exists. In return for U.S. defense guarantees, Japan provides bases, opportunities to train, and, in more recent times, financial support.
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Bases Good- Power Projection

US presence in Okinawa critical to power projection capabilities Klinger 09 (Bruce Klinger, Bruce Klingner is the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies
Center, he was the selected as Chief of CIA's Korea Branch which provided analytic reports on military developments during the nuclear crisis with North Korea. From 1996-2001, Klingner was the Deputy Chief for Korea in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence where he was responsible for analyzing Korean political, military, economic and leadership issues for the president and other senior policymakers., U.S. Should Stay Firm on Implementation of Okinawa Force Realignment, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/us-should-stay-firm-on-implementationof-okinawa-force-realignment; december 16 2009)
Okinawa's strategic location contributes to potent U.S. deterrent and power projection capabilities as well as enabling rapid and flexible contingency response, including to natural disasters in Asia. Marine ground units on Okinawa can utilize Futenma airlift to deploy quickly to amphibious assault and landing ships stationed at the nearby U.S. Naval Base at Sasebo, Nagasaki Prefecture. Okinawa has four long runways: two at Kadena Air Base, one at
Futenma, and one at Naha civilian airfield. The Futenma runway would likely be eliminated after return to Okinawa control to enable further civilian urban expansion. The planned FRF would compensate by building two new (albeit shorter) runways at Camp Schwab. However, if
the Futenma unit redeployed to Guam instead, no new runway on Okinawa would be built. Japan would have thus lost a strategic national security asset, which includes the capability to augment U.S. or Japanese forces during a crisis in the region. Not having runways at Futenma or Schwab would be like sinking one's own aircraft carrier, putting further strain on the two runways at Kadena. Redeploying U.S. forces from Japan and Okinawa to Guam would reduce alliance deterrent and combat capabilities. Guam is 1,400 miles, a three-hour flight, and multiple refueling operations farther from potential conflict zones. Furthermore, moving fixed-wing aircraft to Guam would drastically reduce the number of combat aircraft sorties that U.S. forces could conduct during crises with North Korea or China, while exponentially increasing refueling and logistic requirements.
20
Bases Good- China Relations

Military Presence in Okinawa is key to china relations Bush 3/10 (Ricahrd C. Bush III, Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2010/0310_japan_politics_bush.aspx)
Studies,
Okinawa and Security in Easy Asia,
The most sensible strategyfor both the U.S. and Japanis to try to shape Chinas intentions over time so that they move in a benign direction; so that it has more to gain from cooperation than a challenge. This has been the U.S. and Japans strategy since the early 1970s. The strategy has a good foundation in economic interdependence. However, it is easier said than done and is one of the biggest challenges of this century. The strategy requires at least two elements: engaging and incorporating China as much as possible, and maintaining the strength and willingness to define limits. This combination of elements is important because engagement without strength would lead China to exploit our good will while strength without engagement would lead China to suspect that our intentions are not benign. If engagement-plus-strength is the proper strategy for the U.S. and Japan each to cope with a rising China, it only makes sense that Japan and the United States will be more effective if they work together, complementing each others respective abilities. The strength side of this equation almost requires Japan to rely on the alliance since history suggests that it will not build up sufficiently on its own. An important part of strength is positioning your power in the right places. That is why forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan has always been important. That is why our presence on Okinawa is important.
Okinawa key to deterring China from taking taiwan Bush 3/10 (Ricahrd C. Bush III, Director, Center for Northeast Asian
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2010/0310_japan_politics_bush.aspx)
Policy Studies,
Okinawa and Security in Easy Asia,
Taiwan also has concerns. The Marines on Okinawa, plus the U.S. air force, serve to strengthen deterrence in the event of aggression by China against Taiwan. China will be less likely to mount an attack because the U.S. has both ground troops and an air base on Okinawa. If China attacked U.S. installations on Okinawa, that almost ensures a serious conflict. The bases act as a tripwire.
21
Location Key (1/2)

The base must remain in Okinawa-geography Reuters 2/18 (Top U.S. Pacific Marine says base must be in okinawa, Feb 11 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61I12U20100219) TOKYO (Reuters) - The top U.S. Marine in the
Pacific said on Friday that his forces needed to be based on the southern island of Okinawa for strategic reasons, as Tokyo struggles to resolve a dispute with Washington over relocating a base. The relocation of the Futenma Marine base on Okinawa is at the center of a feud between Washington and Tokyo that is
eroding support for Japan's governing Democratic Party and setting its coalition partners at odds ahead of an election expected in July.
Okinawa is in the perfect place in the region," said Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, when asked about suggestions that the base be moved to Guam or the tiny island of Tinian."It's literally a day away from almost anything that can occur in the region," he said during a visit to Tokyo.Stalder underscored the U.S. view that a 2006 agreement between the two governments to shift the Futenma base to a more remote area of Okinawa as part of a realignment that involves moving 8,000 Marines to Guam was the most desirable option. But he said shifting all
Japan-based Marines elsewhere would not be feasible."The notion that you can have an alliance and deter and respond with only sea and air forces is a misperception that I want to dispel," he said. "You've got to have ground forces." Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama said before toppling a long-ruling conservative party in a general election last year that the base should be moved out of the region, sparking a row that threatened to undermine ties with the United States.The Democratic Party needs to win a majority in the upper house poll to end its reliance on an awkward coalition with two smaller parties. A poor result could even result in policy gridlock.Media polls show concern about Hatoyama's handling of Japan's relationship with its most important ally is damaging government support. Japanese media said on Friday the government had sounded out U.S. officials about a proposal to put a new helipad inside an existing base, but one of the Democrats' tiny allies, the Social Democratic Party, said it would be unacceptable to local people.
Okinawa is in a critical location-key to readiness Kapoor 6/10 (Rajesh Kapoor, Dr. Rajesh Kapoor is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, the relevance
of Okinawa,http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheStrategicRelevanceofOkinawa_rkapoor_100610)
In the post-Occupation period, US troops and military bases in Japan have been instrumental in ensuring peace and stability within Japan as well as in East Asia. The geo-strategic location of Okinawa makes it the preferred site for hosting US military bases both in terms of securing Japan as well as for US force projection in the Far East. Okinawas distance from the rest of Japan and from other countries of East Asia makes it an ideal location to host military bases and thus extend US military outreach considerably. In the case of an eventuality, it is easier for the US marines, who act as first responders to exigencies, to take appropriate action well before the rest of Japan is affected. In addition, Japan cannot ignore the potential threat it faces from its nuclear neighbours including China, North Korea and Russia. The Russian and Chinese threats, as of now, can be ruled out. However, the North Korean threat is very much real and Japan has been building up its Ballistic Missile Defence system in collaboration with the US to cater for it.Okinawa Prefecture includes a chain of hundreds of small islands. The midpoint of this chain is almost equidistance from Taiwan and Japans Kyushu Island. During the Vietnam War, the USFJ military bases particularly in Okinawa were among the most important strategic and logistic bases. In addition, strategists in Japan note that despite the countrys three non-nuclear principles, some bases in Okinawa were used for stockpiling nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Even today, US nuclear-armed submarines and destroyers operate in the vicinity of Japan, facilitated by a secret deal between the governments of the US and Japan. Moreover, having military bases in Japan also helps the US to have easy access to the strategically important five seas the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Japan Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
22
Location Key (2/2)

Okinawa bases critical due to their geographical location Stadler, 2/17 (Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo
American Center) Ladies and gentlemen, perhaps this is a good place for me to say a few things about Okinawa, because
our bases there are absolutely vital to this Alliance and to Japan's national security. Okinawa is very important because, as I said earlier, geography matters. If you want to know why the Marine Corps maintains forces on Okinawa, look at a map. Transit time by sea from Okinawa to mainland Japan is one-to-two days, to Korea, two days, to the South China Sea, three days, and to the Strait of Malacca, five days. From California, transit time to any of those locations is 21 days or more. When the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit is aboard ship near Okinawa, on any given day there is a 100% chance they are about a day's transit time to either a U.S. defense Treaty ally, a threat to regional stability, or a perennial disaster relief location. That's why, in order to fulfill our Alliance responsibilities to defend Japan, the Marine Corps - the expeditionary, rapidly deployable branch of the U.S. military and the only forward deployed and available U.S. ground force between Hawaii and India - must be based on Okinawa and must have its helicopters near its ground and logistics forces. Ladies and gentlemen: Other nations are watching. Foreign
governments are watching to see whether the United States-Japan Alliance is strong enough to find a solution to the current issues at hand and ensure that the awesome deterrent power of the U.S. Marine Corps remains based on Okinawa for decades to come.
23
***Heg Advantage***
24
1NC Hegemony Bad Advantage 1/4

U.S. presence in Okinawa is key to Asian stability Hayes 01 (Declan-, Prof of International Business at Sophia University (Tokyo, Japan), Japan: The Toothless Tiger, P. 7-11)
Currently, only the American bases in Okinawa maintain the political tranquility of the South China Sea, and even they are no panacea. Roughly 20,000 of the 29,000 troops on Okinawa are Marines attached to the Seventh Fleet, and they are routinely deployed anywhere in the Seventh Fleet's sprawling operating areas of the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Okinawa is, in other words, merely a convenient parking lot; the fact that it is on Japanese soil is secondary to its main policing mission. These U S. Marines have nothing to do with the defense of Okinawa-- or the rest of Japan for that matter. Recent revelations of U.S. plans to blast the island and its inhabitants to smithereens in the event of a Soviet attack have not endeared U.S. forces to the locals who remember how the Japanese Imperial Army wantonly sacrificed them as literal cannon fodder in their battles against the Americans in 1945. On the positive side, the bases do show Okinawa's continuing strategic importance, the United States did not want the island falling into enemy hands. Cold consolation to the Okinawans, but consolation nonetheless. The fact is that Okinawas strategic position gives it immense value to the U nited
States and her allies, a value that the opponents of the American alliance downplay, when they don't dismiss it out of
Okinawa remains the linchpin of American military power in the Asian arena. Okinawa is Americas front line in the South China Sea. The joint American and Japanese forces stationed there prevent China's navy from asserting itself in the South China Sea. Okinawa is the fallback position if America and her allies are ever again pushed off the Kuwait peninsula. Okinawa is the base from which American reinforcements will be rushed to Taiwan in a doomsday situation. Okinawa keeps the sea lanes open; it preserves the status quo the Pax Americana that has been so good to Japan. And therein lies the rub. It keeps a non-Asian power, the United States, at the helm of Asia and therefore keeps a major Asian nation, China, down. Author continues Although this makes good housekeeping sense in Washington, it spells strategic disaster Tokyo. Just as America's withdrawal from Subic Bay created a vacuum that China quickly filled, so also will the abandonment of Okinawa create another, bigger vacuum that China will also fill. China's leaders are using nationalistic rhetoric to keep their vast regime together, and any diminution of the American forces in Okinawa will only encourage China to increase its war of words. Because Japan has been as quiet as a mouse for the last fifty years, it is ill equipped to engage in the propaganda wars that will ensue when the Seventh Fleet weighs anchor- Japan will wake up to find Uncle Sam's navy gone back to Hawaii and her own neighbor descending into anarchy. And Japan will be helpless to remedy the situation. China is not the only source of concern. Far from it! Asia is awash with flash points that the United States, Japan, and their allies must continue to monitor. These include the four Kurile Islands, occupied by Russia since 1945 and claimed by Japan; North Korea, still isolated, still armed, and still extremely dangerous; the Diaoyo/Senkaku Islands, subject to rival claims by Japan, China, and Taiwan; Taiwan itself, under almost continuous military threat from China; Myanmar, controlled by an oppressive military junta Cambodia, emerging from decades of strife and mayhem and always facing the prospect of war with Vietnam; the Spratly Islands, variously claimed by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei; Mindanao, where Muslim insurgents continue to undermine the government of the Philippines; East Timor, the former Portuguese territory annexed by Indonesia in 1975 and only now emerging from an Indonesian-inspired genocide campaign; Indonesia itself, Asia's Yugoslavia, the world's must populous Muslim nation, awash with ethnic and sectarian strife; Kashmir, the epicenter of a nuclear roulette game between India and Pakistan; and Bougainville, fighting for independence from Papua New Guinea. And then, of course, there is the chaos of Russia, the former "evil empire" that continues to spiral out of control. This is a long and incendiary list, needing only a spark to create mayhem. These flash points will, sooner or later, blow tip into more hot wars. This is all the more true because Asia is strikingly underinstitutionalized. Unlike Europe, which is rife with flash points of its own, Asia has no real working equivalents of NATO and the European Union to iron out the area's many differences. Quite the contrary, in fact. The end of the Cold War has ignited an arms race in Asia and witnessed the diffusion of high-tech military capabilities throughout the region. Therefore, future wars in Asia will be very bloody and very costly to all involved. A more hard-line regime in Vietnam could, for example, decide to formally colonize much of Cambodia. Already, large numbers of Vietnamese civilians are encroaching into Cambodia in much the same way that Chinese civilians are colonizing the sparsely populated Russian Far East. Because the Cambodian government is currently friendly with Hanoi, this has not yet caused much bloodshed. However, conflicts between these two old adversaries will almost certainly call a third player into the game. That third player China, which sees Vietnam as a major threat and which desperately wants to break the growing working alliance between Taipei and Hanoi. If India or any of Chinas other potential enemies decided to join in, the conflict would quickly spread. The same would be true China were to be drawn into a major war between India and Pakistan. Russia, India, China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and most of Asias other key players are held together as national entities only by the slimmest of threads. It would not take much to unravel
hand.
25

those threads. Indonesia, East Timor, Kashmir, and Chechnya have shown the violence easy to dismiss such scenarios out of hand, but we ignore these undercurrents at our peril.

the region is capable of. It is

Military presence in Japan key to hegemony and counterbalancing China Xinbo, IR Professor at the Center for American Studies, 06 (Wu, Winter, The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.Japanese Alliance Washington Quarterly, Vol 29 No 1, p 119-130) POLARIZING THE REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE Chinese analysts believe that it has been a key objective to maintain primacy in regional security since the Cold War years. To that end, Washington not
U.S. policy only retains a strong forward deployment but also a vibrant hub-and-spoke alliance system, of which the U.S.-Japanese alliance is the core. In the postCold War era, Japan has become an even more valuable piece of the U.S. regional security strategy: it helps consolidate U.S. preponderance and balance Chinas growing power. As Japan becomes more actively involved in the U.S. regional security strategy, enhanced U.S.-Japanese security ties will contribute to the primary U.S. strategic position in East Asia and the western Pacific region, amplifying U.S. clout on regional political, economic, and security affairs. As the alliance also intends to serve as the backbone of a regional security structure, the emphasis
placed on it reflects an attempt to enhance the U.S.-Japanese condominium of regional security, a development that will both undermine Chinas influence in the region and run the risk of returning the region to a bipolar structure characterized by strategic competition, antagonism, and even confrontation. A bipolar regional order would be a nightmare scenario, at least for China and presumably for the entire region, including the United States and Japan.
26

Hegemony is key to prevent multiple scenarios for nuclear war Kagan, 07 Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall
Fund, (Robert, July 19, End of Dreams, Return of History Real Clear Politics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_ return_of_histor.html) The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers
no guarantee against major conflict among the world 's great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the U nited States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene -- even if it remained the world's most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to
imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back
and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more "even-handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East , obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has
raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn 't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance
in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
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Withdraw backfires magnifing all their impacts Thayer, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri
State University, 06 (Bradley, November/December, In Defense of Primacy The National Interest, lexis) Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world , imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed,
retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.
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Withdrawal Kills Hegemony

Okinawa is key to US global power projection Kazuhisa 99 (Ogawa, Analyst of International Ptx, Japan Quarterly, P. 22)
No country in the littorals of the Pacific and Indian Oceans even begins to approach Japan in meeting conditions for a power-projection platform. One year after Japan notifies the United States of its intention to terminate the alliance, the United States would lose leverage and with it, most of its capability to project military power over half the world. Short of power-projection capability, the United States would be hard-pressed to remain the worlds sole superpower. Despite its colossal economy, diversified nuclear arsenal and qualitative advantage in conventional forces, the United States would be just one among several great powers, Americas power differential with respect to China, Russia, and other major powers would be much smaller. This has been generally acknowledged by U.S. governmental policy advisers in semiofficial meetings. Then, by the way of reports, I convinced the Japanese government leaders of the significance of the Americans agreement.
Military presence in Japan key to counterbalance China Xinbo, IR Professor at the Center for American Studies, 06 (Wu, Winter, The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.Japanese Alliance Washington Quarterly, Vol 29 No 1, p 119-130) Although the U.S. political elite generally agree on the desirability of expanding U.S.-Japanese security ties, two different schools of thought exist in the United States regarding the function of the alliance vis--vis China. One suggests that the alliance should play an instrumental role in developing a security arrangement among the United States, Japan, and China. As former deputy assistant secretary of defense Kurt Campbell noted, It is hard to imagine a continuing future of peace and stability in Asia unless these three powers can negotiate a kind of strategic modus operandi. 20 Some in this camp argue that the broader goal of the alliance is to integrate China and Russia into a regional security order without sacrificing the security of Japan, South Ko- rea, and the United States.21 No matter what the ultimate formula of the security calculus looks like, this line of thinking seeks to use the alliance to engage and integrate China. The other school emphasizes
constraining and containing China. Believing that a rising China is doomed to be the United States strategic competitor and the Taiwan Strait to be the place where the United States could become enmeshed in a major war in Asia, adherents of this school argue that a strengthened U.S.-Japanese alliance, including an expanded Japanese role, will best serve the purpose of containing a stronger China and deterring China on the Taiwan issue.22
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A2: Hegemony Unsustainable

Hegemony is sustainable if the U.S. holds onto its allies Kagan Sr. Assoc. Carnegie 10-30-08 (Robert-, Washington Post, Still No. 1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/10/30/ST2008103002048 .html) One hopes that whoever wins next week will quickly dismiss all this faddish declinism. It seems to come along every 10 years or so. In the late 1970s, the foreign policy establishment was seized with what Cyrus Vance called "the limits of our power." In the late 1980s, the scholar Paul Kennedy predicted the imminent collapse of American power due to "imperial overstretch." In the late 1990s, Samuel P. Huntington warned of American isolation as the "lonely superpower." Now we have the "post-American world." Yet the evidence of American decline is weak. Yes, as Zakaria notes, the world's largest Ferris wheel is in Singapore and the largest casino in Macau. But by more serious measures of power, the United States is not in decline, not even relative to other powers. Its share of the global economy last year was about 21 percent, compared with about 23 percent in 1990, 22 percent in 1980 and 24 percent in 1960.
Although the United States is suffering through a financial crisis, so is every other major economy. If the past is any
guide, the adaptable American economy will be the first to come out of recession and may actually find its position in the global economy enhanced. Meanwhile, American military power is unmatched. While the Chinese and Russian militaries are both growing, America's is growing, too, and continues to outpace them technologically. Russian and Chinese power is growing relative to their neighbors and their regions, which will pose strategic problems, but that is because American allies, especially in Europe, have systematically neglected their defenses. America's image is certainly damaged, as measured by global polls, but the practical effects of this are far from clear. Is America's image today worse than it was in the 1960s and early 1970s, with the Vietnam War; the Watts riots; the My Lai massacre; the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy; and Watergate? Does anyone recall that millions of anti-American protesters took to the streets in Europe in those years? Today, despite the polls, President Bush has managed to restore closer relations with allies in Europe and Asia, and the next president will be able to improve them even further. Realist theorists have consistently predicted for the past two decades that the world would "balance" against the United States. But nations such as India are drawing closer to America, and if any balancing is occurring, it is against China, Russia and Iran. Sober analysts such as Richard Haass acknowledge that the United States remains "the single most powerful entity in the world ." But he warns, "The United States cannot dominate, much less dictate, and expect that others will follow." That is true. But when was it not? Was there ever a time when the United States could dominate, dictate and always have its way? Many declinists imagine a mythical past when the world danced to America's tune. Nostalgia swells for the wondrous American-dominated era after World War II, but between 1945 and 1965 the United States actually suffered one calamity after another. The "loss" of China to communism; the North Korean invasion of South Korea; the Soviet testing of a hydrogen bomb; the stirrings of postcolonial nationalism in Indochina -- each proved a strategic setback of the first order. And each was beyond America's power to control or even to manage successfully. No event in the past decade, with the exception of Sept. 11, can match the scale of damage to America's position in the world. Many would say, "But what about Iraq?" Yet even in the Middle East, where America's image has suffered most as a result of that war, there has been no fundamental strategic realignment . Longtime American allies remain allies, and Iraq, which was once an adversary, is now an ally. Contrast this with the strategic setbacks the United States suffered during the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, the pan-Arab nationalist movement swept out pro-American governments and opened the door to unprecedented Soviet involvement, including a quasi-alliance between Moscow and the Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, as well as with Syria. In 1979, the central pillar of American strategy toppled when the pro-American Shah of Iran was overthrown by Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution. That produced a fundamental shift in the strategic balance from which the United States is still suffering. Nothing similar has occurred as a result of the Iraq war. So perhaps a little perspective is in order. The danger of today's declinism is not that it is true but that the next president will act as if it is. The good news is that I doubt either nominee really will. And I'm confident the American people would take a dim view if he tried.
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A2: Hegemony Collapse Inevitable 1/2

Other nations will always resent whoever is at the top of a unipolar order- this doesnt make multipolarity inevitable but instead only underscores the importance of maintaining U.S. leadership to prevent these rivalries from intensifying Kagan, 07Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall
Fund, (Robert, July 19, End of Dreams, Return of History Real Clear Politics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_ return_of_histor.html) This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world 's powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The return of great powers and great games If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the
reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial.
During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of
nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence . Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives China's foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is pass; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including military power, is a good thing to have and
that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an
aspiring postmodern power -- with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending -- now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea 's nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japan's own national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or "little brother" to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other 's rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a "greater China" and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe's past than its present. But it also looks like Asia's past. Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply seeking integration into the new European
order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO, would not insist on predominant influence over its "near abroad," and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia 's international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security from NATO and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia's complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor in Russia 's relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations. India 's regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership
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in its region. 17 Its nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role
***Card Continued***
in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its "century of humiliation." Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Finally, there is the United States
itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance
prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.
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Troop Presence Good Conflict Escalation

This form of power projection prevents the escalation of all conflict to the nuclear level Walt International Affairs Kennedy 02 (Stephen, Kennedy = Harvards School of Government, Spring American Primacy: Its Prospects
and Pitfalls. Naval War College Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2. pg. 9, Proquest) 8 The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is
likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph
Joffe has termed the American pacifier is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on Americas allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want Uncle Sam to leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it
dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than interesting decades like the 1930s or 1940s.
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Hegemony Good Asian Stability

American security backing cornerstone of Asian stability Alagappa 03 Director East-West Center Washington Asian Security Order p 598-599
And, finally, relative peace and stability in Asia have been aided by the predominant position of the the public goods it provides. Through its alliance network and forward deployment, the United States deters war
United States and on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait, provides security for its allies and friends, keeps the sea lines of communication open, moderates the security dilemma, and generally contributes to stability in the region. American leadership and backing have been crucial to defusing crises and initiating confidence-building and conflict-settlement measures in key regional disputes. The security and stability afforded by the United Statescombined with the access it provides to its market, capital, technology, and educational facilities-have been pillars of prosperity in the region. But the United States does not want to get involved in managing the entire range of security affairs. It looked to Australia and the
ASEAN countries, for example, to shoulder the responsibility in East Timor. Further, Washington is not in a position to write and enforce the rules of the game alone. Recognizing this, the United States seeks to improve its position by reinvigorating its alliance network in the region, by engaging and socializing the major countries (China, Russia, India) outside this network and steering them toward a framework based on its global and regional vision, by supporting friendly regional and subregional multilateral institutions (but only as a supplement to its alliance network) while opposing those it deems hostile, and by relying on the threat of force against countries that challenge its interests and those of its allies and friends.
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Hegemony Good China Modernization

Hegemony curbs Chinese military modernization Nathan And Ross 97 Profs Poly Sci @ Columbia And Boston College The Great Wall And The Empty Fortress, Page 99
Any uncertainty in U.S. policy would be highly destabilizing. Chinese perceive the U.S. naval presence in the western Pacific, the pan alliance, and U.S. troops in South Korea as positive factors in the East Asian balance of power. They understand that the American presence reassures Japanese leaders that they do not have to take unilateral military measures to achieve security. Current U.S. policy contributes to Chinese and Japanese security simultaneously. If America's ability as an Asian power were to diminish, Japan would be likely to expand its military power in order to protect its interests throughout Asia. This would prompt China to augment its military power, contributing to a Sino-Japanese arms race. This scenario could be triggered by American hesitation during a crisis on the Korean peninsula or in the
Taiwan Strait. U.S. military withdrawal following the unification of Korea by South Korea could create perception that the United States was making a strategic retrenchment Northeast Asia. A crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations, arising from politicized economic conflicts or popular resentment in either country at the costs of cooperation, could be the catalyst leading to American military withdrawal from Japan. A
significant decline in the U.S. defense budget in its naval presence in the western Pacific would call into question America's commitment to the regional balance of power. All of these developments would cast doubt on the future of the U.S.Japan alliance and thus affect foreign policies throughout Asia.
Nuclear war Fuerth, 01Shapiro Visiting Fellow at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, (Leon, Autumn, Return
of the Nuclear Debate Washington Quarterly, p 97) As for China, its resources may limit it only to modernization in forms it was already pursuing. In that case,
China may deploy roadmobile ICBMs that are harder to target, and push forward until it has the technology to MIRV these, to maximize the chance of overwhelming a U.S. defensive shield. China is, however, a country whose gross domestic product (GDP) grows at about 8 percent a year and will not lack for means for much longer. Thus, one should not ignore the possibility of a major expansion of Chinese ballistic missile forces. Meanwhile, the United States will have built into the Chinese political system a deepening conviction that the United States is an implacable enemy. The United States will therefore be building momentum toward confrontation that could unleash the nuclear war it was fortunate enough to avoid with the Soviet Union. A final word about our allies. In the end, faced with an atmosphere of inevitability, and the choice of resisting the United States to the point of severely damaging alliances, U.S. friends may swallow their objections and acquiesce. If this happens, however, it will be yet another galling example for the allies of their dependence on the United States and of a style of U.S. leadership they consider both arrogant and reckless. If a new arms race does materialize, the consequences for relations between the United States and its allies will be disastrous.
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Hegemony Good Taiwan War

U.S. force presence prevents a Chinese invasion of Taiwan Nicsch, 00 Asian Affairs Specialist for the Congressional Research Service, 5-25 (Larry, Washington Times)
The limitations of the debate will not be altered so long as it pays no attention to the issue of the adequacy of the U.S. force structure in the Western Pacific to influence the situation in the Taiwan Strait. No future decisions on arms sales to Taiwan will replace two fundamental roles that only U.S. forces in the Western Pacific can play. Only U.S. forces would have the capabilities to respond immediately to a Chinese attack by striking at bases and missiles launch sites that would be the sources of the attack, thus limiting the damage to Taiwan. Equally, and perhaps most important, only U.S. forces would constitute an effective deterrence against
a Chinese decision to use military force. If China continues to escalate its threats and military buildup, Beijing will examine closely the indicators of U.S. intent and military capabilities. Chinese analysts and policy-makers increasingly will link U.S. intent with U.S. military capabilities in the region, especially if, as expected, the United States continues its policy of maintaining ambiguity regarding its commitment to Taiwan's defense.
The impact is nuclear war Chicago Tribune 2-6-96

if the U.S. intervened, Washington could only retard--but not reverse--the defeat of Taiwan, and a Sino-U.S. conflict might lead to a global nuclear holocaust.
The document, circulated among officers, concludes that even
And, The impact outweighs theirs Its the end of civilization Straits Times 6-25- 00
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a fullscale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country
providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And
the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be
similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see
the destruction of civilisation.
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Hegemony Good Sino-Japanese War

Hegemony prevents Sino-Japanese war Mastanduno 3 Prof Government @ Dartmouth Asian Security Order, Page 153-154
One important contribution of the U.S. position in Asia has been to keep potential power rivals at bay. Japan and China are major powers, each with the capacity to become a great military power. They share geographic proximity and an unfortunate history of conflict and mutual recrimination. Events such as the recent conference in Japan reconsidering the 1937 massacre at Nanking, ongoing disputes over the veracity of Japanese textbooks, and recent remarks by Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara to the effect that Japan must be prepared to put down Korean or Chinese "uprisings" reopen old wounds and keep hostilities alive." The Japanese-Chinese relationship has the makings of a classic security dilemma, one reinforced by bad memories and ethnic conflict. As Tom Christensen noted recently: "Although Chinese analysts presently fear U.S. power much more than Japanese power, in terms of national intentions, Chinese analysts view Japan with much less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely found in their attitudes about the United States" (1999: 52). Chinese
attitudes and suspicions obviously factor into Japan's own anxieties about the rising power and intentions of its large neighbor. In this circumstance, U.S. hegemony plays a critical role in keeping the negative aspects of the relationship from spiraling in a dangerous direction. Through its alliance and commitment to defend Japan, the United States makes it possible for Japan to avoid confronting China directly. A direct Japanese approach to China would only
confirm Chinese fears of a revanchist Japan. Although Chinese officials are reluctant to admit it, they recognize that the U.S.-Japan alliance constrains as well as protects Japan. This alliance, combined with the U.S. cooperative approach to China, helps to
reassure China that it need not confront Japan directly. The diplomatic game U.S. officials must play is a delicate one: too strong an alliance with Japan arouses Chinese fears of containment; too strong a partnership with China arouses Japanese fears of abandonment. The difficulty of the diplomatic task reinforces the likelihood that in the absence of a U.S. hegemonic role, Japanese-Chinese geopolitical competition would increase substantially.
Nuclear war Nathan and Ross 97 Profs Poly Sci @ Columbia And Boston College The Great Wall And The Empty Fortress, Page 99
Given the size of these two powers, their potential capabilities, their proximity to each other, and their historical animosity, this would be a costly conflict that could rival the Cold War. Sino-Japanese competition would polarize all of Asia, affecting great power alignments, developments on the Korean peninsula, and the stability of Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia.
A common element in these scenarios is the prospect of escalated conflict between China and Japan.
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***F-22 Advantage***
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1NC F-22 Advantage 1/3

New sales to Japan would be with the F-35 not the F-22 Japan Today 10-4- 09 (http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/us-asks-japan-to-pay-y1-bil-for-fighter-jet-info)
The U.S. government has asked Japan to pay around 1 billion yen for information related to the capabilities of the U.S. F-35 fighter jet, a leading candidate for Japans next-generation mainstay fighter, sources close to Japan-U.S. relations said Saturday. The U.S. side has also told Japan that Washington will provide information on the jets stealth capabilities for evading radar detection once Tokyo makes a decision to purchase the fighter jet, the sources said. Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates are likely to discuss Japans possible selection of the F-35 when they hold talks in Japan on Oct 20. The F-35 is being jointly developed by the United States, Britain, Australia
and other countries, and the 1 billion yen would likely be redistributed depending on the ratio of development costs shouldered by each country. Japan is not participating in the joint development as it conflicts with the countrys principles of banning weapons and armstechnology exports. Japan initially aimed to acquire the U.S. F-22 stealth fighter to replace its aging F-4EJ fighter
fleet, but U.S. law currently prohibits export of the F-22 and the United States has announced a plan to halt production of the jet. Though other models such as the F/A-18 and F-15FX produced by the United States and the Eurofighter, produced by a consortium of European manufacturers, are still being studied, Japan is inclined to select the F-35 as it has the highest performance after the F-22. Japan will start considering allocating purchasing costs for the F-35 in a draft budget for fiscal 2011, while accepting the payment request for the F-35 information, the sources said. One F-35 jet is expected to
cost about 9 billion yen.
No Japanese support for the F-22. Konishi and Dujarric 09 (Weston S., adjunct fellow at the Mansfield Foundation in Washington, D.C., and Robert, heads the
Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies at Temple University, Japan Campus, Hurdles to a Japanese F-22, Japan Times, May 16th http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090516a1.html) There are also numerous hurdles on the Japanese side. Even if Washington were willing to sell the F-22 at a foreclosure price of $140 million per unit, a very small number of planes, say 40, would increase Tokyo's defense
expenditures by $5.6 billion. Operating costs would bring that figure much higher. In order for Tokyo to pay for a viable F22 program, it would either have to cut pet projects, such as its spy satellite system, or shatter the 1-percent-of-GDP cap on defense spending, which most Japanese voters support. Either scenario requires significant political groundwork that has simply not been attempted and seems unlikely to succeed at this point. Furthermore, for several
decades, Japan has opted for the domestic manufacture of its combat aircraft under license from U.S. contractors. Such an option for the F-22 would make it even harder to go ahead with the Raptor. License manufacturing in Japan is a budgetary black hole, where billions can vanish as small production runs and other inefficiencies exponentially raise costs. According to experts, per unit costs under these licensed production programs are twice those of the U.S.-made versions and sometimes even higher. Moreover, a made-in-Japan F-22 would create extra concerns in the U.S. Congress about technology transfers to a country that is considered an economic competitor. In sum, Japan's acquisition of
the F-22 would involve significantly increasing defense spending, rethinking the domestic production of weapons platforms and implementing a more robust legal and enforcement framework to protect classified information. Under current circumstances, these developments are not in the cards. In the past two decades, China has invested heavily in its
military and North Korea in its missile and nuclear arsenals. But Japan's defense budget has been kept flat, or sometimes slightly lowered. Despite its enormous maritime interests, it took Tokyo months to approve the deployment of a few vessels to Somalia under very restrictive rules of engagement. Consequently, it is not realistic to expect the Japanese government and Diet to suddenly summon the willpower to boost military outlays, cut down on wasteful domestic production (which gives jobs and money to voters and campaign contributors), and pass draconian laws to safeguard classified information.
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US military doesnt want F-22 sales Reuters, 9-15- 09 (UPDATE 1-US Air Force chief wary of F-22 export project
http://in.reuters.com/article/rbssIndustryMaterialsUtilitiesNews/idINN155086220090915) NATIONAL HARBOR, Maryland, Sept 15 (Reuters) - A top U.S. Air Force official expressed doubts on Tuesday about diverting service personnel toward developing an export version of Lockheed Martin Corp's (LMT.N: Quote, Profile, Research) F-22 fighter. An export version could keep the production line going even as the Obama administration seeks to end purchases of the advanced combat jet during fiscal 2010, that begins Oct. 1. But Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz said personnel were needed to focus on what he described as higher-priority programs, including a new aerial refueling tanker and a new long-range strike capability. He termed the proposed F-22 for export as more of a commercial issue than a government issue. "I personally don't see it as being the best use of our acquisition talent," Schwartz told reporters after a speech to the annual meeting of the Air Force Association. Schwartz, the service's top uniformed officer, said he would talk to members of Congress and their staff to make sure the Air Force understood their intent. Japan, Israel and Australia have shown interest in buying the supersonic, radar-evading F-22 Raptor, manufactured by Lockheed as its top dogfighter. Foreign F-22 sales have been banned by a 1998 law aimed at protecting the "stealth" technology and other high-tech features said to make the fighter too good for money to buy.
F-22 to Japan risks leaks that collapse competitiveness. Chanlett-Avery, 09 Analyst in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 3/11 (Emma, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to
Japan, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22684.pdf)
The potential for technology transfer touches upon both military and economic concerns. Unlike some countries, Japan does not have a track record of re-exporting technology that it acquires through import. However, an inadvertent leak of U.S. technology or knowledge could also be a threat. The leak of secret data associated with the Aegis weapon system by Japanese military personnel in 2002 is an example of this potential danger.9 Japan is a military ally, but also considered by some to be an economic rival. Many of the F-22 technologies or industrial processes could have commercial application. Some may be concerned that F-22 technology or knowledge could find their way into a myriad of Japanese products, to the competitive detriment of U.S. industry.
Key to the economy Richardson, 04 Former Chief Scientist and current Senior Fellow at the Potamac Institute for Policy Studies, (James, Innovating
science policy: restructuring S&T policy for the twenty-first century, The Review of Policy Research, November 1, Number 6, Volume 21) New technologies have and will continue to have great impact on the size and character of the United States economy. The degree to which S&T impacts the economy is not precisely known, but one study estimates that one-third of measured economic growth in developed countries can be attributed to improvements in knowledge (Cameron, 1996). The Council on Competitiveness suggests that technological innovation and development was the force behind two-thirds of United States GDP growth in the 1990s (Porter & Opstal, 2001, p. vi). Its strong economy greatly enhances the ability of the United States to cope with security threats, and innovation is the cornerstone of the United States economy. Having industries capable of competing in an increasingly competitive global market not only increases national wealth, enabling Americans to preserve their way of life, but also provides the government with the tools to ensure safety. If S&T contributes to growth and economic security, it is critical that the United States remains at the forefront of scientific exploration and maintains technological superiority. The motivation for improving investment in S&T comes not only from within but also from abroad. The United States now sponsors less than 44% of the world's R&D. Research and development and production must be handled more skillfully now than in the days when the United States dominated the world's R&D. America cannot as easily count on its superior budget to overwhelm the competition in economic or national security. Moreover, globalization will encourage competition and create opportunities for other nations to rapidly advance and leapfrog over the United States in key, particularly niche, technologies . Innovation is critical to economic competitiveness. One of the major national goals that the United States hopes to promote through research is economic competitiveness. The link between innovation and economic growth is widely acknowledged and well documented. Innovation is particularly important to the United States economy as the United States heavily relies on competitive advantage in advanced technology products. However, this stronghold of the United States economy is under increased pressure. This is largely the result of globalization, a trend that seems likely to accelerate. If so, international competition in high-tech goods will increase in the future. International competition should be seen as an opportunity for the United States industry to become stronger and more efficient. The United States is well positioned to embrace globalization and reap the fruits of economic competition.
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No timeframe sales take a decade Shalal-Esa, Reuters, 09 (Andrea, June 5, Cost of F-22 fighter for Japan as much as $250 mln
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssIndustryMaterialsUtilitiesNews/idUSN0530055420090605) WASHINGTON, June 5 (Reuters) - The U.S. Air Force estimates it would cost Japan as much as $250 million per plane to buy dozens of radar-evading F-22 fighter jets, a U.S. senator told Japan's ambassador in a letter, saying he hopes to reverse a current U.S. ban on such exports. Senator Daniel Inouye, who heads the Senate Appropriations Committee, said this price included the cost of creating an export version of the most advanced U.S. fighter, built by Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N). This assumes production would
begin in four to five years, with deliveries in seven to nine years, according to two sources familiar with the letter.
F-22 sales to Japan spark an Asian arms race. Chanlett-Avery, 09 Analyst in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 3/11
Japan, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22684.pdf)
(Emma, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to
China and South Korea have voiced concern about Japans intention to upgrade its military capabilities, largely grounded in suspicions that Japan will inch toward returning to its pre-1945 militarism. Some analysts caution that selling the F-22s to Japan could destabilize the region, possibly even sparking an arms race, and contribute to an image of Japan becoming Americas proxy in the region. The sale could complicate the U.S. effort to manage its relationship with China. South Korea has already registered its unease at Japan acquiring F-22s, and at one point suggested that it may seek a deal to purchase
the aircraft in order to match Japans capabilities.10 Although the Lee Myung-bak government has made moves to strengthen U.S.-South Korean alliance, the Seoul-Washington relationship has been strained at times over the past several years, and some South Koreans chafe at indications that the United States prioritizes defense ties with Japan above those with Korea. Japanese defense officials have pointed to Chinas acquisition of increasingly sophisticated air capabilities to justify their request for the F-22s, asserting that Chinas modern air fleet will soon dwarf Japans. Despite the relatively strong state of relations between Tokyo and Beijing, the two nations remain wary of each others intentions. Although the risk of military confrontation is considered small, there is the potential that territorial
disputes over outlying islands could escalate into armed clashes, or that conflict could break out in the Taiwan Strait between the United States and China, which could involve Japan. For this reason, some U.S. and Japanese
commentators have supported the sale of F-22s to Japan as necessary to maintain the Taiwan balance.
Nuclear war Cirincione 00 (Joseph, dir. Nonprolif project at CEIP, The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain, Foreign Policy, Spring)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom , one nation's actions can trigger
reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.
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F-35 Preferred
Gates is pushing the F-35 on Japan- and they are already considering it. Worsley 09 (Ken, So much for the F-22 in Japan: Gates says the F-35 is good enough, May 23,
http://www.japaneconomynews.com/2009/05/23/so-much-for-the-f-22-in-japan-gates-says-the-f-35-is-good-enough/) Earlier today, the Nikkei reported that US Defense Secretary Robert Gates recommended that the F-35 fighter jet become Japans next generation mainstay to Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada when the two met earlier this month at the Pentagon. It seems as though Gates is looking at ending production of the higher-end F-22, and thus wants to see the F35 replace Japans aging fleet of F-4EJs. Japan is currently considering adopting the F-22, F/A-18, F-15FX, F-35, the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Rafale. Of this group, only the F-22 and F-35 are stealth fighters, and I cant see the point in buying F18s when Japan has no offensive carriers. Likewise, the F-15 is scheduled to go out of commission around 2025; its a bit late to be buying more of them. Edit: See LBs note in the comments about the F-15. Japan is eager to upgrade from F-4s, but the F-35 is not scheduled to be fully deployed until 2014, and shipments to Japan could be later than that. It will be interesting to see how this plays out, as Japan attempts to upgrade 48 of its existing F-15s while a decision on what will be the next generation fighter is further delayed. Given the bilateral alliance,
this observer sees little choice for Japan other than waiting for the F-35 to become available. It appears as though the F-22 program will be (sadly) cut short, and that the aircraft will (rightly) not become available for export.
They will buy the F35 Defense Industry Daily, 09 (June 8, F-22 Raptors to Japan? http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/f22-raptors-to-japan-01909/)
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter would be attractive for budgetary reasons. It offers exceptional performance in the reconnaissance role, while its set partnership model smooths technology transfer issues. Unfortunately, its single-engine
design would be a concern during maritime combat air patrols, and its declared status as a strike fighter works against it in a country thats so insistent on the purely defensive functions of its weaponry. The F-35Bs STOVL (Short Take Off, Vertical Landing) capabilities
might make it a politically salable option as a defensive aircraft that could operate from dispersed locations, rather than easily-targeted bases. Of course, Japan is also purchasing a helicopter carrier for roles like disaster response.
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US Wont Sell
Congressional opposition overwhelms. Konishi and Dujarric 09 (Weston S., adjunct fellow at the Mansfield Foundation in Washington, D.C., and Robert, heads the
Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies at Temple University, Japan Campus, Hurdles to a Japanese F-22, Japan Times, May 16th http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090516a1.html) There are, however, serious obstacles to such an acquisition. On the legal front, the U.S. Congress currently prohibits the sale of this highly sensitive military technology to any foreign air force. Moreover, recent leaks by Japanese personnel
of classified U.S. data have hurt the country's credibility when it comes to protecting secrets. On the diplomatic front, selling F-22s to Japan would make it harder for the Obama administration to resist pressure from other allies who may have an interest in procuring the aircraft. A selloff of F-22s to other countries could disrupt delicate balances of power in
Asia and other key regions.
43
***China Relations***
44
Sino-Japanese Relations High

Relations high: First, Japanese and Chinese reconciliation. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session 21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia, Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor cp
While Japan may be seen as having initiated a chain of negative bilateral dynamics during Koizumis term in office, Tokyos foreign policy behaviour since 2006 has opened up the way for an improvement in Sino-Japanese political and security relations. From a Chinese perspective, a major contributing factor for this is the fact that none of Koizumis successors has visited Yasukuni. Abes first foreign trip as prime minster was to China, which was followed by the resumption of mutual diplomatic visits. Fukuda Yasuo (2007-2008), for his part, strongly promoted a deepening of ties with the PRC, and succeeded in steering Japan-China relations towards what was termed as a new era of a mutually beneficial relationship. During the term of Aso, the history issue re-emerged amid his decision to make an offering to Yasukuni. However, Beijings reaction was rather restrained in comparison with the Koizumi era. The Chinese government stressed its determination to push forward the bilateral strategic mutual-beneficial ties, while calling on Japan to properly settle existing problems with the PRC (Xinhua, 2009). Finally, Japans domestic political scene has dramatically changed in the wake of the Democratic Party of Japans (DPJ) electoral victory in the summer of 2009. The administration of Hatoyama Yukio (2009-present) has emphasised Japans Asia diplomacy, which contrasts with the US-centred foreign policy that had been pursued by the LDP.
SpecificallyChina is acknowledging Japanese apologies for WWII and trying to control anti-Japanese sentiment. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium , Paper for the PSA Annual
Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session 21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia, Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor cp Beijings changing strategy towards Tokyo became clear when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his 2007 speech at the Japanese Diet11 acknowledged Japans remorse and apology for its aggression during World War II, and, what
was seen as even more striking from a Japanese perspective, expressed an unequivocal appreciation for Japanese ODA to China (Daily Yomiuri, 2007b). Subsequent policies by the Hu administration, including the introduction of restrictions on media reports critical of Japan, have sought to contain Chinese peoples anti-Japan attitudes. The CCP government has also focused on promoting a positive image of Japan and de-emphasising the history problem, which has been possible due to Tokyos non-provocative behaviour on the history issue. Indeed, the dilemma that the PRC government faces is that while it may not be seen by its people as being soft on Japan due to the widespread anti-Japan attitudes (not least stimulated by official patriotism), it also realises that uncontrolled public sentiment could easily turn against the CCP regime (Moon and Suh, 2008). Domestic goals, therefore, seemed to underpin Beijings adjustment in its Tokyo strategy (Fujino, 2007). These included securing political stability and controlling the antiJapan public sentiments, especially ahead of important events such as the 17th CCP convention in 2007, the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Expo. Mutual economic interests have also contributed to positive bilateral relations. In particular, Japans cooperation with China in the fields of environmental protection and energy conservation is seen by Beijing as crucial for Chinas further economic development (ibid.).
45

Second, military cooperationbut relations could deteriorate. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium , Paper for the PSA Annual
As far as the security dimension of Sino-Japanese relations is concerned, there have been attempts for enhancing military transparency and confidence-building. These include regular highlevel defence meetings, an agreement for the establishment of an emergency communication hotline between the SDF and PLA, and the first since 1945 mutual visits by naval ships.12 Indeed, while a bilateral agreement for exchange visits by warships was reached in 2000, Beijing postponed the planned visits due to Koizumis tributes to Yasukuni. The Hatoyama administration has moved forward with strengthening defence ties with Beijing when in November 2009 the two sides agreed to hold in 2010 their first joint naval drill for search and rescue operations, as well as start discussions on cooperation in the areas of disaster relief and UN peacekeeping operations. These attempts in the post-Koizumi era for mutual reassurance have been paralleled by expressions of mutual strategic suspicion, however. Japanese White Papers on Defence have continued to urge Beijing to improve its military transparency, expressing concerns about its growing military spending. Abe, for example, stressed in 2007 that improved transparency was crucial if China were to play a responsible role in the region (Daily Yomiuri, 2007a). For its part, Hatoyamas advisory group on security issues, which is preparing recommendations for the 2010 revision of the NDPG, has reportedly focused on the PRCs military build-up in its discussions. Beijing has warned that playing the China threat card would damage mutual trust, while some Chinese observers have concluded that Tokyo would likely return to this approach in the new NDPG (Xinhua, 2010).
Third, public sentiment improving. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
With efforts made by both governments to maintain stable bilateral relations at the political level, public sentiments towards the other have changed as well. However, whereas in China there has been a sharp increase of a positive attitude towards Japan, there has been no such improvement, but indeed a worsening, of Chinas image among the Japanese (Okada, 2008). While the CCPs efforts at easing the anti-Japan sentiment may have succeeded domestically, many Japanese people have arguably continued to view Chinas rise with suspicion and fear. The trend under Hatoyama suggests a slight increase in positive Japanese perceptions of China and the bilateral relations; the percentage remains lower than that observed among the Chinese (Daily Yomiuri, 2009).
46

Fourth, security interests. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
The arrival of a DPJ-led administration in Tokyo may have further changed the strategic positioning of Japan and China within the triangle. The Hatoyama government has called for an equal US-Japan alliance, stressing the need for Japan to reduce its dependence on Washington in foreign policy. Instead, he has emphasised Japans ties with Asia, especially China and South Korea, and proposed the formation of an East Asian community. Strains in Japan-US security relations have emerged due to Hatoyamas decision to review a bilateral agreement for the relocation of the US Marine Corps Futenma Air Station in Okinawa. Tokyo has also withdrawn Japanese supply ships from
the Indian Ocean in support of the US-led war on terror, after the law authorising the refuelling mission (initially enacted by Koizumi in 2001) expired in January. Domestic considerations are arguably a leading factor for these decisions, given that the DPJ needs the support of its leftwing coalition partner (the Social Democratic Party) in the 2010 Diet elections. Critics warn that Hatoyamas policies may lead to US distrust of Japan and have an adverse impact on the planned in 2010 revision of the alliance to mark the 50th anniversary of the bilateral Security Treaty.
47
Tensions Now Taiwan

Specifically, the US, Japan, and China clash over Taiwan. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
It is the Taiwan question that has arguably led Beijing to see Tokyos adjustments in its security policy largely through the lens of cross-Strait relations; from a Japanese perspective, the perceived North Korean military threat is a legitimate reason to strengthen its defence posture and alliance with the US. China has been worried that the revised in 1997 US-Japan Defence Guidelines could be applied to a Taiwan contingency, as Tokyo and Washington have refused to explicitly rule Taiwan in or out, adopting a situational rather than geographical definition of the region, instead (Green, 2003). Likewise, Beijing has been concerned that a mobile, sea-based US-Japan BMD system could be used for the defence of Taiwan and, thereby, neutralise the mainlands ability to coerce the island into reunification. According to some Chinese analysts, the alleged inclusion of Taiwan in the US-Japan security cooperation serves to embolden the separatist forces in Taiwan by creating perceptions that Washington and Tokyo would help Taipei no matter which side provoked a war in the Strait (Wu, 2005: 126). The 2004 Chinese White Paper on Defence stressed that the PRC would never allow anyone to split Taiwan and that if Taipei decided to seek independence China would resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost (Chinese Governments Official Web Portal,
2004).
Tensions over Taiwan. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
The Taiwan issue is also an illustration of the complexity of Sino-Japanese relations, in which strategic divergences intersect with domestic politics. For Beijing, the Taiwan issue is a core national security interest on which the Chinese government cannot compromise. For Japan, Taiwan is particularly relevant from a geopolitical perspective, as the Taiwan Strait is located in an area where Japans vital for its economy SLOC stretch. This arguably feeds Beijings suspicion that Tokyo does not want reunification, hence its real motives behind the deepening of its security ties with Washington, as a unified China might be seen as a challenge to Japans strategic interests in the Western Pacific. Although Tokyo has officially adhered to a one China policy since the 1972 normalisation, the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance has been perceived by Beijing as signalling a shift in Japans Taiwan policy (Xinhua, 2005a). Tokyos involvement in cross-Strait relations is viewed all the more negatively by the PRC, given Japans past colonisation of the island (Wu, 2000). LDPs moves under Koizumi and Abe to
revise Article 9 in order to allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defence in support of the US were interpreted as a major manifestation of Japans growing security ambitions and fuelled further Chinese suspicion regarding Tokyos future interference in the Taiwan issue. In Japan, meanwhile, Beijings hardened approach towards Taiwan and uncompromising attitude on the history issue only served to strengthen the publics negative perceptions of the CCPs authoritarian rule.
48
Sino-Japanese Tensions Now Public Opinion

Tensions nowJapanese populations dislikes the Chinese. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium , Paper for the PSA Annual
Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session 21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia, Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor cp In Japan, meanwhile, negative popular perceptions and distrust of China have increased since the 1990s, not least due to the heightened anti-Japan sentiment within the Chinese society. The 1989 military crackdown on the democratic movement at the Tiananmen square was the first event that triggered a sharp decrease of the number of Japanese with friendly feelings towards the PRC (Mochizuki, 2007). Burdened by apology fatigue (Green, 2003), Japanese people
increasingly came to believe that Beijing was taking advantage of the history issue in order to extract more economic assistance from Tokyo, as well as prevent Japan from maintaining, or expanding, its regional influence (Roy, 2006). There was also a perceived lack of appreciation for Japanese ODA to China and a strong feeling in Japan that the CCP stimulated anti-Japanese nationalism in order to legitimise its grip on power. These negative perceptions, together with the growing concerns regarding the PRCs military modernisation and regional ambitions, arguably led to the Koizumi governments decision in 2005 to terminate the yen loan programme of Japanese aid as of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
49
Sino-Japanese Tensions Now Energy

China and Japan compete for energy. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session 21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia, Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor cp Finally, the structural vulnerabilities of Japan and China additionally complicate the security dimension of Sino-
Japanese relations. Japan is a resource-poor country, which depends on energy imports for almost all of its oil and natural gas consumption; Chinas demand for energy imports is increasing fast. Both countries dependence on secure access to energy supplies for ensuring economic growth fuels energy competition and generates mutual distrust. In this context, Chinas expansion of its naval and air military capabilities has raised concerns in Tokyo, as this would allow Beijing to project power into the East and South China Seas where Japans vital for its economy sea lanes of communication (SLOC) stretch. The ongoing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is representative of a mounting Sino-Japanese energy rivalry, as there are prospects for large oil and gas reserves in the surrounding waters. The dispute escalated in 2004 amid revelations of Chinas development of a natural gas project very close to the
Japan-drawn demarcation line of the contested exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boarder in the East China Sea. Beijings actions led to worries in Tokyo that the sources from the Japanese side could be drained.
50
Sino-Japanese Tensions Now Military***

High Sino-Japanese tensions nowmilitary actions. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session 21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia, Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor cp Sino-Japanese relations in the political and security areas have been influenced by a complex interaction of factors from both the international and domestic levels. The structural change in East Asias geopolitical environment, and the shift in the balance of
power between Japan and China have led to strategic divergences and security dilemma dynamics. Chinas military modernisation and active regional diplomacy have fuelled Japanese mistrust and sense of insecurity, while the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance and Tokyos security activism have been perceived by Beijing as a threat to the resolution of the Taiwan issue. Domestically, the conservative trend in Japanese domestic politics under Koizumi provided a fertile ground for the CCP leadership to stimulate anti-Japanese nationalism and play the history card for internal political gains. In turn, this exacerbated mutual distrust and contributed to a sharp increase in the negative public perceptions of the other. The intersection between strategic divergences and domestic politics aggravated Sino-Japanese tensions by exposing the unresolved bilateral problems.
51
AT: Sino-Japanese Relations Stable

Tensions nowmistrust runs too deep. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
In the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely that this cooling-off period will mark a transition towards long-term stability in Sino-Japanese relations. The present stability is fragile, for the differences between the two neighbours have not been resolved at the their root, i.e. at the level of strategic trust. Japan will remain wary of Chinas regional strategic intentions and unwilling to accept a Pax-Sinica in East Asia, while Beijings concerns about the implications of the US-Japan alliance for the Taiwan issue and uncertainty regarding its relations with Washington will prevent it from treating Japan as a partner. While there may be political will at the moment for improved SinoJapanese relations, Tokyo and Beijing are still far away from reaching a strategic understanding.
52
Ext China-US-Japan Alliance Zero-Sum

US-China-Japan relations are all interconnected. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
Sino-Japanese security relations have been largely conducted within a triangular framework of interactions with the US.13 Strategic divergences, unresolved historical issues, contrasting domestic political calculations and volatile public sentiments have been the major obstacles for the two neighbours to establish institutional mechanisms for the management of their relationship. This has increased the significance of the US factor in SinoJapanese relations. Americas military presence in East Asia and role as a provider for regional stability has been a crucial determinant of Japanese and Chinese respective security policies. For Tokyo, its alliance with the US is the bedrock of Japans national security; for Beijing, the US (and its strengthened security partnership with Japan) poses the greatest potential threat to Beijings internal stability and leadership ambitions in East Asia. Despite the
criticism of Japans alleged remilitarisation, most Chinese elites and observers do not seem to worry that, at least in the foreseeable future, Japan might become an independent (of the US) security actor in East Asia or turn into a national security threat to the PRC. China
continues to recognise the US security umbrella as putting a cap on Japans rearmament. What mostly concerns Beijing is the perceived US hegemony in East Asia, of which Tokyo is seen as a main pillar, and its impact on the Taiwan issue (Roy, 2006). Especially during Koizumis term, Beijing regarded Japans normalisation being channelled through a strengthened US-Japan alliance and encouraged by Washington, hence came to view Tokyo as a major tool in Americas strategy of balancing the PRCs rising power and maintaining the US regional security dominance (Wu, 2005). Indeed, Chinas US strategy of, what has been termed as, hedged acquiescence14 has been motivated in part by the unprecedented expansion of US-Japan security ties under the Koizumi- George W. Bush partnership,
and its recognition of the strategic advantage enjoyed by the US as a balancer (notably with Japan) in Asias geopolitics (Pei, 2007). As mentioned earlier, Chinese hedging has included active regional diplomacy and military modernisation efforts. The US, too, has been hedging vis--vis China. While emphasising bilateral cooperation with Beijing, Washington has reinforced its security partnerships in Asia, with its alliance with Japan playing a central role in this strategy (Medeiros, 2005). Sino-US relations stabilised during the Bush administration, especially after 9/11, and this trend of focusing on common interests has continued under Obama.
53
AT: US-Japanese Relations Low

Even if relations are tense, theyre still strong. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session 21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia, Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor cp At the moment, therefore, it seems that China is better positioned in the triangle than Japan. While it enjoys good
relations with both Obama and Hatoyama, there are tensions between Tokyo and Washington. Some sources note that Beijings support for Hatoyamas East Asian community proposal is driven by a goal to weaken the alliance and hence Americas strategic influence in the region (Saeki, 2009). Beijing must also be pleased that Japans normalisation drive
has slowed down in the post-Koizumi era. Indeed, Japan under Hatoyama seems unlikely to re-emerge as a pillar of the perceived US hegemony in a way that China feared was the case under Koizumi. To be sure, Washington and Tokyo agreed in February 2010
to strengthen their security cooperation and develop a common understanding regarding the security situation in East Asia in the framework of the deepening of the alliance. These developments, together with Hatoyamas planned revision of the NDPG, led Beijing to remind Tokyo that the US-Japan military cooperation should not target a third party (Xinhua, 2010), alluding to a potential joint containment of China. Furthermore, Washington has sided with Tokyo in criticising the PRCs steady military modernisation and lack of clarity in Chinas strategic intentions,15 and the Obama administration, as Hatoyama, has expressed discontent with Beijings alleged censorship of the Internet in the wake of the recent Google scandal. Finally, US approval in January 2010 of a new arms package for Taiwan has raised tensions in Sino-US relations.
54
Chinese Multilateralism Solves Containment

Chinese multilateralism builds trustkey to check against containment. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, Paper for the PSA Annual
For Beijing, multilateralism has formed an important part of its reassurance campaign since the late 1990s aimed at minimising concerns in East Asia regarding Chinas growing (military) power, especially in the wake of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis (Saunders, 2008). Accompanied by political rhetoric and concepts such as peaceful development, the PRCs involvement in regional multilateralism has sought to demonstrate to its neighbours that Chinas rise would be benign and mutually beneficial (Foot, 2006: 85). Finally, Beijings regional diplomacy, together with its military modernisation, has become a crucial component of its hedging strategy towards the US (Medeiros, 2005; Pei, 2007). This strategy is designed to reduce the risk of containment by Washington and its East Asian allies, most notably Tokyo, as well as raise the stakes for the US (and Japan) of potential involvement in the Taiwan issue.
55
Sino-Japanese Relations Good Energy

Strong relations are key to prevent war over East China Sea oil. Janet Xuanli Liao, 08, Lecturer in international relations and energy security in The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and
Policy at The University of Dundee, PhD in International Relation from the University of Hong Kong, 1/3, Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East China Sea Gas Exploration, accessed via Springer Science cp
The period between the 1970s up to the early 1990s witnessed effective energy cooperation between China and Japan, both for economic and strategic reasons. However, the past decade has seen acceleration in energy competition between the two major players in East Asia. Following their rivalry over the Russian oil pipelines which commenced in 2003, these two nations have entered into a further dispute in the case over gas exploration in the East China Sea since mid 2004. Despite a series of diplomatic negotiations between China and Japan that lasted for more than three years, no solution settlement was reached. The commonly held opinion is that such competition is a prelude to an all out energy struggle between China and Japan in the international arena. Some even believe this could lead to armed conflict between these two regional powers [1, 1214, 32]. Opinions for cooperation also exist [15, 24], but they seem less prevalent, largely due to political distrust between the two nations. This article argues that while the concern of energy security was genuine given the increasing energy demands by China and Japan, the forces behind their intensified energy competition were political distrust and power politics. Taking the East China Sea dispute as an example, the direct causes for the dispute were the unsettled maritime boundary between China and Japan, which could either be solved through legal arbitrations or be shelved for later negotiations if better political trust existed between China and Japan. Nevertheless, due to the realist zero-sum perceptions held by both governments, no solution has been reached after 11 rounds of the bilateral negotiations in the past three years. This article aspires to illustrate the interplay between the energy security concerns and the mutual political distrust, in order to demonstrate that the power struggles had prevented the two countries from finding a solution to serve their interest in energy security.
56
Ext Relations Key to Energy

Bad relations prevent compromise on energy dispute. Janet Xuanli Liao, 08, Lecturer in international relations and energy security in The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and
Policy at The University of Dundee, PhD in International Relation from the University of Hong Kong, 1/3, Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East China Sea Gas Exploration, accessed via Springer Science cp China and Japan started their diplomatic dialogues on 26 October 2004 in Beijing, aimed at finding a solution to the problem of making the East China Sea a Sea for friendship. The two delegations were led by Cui Tiankai, head of the Department of Asian Affairs under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Mitoji Yabunaka, head of Japanese Foreign Ministrys Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, respectively. The focus of the discussions was on how to define the EEZ boundary between the two countries, and whether to jointly explore petroleum resources and how. However, neither side seemed to be prepared to concede but instead insisted on its own position over the EEZ boundary. Beijing repeated its invitation for joint-exploration but Tokyo rejected the offer by demanding China provide data of the gas fields first. Consequently, no progress was made at the first meeting (PD, 26 Oct 2004; FT, 26 Oct 2004). In fact, fraught with the stressful political relationship between the two powers, the meeting was almost doomed to fail from the start. Despite the opotimistic estimates by the CNOOC, with over 150 billion cubic meters of gas reserves in the Xihu Trough (PD, 27 Apr 2000), a Japanese energy specialist held that the exploration of natural gas in the East China Sea had no economic viability due to the small scale of the gas fields and the high cost of offshore drilling. Many thus believed that the dispute was frought with highly political undertones in both countries prior to the dialogue (creaders.net, 22 Oct 2004). This concern was further proved by the METI Minister
Shoichi Nakagawas statement that the dispute was a matter not only relevant to Japans energy sources, but also relating to its national interests and sovereignty (Yomiuri, 25 Oct 2004). Chinese analysts also argued that an overall energy competition with Japan would be inevitable given their scarcity of energy and the surprising convergence of supply sources. Some even went so far to claime that Japan was using energy as a means to constrain China from challenging Japans economic leadership in Asia (PD, 28 Oct 2004).
Improved relations are critical to resolve energy disputesthats key to East Asian stability. Janet Xuanli Liao, 08, Lecturer in international relations and energy security in The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and
Policy at The University of Dundee, PhD in International Relation from the University of Hong Kong, 1/3, Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East China Sea Gas Exploration, accessed via Springer Science cp However, as shown in the above analysis, the 11 rounds of talks between China and Japan have made limited progress so far, largely due to their lack of political trust. During Junichiro Koizumis premiership, such mistrust was highlighted by the history issue and severely undermined the progress of the negotiations. The post-Koizumi era has seen a warmer Sino-Japanese relationship but the
political mistrust remains essentially intact, but more relevant to the changed balance of their power potentials. Compared with the history issue, the management of their co-existence as great powers in East Asia is a more practical and tougher task for the two governments. Unless the two nations , especially the top leaderships, are willing to change their perspectives towards each other and to reconcile in the negotiations, the stalemate may well continue for a while yet. It is encouraging to see some positive signs emerging towards an early solution for the dispute, but it is still too early to say if the possibility will be turned into reality in the foreseeable future. Energy security is important for China and Japan, but it should not become a football for power politics, and should never be achieved at the risk of regional peace and stability. East Asia can only stay peaceful and prosperous if China and Japan play a positive role in the region, based on better political trust and more liberal accord towards each other. It requires time for China and Japan to settle their dispute over the East China Sea gas exploration; but more importantly, it requires political willingness and wisdom from the two leaderships to ensure their energy security and regional stability in East Asia. To melt the ice completely, Japan and China must make further efforts.
57
AT: Japan Multilateral Now/Strong Regional Ties Now

Not truemultilateral activates only supplement activates taken with the US and Japan is way behind China. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 10, Catholic University of Leuven & University of Antwerp Belgium, 10 , Paper for the PSA Annual
Conference, Edinburgh, 29 March-1 April 2010, Panel Session 21st Century Security in Pacific-Asia, Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability and the US Factor cp Japan, on the other hand, while emphasising its security alliance with the US, has also supported regional cooperation. The latter has been part of its comprehensive approach to security,5 reflected in Tokyos ODA diplomacy in Southeast Asia (as a main donor), promotion of alternative security concepts, such as human security, and support for regional multilateralism. For example, Japan has played a major role in establishing the ARF in 1994, has been active in the APT process and has participated in the SPT. By promoting regional cooperation, Tokyo has sought to increase its regional influence (notably vis--vis Beijing), as well as enmesh China
in a web of interdependent relationships in order to encourage it to behave as a responsible power. However, Tokyos multilateral initiatives have only played a supplemental role to its bilateral security arrangements with Washington, or what has been called as a bilateralism plus security policy (Hughes and Fukushima, 2004). Japan is also seen as catching up with China rather than driving regional cooperation, for example, by joining the TAC in 2004 and launching FTA negotiations with ASEAN in 2005.
58
***Adventurism***
59
A2: Adventurism Advantage

There are real threats to East Asian security that Okinawan forces can uniquely resolve its geostrategic location is key. Rajesh Kapoor, 10, Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies at The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses a nonpartisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security that has been rated as one of the top think tanks in Asia, (The Strategic Relevance of Okinawa, Eurasia Review, June 10th, Available Online at http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006102989/the-strategic-relevance-of-okinawa.html) In the post-Occupation period, US troops and military bases in Japan have been instrumental in ensuring peace and
stability within Japan as well as in East Asia. The geo-strategic location of Okinawa makes it the preferred site for hosting US military bases both in terms of securing Japan as well as for US force projection in the Far East. Okinawas distance from the rest of Japan and from other countries of East Asia makes it an ideal location to host military bases and thus extend US military outreach considerably. In the case of an eventuality, it is easier for the US marines, who act as first responders to exigencies, to take appropriate action well before the rest of Japan is affected. In addition, Japan cannot ignore the potential threat it faces from its nuclear neighbours including China, North Korea and Russia. The Russian and Chinese threats, as of now, can be ruled out. However, the North Korean threat is very much real and Japan has been building up its Ballistic Missile Defence system in collaboration with the US to cater for it. Okinawa Prefecture includes a chain of hundreds of small islands. The midpoint of this chain is almost
equidistance from Taiwan and Japans Kyushu Island. During the Vietnam War, the USFJ military bases particularly in Okinawa were among the most important strategic and logistic bases. In addition, strategists in Japan note that despite the countrys three non-nuclear principles, some bases in Okinawa were used for stockpiling nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Even today, US nuclear-armed submarines and destroyers operate in the vicinity of Japan, facilitated by a secret deal between the governments of the US and Japan. Moreover, having
military bases in Japan also helps the US to have easy access to the strategically important five seas the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Japan Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea.1
Withdrawal is net-worse for regional securityChina and Korea are genuine threats. Michael Auslin, 10, Resident Scholar and Director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Michael Auslin, former associate
professor of history and senior research fellow at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University, (The Real Futenma Fallout, Wall Street Journal Asia, June 16th, Available Online at http://www.aei.org/article/102196)
This worst-case scenario would be a series of simultaneous, grassroots movements against the U.S. military presence in Japan that could potentially put fatal stress on the bilateral security alliance and effectively isolate Japan militarily in the western Pacific. Given Mr. Hatoyama's fate when he botched this issue, politicians now are more likely to respond to public demands or they will be replaced by those who do. The resulting political clash would either reaffirm tight ties with Washington or lead to endemic paralysis in Japan's national security establishment. Given that the U.S. has permanently forward deployed ships and planes only in Japan, any scenario like the one sketched out above could significantly weaken U.S. capability to operate in the western Pacific, and thus call into question U.S. credibility as the underwriter of regional stability at a time when a crisis is brewing on the Korean peninsula and China continues to flex its naval and air muscle. Anyone concerned about that scenario, even if unlikely, realizes that the next half-decade of U.S.-Japan relations will have to go back to basics: rebuilding trust in the relationship, agreeing on a common set of objectives in Japan's waters and throughout Northeast Asia, and strengthening a commitment to upholding the alliance's military capabilities. The good news is that Japan's bureaucrats and military leaders remain more committed
than ever to revitalizing the alliance. Whether politicians on both sides of the Pacific are willing to follow them, however, is another matter.
60
***Deficit***
61
A2: Deficits Advantage (1/2)

The plan is a drop in the bucket
Iraq and Afghanistan and Social Security and Medicare swamp the effect of the plan.
The thesis of anti-deficit arguments is fundamentally wrongonly sustained deficit spending achieves economic growth. James K. Galbraith, 10, Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations and Professor of Government at the University
of Texas, Senior Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute, Chair of Economists for Peace and Security, Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University, (In defense of deficits, San Francisco Chronicle, March 21st, Available Online at http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-0321/opinion/18841327_1_wasteful-spending-deficit-private-loans/) For this reason, the deficit phobia of Wall Street, the press, some economists and practically all politicians is one of
the deepest dangers that we face. To cut current deficits without first rebuilding the economic engine of the private credit system is a sure path to stagnation, to a double-dip recession - even to a second Great Depression. There are two ways to get the increase in total spending that we call "economic growth." One way is for government to spend. The other is for banks to lend. For ordinary people, public budget deficits, despite their bad reputation, are much better than
private loans. Deficits put money in private pockets. Private households get more cash. They own that cash free and clear, and they can spend it as they like. Ordinary people benefit, but there is nothing in it for banks. And this explains the deficit phobia of Wall Street. Bankers don't like budget deficits because they compete with bank loans as a source of growth. When a bank makes a loan, cash balances in private hands also go up. But now there is a contractual obligation to pay interest and to repay principal. If the enterprise defaults, there may be an asset left over - a house or factory or company - that will then become the property of the bank. All of this should be painfully obvious, but it is deeply obscure. It is obscure because legions of Wall Streeters have labored mightily to confuse the issues. We also hear about the impending "bankruptcy" of Social Security, Medicare - even the United States itself. Or of the burden that public debts will "impose on our grandchildren." Or about "unfunded liabilities" supposedly facing us all. All of this forms part of one of the great misinformation campaigns of all time. The misinformation is rooted in what many consider to be plain common sense. It may seem like homely wisdom, especially, to say that "just like the family, the government can't live beyond its means." But it's not. In
these matters the public and private sectors differ on a very basic point. Your family needs income in order to pay its debts. Your government does not. Private borrowers can and do default. With government, the risk of nonpayment does not exist. Government spends money (and pays interest) simply by typing numbers into a computer. Because it is the source of money, government can't run out. It's true that government can spend imprudently. Too much spending may lead to inflation. Wasteful spending - on unnecessary military adventures, say - burns real resources. But no government can ever be forced to default on debts in a currency it controls. Public defaults happen only when governments don't control the currency in which they owe debts - as Argentina owed dollars or as Greece now owes euros. But for true sovereigns, bankruptcy is an irrelevant concept. Nor is public debt a burden on future generations. It does not have to be repaid, and in practice it will never be repaid. Personal debts are generally settled during the lifetime of the debtor or at death. Governments do not die - except in war or revolution, and when that happens, their debts are generally moot anyway. So the public debt simply increases from one year to the next. In the entire history of the United States it has done so, with budget deficits and increased public debt on all but about six very short occasions - with each surplus followed by a recession. Far from being a burden, these debts are the foundation of economic growth.
62
A2: Deficits Advantage (2/2)

Deficit spending is key to growthits key to sustain consumption and avoid a deflationary cycle. Marshall Auerback, 09, Market Analyst and Commentator at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institutean advocacy organization
committed to the ideals of the FDR Administration, (Government Spending is the Solution--Not the Problem, Counter Punch, September 15th, Available Online at http://www.counterpunch.org/ auerback09152009.html)
By the same token, the emphasis on "sound fiscal management, which allegedly created the platform for vigorous, low inflationary growth, generating jobs and higher incomes is false. Similarly, it is clear that the current reliance on monetary policy (accompanied by the budget deficit phobia) will always fail to deliver full employment and relies on the impoverishment of the disadvantaged for its ability to achieve low inflation . In the market fundamentalist era, prior to the
current economic crisis, governments began to rely on monetary policy for counter-stabilization. According to the logic, this rendered fiscal policy a passive player. Under the misguided inflation-targeting regimes that emerged in the early 1990s, central banks adjusted short-term interest rates to control inflation and therefore saw the unemployment rate as a policy tool rather than a legitimate target in its own right. Given the erroneous belief that expansionary fiscal policy was inflationary and its use would compromise the primacy of monetary policy, governments began to pursue surpluses and put in place frameworks to punish deficits and penalize workers who obtained high wage settlements, on the grounds that this was inherently inflationary (though this logic is never extended to CEO executive compensation or Wall Street bonuses). The results have been clear. They indicate that this way of managing the economy cannot possibly be a
sustainable long-term strategy. The emphasis we have placed on "financial responsibility" on the government side has actually introduced a deflationary bias that has slowed output and employment growth (keeping unemployment at unnecessarily high levels) and has forced the non-government sector into relying on increasing debt to sustain consumption. The complaints about private sector debt fuelled consumption miss the mark: the debt accumulation is a direct consequence of our failure to use fiscal policy in a manner which supports aggregate incomes and job growth. Targeting wages and the use of a buffer stock of unemployed labor have been the preferred methods of controlling inflation, but minimizing economic output below full potential. This was not, however, the model which gave the US its greatest period of prosperity. In fact, until the mid-1970s, the U.S. consistently paid the highest industrial wages in the world.
According to the late Seymour Melman (a professor of industrial engineering at Columbia University), this fact actually helped the U.S. maintain its economic supremacy. Melmans concept that explained this unconventional wisdom he called alternative cost. The basic idea is this: faced with high labor costs, firm managers will be more willing to mechanize, that is, use more machinery, and more sophisticated machinery, instead of using labor. By using more, better machinery, they increase labor productivity, which leads to higher wages, and they also stay at the cutting edge of technology. Melman compared factories in England and the U.S. after World War II, and found that the English, who paid lower wages, were using more primitive equipment than the Americans. More recently, his theory has been echoed in Suzanne Bergers new book, How We Compete, in which she argues that employing cheap labor is not the most effective way of responding to global competition. The activities that succeed over time are those that involve conditions such as long-term working relationships with customers and suppliers and specialized skills which companies whose main asset is cheap labor cannot match. A company policy of forcing down wages is not a recipe for long-term economic success. Economic growth has never been strong enough to fully employ the willing workforce and inequalities are rising throughout the Western world not falling. Further, the disparities between wealthy and poor countries have widened. By curbing the role of government and fiscal policy, we risk reverting to an approach which not only established the pre-conditions for the current crisis including the massive build-up of nongovernment debt and persistently high labor underutilization, but will almost certainly ensure a return to intense recessionary pressures (at a time when we are still experiencing double digit unemployment). To be clear: I am not advocating unlimited government deficits or spending. Rather, the size of the deficit (surplus) should be market determined by the desired net saving of the non-government sector. This may not coincide with full employment and so it is the responsibility of the government to ensure that its taxation/spending are at the right level to ensure that this equality occurs at full employment.
63
***Environment***
64
Dugong Frontline (1/2)

1) Dugongs wont recover- Low Reproduction rate Feffer 10 (John Feffer, institute for policy studies, Save the Dugong, http://closethebase.org/environmental-issue/dugong/)
Female dugongs give birth to a single infant after a thirteen-month pregnancy. The mother then spends the next two years raising her cafe. Although a female dugong can live as long as seventy years, she will only have a few offspring, investing considerable time with each one. This means the dugong population is especially sensitive to over-hunting and habitat destruction.
2) Impact N/U only 50 dugongs left Center for Biological Diversity 10 ( Okinawa Dugong,
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/mammals/Okinawa_dugong/index.html) Dugongs, distant relatives of the manatee, can live for 70 years and grow to nearly 1,000 pounds. Yet somehow these gentle creatures are said to have fooled lonely sailors into mistaking them for mermaids. In the vibrant turquoise waters of Japans Henoko Bay, dugong
herds once grazed peacefully on vast meadows of sea grass. But after decades of active U.S. military operations in the region, possibly fewer than 50 last dugongs now struggle to survive in Okinawa once dubbed the Galpagos of the East for its rich biodiversity.
3) Removing the base for the Dugongs undermines and causes activist spillover to our bases worldwide Carafano 08(Dr. James Carafano, Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and
Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, He is a visiting professor at National Defense University and Georgetown University. He previously served as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y., and as director of military studies at the Army's Center of Military History. He taught at Mount Saint Mary College in New York and was a fleet professor at the U.S. Naval War College, When wales trump security, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2008/10/When-whales-trump-security)
The Navy is not the only service losing "lawfare" battles to the enviros. Earlier this year, a U.S. district judge ruled the Pentagon violated the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) by failing to evaluate how a new air base, the Futenma Replacement Facility, might affect the Japanese dugong. Since NHPA is intended to apply to historical property, not animals, the court's decision is as strange as the unusual mammal it purports to protect. More than odd, the ruling undermines security. A joint statement by U.S. and Japanese officials "reaffirmed that completion of the
Futenma Replacement Facility ... by the target date of 2014, is the key to ... the overall realignment plan for Okinawa," including relocation of a Marine Expeditionary Unit to Guam. The actions of an activist judge have now all but ensured this vital process will
not be complete by the deadline. Worse, the dugong decision may create a new opening for environmental activists to target other U.S. bases around the world, re-labeling arcane animals as historic relics that must take precedence under the NHPA. Judges gone wild is a symptom of a bigger problem. In the end, the greatest threat to American security may be constituent politics that puts narrow self-interest above the common good."Lawfare"
advocates a constituent concern regardless of the cost. As long as stakeholders advance their agenda, nothing else matters. This problem can get out of control when judges cultivate a culture of litigation and creative interpretation of law. The activists can rightly argue they are just doing their job, lobbying for their thing. Government, however, is supposed to be about more than just the sum of constituent politics. Lawmakers have an obligation to give us laws that will keep us all free, safe and prosperous. Courts are obliged to protect us from those who would violate or abuse the law. But when activists hijack the judiciary and advance one goal at the expense of another, justice is perverted. And when government's fundamental obligation to "provide for the common defense" falls victim to perverse court rulings, the nation's future is at risk.
65
Dugong Frontline (2/2)

a) Dugongs Kill Seagrass Australian-Animals.net, No Date (Dugong (sea cow),
http://australian-animals.net/dugong.htm
Dugongs are sometimes called "Sea Cows", because they graze on seagrasses. These marine plants look like grass growing on a sandy sea floor in shallow, warm water. Dugongs eat large amounts of seagrass, leaving behind feeding trails of bare sand and uprooted seagrass.
b) Seagrass Key to Biodiversity Smithsonian 02 (Seagrass Habitats,http://www.sms.si.edu/IRLspec/Seagrass_Habitat.htm)

Within seagrass communities, a single acre of seagrass can produce over 10 tons of leaves per year. This vast biomass provides food, habitat, and nursery areas for a myriad of adult and juvenile vertebrates and invertebrates. Further, a single acre of seagrass may support as many as 40,00 fish, and 50 million small invertebrates. Because seagrasses support such high biodiversity, and because of their sensitivity to changes in water quality, they have become recognized as important indicator species that reflect the overall health of coastal ecosystems.Seagrasses perform a variety of functions within ecosystems, and have both economic and ecological value. The high level of productivity, structural complexity, and biodiversity in seagrass beds has led some researchers to describe seagrass communities as the marine equivalent of tropical rainforests. While nutrient cycling and primary production in seagrasses tends to be seasonal, annual production in seagrass communities rivals or exceeds that of terrestrially cultivated areas. In Florida, Halodule beaudettei, has an estimated annual production (as measured in grams of carbon per square meter) of
182 730 g/C/m-2; Syringodium filiforme has an estimated annual production of 292 - 1095 g/C/m-2; and Thalassia testudinum has an estimated annual production 329 - 5840 g/C/m-2. Blade elongation in seagrasses averages 2-5 mm per day in Thalassia testudinum, 8.5 mm in Syringodium filiforme, and as much as 3.1 mm in Halodule beaudettei. In the Indian River Lagoon, Halodule beaudettei has been shown to produce one new leaf every 9 days during spring the season of highest productivity (Virnstein 1982). As habitat, seagrasses offer
food, shelter, and essential nursery areas to commercial and recreational fishery species, and to the countless invertebrates that are produced within, or migrate to seagrasses. The complexity of seagrass habitat is increased when several species of seagrasses grow together, their leaves concealing juvenile fish, smaller finfish, and benthic invertebrates such as crustaceans, bivalves, echinoderms, and other groups. Juvenile stages of many fish species spend their early days in the relative safety and protection of seagrasses. Additionally, seagrasses provide both habitat and protection to the infaunal organisms living within the substratum as seagrass rhizomes intermingle to form dense networks of underground runners that deter predators from digging infaunal prey from the substratum. Seagrass meadows also help dampen the effects of strong currents, providing protection to fish and invertebrates, while also preventing the scouring of bottom areas. Finally, seagrasses provide attachment sites to small macroalgae and epiphytic organisms such as sponges, bryozoans, forams, and other taxa that use seagrasses as habitat. A number of studies have found epiphytes to be highly productive components of seagrass habitats (Penhale 1977, Heijs 1984,
Tomasko & Lapointe 1991), with epiphytes in some systems accounting for up to 30% of ecosystem productivity, and more than 30% of the total above ground biomass (Penhale 1977, Morgan & Kitting 1984, Heijs 1984). Seagrass epiphytes also contribute to food webs, either directly via organisms grazing on seagrasses, or indirectly following the deaths of epiphytes, which then enter the food web as a detrital carbon source (Fry & Parker 1979, Kitting et al. 1984).
66
AT: Dugong Advantage

Dugong can be found all around the world Cheryl Draynak, 10, Communications Director, Denison Nature Center, January 27
[http://marine-mammals.suite101.com/article.cfm/what-is-a-dugong]
The dugong can be found in shallow, coastal areas of tropical regions, such as the east coast of Africa, up into to the Red Sea, around the coasts of India and China, to Indonesia and the Philippine islands, and southward to New Guinea and northern Australia. It will stay in waters that arent more than 30 feet deep.
There are 100,000 dugongs around the world National Geographic News, 07, August 23 http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/08/070823-dugongs.html]
About 100,000 dugongsrelatives of the manateeslive in the coastal waters of the South Pacific and Indian oceans.
The Japanese didnt even know the dugongs still existed in Okinawa until the military was surveying for the base Financial Times, May 28, 2010 [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e443c5fe-6a7c-11df-b282-00144feab49a.html]
naturalists thought Okinawas dugong population extinct until military surveyors examining Henokos suitability as a base in the 1990s spotted some.
As many as 50 of the grey-skinned, sumo-wrestler-sized creatures are thought to frequent the bay. Ironically, some
Banning expansion or relocation would solve the dugong and other habitat problems Center for Biological Diversity, May 15, 2010 [http://martinjapan.blogspot.com/2010/05/center-for-biological-diversityletter.html] As Center Conservation Director Peter Galvin explains: Destroying the environmental and social well-being of an area, even in the name of national or global security, is itself like actively waging warfare against nature and human communities. We
implore the U.S. and Japanese governments to cancel any plans to construct or expand military airbases in the last remaining Okinawa dugong habitat.
Its the new base that threatens the ecosystems and species Close The Base.Org, June 17, 2010 [http://www.dmzhawaii.org/?p=7313]
We should halt base expansion in Okinawa not only for peoples sake, but for other species and the sea as well. Henoko, where the two countries are planning to build a massive state-of-art military complex to host accidentprone Osprey helicopters, is located on Oura Bay, a unique fan-shaped bay that holds complex and rich ecosystems those of wetland, sea grass, coral reef, and mangrove that relate to each other and maintain a fragile balance.
The U.S. could stay in the Fuenma base, solving the environmental damage of building the new sea base Associated Press, March 5, 2010 [http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9E8JJJO0&show_article=1] Col. Dale Smith, who commands the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, is undaunted . "We operate just fine out of Futenma," he told The Associated Press on Friday in his first interview with the media. "When a new facility is built and it's fully operational,
that's the day that we will close our doors. We do not have any problem with the way we do business out of the current location of Futenma as it is now, though."
67
AT: Dugong
Multiple alt causes. Thai Society for the Conservation of Wild Animals, 10 (date last modified),
http://www.tscwa.org/wildlife/rare_or_extinct_15.html
numbers of the dugong have fallen rapidly to a critical condition because they have been hunted for food, caught in fishing nets and die as a result. In addition to the long reproduction cycle, dugong eat only sea grasses which are getting scarcer because of pollution, contributing to fewer feeding areas and the possible contamination of existing feeding areas
Today the which might poison the dugong.
68
Dugong: Alt Cause (Bycatch)

Alt Cause- Bycatch The Daily Telegraph 09 (The Daily Telegraph (Australia), Dugong is left to die--- shark nets trap rare visitor,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9647857520&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEV ANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9647857525&cisb=22_T9647857524&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=244786&docNo=3 , 11/26/2009)
A DUGONG was found dead in a Sydney shark net yesterday morning -- more than nine hours after the marine mammal was first reported to be trapped and fighting for its life. The State Government yesterday denied not doing enough to save the creature, which is an endangered species and an exceptionally rare visitor to Sydney's coast. A NSW Police spokesman told The Daily Telegraph yesterday a woman sea kayaker had seen what she believed was a dugong or a seal, trapped and fighting for its life in the shark nets at Coogee Beach and had called NSW Water Police at 8pm.`Àt 8.10pm the Fisheries section of the Department of Primary Industries was notified by water police,'' the police spokesman said. ``Water police at the same time contacted the private contractor in charge of the shark nets.`À water police vessel was in the area -- attending a self-harm incident at The Gap. At 9.15pm they were asked by DPI to confirm if an animal was in the nets. They could not find anything, as it was dark.''About 5.30am yesterday Coogee Surf Life Saving Club members training in their surf boats found the dugong dead and snarled in the net.`Ìt looked like it had tried with all its might to get out -- it looked like it had done a sort of croc roll to try to escape and was covered in twisted netting,'' said Coogee SLSC member Ben Burdett, who was on one of the surf boats yesterday. ``We were all really shocked, everyone felt terrible.''Coogee Beach was buzzing with news of the death of the dugong, an adult about 2m in length.A spokesman for Industry and Investment NSW, a section of the NSW DPI, denied State Government rules intended to save marine life caught in shark nets had failed.
69
Dugong: Alt Cause- Dredging

Alt Cause- Dredging The Australian, 4/1 (Dredging threatens dugongs,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9647728842&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEV ANCE&startDocNo=26&resultsUrlKey=29_T9647728845&cisb=22_T9647728844&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=244777&docNo=49)
UP to 55 million cubic metres of dredge spoil will be dumped on seagrass beds in Gladstone harbour to allow the development of the LNG export industry, despite the risks to the region's dugong population. With Curtis Island, on the
edge of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, already declared the site of planned LNG terminals and wharves, the Bligh government yesterday released maps to indicate the proposed dredging and land reclamation works. The government investigated several sites for
dumping the dredge spoils and settled on an extension of Fisherman's Landing. Seagrass grows in that area -Gladstone is the only dugong feeding place in the region -- and the reclamation site will need to be set back 40m from the foreshore to maintain mangroves. Given the space restrictions, and the fact that the site only provides storage for 29 million cubic metres of the estimated 55 million cubic metres of spoil needing to be dumped, not only will the seagrass be buried but a 50-70m high mound of soil will be visible above the waterline. Premier Anna
Bligh yesterday said the Port of Gladstone was one of the largest mining export facilities on Australia's east coast and one of three major ports in Queensland. ``Last week we witnessed a historic $60 billion LNG agreement and this will present massive opportunities and also many challenges for Gladstone,'' she said.Greens Senate candidate Larissa Waters said the government was ``willing to trade off the health of the residents and the wildlife of Gladstone for royalties''.`Èxpanding dirty industries on the shores of the southern Great Barrier Reef exposes the state government's contempt for our most profitable tourism icon,'' Ms Waters said.`Ìnstead of supporting job-rich clean renewable energy, the state government's fossil fuel obsession is selling out our reef and Queensland's environment.``From dumping dredge spoil on
dugong feeding grounds to facilitating industries which spew out greenhouse gas emissions, this is bad news for the 63,000 people who rely on the reef for employment, and bad news for future generations.''
70
Dugong: Alt Cause (Hunting)

Alt Cause- Dugong is Hunted Cairns Post 6/11(Daniel Bateman,Despair at Far Northern dugong hunts, 6/11/2010,
http://www.cairns.com.au/article/2010/06/11/113581_print-version.html) The society's Far North Queensland representative, Sam Sakamoto, said Japanese people were respectful of native cultures, but
many would be shocked to find endangered dugongs were still being hunted in Australia, using both legal and illegal methods."It is a shock," Mr Sakamoto said. "It doesn't matter which nation is hunting those animals, but I feel very sorry for them, even kangaroos."Every time I see a dead body of a kangaroo on the highway, I feel very sorry for them because we are using their habitat."It comes as the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority steps up its patrols of illegal dugong poaching in the region after the deaths of five dugongs in Cairns waters in the past three months, including two dugongs caught in a net off the coast of Yarrabah last week.GBRMPA chairman Dr Russell Reichelt said compliance patrols would be sent to areas where the practice had been reported."Traditional owners value their right to hunt culturally significant animals in their sea country and respect the importance of doing this in a sustainable way," Dr Reichelt said.Regrettably, the practice by some people of illegally using nets for the purpose of targeting dugong is now impacting on those traditional owners."Traditional owners met in Cairns yesterday for a symposium on the hunting of dugong and
turtles, hosted by Leichhardt Family First candidate Yodie Batzke.She called for a 12-month trial moratorium on hunting turtle and dugong."A moratorium is common sense, it's logic - we need to get some sound management practices right across the board," she said.Danny O'Shane, from the North Queensland Land Council, who attended the symposium, did not support a moratorium on dugong hunting saying it would affect those indigenous communities who depend on it for fresh meat. I don't support the idea of blatant misuse of the resource," Mr O'Shane said."I know that happens and it has to stop. But the way to control that is through the agreement with all the traditional owner groups."GBRMPA indigenous reef advisory committee chairwoman Melissa George said a holistic approach to dugong management was needed.
Traditional Hunting and The Black Market funds Dugong Hunting Schwarten, 09(Evan Schwarten, Minister for public works and information and communication,
leader http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/855525/stop-dugong-hunting-aboriginal-leader)
Stop Dugong hunting: Aboriginal
North Queensland Land Council chair Terry O'Shane said that although traditional owners had the right to hunt the endangered species for traditional purposes, they had a responsibility to protect the environment."What I'm talking to the mobs about is developing a responsible response to those rights," he told AAP."We need to protect the ecosystem."Dugong is an endangered species and we have to recognise that too."His comments come after reports poachers at Yarrabah in far north Queensland have been abusing native title laws to kill dugong and turtles before selling the meat on the black market for up to $50 a kilogram.
No Moratorium on Dugong hunting Brisban Times 6/8, (Brisban Times, No moratorium on dugong hunting, http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/nomoratorium-on-dugong-hunting-20100608-xte8.html)
Federal Environment Minister Peter Garrett will not support a moratorium on killing dugongs, believing better policing and education will stop the gentle animals being hunted to extinction. Mr Garrett was in Cairns today to commit
$15 million to measure water quality improvements made through a federal program that supports farmers to cut the amount of nutrients that leave their farms and flow into the Great Barrier Reef.Calls for a crackdown on illegal dugong netting in far north Queensland have been growing since the bodies of three of the endangered creatures were discovered near Cairns in April.Only one could be saved .Former federal
Liberal MP Warren Entsch, who is contesting the next election, believes indigenous people have taken advantage of laws that allow them to hunt dugong and have set up a lucrative dugong meat industry.Traditional owners can hunt the animals using traditional means, but netting is banned. Conservationist Bob Irwin, father of the late "crocodile hunter"
Steve Irwin, is calling for a moratorium.But Mr Garrett said it was unnecessary at this point. Compliance officers and training programs to ensure dugongs were hunted in sustainable numbers would take time to have an effect, he said."I am confident that if we put those measures in place and see them through then it's an issue that can be properly addressed without a moratorium," Mr Garrett told reporters.Traditional land owners would welcome the support, Mr Garrett said."We recognise that some indigenous people have specific rights, they
are cultural rights, they are not commercial rights," he said."It is just a question of making sure that everybody understands what their rights and responsibilities are and make sure that they put them into practice."
71
No Extinction: Australia/Diverse
10,000 dugongs in Northern Australia alone, no chance of extinction CRC Reef Research, 02 (CRC Reef Research, The Cooperative Research Centre for the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area
(incorporated as CRC Reef Research Centre Ltd) is a knowledge-based partnership of coral reef managers, researchers and industry, http://sydneyaquarium.myfun.com.au/upload/Document/CLA030_17_1_1.pdf)
The remote coast was surveyed in 1984,1985, 1990,1995 and 2000 using the same technique. The number of dugongs did not change significantly during these surveys;this area supports an estimated 10,000 dugongs and 4,400 km2of seagrass.This suggests that the dugong population is stable in the northern Great Barrier Reef.
Diverse spread of Dugong and 85,000 in australia means no probability of extinction The Humane Society 09 (Dugong, http://www.hsus.org/marine_mammals/a_closer_look_at_marine_mammals/dugongs.html)
The large, slow-moving dugong (Dugong dugon) is found in 43 countries along the western Pacific and Indian Oceans (also known as the Indo-Pacific), with populations ranging from the coastal waters of East Africa and the Persian Gulf to Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. With approximately 85,000 animals, Australia has the highest dugong population.
72
***Economy***
73
AT: Econ
Japanese economy is already recovering due to increased car and electronics exporting. Hiroko Tabuchi, 10, business, economics and technology reporter at The New York Times, May 19;
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/business/global/21yen.html
The Japanese economy grew at a healthy clip of 1.2 percent in the first quarter , the government said Thursday, hinting that the countrys recovery from a crippling recession was finally gathering momentum. The expansion from the previous quarter marked the economys fourth quarterly gain in a row; it expanded by 1 percent in the last three months of 2009. Economic recovery in Japan has been bolstered by a rebound in the nations mainstay exports of cars and electronics, which posted the fourth year-on-year
rise in March. The rebound finally appears to be filtering through to domestic production and wages. The Greek debt crisis, which has roiled global markets and caused the yen to surge against the euro, has raised some concerns that Japanese exports might suffer. A strong yen hurts Japanese exporters because it makes their products more expensive overseas, and their foreign-currency earnings are worth less when converted into yen. Japan will continue to experience an upward momentum for the time being, Hirokata Kusaba, senior economist at the Mizuho Research Institute in Tokyo, said in a note Thursday after the economic growth figures were released.
Japans economy is strong. Greg Sheridan, 10 Foreign Editor, The Australian, 6/12
Japanese economy was growing at an annual rate of 5 per cent in the first its fourth consecutive quarter of growth. The Japanese recovery has been export led though there are some signs of growing domestic demand now, too. It is reasonable to ask whether Europe's burgeoning debt crisis, and the need to cut demand through cutting expenditure in Europe and to some extent North America, will hurt Japanese recovery. The early policy statements and actions of Kan, who was finance minister before becoming Prime Minister, all look pretty encouraging.
Official figures released this week indicate the quarter of this year,
74
Kans economic reforms wont help economy

Kans plans are too contradictory of each other he wont be able to avoid the inevitable backlash from doing a policy. He doesnt have many options and the ones that he is going for will only cause him to collapse the economy. Michael Schuman writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME based in Hong Kong. Wednesday, June 23, 2010 Japans economy: Nowhere to hide HYPERLINK "http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/06/23/japan%E2%80%99s-economynowhere-to-hide/?xid=rss-topstories"http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/06/23/japan%E2%80%99s-economy-nowhere-to-hide/?xid=rsstopstories Growth, though, is what Kan is promising, or at least a Japanese version of it. In a long-term economic strategy report
approved by Kans cabinet a few days ago, his government vowed to achieve 2% real growth annually over the next decade. That may not sound like much, but to Japan that would be scorching. The economy has reached GDP growth of 2% or more only five times since 1992, according to IMF data. To meet that target, Kan intends to support new industries, like green energy, and tighten trade links to a growing Asia. But a big part of Kans program is to try to unlock consumer spending in Japan, thus boosting domestic demand, eradicating excess capacity and finally putting an end to deflation. Like his predecessor, Kan intends to achieve those goals by turning to turn Japan into something like a European welfare state, with improved medical and child day-care services and outright subsidies to help families with young children. Heres what Kan said in a June 11 policy speech: If people are anxious about or distrustful of the social security system whether it be about medical treatment or nursing care, pensions or child rearingthey will lack the confidence to allocate their money to consumption. Additionally, many aspects of social security can bring about growth by creating employment. Kans idea is actually a good one, since Japanese continue to save too much and spend too little. But theres a big catch with this plan he may not be able to afford it. Japans government debt is approaching 200% of GDP the highest in the developed world and Kan is feeling the same pressure to rein in fiscal deficits as his counterparts in Europe. Earlier this week, Kans government approved a plan to balance the budget over the next decade. Heres what Kan said about the countrys national finances: The state of Japans public finances is now dire, being the worst of any developed country. Fiscal policy which relies excessively on deficit bond issuance is no longer sustainable. As seen in the instability in the eurozone which originated in Greece, we risk fiscal collapse if we neglect mounting public debt and lose confidence in the bond markets. The scale of Japans outstanding debt is enormous, and will not vanish overnight. This is why it is vital to start right away on fundamental reforms leading to fiscal health. To me, Kans twin goals boosting social security and curtailing deficits and debt seem mutually exclusive. Kan thinks otherwise. He insists there is a way to repair the countrys finances while maintaining his social welfare spending: The view that the economy, public finances and social security are opposed to one another needs to be turned on its head. We should rather see that they exist in a mutually beneficial, win-win relationship Through the inherent function of fiscal policy, our efforts to restore fiscal health will secure stability in the social security system, providing reassurance to the people and leading to sustainable growth. Yet the fiscal pressure is so great that Kan is simultaneously proposiing new taxes that completely run counter to his end goals. Kan intends to double the sales tax to 10% in coming years as a way to raise revenue to plug the deficit. But that will suppress the same consumer spending Kan intends to unleash. The state handouts Kan is giving with one hand hes immediately taking back with the other. Kan will never be able to get Japanese spending if they think their taxes are going to go up. And while increasing the tax burden on the average Japanese, Kan is also talking about giving corporations a tax cut. Again, I see the logic here. Japans corporate tax rate, at 40%, is higher than in other major economies, and by
reducing it, the government can encourage companies to invest more, thereby creating jobs and, in theory, greater tax receipts. But my worry is that Japanese firms wont invest much more anyway. In an economy with high costs, low growth and excess capacity, Id guess that many firms have little incentive to build new factories or open new offices. So what we have here is
a contradictory mix of welfare spending, deficit reduction, tax hikes, tax cuts does any of this make sense? The heart of the problem facing Kan is that the governments finances are such a mess that his policy options are severely constrained. That doesnt bode well for the future of Kans policy agenda. Remember what Martha was trying to run from in her pop hit: the heartaches that I know will come. Japan and its new leader may not be able to avoid the coming heartache either.
75
Kans economic reforms wont help economy

Kan is trying to recover the economy but they are contradictory to what they need- Growth Michael Schuman writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME based in Hong Kong. Wednesday, June 23, 2010 Japans economy: Nowhere to hide HYPERLINK "http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/06/23/japan%E2%80%99s-economynowhere-to-hide/?xid=rss-topstories"http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/06/23/japan%E2%80%99s-economy-nowhere-to-hide/?xid=rsstopstories Looking at Japans latest attempts to restore life to its moribund economy makes me think of the old Martha and the Vandellas song, with the chorus: Got nowhere to run to, baby / Nowhere to hide. The problems of Japan run so
deep that whatever solution Tokyos policymakers offer up, the potential downside could be more frightening than the intended benefits. But we cant blame newly installed Prime Minister Naoto Kan for not trying. Since replacing the discombobulated Yukio Hatoyama this month, Kan has proposed a host of initiatives, which have actually sparked some rare optimism in Japan. T-shirts with the Obama-inspired slogan Yes We Kan have been a local hit. But Kan he? It seems to me that his contradictory programs wont provide Japan with what it really needs growth.
76
Japan economy recovering now

13 Straight months of pure Japanese recovering English.news.cn s the official press agency of the government of the People's Republic of Chin 06-08 2010- Japan's key economic
gauge rises for 13th straight month in April15:27:15 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/business/2010-06/08/c_13339632.htm TOKYO, June 8 (Xinhua) -- Japan's coincident composite index ( CI) rose for a 13th straight month in April, the Cabinet Office said in a preliminary report Tuesday. The coincident composite index, which reflects current business conditions, rose a preliminary 1.1 points in April to 101.6 against the 2005 base of 100. However the index of leading economic indicators, compiled using data such as the number of job offers and consumer sentiment and a gauge of the economy a few months ahead, fell 0.2 point to mark the first fall in 14 months. According to the Cabinet Office the leading CI was adversely affected by a sluggish stock market and drops in inventories and durable goods shipments. The lagging CI, which reflects economic conditions three months before, fell 2.2 points in April at 82.6. Meanwhile, the diffusion index (DI), which shows the share of component indicators showing improvement from three months earlier, came to 100 percent for coincident indicators and 90 percent for leading indicators. The Cabinet Office repeated its recent
assessment based on the coincident CI that the index "shows Japan's economy is improving."
The economy is recovering Kan reforms not key By Takashi Mochizuki Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES JUNE 18, 2010 UPDATE: Japan Lifts Economic View As Export-Driven
Recovery Continues, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100618-702784.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines TOKYO (Dow Jones)--The Japanese government Friday upgraded its assessment of the economy, saying it "has been picking up" as a result of recovering capital investment and strong exports. The government also said in its monthly economic report for June that "the foundation for a self-sustaining recovery is being laid." It was the first time for the government to raise its economic view since March. Last month, it said the economy was picking up but lacks autonomous growth factors. "The gradual economic recovery trend is intact," Economy Minister Satoshi Arai said 87 "A self-sustaining
recovery is coming into sight." Steady overseas demand for Japanese exports and rebounding corporate capital spending helped the economy grow at a 5.0% annualized pace in the first quarter. New Prime Minister Naoto Kan has
called for policies to encourage strong economic growth and fiscal health in the world's second largest economy. The ruling Democratic Party of Japan, which Kan leads, aims for average real growth of over 2% in the decade ahead.
Japanese Economy is growing, projected to double in the next year Takashi Nakamichi, Dow Jones Newswires JUNE 20, 2010 Japan Likely To Nearly Double This FY Growth Forecast Official
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100620-705217.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines TOKYO (Dow Jones)--Japan's government plans to nearly double its growth
projection for the current fiscal year to a price-adjusted 2.6%, a government official familiar with the matter said Monday, as the nation's export-led economic recovery continues to gather pace. The Cabinet Office will release its new growth estimates as early as Tuesday, the official told Dow Jones Newswires. The projection compares with an estimate in January for 1.4% price-adjusted growth, and would be the first yearly expansion of Japan's economy in three years. The official also said the government is likely to predict a continued fall in consumer prices during this fiscal year, though he didn't specify by how much . The planned revision underscores how a recovery in the global economy is helping to offset Japan's domestic problems, which include entrenched deflation and stagnant consumer spending. The world's second largest economy
contracted 2.0% in the last fiscal year after posting a record 3.7% contraction in the preceding year, according to the Cabinet Office. The latest estimates will also include figures for the next fiscal year beginning April 2011, and the focus is on whether policy-makers will predict an end to Japan's persistent deflation in that year. Such a forecast could put more pressure on the Bank of Japan to keep its monetary policy loose to help the government to achieve that goal. The government official declined to comment on those projections. A broad set of growth strategies released last week by Prime Minister Naoto Kan's Administration pledged to try to reverse falling consumer prices during fiscal 2011 through cooperation with the central bank. Japan's economic pickup has been gaining traction over recent
months as robust overseas demand for Japan-made products--particularly from Asia--boosted Japanese industrial production. In the January-March period Japan's economy grew an annualized 5.0%, Cabinet Office data show, the strongest climb in four quarters.
77
***Alliance***
78
AT: Alliance Collapse

The alliance is resilient and will survive the Okinawa crisis Michael Green, 10, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 12 [http://csis.org/publication/12-step-recovery-plan-us-japanalliance]
The U.S.-Japan alliance has seen periods of strategic drift and even crisis before. Usually, the security relationship emerges stronger as each side adjusts to new political realities at home and shared strategic challenges abroad. Will the alliance come out of the current crisis of confidence resulting from the impasse over Marine Corps Air Station Futenma? Probably. Opinion polls in both the United States and Japan continue to show strong support for the security relationship, though increasing anxiety about its health. The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review and preparations for Japans new Mid-term Defense Plan both suggest more convergence than divergence in terms of American and Japanese strategic perceptions and planning for bilateral defense cooperation.
The alliance is fundamentally sound Emma Chanlett-Avery, 09, Specialist Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service
[Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, Feb 19, 2009 Congressional Research Service report, RL34487] Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of
cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, Chinas rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia.
The current Japanese government is not Anti-American Brad Glosserman, 10, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April [http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-19-breaking-pointalliance]
If there is a bright lining to this grim cloud, it is the fact that there is no indication that this government is antiAmerican. Fears that it will jettison its ally, align with China, or go it alone are misplaced. The rhetorical flourishes that the US-Japan partnership is the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy are not empty words.
Overall Japanese public opinion is still very Pro-America Dan Twining, 10, Foreign Policy, June 2, 2010
[http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/02/the_implications_of_hatoyama_s_downfall_for_the_us_japan_alliance] First, Hatoyama misread the domestic politics of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which polling shows to have
stronger support in Japan than at almost any time in the past. Hatoyama's decline and fall were due in large measure to the crisis in U.S.-Japan relations he helped create by opposing a carefully negotiated plan for the redeployment of American forces on Okinawa. His missteps in first blowing up the deal -- then after nine painful months coming around to embrace it after inflating the expectations of the Okinawan people and his own party -- put him on the opposite side of both the United States and a still pro-American Japanese public. The good news is that the political logic of maintaining strong U.S.-Japan ties overcame that of running against the U.S. for political gain.
Opposition to the base is not that intense Gavan McCormack, 10, Emeritus Prof. Australian National University, March 12 [Foreign Policy In Focus,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_travails_of_a_client_state] For a country in which ultra-nationalism was for so long a problem, the weakness of nationalism in contemporary Japan is puzzling. Six and a half decades after the war ended, Japan still clings to the apron of its former conqueror. Government and opinion leaders want Japan
to remain occupied, and are determined at all costs to avoid offence to the occupiers. US forces still occupy lands they then took by force, especially in Okinawa, while the Government of Japan insists they stay and pays them generously to do so. Furthermore, despite successive revelations of the deception and lies (the secret agreements) that have characterized the Ampo relationship, one does not hear any public voice calling for a public inquiry into it. Instead, on all sides one hears only talk of deepening it. In particular, the US insists the Futenma Marine Air Station on Okinawa must be replaced by a new military complex at Henoko, and with few exceptions politicians and pundits throughout the country nod their heads.
79
AT: Alliance Collapse

Many shared values tie relationships together Michael Austin, 10, resident scholar, American Enterprise Institute, April 15[http://www.aei.org/speech/100137]
the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the broader relationship it embodies, remains the keystone of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. There is little doubt that America and Japan share certain core values that tie us together, including a belief in democracy, the rule of law, and civil and individual rights, among others, which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad. Our commitment to these values has translated into policies to support other nations in Asia and around the world that are trying to democratize and liberalize their societies.
Despite this litany of problems both real and perceived,
Issues with North Korea and China have tightened the alliance Dan Twining, 10, Foreign Policy, June 2
[http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/02/the_implications_of_hatoyama_s_downfall_for_the_us_japan_alliance] Second, in a perverse way we may have Kim Jong-Il to thank for this turn of events. North Korea's sinking of the South
Korean destroyer Cheonan and ensuing threats to bring war to East Asia should South Korea retaliate reminded Japan's leaders and people that they continue to live in a very dangerous neighborhood. Aggressive Chinese naval maneuvers in waters near Japan have also reminded Tokyo that Hatoyama's lofty rhetoric about "East Asian fraternity" has its limits. North Korean and Chinese bullying underscored how potentially risky Japan's alliance dispute with America was, and how necessary it was to move rapidly to repair it by agreeing to the U.S. troop realignment on Okinawa.
Prime Minister Naoto Kan will fix the relationship between the U.S. and Japan Michael Green, 10, Assoc Prof., Georgetown Univ., Wall Street Journal, June 13
[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703433704575303592164774492.html] Mr. Hatoyama's successor, Naoto Kan, has virtually no track record on foreign-
and security-policy, but he appears keen to fix these mistakes. In his first week, he called the U.S.-Japan alliance the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy; pledged to follow through on building the replacement for the Futenma air base; cancelled a trip to the Shanghai Expo so that he can meet President Obama before going to China; and presented plans at the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation trade-ministers' summit for a Pacific free-trade area that includes the U.S. Even more encouraging, Mr. Kan has weakened the influence of Mr. Ozawa and shifted the party's center of gravity toward national-security realists associated with Land and Transport Minister Seiji Maehara.
80
***Other***
81
AT: Futenma Key to Relations

The Okinawa base issue is only a small part of Japan-US relations and may get lost in transition to the new government Tze M. Loo, 10 assistant professor of East Asian history at the University of Richmond, Virginia, June 10;
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/opinion/11iht-edloo.html?_r=1 Was Hatoyama doomed to fail from the beginning? Maybe. The
Futenma base issue is only the most visible tip of a much larger configuration of issues relating to the foundations of the postwar Japanese state and U.S.-Japan relations. It was
nave to think that Hatoyama could singlehandedly undo a situation that has been more than 60 years in the making. But there are many ways to fail, and Hatoyama failed particularly badly. He reached an agreement with the United States on May 28 about Futenmas relocation despite the strong, vocal and frequent expressions of opposition from Okinawans. The anger at Hatoyamas betrayal shut down channels of communication between Okinawa and the central government and aggravated local mistrust of the center. It has also exacerbated the sense among Okinawans that mainland Japan is perfectly willing to continue its discriminatory treatment of Okinawa by leaving the island to carry the burden of the U.S.-Japan security relationship from which all Japan benefits. But this is not only about Okinawa. Any serious attempt to
address the question of bases on Okinawa cannot avoid the inextricably linked question of the entire U.S.-Japan security arrangement. In mishandling the Futenma issue, Hatoyama squandered the opportunity to start a frank discussion and perhaps even a rethinking of what Japans role in that relationship is, and what it wants from it. This is crucial for Japan as a whole because a conversation about the countrys future direction (including its existing security relationships) within a rapidly changing East Asia is becoming increasingly necessary. Hatoyama cast his resignation as taking responsibility for failure on the Futenma issue, but this too, looks likely to hurt the situation. Since his resignation, Japanese media and popular attention to the Futenma issue has collapsed, and Okinawas base issue faces the very real risk of getting lost in the transition to the new government. Indeed, the new prime minister, Naoto Kan, has made the Japanese economy his primary focus. Regarding Futenma, he reaffirmed the governments commitment to the May 28 agreement with the U.S. while promising (vaguely) to give attention to reducing Okinawas base burdens.
82
AT: Oppression
1. The Japanese Government has added to the oppression faced by Japanese civilians Jorene Soto, 07 We're Here to Protect Democracy - We're Not Here to Practice It: The U.S. Military's Involvement in Trafficking in
Persons and Suggestions for the Future, Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender 13 Cardozo J.L. & Gender, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/cardw13&id=8&type=text&collection=journals Like the Philippines, women and children were trafficked to Japan from throughout Asia to fulfill the sexual desires of United States military personnel after the United States occupation at the end of World War II. The Japanese government lured hundreds of Japanese
and Korean women and children to areas occupied by United States military personnel with false promises of lodging, clothing, and food.30 When the women and children arrived, they were forced to prostitute themselves to
United States military personnel.3' The Japanese government spent nearly five million dollars to send approximately 70,000 women and children to areas surrounding United States military bases as an "emergency measure to protect our [pure] women and children from sex starved American soldiers."32 The Japanese Interior Ministry even recruited members of the Japanese army's women's corps to "bear the unbearable and be a shield for all Japanese women."33 Fine restaurants were turned into brothels with Japanese-government supplied prostitutes. United States military personnel paid eight cents for admission to the restaurant, a bottle of beer, and the services of a prostitute
2. The U.S. military and Japanese civilian are working together to reduce problems Global Security 09
[www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm]
The bases and communities cooperate on issues affecting them both. Military aviation units have adjusted flying hours to reduce aircraft noise over civilian neighborhoods and schools. Okinawan real estate agents go out of their way to help service families find off-base housing near their work place and schools. And both communities -- military and civilian -invite each other to participate in festivals and other social events.
83
AT: Global Instability (1/2)

1. Impacts empirically deniedUS troops have been in Japan since WWII without causing conflict. 2. U.S. withdrawal would leave Japan vulnerablethey lack the technology to counter China and North Koreamakes conflict more likely. William C. Middlebrooks, 08, Jr., policy program manager at the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network for the Department of the
Treasury; (Beyond Pacifism: Why Japan Must Become a Normal Nation, pg. xvii) http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=g66eH6KCnIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=Japan+military+rearm+&ots=Lh3wa4QdUc&sig=ZEcKE1J_o1cHOc9l4zwHUNNhDSM#v=onepage&q=J apan%20military%20rearm&f=false In North Korea, Japan has a calculating and determined foe willing and able to commit mass murder in its desperate struggle to prop up its cadaverous regime. North Koreas launch of a Taepo Dong-I missile over the northern part of Japan in August 1998, and its test of at nuclear device eight years later, provided irrefutable proof not only that Japan is at risk as never before, but that the Japanese are ill equipped to counter North Korean aggressions. Because of Article 9 and decades of cautious interpretation, Japan is unprepared in almost every conceivable way to face the menace on the western shore of the Sea of Japan: Japans Air Self Defense Force does not have the capability to hit North Korean launch sites and return should Tokyo decide to strike preemptively, no branch of the SDF possesses land attack cruise missiles, and, even if such weapons were in its arsenal, Japan has not developed institutions and doctrines configured for a quick response to any North Korean threat. If that were not enough, the threat that a resurgent China poses (eager as it is to reacquire the dominant role in the region that it has not played in centuries) is potentially a more pronounced danger to Japans long-term interests. Japans ability to protect itself hinges on its willingness to break free of the inertia generated by 60 years of living under the premise that pacifism is a viable alternative to the immoral and ineffective reliance on crude violence as a means to defend ones homeland. The premise is false, of course, because Japan has rested its defense, not on the good wishes of the worlds people, but entirely upon the promise of the greatest military power in the history of mankind to go to war on Japans behalf should it be attacked. That promise is no longer sufficient to ensure Japans well-being.
U.S.-Japan alliance key to stability in volatile, proliferated East Asia. Richard L. Armitage, 00, et al, study group organized by National Defense University, 2000. (National Defense University)
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Spelreprts/SR_JAPAN.HTM Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but
the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the worlds largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moments notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the worlds fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the regions de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the worlds second-largest economy and a well-equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to Americas global security strategy.
84
AT: Global Instability (2/2)

Withdrawal weakens US-Japan Alliance Japan may proliferate and become U.S. rival. Daizo Sakurada, 97, Associate Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of Integrated Arts & Sciences of the University of
Tokushima in Japan, July, For Mutual Benefit: The Japan-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese Perspective http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Working_Papers/WP07.pdf The withdrawal of the US military forces from Japan would represent a fundamental disengagement of US military commitments in East Asia; it would signify the end of American trustworthiness. Fearing Japans remilitarization, no state in the AsiaPacific region, except perhaps North Korea, seeks the termination of the Treaty. Once the Treaty is abolished, Japan would be forced to consider options that Washington would currently regard as unpalatable. Japan may decide to take on a more independent strategic role in the region. The SDF could be developed to a greater potential, and could be used directly in support of its foreign policy goals. Strategic links with China and Russia could be reconsidered. Moreover, Japan might have to seriously consider a nuclear option. At the extreme both Japan and the US could grow to regard each other as hostile entities.44 The Treaty provides a mechanism to avoid this strategic rivalry and to deepen the cooperative strategic
relationship between Japan and the United States.
Japanese leadership supports U.S. alliance and presence. CBS News, 6-22- 10. CBS News: US-Japan Security Pact Turns 50, Faces New Strains.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/22/ap/asia/main6605396.shtml (AP) TOKYO (AP) Uncertainty over a Marine base and plans to move thousands of U.S. troops to Guam are straining a post-World War II security alliance Japan and the United States set 50 years ago, but Tokyos new leader said Tuesday he stands behind the pact.
Prime Minister Naoto Kan said he sees the arrangement as a crucial means of maintaining the balance of power in Asia, where the economic and military rise of China is looming large, and vowed to stand behind it despite recent disputes with Washington. Keeping our alliance with the United States contributes to peace in the region, Kan said in a televised question-and-answer session with other party leaders. Stability helps the U.S.-Japan relationship, and that between China and Japan and, in turn, China and the United States. The U.S.-Japan alliance, formalized over violent protests in 1960, provides for the defense of Japan while assuring the U.S. has regional bases that serve as a significant deterrent to hostilities over the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan.
U.S. presence in past big help to Japanese economy limits Japans own defense budget. CBS News, 6-22- 10. CBS News: US-Japan Security Pact Turns 50, Faces New Strains.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/22/ap/asia/main6605396.shtml
The large U.S. presence over the past five decades has allowed Japan to keep its own defense spending low, to about 1 percent of its GDP, and focus its spending elsewhere a factor that helped it rebuild after World War II to become the worlds second-largest economy. Even though there are some small problems here and there, in the bigger sense the relationship remains strong, said Jun Iio, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in
Tokyo. Very few people think that it is actually necessary to make major changes in the alliance.
85

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LRHS Debate Neg V. (1.

Kuwait Presence Good Joshua/Sam

Okinawa Japan Neg Master File

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