Q. What according to J.Watkins is Humean scepticism? How does Hume himself respond to it?

In his paper Scepticism and Irrationalism, J. Watkins gives us an insightful overview of the tradition of scepticism and its affect on epistemological concerns. His focus centres on a particular kind of scepticism, the one presented by Hume in his Treatise on Human Understanding. Watkins follows its course in Western philosophic thought and its implication of irrationalism on knowledge claims about the external world alongside the reactions it has provoked since its inception in the late eighteenth century. This paper will give a brief outline of these reactions and will then deal with the above question. Scepticism may be seen as the generic term for a denial or doubt on the possibility of knowing which then poses a threat to the Epistemological enterprise. Humean scepticism doesnt imply a global scepticism of the kind that disavows all claims of knowledge, it allows us most of our egocentric knowledge1 , it also allows for knowledge to proceed from logical reasoning (justified belief). But it denies a basic assumption behind knowledge of the external world, i.e. it denies the jump from perceptible experience to general laws based on rational grounds, from particular instances to determinate or even probable knowledge about the world based on inductive reasoning. The principle of causality or causal relation that seems to carries us from immediate experience to stable predictions, from experience of the past to beliefs about the future; that which seems to account for so much of what we expect in the world, the assumption of causality. Denying its existence by the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas2 knowledge based on causal connection becomes far from certain or objective and is relegated to unjustified belief; to an irrational psychological process of habit. According to Watkins, because Humean scepticism pertains only to knowledge of the external world it gets saved from being selfundermining or in his words one can know (perhaps on logical grounds) that there can be no genuine knowledge of an external world as it doesnt entail a global scepticism. He re-presents Humes theory that all our beliefs about the external world cannot count account as knowledge as follows:

1. 2. 3.

there are no synthetic a prior truths about the external world;(anti-apriorist thesis) any genuine knowledge we have of the external world must ultimately be derived from perceptual experiences;(experientialist thesis) only deductive derivations are valid.(deductivist thesis)

This entails that for any statement h to count as knowledge, there must exist true premises e that report perceptual experiences and from which h is derivable. However h talks about the external world and e only reports perceptual experiences then h has gone beyond e and thus is not logically derivable from e. Watkins identifies two main strategies as responses to this. The first, denies one or the other of the above three arguments or modifies them to refute scepticism and the second retains them to some degree to cope with scepticism. Anti-sceptic Strategies include the likes of Apriorist strategy which denies proposition 1 subsequently modifying statement 3; Transcendental arguments modify proposition 2 claiming that certain principles are not themselves established by ordinary induction but may be proved in the argument form this principle must be true if scientific knowledge is to be possible; Probabilist strategies retain assertion 3, but adds that logic of partial entailment is a generalization of classical logic or that where h is not entailed e, we may establish with probabilistic logic, that h is more or less confirmed by e; the Nondeductivist enterprise denies proposition 3 believing that inference neednt always be deductive to be valid; Naturalistic strategy like that employed by Hume who concede that there is no epistemological answer to scepticism adding that scepticism is only an academic pursuit, that nature has endowed us with a strong enough cognitive machinery not to be troubled by the problems illuminated by scepticism... etc. Noting that these strategies do not always imply a mutually exclusive application, Watkins exclaims that they are often used in conjunction with each other. The point Watkins brings forward is that sometimes two or more strategies are bracketed together, for example the nondeductivist and probabilist strategies, versions of which come close together3 but there are versions that stand distinctly apart and should be treated thus.4
1 2

beliefs, feelings and perceptual experiences- Skepticism and Irrationalism, J. Watkins Treatise, David Hume. All one actually perceives are impressions of contiguity in space and time. 3 Versions of probabilistic strategies like the subjectivist or personalist ones that allow us to distribute initial probabilities according to taste come rather close to nondeductivism, Skepticism and Irrationalism, J. Watkins, p5
4

The version of the probabilist strategy to which Watkins refers tries to provide a nonarbitrary and impersonal measure of initial and relative probabilities. The probabilistic logic dealing with such a demand must be perfectly explicit. However, the nondeductivist strategy does not generalize classical logic but postulates a peculiar, nondeductive relation between statements whereby e provides inductive proof for h without entailing it. As Watkins notes, the nature of this mysterious relation is not perfectly explicit at all.

There are other defences against scepticism such as Strawsons anti sceptic argument5 but Watkins points out that the above three propositions present no self contradiction. Strategies for coping with scepticism: He then goes on to elaborate the Paradigm Case Argument against scepticism according to which some descriptive expressions figuring in debates between defenders and critics of common sense have meanings that cannot be explained or described verbally but can only be ostensively shown by pointing to paradigm cases or exemplars of it, for example Malcolms paradigmatic case for understanding material thing or Lockes simple ideas such as mauve patch. Let F be such a description and let us concede with common sense defenders (against Humes scepticism) that such descriptions do exist or that there are things that are F. Watkins believes that there are indeed some expressions, F: mauve patch or dusty smell and other Lockean simple ideas that cannot be understood without one actually having had a perceptual experience of them in the past but he believes that if such an argument is used by defenders of common sense against Humean Scepticism which allows ego-centric knowledge of mental existents, the Paradigm Case Argument would imply an extension beyond simple ideas to some ideas in the external world. Using Freges distinction between sense and reference, (I can grasp a sense but this does not assure us of a reference and its converse, to know what an expression refers to does not ensure that one has grasped its sense), Watkins shows Malcolms theory of ostensive description to be false by showing that the meaning of material thing can only be understood through a discursive explanation, a verbal description and cannot be just pointed to or ostensively shown. The meaning of material thing has indeed been quite satisfactorily defined, first by Descartes6, and subsequently been added to by more nuanced descriptions by Newton7 and Locke8. There is no way that the understanding by ostensive pointing can explain how a microscopic atom or the Milky Way may be considered material things. That we can grasp its sense by discursive explanation does not refute the idealists claim that it has no reference. Another defence of induction comes from Wittgensteins notion of Language Game as a form of life, informed by rules. These rules may be subordinate to, defended by appeals to, higher rules and ultimately to a supreme rule that is subordinate to no others. There defence cannot appeal to any higher rules; nor may they be defended by rules outside of the particular form of life. The form of life is given, as it is, it is the horizon of expectations or paradigm to which a body of knowledge or epistemic theory subscribes. Science subscribes to a form of life in which the principle of induction is the reigning rule. This principle is indefensible, it doesnt need a defence as it is itself the supreme rule of the scientific game or scientific form of life. Inductive reasoning does not fail any standard of rationality but is the measure of rationality. It is what sets the standard of rationality. Once it is realised that there is no higher court of justification to appeal to, inductive reasoning is easily seen to act as judge in its own case.9 Thus, in choosing between one form of life, say science with its reigning rule of inductive reasoning and another form of life, say magic with its particular supreme law, there lies no rational method in preferring or adopting one over the other. According to Watkins this implies a relativist thesis implicit in Wittgensteins idea of forms of life as given. He goes onto quote Gellner that relativism is a price worth paying if it enables us to confound the sceptic. In other words, a sceptic doubt about sciences method of inductive reasoning gets confounded if one adopts Wittgensteins prolific theory of form of life and the relativism implicit in it. Inductive reasoning does lead to knowledge (of the external world) because we choose to inhabit the scientific world; once we choose this form of life we have to accept whatever is given in it, inductive reasoning being its supreme principle, it doesnt require further justification. These were elucidations of some of the anti-skeptic arguments. We come now to Watkins rendition of Humean Scepticism. Some of the above arguments do have a bearing in understanding Watkins portrayal and answer to Humean Scepticism. He opens the section on Scepticism and Doubt with a popularly held view of scepticism as doubt. the mental state lying between belief and disbelief. According to this school of thought, a self professed sceptic who cannot help believing something about which he claims to be a sceptic is not a genuine sceptic; that it is psychologically impossible for a Humean sceptic to doubt all he professes to be sceptical about. They thus conclude that genuine scepticism is impossible. Watkins re-interpretation of Humean Scepticism sees it as a strictly epistemological theory. He thus adheres to Humes notion that our beliefs about the external world cannot be justified as knowledge claim. He considers this position to be analogous to the one propogated in moral philosophy whereby there can be no objective justification for any system of moral beliefs. Just as a moral philosopher in this position neednt abandon his own standard or preference of morality to concede that there are no objectively valid moral positions, the Humean Sceptic neednt abandon or anaesthetize his own personal beliefs. All they must do is admit that they have no rational methods or can offer no rational defence of their choice. Just as the moral philosopher can dislike moral values of some point of view that conflicts with his but can offer no rational basis for the discrimination between the two, the sceptic may hold as many beliefs as he wishes but is obliged to maintain that he has no rational defence of them, that he cannot justify them. There lies a midway between justified belief and unbelief, that of unjustified belief. Thus a sceptic may believe a number of things of which there are no epistemological justifications.

Ibid.p 6 scepticism is an incoherent position, it sets up a standard of knowledge that is self-contradictorily high Strawsons quote 6 Material things are extended (i.e. three dimensional) 7 They resist displacement or possess inertia 8 They resist compression 9 Ibid. Ayers (1956)words

It is worth noting here, as Watkins himself exclaims that in his conception of Humean scepticism he retains only a part, the most decisive and radical part of Humes entire attack on the possibility of knowledge and knowledge claims. He believes that complying with Humes naturalist conclusion that scepticism presents itself only as an academic joke and thus neednt be answered would lead to and encourage a form of irrationalism. Watkins leads us through an historical excursis dealing with attempts to answer Humean scepticism dabbling briefly from Thomas Reid up to Kant. He ends this section reminding us that Kants synthetic a priori thesis borne as an answer to Hume and accommodated to validate Newtonian physics is now believed to be a magnificent ruin and goes on to elucidate Humes first principle. the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas He consrues this to be in some sense a reformulation of Epicurean sensationalism, There is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses According to Watkins, Hume brought out the implications of this belief for the possibility of knowledge of physical reality beyond our senses. Imagine its bearing on a statement about the sun as: something existing even at night, as an immense mass composed mainly of hydrogen and exerting a gravitational pull such that it keeps the earth in its orbit. According to Watkins, sensationalism would imply that this statement taken literally and realistically, fails to express an idea. Neither hydrogen nor gravitational pull are entities of which we have impressions. According to sensationalism and Hume, these terms would render no ideas since I can have no sense impressions of them. Now, from my sense impressions I derive an idea of the sun as a big yellow disc, but can I have an idea of the physical sun different from my mental image of the sun? According to Hume, nothing is present to the mind but perceptions and all ideas are got from things antecedently present to the mind, thus it is impossible for us to even conceive of ideas independent of other ideas and impressions. Hume in his Treatise had exclaimed, thus i deceive myself when i believe that i have an idea of the sun as a body with a continuous existence independent of my perceptions and concluded with certainty that the notion of a continued and distinct existence never arises from the senses. Watkins uses the label irrealism for the sceptical belief that it is impossible for us even to form the idea of a body that has a continued existence independent of our minds. Thus according to Watkins, Humes remarks on sensationalism would imply an irrealism. Watkins asks us to assume for a moment that the above statement is true and presents us with a choice. Either in alliance with Hume we accept sensationalism and thus its implication of irrealism or against him we deny irrealism and consequently reject sensationalism. Taking first the case of sensationalism, Watkins reintroduces the Kantian notion- percepts without concepts are blind or that sensations must be structured by categories and Poppers priority of hypothesis before observation or the existence of a horizon-of-expectations before observation. Thus according to Watkins, we cant accept sensationalism without at least questioning it or that arguments proposed by the above philosophers, Kant and Popper, reinstate a question mark against sensationalism. He then proceeds to review irrealism. At the onset, Watkins views this thesis to be self-refuting. In trying to understand a meaning for the three sentences, There are no centaurs; There are no round squares; There are no ibeims, based on Humes idea of positive and negative existential statements (the non-existence of anything is as clear and distinct as the idea of its existence; or more generally, in order to understand a positive or negative existential statement we must be able to form an idea of the kind of thing that it declares to exist or not exist)10 we successfully derive meaning for the first statement, we can in imagination form an amalgamation made up from the various features particular to centaurs; the second sentence is also meaningful but cannot be amalgamated in imagination; the third sentence is a little more tricky for deriving meaning. If we attach no meaning to ibeim does it mean then that there are no ibeims? Replacing ibeims with the idea of a body existing independently of mind we get there is no idea of a body existing independently of mind. This is Humes irrealist thesis. But what idea can one attach to the italicized portion? As Watkins remarks, the sentence itself states that it cant have an idea attached to it. This constitutes a paradox, thus if Humes thesis is true, no one would understand it. The paradox is better explained with an example. Imagine a world in which all living creatures are blind with the exception of a Mr. David who publishes a book in Braille and it contains the sentence no idea of the colour red exists This sentence would be false, as Mr. David has an idea of red. Now, what if even he was blind and the book was published with the same sentence? Wouldnt it be unintelligible even to him? So if Humes thesis is true, nobody, not even Hume will be able to understand it. But Hume obviously considered his irrealist thesis meaningful, as does Watkins but then this would imply that it was false. Now astronomers who have an idea of black holes, this idea couldnt have existed independently of minds, but an idea of things,that if they do exist, exist independently of our minds. This was Reids criticism of Hume, that since sensationalism implies irrealism, sensationalism must be false. Whether humes sensationalism inevitably leads to irrealism hinges on his distinction between impressions and their derivatives, i.e. ideas. According to Watkins in compliance with Mandelbaum, the integral distinction presupposes a necessary realistic assumption. Hume based the distinction on force and liveliness of impressions in contrast to the faint images of these impressions that then characterize ideas, but himself admitted that some ideas furnished by imagination could be more vivid and forceful than impressions. Mandelbaum and Watkins thus surmise agreeing with Hume that what characterizes all original impressions ...is the fact that they must be attributed to causes lying outside of experience. They maintain that Humes sensationalism presupposes some sort of physical reality, thus rejecting irrealism.

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as long as we have ideas of the terms in the positive existential statement, its corresponding negative existential statement is equally meaningful. Conversely, if we have no answers to the terms that occur in an existential statement it becomes meaningless both in its positive and negative forms. Ibid. p16

Prescribing to the Naturalist attitude that scepticism is an academic joke and that other than for the pleasure of philosophical pursuit, one neednt entertain the threats imposed by scepticism Hume didnt need to find an answer to scepticism. According to him, inspite of knowing that theyre irrational, the natural beliefs endowed in humans are ones he cannot help but believe much like the fear of heights, they furnish him with an ability to get on in life by forming general beliefs based on observed patterns. Theyre strong enough not to be deterred by sceptic threat. Humean scepticism doesnt have and doesnt need an answer. Since our faith in causality, in spite of being an irrational psychological habit doesnt engender our daily living we neednt be troubled or lose sleep over the sceptics nightmare, according to Watkins holding such an stand, we are encouraged into a dangerous irrationalism. What are the options for such a sceptic who believes it is irrational to accept any hypothesis? Watkins presents us with three alternatives. 1. 2. He discards some or all of the hypothesis he had previously accepted without accepting any new ones to replace them He retains all of his previously accepted beliefs without changing them knowing the irrationality of retaining them He switches some or all of his original beliefs knowing the irrationality of doing so, i.e. the non rational justification behind one cannot justify choosing one system of knowledge over another.

3.

Watkins believes that Hume would have rejected the third alternative, switching to a new faith on account that all hypothesis are irrational in any case and that his psychological theory would rule out option one so Hume would choose the second option. This is where we detect the radical difference between Watkins view of the implication of Humean scepticism and Humes response to his self proposed scepticism. They agree to the point that like the moral philosopher, the sceptic cannot admit to having a rational, logical base for claims to knowledge; he cannot defend his stand on logical grounds, cannot offer reasons for holding his unjustified belief but differ in responding to what the implications of holding these unjustified beliefs would be. Humes response to this construal would be that it neednt bother us. We should just accept the natural beliefs one is endowed with knowing throughout that theyre irrational. Watkins however wants to reach the third alternative. His notion appears to reiterate Wittgensteins form of life argument.

Humes monist thesis according to Watkins, a. there is one way of forming our beliefs about the world and that we do this instinctively and as inevitably as we breathe and feel. The general beliefs we form about those natural regularities of which we have all had experiences tend to converge, despite local variations due to peculiarities in each persons individual experiences.

b.

He then undertakes a lengthy discussion of what the basic canons of induction for belief formation might be. This deals with the first part of the monoist thesis. Watkins shows this to be empirically refuted. He then turns to the second part and again shows this to be empirically refuted largely basing his proof on the social anthropologist experience of Azande when they believe themselves to be bewitched. There isnt one essential way by which all of humanity forms its beliefs. And the same experiences had by different people lead to different beliefs, they do not all tend to converge.

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Good work!