18 2

Vol. 18 , No . 2

2010 4
Chinese Journal of Management Science
Ap r. , 2010
:1003 - 207 (2010) 02 - 0157 - 08

1 ,2
( 11 , 410012 ; 21 , 410205 )
:
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( 2004) [ 12 ] ,

[ 1 ]

,
( )

[2 ]

,
( 2007 ) [ 13 ]

[ 3 - 5 ]

Dar2
dis ( 1975) [ 6 ] ,

Salman Cruz J r. ( 1981 ) [ 7 ]

Stackelberg ,

( 2006 ) [ 8 ] ,

Wagener ( 2001) [ 9 ] Bert rand

[ 14 - 16 ] ,

, ,

( 2006 ) [ 10 ] ,

( 2007 ) [ 11 ] ,
:2009 - 07 - 01 ; :2010 - 03 - 24
: (20060532021)
: (1975 - ) , ( ) , ,
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.

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Co urnot

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 2010

158

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,
2 ,

1 , 1 2
, 1
: 2
;
2 ,

, q1 q2 1 2 ;
1
2 1 2 ; c

; c 1
,
,
; k ( k 0)
; ;
[ 0 , 1 ]

3 : 1 2
, q1 q2
:
p = a - q1 - q2

, a > 0 , q1 0 , q2 0 , ( q1 + q2 ) a
4 : 1 2 ,

1

:
,
k ; 1
2 ;
1
,
2. 2

1 : ( 0 , 1 ]
,
,


,

2 : ,

,

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:
U G = [

( q1 + q2 )

+ ( 1 - ) (1 + 2 )

+ c ( q1 + q2 ) + (k - 1 ) cq1 ]

( 1)

2 ,
TC ( q2 ) = cq2 ( c > 0)
1 ,
,
TC ( q1 ) = ( c - c ) q1 +kcq1 ( c c > 0) ,
1
, , 1
; 1

, 1 2
, :
1 = [ a - q1 - q2 - c - (k - 1) c ] q1
2 = [ a - q1 - q2 - c] q2
: a > c

( 2)
( 3)
( 4)

3
,
,
, ,
,
k 1 cq1 ,
1 kcq1
3. 1

kcq1 , 1
2 Co urnot ( 2 )
( 3 ) , 1 2
:

 2 :

51
= a - 2 q1 - q2 - c - (k - 1 ) c
5 q1
52
= a - q1 - 2 q2 - c
5 q2

( )

1 2
, 0 q1 q2 ,
1 2 Co urnot
:
3

q1
3

q2

( a - c) - 2 (k - 1) c

3
( a - c) + (k - 1 ) c

( 5)
( 6)

1 : ,
( kc ) (
) ( c )
,
( )

: Q13
, Q23
, :
c > 0 , 1
, ( 5) ( 6 ) ,
:
Q1

2 ( a - c) - (k - 1 ) c
3

, c = 0 c
= 0 ( 5 ) ( 6 ) :
3

Q2

159

2 ( a - c)
3

,kc < c , Q13 > Q23 ; kc =

c , Q13 = Q23 ; kc > c , Q13 < Q23
1
,
,
,
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2 : ,
( kc ) (
) ( c )
,

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= 2 - 1 , ( 5 )

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( 3 ) ,
, :
2
2
(
) c + 2 ( a - c) (k - 1) c

= - k - 1
3
( 7)
( 4) : a - c > 0 c > 0 , ,
< 0 ; k = 1 ,
= 0;
k < 1 ,
3
3
k > 1 , q1 0 q2 0 , :
( a - c) 2 (k - 1) c ( a - c) - (k - 1 ) c
( 8)
k > 1 , ( 8) :
a - c 2 (k - 1) c

( 7) , :

(k - 1) 2c2 > 0 2
, ,

,
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,

3. 2
, 1
2 ,
k 3 3 ( 5) ( 6) ( 1) , :
( 10 - 21) c2 (k - 1) 2
1 (
UG =
[ 2 - 3) a
18
9
+ 2 ( 3 - 1) c]c (k - 1) +

2 ( a - c)
[ a + ( 3- 1) c]
9
( 9)

U G k , :
( 10 - 21) c22
dU G
=
[k
dk
9
( 2 - 3) a + 2 ( 3 - 1) c + ( 10 - 21) c
]
( 10 - 21) c

( 10)

k 3 U G k 0 ,
( 10) :
( 2 - 3) a + 2 ( 3 - 1) c + ( 10 - 21) c
3
k =
( 10 - 21) c
( 11)
10
: 0 <
, U G k ;
21
10
10
=
, U G k ;
<
21
21

 2010

160

1 , U G k
: ( 9) , U G k ,

:
2
( 10 - 21) c22
d UG
=
2
9
dk

c , > 0 , ,

10
< 1 ,
21

d UG
< 0 , U G k ; 0 <
2
dk
2
d UG
10
,
> 0 , U G k ;
2
21
dk

= 10 , ( 9) :
21
- 2 ( 2 a + 3 c) ck + 2 ( a - c) ( 7 a + 3 c)
UG =
63
2 ( 2 a + 3 c) c
+
63
a , c ,c , > 0 , U G k

10
3 :
< 1 a - c > c
21
10
3
3
k 0
< 1 a - c c k
21
- ( a - c) + c

,
c
, ,

: ( 8) :
- ( a - c) + c
a - c + 2c
( 12)
k
c
2c
, ( 5 ) ( 6 ) q13 + q23 a ,
:
k

- ( a + 2 c) + c
c

( 13)

a > c c > 0 > 0 , ( 12 )

( 13) k 0 k ,
:
( i) a - c > c , :

0 k

a - c + 2c
2c

( 14)

( ii ) a - c c , :
- ( a - c) + c
a - c + 2c
k
c
2c

( 15)

, k 3 ( 14 ) ( 15 )
( 14 ) ( 15 ) kmax =
a - c + 2c
kmax
2c
, kmax ( 5) ( 6) , q11

q2 1 2 , q1
1

= 0 , q2 =

( a - c)

, 1 ,

2
k 3 , k 3
3
kmax
kmax ( 11) , k 3
, :
3
dk
12 a + 18 c
=
( 10 - 21) 2c
d
a , c ,c , > 0 ,

dk
3
> 0 , k
d

= 1 ( 11) , k 3
a - 4 c + 11c
3
3
kmax
=
kmax
kmax ,
11c
:
3

kmax - kmax =

- 9 a + 3c
22c

( 4) , : - 9 a + 3 c < 0 , c , >
3
3
0 , k 3 kmax
< kmax , k ( 14 )
( 15) , 3
, k 3 ( 14) ( 15 ) ,
10
3
,
< 1 , k U G ,
21
3 , k 3
, k 3 3
, k 3 , k 3
< kmax ,
,
3
, ,

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,

: ,
, ,
,
, ,

,

2 ( a - c)
1 : a 4 c
1
3 ( a - 2 c)
3
k 0 ,

 2 :

: k 3 3 ( 14)

: c c > 0 , :
a - c 3 c > c

( 15) U G k , k

, :
( 1) 0 < 10 , , U G
21

a 4 c > 0 , :
2 ( a - c)
10
2 ( 2 a + 3 c)
=
> 0
3 ( a - 2 c)
21
21 ( a - 2 c)

10
<
1
21

k 3 0 , 3 :
1 , k 3
k 3 3 , :
k

3 3

( 2 - 3) a + 2 ( 3 - 1) c + ( 10 - 21)c
( 10 - 21)c

3 , k

161

( k

3 3

k 3 3
( 14) ( 15 ) , k a c
c , ,
- ( a - c) + c
a - c + 2c
0 ,
,
k 3 3 = 0
c
2c

k3 3 =

2 ( a - c)
1 ,
3 ( a - 2 c)

(
)
1
3 3
= 2 a - c , : kmin
=

3 ( a - 2 c)

- ( a - c) + c

, k 3 3 =

- ( a - c) + c
( 5)
c

( 6) , q21 q22 1 2
, q21 = a - c , q22 = 0 1

( k 3 3 - 1) c 0

, 2
a - c + 2c
, k 3 3 =

2c

2 : 1 ,

3 3
k 3 3 kmin
=

1
,,c > 0 , :

,
1

, ,
( a 4 c )
3

,

4 : ( a )
( c )
( c )
:
( 1) 0 < 10 ,
21

( 2) = 10 , U G k ,
21

k U G ( 14 ) ( 15 )
, a - c > c , k 3 3 = 0 U G ; a - c
- ( a - c) + c
c , k 3 3 =
U G
c
( 3) 10 < 1 , 3 , k 3
21
( 14) ( 15 ) , k 3
k

3 3

, :
k

3 3

( 2 - 3) a + 2 ( 3 - 1) c + ( 10 - 21)c
( 10 - 21)c

k 3 ( 14) ( 15) , k 3 < kmax ,

: a - c > c , k 3 < 0 ; a - c c , k 3 <

, ,

- ( a - c) + c
( 10 ) , k
c

( 2) = 10 ,
21

, ;
( 3) 10 < 1 ,
21

, ,
( 2 - 3) a + 2 ( 3 - 1) c + ( 10 - 21) c
3 3
k
=

( 10 - 21) c

dU G
< 0 , U G k k
dk

U G , k 3 3 = 0
- ( a - c) + c
k3 3 =

c
, 4

[ 16 ] ,
,
,

162

2010

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, ( )
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2 : ,

: 4 , [ 0 ,
1 ] , a c c ,
- ( a - c) + c
k 3 3 = 0 k 3 3 =

2 c1 c

k 3 3 = 0 ,k 3 3 c = 0 < c ; k 3 3
- ( a - c) + c
=
, ( 4) k 3 3 c = c c
( a - c) < c 2 ,k 3 3 c <
c ,
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[ 17 ,18 ]
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a
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c2 c 0 . 01 c1
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,

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 2 :

163

1 2 ,
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,

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c1 c2 1 2

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 2010

164

, ,

[J ] . , 2006 , 14 :197 - 200.

,
,

[ 9 ] Wagener ,A. Do uble Bert rand tax co mpetition : A fiscal

game wit h government s acting as middlemen [J ] . Re2
gio nal Science and U rban Eco no mics , 2001 , 31 (2) : 273
- 297.

[ 10 ] , , .

[ J ] . , 2006 , 14 ( 1) : 136 -

[ 1 ] Schwartz , M. S. , Carroll , A. B. . Corporate social re2

sponsibility : a t hree - do main app roach [ J ] . Business

141.
[ 11 ] , .

Et hics Quarterly , 2003 , 13 ( 4) : 503 - 530.

[J ] . ,2007 , 12 ( 12 ) :85

[ 2 ] Lanto s , G. P. . The boundaries of st rategic co rpo rate

social responsibility [J ] . Jo urnal of Consumer Market 2

- 89.
[ 12 ] , , .

ing , 2001 , 18 ( 7) : 595 - 630.

[ 3 ] . [J ].

, 2007 ,146 ( 4) : 129 - 1371

[ 4 ] Qu , R. . Effect s of government regulations , market ori2
entation and ownership st ruct ure on corpo rate social re2
sponsibility in china : an empirical st udy [ J ] . Interna2

[J ] . , 2004 , 22 ( 3) :44 - 46.

[ 13 ] , .

[J ]. , 2007 , 170 (11) :150 - 151.

[ 14 ] . [J ]. , 2003 ,
( 3) : 112 - 115.
[ 15 ] Albareda , L . , et al. The changing role of government s

tio nal Journal of Management , 2007 , 24 ( 3) : 582 - 591.

in co rporate social respo nsibility : Drivers and respon2

[ 5 ] Steurer , R. . The role of government in co rpo rate social

ses[J ] . Business Et hics : A European Review , 2008 ,

respo nsibility : Characterizing p ublic policies on CSR in

Europe[J ] . Policy Sciences , 2010 , 43 (1) :49 - 72.

17 (4) : 347 - 363.

[ 16 ] .

[ 6 ] Dardis , R. . Sho rt and long term co st consequences of

government regulations to consumers [ J ] . Associatio n

[J ] . , 2009 , 252 (3) : 5 - 17.

[ 17 ] . [ N ].

fo r Consumer Research , 1978 , 5 (1) : 377 - 379.

[ 7 ] Salman , M. A. , Cruz , J r. J . B. . An incentive model
of duopoly wit h government coo rdinatio n [J ] . Auto mat 2

, 2008/ 09/ 19 , .
[ 18 ] . [J ] .

, 2008 , 299 ( 11) : 70 - 72.

ica , 1981 , 17 (6) : 821 - 829.

[ 8 ] , .

Game Research on Government Regulation and Corporate Social Responsibil ity in Duopoly Market
NING Ya2chun1 ,L UO Zhi2ren2
( 1. School of Indust rial and Business Administ ration , Hunan University , Changsha 410012 , China ;
2. Hunan International Eco nomics U niversity , Changsha 410205 , China)

Abstract : Irrespo nsible co rporate behaviors are co nst rained by bot h government regulatio n and p roduct
co mpetitio n. This article builds a t hree - stage game model , analyzes t he impact of government p reference
and executio n o n government regulatio n of irrespo nsible corporate behavior s , and reveal s t he parado x of
government p reference. Research shows t hat t he key for a government to co nst rain irrespo nsible corporate
behavior s effectively , is to make corporate lo sses f ro m irrespo nsible behavio rs exceed gains f ro m t ho se ; no
mat ter how t he government p refer s social interest s , t here exist s a po ssibilit y t hat t he government deregu2
lates irrespo nsible corporate behavior s ; t he mo re t he government p refer s t he social interest s , t he less a
po ssibilit y of eliminating an irrespo nsible corporatio n f ro m t he market is ; and , t he parado x of government
p reference result s f ro m t he dualit y of irrespo nsible corporate behavior s.
Key words : government regulatio n ; CSR ; Co urnot model