Iran 15. On 22 Aug 1946, on his twelfth birthday, Schwarzkopf mov to Iran.

This was a very significant event of his life and as expressed in his words, "I mark that day as the start of my mil career because, from then on, I lived in an Army world". 16. Schwarzkopfs father was the most powerful American in Iran after Ambassador George Allen. He had access to the Shah, conferred constantly with the Iranian prime minister, was friends with important tribal ldrs, and had even better connections outside Tehran than Ambassador Allen did. He had built the gendarmerie into a well trained and highly organized force which had largely succeeded in its msn. After the end of WW II in 1945, his msn changed to keep communism out of Iran ie prevent it from going under the Soviet influence. This made him a tgt of Soviet propaganda but he prided in being an anticommunist. 17. In Iran his father lived in a comfortable 'Big House' with terraces, balconies and white marble walls. There were two swimming pools, and huge rooms with Persian carpets. There was a bty of servants and helpers and Schwarzkopf developed a love for Tehran right away. His father took him to the palace of the Shah, historic mosques and other beautiful places. In the school he had classmates of many different nationality. It gave him an insight into many different culture to which his friends belonged. 18. His father was a very busy person and did not find adequate time to be with him. So, he incl Schwarzkopf in official activities whenever he could, like the diplomatic receptions, formal dinners, parties etc. He would encourage his son to mingle with the people, introduce himself and tell them who he was. He would take him out to meet tribal chiefs. On one such occasion he took him out to dinner with a Baluchi tribal chief who had camped at the outskirts of Tehran. The tribals were fierce looking and scared him a little. They laid out a lavish fare in front of them which incl saffron rice, salads, fruits, sheep, chicken and many other varieties of food. The Baluchs delicacy was eyeballs of the sheep. These were offered to the guest as an honour. Schwarzkopf was

2 reluctant to eat it but his father insisted. He then scooped the eyeball and swallowed it. Everyone applauded. Afterwards his father complemented him saying They were paying you a great tribute and if you hadn't eaten the eye, you'd have insulted them. But by eating it you have made a contribution to American - Iranian relationship". This important lesson came in handy when he faced similar sits later in Vietnam and UAE. 25. In the spring of 1948 his father got posted to Frankfurt as Dy Pro Marshall of US forces in Germany. Much to his dislike Schwarzkopf was recalled back to live with his parents. 26. In Frankfurt, the after effects of the WW II were vis. There was lot of scarcity of food and black market was rampant. The Americans, however, lived in relative luxury. They had spacious undamaged houses in good neighbourhood. They had maids and servants. They had an active social life. One ni Schwarzkopfs father took him to Carlton Hotel. The dining room was splendid with crystal chandeliers. By candlelight his father showed him how to eat a lobster. He had learned the technique from his father and was now imparting it to his son. The ritual made the taste of the lobster very spec for Schwarzkopf. 27. His father was very strict on timings and study. He was allowed to have fun with his friends but had to be home for dinner. On weekdays, he was not allowed to stay out beyond 11:30 PM. Whenever he broke any of the rules he was put on restriction. The discipline was nothing extraordinary and was well meaning to prepare Schwarzkopf for the West Pt, but seen against the leniency he had enjoyed at Iran, it looked harsh and arbitrary. He missed the easy going friendship he had with his father earlier. His mothers drinking was another problem which embarrassed him a lot. 28. His father wanted him to be a good athlete and play football. He presented him with a pair of football shoes. However, Schwarzkopf was slow and lacked technique. With the help of a German coach Schwarzkopf learned the basic techniques and improved in str. The next yr he made the grade in the school team. 29. The Army HQ mov from Frankfurt to Heidelberg, fifty miles to the south to Necker Valley. At Heidelberg, Schwarzkopf joined the football team and played well. They won the European championship beating all six American high school teams in Germany. This gave him a lot of confidence and recognition.

3 30. Socially, they were a gang of eight teenage friends, who were all athletes, letter men and good guys and considered themselves the elite. Though, they did not indulge in criminal activities, they loved the gang trappings like catchy nicknames. Schwarzkopf nick name was Cuddles, a name acquired because he had smooched his girlfriends on a city bus. They played games, partied with their girl friends and had a wonderful time. He was also very popular at the school and was elected to the student council. He did not take his studies seriously but nevertheless managed to do well. One day he along with his friends was arrested by the MPs for brawling with Germans (which they hadn't done). His father became worried that he was straying from the path he had set and decided to send him to a mil school in US. Schwarzkopf was happy to get away from the chaotic atmosphere at home and to get along with prep for West Pt. Valley Forge 31. In Aug, Schwarzkopf joined his new school "Valley Forge". He had returned to US after spending four yrs in Asia and Europe. He liked the school, the discipline, the marching and did well academically. Football was taken very seriously and he did well in that too. The school was divided into two gps of students based on their financial status, ie those who were rich 'Haves' and those who survived on scholarships Have Nots'. Schwarzkopf belonged to the sec gp. The 'Haves' out numbered the 'Have Nots' and bossed over then. Nobody however, messed with Schwarzkopf because of his large size and hy built. 32. Valley Forge prided itself in maintaining an honour system similar to that of West Pt. They were taught the fundamental rule of selfdiscipline - a cadet neither lies, cheats nor steals, nor tolerates anyone who does - and cadet offrs were responsible for the enforcement of the code, just as at West Pt. However, the code was applied very clumsily and the schools discipline sometimes crossed the line into cruelty. One day the desert served in their mess was badly prep. The cadet started throwing the pie in the air and Schwarzkopf also joined in. The matter was reported and the Cadet Regt Cdr called a fall-in of all the cadets and wanted to know the culprits. When nobody owned up, he put the cadets 'on their honour' to report themselves. Those who would not do so would be expelled from the school if found out. Schwarzkopf was taken in by the threat and by his sense of honour and owned up. He was asked to go outside in the snow and march till his punishment was determined. He felt like a scapegoat since nobody else had owned up and he was being punished harshly for a minor breach. Later he got a letter of reprimand. The incident taught

4 him an important lesson about running an honour system. Honour is fundamentally a code of conscience. Any institution that wants to foster it should not use a persons sense of honour against him as Valley Forge had done. They had been wrong to throw the pie, but the Cadet Regt Cdr had shown even poorer judgment by escalating minor sit into a matter of personal honour". Struggle for Admission to West Pt 33. Getting into West Pt was very tough. There were 816 seats of which only very limited were filled by competitive exam. The rest were filled by nomination from a Senator or a Congressmen and thereafter passing through a set of academic, physical and med tests. His father approached a few but none of the Senators or Congressmen was willing to push for Schwarzkopf since his father was serving oversees and did not belong to any constituency. 34. After retirement, his father returned back to US. Though he wanted to see Schwarzkopf at West Pt, he didn't intercede earlier or really try to pull strings. He had faith in his son and the admission system and was confident that his son would get in fair and sq. He urged Schwarzkopf to try for the "Honour Mil Appt" vacancies. These were a few vacancies earmarked for candidates from mil schools and the selection was based on leadership potential, high school grades and achievement in athletics, school activities and a nationwide exam similar to collage boards. It was a very tough competition between hundreds of candidates for just five vacancies in that yr. However, his father was very sure that he would make it. Schwarzkopf went back to Valley Forge determined to excel. That yr he earned varsity letters in football and tr. Militarily, he achieved the highest rank in the school. He also topped academically. He won the debate competition and became very good at taking multiple-choice tests. As a result in the honour mil exam he scored very high. He was also named the Valedictorian by the school. On 26 Jun 1952 he received a telegram of his admission to West Pt.

5 CHAPTER II : WEST PT (1952-1956)

35. This chapter is a summery of Chapter 5 of the book. It covers the entire period of trg of Schwarzkopf at West Pt and the strong foundation he received which was the basis of his illustrious career. The important highlights of the chapter are as follows :(a) Plebe Summer - The tough physical and mental conditioning for West Pt. (b) (c) (d) (e) Honour Code. Achievements at West Pt. Selection of Arm. Impact of West Pt.

Plebe Summary 36. Schwarzkopf joined West Pt in Jul 1952. The initial official formalities were over quickly and thereafter the immediate seniors called the 'First Classmen' took over. Officially the first eight weeks of trg was called "Plebe Summer", unofficially it was known as "Beast Bks". The First Classmen were the Beast Detail and their assignment was to whip the new plebes into shape. This initiation was far harder than the Army Basic Trg and was designed to drive out those plebes who couldnt handle physical and psychological stress, as well as to teach the survivors the discipline and basic skills they needed to get along at the West Pt. 37. Schwarzkopf did not have a first name which was only an initial. This created a little crisis and the regs had to be looked up. Finally he was allowed to write his name as 'H (F.I.O) Schwarzkopf'. 'F.I.O' stood for "First Initials Only". 38. The first classmen made them go through the initial chores like haircuts, collection of QM stores, med check up etc, on the run with eyes fwd. The edn on table manners left them hardly anything to eat. They were made to take the Oath of Allegiance at the Trophy Pt. The physical trg became increasingly tough and incl calisthenics with rifles, marching, swimming etc. Some of the rules for plebes made no sense

6 such as they were not allowed to look out of the windows of their room. Schwarzkopf kept his sense of humor and never allowed the harassment to get on his nerves. Honour Code 39. The most important lesson drilled into them was the honour code. There had been a case of cheating in the exams by the football team in the previous yr which had given the Academy a bad name. West Pt had thrown out most of the guilty, to cleanse its reputation. Schwarzkopfs course was the first after that incident and they were thoroughly drilled with the honour code. The basic rule was simple; `a cadet does not lie, cheat or steal or tolerate anybody who does. 40. The auths practiced the honour code by exercising faith in the cadets. The system was open and in case of a dispute the cadets word was taken for truth. Identical tests were given to separate sets of cadets on different dates. Although it gave an opportunity for the paper to be leaked, the cadets were on their honour and not expected to cheat. On weekends the cadets could go out after filling up a card saying that their absence was to legitimate places only. The auths never checked up. The purpose was to instill a standard of truthfulness that an offr would follow for the rest of his life. Schwarzkopf liked living by a code of behaviour that applied twenty four hrs a day and he liked his word to be his bond. On one occasion one of his friends broke the rule by looking out of Schwarzkopfs window to watch a parade. A first classmen named Nerone who disliked Schwarzkopf, saw someone taking a peak out and assumed it was him. He confronted Schwarzkopf with abuses and threatened him. Schwarzkopf replied that he had not watched the parade. Even though Nerone did not believe him, he had to accept his word due to the honour code. Trg 41. At the beginning of academic yr, the Beast Barrack coys were dissolved and distr amongst the twenty four coys of cadets. Thereafter they were bullied by sec and third classmen also. It was very tough on the cadets and some of the weaker ones used to still dropout but Schwarzkopf remained confident of making through West Pt. 42. The syllabus at West Pt incl Physics, Maths, Engineering, History, Social Science and Tac. Besides, there were games, marching, inspections and drills. The routine was tough and tiring. The mil ethos were taught in the most eff way imaginable. The teachers were war

7 heroes who would narrate their personal experiences and made the subject interesting. One such instr was Lt Col James Hollingsworth who while teaching tac would talk to them of his experiences of the North African Campaign. This was very much enjoyed by the cadets and made all the pettiness and harassment of West Pt tolerable. These experiences were also helpful in teaching aspects of leadership that were not written in any of the books. One of the incidents he described was that During WW II to improve camaraderie and raise the morale of his men he had dispensed with saluting and instead started the wave of a hand. The men would wave at him with pride and the units morale improved. 43. Trg at West Pt was meant to prepare the cadets mentally and physically for the combat. The cadets had many a doubt. "How will they perform the first time they would be in combat? What would they do if captured, were they tough enough to hold out?" etc. The psychiatrists gave an analysis of brain washing of the POWs in the Korean War. One out of every three soldiers captured had broken down and become a collaborator and was responsible for the death of fellow soldiers. The study attributed the collaborators behaviour to lack of self discipline and Schwarzkopf hoped he would never be guilty of the same. They were also shown "The Triumph of the Will" a propaganda film about the Hitlers Numbarg rally of 1934. The cadets were taken aback by the atrocities that the Nazis had committed and debated hotly the fundamental immorality of war. Such debates were frequent and though they did not resolve the issues discussed but by encouraging them to ask questions, the West Pt prep them to ethical and moral ambiguities they may same day face as offrs. The Academy did not want them to be like the Nazi generals who shrugged of their participation in the atrocities by saying that they were only doing their duty. Achievements 44. Schwarzkopfs goal was to be good academically, socially, athletically and militarily. With little effort he fared well in studies. However, he did not get carried away with his performance. He loved easy going and fun loving friends rather than the serious kind. He played pranks with his roommates Leroy Suddath and David Hortan, and went out on dates, to the parties and restaurants. 45. Though Schwarzkopf did not do well in football he made the grades in other sports like wrestling, soccer and tr (shot put and discuss). Militarilly, he did well to win an appt and was proud to gain ranks with seniority. He was a Cadet Cpl in junior yrs and became a

8 Cadet Capt and Coy Cdr in the senior yrs. It was his first taste in leadership and he found he was good at it. As a Coy Cdr he was responsible for all things that went in the bks from reveille to lights out. The morale in his coy was low and he released it was because of hostile gps that had been formed. He went about dissolving the gps by involving all the upper cl men in running of the coy. He believed that 'To be an eff ldr, one has to have a manipulative streak and distr tasks to pers so as to take advantage of their strs. One of the indifferent cadets had artistic abilities. He asked him to design a mug for the coy and manufacture it. He was against too much ragging of plebes and found that he could get much better results out of them by teaching, setting a good example and helping them along. Selection of Arm 46. The culmination of West Pt edn was branch selection' ie selection of Service/ Arm. They were sent on a tour of mil units of different services to help them make up their minds. Schwarzkopf was tempted to sign up for the AF since it was believed to be the future of warfare and the most favoured and expanding service. However, two things stopped him from doing that. Firstly, he wanted to lead men in battle which would not be the case in the AF and secondly, he got air sick whenever he flew. He was drawn to Inf in spite of its lack of status. He was drawn to their lan and found the job most challenging as compared to all other arm. He was impressed when he heard that inf was trying to complete with the AF to win its rightful share of funding. Towards that they had set up Strat Army Corps (STRAC): AB divs tailored to fight on the atomic battlefield. 47. The process of branch selection was in an open forum where the vacancies for each arm/service were given out beforehand and the cadets picked their choice. Inf was not usually a favoured choice. Schwarzkopf and his friends who were opting for inf decided to boost its prestige and get enough volunteers. They started a word of mouth campaign telling others their choice and reasons for it. They put up wooden insignias of ptr wgs and the combat inf mans badge in the orderly room. On the day of the selection they all gathered in a large hall. The cadets as per the seniority of their cl ranks called out their choices. Schwarzkopf was forty third in the batch and sec to opt for inf. As the polling went on they cheered for all those who opted for inf and soon some fence sitters changed their choice and joined them. All the inf vacancies were filled up and Arty got the last offr.

9 Impact of West Pt. 48. In the four yrs that he spent in the idealized mil world at West Pt, a new system of values was imbibed into him. As a plebe 'Duty, Honour and Country which he had heard from his father became fixed for all times to come. It instilled into him the ideal of Service above Self and to do his duty for the country regardless of what personal gains it brought. It gave him a motivation and a calling and not just a career. He felt liberated since he no longer felt the need to run after rank, medals and efficiency reports or get consumed by ambition and curry favours.

10 CHAPTER III : THE EARLY YRS (1957-1965)

49. This chapter is a summary of Chapters 6 and 7 of the book. It covers the tenures from commissioning till he volunteers for combat in Vietnam. These were important tenures from the pt of view of his grooming and exposure. He was often rewarded with important assignments for his hard work and team play. The main highlights of the chapter are as follows:(a) (b) (c) (d) The rot in the army: after effects of the Korean War. Valuable experiences of comd of tps. Work and neglect of family. Prize posting to Berlin. FIRST UNIT 50. 101 AB Div. Schwarzkopf was posted to the Sec Battle Gp of 187 AB Inf part of 101 AB Div at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The div was part of newly formed Strat Army Corps and was Americas first Pentomic Div, specially tailored to fight on the atomic battle fd. It had a magnificent tradition. The div had given a good acct of itself in the Battle of Bulge where its paratroopers had jumped behind German lines on D Day and held off the Nazi tks. 51. His units focus was more on sports than the professional work. His CO had requested for him believing that he was a good football player but was disappointed when he replied that he had not played for yrs and was not good at it. As a result he was assigned to `E' Coy under Capt John J Plosey. Rot In the Army 52. The army was suffering from the after affects of Korean war. Offrs and NCOs were in short sup and the budgets had been severely cut.

11 53. Schwarzkopf was shocked at the state of affairs, because it was very different from what he had learnt at the West Pt. The unit had large influx of draftees to make up for the short sup of rects. The discipline was slack and response to orders was poor. The tps were late for most parades. They were afraid to do para jumps and would do so only after a lot of persuasion. They were not motivated and tried to escape from work. 54. At the end of the first yr he felt disillusioned and torn in spite of the glamour and the prestige of the paratroopers. The main reason was the quality of fellow offrs. Most of the Lts and Capts were hard drinking rogues left over from WW II and Korea. The talented ones had risen to senior rks or left the army. The other junior offrs were just marking time who had no sense of duty or honour. Schwarzkopf did not like to be answerable to those seniors whom he did not respect. 55. His new coy cdr was a fat, lazy, forty yrs old Lt who drank a lot and was afraid to jump. He made Schwarzkopf do all his work especially at the end of 1957 after Schwarzkopf was promoted as Lt and became his executive offr. Schwarzkopf had to do all adm chores which were in any case his jobs and the op work which the coy cdr was supposed to do. He would also land the coy in trouble by his inefficiency and drinking. Schwarzkopf wanted to report against his Coy Cdr. However, the unit did not allow their messy affairs to be reported. He was told by his CO The single most important value in the AB is loyalty to your commanders. That's loyalty no matter what. Any attempt to undermine the auth of your superiors will be viewed in the direst lt by all of us in this HQ. Schwarzkopf withdrew his complaint, in disgust. 56. The trg ex and tests were also a sham. The trg revolved around a ritual called the "annual trg test" and all yr they practiced routines they knew would be on that test-at the indl level, the squad level, the pl level, all the way up to the battle gp. Two weeks before the test, they would rehearse, usually on the same trn where the test itself would take place. In spite of this, the first time he participated in one, he saw that the battle gp had not performed well. The orders did not go out on time, the attack was carried off sloppily - there were problems galore. Yet when they got the final score, it was 99.8! That was the culture admitting weakness was seen as a failure to manifest the can - do attitude expected of an AB offr. Schwarzkopf thought it to be crazy and incompatible with the standard of honesty they had learned at West Pt.

12 57. At the battle gp HQ, they didn't rate their coys on trg or eqpt readiness - factors that would have saved soldiers' lives in war. The "Best Coy" award, given each month, was based on criteria such as lowest No of soldiers AWOL, lowest No of soldiers with VD and contributions of money to the AB association. The consistent winner was A Coy - until the spring of 1958, when the country police discovered a burglary ring involving soldiers of the Coy. 58. In spite of the aberrations, Schwarzkopf worked hard. He used to scoff at the idea that one could be a good junior offr and raise a family at the same time. He was rewarded for his competence and hard work and was assigned to the battle gp staff which were coveted appts. His new superior, Maj Tom Welhan, was a smart and blunt offr and hard task master. Schwarzkopf discussed with Maj Welhan the predicament about reconciling to the realities of the job. Maj Welhan advised "There are two ways to approach it. No one is to get out, No two is to stick around and someday, when you have more rk, fix the problems. But dont forget, if you get out, the bad guys win and I dont want bad guy to win". This helped him to stick around in the unit and change things within his capabilities. Comd of Tps 59. At the E coy his Coy Cdr Capt JJ Plosey was a fine offr and Schwarzkopf felt he could not have asked for a better superior. He was a great example of what a young ldr could aspire to be. Schwarzkopf lacked experience. Plosey taught him doing things himself. He was put in charge of a wpn pl. He had a few good NCOs, especially two tough old sergeants, Calvert and Barney who taught him willingly. Thus his own initial trg and grooming for the comd of tps was good. 60. The tps in his coy were draftees with very varied backgrounds. They ranged from suburban collage kids to farm boys to city dropouts. Comdg them Schwarzkopf learnt that there was no single way for a ldr of a small unit to comd the soldiers respect. They had to be addsd in terms each one understood. The collage kids were persuaded by logical explanations, the farm boys by common sense and the dropouts understood only the size and str of their ldr and that he could be very tough. He also learned how to deal with perpetual shammers. He observed that those sgts who were tough with their men but at the same time loved them, were in turn loved and respected by the men.

13 Family Ties 61. Schwarzkopf pulled away from his family to a great extent. He met them rarely, was poor at writing letters and found phone calls too expensive. He called them up rarely and the conversation used to be short. As a result he did not realize that his father's health was failing. He was suffering from lung cancer. His parents also did not tell him the exact extent of illness. A week before Thanks Giving, his mother info him that his father was down with pneumonia. He went a few days later but by then his father had died. Schwarzkopf deeply regretted for not having been there himself. In his words "My father was a selfless public servant, a true patriot, a man of honour, and a loving father. To me he was a great man, I loved him dearly and we never had a proper chance to say goodbye. Alcohol had shattered our family so badly that I'd pulled away just when he needed me". Experience 62. Schwarzkopf was made the Air Mobility Offr. He was responsible for arranging the airplanes and supervising the loading for ops. Later he became Asst Ops Offr. It was a job reserved for a Jr Capt but, there was no suitable offr left. When Maj Whelan left for a four month stint at Army's Comd and Gen Staff College, his responsibilities as Battle Gp Ops Offr also fell on Schwarzkopf. He was then a Lt but performed the duties of a Maj. He learned a lot watching the battle gp from the vantage of HQ. There were seven coys in the gp with almost the same mix of soldiers. However, three coys ran well and the fourth poorly. He realized that the best coy cdrs were those who could carry out bad orders when necessary, without affecting the morale of the tps. When an order to repaint the lines was given for a forthcoming insp, the bad coy cdrs resented and tried to change the mind of the CO and finally when their request was not agreed, conveyed the order in such a manner that the tps worked unenthusiastically. They had also wasted a lot of time in fighting the order and hence the tps were left with very little time to do the work. 63. The new CO of the battle gp was incompetent. His personal habits alienated the men, like he would be in pajamas resting in the fd in front of his men, where as they would be in battle fatigues. Schwarzkopf understood that to comd tps one should be willing to live with them in their conditions when sit so demands. The bonding was very important.

14 BERLIN Recce Pl 64. In Jun 1959 Schwarzkopf was posted to Berlin for a two yr tenure. East Berlin was under the occupation of Soviets and was under developed and the West Berlin was under the Western Powers ie America, Britain and France and was more developed. The Soviets wanted the Western powers to leave and there was tension between the two. 65. The Americans had posted the best soldiers in their combat units at Berlin. All rks assigned to the city were carefully screened and those with a slightest of blot in their records were sent back. The Army units there were far more professional than those he had seen at Fort Campbell. Schwarzkopf was elated at his new posting and was made a rifle pl ldr. They took part in flag marches and guarding the Spandau prison. They learned about riot control so as to prevent any civ disturbance if it occurred due to communist provocateurs. They considered the East Germans and the Soviet as their en. After three months Schwarzkopf was given the comd of the battle gp recce pl. The recce pl was the best in the battle gp and posting to it was considered prestigious. It had a large str of 75 men each handpicked. Its task was to conduct actual recce against East German and Soviet forces. They used to go on ptl into East Berlin sometime to gather int and other times just to ex their right to free access. The pl was a very proud outfit and had set a very high std in their professional work incl maint of wpn. On their kote they had put up a sign saying RECON WPNS BEST WPNS ROOM IN THE BATTLE GP 66. It was a very close outfit and the worst punishment was to be excl from it. One of the NCO, who was an excellent radio opr was a habitual offender. In spite of warnings, he did not mend his ways since he thought he was indispensable. Schwarzkopf worried that he was setting a bad example. When the opr committed another offence, Schwarzkopf ordered for him to be removed from the pl. It came as a shock to the NCO, who broke down and pleaded to be forgiven. Though Schwarzkopf was tempted to forgive, he stuck to his decision. The tough stand was appreciated by the senior NCO of the pl. It also had a positive impact on the men and their discipline improved and their pride in themselves and the pl grew even fiercer.

15 ADC 67. Schwarzkopf mov as ADC to Brig Gen Charles E Johnson III who commanded all American tps in Berlin. It was a learning experience for him watching the Gen deal with the mil-diplomatic world of Berlin, an experience similar to one he had in Iran watching his father. He learned a great deal about flexibility, patience and professionalism required of a Gen in an international arena. On one occasion when the mayor of West Berlin demanded free use of US tents and tps for a political rally, the Gen politely turned him down, diplomatically explaining that he wasn't authorized to spend American taxpayers money in that way. As ADC, Schwarzkopf had to deal with the foreigners on a No of occasions, a task he enjoyed. He learned it was more important to adapt to them rather than force then to adapt to him. The tenure also gave him an opportunity to witness the world events from a birds eye view especially the fast unfolding tension between the USSR and the US. Adv Trg in Inf Tac 68. In the yr 1961, Schwarzkopf was detailed for a one yr course in Adv Trg in Inf Tac at Fort Benning, Georgia. He found the course did not lay adequate emphasis on Tp Leadership, a subject which many army offrs did not understand. The army was obsessed with Nuclear Warfare and the course also paid lot of emphasis on tech and tac aspects of atomic blast. 69. Schwarzkopf stood third on the course and won the doubles trophy in tennis. He also won an award for excellence in mil writing for an essay "The Battered Helmet" which recounted a cdrs thoughts upon having won a maj battle. It was a piece written to demonstrate the timelessness of the principles of war. Degree in Guided Msl Engineering 70. The next tenure for Schwarzkopf was a sponsored masters degree in guided msl engineering at the University of Southern California. The Dept of Mechanics at West Pt sponsored him on the condition that he would serve as instr for three yrs at the Dept thereafter. Schwarzkopf had agreed to this assignment since he was still a bachelor, the University was in Southern California and that this would be first chance to live off a mil post (Cantt). He came in for three shocks when he joined the University. The first one when he went to California prep for a good summer with a tan and realized that he was

16 an odd man out. The sec when he was excited about joining a co-ed college but the girls addsd him as 'Sir' which made him realize that he was touching thirty and much older than his colleagues. The third shock came to him when he realised his pay was insufficient for him and he had to take up a job teaching Calculus and Basic Engineering at Northrop Institute. He also taught acct and business math at South Bay Womens College. 71. Schwarzkopf was fond of all kinds of music especially folk music. He owned a lot of records and listened to renditions of the Blues by Bobby Troupe with his wife Julie London who stayed a few blocks away. The Times they are a Chagrin' was his all time favourite song. He liked folk singers for the msg of social values in their songs. 72. It was a cold war period and most of the offrs thought that the future of warfare lay in msls and atomic wpns. Schwarzkopf didn't believe so. He was confident the nuc attack would never take place. Only once his confidence was shaken during the Cuban msl crisis. 73. He found his masters course very easy. He spent six weeks during the next summer touring Southern California aerospace plants and R&D facilities. He was in awe of the engineers working on Apollo program and designing of space crafts. Other than serving the army, Schwarzkopf had dreamt of becoming a scientist exploring and inventing new horizons. In his view those engineers were opening the doors of heavens and he regretted having not become one himself. 74. Schwarzkopf was often troubled by the fact that he was having a soft life in California whereas his friends were fighting and dying for their country in Vietnam. His sense of duty told him that this wasn't right and Vietnam was where he belonged. At the end of the course he was posted to West Pt as instr. Due to the war the promotions had come faster and he was soon promoted to Maj. At the offrs club, the main topic of conversation used to be Vietnam. America was providing sp to Vietnam by way of comb units, offrs as advisors att with Vietnamese units and in terms of eqpt and mtrl. The offrs scoffed at serving in MACV (Mil Assistance Comd, Vietnam), which was an advisory force to Vietnamese units. They thought comd of American tps was the only worth while task out there. However, Schwarzkopf thought otherwise. His father had been an advisor himself. He opted for Vietnam even though it was considered a professional suicide and he could have gone into a soft appt into R&D. Some of his friends thought he had opted for combat to adv his career. A Broadway Musical 'Ben Franklin in Paris' made a tremendous impact on him. It was a period play of American Revolution where Franklin imagines Americans two hundred yrs hence: I wonder how I'd find them then - those

17 Americans to whom the name American will not be new. Will they love liberty, being given it outright in the crib for nothing? Will they know that if you are not free, you are, sir, lost without hope, and will they who reaped that harvest of ideas be willing to strive to preserve what we so willingly strove to plant? That all men are created equal! and, are endowed by their creator with certain, inalienable rights. He pauses and then says: and would they die for it? That's the question one finally has to ask oneself. Would I die for it! and the answer one has to say - is -yes, sir, I would! It summed up succinctly why he wanted to go to Vietnam. It had nothing to do with careerism. It had to do with ideals.

18 CHAPTER IV : VIETNAM (1965-1970) 75. Schwarzkopf had two tenures at Vietnam. The first as a Maj where in he was an advisor to a newly formed TF of Vietnamese paratroopers and sec as bn cdr of an American unit. This chapter is a summary of Chapters 8 to 10 of the book. The three chapters have been grouped to bring out his qualities as a mil ldr in comb. The main highlights of the chapter are as follows:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Adaptation to hard conditions of Vietnam. Physical and Moral courage. Respect and sympathy towards Vietnamese soldiers. Instructional Qualities. Comd and Gen Staff Collage. Comd of a Bn and turning it around from the worst to the best. Concern for his tps : their welfare and lives. FIRST TENURE 76. Schwarzkopf was assigned as advisor to the Vietnamese AB bde due to his knowledge of French. It was one of the most coveted advisory assignments there. The AB Bde was South Vietnams best and most cohesive fighting force with six bns and five thousand men. This bde along with the marines was kept as res and utilized only to stabilize a losing situ in an imp battle. The tps were tough and experienced. They were also highly motivated. Capt Hop the Chief of Ops for the TF told Schwarzkopf that it was their war and he would rather see his children dead than in the hands of the communists. The American advisors would go back to their peaceful homes after a yr but they would continue to stay and fight. 77. There were thirty five American advisors att to Vietnamese AB bde. During ops they lived like the Vietnamese, ate what they ate, slept where they slept, wore the same uniform and suffered the same hardships. They were almost totally involved with the Vietnamese

19 counterparts. At the end of the ops they would come back and stay at a villa called the Manor BOQ "Bachelor Offrs Qtrs' and have parties and fun. The tps meanwhile, would return to their bases and recoup and train. Adapting to Hard Conditions of Combat in Vietnam 78. The first hardship that Schwarzkopf faced was the hot and humid climate and the tough trn. They were assigned to open a stretch of Route No 19, an imp highway. There were huge ravines along the route coated with slipping mud. They had to probe each ravine for the en. They would skid down the slopes into muddy water and climb up crawling. The Vietnamese were adept to the conditions and would crawl up the ravine in no time with all the load of amn on their back. The heat was extreme. The mosquitoes, whined in their ears and bizarre looking insects dropped on them. Schwarzkopf began to doubt how suited he was to this challenge. He used to consume a lot of water and was nicknamed 'Water Buffalo'. His primary duty was to coord all the available fire power to sp the ops. He therefore, carried a R/S on his back. His other stuff was carried in a rucksack by his Vietnamese dvr. Initially, Schwarzkopf carried all the items as per regs but soon realized the rucksack had became too hy and the dvr was unhappy carrying all the load. He quickly replaced it with lighter Vietnamese style gear. 79. The South Vietnamese AB op in the fd totally unlike the Americans. Schwarzkopf found a lot to admire in their methods. They ate better and more sensibly than the US tps. When out on long ops they carried live ducks and chicken tied to their belts, pork and beef of freshly slaughtered animals and sardines in their rucksack and rice in long brown fabric tube worn across their chests. They ate pork and beef first, with the rice, followed by chicken and duck and finally tinned sardines. One could make out how long they had been in the ops by what was served for the meal. 80. Schwarzkopf quickly made friends with the Vietnamese tps. He was competent and had a genuine respect for them. There were times when the Vietnamese would try to test him. Once he was given a glass filled with scotch and blood of a slaughtered pig. It was a toast given by the Engr Bn Cdr to celebrate the completion of a br on the highway. The Bn Cdr wanted to embarrass him thinking that he would not be able to drink it. However, his yrs at Tehran had taught Schwarzkopf to respect the traditions of his hosts. He pleasantly surprised them by gulping it down. The incident helped in fostering closer bond between them.

20 Ops at Duc Co 81. Ref Appx A. Schwarzkopfs TF was ordered on a msn to drive away the Viet Cong (VC) from a South Vietnamese spec forces camp Duc Co which was under their seize. The msn was ordered by Maj Gen Vin Loc, an influential Vietnamese prince and the Cdr of II Corps. They had 48 hrs to prepare for the task. The op order was exhaustive and had catered for everything incl adequate fire power and res. However, it had been issued by the staff without checking out the availability of forces that were to sp them. When Schwarzkopf did the liaison to coord, he realized that the copy of orders had not been del to the supporting units. Hence, they were unprepared and it was impossible to get adequate resources mob in time without which the msn would have been suicidal. He advised his TF Cdr, Nghi, to ask for a delay of 48 hrs to sort out the problems. The request went to the Gen who considered it as insubordination and ordered Nghi and Schwarzkopf for a meeting to explain the delay. The Gen was a short tempered man who was feared by his subordinates. He started by demanding from Nghi that how could he dare to put in a request for the delay when the orders had come from him. Nghi out of fear washed his hands off and replied that he had requested for the postponement on the recommendations of his US advisor, Schwarzkopf. The US advisor to Gen was a Col who was equally short tempered. He questioned Schwarzkopf as to how could he give such an advice. Schwarzkopf explained that they lacked in air and arty sp and that the res bn which had been earmarked for them had just returned from ops and was not ready. Even the LZ selected was unsuitable and had to be changed and therefore the tac plan also needed to be amended. The Col was not willing to understand and insisted that what they had was adequate. Schwarzkopf stood his grnd and in spite of pressure from the Col did not relent. This infuriated the Col further and he called him an embarrassment to USA, unsuited for the task and that he was immediately relieved of his duties. Schwarzkopf realized that the Col did not have adequate experience. He told the Col that he could not be relieved of his duties by him since he was not in his chain of comd. The matter was reported by the Col to Schwarzkopfs senior advisor who sp Schwarzkopf. 82. Schwarzkopf accompanied the TF for the ops. He had been promoted as Maj. The LZ came under the VC fire but they managed to land without much cas. They had planned to sweep the area from the camp upto the Cambodian border, then turn south, and finally circle back to the West side of the camp. They came under hy fire from the VCs near the Combodian border. Schwarzkopf called for heptr gunships that drove the attackers away. They spent the ni at the border and mov out for the return sweep the next day morning. At noon they came under hy fire from all directions. In the jungle it was difficult to iden

21 the direction of the fire and loc of the en. There was no place to hide or run from the mor fire. They had mov into a maj conc of en forces. Unless they reached their camp before ni fall the en would maneuver and annihilate them. The AB did not panic. Schwarzkopf was struck by the ptrs almost fatalistic coolness; they had been under fire many times before. The gp continued to mov on as though nothing had happened. 83. Five or six times that afternoon, whenever part of the TF got pinned down, Schwarzkopf had to stop to call in air strike, then wait to make sure the heptrs and the planes accomplished their task. Maj Naghi wanted to quickly get into the safety of the camp and left Schwarzkopf behind. After a horrifying day they finally reached the camp. However, part of the Third Bn lost its way in the jungle. Naghi was not willing to send anyone to search for them. Schwarzkopf decided to go on his own and find them. He was at risk not only from the en but his own panicky tps. As he mov out he had an odd sensation in him ie of dissociation from the actions. It was a kind of out of body experience, as though he could watch himself going back out side the perimeter of the camp, at the risk of being blown away. But their was nothing eerie or mystical about it. It was kind of an auto pilot. He made his way alone to the west of the camp all the while talking to the lost gp on radio. Finally, he found them and led them back into the camp. 84. The en was two full regts of North Vietnamese regulars, much larger in str than earlier anticipated and much better equipped and trained than the VCs. They surrounded the camp from all sides. Even medevac flts came under hy fire. A few American pilots like Lt Earl S Van Eigweegen showed great heroism in flg out the serious cas from the camp in spite of en fire and damage to their ac. Since the task of clearing the en was beyond the AB TF capability, a TF of marines was sent to relive the pressure on the camp. The marines drove the North Vietnamese out to the Cambodian border. 85. The AB were very sentimental about returning the bodies of their dead comrades to their families. The American crew of the heptr refused to carry the bodies back to the base. Schwarzkopf immediately intervened and forced the pilots to carry the bodies. This had a great impact on the South Vietnamese tps. They found in Schwarzkopf a person who cared for them. The word went out right to the rear and the Vietnamese tps greatly appreciated his concerns for them.

22 Ia Drong Valley Campaign 86. Refer Appx A. Schwarzkopf and other advisors with the Vietnamese AB became att and fully involved with their Vietnamese tps and stayed with them. They were often scorned by the other advisors. However, he felt more fulfilled then ever before. He was happy at the work, helping those fighting for their country. The US continued to pour in large No of tps in South Vietnam and also helped by building rds, CP, bunkers and airfds. In response North Vietnam increased its forces in South Vietnam and came in direct confrontation with the American tps. They sent three regts (7000 tps) to cross over from Cambodia and sweep down from the highlands into heavily populated coastal plains near Qui Nhon, there by cutting the country into half. The attack was however, thwarted by the US 1st Cav Div crushing a large part of the communist force along the river south of Duc Co, in what was called the Ia Drong valley campaign. It was the first time heptrs were used to maneuver large American units in battle, a landmark in modern warfare. Schwarzkopf came in contact with Col Ngo Quang Truong, one of the most brilliant tac cdr of South Vietnam. He was COS of Gen Dong. He was revered by his offrs and tps and feared by the North Vietnamese cdrs. Therefore, wherever there were tricky comb ops, he would be put in comd. 87. After the defeat of the North Vietnamese tps in the Ia Drong valley, Col Truong was given the task to prevent the defeated tps from escaping into Cambodia. He chose Maj Schwarzkopf as his advisor. He visualized that the strip of jungle between the ridges and the river formed a natural corridor for the en to mov. They flew to the valley which was twelve miles wide at the pt where Ia Drong flowed westward into Cambodia. Somewhere there in the dense jungles, was the en's main body mov to escape. They landed to the North, crossed the river and took up posns along the Chu Pong mtns, which formed a series of steep ridges. Simply by visualizing the trn and from his experience of 45 yrs of comb, Col Truong could predict what the en was doing. While marching he would look at the map and indicate a posn to fire arty. Later they would find en bodies there. His visualization was perfect. He could even predict every mov of the en to exact timings, their reactions and the time of next contact. The battle progressed exactly as visualized by him. He set up blocking posns at the border. The en on encountering the block backed up. They then ran into another block which had been placed at the rear. Col Truong fired his arty to effect hy cas on the en which had been boxed in. He then attacked them with his two res bns. After some time he ordered his forces to search for en wpns. As he had visualized they had killed a large No of en and the others had run away leaving their wpns behind.

23 The Growing Divide 88. The large influx of American forces disturbed Schwarzkopf. He felt that they were going in the wrong direction with the South Vietnamese. It was their country, their battle and eventually they had to sustain it. He thought America should give them the skills, the confidence, the eqpt needed, and encourage them to fight. However, more and more battles were being fought exclusively by the Americans. The American soldiers started criticizing and looking down upon the Vietnamese soldiers as cowards who could not fight for their country. They treated the Vietnamese soldiers as sec cl citizens and did not allow them in their messes, clubs etc. The American sups to the Vietnamese units also reduced since most of them went to the American units. Schwarzkopf, who had participated in ops with the Vietnamese knew that the perception of the American soldiers was wrong and based on rumors rather than the facts. Qui Nhon 89. In Jan the battle shifted to Bon Son plains, a roughly forty mile stretch of coastal low lands north of Qui Nhon which the VC had dominated over the yrs. The South Vietnamese AB under Col Truong, US 1st Cav Div and American and Vietnamese marines were tasked to sweep the area in a coord manner. Schwarzkopf was advisor to Col Truong. 90. Wounded. In one of the ops the TF was pursuing a Vietcong force which was trying to slip away from the coast, westward into the An Lao Valley, along a communist stronghold. They mounted an aslt in a hamlet strongly held by the en. Schwarzkopf was traveling in an APC but due to his ht, half of his body was protruding outside the veh. A splinter by a MG fire hit him in the arm and he started bleeding badly. His cheeks, eyebrows and eyelid were all lacerated by fragments from bullets that had splattered against the armr plate and his left eye was swollen shut. Col Truong wanted to continue with the attack and wanted Schwarzkopf to stay and help him with the ops. Schwarzkopf agreed and in spite of his injuries continued to call for arty and air strikes to cover their adv. Their adv was not making progress due to hy oppositions by the VCs who used to hide in tunnels to escape the arty fire but come back into posns as soon as it was lifted. Schwarzkopf advised that they go for an air strike followed by 15 mins of arty shelling, which would progressively shift ahead. This was to be followed by heptr gunship fire. Under the cover of this gunship fire the APCs could adv into the village. The tac proved very eff and they rolled into the village killing a large No of VCs. Schwarzkopf was later evacuated

24 in the ni by a heptr. He soon rec to fight one more battle. He had fought in seven maj ops in the nine months, survived gun shot wound once and was affected by tropical diseases twice. He won two Silver Stars and three Bronze Stars for his services and valor. 91. Schwarzkopf was exhausted by the frequent ops. He was pulled back to Saigon for the balance of the three months in Vietnam. He helped Col Truong in the expansion of the AB bde into a full fledged Div. He also quietly enjoyed the social life of Saigon with his Vietnamese girl friend and other AB advisors. He utilized his time in the rear by making para jumps with the Vietnamese and earned the US Masters Para Wgs. He also completed three free fall jumps to earn South Vietnamese Jumpmaster Wgs, a badge rarely awarded to the Americans. He was happy and applied for extn of tenure which was denied. He left Vietnam with a hy heart and a lump in his throat. BETWEEN TOURS OF VIETNAM 92. After his return Schwarzkopf felt disoriented and could not think of anything but Vietnam. To his dismay he found that the American people had no concern for the war and did not want to know about it either. He went back to West Pt as instr but found the routine slow and inane compared to the life at Vietnam. He longed for the moral clarity he had found there. So strong were his emotions that during conversations, whenever some one argued against the war in Vietnam or question its morality, he would get an urge to beat up the fellow. 93. Schwarzkopf was still a bachelor. He had released the str and hope that the family ties gave to the soldiers in the battlefield. He tried to re-est connections with his mother and sister. He went to stay with his sister Ruth but he found that they had drifted too far apart and it would be difficult to achieve closeness. He realized that the only way to get a family was by getting married. He married Brenda and found the warmth and happiness that he was longing for. West Pt 94. At the West Pt he was known as a highly decorated Vietnam veteran. He became popular with students telling them the stories of combat in Vietnam. He liked to call himself a TOAD (Temporarily on Academic Duty) and told the students that he was not an academic offr but a proud United States Army infantryman. He considered academics imp but only enough to graduate. His favourite topics were on

25 character building of an offr, values, honour and morality. Teaching gave him a new sense of msn. He had the ability to motivate even the 'goats' (cadets standing at the bottom of the course). He found that some of those cadets though weak in studies had great leadership qualities and would make good offrs. He therefore made it his msn to bring them up to the passing stds. 95. The war in Vietnam took its toll on the aspirants for the West Pt. As cadets became scarce, West Pts attitude towards them changed. Schwarzkopf had spent his four yrs as cadet proving he was good enough for the institution, but in an uncomfortable reversal, the West Pt seemed more concerned with proving that it was good enough. The institute considered changing its msn and started soft pedaling the tough conditions of army life. As a result the cadets who joined were taken by surprise when they faced the harsh realities of trg and the drop out rate went up. 96. Schwarzkopf made a name for himself as an orator delivering speeches at various forums like the Rotary Club, American Veterans Association and other civic gps. The press had given a bad name to the South Vietnamese and people were concerned that many American soldiers were losing their lives there. People were questioning "Why were they there"? Schwarzkopf would explain that the South Vietnamese were fighting for their country and their freedom and were neither coward, corrupt nor incompetent. Through these speeches he would explain that it was the moral responsibility of USA to sp the Vietnamese in their fight for the freedom and the war against the communists. Schwarzkopf felt he was in some way contributing for the war effort. Comd and Gen Staff Course 97. Schwarzkopf was detailed for Comd and Gen Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth. It was considered pinnacle of army education. The course was designed to equip an offr with the knowledge and skills required to plan mil campaigns and maneuver large fmns of tps in battle. It also taught staff work required for higher HQs. He worked hard and graduated in the top ten percent of his cl. At the end of the course he volunteered to go back to Vietnam. He had been promoted to Lt Col and was due for comd of a unit. He felt that given his combat experience and knowledge survival in the jungles, he could comd better with loss of fewer lives.

26 SEC TOUR OF VIETNAM 98. At the Army HQ, at Long Binh he was made executive offr to Gen Mabry in spite of his unwillingness to serve in staff. Schwarzkopf clearly told Gen Mabry that he had come to Vietnam to comd a bn and though he would do whatever assignment he was given he would not be happy in the staff. Gen Mabry assured him that if he did a good job, he would be sent for comd after six months. Schwarzkopf hated every day there. He found the offrs and NCOs guilty of moral and financial misconducts. Theft and misuse of eqpt was rampant. 99. In Nov he got the comd of a bn in Americal Div at Chu Lai. He found the atmosphere at Div HQ was full of fun and enjoyment. Schwarzkopf was anguished that about eighteen thousand men were fighting and dying in the jungle, while the senior offrs ate of fine china, recited poems and enjoyed movies. Rocket Pocket 100. He took over the comd of the First Bn of the Sixth Inf or 1/6. The bn was on a compound called LZ Bayonet on the main highway near the Bde HQ. Their task was to police the Rocket Pocket' (refer Appx B), a band of foothills west of the town from where the VC sneaked and launched rkts at the rear of the Div. The bn was nick named Worst of the Sixth due to its poor performance. As a result it had been assigned the policing task while the other bns were in the jungles in the thick of real action. As soon as he took over the comd, the Asst Div Cdr info him that his bn had failed its annual eqpt readiness insp and ordered a re-insp after 30 days. 101. Schwarzkopf decided to visit the coys. The bn had four rif coys A to D and a mor coy E. He found the bn cdrs job was being performed by the ops staff offr Maj Lee and that his predecessor had never been out to the fd. All the inf coys had the same msn ; to intercept the VC rkt teams. They were supposed to stay under cam during day and set up ambush at ni. At the A coy he found there was no cam. The men were mov around instead of resting for the ni ops. The men wore bright clothes and were w/o helmets/wpns. The security arngs were non existent. The MG was coated with rust and there were no amn in it. Schwarzkopf realized that immediate corrective actions were needed. He immediately passed orders for a proper security to be put up, all ptbl radios to be thrown out and wpns and amn to be cleaned. He instr all men to be shaved and cleaned up, in proper uniform with a helmet and with personal wpn at all times. He told then to take proper rest during the day to be able to stay awake for ambush ptls at ni. He found the sit at B coy to be the same.

27 102. At the Bn HQs the tps stood in the rain for collection of food and the NCOs bossed over them. Schwarzkopf also stood in the line. The sgt told him that his food would be served separately in the tent. Schwarzkopf insisted that all offrs should eat their food with the men under the same conditions. The men were impressed and warmed up to him. They info him that this was the first time they were taking to their bn cdr. 103. His staff info him that 1/6 was not doing its msn properly. The VCs were able to fire the rkts at will and that they were losing lives. To his dismay he found that even his ops center was sited outside the security perimeter fencing. It had been done on the orders of the previous bn cdr who was afraid of VC rkt attack. Foolishly he had created a sit where the VCs could attack on ft and kill them all. Schwarzkopf realised that the previous bn cdrs was incompetent. He had probably got the comd by pulling strings to get a bn cdrs rpt which was essential for the next promotion. 104. The next day morning, at dawn one of his ptl shot dead a VC who had sneeked through the wire fencing and had made a detailed sketch of LZ Bayonet. This was the type of recce needed for one of the VCs most devastating tac called Spr Attack. At ni the VCs who would have memorized the layout would sneak through the wire from one end, sprint across the compound throwing grens and explosive charges into the bunkers and sleeping hooches, and make it out of the other end having inflicted hy cas. The Bde Cdr on hearing the news of the VC came to inspect and was appalled at the state of defs. He was angry and admonished Schwarzkopf. 105. Schwarzkopf immediately got the defs improved. He extended the perimeter to take in the ops centre. He had felt bad about the reproach he had received from his cdr. He decided that he could not work well with a cdr who doubted his competence and had a word with him. He told his cdr that he had inherited the worst unit of the US Army and needed time to correct things. However, he also pointed out that if the cdr shouted at him every time he came for inspection, then it would only slow them down. 106. The bn had many cas in the following weeks. All of them happened due to disregard for rules and casual attitude on part of his men. Schwarzkopf had to be extremely tough with them to get any kind of results. Being calm and reasonable did not work. The men didn't want to fight. In addn there was a constant stream of new rects due to turnover after one yr. The experienced Jr offrs and NCOs were scarce. The Lts were also draftees who were psychologically unprepared to take on the responsibilities of their mens lives.

28 107. Schwarzkopf and his small team had to teach the new rects everything from wearing helmets, cleaning of wpns to shooting etc. He also started aggressive patrolling to push back the VCs from Rocket Pocket. It was a dangerous task and the tps used to get tensed up after a few days. He set up a rotational system that let the subunits come back from the jungle and spend a week manning bunkers in the rear. It gave the men a chance to relax, shower, wear clean clothes and eat well. Schwarzkopf overworked himself, supervising the ops and discussing plans with his staff. So concerned was he about the success of ops and the safety of his men that he would be on a short fuse shouting and pushing his men. He felt guilty of the same but nevertheless realized it was imp for the sake of his mens lives. 108. He did make up to them on the Christmas. Huge meals were carried to fwd posts in heptrs along with a Santa Claus, a Priest and a Minister. The men ate heartily and attended a religion service. One of the coy cdrs had gone to the rear apparently to visit the wounded in the hosp. However, Schwarzkopf found that the offr did not return after the visit but instead went to the offrs mess for a Christmas dinner. Schwarzkopf confronted him in the mess and asked him as to why did he not go back and be with his men. The offr did not show any remorse and replied that he was not happy being responsible for his men. Schwarzkopf took him back to the coy and got the coy to fall in. He then told the coy cdr " I am relieving you of comd of the coy imdtly since you dont care about your tps. He felt a conflict within, at relieving an offr of his charge. He had been taught that the responsibility of a cdr was to develop his subordinates and not to relieve them. However, he also felt that at this pt of time the men desperately needed to know that somebody cared about keeping them alive. The msg got through to them. 109. Gradually the bn also come around and improved. They passed the readiness insp. A new self confidence developed in the men and they did not consider themselves as the worst of the sixth anymore. They increasingly become successful in their msn and the cas rate dropped. They caught a VC who had sneaked to launch a rkt. Such catches were rare even for good units. The killing of the rocketer stymied the VC and there were no more rkt attacks for a month. A captured int rpt warned the VCs to stay away from LZ Bayonet since a strong new American bn had mov in. Schwarzkopf considered this to be the greatest complement as CO of 1/6 Bn.

29 Batangan Peninsula 110. One of their sister bns, 5/46 was op in Batangan Peninsula. It was a bad place, loaded with booby traps and minefds. The bn had suffered hy cas and the tps were demoralized. They had stooped fighting. The Bde Cdr Col Clemons asked Schwarzkopfs unit 1/6 to trade places with 5/46. It was a complement to be nominated for the task but it was also a dangerous one. 111. Batangan had seen fighting for the last 30 yrs since WW-II. The Japanese, French, Koreans, American and VCs had all fought there. Hence, it was full of booby traps and mines. Schwarzkopf and his new ops offrs Slade Johnson, plotted the site of mine incidents of 5/46 on a map to get a picture of the area. Though the map was full of incidents all along, they est patterns like abandoned ni def posns where a force had previously camped. Such places used to be mined since tps had a tendency to return back to same loc for camping during future ptls. Schwarzkopf gave mine maps to his tps and passed three rules to avoid cas, ie firstly 'Avoid known rds and trails', secondly Avoid readymade openings in hedgerows between rice paddies and lastly 'Avoid previous ni def posns. 112. Inspite of the precautions, they encountered one mine incident every day. As soon as there was a mine incident the cas was evac by heptr and within half an hr Schwarzkopf would speak to the tps who had lost a buddy to prevent their morale from falling. He could reduce the tension by being there, talking and reassuring them and reminding them to follow the three rules. The cas rate dropped significantly to less than one a week. 113. Schwarzkopf made it a pt to visit his men at the hosp and talk to them. He would tell them that he was proud of them. He would arrange for them to talk to their relatives through phone. He would keep his hand on their shoulder and silently pray that somehow his str would flow into their broken body. He avoided breaking down in front of the men but frequently felt tears in his eyes once he got outside. He felt they were his men and that he was responsible for them. 114. Schwarzkopf also followed the system of periodically putting back each coy to the rear at Chu Lai to help the tps to rec. The men would lie around on the beach, drink bear and let off the steam. He would then talk to them on any issue they wanted to discuss before returning them back to the fd. He believed that better info a soldier was, the better he'd fight. The men would ask a lot of uncomfortable questions like why were they there, and why did they have to wear helmets and jackets in the heat. Schwarzkopf was very clear that

30 comfort and welfare were to be kept separate. He would tell them that it was his concern to keep them alive and therefore the precautions were necessary. He wanted them to go back home alive. 115. At Batangan, Schwarzkopf kept a very close watch over the activities of his bn. He would work twenty four hrs a day. He would listen to the radio comn of his bn even when lying down for sleep inside the ops centre. He knew his bn was good but it lacked seasoned jr offrs and NCOs. The men were not confident of fighting the VCs and sometimes deliberately allow them to walk away from the ambush. Schwarzkopf beefed up the ambush parties to 15-20 men from 6-8 earlier to instill greater confidence in them. 116. Schwarzkopf considered the VCs as opportunistic brigands who with encouragement from North Vietnamese, oppressed the peasants, stole their money and crops, and bullied them into co-op. A full scale war would have annihilated the VCs but the war then was just piecemeal engagements that played to the weakness of the Americans; their shortage of capable jr offrs and NCOs and the draftees reluctance to fight. The VCs also followed a pattern. In the dry season they would attack by ni to avoid counter attack from heptr gunships and air. They would also invariably attack on holidays and on the anniversaries of past victories. Schwarzkopf followed his schedule as per the VCs tac. In the dry seasons he would remain awake till 4 AM and sleep for a few hrs thereafter. On holidays they would take extra security precautions and carry out speculative fire barrages called Mad Minute'. 117. 1/6 did not inflate the figs of VC cas in their reports. As a result their count was low. The Div Cdr was an incompetent fellow who was unhappy with the cas figs. He told them to break the subunits into small gps of twos and threes like the VCs and spread out all over to incr contact with them and achieve greater kills. However, Schwarzkopf disagreed. They had to op in greater str to provide a sense of security to the tps who were not very confident. Besides there would be other problems like they would not be able to fire their arty w/o endangering own tps. The Gen was furious but Schwarzkopfs Bde Cdr sp him. Had the Bde Cdr not interjected, Schwarzkopfs career would have finished. The Bde Cdr took the heat, which was the correct thing to do since a cdr should stick up for his subordinates when they're right and it requires tremendous moral courage. The Bde Cdr got a bad ACR (Efficiency Report) for his uprightness and was overlooked for future promotions. 118. Schwarzkopfs bn was carrying a lot of civ work as well to win the hearts and minds of the people. They build a rd through the peninsula to link the capital with small hamlets. The VCs tried hard to

31 disrupt but the bn succeeded. They started a Medcap program, which provided local villagers with regular med care. 119. The new Div Cdr Maj Gen AE Milloy was the kind of cdr that Schwarzkopf admired. He was professionally very thorough. Gen Milloy told Col Clemons, his bde cdr, that in his judgment, only four of the eleven bn cdrs under him were competent. Schwarzkopf was one of them. He felt overwhelmed. The sec Vietnamese tour had been an unhappy one for Schwarzkopf due to the incompetence of his subordinates, pears and seniors and therefore he cherished the compliment. It was very different from the first tour where he had needed no praise because of the task which was fulfilling. 120. One of his coys one day strayed into a mined area during patrolling. Two soldiers had been blown off. The injured were yelling and the coy was in a panic. Schwarzkopf immediately flew to the site and crawled up to the injured soldier risking his life by mov in the mine fd. He asked the coy cdr to calm down the coy. He calmed the injured soldier down after reassuring him of med help. Another mine blew up under the coy cdr and its shrapnel injured Schwarzkopf also. He realized that they could not get out of the area without the help of the engrs. He called for an engr team with mine detectors to clear the area. The engrs didnt have any marking stores. He called for cans of shaving cream to mk the mines detected by the engineers. They extricated the men and after the last man got out, Schwarzkopf left for the hosp. The doctors dug out seven or eight shrapnel from his left pectoral muscle and bandaged him up. He than bullied the doctors to disch him. He went up to see the coy cdr and other injured soldiers. The black soldiers came up to him to express their gratitude in saving the life of one of them. He had not realized until then that the soldier to whom he had crawled up in the minefd was black. 121. Schwarzkopf had spent eleven months in Vietnam and it was time for him to go back home. He felt torn. On the one hand he felt the powerful tug of home, and, on the other, he felt that he had put in a lot of handwork to put his bn into shape and wanted to run it. But he knew it was time to leave and go. 122. He recd a warm sendoff from the men. He thanked them for serving their country and under him. He was proud that they were alive. At the end he was relived to have done a good job of saving the lives of as many men as possible.

32 CHAPTER V : AFTER EFFECTS OF VIETNAM AND ARMY WAR COLLEGE (1970-1974) 123. This chapter is a prcis of Chapter 11 of the book. On his return, Schwarzkopf found that the Vietnam experience haunted him especially due to the adverse public opinion. He also found the army morally and ethically weak. However, the sp of his wife and sister and the birth of his two daughters helped him to keep his sanity. The main issues highlighted in the chapter are as follows:(a) (b) (b) (d) His family life. The rot in the army. His attitude to the adverse public opinion on Vietnam. Admission to Army War College.

His Family Life 124. Schwarzkopf was happy to be back with his wife Brenda who was very supportive and loving. Their first daughter Cynthia was born shortly after his arr. In Mar 1972 a yr and a half later his sec daughter Jessica was born. All of them brought great joy to him. 125. His sister Sally had become close to them and often visited them. Though they had some differences in opinion on Vietnam, both him and Brenda loved her. Thus Schwarzkopf had a stable and happy family life. The Rot in the Army 126. On his return from Vietnam. Schwarzkopf was posted to Pers Office at Inf Branch (Equivalent of MS Branch) and his job was posting of Inf offrs world wide. He was with the Professional Devp Sec which dealt with matching qualifications of the selected pers with the QRs. 127. Moral Bankruptcy. The army was morally and ethically in a bad shape. He came across Lt Cols who, as they neared their twenty yr mk wanted to know if they had a future in the Army. Many of them had been mislead by the bosses ie while they had been told that they would get a good efficiency report, they had actually been graded low. The freq with which Schwarzkopf saw people who had been lied to was astonishing.

33 128. In the summer of 1970 Army War College issued a scathing report commissioned by Gen William Westmoreland as Army Chief, that blasted the Army for rewarding the wrong people. It described how the system had been subverted to condone selfish behavior and tolerated incompetent cdrs who sacrificed their subordinates and distorted facts to get ahead. It criticized the armys obsession with meaningless statistic especially on the subject of body count in Vietnam as a result of which, offrs were inflating kills. 129. Nepotism. In Washington, the high ranking officials were pulling strings to prevent favoured subordinates from being assigned sec tour of Vietnam, even though it meant others served a third time. Some offrs were tampering with school selection process. One maj who had been undeserving for Comd and Gen Staff College got the seat through a virtual blackmail by his brother-in-law who was a member of the House Appropriation Committee. 130. Schwarzkopfs career was progressing well. He was, one of the five offrs in his batch selected for the Army War College. This was on his merit and without compromising on his principles. After Effects of Vietnam 131. The Vietnam War had evoked strong reactions amongst the public who felt it was an unnecessary war. The soldiers were dying every day. Anti-war protests were common and the protesters spitted on the soldiers. It was a shock to Schwarzkopf who had thought of himself as a hero having fought bravely in Vietnam and who felt that they were fighting for a just cause. 132. Schwarzkopf had to be hospitalized for a back surg. In the hosp he met a lot of Vietnam veterans, recuperating after serious injuries and losses to their limbs. A few days earlier hundreds of such veterans, some in wh chair had gone to Washington to protest against the war and thrown their medals onto the steps of the Capitol. Schwarzkopf couldnt believe that. Secret Pentagon papers on sp to Vietnam had been leaked which raised doubts that probably President Johnson had deceived the public about Americas growing involvement. The nation was on a turmoil. Schwarzkopf hated what Vietnam was doing to the US and the Army. It was a nightmare for him that the American public had withdrawn its sp. They never had a doubt about the sp of their people back home even for one min during the two World Wars. The mil did not chose the en. Nevertheless they were taking much of the blame. The soldiers were the sons of America and to lose public sp was akin to being rejected by own parents. He doubted whether he would like to go

34 and fight in Vietnam again. He felt he would not be able to stay in the army if the attitude of the army and the public did not change. 133. He was also disturbed to see the pain of the Vietnam war cas in the hosp. Moreover, he found that the Army was insensitive towards the families of the victims and hid facts thereby raising doubts in their minds. In one such incident Schwarzkopf was approached by a reporter for the truth in the case of the death of a soldier by friendly fire. The army auths were not willing to disclose the circumstances of the incident. Schwarzkopf gave out the truth about the incident, explaining the circumstances under which the indl had died. The family was satisfied thereafter and the matter was closed. Army War College 134. The curriculum at Army War College comprised contemporary history, world affairs, international relations, US policy making and numerous other aspects of national and international thinking. The cl consisted almost entirely of Vietnam war veterans. They didnt hesitate to challenge the speakers who tried to paint a rosy picture of the army. It was a fact that Vietnam had not only demoralized the army but had also soaked up a huge share of Armys budget. The fighting eqpt had become obsolete and the bases and facilities were in dis-repair. 135. The Army in its bid to improve its image stopped compulsory drafting and started looking for volunteers. It launched a big advertisement campaign built around the theme The Army wants to Join You. Schwarzkopf was greatly disappointed to see that there were no fundamental changes in the armys attitude. Instead of focusing on new trg pgmes, improvement in living conditions etc, he found them focusing on glamorizing the army by flashy apparels, introducing beer vending machines in the bks and topless go-go dancers in offrs and NCOs clubs. Pentagon 136. Schwarzkopf was overlooked for early promotion to the rk of Col. It came as a shock and great disappointment to him. He felt it was because of his lack of experience of staff at higher levels. At the end of the course he was given an offer for a staff appt at the Pentagon. Another offer with him was at Trg and Doctrine Comd where he could participate in the reforms for the army and help it to rec from Vietnam. It was a test bed for new ideas in trg and fighting and a more challenging appt. However, he opted for the staff at Pentagon. It was

35 for the first time he had opted for an assignment not because he wanted it or because he could make great contribution to the army, but because he thought it would help him to get ahead in his career. 137. At Pentagon he became aware of the inner workings of Washington. In one of the projects Concise, the army had to cut down on its bases in US due to budgetary constraints. They worked hard and after deep analysis made a fair list of low priority bases. However, when they briefed the Senators of the states where bases were to be closed, they faced stiff resistance. The final list prep was a political one. Eighteen months of hard work had gone down the drain. He realized to accomplish anything in Washington meant having to compromise, manipulate and put the fix behind the scenes. 138. Schwarzkopf was again overlooked for promotion to Col, the next yr. He was also manipulated in the selection of Mil Aid to the Vice President. He had been one of the three candidates short listed, but the selection was rigged. It was a mere formality since the choice had already been made from the start. He was disappointed at the dumb and corrupt system and at himself for allowing to be manipulated. 139. He continued to work hard and earned a reputation of a team player who knew how to get things done in the bureaucracy something which he wasnt proud of. In Nov, he got the promotion to the rk of Col, which was auto for offrs with his profile. He got an offer to be Dy Bde Cdr of an Alaska Bde, which was being reorganized. The Bde was very large and almost equivalent to a div with a No of combat and lgs units. Due to the re-org the Bde Cdr was likely to be swamped with adm work, and hence he as the Dy Cdr would have to look after comd of the comb bde. Even though the Bde Cdr, Brig Gen Willard Latham had a reputation of being a hard task master, he grabbed the opportunity since it gave him a chance to comd tps again. His friends thought he was crazy to go to Alaska leaving a good career assignment at Pentagon.

36 CHAPTER VI : COMD OF FMNS (1976-1988) 140. This chapter is a prcis of Chapters 12 to 15 of the book. It covers the period from the time he became Dy Cdr of a Bde at Alaska till he took over the Central Comd. It covers his journey through various higher echelons of the army. The main issues highlighted in the chapter are as follows:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Plg. His initiatives in trg. The Family Welfare Pgmes. Exposure to Jt Comd. Ops in Grenada. His comd of Mech fmns. Experiences in the highest echs of Pers Mgmt and Ops and

ALASKA 141. Schwarzkopf joined as Dy Cdr of the Bde at Alaska in mid Dec. His Bde comprised Lt Inf units, Para troopers, Arty, Engrs, Avn and Lgs units. It was 4500 men strong and nick named as Snow Hawks. They had to be trained to fight in mtns and snow. Schwarzkopf quickly learned the fundamentals of skiing and survival techniques. He also started para jumping after a long time. Alaska had a reputation of being mil backwaters. Amongst the grn cdrs and HQ staff there were about a doz cols who were overlooked for promotion and were senior to Schwarzkopf. Schwarzkopf had superceded them to the post of Dy Cdr which was not liked by them. 142. Brig Latham was a hard task master. He was religious minded and fanatic about fitness. He was also relentless in his demands and stingy in praises. He was clear headed and wanted results. Schwarzkopf thought he could learn a lot from him.

37 Msn Oriented Trg 143. Brig Latham pointed out that the Bde lacked a clear cut msn. He iden that the oil pipelines in Alaska were a strat tgt for the en and hence their protection became their msn. He introduced a new approach to trg, developed at TRADOC which required the subordinate cdrs to ex greater int, flexibility and initiatives than earlier. The cdrs were required to define their units msn and iden the indl and collective skills essential to achieve that. The trg pgme was then designed so as to devp those skills. 144. A clear msn had an electrifying effect on the Snow Hawks. They could bear the hardships of the trg since they knew what was expected of them. The state of morale improved further and the bde's performance also became better. Schwarzkopf wrote the Stds Of Op Performance expected of each CO. Each pl was handed a single sheet of paper that spelled out the skills expected of the subunit to master. All these measures helped in achieving focus on the right kind of trg. Brig Latham was posted out on promotion and he said his good-bye to the Bde in his characteristic style. He took the Bde out for an ex wherein they had to march 75 kms in three days to reach the ex area. Schwarzkopf found that the tps had a high morale in spite of the tough route march. 145. The new cdr Brig Jim Boatner was also a professionally competent offr. However, he was a relaxed fellow, with a quiet sense of humor who enjoyed seeing his subordinates happy. He preferred persuasion, to confrontation. He adopted his predecessors trg methods and built upon his legacy. He introduced a new annual trg test specifically designed to uncover a units weakness. The Bde further progressed and flourished under him and they could perform impressively even against the Ranger Bn which was considered as the armys best. 146. The tenure at Alaska was a satisfying one for Schwarzkopf in many different ways incl professionally. He indulged in lots of outdoor activities like rafting, fly-fishing, skiing and hunting. He undertook a forty-mile long hike on Resurrection Pass trail. These activities helped him to find calm and peace and reconnect with the nature. He was happy to have freed himself from the ticket-punching syndrome of Pentagon and get on with comd of tps. Fall of Saigon on 30 Apr 1975 however, disturbed him. He felt that America had betrayed the South Vietnamese by reducing their sp in terms of men and mtrl. He thought about the countless lives that had been lost without achieving anything.

38 147. In Sep his mother died due to illness. Like at his fathers death, he felt overwhelmed by sorrow and regret. He had loved his mother in spite of her alcoholism and missed her. BDE CDR 148. Even before completing one yr at Alaska, Schwarzkopf got the news that he had been selected to comd a bde as a col. Since only a minority of cols got to comd a bde, it meant his career was back on the fast tr. He was given the comd of 1st Bde part of a Div at Fort Lewis Washington. 149. His predecessor was fond of show-off and had some wild ideas. People felt that he did not have a real grasp of his business. As a result the tps were unhappy and the Bde had been nicknamed as Circus Bde. The official name was Recondo Bde (Recce/Cdo). Schwarzkopf had op with the Bde earlier twice in exs at Alaska. However, on both occasions the Bde had given a bad acct of itself. Before assuming the comd, Schwarzkopf spent some time finding out about the bdes performance from the staff at the Div HQ. On the day he took over the comd, he called all his key offrs the staff chiefs, bn cdrs, coy cdrs and the sgt majs and gave them a questionnaire to get their views about the role, task and functioning of the bde. The cdrs , in their replies told that the bde was not doing its task well and they would like the bde to stop the wild practices of his predecessor and start real trg in the fd. 150. The Div Cdr, Maj Gen Volney Warner was a war veteran and very clear headed. He had laid what he called his "big fours"-the four types of trg ex he expected every unit to do well. He told his cdrs that those would be the parameters on which he would grade them and on the rest of the issues they had tremendous lat. Schwarzkopf discussed the problems of his bde with the Div Cdr and the measures he had in mind to improve. He told Gen Warner, that on scrutinizing the records he had found that his bde had been assigned greater share of grn duties and had spend less time in the fd. He requested him to allow his bde to rep the Div in the next summer ex 'Brave Shield'. In that ex the Bde would be the en in defending role. That would give them a goal to train. Gen Warner agreed. The tps were galvanized by the news. They trained hard and the morale improved. During this pd, on 20 Jun, Schwarzkopf was blessed with a son which further raised his spirits. 151. Ex Brave Shield pitted their three bns against thirteen bns of the Marines. The war games scenario called for them to est initial defenses along a line of desert bluffs and, once the Marines dislodged them, to

39 fight a delaying action alternately resisting and withdrawing until, after ten days, they would finally succumb. Instead, their performance in def was so good that they practically won. They held their posns along the bluffs so effectively that they repulsed the Marines attack twice. The umpires finally had to orders them off the bluffs because the ex was running far behind the schedule. They had played strictly by the rules, but the Marine two-star gen was cheesed off and did not speak to Schwarzkopf when the ex ended. 152. Maj Gen Richard Cavazos took over the div from Maj Gen Volney Warner. He was an outgoing offr and a great cdr of tps. He was superb at rallying the men and was genuinely concerned about their welfare. He would ensure that the men got their weekends off. He was also a good instr. The traditional bn fd ex called for a unit to practice delaying, defending and counter attacking all in a single week. He told them to conc on one element at a time like digging in against armd attack. The men then practiced stringing barbed wires, laying minefds establishing fighting posns, putting up cam - the fundamentals that they had studied but rarely practiced. 153. Schwarzkopfs bde thrived and made a name for itself. The Div Cdr came to rely on them and he was chosen to rep the Div in one of the exs. His promotion to the rk of Brig also came by. Schwarzkopf felt very happy and proud. He had always wanted to be a Gen like his father. He shared his joy with his tps by addressing them and giving them a day off. In his address Schwarzkopf told them "Any Cdr worth his salt knows that when a good thing happens to him, it happens because of the soldiers under his comd. I am proud of the bde. I am proud of the great work you guys have done ". He told them that a part of the star belonged to each one of them. 154. The thirty six newly promoted Gen offrs were given a ten day orientation capsule know as `Charm School' at the Pentagon. The aim of it was to orient the offrs, since from then on they would be comdg tps of all arms and services. To do their jobs well, they would need a much broader view of what was going on in the army. They got tough lectures on conduct of Gen offrs from the COAS, Gen Rogers and the Inspector Gen Dick Trefry. The Chief told them that they should not indulge in abuse of powers, womanising or allow their wives to brow beat everybody on their staff. The theme of the Inspector Gen was also on morale behavior and he promised to come after them if they breached any code of conduct. 155. One of the reg was that for an offr to get promoted to Gen offr, he should have served at a jt comd and Schwarzkopf lacked in this criterion. He was posted as Asst Staff Offr Plans And Policy at Pacific Comd in Hawai.

40 PACIFIC COMD 156. Adm Maurice F Weisner was the C-in-C of the Pacific Comd. R Adm Don Shelton was the Chief of Plans and Policy of the comd and Schwarzkopfs was his asst. 157. The Pacific Comd's area of responsibility extended from the west coast of US to east coast of Africa covering almost half the world. It covered the entire Pacific and Indian oceans. It was a domain of the Navy. Schwarzkopfs predecessor Brig Sadler advised him to get out of there as early as possible since it could ruin his career. R Adm Shelton had been overlooked for further promotion and was bitter about it. Moreover, he viewed Schwarzkopf with absolute disdain and had assigned him staff work, which would normally be done by lower ranking offrs. However, soon Adm Shelton realized that Schwarzkopf was a team player and assigned him the responsibilities of politico - mil work that involved maintaining relations with govt and mil ldrs in the Pacific basin. Schwarzkopf traveled extensively and conducted plg and base negotiations with the Koreans, Taiwanese, Australians, New Zealanders and Japanese. 158. The other responsibility of the plans and policy branch was to plan how the American forces would dply and fight in various countries. Adm Weisner and Shelton believed that the strat importance of Pacific was greater than that of Europe and hence the priority of forces should be assigned to them. The Pentagon thought otherwise keeping the Soviet threat in mind. As a result, Adm Shelton spent a greater part of his time concentrating on grand strat and convincing the Pentagon. He was uninterested in specific plans on dply of forces of the comd and so Schwarzkopf on his own took over the plg of grnd ops. The work brought him into close contact with offrs from all the services. He realized the Navy worked differently. The decision making power was conc at the top while the middle ranking offrs had much less autonomy compared to their counter parts in Army, AF and Marine Corps. 159. The independence that Shelton allowed made him happier. After the retirement of Adm Shelton he became the actg plans and policy chief. During this period three incidents took place. Firstly, in Iran, the Shah was deposed by the Islamic fundamentalists and sixty Americans were taken hostage in the embassy. Secondly, the Islamic radicals in Palestine burned the US embassy. Thirdly, the Soviets got involved in Afghanistan. Though, all the crisis passed off but Schwarzkopf realized that the Pacific comd was not prep with contingency plans. The army was insufficient, the AF did not have adequate knowledge of air fds in those areas and the Navy had ships that were too big for the Persian

41 Gulf. President Carter enunciated, a doctrine that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf would be repelled by all means necessary. Hence to meet any crisis in the Middle East a new Rapid Dply Jt TF was formed. The TF created ripples in the Pacific Comd since it threatened to take away a chunk of their area of responsibility. ASST DIV CDR, 8 MECH DIV 160. On 28 Mar 1980 Schwarzkopf was posted as Asst Div Cdr of the 8 Mech Div. It was a top-notch div that was part of NATOs front line defs in Germany. It was one of the armys largest div. It comprised four bdes and twenty four thousand soldiers. Its role was to help def Fulda Gap, a broad, flat corridor in Germanys central hills that provided a natural invasion route for the Warsaw Pact tks, right into the heavily industrialised Rhineland. 161. Schwarzkopf was very happy for many reasons. He was back to the tps and to the same part of the country where he had lived as a kid. He was excited about working with an armd fmn having all along served in lt inf and to learn about mech W. He had known the Div Cdr, Maj Gen Bill Livsey since his 2/Lt days and both the fellow asst div cdrs were his friends. Maj Gen Livsey was a good cdr who had built a happy team. 162. The 8 Mech Div was spread at a No of locs. Schwarzkopfs was given dual responsibilities as Community Cdr (Stn Cdr) of Mainz town and as Asst Div Cdr for Sp (ADCS) (Equivalent to Col Adm of a Div). As Community Cdr he was responsible for five thousand soldiers, their families and their all adm needs. In addn there was a large tk repair depot and Finthen Army Air Base outside the town where the divs heptr unit was based. 163. The change of comd ceremony was a grand affair presided by the Corps Cdr. His first assignment was to org the Holy Mass at Finthen Air Base by Pope who was on a visit to Germany. It was considered as very imp for German-American relationship since the Pope was vis only four places incl Mainz. The task brought him in contact with all the imp personalities of Mainz.

42 Initiation into Mech Fmn 164. He had been made ADCS so that he could quickly learn about the mech units. He was in charge of maint of all eqpt, tn and sup of the div. It was an enormous responsibility for someone who had little knowledge of mech eqpt and functioning. The Div Cdr gave him a paper describing his responsibilities as under:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Comd Mainz Mil Community. Oversee 1st Bde, Div Sp Comd, Avn Bn, Sig Bn, Engr Bn. Responsible for Div Maint. Responsible for Lgs ops. Oversee amn storage and distr. Supervise div tn plg to incl rail, rd and air.

165. Schwarzkopf was given a free hand to take decisions to fix the problems related to his duties as ADCS. He started of by taking detailed briefing from his subordinate staff and the services. He read through the maint and sup manuals. In the past few yrs a No of changes had taken place in the army, in eqpt, doctrines and trg. The army had inducted a lot of new eqpt like the M1 tks, Apache heptrs, Bradley fighting vehs and Pershing msls. TRADOC had given new concepts of fighting the larger Soviet forces by using new technologies to offset their numerical superiority, synchronize the comb power and encourage cdrs at every level to ex initiative, flexibility and ingenuity on the battle fd. 166. The trg had also matured into a comprehensive system, which integrated all ingredients such as trg to stds, trg to accomplish a specific msn and trg to overcome weaknesses. Hi tech trg aids had been integrated that emp LASERS on the wpns to record hits during ex. The tps had detectors, which would give a beep as soon as hit by a LASER. Other systems allowed tk crews to simulate firing through the main guns at mov on en tks projected on a screen. Stop action replays showed exactly where the anti tk rd had hit. The realism in trg inspired the soldiers to work hard to improve their firing and survival skills. The proficiency in gunnery increased and freq of first rd hits went up.

43 Community Comd 167. Schwarzkopf found that the most challenging job was the community comd. The accn for NCOs was short and many privates were not permitted to bring in the families. However, the families would anyway join them thus creating med and financial problems. He understood their need and tried to make their lives comfortable. He opened the community commissary clinic and day care center for them. He also started shuttle bus service to ferry them to these places. He told his cdrs that they were responsible for the families of the men under their comd. His logic was that if a soldier was not secure about his family he would not be able to fight well. 168. PR. Schwarzkopf also involved himself with the German community. He joined walking club and hunting circles. He held meetings every month with the city officials to iden and resolve German American frictions. The Popes visit had allowed him to meet the cardinals committee. He also socialized with lord mayor of Mainz, the county commissioner, his mil counterpart Maj Gen Hermann Vogt, the eight neighborhood mayors, the police commissioner and other city ldrs. 169. In Feb he received the news of his approval to the rk of Maj Gen. He was elated. Two stars was the highest rk in the army that was decided by a promotion board, that weighed all eligible candidates in an open competition, and only half of all one stars ever made the cut. Maj Gen Livsey had also been promoted to Lt Gen and left in Jun. His successor was Maj Gen Carl Vuono who was also well known to Schwarzkopf. 170. Maj Gen Vuono was good-natured man but a workaholic. He had served at TRADOC and was determined to institute the new trg techniques developed there. He started by instituting the Trg Mgmt Review. He asked his bn cdrs to present their entire trg schedules and progress for the next six months. He would scrutinize every detail and ask the cdrs to justify their plans on the basis of op msn. Within six months 8 Mech looked sharper on almost every aspect of readiness. 171. Maj Gen Vuono made Schwarzkopf his Asst Div Cdr for Ops. He was responsible for war plans and fighting units. He analysed the limitations and str in Vuonos methods. The rigorous trg was good but constant practice of maneuvers in the same manner resulted in inflexibility. In one of the exs, 8 Mech was initially required to def and then counter-attack. During def they were required to fight a delaying action withdrawing until the aslt was blunted. Maj Gen Vuono carefully made his plans many weeks in adv and practiced the tps relentlessly on how each one of them would carryout his actions. During the ex the

44 attacking force mod its plans and instead of attacking on all fronts attacked only in one sect driving a deep wedge into the en posns. The staff of 8 Mech ignored all the int reports and continued to execute the plan that Vuono had drilled. They retreated in those sectors also where they had not been attacked. They did not counter attack in spite of the sit demanding so. The unit however, performed much better during the offensive phase since they could follow the practiced drills. Schwarzkopf had been the chief umpire and hence was not allowed to participate with 8 Mech. However, he learned a maj lesson about staying flexible enough on the battlefd to react to the unexpected en actions. Rtg Scandal 172. The quality of soldiers that the army had been rtg was not of a high stds. The Modern Volunteer Army Campaign had not succeeded. The rtg offrs, in order to complete their quotes had been helping the undeserving candidates to pass. Even amongst those who joined the army, the better ones went to tech arms and the worst lot came to Inf, Armr and Arty. Hence handling them was a problem since most of them had an IQ of 60 to 80. 173. After some scandals in rtg were exposed, the army took up reforms in earnest. Inf and Armr were given funds to offer bonuses to rects joining them. The rtg comd replaced its slogan Join the people who have joined the Army with BE ALL THAT YOU CAN BE. The new slogan was an advertising genius and had imdt impact. The better rects started joining the army who learned quickly and adapted more readily. DIRECTOR OF MIL PERS MGMT 174. In June 1982 Schwarzkopf was transferred on promotion as Director of Mil Pers Mgmt in the office of Dy COS Pers. He was delighted with the new assignment not only because he was returning to the pers business which he enjoyed but also because of his new boss Lt Gen Thurman who was an interesting character. Lt Gen Thruman was a disciplinarian and an eccentric. He was the one who had cleaned up the rtg comd and given the slogan Be All That You Can Be. The army had to thank him for the first rate soldiers coming in. As a reward he had been hand picked as Dy COS Pers, the highest post in pers. His shortcoming was that he had not commanded a unit larger then a Bde. He therefore, wanted an experienced Div Cdr as his Asst Dy. The COS

45 wanted the div cdrs for other imp jobs and hence Thruman temp pitched for Schwarzkopf who had been an asst div cdr and had wealth of experience in comd of tps. 175. It was a good time for the pers dept. After yrs of failed expts, army started getting educated rects (85% were high school graduates) and the re-enlistment rate also became highest since Vietnam. There were more soldiers wanting to stay in the army than they needed. As a result they instituted programs to weed out lazy and incompetent NCOs. 176. Gen Thurman was very strict about physical fitness stds. He asked Schwarzkopf to comment on old stds. Schwarzkopf was quick to pt out that old stds based on ht-wt consideration were unrealistic. He proved that all athletes would have failed them. They were more of beauty reqmts. Gen Thurman agreed and the old stds were replaced with a new set which set a limit on the percentage of body fat. 177. One of Gen Thurmans big campaign was to make the army more accessible to women. They acct for only eight percent of rects. A study commissioned by him recommended easing of gender restns in noncomb specialist units and to continue excl women from direct comb units. Both conclusions were controversial but Gen Thurman by his drive made them as Army Policy. He directed each branch to explain how they would apply the new gender rules to their mil specialists and Schwarzkopf was made in charge to review them. Schwarzkopf was fair and ruthless in ensuring all branches applied them in letter and spirit and earned the reputation of as the guy at Army HQ who was carrying the banner for womens cause. 178. They launched half a doz other maj reforms over the course of six months, tightening criteria for enlistment and re-enlistment, revamping the procedures for commissioning graduates of the ROTC, completely revising the promotion standards for NCOs, and putting real teeth in the offr-retention stds. Thurman used Schwarzkopf as sounding bd for his ideas because of his experience at comd of tps. He allowed Schwarzkopf great lat in functioning. His directive to Schwarzkopf was Do Whats Right.

46 COMD OF 24 MECH : FORT STEWANT 179. Five Goals. In Mar 1983, Schwarzkopf was posted as Div Cdr of 24 Mech. Comd of a div was the pinnacle of success for a comb arms offr. The army had only sixteen active-duty divs and each comd turned over every two yrs, so that out of the fifty or more maj gens who got promoted, only eight got comd of a div in a given yr. Schwarzkopf remembered the words of Tom Welham who had twentyfive yrs earlier advised him when he was a disillusioned young Lt at Fort Campbell, Stick around and someday, when you have more rk, you may be able to fix the problems. Schwarzkopf thought this was his chance to apply everything he had learned in his mil career. He had a long list of role models with whom he had worked and admired such as Latham, Boatner, Cavazor, Livsey, Vuono and so on. He remembered the big four list of goals of Gen Warner and made his own list of five goals encompassing the entire sphere of his responsibilities. The list was as follows: (a) First. To make sure that the Div was Comb ready. 24 Mech was already one of the best in the army and his job would be to keep it sharp. (b) Sec. To take care of the soldiers. These he had learned from Cavazos and Livsey. (c) Third. To take care of the soldiers families. This he had learned on his own. (d) Fourth. Loyalty to one another was what motivated the soldiers to fight. Camaraderie and cohesion at every level of the 24th was to be encouraged. This he had learned in war. (e) Fifth. taught him. To teach his subordinates just as his mentors had

180. The Div was earmarked to fight in the Middle East. The Rapid Dply Force mentioned earlier had been expanded into a full-fledged four-star comd and renamed Central Comd. It had under it an impressive array of forces incl the Ninth AF, the First Marine Expeditionary Force and the Armys XVIII AB Corps. The 24 Mech was part of XVIII Corps along with 82 Air borne Div and 101 Air Aslt Div. In the event of war the div was to follow the 82 AB and 101 Air Aslt by air and their eqpt was to follow in high speed cargo ships. Gen Cavazos had selected Schwarzkopf for the comd due to his extensive experience in lt inf, AB and armr. He was most suitable to op with the other fmns of the corps.

47 181. 24 Mech was a good fmn. It was a modern and large div with three armr bns, three mech inf bns, three fd arty bns, an AD bn and two bns of sp tps. In addn they had a bde of reservists. Schwarzkopf was keen to introduce everything that he had learned in his previous comds. However, he decided to watch the div for the first six months and allow them time to adjust to the change of comd. Although he had delayed any sweeping changes, he was on the look out for ways to est himself as the ldr from the beginning. On his sec day, he found that during PT, the head of one of the squads was running very fast leaving a long tail of straggles behind. He went up to the Capt in charge of the squad and explained that the run should be so org that every one in it could keep pace. It would help build unit cohesion. The lt dawned on the Capts face and the msg spread to other units as well. 182. Schwarzkopf made it a pt, never to pass by a mistake and tried to instill that principle in all his ldrs. He did away with the unnecessary weekend trg. He told his cdrs that if they wanted to train on a weekened they would have to tell their tps six weeks in adv so that they could plan accordingly. He also emphasized that the weekend trg whenever held, should be good and purposeful and should be compensated by giving them a day off. The cdrs had doubts that their comb readiness would suffer. However, Schwarzkopf was firm that this would improve the comb readiness. Trg 183. NTC. The Armys new National Trg Center, at Fort Irwin, California was the most sophisticated practice rg ever devised. The trn closely resembled that of northern Iran and was well suited for the 24 Mech. They could teach and evaluate their units under circumstances, which closely resembled the actual battles. Two bns at a time along with sp elements could train at a time. The en was depicted by a unit knows as OPFOR (short for Opposing forces) that had been org and equipped to fight like Soviets and was very well trained. The bns were given three days to att LASERS, tx and monitors to their eqpt and then were thrown into two weeks of simulated comb, twenty four hrs a day. The trg consisted of a continuous sequence of actions. As soon as a bn finished one msn it was thrust into the next just as in comb at its most intense. The battle fd was fully automated and the evaluators accompanied the unit at every level. At the end of the battle there used to be detailed debriefing of cdrs. The umpires questioned every wrong action and show the unit their faults on the cmptr. During the debrief, the units NCOs, remained in the fd replenishing sups, feeding the tps and dragging shot up tks off the battle fd to a maint tent just as in actual ops. Traditionally, armies all over the world do not ex sups and maint procedures but Schwarzkopf ensured that they did it under battle conditions simulated to as real as possible.

48 184. When Schwarzkopfs bns went to the NTC he explained to them that NTC was `National Trg Center and not `National Testing Center. He expected them to use their initiative and make mistakes. It was better to err during peace time then in the war and that they should learn from their experiences. If they failed in any maneuver he would not hold it against them. So as, not to put pressure on his COs, he would not visit them at the NTC in the first week so that even if they fared poorly, they would not be embarrassed. From the sec week onwards, after a few failures the units usually performed well and it was then he visited them. 185. Towards the op readiness of his div, he and his staff prep a high level ex along with the XVIII AB Corps to evaluate their role in the event of a war. Each cdr del a detailed acct of how his unit would fight its part. At the end of it they compiled a list of the shortcomings that the Pentagon needed to address. 186. The 24 Mech turned into a superb fighting div. They trained smart and with purpose, instead of dumb and by rote. They took every opportunity to send the div though NTC, and instead of usual two rotations per yr, they managed to get four. The opposing forces also realised the high stds of 24 Mech and would prepare better for the ex. The Cdrs of 24 Mech relished the challenge but never lost sight of the fact that they were there to learn. Hence, they would not hesitate to innovate or practice new maneuvers. Family Welfare Pgme 187. Taking care of the soldiers families was the trickiest task since it was least traditional. He began by making small improvements such as extending the hrs of commissary (shopping center) for the families to shop on Sundays, setting up a bus service for them to come to the shopping center and making them aware of the programs of the Red Cross and the Army Emergency Relief, that were offered to families in trouble. With time he became more aggressive. He declared 03 Aug, 1984 as the Family Day and the soldiers were allowed to bring their wives to see the offices, bks, mess halls etc and participate in games and rides org for them. Some unit cdrs caught the spirit and some started putting out news letters when going out to fd telling families how to get help when their husbands were away. However, some others were skeptical and thought it to be out of the preview of their responsibilities. Schwarzkopf called a meeting of all cdrs called Family Action Committee and gave each one some responsibility or the other such as charge of day-care center, club scouts or kids soccer league. The family pgme developed very well.

49

188. The family pgme however, brought him in direct confrontation with the locals who used to fleece the soldiers. The police used to take bribes from soldiers after catching them driving in drunken state usually on the pay day. Schwarzkopf stared parties and other recreational activities in the campus itself, thereby reducing the trips of the soldiers to the mkt to purchase drinks. He brought Burger King a fast food jt to the mil grn. The locals accused him of taking the food out of their childrens mouth. The controversy grew so fierce that the US Senate ordered an investigation and banned opening of any more such outlets in mil campus. However, Schwarzkopfs outlet gave good profits with which he build a swimming pool at Fort Stewart. Ops In Greneda 189. The govt of Grenada had been overthrown by a mil junta, in Oct 1983. Hundreds of American med students studying there were detained in dormitories. A jt op under the Navy was launched to liberate the students and put the legitimate govt back in place. Schwarzkopf was placed in as a advisor to co-ord the correct emp of army units ie the 82nd Air borne, the Spl Ops units and the Ranger bn. Navy was not happy with this arng. V Adm Joseph Metcalf, on his first briefing at the Atlantic Comd told him to be helpful and hoped army would not give them a hard time. Schwarzkopf replied, Sir, Im here to help in any way I can. I have served for two yrs at Pacific Comd under Adm Weisner and Adm Don Shelton and I understand how the Navy wks. I have no intention of being disruptive. This mollified them a little. 190. Ref Appx C. Greneda was an island ten miles wide the twenty five miles long, part of the Coast was sandy beach but the island consisted mostly of mtnous jungle that came st up out of the sea. The op was planned as a Coup-de-main, a one punch knockout. While the Navy was to cordon off the island with ships and planes, the Marines were to make an amphibious aslt on the eastern shore. Their obj was Pearl airfd, the islands only op airport and the town of Greenville, which housed a mil grn. Simultaneously, the Rangers were to fly and seize the Port Salines airfd, a very large installation under constr at the islands southern tip and also the True Blue campus of the med school where the American med students were reportedly detained. The 82nd AB was to relieve the Rangers after the capture of Port Salines airfd. The spl ops forces were to fly in their heptrs into St Georges, the capital, on the islands west coast and rescue Sir Paul Scoon, the British appt Governor Gen who was being held as a prisoner at his residence. They were also to capture the radio stn, Fort Rupert, Fort Fredrick and

50 Richmond Hill prison. The prison was where the rebels had allegedly incarcerated the PM Maurice Bishop and other govt officials. Later the units were to fan out from the airfd and assert control of the rest of the island. 191. The Grenadian army consisted of two thousand active tps and some in res. There were anti-ac emplacements around Pt Salines and St George. In addn, there were 600-800 Cuban constr workers at Pt Salines airfd who had mil trg and were armed. However, the Americans believed that none of them would give any fight, but, Schwarzkopf was skeptical of the Cuban workers. 192. Schwarzkopf was based on a heptr carrier ship GUAM, which was Adm Metcalfs flagship for the ops. The H Hr was 0500h, 25 Oct 83. After his bitter experience in Vietnam, an op which American public didnt sp, he had self doubts as to whether they should participate in this op. However, he decided as a soldier his job was not to question the judgment of his ldrs but to make sure that the msn succeeded with min losses. 193. A recce msn by Navy, to check the serviceability of Salines rw had failed due to rough weather. The beaches near Pearl Airfd and Greenville had been reported as unsuitable for amphibian ldg. Adm Metcalf had mod the plan and decided to attack that side by heptr. GUAM and its escort ships steamed to within five miles of the island for facilitating aslt by heptr. By 0630h, the Marines took the Pearl airfd and the Greenville town without a fight. However, at Pt Salines, the Rangers who had been forced to paradrop, met with the fire of anti ac gun and the Cuban constr workers who were dug in. In St George the Spl Forces heptr also encountered hy anti ac fire and couldnt fly too much inside to reach their obj. Few tps did manage to land at the Governor Gens house but were surrounded and trapped. Fort Frederick had been iden as HQ of the rebel forces by the int pers, monitoring radio tfc. Adm Metcalf on the advice of Schwarzkopf ordered for it to be bombed. The Rangers meanwhile secured Pt Salines airfd for the ac to land. They mov to True Blue complex to rescue the students but found that bulk of the students had been kept hostage at a hotel Grand Anse two miles away at the beach. Since the spl ops forces were trapped, Schwarzkopf advised that the amphibious forces positioned near Greenville to be brought around the island and made to land north of St George where the ldg was feasible. The Marines managed to land at a place called Grand Mal, north of St George by 26 Oct morning and could then mov south to the town of St George.

51 194. At the end of the first day it was clear that the coup-de-main had failed and the Marines and the Army would have to fight together to secure the release of captured students and the Governor Gen. Since, this was to be a grnd ops, Adm Metcalf asked Schwarzkopf to make up the plans and write orders. Meanwhile, the rivalry between army and the navy came to the fore. First the Naval HQ, passed an order to Adm Metcalf not to refuel Armys heptrs. Adm Metcalf, refused to obey the order. Sec, the higher HQ, asked them to give en body count for the day. Schwarzkopf, had seen the trouble the body count had done at Vietnam. He advised Metcalf to refrain from the same. However, the higher HQs persisted. The Marines inflated the figs to outdo the army. Schwarzkopf advised that they should send one aggregated fig rather than separate for marines and the army. 195. By the next day morning, the marines cleared St George and freed the Governor Gen. The AB got reports that a large en force was blocking Grand Anse. Hence, they were consolidating before attacking. The delay was not acceptable to the higher HQs. Schwarzkopf suggested that they tpt the AB tps by Marine heptrs which were standing on the deck. The Marines initially refused to obey saying they would not fly the army soldiers in their heptrs. Schwarzkopf had to pull his rk to make them comply. Later Adm Metcalf nominated him as his Dy so that his orders were not questioned or violated. The ops were successful and all students were rescued safely. The Jt COS then ordered them to take Calivigny bks by the end of the day, which was five miles east of the air base. Int rep suggested it could be a Cuban run terrorist trg camp. The 82 AB was mov towards it clearing all pocket of en resistance en-route. They had planned to take it the next day. However, the JCS was adamant that it be taken at the earliest. They had to therefore, order a hurried heptr aslt. The op was a disaster. Two heptrs collided in the crowded ldg Z killing about two doz men. Meanwhile, there was no en there. Schwarzkopf was very annoyed at the unnecessary interference by higher HQ resulting in avoidable cas. The hostilities ceased on 02 Nov 83. 196. Schwarzkopf was rated as the best Div Cdr by the his Corps Cdr. In spite of this he did not expect a good next posting since he was not the favourite of the new COS Gen John Wickham. He, seriously considered early retirement after serving for one more appt.

52 ASST DY COS FOR OPS and PLAN 197. The next assignment for Schwarzkopf was as Asst Dy COS for Pers. It was the same job, which he had two yrs earlier under Gen Max Thurman. Schwarzkopf was greatly disappointed. However, just as he reached Washington he was hand picked as Asst Dy COS for Ops and Plan by Lt Gen Carl Vuono. It was an enormously imp and prestigious assignment. Gen Vuono was the Dy COS for Ops and Plan. 198. The Dy COS Ops and Plans was responsible to oversee every aspect of army ops which incl preparing war plans, writing regs and looking ahead to the wpns and org of the future. Gen Vuono in addn had to accompany the chief of Army Staff to meetings of Jt COS Committee (JCS). A No of his duties therefore fell on Schwarzkopf who had to rep him in meetings with Def Dept officials, testimonies before the Congress, routine staff confs, parades to greet foreign dignitaries and even delivering lectures at the War College and other service schools. The most imp duty was however, to make plans for utilization of the Armys $ 73 bn annual budget. Schwarzkopf had experience in handling budgets from his first assignment as Lt Col in the Pentagon. The army was in the process of acquiring sophisticated new eqpt and applying adv electronics to the battle fd. He participated in meetings where maj decisions of wpn procurement were made. 199. Schwarzkopf and Vuono had different styles of functioning. Schwarzkopf was blunt and forthwrite while Vuono had a reputation as an accommodator who won bureaucratic battles by wearing down his opponents with friendliness. Their approaches were complementary and Vuono had chosen Schwarzkopf as his asst because he was a loyal and eff asst. COMD OF 1 CORPS 200. Schwarzkopf was promoted and given Comd of 1 Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington. The Corps had three divs under comd ie 7 Inf Div, 9 Inf Div and the 6 Inf Div. The later was at Alaska. 201. Schwarzkopf found the comd of the Corps similar to that of the div but at a greater scale. He was in charge of seventy thousand tps, eight thousand reservist and a No of instlns. Within six months Schwarzkopf launched his family programs. His tenure at the helms of 1 Corps was very short. In less than a yr he was posted back to Washington as Dy COS for Ops and Plg, the appt earlier occupied by

53 Gen Vuono to whom he had been an asst. Though, the prospect of returning to Pentagon depressed Schwarzkopf he realized the enormous prestige associated with the appt and the virtual guarantee for the next promotion to a four star Gen. Meanwhile, Gen Carl Vuono had been named to succeed Gen Wickham as COAS. DY COS FOR OPS AND PLANS 202. Schwarzkopf took up the assignment in mid Aug 1987 under Gen Vuono. The job was tough which required 14 hrs of work every day. The Dy COS was the first among equals in the Army Staff. The other Dy Chiefs reported to the Vice Chief but Schwarzkopf reported to the Chief directly. Under him were five huge dtes that oversaw essential army functions. These were Directors of Plans and Strat, Ops, Reqmts, Trg Polices and Regs and Policy for Nuc and Chem Wpns and Wpns in Space. In addn, he was also had to accompany the Chief to JCS as his ops dy. 203. The meetings of JCS were informal but followed a strict protocol. The Middle East was at the top of the agenda. Iraq and Iran were at war. America had taken up escort of Kuwaiti super tankers so as to maint the flow of oil. Iran started sowing mines in their path. US army heptrs captured the Iranian ships sowing the mines. They responded violently to the Iranian attacks and twice they launched retaliatory strikes causing severe destr of Iranian ships. 204. The role of the Jt Chief in such crisis was to recommend mil options from which the President, the National Security Council and the Secy of Def could choose. Schwarzkopf was startled to learn that their capabilities and options in the Gulf were very ltd. Due to Americas stand off relations with Arab nations, the AF still had no access to the regions airfds and the Navy still couldnt put its carriers in the constricted waters of the Gulf. 205. The Soviet Union also consumed endless hrs of the JCS. In 1988, talks on four arms reduction treaties were underway. The Soviet highest ranking mil offr visited them twice. The JCS was gradually convinced that the struggle with the Soviets was ending. Schwarzkopf wondered that how the armed forces would adopt to the new realities since their main focus till then had been fending off communism. The Pentagon would have to re-think its msn and the funding of the army would probably reduce.

54 CHAPTER VII : CENTRAL COMD (Jun 1988 - 1991) 206. This chapter is a prcis of of Chapters 15 and 16 of the book. It is from this pt onwards that the involvement of Gen Schwarzkopf with the Middle East started in the right earnest leading to the Gulf War. The main highlights of the chapter are as follows:(a) Redefining the role of the Central Comd and preparing it for the Gulf War. (b) (c) Improving relations with the middle eastern countries. War by Iraq and American options.

207. Schwarzkopf, on promotion to a four star Gen, was given a choice of comd between Central Comd, Forces Comd and the Combined Forces Comd, Korea. He chose Central Comd. He had always been fascinated with the Middle East since his early yrs at Iran. He could also foresee the regions increasing strat importance. In the event of a war the Central Comd had an impressive array of forces that incl Ninth AF, the First Marine Expedition Force and the Third Army. However, during peacetime while the Central Comd directed the plg of all those forces, the only comb force under its day-to-day op cont was the Navy TF in the gulf, which was also about to be reduced due to the end of Iran Iraq War. One of his principle peacetime duties as he thought could be was to act as a kind of mil ombudsman in that part of the world overseeing the advisors work, administering $1.6 billion a yr in mil programs and solidifying relations with rulers and generals. Most army offrs perceived the diplomatic aspect of the job as distasteful, but he always relished the opportunity to be among people of other countries whether in Iran, Germany or Vietnam. Finally he concluded that Central Comd was where he could make history. 208. Schwarzkopfs appt as cdr of Central Comd was announced in Jul 1988. He joined an intensive course on the Middle East at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, Virginia. The course covered the culture, customs, oil issues, water issues and religion conflicts there. On Nov 18 Schwarzkopf got the highest rank in the US Army ie of a four star Gen and he took over the Comd on 23 Nov. 209. Central Comd had been carved out of the areas of Pacific Comd and the European Comd. Both the comds had neglected the middle east portion of their responsibility. As a result, their understanding of

55 the area and the prep for ops had suffered. However, when the Central Comd was formed both the comds protested on loss of their areas. To accommodate their protests certain Arab Countries like Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, which should have been part of the Central Comd, were not incl in its area of responsibility. Geographically, the Central Comd centered on the Arabian peninsula and the crucial fingers of water along its sides in the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The comd also incl Egypt, Sudan, the Horn of Africa and all the way northeast to Afghanistan and Pakistan, extending to about 4000 miles (refer Appx D). Re-Defining Role and Priorities of Central Comd 210. From its inception in 1983 Central Comd had been defined as a rapid dply force whose war time msn was to stop the Red Army from seizing the precious oil fds in Iran. The op plans called for Central Comd to rush forces to the Zagros mtns in northern Iran. It was suicidal since the narrow passes and forbidden trn favored def and however well they would have fought they would have been out numbered. Seven thousand miles from home their sups would have been another maj problem. Nonetheless, Central Comd had used it for yrs to justify allocation of large funds to it. However, with the Soviet threat diminishing a new valid purpose had to be defined for the Comd for its existence. 211. Schwarzkopf and his staff reworked the outlook and priorities of the Central Comd. For the last two yrs the focus had been on the War in Iran Iraq and Afghanistan. The peacetime responsibility of mil relationship with Middle Eastern Countries had been neglected. He started re-establishing a politico-mil branch within the plans and policy sec. Within six months they had defined the objs and pgmes for each country. The Central Comd defined its goal as arranging access to crucial air fds, harbors and mil bases in the event of war since Arab countries would not allow America to est bases. Schwarzkopf was working for gradual progress such as sending teams to Pakistan to teach Afghan refugees in how to protect themselves against Soviet mines, digging wells for vills in Somalia and persuading Congress to grant a $50,000 incr in mil aid to Jordan. The greatest success came in instituting jt trg ex of US and Saudi spl forces and with the Egypt. Such exs demonstrated that the other nations had become willing to accept Central Comds presence even if temp and on a small scale. 212. They conducted seminars for the Central Comd Staff, where vis professors and the govt officials discussed the region. His Dy Cdr in Chief Lt Gen Craven C Buck Rogers, was a veteran fighter pilot and at

56 home in the intentional arena. His COS Maj Gen Joe Hoar was brilliant, aggressive, charismatic and cool under pressure and always del results. The rest of the staff was also very strong. He also had a No of advisors from central agencies like the CIA, the Def Int Agency, the NSA, the Def Comn Agency and the Pol advisor from State Dept who was a first cl diplomat. Within six months the word got around the Washington that the CENTCOM had focused on its region in a new interesting way. They were complimented on their growing understanding of the Arab World. 213. Schwarzkopf had to convince the JCS committee to mod his msn from prep for the Soviet Invasion of Iran to intervention in regional crisis over oil in the Middle East. Pentagon was under pressure to cut its budget concurrently with the end of cold war. Adm Crowe the chairman of JCS in his recommendations on national mil strat, made no provision for the Middle East. Schwarzkopf pleaded his case with the JCS but to no avail. When Schwarzkopf presented his plans for redefining Central Comd to Paul Wolfowitz, the under Secy of Def for policy and Henry Rower, the Asst Secy for International Security Affairs he was asked to comment on the strat submitted by Adm Crowe. He replied that he did not agree. The matter went to Dick Cheney who was Secy for Def who ordered the JCS to incl Middle East. Another ally he found was Gen Collin Powell who was cdr of Forces Comd and was politically and mil influential. Schwarzkopf explained to Powell the changes he was making in the strat and war plans of the Central Comd with which Gen Powell agreed. Middle East : Schwarzkopf Initiative 214. Importance of Middle East. Schwarzkopf believed that the Middle East, because of its oil was the most imp region. The region held 65% of the Worlds proven res. An estimate of the Foreign Service Institute showed that the gulf region would be pumping oil for at least two centuries while Americas economically exploitable res would be used up in two decades. Americans after twenty five yrs could be competing against Japan, England, France, Germany etc for oil. Washington somehow was not focusing on the issue. 215. Schwarzkopf was confident of the Middle East, its Strat importance and therefore Central Comds reason for existence. There were 13 current conflicts that he could count, any one of which could endanger the US interests. He decided to devp an op plan for the comd to cope with the worst of these conflicts. The worst case scenario appeared to be Iraq as aggressor, which, with the worlds fourth largest army was sitting just north of oil fds whose output was essential to the industrialized world.

57 216. Saudi Arabia. Soon after assuming comd, Schwarzkopf, visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan. The relationship with Saudis had been cold due to American policies and high headedness. At the Foreign Service Institute he was told In the Arab World your posn gets you through the door but your personal relationship gets you commitments from the Arabs. It was a form of diplomacy, which he enjoyed. Schwarzkopf wanted to rebuild the relationship. He had a twenty min audience with Prince Abdul Rahman Bir Abdulaziz al Saud the Dy minister of def and avn. The prince was a full brother of King Fahd. Schwarzkopf told him that he had earlier visited Saudi Arabia in 1947 when his father had been stationed at Iran. He told him that his meeting with the Prince was a repeat of history. After the WW-II, the relationship between America and Saudi Arabia had been warm. His father in 1946 had an audience with the King Abdulaziz who was the father of the prince. Now that they were meeting, Schwarzkopf hoped it would be renewal of ties between their families. The Prince was amused to hear the sentiments. 217. A tricky issue was American posn on the Israel and the Palestine. Sheikh Abdulaziz Bin Abdul Moshan al Tuwaijari was the alternate Dy Cdr of the Saudi Arabian National Gd. He was a Bedouin sage and a very influential person. The Sheikh in his meeting asked him Isnt it true that if the US had to choose between Saudi Arabia and Israel, they would always choose Israel. Schwarzkopf replied that Why must it ever come to a choice? The US is friends with both, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Isnt a man entitled to have more than one friend or must he have only one?. The Sheikh liked the answer. 218. By spring of 1989, Schwarzkopf made three trips to the Middle East and was surprised by some of the things he learned. The ceasefire with Iran had left Iraq with a million-man strong army and a weak economy to absorb them. Schwarzkopf was concerned about the Iraqis mil might. However, he found that most of the countries- Saudi Arabia, Jordon, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar were instead leery of Iran. They thought Iran would go back to war once it rearmed itself. The Iraqis they felt had no aggressive intentions towards their Arab brothers. 219. His sec surprise was to discover that many Arab ldrs both anticipated and welcomed greater US mil involvement in the gulf region. Americas intervention in the tanker war had made a dramatic impression. 220. Kuwait. By the sec half of 1989, during his sec rd of visits to the Middle East he found the doors of the Arab ldrs started opening to him. They started inviting him to their palaces museums and mosques and were willing to share the mil secrets. Gen Al Sanii of Kuwait in

58 their sec meeting took him on a tour of their mil instlns. Schwarzkopf noticed that all their guns were pointed north towards Iraq. Al Sanii confirmed that Iraq was their No one threat. He explained that Saddam had failed to achieve one of its maj objs in the war with Iran ie regarding Iraqs access to the Arabian Gulf. In its recapture of the Al Faw Peninsula, Iraq had completed the destr of the very prize it sought. The Shatt-al-Arab Waterway was unusable due to hy silting and presence of sunken ships, unexploded arty shells and bombs. Iraq was more dependent then ever on Umm Qasr, its mil port near Kuwaits Bubiyen Island, which Saddam Hussian would very likely try to seize. 221. UAE. Central Comds new apch also paid off in the UAE. In late 1988 the two govts had been practically estranged. They considered since US was a friend of Israel, it was not their friend. The relationship had further soured due to an arms deal in which Americans sold them obsolete Hawk AD msls. However, they warmed up when they heard a new crew had taken over the Central Comd and invited Schwarzkopf to witness the UAE, National Day Parade. Schwarzkopf made a spl trip to attend the same. He developed friendship with the Sheikhs son Mohammad and agreed to make a new start. Ex Internal Look 222. To speed up the reorientation of Central Comd Schwarzkopf played the new scenario in their annual war game, code named Internal Look in Jul 1990. The ex involved eight grueling twenty H days in which CENTCOMs staff, as well as the staffs of US Army, Navy, AF, and Marine comps, would practice running a war developing and issuing orders, sorting out battlefd reports, directing flows of amn and sups, and coord the maneuvers of AF, armies and fleets by using cmptr programs instead of actual forces in the fd. 223. To make the ex more realistic, they started sending streams of fictional dispatches about mil and pol devps in Iraq to the HQs of participating units, several weeks in adv. These dispatches were so real to the actual routine int bulletins coming in, that the msg centre had to stamp the fictional reports as Ex Only to differentiate. Crisis in the Gulf: Unfolding and Preps 224. The US ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie spoke to Schwarzkopf describing Iraq as a bleak and repressive regime. She said it was nevertheless too powerful a nation for the US to ignore. Since it

59 was a mil state she hoped that mil to mil contact through Central Comd would be an eff way to promote comns between the two govts. 225. Meanwhile during the ex, the real crisis also started to build. On July 17 Saddam Hussein angrily and publicly threatened Kuwait and the UAE with war. Saddam wanted to jack up oil prices to cover for his eighty billion dollar war debt. As a result he wanted other OPEC countries to produce less oil. The UAE asked for help. They requested for EW if the Iraqis launched an attack and a pair of tanker ac placed for ae refueling of fighter ac. Both the requests were def. However, the State Dept recommended for these to be turned down. Schwarzkopf protested but they fell on deaf ears. He then sought help from Gen Collin Powell who had taken over as Jt COS. Finally, near the end of Jul they quietly sent over the tankers in the garb of jt ex. They also positioned three ships for svl and alerting UAE. 226. The Emir of Kuwait still did not believe that Iraq would attack and hence did not dply his forces. Saddam was accusing Kuwait of steeling $ 2.5 billion worth of oil from the Rumaila oil fds, which both countries shared. The Emir believed that Saddam could be placated with money. The State Dept and the international diplomatic community also sp the view. Everybody believed that no Arab nations would attack another. 227. Schwarzkopf had an excellent int staff. The region was under stepped up svl and huge qty of fresh info came up daily. Iraq mov its tps to Basra which they had used earlier for ex. By Jul the Iraqis fanned out SE and SW of Basra and pointed towards Kuwait. The eqpt like armr, heptrs and pontoon brs also mov fwd near the tps. It became clear that a battle plan was taking shape. On 31 Jul, the Central Comd notified Washington that war between Iraq and Kuwait appeared immurement. 228. Schwarzkopf was called to brief Secy of Def, Cheney and the JCS on their options if the War started. Schwarzkopf told them that in his view the Iraqis would attack but anticipated that Saddam would not capture the whole of Kuwait and would stop south of 30th parallel taking Kuwaits part of Rumaila oil fd and Bubiyan Island (refer Appx E). As events turned out he was right in his first assessment but wrong in the sec one. Schwarzkopf presented the detailed plans for air and sea strikes they could launch against Iraqs high value tgts mil HQ, power plants factories etc. He also outlined the contingency plan to send tps to def Saudi Arabia in case Saddam ventured that far.

60 Attack by Iraq 229. Within a few hr later Iraq attacked Kuwait. They by passed Rumaila Oilfd and struck deep into Kuwait. Iraq did not face any resistance till they reached Kuwait city. Maj Fealey one the int experts who had gone to Kuwait to brief them, info from there that Iraqis had reached Kuwait city. He provided a running commentary of the battle from the embassy roof. The spl forces of Iraq had been dropped at strat loc throughout the city and civ agents planted by them directed the heptrs to ldg Z. While the fight for the city was on, a coln of tks swung around the city and headed south towards the mil bases and oil fds of Southern Kuwait. 230. Next day morning Schwarzkopf accompanied Gen Collin Powell to White House to brief the President. He was advised to limit his presentation to what the Central Comd could do right away, specifically, the air and the sea strikes. Schwarzkopf laid out the options. While they could not stop the invasion, he told them, they could use their air and sea power to demonstrate US determination and if necessary, punish Iraq. President Bush had made up his mind to check Saddams aggression. He instr them to be prep to fight if Iraq took the American staff hostage. He also ordered that if Saudis were attacked then America should declare War on Iraq. 231. Two days later Schwarzkopf again briefed the President at Camp David. Schwarzkopf was instr to give out his plan in detail incl ground offensive options, since President was ready to consider sending tps. In the last three days, Iraq had captured the complete Kuwait and was amassing tks and arty along Saudi border. 231. The President was deeply concerned for Kuwait and the plight of Americans trapped there. He argued that Iraqi aggression could not be allowed to go unchallenged. Schwarzkopf explained that they were up against the worlds forth largest army comprising 900,000 men organized into sixty three divs. Saddams arsenal incl some of the best wpns from the International market. They also had chem wpns. Their weakness however, lay in feeble lgs and very centralized system of comd and cont. Schwarzkopf outlined the sea and air options as also the dply of grnd forces for def of Saudi Arabia. The def plan was same as that had been validated in the recent ex Internal Look. They would require coop of Saudi Arabia to execute the plan. He info that they would need three months to amass enough comb power to fend off a full scale Iraqi attack. For the offensive plan to kick out Iraq, they would have to double the size of the forces required for the def plan, pulling at least six addl divs. They would require about 8-10 months for the build up.

61 232. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia allowed America to dply his forces to def his country. The Central Comd imdtly got into action to deploy its forces. It was an herculian task to coord induction of a such a large force at such a short notice. Gen Schwarzkopf distr the responsibilities to his sr staff offrs and him self went around to brief President Mubarak of Egypt on the dply and seek his help for rapid transit of his warships through the Suez cnl and to use Egypts airfds and air space. He later went to brief King Hassan of Morocco and seek his sp as well.

62 CHAPTER VIII : OP DESERT SHIELD 233. This chapter is a prcis of Chapter 17 of the book. It covers a period from 07 Aug 90 (the day dply for Op Desert Shield commenced) upto 24 Aug 90. The imp issues which are highlighted in this chapter are :(a) (b) (c) Lgs Effort 234 Tn of US Forces to Saudi Arabia. On receiving the exec orders for Op Desert Shield for def of Saudi Arabia against Iraq, on 07 Aug 90, the main concern of Gen Schwarzkopf, Cdr in Chief (C-IN-C) was to tpt the forces placed under his comd to Saudi Arabia in an earliest time frame before Saddam could send his forces to occupy it. What it meant, in terms of statistics, was to shift five and one third divs, or 1,20,000 tps in four months to a distance of 7000 miles. The problems was magnified due to following :(a) Tn of Battle Loads as per Priority. Besides the magnitude of the load to be shifted these had to be shifted in complete battle loads and as per priority of reqmt at Saudi Arabia for the ultimate task of defending it. For example, the mov of tks on priority was not worthwhile unless it was moved along with its amn, maint teams and spare parts. Similarly the priority of induction into Saudi Arabia was firstly the comb tps, warplanes and heptrs and not the staff and sr cdrs. This problem occurred when sr offrs on grnd, decided to change the priority of induction set by higher HQs w/o taking any approval. It actually happened that HQ staff of an AB Corps reached first at Saudi Arabia before any of the fighting element. (b) Lack of Coord. It seemed that everybody was working towards the common goal however, the effort did not commensurate with the end result due to lack of coord. The offrs at Tn Comd claimed to have provided a No of tpt ac at Fort Bragg as reqd but the AB Cdr at Fort Bragg insisted that he has the tps lined up at the airport and there was not a single ac available. The sit aggravated as finger pointing, arguments and throwing The lgs effort involved in mob of Central Comd. Political compulsions and interventions effecting ops. Various mil issues.

63 blames at each other started and finally it was the timely intervention of Gen Schwarzkopf which resolved the issue amicably. In case of AF, it over reacted to the reqmt by sending ten sqns instead of five, which resulted in addl tn resources being allotted to them for moving their engrs, technicians and armourers. However, C-IN-C accepted it, as it gave him extra insurance for the safety of grnd forces arriving at Saudi Arabia. Political Interventions and Compulsions 235. Hostage Crisis. On 09 Aug 90, Saddam ordered borders of Iraq and Kuwait closed, thereby trapping more than 13,000 foreigners. Gen Schwarzkopf was apprehensive of the incident triggering early initiation of war, as the grnd forces in Saudi Arabia were not even sufficient for proper def of the country. He imdt requested Colin Powell to ask AF to prepare a plan for strat bombing aimed at Iraqis mil capability, which could provide the reqd retaliatory option and provide adequate time for sufficient grnd forces to mov to Saudi Arabia and take def. 236. Lack of Clear Pol Aim. C-IN-C was concerned about future of Op Desert Shield as it could be a long drawn def occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and US citizens may not accept their sons and daughters (soldiers) staying in deserts for no tangible results. He discussed this with Gen Colin Powell who shared his concern and asked him to be ready for an offensive with available forces only. This surprised Gen Schwarzkopf, as the forces available in Saudi Arabia were not even sufficient for proper def of the country. However, he still presented a plan, which he did not sp himself, for want for viable forces. Here was one of the instances where the pol masters were not defining clear aim for op but were forcing mil cdrs to perform tasks well beyond their capabilities. Gen Schwarzkopf faced this particular problem a No of times till Op Desert Storm was formally announced. 237. Naval Blockade. White House had ordered a naval blockade, which UN had not auth to be implemented by mil means. A dilemma had set in, when two empty coastal tankers of Iraq were noticed returning home. Gen Schwarzkopf could not contact Gen Colin Powell and obtain directions in time and finally relied on UN resolutions and took decision to let the ships pass by. He was admonished for the same. However, few hr later a fully loaded oil tanker of Iraq was reported and the higher auth were info of the same. What followed was a classic case of mismanagement especially when pol ldrs try to control mil sit from a far distance. Hr passed before any decision could be conveyed to mil cdrs on grnd and the outcome of the decision again took hr to reach the pol ldrs to obtain further directions.

64

238. Raising of Round Out Bdes. Calling up of res by the President was well appre as it would result in involvement of people of US in the war effort which was missing in Vietnam war. However, problem arose on two fronts mil and pol both, regarding the type of res unit to be called up. While each service clamored for its own service res to be raised, politicians wanted their own political ends to be met by favouring res units of their area. Gen Schwarzkopf refused to accept raising of Round Out Bdes as they would take months to get op worthy. He was sp by Powell and also Cdr of Forces and finally he got the type of help he wanted, which was in terms of truck dvrs, stevedores, amn handlers etc who were reqd to do small jobs of sp a dply in comb Z. 239. Human Shields. Gen Schwarzkopf was asked to comment on his plan in contingency of Saddam using Westerners as human shields against an US attack. He was very clear about the problem being a pol and not a mil one, and he asked Powell to let President decide on this issue. Mil Issues 240. Comd Problem During Induction. As the US forces began arriving at Saudi Arabia, Saudi mil claimed to be in ch of everything as the forces were dply on their soil, which was not acceptable to US. Gen Schwarzkopf displayed maturity, experience and political acumen and before sit went out of hand, he proposed to wk on a hybrid sys where in US forces would wk under US cdrs, Saudi forces under Saudi cdrs and the actions of armies would be coord at the very top level. Though this apch violated age-old principle of unity of comd, it had worked in Vietnam and C-IN-C was confident of achieving better results. 241. Careerism. Gen Schwarzkopf admitted of being elated by the imp being given to him by the President during his speech at Pentagon. He knew what held in store for him if this op went well. However, he displayed maturity and a conscientious personality and avoided such thoughts as these could adversely influence his capability of taking proper mil decisions. 242. Security of Info and Men. Foolproof methods for ensuring security of info were brought into place, especially regarding C-IN-C discussions with Powell. They even went to the extent of avoiding keeping records of discussions and directions on many formal issues, which could be reqd at a later dt for official purposes. This displayed the extent of faith these two ldrs had in each other and also the

65 understanding of importance of security of info for success, in such a delicate op. The C-IN-C also ensured that the tps in Saudi Arabia do not stay in hotels and congested areas to ensure their safety. 243. Plan Op Desert Strom. The mil brilliance of Gen Schwarzkopf as a mil ldr is evident by the plan he devised for an offensive against Iraq. The plan was aptly named Op Desert Strom so as not to mix with Op Desert Shield, which was primarily defensive in nature.

66 CHAPTER IX : BUILD UP AND DPLY OF COALITION FORCES Build Up and Dply 244. This chapter is a prcis of Chapter 18 of the book. It covers a period from 25 Aug 90 to 28 Sep 90. The imp issues which are highlighted in this chapter are as follows:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Built up of coalition forces and their dply. Media interactions. Arab world sentiments. Cultural problems faced by US forces. Nonchalant attitude of Saudis. Adm marvel.

Build Up and Dply of Coalition Forces 245. By mid Sep the coalition AF and grnd forces were dply in str and C-IN-C was confident of defending Saudi Arabia against air / grnd attack. However, Gen Schwarzkopf was worried about any symbolic defeat. The space constraint in Saudi Arabia had forced AF to jam pack many ac at air bases, which posed a lucrative tgt for any stray Iraqi ac, if it could sneak in through the AD svl plan of US. However, C-IN-C was assured by the AF cdr that not even one ac could sneak in and they had a foolproof AD cover. The dply of AF and grnd forces have been depicted in Appces F to H. Media Interaction 246. After spending about a week in Saudi Arabia, Gen Schwarzkopf decided to hold a press conf. He wanted to keep media informed to curb rumours and speculations. However, he formulated certain rules for himself to follow to help him during these interactions. These were :(a) He is fully aware of grnd realities; hence media should not be able to intimidate him. (b) He need not answer all questions.

67

(c) (d)

Not to divulge any info which may be useful to en. The most imp one, was never to lie to the American people.

247. He conducted the press conf successfully and conveyed a msg to Saddam about a strong def in place by coalition forces. Arab World Sentiments 248. Gen Schwarzkopf well understood the reqmt of keeping the coalition together in which the most imp partners were members of Arab world. He felt a reqmt to confirm their participation in offensive against Iraq by visiting them and ascertaining their sentiments personally. He also wanted to thank them for their participation, in Op Desert Shield. On his visits, he was surprised to receive overwhelming sp to coalition forces against Iraq. They blamed Saddam for attacking an Arab brother, unprovoked, and felt threatened of the same fate. 249. Diplomatic attempts to have a negotiated agreement with Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait were already in prog. The apprehensions of Arab world countries along with Saudi Arabias reluctance of allowing offensive on Iraq through their country made C-IN-C concerned about following facts of the sit :(a) If the diplomatic negotiations became a success and Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, Saddam would still be a potential threat to all its neighbours. (b) Saddam may punish its neighbours at a later stg for having coop with US forces. (c) In view of the above, anything short of Iraqi defeat in Kuwait was a loosing proposition. Cultural Problems 250. Gen Schwarzkopf, was surprised to realise that the main concern of Saudis was not a threat from Saddam, nor the enormous mil op which was taking place in their country, but it was the apparent cultural crisis triggered by sudden influx of Americans into their kingdom. C-INC had foreseen this problem and had banned alcohol and pornographic mtrl right from the beginning. Lectures on cultural sensitivity were

68 taken for tps and a book called The mil Guide to Arab Culture was issued to all rks. However, the crisis kept occurring frequently and in various forms, some genuine and some as rumours. Gen Schwarzkopf was aware that each issue genuine or otherwise, had to be tackled in a deliberate manner as even a small incident could get bloated up and jeopardize the whole op. These incidents and the actions of C-IN-C have been illustrated in following paras. 251. T Shirts. Lt Gen Khalid complained of US tps sporting offensive T-shirts which displayed tks in deserts, Khalid claimed that this was not liked by Saudis. Another one, which displayed map of Saudi Arabia, was objected as divulging cl info about loc of cities. C-IN-C investigated and realized that these were sold by a Pakistani merchant in market and he asked Lt Gen Khalid to stop the sale in the first place as it is not possible to stop his tps from buying things on sale in the market. Ultimately the issue died its own death. 252. Christian and Jewish Religious Insignias. Saudis objected to the display of these religious symbols in their country. C-IN-C decided to spk to tps on this issue but he was apprehensive about protest from Chaplains. He was pleasantly surprised to learn that they all agreed and followed it. 253. Misc Incidents. A No of objections on real issues / rumours kept occurring frequently, eg women soldiers removing their comb jackets to wk in warehouses was termed as women disrobing in public ; rumours regarding US tps drinking liquor in mosques and defiling their shrines; dancing girls being brought for entertainment were some of the many such incidents. Gen Schwarzkopf took following measures to counter these problems effectively:(a) Community Relations Pgme. Sr offr in each maj town was designated as Community Cdr. He was tasked to iden and talk to towns civ and mil ldrs. These interactions on reg basis could solve many such problems before they could arise. (b) Escan Vill. A sprawling compound of houses was built 15 miles outside Riyadh for Bedouins, who did not stay there for long. These vacant accn was given to US soldiers who now could live freely, as much as they did back home w/o objns to the Saudis.

69 Nonchalant Attitude of Saudis 254. Saudis had never been invaded for last 1200 yrs. War was farthest thing on their mind, there was no sense of urgency in govt or among the people. They refused to understand the imp of having protection at public places and govt instlns. Saudi AF was meshed neatly with coalition AF as they had earlier trained together and had also purchased similar ac. However, their army was in a terrible shape as it was absolutely tied to their bases, and did not have any org lgs sp. Adm Marvel 255. Maj Gen Gus Pagonis had done wonders to administratively sustain the forces in Saudi Arabia. He was the chief of lgs for the grnd forces. He displayed immense resourcefulness, tact and aptitude to generate facilities out of almost nothing.

70 CHAPTER X : PLG FOR OP DESERT STORM 256. This chapter is a Prcis of Chapter 19. It covers a period from 01 Oct 90 to 07 Nov 90. The main issues highlighted in this chapter are :(a) (b) Plg and prep for offensive. Adm and lgs issues.

Plg and Prep for Offensive 257. Arab World Reaction. Gen Schwarzkopf was aware that an US attack on Iraq could cause a serious backlash in the Arab world. He realized that adequate thought had not been given to this imp aspect as yet, and it could have serious implications at strat level. He conferred with Mr Chas Freeman, US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, as also org an Arab Reaction Seminar with experts from US Embassy and Central Comd. Finally, the conclusion of the seminar was that any offensive against Iraq was acceptable but it should meet the following twin conditions:(a) Arab forces should form a maj portion of offensive against Iraq. (b) Coalition forces must win.

258. High Risk Offensive Plan by Mil Planners. A four men team from School of Advanced Mil Studies (SAMS) in America was called in and asked to make a grnd offensive plan following the air campaign. The problem was availability of adequate forces for a proper grnd offensive as the tps available were only the ones presently dply for def of Saudi Arabia. The offensive plan which finally emerged was the best possible apch given the resources (Refer to Appx J). However, the C-IN-C observed following lacunae in the plan :(a) (b) (c) It lacked element of surprise. It would cause substantial cas. No res were catered for.

(d) In the event of a counterattack by Iraq a battle of attrition would follow, which would be advantageous to Iraq due to its numerical superiority.

71 259. Presentation of Plan to Washington. Collin Powell asked Gen Schwarzkopf to present the air campaign and grnd offensive plan to Jt Chiefs, Secy Cheney and to the President. C-IN-C desired to conduct the briefing himself, as he was well aware of the pitfalls and did not want any false commitment to be made which was beyond the capability of his forces, due to which the lives of American soldiers could be endangered. However, he was told that his mov to USA for any purpose may generate avoidable rumours and he had to send his chief of staff for the same. C-IN-C ensured that no one in the team gave any personal opinions, any commitment beyond capability of grnd forces and any speculations on the op. All this was overemphasized by C-IN-C because he was concerned for the lives of his soldiers under his comd. He also got involved in prep of presentation of offensive plan to cover following imp issues :(a) Concern over participation of Allied forces in reqd str as the build up of tps was yet to complete. (b) Absence of res.

(c) Saudis were not yet convinced about attacking a brother Arab country and permit the offensive of allied forces through their territory. (d) (e) Underestimation of Iraqis ability to fight. Reqmt of another hy corps having two armd divs.

Criticism of Grnd Offensive Plan 260. The grnd offensive plan and demand for addl corps was criticized negatively by Presidents advisors, who made remarks such as:(a) The plan could be more imaginative.

(b) My God hes already got all the forces he needs, why wont he attack? (b) Schwarzkopf is just another McClellan.

261. The a/m remarks were made by civs who did not have experience on mil matters and were unaware of grnd realities. Schwarzkopf being compared to McClellan was another such remark made w/o complete knowledge of mil history. George McClellan was a mil ldr who had dply

72 outside Richmond in the spring of 1862 and had refused to attack the army of Robert E Lee, though McClellans army outnumbered Lees. However in this case, forces in Saudi Arabias were outnumbered by Iraqs. 262. Plan for Op Desert Storm. C-IN-C was later assured of being provided addl tps, and he tasked his staff to assume availability of an addl corps and devp a flanking attack, which would require the largest mvre of armour in the desert in the history of US. When Colin Powel came to Riyadh on 22 Oct, he was presented this offensive plan involving envelopment. Powell was quick to realize and remarked that the plan was lgs difficult to maint. He later accepted the plan and agreed to present the same to the President who was likely to take some time to approve it. He expressed his helplessness in getting an early decision in Washington as the policy makers at times were hawkish and some times wanted to give some more time for UN sanctions to wk, and due to these radical changes in policies, firm decision was not forthcoming. 263. Offensive Plan with Available Force. C-IN-C was surprised when Powell again wanted to be briefed on the old offensive plan with available defensive forces. C-IN-C requested Powell to shelve this option. He pointed out the essential reqmt of addl tps for offensive as Iraqi forces in Kuwait were adding tps with time. Powell expressed the problem of sending addl tps for offensive as it reqd clear mandate from congress and the American public. However, he promised that if we do not have the public sp, we would not launch the offensive at all. That relieved a great burden from the minds of Gen Schwarzkopf as he was deeply concerned about the lives of his men whom he was putting in grave danger due to inadequate str for offensive. 264. Western Excursion. Def Secy Cheney came up with an offensive plan of capturing Iraqi msl sites in western Iraq and then moving forces on East-West highway to threaten Baghdad. Powell passed on this plan to C-IN-C for assessing, also admitting the obvious fallacies of the plan. The plan was not lgs viable as the msl sites were 500 miles from the friendly lines as also it had overlooked the fact that the power centre of Iraq was in the East and not in West. Gen Schwarzkopf and his staff named this plan as Western Excursion but examined it fairly. Later the plan was again mod by Cheney to capture a town in Western Iraq and offering it to Saddam in exch of Kuwait. In both these cases the plans were rejected being lgs unsustainable and not meeting the tac / strat objs of coalition forces.

73 265. Tension Brewing Up. As the time passed with no clear cut directions and no offensive plan getting materialized, impatience started building up and led to following :(a) Allied forces began questioning the future course of action as coalition had already built up sufficient forces to defend Saudi Arabia. (b) King Fahd and President Mubarak were seeking assurances from America, not to withdraw tps till Iraqi threat was eliminated. (c) British stated the fact that an offensive, if launched, must finish before Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, which began in Mar 91. As also the offensive must be launched earliest to avoid the difficult summers of desert. (d) C-IN-C finally decided to go on record and make a formal request for a decision. 266. Presidents Approval. On 31 Oct 90, Powell confirmed Presidents approval to go in for the offensive with addl forces. He also stated that Secy of State, Mr Baker would visit Saudi Arabia to meet pol ldrs of coalition forces and ascertain agreement on the issue. 267. Bakers Visit. Secy Baker visit was very fruitful as King Fahd agreed on nearly all the issues wholeheartedly. These critical issues were as follows:(a) (b) (c) Launching an offensive against Iraq through Saudi Arabia. Bringing addl forces for the offensive. Saudi Arabia to pay for adm of these tps.

(d) Diplomatic help from Saudi Arabia to convince other Arab states on the issue of offensive against Iraq. (e) Contd sp from Saudi Arabia even if Israel also got involved in the battle and went on offensive against Iraq. (f) An understanding that jt comd, as hitherto fore, would continue to exist. However, Cdr of US Forces would be the final approving auth for all mil op.

74 Adm and Lgs Issues 268. Money for Sustenance. As per the initial commitment made by King Fahd, Prince Sultan and Khalid, Saudi Arabia was to pay for the adm sp to US forces incl accn, water, tn etc. However, they were clearing no bills. On being apch, Gen Khalid proposed that consolidated reqmt should be given to him and Saudi Arabia would find a contractor to provide all items. This was not acceptable to Gen Schwarzkopf as it was too centralized and the US Forces did not wk in that fashion. Khalid could not provide designated offrs to wk at different levels with US Forces and sign contracts on behalf of Saudi Arabia, because of the bureaucratic hassles in his HQ. US Forces were actually sustaining on aid from Japan being paid through their embassy in Saudi Arabia. 269. Host Nation Sp Agreement. In absence of such an agreement, C-IN-C apch Ambassador Chass Freeman. The Ambassador accepted it as his duty and called for an host nation sp expert from Washington. Maj Gen Bill Ray (host nation sp negotiator) finally arrived on 19 Oct 90, and also brought along with him consolidated bills for tn of US Forces to Saudi Arabia which amounted to almost $ 1.9 billion. By then the expenditure claimed towards tn within Saudi Arabia by US Forces had also added up to $ 760 million. Finally Saudi Arabia agreed to pay for the expenses on tn within Saudi Arabia only. Later, around 31 Oct 90, US Forces recd a cheque for $760 million, which was promptly sent to Washington.

75 CHAPTER XI : PREPARATION AND BUILD UP (OP DESERT STORM) 270. This chapter is a precis of Chapter 20 of the book. The period covered is from late Oct 90 to first week of Jan 91. The highlights of this chapter are :(a) (b) Briefing of cdrs on grnd offensive plan by C-IN-C. Build up and prep of forces for offensive.

(c) Reservations of few countries about the offensive and their solutions. (d) Visit of President Bush during Thanks Giving in Saudi Arabia. (e) (f) (g) Visit of Secy Cheney and Chairman Powell to Saudi Arabia. Celebration of Christmas in a Muslim country. King Fahds review of coalition forces.

Briefing of Op Plan 271. On 14 Nov 90, C-IN-C called all his cdrs to Dhahran to reveal the outline plan of grnd offensive against Iraq. Gen Schwarzkopf conducted the briefing as follows:(a) Maint Secrecy. C-IN-C commenced the briefing with emphasis on maintaining the security of info. He forewarned everyone about dealing with the press and cautioned every one that no info about mil ops and forces capability was to be divulged to media. He threatened to be brutally harsh with anyone who did not follow these security instrs. (b) Iraqs Capability. C-IN-C thereafter gave an analysis of Iraqs capability. He brought out that Iraq had numerical superiority as also had the advantage of chemical wpns. (c) Battle Fd Objs. The objs in the following order of priority for the offensive were laid out:(i) Attack the en leadership and destroy his comd and control capability. (ii) Gain and maint air superiority.

76

(iii)

Disrupt en sup lines and destroy his NBC capability. (iv) Destroy Republican Guards.

(d)

Ph of Attack. Four ph of attack were given out as under:(i) (ii) (iii) Ph 1. Ph 2. Ph 3. Strat bombing. Achieving air superiority. Bombing of Iraqi Arty locs and tps. The four pronged grnd attack into Iraq and

(iv) Ph 4. Kuwait.

(e) Lgs Problem. C-IN-C had planned shifting two corps towards West after the air campaign commenced. He was fully aware of the lgs problem in conducting this lateral shift but wanted to maint surprise about the overall offensive plan. He later convinced everyone to follow his logic. (f) Final Word. In the end, he overemphasized the ultimate obj which was to attack and destroy Iraqi forces all through out. Build Up and Prep for Offensive 272. Str of Tps. C-IN-C had requested Powell for addl str for offensive in terms of two armd divs. Washington sent three divs with an addl bde, each outfitted with Armys most modern tk, the M1A1. The President had doubled the grnd forces, tripled the No of tks, boosted AF by 30%, and doubled the Naval Force. 273. Build up of Tps. The problem thereafter was not of the No of tps, but the tn of the tps into Saudi Arabia. By 22 Dec 1990, the tps str in Saudi Arabia had built up to 300,000 but rft from Germany was yet to arrive. 274. Lgs Problems of Lateral Mov. Lgs experts were still finding it hard to plan the complete shift of two corps laterally after the air campaign commenced and before grnd offensive started, ie in about a months time. However, C-IN-C kept pressing them on to achieve the same.

77 275. Prep of Tps and Eqpt. Another maj problem was prep of tps and eqpt after they arrived in Saudi Arabia. A No of precious days were reqd for the following after their arr:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Unload eqpt off the ships. Change cam pattern from forest green to desert Khakhi. Marrying up. Mov units to fwd posn, 300 miles away. Train tps for desert warfare most time consuming.

276. X - Mas Delays. Tps leaving Germany were further delayed as X- mas holidays slowed the wk at docks. Reservations of Coalition Partners 277. Britain. C-IN-C visited British tps first, to meet Lt Gen Sir Peter de La Billiere, Cdr of British Forces in Gulf. He approved of the offensive plan, but remarked bluntly that British voters would not like their tps relegated to sp role. C-IN-C imdt agreed to make changes in the op plan to the satisfaction of British Gen. 278. Egypt. Though no reservations were made by Egyptians but Gen Schwarzkopf was astute enough to realize their imp in pol and mil terms. Whole of the Arab world was observing Egypt if it would join offensive against Iraq, or not. Their participation was imp to keep the coalition together. Militarily also they were indispensable with their high state of trg and modern eqpts. C-IN-C planned to visit Cairo to inspect a tk manufacturing factory. The main aim of this visit was to ensure sp of Egypt for the offensive, which was achieved. 279. France. France was a maj arms dealer to both Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The C-IN-C realized their dilemma due to conflicting commercial interests. Initially French insisted on having their own sector to defend in Saudi Arabia and on reporting to no one. Saudis rejected this and they later agreed to place their forces under Khalids comd. Later, in Dec, Gen Maurice Schmitt, the Chief of French Armed Forces info C-INC that France wanted to sp the offensive but was apprehensive about the head on tk to tk battle as French lt armd vehs did not stand a chance against Iraqs Soviet hy tks. He suggested that French forces could be assigned the msn of protecting western flks. This was agreed by C-IN-C and finally France was also counted in coalition forces against Iraq.

78 280. Syria. Syrians had one full armd div placed under Khalid. However, C-IN-C was always uneasy about their presence, as Syrians had long been a Soviet arms client and was on State Depts list of countries that sponsored terrorism. C-IN-C was however, comfortable in relying on Khalid to keep him informed about Syrians intentions. Later, in end Dec 90, Syrians refused to sp the offensive. This could cause a maj political problem of disrupting the coalition, as also a mil one since sp of Syrians tks was essential for Egyptian attack in Kuwait. The problem was resolved by C-IN-C who displayed keen diplomatic sense and tact. He suggested Khalid, to put Syrians as res to Egyptian forces. Now Syrians would go in for offensive only to rescue and in sp of their Arab brothers and not initially in an offensive against an Arab brother. 281. Saudi Arabia. Problem came in, in end of Dec 90, when Khalid publicly announced that the best apch to attack was through Turkey. He also raised inhibitions about attacking an Arab brother. Finally, CIN-C called for him and spoke quite harshly over the issue which Khalid was not used to. Later, however, Khalid and C-IN-C both apologized to each other and Khalid assured him that his govt would abide by the plan for Op Desert Storm. President Bush Visit 282. President Bush arrived in Nov 90 to spend Thanks Giving with the tps. Arngs were made to make sure that religious ceremony was not conducted on Arabian Soil and was finally held 75 miles away aboard the Naval helicopter carrier, USS Nassau. The visit of President was a boost to the morale of tps. However, once again the tact and diplomatic acumen of Gen Schwarzkopf was highlighted in his commitment of a time plan to finish the offensive against Iraq to the President. Secy Cheney and Chairman Powell Visit 283. Both Secy Cheney and Powell visited Saudi Arabia on 19 Dec 90 to assess the status of coalition forces and report on the same to the President. The visit was to be preceded by a news conference which Pentagon wanted Gen Schwarzkopf to conduct. C-IN-C expressed that he would be busy for the visit and delegated the resp to his deputy, Lt Gen Cal Waller, who had admitted, under pressure, that the grnd offensive would not be ready until mid Feb which caused an uproar because it contradicted Presidents position of putting pressure on Iraq. Later, Gen Schwarzkopf was magnanimous enough to accept his

79 mistake, as he agreed that Cal Waller was relatively new in the theatre and had little experience in handling the press. C-IN-C also apologized to Gen Powell and Cheney for the mistake. C-IN-C was relieved to learn at the end of the visit and briefing that both Cheney and Powell agreed that the timing of grnd offensive was subject to lgs constraints. Celebrating Christmas 284. Besides preparing for war, Gen Schwarzkopf was also preparing for Christmas. He was aware of the cultural sensitivity of the muslims regarding Christmas celebrations in their country. Following were the highlights of this duration :(a) Carols. C-IN-C displayed his ingenuity by convincing Khalid that carols would be played in instrumental form only, which would not offend Muslims and also keep tps happy. (b) Christmas Cards. C-in-C agreed to Saudi censorship of all mail coming for US forces in Saudi Arabia to ban all Christmas cards. Saudis had to give it up finally due to the amount of mail involved and the effort reqd to implement the censor. (c) Bob Hope Show. Was conducted in a simple fashion w/o any dancing/entertaining girls. (d) Missing Home and Family. The softer side of Gen Schwarzkopf is highlighted as he missed his home and family on this occasion. King Fahd Review of Coalition Force 285. C-in-Cs concern for his tps suffering in heat during the review of forces by King Fahd was evident on this occasion. He made sure that his tps had minimal suffering for the same.

80 CHAPTER XII : AIR CAMPAIGN (OP DESERT STORM) 286. This chapter is a precis of Chapter 21 of the book. It covers the period from 08 Jan 1991 to end of Jan. The main highlights of this period are :(a) (b) (c) (d) Launch of air offensive. Scud attacks. Lateral shift of two corps. Iraq attack on Al Khafji.

Launch of Offensive 287. On 09 Jan 1991, the talks between the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and US, Secy of State, Baker failed and the war was imminent. Gen Schwarzkopf had established his office close to the warroom and followed a routine in which he would be awake the whole night, attending calls from USA and then sleep in the wee hours of the morning. However, he had given explicit instrs to his staff to wake him up in case of any serious eventuality. 288. On 15 Jan 91, during a meeting of Gen Schwarzkopf with the Minister of Def, Prince Sultan, Gen Schwarzkopf dispelled the fear of the Saudi regime that Riyadh and in particularly King Fahds palace were adequately protected from Iraqi Scud missiles. He informed them that the anti ac and anti msl Patriot Air Def sys were adequately dply to gd the city and the palace. On the same day itself during a tele conv with the Chairman, Gen Schwarzkopf was ordered that the attack on Iraq was to commence at 0300 hr on 17 Jan 91. 289. Despite the clouds of war hanging over Middle East, Gen Schwarzkopf maint balance and remained calm, which he had probably devp during his formative yrs in West Point. Just before going to the war room to address his sr mil offrs and principal staff, he sat down in his office and wrote a letter to his wife Brenda and his three children, telling them, how much he loved them and what they meant to him. He also wrote a msg to the American tps, admiring their sheer gut, determination and bravery and asking them to stand together for a just war which was rather imposed on USA and its allies.

81 290. Air attack on Iraq commenced as scheduled with the firing of msls, rkts and bombs. American ac carriers in the Gulf and Red Sea had steamed northward, putting Iraq within rg of their planes. Cruisers and the battleships had positioned scores of Tomahawk msls for firing. The attack commenced with heptrs destroying two key EW rdrs, on Saudi-Iraqi border, followed by eight F-15 fighter-bombers destroying the nearest air def comd center. This opened up a corridor for hundreds of fighter ac headed towards tgts in Iraq. Meanwhile F-117 stealth fighters bombed Iraqi air bases. By afternoon 850 msns had been flown and had attacked some of the key tgts which incl Saddams heavily defended lakeside palace. The disposn of Iraqi and Allied Forces as on 17 Jan 91 is given at Appx K. Scud Attacks 291. Scud Attack on Israel. The first Scud attack by Iraq was on Israel. Tel Aviv was bombed. There was an uproar as this could force Israel to join the war which could create problems for coalition forces as Arab countries would not accept joining hands with Israel for attack against Iraq. Later, Israel suffered three more scud msl hits. Israel proposed to send in an air attack on Western Iraq through Saudi Arabian air space. This was refused by King Fahd. Thereafter, Israel also proposed through Washington, to place their offrs in Central Comd HQ to direct AF on tgts. C-IN-C refused it on two grnds; firstly, US forces had better eqpt for ascertaining tgts, and secondly, presence of an Israeli would not be accepted by Saudis on their soil. This could jeopardize the whole op. Finally, Israelis settled to send in a tgt list to engage. AF directed one third of its effort towards neutr of scud sites incl tgt list handed over by Israel. 292. Scud Attacks on Saudi Arabia. Scuds were fired against Dhahran and Riyadh, however, the patriot msls were very eff and destroyed these msls mid way in the air. The threat of chemical wpns being carried on these msls was also negated on investigation of crash site. 293. Actions to Neautr Scud Threat. Besides emp defensive measures such as Patriot msls, the offensive measures instituted against scud msls incl bombing of all known and suspected msl sites, one third comb and sp air msns were diverted to scud hunt and special op teams went deep in Iraqi territory to report loc of mob lrs. The freq of scud launches began to drop from 35 in first week, to 18 in sec week and finally just an avg of one msl a day which too was being fired in a haphazard manner.

82 Lateral Shift of Two Corps 294. The lateral shifting of two corps for the offensive from western flk went on smoothly. C-IN-C was confident of being ready for offensive by mid Feb as planned. However, the lgs mvres did face a No of problems. It was the ingenuity of lgs cdrs that made sure that the ops went in time. The final disposn of Iraqi tps and Allied Forces, before grnd offensive, on 23 Jan is as shown at Appx L. Some of the problems with their imaginative and innovative solutions are as follows:(a) Dvrs Problem. Despite making accn and sleeping arngs for civ truck dvrs they preferred to go home at ni and were not available for next day haul. It was noticed that these dvrs had fascination for American professional wrestling. So large sized screen were placed in their accn area which played the video tape of wrestling duels. This ensured that dvrs stayed back and were available whenever reqd. (b) Gus Pagonis Promotion. The lgs incharge faced problems when the div and corps cdrs tried to throw their wt and demanded more than auth from Gus Pagonis. C-IN-C found a novel way of dealing with this situ. He felt that Pagonis was shouldering as much responsibility as other cdrs and and he should be duly recommended for third star. Powell expedited it, and the problem was solved. Iraq Attack on Al Khafji 295. On 29 Jan 1991, Iraqs 5 Mech Div launched tk attacks at three pts along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. One of the colns ran into a bn of US Marines and was repulsed. The other two threats hit only scattered resistance from fwd recce units and entered Al Khafji, an oil processing centre on the Saudi coast, about eight miles South of Kuwait. Nearly 400 tks and APCs advanced down the coast highway into AI Khafji. The Saudi forces launched a deliberate CA but were forced to pull back. Meanwhile, the AF and Marine Air continued to pound tk colns, till they couldnt see the tgts because of smoke from the ones theyd already hit. The attack on Al Khafji perplexed Gen Schwarzkopf, as there was no evidence that Iraq was launching a maj offensive and attack by a solitary div on Saudi Arabia defied all mil logic. This was probably a propaganda ploy of Saddam to show the world that dispite coalition bombing, Iraq remained unbowed. Saddam had gambled with the lives of his tps as the complete div was trapped and USA marines and Qatari forces had blocked their further adv. However, the complete div could not be annihilated soon, which triggered uneasiness in Saudi kingdom.

83 The king even suggested to destroy the town, which was not accepted by the coalition forces cdr as there were hardly any Iraqi tps left in Al Khafji and destr of the city would take large amt of amn which would be wasted w/o any mil purpose. Moreover, the world opinion would not accept the destr of one of Saudi Arabias cities w/o sufficient reasons and also Iraq may attempt many such ventures and destr of all those towns and cities defied sane thinking. The C-IN-Cs recommendation finally prevailed and a deliberate counter attack by Saudi Forces repulsed Iraqis out of the vill the next day. This also helped raise the morale of Saudi Tps.

84 CHAPTER XIII : FINAL PREP FOR GRND OFFENSIVE 296. This chapter is a precis of Chapter 22 of the book. It covers a period from 31 Jan 91 to 23 Feb 91. The main highlights of this chapter are as follows:(a) The amdts carried out to grnd offensive plan in the last stgs due to grnd realities. The delay caused due to weather and the changes in op plans. (b) Diplomatic forays between Russia, Iraq and UN to force Iraq withdraw from Kuwait avoiding grnd offensive. Simultaneous US pressures on Central Comd to go in for an early grnd attack. Amdts to Grnd Offensive Plan 297. VII Corps Plan. C-IN-C felt that the plan of VII Corps cdr was overly cautious. The corps was given the imp task to destroy Republican Gd and it was plg to adv, stop, regp, adv again and proceed in a deliberate manner. C-IN-C emphasised that the Corps should not get to inter obj, stop, rearm and refuel. It would present a lucrative tgt for a chemical attack. Instead the corps should go after Republican gd with audacity, shock action and achieve surprise. The concept was understood and assured to be implemented. 298. Boomers Marines. Lt Gen Walt Boomer, Cdr of all US Marines, wanted to amend his plan. The problem was a series of obsts which Iraq had built all along Kuwait border. This incl minefds, wire obst, berms (sand obst), fire trenches (ditches flooded with oil to make a wall of flame), dug in tks and inf trenches all along these obsts. Iraqi idea was to slow down the attack and bunch them up to engage effectively with arty. Lt Gen Boomer found a weakly defended sector some twenty miles to the west of the original axis of attack. The obsts in that sector were not prepared fully. He asked extention of G day (grnd attack day) to 24 Feb. The President agreed for the extention. 299. Weather. The weather forecast for 24 and 25 Feb was bad and it could seriously effect grnd offensive, as the air sp essential for its initial success would be adversely effected. Gen Schwarzkopf requested Powell to grant another extension due to weather. Powell was finding it hard to get President approval on this as diplomatic pressures for a peaceful settlement were gaining grnds. However, to the relief of C-IN-C the weather forecast changed again for good and was not likely to effect air op adversely.

85 Diplomatic Forays 300. While the air campaign was on and grnd offensive was about to commence diplomatic attempts by Moscow to send peace proposals to Iraq through their Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz continued. Much to the consternation of Gen Schwarzkopf who was keen to avoid cas to own tps, President wanted to go in for an early attack before the peace proposal could materialize. Every time any peace proposal surfaced, Washington would request for an early grnd offensive. Gen Schwarzkopf was under tremendous pressures as Chairman, Powell asked him for early attack and his cdrs expressed their in ability to do so. Gen Schwarzkopf displayed his resoluteness and his responsibility as mil cdr and never conceded to Powells request of preponement of G Day. Gen Schwarzkopf also realized that if Iraq was permitted to withdraw its tps along with eqpt it would continue to remain a threat in future. Hence, in all his recommendations to Powell he suggested to permit Iraq only one week to withdraw, so that only tps and no eqpt could be withdrawn from Kuwait, and those could be destroyed and Iraqs fighting potential be decimated. This clearly brings out the capability of Gen Schwarzkopf to foresee the future, the deep concern he had for peace in the region and the astute political acumen and understanding of the sit.

86 CHAPTER XIV : GRND OFFENSIVE (OP DESERT STORM) 301. This chapter is a precis of Chapter Nos 23 and 24 of the book. It covers a period from 24 Feb 91 to 17 Mar 91. The highlights of this period are:(a) (b) Execution of grnd offensive of Op Desert Storm. Prep and conduct of Cease Fire Mtg.

Execution of Grnd Offensive of Op Desert Storm 302. The grnd offensive commenced as scheduled. All the thrust lines into Iraq and Kuwait advanced as per plans. Gen Schwarzkopf decided to stay out of the way in the initial period as he knew that if he would start pestering his cdrs right from the beginning he would only be distracting them. He felt his job now was to:(a) (b) (c) Assess the offensive as it devp. Keep sr cdrs apprised of each others prog. Make sure that offensive achieved the following three strat goals:(i) (ii) To push out Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. To sp Arab allies in the liberation of Kuwait city.

(iii) To destroy the invading forces such that Saddam could never use them again. Commencement of Main Attack 303. As the thrust lines contd moving deep into Kuwait and Iraq w/o much resistance, C-IN-C realized that Marines had made substantial adv much beyond the plan. He was concerned that if they went too far ahead of the rest of the offensive, they would be vulnerable to a massive counter attack on their exposed western flk as prog on other thrust line was still lagging. Later, before noon, news came in about Iraq blowing up desalinization plant in Kuwait city which indicated their intention of withdrawl. C-IN-C, pondered over releasing the main attack since he felt that Iraq might escape if he did not avail of this fleeting opportunity. He decided to unleash the main attack early.

87 304. VII Corps Debacle. C-IN-C noticed that although 24 Mech Inf Div was moving faster than planned, VII Corps had not made much prog. He was concerned that though the trn was flat and en interference was little in the area still the Corps was moving over cautiously. It was getting delayed for its main obj of engaging and destroying Republican Guard. The delay in its prog could also effect the ops of 24 Mech Div as it had gone much deep and was nearing Euphrates valley. Though Gen Schwarzkopf was advised by his deputy to speed up VII Corps by ordering Lt Gen Yeosock but C-IN-C felt that cdrs at fd should not be interfered with. When he recd news about Iraqi broadcast ordering tps to withdraw from Kuwait, he realized that any more delay could let Iraq escape and VII Corps should now be pushed faster. He ordered Yeosock and later personally told Lt Gen Fred Franks, Cdr VII Corps that he was not satisfied with his prog. His prodding helped in expediting VII Corps in joining battle with Republican Gd and preventing their planned withdrawal. 305. Call from the President. It was a great moment for Gen Schwarzkopf when he recd a call from the President who only clarified certain issues from him and did not question him anything over his decisions which in a way reposed total confidence in his mil ability. 306. 100 Hr War. As the war prog, the coalition forces made deep penetration into Kuwait and Iraq and sealed off routes of withdrawal for Iraqi forces by breaking off the brs on Euphrates R. The Iraqi Corps in Kuwait were getting decimated, No of PsW was ever increasing. The Iraqi forces in an effort to withdraw were getting conc in the northern part of Kuwait and were boxed in presenting a lucrative tgt for coalition AF. The maps showing disposn of forces on the eve of 24, 25, 26 and 27 Feb are att as Appces M, N, P, and Q. C-IN-C was told by Powell that President was going to announce cease fire, contingent on an end to Iraqis fighting and scud msl attacks, imdt release of mil prisoners and Kuwaiti civ hostages, compliance with all UN resolutions and other conditions. The cease fire would be eff at the 100 th hr from commencement of grnd offensive. Powell also told that President had added a stipulation that the Iraqi soldiers would have to lve their eqpt and withdraw. This served the purpose of destroying the mil capability of Saddam to wage future wars. However, this stipulation was later removed since the Iraqi tps close to Euphrates R were likely to try and take their eqpt across the br after repairing it and stopping them would have caused another outbreak of hostilities. Map showing post cease fire disposn of the tps and demarcation line is att as Appx R. 307. Loc of Cease Fire Mtg. Powell told C-IN-C to org a Cease Fire Mtg within 48hr of cessation of hostilities. C-IN-C wanted this ceremony to be held on the decks of Battleship Missouri as was done in

88 1945, between Douglas MacArthur and the Japanese. This was not feasible in this short duration because of tn and lgs problems. Hence Jalibah Airbase was selected as it was 95 miles deep in Iraqi territory and symbolized defeat of Iraq. However, it was changed later to Safwan Airfd as lot of unexploded ord was reported at Jalibah Air Base. Safwan Airfd was an Iraqi mil landing strip just north of Kuwaiti border and only two miles from an imp rd junction. C-IN-C, was horrified to learn that Safwan air fd was never in control of coalition forces. This made him furious as he had given direct orders for its capture as also of the imp cross road north of it. It was a serious case of disobedience of orders and wrong reporting. He was furious at VII Corps for this fiasco, and later it was brought out that they had carried out only heptr recce and reported completion of job on not finding any Iraqi tps over there. They should have carried out physical occupation of this imp piece of land. As Gen Schwarzkopf ordered VII corps to physically occupy it now, he was informed that Iraqi tps had occupied it and refused to lve. At this juncture, the mil experience and tact of Gen Schwarzkopf was again amplified as he told his cdr to play a bluff on Iraqi tps by surrounding them and threatening them of attack if they did not withdraw. C-IN-C knew that cease-fire had come into effect but he did not want any more fighting to prevent any further loss of life. He was relieved to learn that his bluff played and Iraqi left the loc. 308. Cease Fire Mtg. UNC ensured that the visiting Iraqi delegation was fairly intimidated before reaching the site of mtg by the sheer mil might of coalition forces by placing mil eqpts on both sides of the route to mtg place. The cease fire mtg was a success with Iraqi delegation accepting every request of coalition forces. However, C-IN-C felt betrayed later to learn that the only request of Iraqi delegation which he had accepted in good faith, was to permit them flying heptrs to carry officials to assess damages in areas of Iraq, but Iraqis had used it to suppress rebellions in Basra and other cities. 309. Return to Home. After cease-fire mtg, the Central Comd got involved again in returning the tps to USA. Gen Schwarzkopf was given a heros welcome on his return and was honoured by various decorations. He later refused to take the post of Chief of Army Staff, which was offered to him and chose to take retirement.

89 Appx A (Refers to Paras 81 and 86)

IA DRANG VALLEY CAMPAIGN

I CORPS

ABTF 3RD BN 5TH BN

II CORPS

III CORPS

IV CORPS

90 Appx B (Refers to Para 100)

1ST BN,6TH INF, AREA OF OP

TAM KY
TIEN PHUOC

CHU LAL LZ BAYONET

QUANG TIN

BATANGAN PENINSULA

FIRE ROCKET POCKET BASE DOTTIE

SOUTH VIETNAM

QUANG NGAI

CHINA SEA

91 Appx C (Refers to Para 190)

OPS IN GRENADA

GRENADA

GRENADA

PARA ASLT

AMPHI ASLT

HELI ASLT GRND ASLT

92 Appx D (Refers to Para 209)

CENTRAL COMD: AOR

AFGHANISTAN IRAQ IRAN

PAKISTAN EGYPT SAUDI ARABIA

SUDAN

KENYA

93 Appx E (Refers to Para 228)

KUWAIT-IRAQ CONFLICT

IRAN
RUMAILA OIL FD

IRAQ KUWAIT
AL FAW PENINSULA

KUWAIT CITY ARABIAN GULF

SAUDI ARABIA

94 Appx F (Refers to Para 245)

AIR/NAVAL BASES
BASES: ALLIED FORCE CRITICAL IRAQI BASES

TURKEY SAUDI ARABIA

IRAQ

KUWAIT IRAQ KUWAIT

SAUDI AREBIA

OMAN

NAVAL BASES

AIR BASES

BAHRAIN

QATAR

95 Appx G (Refers to Para 245)

INITIAL DPLY OF GRND FORCES

INITIAL DEF PLAN
IRAN

IRAQ

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

96 Appx H (Refers to Para 245)

FINAL DEF PLAN

IRAN

IRAQ KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

97 Appx J (Refers to Para 258)

OFFENSIVE PLAN WITH AVAILABLE FORCES

HIGH RISK OFFENSIVE PLAN
IRAN

IRAQ

KUWAIT

x2

HELI ASLT AMPH ASLT GRND ASLT

SAUDI ARABIA

98 Appx K (Refers to Para 290)

POSN: 17 JAN

IRAQ

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

99 Appx L (Refers to Para 294)

POSN: 23 JAN

IRAQ

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

100 Appx M (Refers to Para 306)

EVENING: 24 FEB

IRAQ

FRONT LINE
KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

101 Appx N (Refers to Para 306)

EVENING 25 FEB

FRONT LINE

KUWAIT IRAQ

SAUDI ARABIA

102

Appx P (Refers to Para 306)

EVENING 26 FEB

FRONT LINE

IRAQ

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

103 Appx Q (Refers to Para 306)

EVENING 27 FEB

FRONT LINE

IRAQ

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

104 Appx R (Refers to Para 306)

POST CEASE FIRE

IRAQ

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

DEMARCATION LINE

105