Philosophy 136 Philosophy of Perception

Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, 12 pm, Fall Semester 2011, 220 Wheeler Instructor: Mike Martin Office: Moses 144 Office Hours: Wednesdays 2.30pm4pm. Email: mgfmartin@berkeley.edu GSI: Austin Andrews Email: austinandrews@berkeley.edu COURSE DESCRIPTION What is sense perception? What is the nature of perceptual consciousness? Can we really be aware of the world around us? The problem of perception is one of the oldest aspects of philosophical debate. The questions raised are central to our understanding of the nature of mind and consciousness and of the ways we have of knowing of the world around us. In this course we will start by reviewing some of the oldest and most intractable puzzles about the nature of perceptual awareness before focusing on questions about the nature of perceptual consciousness and how those questions bear on our knowledge of the world around us. The aim of this course is to explore these problems. This is a lecture course designed primarily for upper division undergraduate students who have taken at least one course in philosophy. Students in the cognitive sciences (psychology, neuroscience, computer science/robotics, philosophy) are welcome. Your grade will be based on the following: Two essays. The first essay will be due 21 October The second essay will be due Friday 2 December. Take-home examination which will be distributed on last day of class. Performance in section will not be formally graded but may be taken into account in adjudicating borderline cases. Sections All students must attend a discussion section. We will pass out section preference cards on the first day class. Section assignments will be emailed to you 2 days later, and section meetings will begin the second week of class. If you are enrolled in the course and do not receive an email about your section assignment, please contact me. Academic integrity Plagiarism and cheating will not be tolerated in this course: students caught cheating or plagiarizing will receive an F in the course. Please review university policy at 100.00 POLICY ON STUDENT CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE. READINGS The key readings and most of the follow up readings are posted on the course site for this course on BSpace.

All handouts are available on that site after the lecture; as well as circulated in class. SCHEDULE The course is divided into five blocks: 1. Direct versus Indirect Perception
Essential Readings: Thompson Clarke, Seeing Surfaces and Physical Objects, in Max Black, ed., Philosophy in America, (George Allen, 1966) Frank Jackson, Perception: A Representative Theory, (CUP, 1977), Ch. 1 Follow up reading: P.F. Snowdon, How to Interpret Direct Perception, in Crane, ed., The Contents of Experience (CUP, 1992) Christopher Peacocke, Sense & Content, (OUP: 1983) Ch. 4

2. The Arguments from Illusion and Hallucination

David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, (OUP), sec. XII, pt.I John Foster, A.J. Ayer, (Routledge: 1986), Ch. II sec. X G.E.M. Anscombe, The Intentionality of Sensation, in R Butler, Analytic Philosophy, Second Series; Collected Papers: Vol. II Mind & Metaphysics; No and Thompson Vision & Mind (MIT Press 2004) M. Burnyeat, Conflicting Appearances, in Proceedings of the British Academy, 1979 J.L. Austin, Sense & Sensibilia, Chs. 45, (OUP: 1962) Follow up reading: J.J. Valberg, The Puzzle of Experience, in Crane, ed., The Contents of Experience (CUP: 1992) A.D. Smith, The Problem of Perception, (Harvard: 2002), selections in Byrne & Logue, Disjunctivism (MIT Press, 2009) 3. Sense-Data G.E. Moore, Visual Sense-Data, in Swartz, Perceiving, Sensing & Knowing, (University California Press, 1966) F. Jackson, Perception: A Representative Theory, Ch. 3, (CUP, 1977) M. Tye, The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience, Philosophical Review, 1984 Follow up reading CD Broad, Scientific Thought, Ch. VIII G.A. Paul, Is There a Problem About Sense-Data?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl Volume, 15, 1936, pp. 61 77 Christopher Peacocke, Sense & Content, (OUP: 1983), Ch. 1 MGF Martin, Sensible Appearances, in Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870 1945 (CUP:

2003)
4. Intentional Objects & Representational Content J. Searle, Intentionality, (CUP, 1980) Ch.2 G. Harman, The Intrinsic Quality of Experience, Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 1990 Follow up reading P.F. Strawson, Perception and its Objects in Macdonald, ed., Perception & Identity (Macmillan: 1979) reprinted in Dancy, Perception & Knowledge, (OUP: 1988), No & Thompson, Vision & Mind, (MIT Press 2004) Mark Johnston, The Obscure Object of Hallucination, Philosophical Studies, July 2006

5. Defending Nave Realism against the Argument from Hallucination P.F. Snowdon, Perception, Vision & Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1980-1 John McDowell, Criteria, Defeasibility & Knowledge, in Proceedings of the British Academy, 1982 and reprinted in his collected papers, Meaning, Knowledge & Reality (Harvard: 1998) J.L. Austin, Sense & Sensibilia, Ch. X Follow up reading: Alex Byrne & Heather Logue, Disjunctivism (MIT Press 2009), introduction Howard Robinson, Perception, (Routledge: 1995) selections in Byrne & Logue AD Smith selections in Byrne & Logue