In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

J. Todd Chapman,

In Re: C. A. Nos.: 01-3815, 00-3743, 99-3278

Plaintiff, Pro Se,

In Re: W.D. Pa. Civ. Nos.: 98-cv-00479, 99-cv-00979

v. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Et al.; Defendants.

In Re: F-01883777 (PA Public Utility ) Commission

Judge Richard W. Roberts

Civil Complaint No: 1:09-cv-02107-RWR

Notice of Objections to the Change of Venue, Nunc Pro Tunc and Motion for Reconsideration.

Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge Amy Reynolds Hay, Chief Magistrate United States District Court for the District of United States District Court for the Western Columbia District of Pennsylvania United States Courthouse United States Courthouse 333 Constitution Avenue, NW 700 Grant Street Courtroom 9C, 9th Floor Washington, DC 20001 Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Enclosed are Objections to the Change of Venue, directed to the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, filed Nunc Pro Tunc due to the failures of this court to grant electronic filing and the failures of this court to provide written or verbal notices of its actions.

A Motion for Reconsideration of the Change of Venue is attached. A CD-ROM is included.

J. Todd Chapman, Plaintiff, Pro Se. 1308 Glenn Street Homestead, PA 15120 (412) 461-5993 jt.chapman@verizon.net

CC: Eric H. Holder, Jr. Dated: March 23, 2010

Signed:___________________________________________ /s/ J. Todd Chapman, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Constitutional Errors
1. The Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution is cited on page -11- in 5 of the
Complaint, explaining why 28 U.S.C. 47 is vitally important to the proper functioning of the federal courts. Judge Roberts' transfer order was not a valid exercise of Congressional Authority. Roberts' actions violated this provision of the Constitution as well as the Due Process component of the Fifth Amendment. Complaint at 179. and 490. Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U. S. 153 (1899).

2. The refusals of docketing of the notices and motions also rise to the level of Fifth Amendment
Due Process violations. This Plaintiff was never served with the transfer order and was prevented from raising any prior objections by the lack of notice. Nevertheless, Judge Roberts' personal

jurisdiction over this case was raised immediately upon the appointment by the Clerk of this Court.

3. This court is bound by the Supreme Court precedential ruling of Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988). The Chief Judge of the DC court, Royce C. Lamberth, must now
make the decision, and the record must be certified. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 18

(1954). Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958). 4. Judge Roberts' Constitutional violations led to Clerk Barth, Jr.'s Constitutional violation of the
Appointments Clause. Barth, Jr., is not empowered to bypass both the Senate and the Congress.

5. Judge Roberts' behaviors violated the Constitution, Article III, Section 1, Khanh Phuong Nguyen
v. U.S., 539 U.S. 69 (2003), requiring federal judges to hold office during good behavior.

6. The failure of this court to overrule Judge Roberts upon this Reconsideration application will
constitute further Constitutional error. The possibilities of appeal must be preserved for all parties, such possibilities which require a venue vested beyond the "embrace" of the Third Circuit.

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Procedural History
7. The subject Complaint was mailed to the clerk of this court on November 4, 2009, and received by
the court on November 6, 2009. Pursuant to local court rule1 electronic filing was requested by leave of court and motion, and two complete copies of the Complaint were attached to the motion. The case was docketed as No: 1:09-cv-02107-RWR.

8. The cover letter for the motion and the Complaint explained the contents of the CD-ROM
containing the PDF versions of the Complaint and the separate component parts which were provided to comply with the electronic file size filing guidelines.

9. The required NOTICE OF DESIGNATION OF RELATED CIVIL CASES PENDING was included in
the initial mailing with sufficient copies for all named defendants. The contents of the form stated (a) the common property relationship, (b) the involvement of common issues of fact, (c) the growth out of the same event or transaction, and (e) that the case was filed by the same pro se party. The box to indicate the relationship to a dismissed case was checked. The case docket numbers were provided, and were listed in the Caption as well.

10. Each of the major cases were explained by detailed allegations. The First Amended Complaint at
WDPA 98-479 was cited extensively by reference to the important paragraph allegations. The

allegations of denial of access to the courts in each instance were explained, citing the events and providing a multitude of Supreme Court case citations regarding the access violations. The actors were identified by their functional roles and the parts that they played in the years of conspiratorial events.

See

4:08-cv-00370-RP-RAW,

http://www.iowamedicalmarijuana.org/petitions/dea_docket.aspx,

Olsen v. Holder, JUDGMENT in favor of Hillary Clinton, dated 04/27/2009, exactly as stated in Judge Roberts' disqualification application, whereat other district courts require the motion. transaction #3 was the motion for electronic filing. Docket

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The actions of law firm of Covington & Burling were identified throughout, and the events concerning the United States Department of Justice were detailed throughout the new Complaint and the First Amended Complaint at WDPA 98-479. The roles of the officials of the Third Circuit and how they acted beyond their personal jurisdictions and in violation of many federal criminal statutes were documented. The nullities of the court orders and the non-final decisions were explained by

referencing United States Supreme Court Cases and the Constitutional Provisions infringed. Detailing the events (p. 1 - 481) and the claims for relief (p. 482 - 502) took five hundred and two (502) pages of text, and was written over several years, during which times the events continued to develop.

11. The Venue Section of the Complaint (here) stating this Plaintiff's venue preference, is of sufficient
clarity for the venue to rest in the District of Columbia. Covington & Burling's principal office is in the District of Columbia, and its corporate decisions and most of its actions are governed from the District. By inclusion, it is clear that the Venue of the case was proper in the District of Columbia, as stated. It is also clear that venue is improper in any district of either Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, the United States Virgin Islands, or anywhere where the Third Circuit may normally exercise jurisdiction. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Eric H. Holder, Jr., and Gregg H. Levy are all believed to reside in the District of Columbia, and all clearly work within the District. Federal question jurisdiction, as legislated by the Congress, has granted this Plaintiff a forum preference.

12. Kevin C. Newsom may be occasionally found within the District of Columbia and has never
claimed to have appeared in any Pennsylvania district. This action requires that venue lie where he may eventually be found again. He does not currently reside in Pennsylvania.

13. The choice of forum is the Plaintiff's right where jurisdiction may be invoked. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005 (1994). Res judicata can not be invoked against the Plaintiff where a
full and fair opportunity to litigate was thwarted by the Defendant conspirators.

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14. Judge Richard W. Roberts, while deeply conflicted, was assigned to the case on November 6,
2009. The court provided written notification of the judicial assignment and the docketing file number.

15. Judge Roberts failed to either approve or deny the motion for leave and electronic filing. 16. A request for Judicial Notice and a Motion for Judge Roberts' possible disqualification was mailed
to this court and dated November 15, 2009, and received by the court. See Exhibit I. The actual mailing date was Saturday, November 14, 2009. On November 15, 2009, a confirming e-mail2 was sent to dcd_cmecf@dcd.uscourts.gov <dcd_cmecf@dcd.uscourts.gov> and was not rejected by this Plaintiff's e-mail server. The Motion is still pending, as is the Leave of Court.

17. Further Internet research revealed the importance of including more definitive information for
Judge Roberts to consider in his response to the prior requests for Notice and the Motion. The supplemental request for Notice of Judge Roberts' disqualification was mailed to the court on

November 18, 2009, and received by the court.

18. Both notices for Judge Roberts to consider and the motion for his possible disqualification were
never responded to, thereby violating the binding requirements of 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(2) and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241 (1978), relying on Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 320 A. 2d 134 (1974). The case specifies that a judge may not decide his own disqualification motion3 (Complaint at page -41-), and that In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133

An electronic copy of the e-mail is included on the enclosed CD-ROM and a print image of the message is included in PDF form as well. See Exhibit II
3

28 U.S.C. 144, Bias or prejudice of judge, provides the procedural method for resolving the question. "Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either

Continued on next page...

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(1955), at page -136-137, specifically bars a judge from trying cases where he has an interest in the outcome. These binding United States Supreme Court citations were stated in the text of the November 15, 2009, pleading. An alternative judge makes the disqualification decision4. Complaint 61.

19. Without explanation or notice, neither of the judicial notices and the motion were publicly
docketed by either the Clerk or Judge Roberts.

20. On November 16, 2009, a one page Motion for Leave to Amend the Caption was mailed to the
Clerk in paper form, CD-ROM form, as well as e-mailed5. The confirming e-mail to the Clerk's Office at dcd_cmecf@dcd.uscourts.gov <dcd_cmecf@dcd.uscourts.gov> was sent on November 16, 2009, and was not rejected by this Plaintiff's e-mail server. The motion addressed this Plaintiff's oversight in inadvertently leaving Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.'s information out of the Caption. A new page 1 of the Caption was included in both forms.

21. Without explanation or notice, the motion was not publicly docketed by the Clerk. The Clerk failed
to return the requested stamped copy of the Notice of Motion to this Plaintiff. Two months passed.

Continued from previous page...

against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding".

In Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), the Supreme Court struggled, mightily, with the judge's right to determine the sufficiency of the affidavit as opposed to the truth of the averments, therein. The court split the baby. Being a court of review, as opposed to a court of first view, it is imperative that some judge, inferior to a Supreme Court justice, make the first view determination.
5

An electronic copy of the e-mail is included on the enclosed CD-ROM and a print image of the message is included in PDF form as well.

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22. On Saturday, January 23, 2010, this Plaintiff received Magistrate Robert C. Mitchell's recusal
order.

23. On Saturday, January 30, 2010, this Plaintiff received Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster's recusal
order.

24. On February 2, 2010, this Plaintiff mailed to this court a combined motion to strike Magistrate
Mitchell's recusal order, motion to strike Chief Judge Lancaster's recusal order, and motion for prohibition against Stephen A. Zappala, Jr. for his attempt to steal this plaintiff's inheritance. The court received the papers and the CD-ROM and, once again, failed to list the documents on the docket. No response was received from the court, from Eric Holder, Jr., or from Stephen A. Zappala, Jr. Both Holder and Zappala, Jr. received the COMPLAINT filings on their CD-ROMs.

25. With this court having failed to act on the required motion for leave to file documents
electronically, this Plaintiff initiated a PACER inquiry on March 5, 2010, to attempt to find out why no responses had been received from the court. The PDF docket report was mangled and unreadable.

26. On Saturday, March 6, 2010, this Plaintiff received a ten page docket report from the office of
Pittsburgh Chief Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay, dated 3/5/2010.

27. On Monday, March 15, 2010, the Office of the Clerk of the Western District of Pennsylvania, had
Tim Tarby call this Plaintiff in an attempt to have this Plaintiff withdraw the March 12, 2010, application for the electronic filing password. The attempt was the second time that the tactic of negative persuasion was used.

28. Next comes this Application.

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Electronic (Shadow) Docket Reports

29. This court's (DC) docket transactions contain notations under item #1 that no summonses were
issued to any of the defendants.

30. At transaction #4, entered on December 17, 2009, despite being subject to disqualification, Judge
Roberts issued a case transfer order, and failed to serve the order upon this Plaintiff. The court never docketed the notices or the motion for Judge Roberts' disqualification.

31. On January 20, 2010, the clerk implemented the change of venue and failed to serve the order on
this Plaintiff. No notation of any case closing was included in the docket transactions.

32. Despite listing this Plaintiff's request for leave of court and for approval of electronic filing, the
docket item at #3 was never addressed by the court. The court never electronically served any transaction upon this Plaintiff.

33. All of this court's actions were performed sua sponte. and without notice or service. 34. The Western District of Pennsylvania's (WDPA) electronic docket report, generated by Magistrate
Amy Reynolds Hay, and dated March 5, 2010, erroneously listed the Demand as $9,999,000, all federal judges knowing that the upper limitation on the original pleaded relief is operable in cases of default. Not only did the COMPLAINT cover state $10,000,000+, but also the DC court's docket stated $10,000,000 after having dropped the plus sign (+).

35. As a matter of statute, Chief Magistrate Hay's mail notification of the WDPA case was null and
void, her not having been assigned to the case by a district court judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 363.

36. Despite this Plaintiff's motions to strike both Chief Judge Lancaster's and Magistrate Judge
Mitchell's self-generated recusal orders, neither motion was listed in the WDPA docket report.

37. In the shadows, the new WDPA docket listed a November 20, 2009, transaction for (Court only)
Staff notes. The entry never appeared on the DC docket. See the WDPA item between #3 and #4. The clandestine revelation defies due process.

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38. The next shadow transaction on the WDPA docket (between #4 and #5) is the "(Court only)" civil
case terminating entry, such entry which does not appear on the DC docket. The failure of the DC court to list the termination caused the case termination decision to be unlisted on LEXIS/NEXUS. Again, this Plaintiff was not provided with notice or any electronic notification by e-mail. The date of the WDPA transaction was 12/18/09.

39. The third shadow transaction on the WDPA docket (between #4 and #5) is the "(Court only)"
category number 7 assignment.

40. The WDPA docket reports (transaction #1) lists Robert V. Barth, Jr., Robert C. Mitchell, and Gary
L. Lancaster as individual capacity defendants.

41. Foreshadowing the Mitchell recusal order at item #6 (void as a matter of law) was the concealed
assignment of the case to Magistrate Robert C. Mitchell by Clerk Robert V. Barth, disqualified as a matter of law. 28 U.S.C. 636. 16 of the judicial notices and motions for Magistrate Mitchell and Chief Judge Lancaster's non judicial recusal orders to be stricken having cited United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), for its unambiguous holding that the term "district court" means "the judge" in the context of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1). 28 U.S.C. 631(i), and 28 U.S.C. 632(a). A United States district clerk is not empowered by the Constitution or by any statute to appoint a magistrate judge absent, inclusively, (1) an appointment by a district court judge, or (2) the unanimous consent of all parties. Barth, Jr.'s recent choice of Chief Magistrate Hay also violated the Appointments Clause.

42. Following the recusal order of Magistrate Mitchell, not before, the WDPA docket actually lists the
clerical appointment of Chief Judge Lancaster, Clerk Barth being already disqualified. The transaction is listed before the recusal order of Lancaster at item #7.

43. Chief Judge Lancaster was disqualified as a matter of law before he issued item #7. Inclusively, his
disqualification as a named defendant or an appointee of Barth made his recusal completely null and void, and he was precluded, jurisdictionally, from ordering Barth to make yet another non jurisdictional

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assignment. Any judge who employs bad behavior is disqualified by the Constitution. The shadow appointment by Barth prior to item #8 is null and void as a matter of law. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). Only the Supreme Court can overrule one of its precedents. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd.6, 460 U.S. 533 (1983).

44. Chief Magistrate Judge Hay's appointment, before item #8, is an idempotent7 legal nullity, it having
been made by a disqualified district court clerk by order of a disqualified chief district court judge.

45. The null and void ORDER of Chief Judge Hay appears at item #8. The entry was docketed on
March 5, 2010, with no notice of the order having been given in advance. On the merits, the WDPA Chief Magistrate had no jurisdiction over the local DC court rule under which the court8, itself, compelled this Plaintiff to file the motion for leave and electronic filing.

''Perhaps unsure of its distinction of Rice, the Court of Appeals went on to "doubt that Rice is still good law." Needless to say, only this Court may overrule one of its precedents. Until that occurs, Rice is the law, and the decision below cannot be reconciled with it.''
7

http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/June08/HPpatent.ws.html. See 275 of the Complaint. Once null and void, always null and void. http://www.freepatentsonline.com/5974522.html.
8

The court's very own procedures require a pro se party to file the motion for access. See the PDF document from https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov. Magistrate Hay's order is a legal nullity.

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Applicable Federal Statutes Jurisdiction

46. 28 U.S.C. 1331 plainly establishes federal question jurisdiction in any United States District
Court. The Complaint invoked the statute at 188 on Page -116- to address "several acts of conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42, and seeks redress for each and all of the harms", and 195 on Page -118- "for injuries which are actionable directly under the Constitution. Harbury, 536 U. S. 403 (2002) (backward looking access to the courts).". Christopher v.

Venue
47.
28 U.S.C. 1294 establishes both jurisdiction and venue for Circuits in which decisions

reviewable, although the title of the statute is of no legal consequence. The Complaint invoked the statute at 197 on page -121- to "to bring all of the defendants together in a common forum where their diverse residencies can be addressed.".

48.

28 U.S.C. 1294 explicitly states "appeals from reviewable decisions of the district and

territorial courts shall be taken to the courts of appeals as follows: (1) From a district court of the United States to the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district;".

49. The Complaint at 208, plainly stated venue was improper at the Third Circuit or in any district
within its influence (embrace!). See 394 of the Complaint. The Relief section was referenced for the

reasoning made apparent in Sections VII, and VIII, pages -497-502- being included wherein without

explicit restatement.

50. 28 U.S.C. 391. Venue generally, states:

(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State,

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(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.

51. 28 U.S.C. 47 states, as a matter of the personal jurisdiction of appellate judges, that "No judge
shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.". See 5 of the Complaint on page -11-.

52.

See Khanh Phuong Nguyen v. U.S., 539 U.S. 69, 70, 80 (2003), relying upon Moran v

Dillingham, 174 US 153 (1899), and basing the decision on, in part, the federal quorum statute, 28 U. S. C. 46(d), cited at page -47- of the Complaint. Paragraphs 72 through 75 of the Complaint pled the multiple organizational statutes governing the composition of the federal courts.

Change of Venue
53. Judge Roberts' transfer order cites no precedential cases yet claims (emphasis added):
"ORDERED that this case be, and hereby is, TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) in the interests of justice".

The Transfer of Venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 1404, contains several operative provisions and, in relevant part reads:

(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought. (b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the division in which pending to any other division in the same district. Transfer of proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf of the United States may be transferred under this section without the consent of the United States where all other parties request transfer.

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Disqualification of Judge Roberts

54. Richard W. Roberts was disqualified from the moment that he was assigned by the Clerk. The
second Notice, dated November 18, 2009, which he was requested to address by affidavit or by sworn testimony before another district court judge, referred the court and the judge to Web address http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/May95/247.txt.html, identifying an "unconstitutional potential for bias9". Judge Roberts' appointment as Section Chief in the Civil Rights Division's Criminal Prosecution Section suggests that his prior supervisor was Eric H. Holder, Jr., and that his next supervisor was Duval Patrick. The term of his service was from May 1, 1995, and for a few years, thereafter. Judge Roberts was, therefore, Section Chief of the Criminal Division on October 30, 1996, when this Plaintiff began mailing several letters on the fraudulent Commonwealth proceedings. Judge Roberts must have personal knowledge of this Plaintiff's complaints about the crimes which were occurring in Pittsburgh and at the hands of the police and the courts. See 116 of the Complaint and

referencing http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1LgEdMtZIVQ.

Duval Patrick refused to even

investigate the crimes against this Plaintiff before refusing his required duties in his letter of November 15, 1996, which is attached as Exhibit III. Exhibit IV is the second refusal letter, dated, December 30, 1996, falsely claiming no statutory authority when 18 U.S.C. 241 and 18 U.S.C. 242 had provided the federal statutory authority for nearly a century and a half. This Plaintiff's acquittal on the Double Jeopardy barring disorderly conduct claim had eliminated any Commonwealth claim as to jurisdiction, making the Patrick refusals fraudulent. The Patrick refusals were the Roberts refusals, and Roberts was mandatorily barred from any proceedings in this matter as a matter of statute. 28 U.S.C.

455(b)(2). Robert's failure to either file an affidavit or give sworn testimony on the particulars violated binding Supreme Court precedents, particularly In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), at page
9

See http://docs.justia.com/cases/supreme/slip/556/08-22/index.pdf, Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. ____ (2009), disqualifying a judge with an indirect conflict of interest.

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-136-. No judge can decide an issue in his own case, and Eric Holder, Jr. was plainly named here in his official capacity as United States Attorney General. Both failed to prevent the subsequent acts of slavery, thus violating the Thirteenth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. 3332. It was mandatory that the Commonwealth's actors' actions be brought before a federal special grand jury. Thus, both Holder, Jr. and Patrick violated 42 U.S.C. 1986, a pattern which was repeated for years as the Commonwealth's actors continued to impose unconstitutional acts of slavery.

55. 38 of the Complaint seems to fit Judge Roberts behavior, although this Plaintiff could not have
identified him in advance by any other means. "When functor = judicial fact-finder, the Sixth Amendment is often offended".

56. The attached letters (Exhibit III & Exhibit IV) from Duval Patrick's office demonstrate the
concealments. Judge Roberts is still required to come completely clean on his failure to submit the affidavit or to let a clerk subject him to recorded testimony10 under oath before another judge of this court. His testimony is essential to a complete airing of the failures of the politicized Justice

Department11, such failures which led to Samuel Alito's far reaching perjuries and omissions before Senator Arlen Specter's Judiciary Committee about this Plaintiff's cases at the Third Circuit. The "first view" functor is that of a judge. Complaint, p. 81, n.81.

57. Now for the statement on malice. Judge Roberts is not the most dishonest federal judge that this
Plaintiff has encountered. He is merely the latest. His functional background might otherwise be exemplary. However, his factor conflicts as a Covington & Burling man and as one of Holder's deputies placed him in an overwhelmingly conflicting position, clearly bad behavior. See Khanh
10

The functor recording of Judge Roberts' proposed (by this Plaintiff) testimony would be essential to fairness. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984), called for a review, not a first view.
11

See Complaint, 40, 42, 44, 48, 52, 77, 113, 116, 151, 211, 256, 260, 261, 262, 273, 287, 381, 435, 441, 443, 454, 458, 459, 460, 474, 503, 509, 510, & 519.

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Phuong Nguyen v. U.S., 539 U.S. 69(2003), stating "Among other things, Chapter 5 creates a United States District Court for each judicial district, 132(a), exhaustively enumerates the districts so constituted, 133(a), and describes district judges as holding office [functor] during good behavior [factor], 134(a)".

58. Judge Robert's concealment of this Plaintiff's mailed pleadings violated 18 U.S.C. 2071, and
delayed the filings of defendant summonses. A plaintiff can not submit summonses to a vacuum.

59. The trick that Judge Roberts has illegally imposed is to transfer this matter back into the forum
where the access was originally denied. His intent is to create a self-referential circular fraud from which there is no escape. It is to be expected that the Pennsylvania courts and the Third Circuit will continue to deny access to the courts, the intended consequence of Judge Roberts' trick transfer. Such a transfer would protect the interests of Eric Holder, Jr. and Covington & Burling. The strong evidence appears in the Complaint under 27 and New Evidence.

60. The further disqualifying functors are (1) Judge Roberts' failure to issue the required electronic
access password in sufficient time for this Plaintiff to provide electronic service on all parties within 120 days, (2) the concealments of the Notices and Motions from the electronic docket, (3) the failure of Judge Roberts to serve this Plaintiff with his transfer of venue order, and the abuse of the statute under which Judge Roberts claimed to be transferring the matter. The unauthorized transfer functor will be discussed next.

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Preservation of Appellate Jurisdiction

61. Since 28 U.S.C. 1294 explicitly states that jurisdiction and venue must be identical for district
courts and appellate courts, the statute does not provide the judicial power where a district court is not subject to the Congressionally appointed appellate court. The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 391(3), mandates that the venue lie "where a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought". Both 28 U.S.C. 47 and 28 U. S. C. 46(d) completely barred Judge Roberts' attempt to transfer the venue, as both statutes qualify appellate jurisdiction. As the Third Circuit is presently composed, more than half of the judges are named defendants, and no quorum is possible. 28 U.S.C. 47 and 28 U. S. C. 46(d) would be jointly offended by a transfer back to the Western District of Pennsylvania because no embracing appellate quorum could possibly exist for an en banc appellate reconsideration of any decision reached. Therefore, the Western District Court, and any court within the reach of the miscreant Third Circuit, are barred from any proceedings here. The action can not be brought in the Western District and hope to preserve appellate jurisdiction as of right. This new matter has already been generated due to the prior jurisdictional violations of the Western District Court and the miscreant Third Circuit. Reprobation for another federal court is not only not required, it is Constitutionally forbidden.

62. 28 U.S.C. 47 and 28 U. S. C. 46(d) would disqualify the Third Circuit even if none of the
officials were named defendants. Without even considering the merits of this new Complaint, the "ORDERED" change of venue is jurisdictionally barred based upon the Statutes.

63. "In the interest of justice" is a balancing test. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), at page
-136-. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). Here, this Plaintiff has given no consent and none of this Plaintiff's rights have been addressed. And because of the obstructions of electronic access to the court, none of the defendants have been served with summonses. Only Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. and Stephen A. Zappala, Jr. have been served with this new Complaint by this Plaintiff,

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and both Chief Judge Lancaster, Magistrate Judge Mitchell and Robert V. Barth, Jr.'s service by the WDPA court was concealed by the WDPA court. Therefore, these five already defaulting defendants have offered no interests to be weighed on the justice scales. Judge Roberts' abuse is a jurisdictional violation, sua sponte changes of venue not being incorporated in the change of venue statutes.

64. In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. , the controlling principle of Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510,
523, was recited as the "objective" standard to be applied to a disqualification case: Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.. Here, the change of venue without notice or the appearance of any defendant satisfies the test that the balance was not kept "nice, clear and true". In fact, there was no balance at all. See footnote 91 of the Complaint, which begins on page -60-. Here, the use of the wrong procedure is the wrong result.

65. Judge Roberts has not asserted that there was improper venue in the District of Columbia because
he could not under the statutes. Even if the defendants were to weigh in on opposite sides from this Plaintiff, the disqualification of the Third Circuit could not be overcome. 28 U.S.C. 47 and 28 U. S. C. 46(d). The Congressional texts of the statutes are controlling, and all of the statutes must be read together. The change of venue statute is not written broadly enough to confer sua sponte changes of venue without calculation12 of the "interest of justice" balance. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 2313 (1988). The balance must lie somewhere between zero and infinity, not at

12

Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), states: "It is a well settled principle of construction that specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling".

Section 1404(a) is not written in specific terms, and is too general to be applied sua sponte.

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either extreme. With no opposing parties weighed in, the interest of justice ratio is either zero or infinity, depending upon which absent factor would appear in the denominator. No party should favor an appeal to a disqualified court.

66. While it is conceded that Stewart read the requirements for a "motion" into the text of part (a), the
proximity of part (b) and its explicit "motion" requirement and its "discretionary" requirement made the expansion of the meaning of part (a) permissible by the Supreme Court. The language of the Supreme Court is binding regarding both the "motion" requirement and its "discretionary" requirement. Judge Roberts' ORDER violates both requirements.

13

Continued from previous page...

13

Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), states: (b) Section 1404(a) is sufficiently broad to control the forum-selection issue. The statute is intended to place discretion in the district courts to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness. A motion to transfer under 1404(a) calls on the district court to weigh in the balance a number of case-specific factors, and the presence of a forum-selection clause will figure centrally in the calculus. A forum-selection clause should receive neither dispositive consideration nor no consideration, but rather the consideration for which Congress provided in 1404(a). Section 1404(a) must be applied, since it represents a valid exercise of Congress' authority under Article III as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. In this case, the District Court should determine in the first instance the appropriate effect under federal law of the parties' forum-selection clause on respondent's 1404(a) motion.

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Substantive Nullity
67. Judge Roberts' ORDER makes an illegal reference to the Third Circuit's null and void order at
Chapman v. Pennsylvania, 82 Fed. Appx. 59 (3rd Cir. 2003)14, the order which the civil rights panel showed its schizophrenia and repeated the Commonwealth's defamations. The voidances of his

reference renders his ORDER as null and void. A federal jury must consider the facts of the prior pleadings, those facts which will include the statements15 of this Plaintiff in objecting to the prior Report and Recommendation of defendant Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell. This Plaintiff's Objections were ignored by Judge Cindrich after he joined in the misprison of the Tabano judgment, rendering the dismissal a legal nullity. The here footnoted statements from this Plaintiff's prior

Objections plainly stated the res judicata effect of the trial court's release by citing the Abney v.

14

Chapman v. Pennsylvania, 82 Fed. Appx. 59 (3rd Cir. 2003).

15

3.2.2.1.6 Heck, supra., itself, invalidates the Recommendation of the Report since the First Amended Complaint, as opposed to violating Heck, supra., is entirely consistent with it. Again nowhere does the First Amended Complaint state that the action is for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Nor could it properly do so since I am not confined and there was a habeas corpus release on September 4, 1997, issued by the trial court. No matter how hard This Court's magistrate has tried to misstate the facts, res judicata bars his attempt to restate the release language which appears in the September 10, 1997, "Opinion" of the trial court judge. Nor can the trial court judge's recommendation that I serve another sentence be used to reverse his very own decision to release me. The release is a done deal, and was done based upon my clear showing that he lacked any jurisdiction to do any of the things which he did to me, including jailing me for a second time for an alleged "Failure to confirm counsel". 3.2.2.1.7 Since it is clear from his "Opinion" that the trial court's judge is trying to reinstate the conviction, Heck, supra., would allow the declaratory and injunctive relief against him for his attempts are precluded by Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), on double jeopardy grounds. Heck, supra., does not address former jeopardy. But what the Report calls for is a declaration that there is a pending conviction. That abuse of discretion, if it is to occur, would unconstitutionally violate these cases.

3.2.2.1.8 Heck, supra., clearly relies on Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75 (1984), for its res judicata dicta, and upon Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), for its conclusions regarding habeas corpus exhaustion in the context of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The next passage from Heck, supra., is important:

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United States16, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), case and the Heck reliances upon the res judicata principle, even though the Heck reliance was dicta.

68. The maintenance of Judge Roberts' non jurisdictional transfer of venue order can not be permitted
without violating this Plaintiff's "superior immunity" under the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. See 525 of this new Complaint, demonstrating that "Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 85

U.S. 163 (1873), barred the execution of the second judgment after the (tow pound) fine had been paid.", and that "under Kepner v. U. S., 195 U.S. 100 (1904), where at page -101-. the Supreme Court recognized no need for a verdict judgment under a Double Jeopardy violation".
Even when the Commonwealth refused and failed to issue any "final judgment" paperwork, this Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Immunity was superior to all of their bogus immunity and other defenses. Even though the named conspirators and their conspiratorial lawyers implemented the retaliatory continuation elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, their unproven and illegal efforts were inferior to this Plaintiff's Double Jeopardy Immunity. Complaint, 220.

69. The narrow Double Jeopardy superior immunity is controlling in a criminal proceeding, and the res
judicata component of the superior immunity is controlling in a civil proceeding. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983), clarifying the concept of issue preclusion in a civil context. See Berger v. United States17, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), requiring an indictment to protect the accused against a Double Jeopardy violation.

70. At this stage in the proceedings, Judge Roberts' reliance upon the Third Circuit's "final judgment"
is a sheer fantasy, that "opinion" having ignored the preclusive effects of the Commonwealth's losses of their case and controversy frauds. Not only is his ORDER a procedural nullity, its substance is completely void for his having referenced the disqualified Third Circuit's dismissal.
16

New Complaint, passim.

17

http://supreme.justia.com/us/295/78/case.html.

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Western District of Pennsylvania Non Judicial Assignment Practice and Unavailability of a District Judge.
71. No district court judge is currently assigned to the case docketed in the Western District of
Pennsylvania. There is no court structured.

72. Disqualified Clerk Robert V. Barth, Jr. first assigned the illegally transferred case to Magistrate
Robert C. Mitchell and then to Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster. This court concealed the pleadings which this Plaintiff filed in DC against both recusal orders. This repeat of history has already been reviewed by the Supreme Court. Roell v. Withrow18, 538 U.S. 580 (2003).

73. Next, Barth hand picked Chief Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay and assigned her without the
statutory authority of 28 U.S.C. 363. The disqualified and non jurisdictional assignments by

defendant Barth were to be expected after he bravely misprized the Tabano Judgment entry for at least the second time.

74. Every act of the court officials after Judge Roberts' illegal and non jurisdictional transfer has
continued the criminal enterprise of obstructing this Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1981 rights as authorized under the self-executing Thirteenth Amendment. See all of the new Complaint sections under Constitutional Provisions and pay particular attention to 169 and pages -107- and -108-. This racketeering enterprise by the federal court officials seems to have no bounds. It has no legitimate governmental purpose. As Judge Roberts and Clerk Barth have recently applied it, they both seem bent upon having the change of venue statute invalidated as applied based upon Thirteenth Amendment

18

The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 (Act) empowers full-time magistrate judges to conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, as long as they are specially designated . . . by the district court and acting with the consent of the parties.

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and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. No white man would expect this treatment, and no intelligent man should have to respect it. Complaint at 99 and 227 and 251 and 599.

75. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 119 (1986), ruling that a transcript of a
preliminary hearing is a mandatory requirement in every criminal proceeding, unless waived by the defendant. The requirement was binding precedent upon the Commonwealth ever since 1986 and plainly applied to Lester G. Nauhaus when he was the chief public defender of Allegheny County. Given that Chief Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay remains married20 to Lester G. Nauhaus, a signatuary of District Court Judge Donald E. Ziegler's court order, under which Nauhaus was fined, it is impossible under the Constitution for Chief Magistrate Hay to be impartial, especially when she, too, served in the Office of the Public Defender of Allegheny County which has always been a public disgrace from its inception. See 125 of the Complaint and its footnotes at #117 and #118. Chief Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay cannot possibly judge her own sins and those of her husband as they apply to the public defenders and their agents. The violations of the federal court order of Judge Ziegler21 was pled upon appeal to the Third Circuit and was raised in the First Amended Complaint at WDPA 998-479.

76. Chief Magistrate Hay also can not adjudge her own behaviors at the Justice Department where her
bio says that she served as "Chief of the Civil Division from 1989 to 2003" Donetta Ambrose and

19

2. The qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary hearings as conducted in California.
20

http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Public/Reference/Hay.pdf.
21

The text of the executed agreement is attached as Exhibit V.

Page -30- of the First Amended

Complaint at WDPA 98-479, and referencing the practices of defiance of the federal court order by the public defenders and others is attached as Exhibit VI.

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staff and Gary Lancaster were gutting my case to protect my children and recover my assets from the IRS and Merck & Co. Inc.

77. It is unimaginable that Chief Judge Hay will rule against defendant Ambrose, or any other federal
judge within the Western District under whom she works. How can she judge her own bosses, and how could Judge Roberts adjudge Eric Holder, Jr. is a non justiciable question.

78. The judicial assignment system, based upon conflicts of interests, has clearly broken down already
and again.

79. All of these issues resulted from Judge Roberts' illegal transfer of venue, justifying that the case be
immediately transferred back to the District of Columbia in the interest of justice.

80. This applications is submitted nunc pro tunc due to the misconduct of Judge Roberts and Clerk
Nancy M. Mayer-Whittington who both failed to serve this Plaintiff with any notice of the transfer.

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Relief
81. This court should vacate the transfer of venue order of Judge Roberts. 82. This court should order that Clerk Nancy M. Mayer-Whittington is disqualified and that a deputy clerk is assigned to handle the duties of the clerk for all matters involved in this litigation and for
its duration.

83. This court should order the newly assigned deputy clerk to locate all of this Plaintiff's submissions
and update the docket, electronically, to reflect all of the submissions of this Plaintiff.

84. This court should grant this Plaintiff's Motion to permit electronic filing and issue a password by
e-mail.

85. This court should issue an order that the Caption of the Complaint is Amended to included the
submitted information for Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.

86. This court should conduct the requested hearing concerning Judge Roberts' disqualification, and
electronically file the transcript of the proceedings.

87. This court should order that Judge Roberts is disqualified from this case. 88. This court should order that the time for service of the Amended Complaint is extended to 120
days from the date of the illegal transfer order and that the newly assigned deputy clerk issue the necessary summonses and electronic services of all of the pleadings to all of the defendants.

89. This court should make the finding that the delay in the service of the Amended Complaint was
caused by the misconduct of Judge Roberts and the Clerk.

90. This court should order that a hearing will be held to adjudge the disqualifications of Magistrate
Robert C. Mitchell and Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster, that their orders of recusal be STRICKEN, and that they answer the Amended Complaint as any other defendant is required to do under the statutes and rules.

91. This court should GRANT the injunctive relief applied for against Stephen A. Zappala, Jr.
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Table of Exhibits

Exhibit No.

Description of PDF Exhibit

. Exhibit I Exhibit II Exhibit III Exhibit IV Exhibit V Exhibit VI Exhibit VII Exhibit VIII

Certificates of Mailing
November 15, 2009, a confirming e-mail Duval Patrick letter of November 15, 1996 Duval Patrick letter of December 30, 1996 Consent decree court order of District Court Judge Donald E. Ziegler - 6 files Page -30- of the First Amended Complaint at WDPA 98-479 ( & Complaint) Complaint Transfer of Venue Order

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FORM OF ORDER
This court, having reviewed the Plaintiff's Objections and Requests for Reconsideration.

hereby ORDERS all of the

Relief

requested in the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration to be

GRANTED.

Dated March ___, 2010

Signed:___________________________________________ Royce C. Lamberth, Chief District Judge.

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CERTIFICATION

I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct and not submitted for the purpose of delay.

Dated March 23, 2010

Signed:___________________________________________ /s/ J. Todd Chapman, Plaintiff Pro Se.

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