MEd: Research Perspectives

Dianne Allen RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION (Assignment 1) RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES Revised format and annotations
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RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES (Assignment 1) RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES.................................................................................................. 1 My Current Understanding of Where I am at in Understanding the Nature of Research: ..... 2 Assumptions Each Perspective makes about how knowledge is to be produced................... 5 Choice of Text:....................................................................................................................... 8 Problem explored: .............................................................................................................. 8 Perspective of the research:................................................................................................ 8 Knowledge Claims: .......................................................................................................... 10 Evidence Assembled: ....................................................................................................... 11 Assumptions embedded in the report:.............................................................................. 11 What is omitted: ............................................................................................................... 13 Kressels Toward a Reflective Research Paradigm........................................................... 13 Bibliography:........................................................................................................................ 15 END NOTES:....................................................................................................................... 16
Dianne Allen, 2000
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My Current Understanding of Where I am at in Understanding the Nature of Research:

The old adage is that there is more than one way to skin a cat. Such seems to be the case in the world of research. Another cat analogy applies - as in the world of cat there is more than one category of cat, likewise for research. Further, given the work, the energy, the mental effort I have had to exert, to have some sense of understanding this arena 1 of research, it seems to me, that in 2000AD we have something like a tiger by the tail. 2 My initial reaction 3 to the question of what is research? was: it had something to do with discovery. I now find that this declares my indoctrinated science background. As I have wrestled further with the issue over the past period, I have come to see that what we are talking about in research is inquiry. 4 At its simplest level it is whatever is needed to help an individual be able to answer, for at least themselves, and to their own satisfaction, the question, the inquiry they have. We can inquire about the world out there. We can inquire about the world inside our mind our inventions. As a result of inquiry we can modify our inventions. We can engage in the continuous improvement of our inventions, because they are our inventions. In the English language we have a number of indicators of the (querulous?!) inquiry form: Kiplings 5 six servants: What? Why? When? How? Where? Who? I might also add that in our vocalising we can express a query by intonation, though that is sometimes ambiguous. Also, in our non-verbal behaviour, in my culture, it can be expressed by: a focusing of attention, the raising of an eyebrow, the furrowing of the forehead. Again, these signals/ symbols are, and can be, ambiguous. They can also be taken as an outcome, a judgement of disapproval, interpreted by the other in that way. Similarly, the question why? has at least two optional interpretations: what is the explanation of the mechanism, or at the personal level, the challenge of the reasons, the reasonableness of the motivations -the query that can get defensiveness going. One of the frames which I tend to take to the task of understanding is: I try to take things back to an individuals earliest experiences (origins?!) and ask questions of that and think about it. 6 As a result I am attracted to Montessoris work with the education of young children. Montessoris principles for early child education recognise the importance of exploration as a natural behavioural tendency. It seems we explore in order to meet our needs. Lillard (1996:11) expresses the terms representative of Montessoris concepts for the tendencies of behaviours needed to meet survival needs as: exploration, orientation, order, imagination, manipulation, repetition, precision, control of error leading to perfection and communication. As I look at the varieties of research in todays market place 7 , I see these ideas, these concepts, appearing time and again as we strive to have a sense of control over our complex and uncertain world. And I see that much of the debate about variety and dominance and/or relevance of one form of research compared to another is but a demonstration of the old power struggle: mines better than yours! For me the simplest (most straightforward, most natural) mechanism of inquiry is that which helps me to interact successfully with the world around me 8 : if I do this to that, then something happens. This approach is exemplified in the empirical-analytic model.
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Theres an I, an agent. 9 The experimenter. Doesnt matter who they are, what gender, what colour their skin, when or where they were born, what place they are in space or time, who they vote for. If the agent does this, to that, something happens. 10 The assumptions, the observations, the conclusions build what is our concept of order. The technique is repetition. The constraints are precision without precision we can make no claims to repetition. The process is manipulation. The concepts are uniformity and generalisability. 11 The empirical-analytic model is constructed in a way that endeavours to take the subjective I, as a particular entity, with uniqueness, out, and to have the agent as a generality anyone who does X gets Y. The empirical-analytic model is understood to act on an objective world out there, to do so in a repetitive way and where if the observed results are able to be ordered in some way, then further repetition delivers control. The next level, for the human, involves the matter of communication. I suspect that we can have manipulative control over a lot of activity and survive in our world by exploration, manipulation, repetition, the mimicking of another, without the necessity for language and communication. (And there appears to be some evidence that other animals approach living in our world in a like technical/ mechanical manner: exploration and mimicry. So far, we havent been able to demonstrate evidence of communication by concepts.) What language and communication does is allow us to develop another layer in our control. We can now control with ideas and the communication of ideas. By control here I mean have a sense of control or, perhaps better, closure 12 , about what is going on in our world, when we understand it. I also mean that ideas and concepts have a power to affect our actions as well. 13 With language we can tell stories. We can make them up (imagination). We can develop/ agree to have shared meaning/ understanding of the external things in our world. We choose to categorise the objects out there: cats, dogs, trees, mountains. 14 We can explore their similarities and differences: animal, vegetable, mineral; dead or alive. We can gather together characteristics to define complexes: the way we differentiate between a live and a dead dog. With the development of a shared understanding of the general repetition of the diurnal cycle, the seasonal cycle, we build a sense of time. Our mind, with what we understand to be memory, is capable of matching similar events within a time frame (part of what we understand by order). And as we remember our personal events we can tell a story, develop a history. We can tell stories about those things, those events, those actionsreactions which are repetitious, ordered in some way. Those stories, those models of meaning are our empirical-analytic models theory, or our interpretive models. Further, we can work on these models in a meta way: we can follow rules, or frameworks of thinking and arguing, which allow us to form yet other models: the social critical model, the feminist model, the post-structuralist model. All of these things are framed by our language: the vocabulary, the way we build sentences, how we build and define ideas: analogy; metaphor, etc; how we argue reasonableness: logic, deduction, induction, inference, etc. 15
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The more complex methods of inquiry: the interpretive, the social critical theory, the feminist, the post-structural, all seek, in a variety of ways, to make clear what it is that we know, in our ideas and concepts, and how we know it. They seek to make clear what are the factors from language, from ideas developed in language, which are used, and how they are used, to give us the sense of control by way of meaning, of understanding ie no longer perplexing and in need of further inquiry. In different times different ideas and ways of looking at the world and picturing it have held sway as being important in our endeavours to have the control of understanding. All groupings of people have their technologies: how to meet the needs of food and shelter and clothing, defense and transportation. All have their histories stories for using the experience of others to inform choices: what are dangers, how to act to have success. All have their cosmologies explanations of birth and death and beyond the here and now and beyond the horizon. What the particular varieties of inquiry do is answer the questions of What? Why? When? How? Where? Who? - in particular areas. As I have struggled with an understanding of these different varieties of research, and how they relate to the field of education, for me, I keep coming back to the pragmatic: How can I use them? How useful are they for me? - the self-referent utilitarian. 16 The current 17 best summary of my understanding of these varieties, in these terms, is as follows:
If I want to compare the comparable-but-different, to be able to have, or develop, some indicators of different effectiveness, especially comparing inputs and outcomes and their linkages, in order to inform my choices in decision making, about predictable relationships in systems, or between system components, where they appear to exist, then I will use the empirical-analytic approach and perspective. If I want to explore meaning for the participants, to inform choice/ decision making, in interactive endeavours between people, especially for the process of negotiating consensus of meaning, understanding, then I will use the interpretive approach and perspective. If I want to see whats going on in a different way, to be able to see the impact of culture/ socioeconomic/ political trends in a situation in order to inform my reconsideration of values exercised in choice/ decision making, especially to look for indications of options for change based on different values, then I will use the critical approach and perspective, either in its broadest form social (culture with or without economic and/or political emphases), or in its specific interest forms: feminism (focus on gender issues, with their power interactions), post-structuralism (focus on power issues). I would note that it is my understanding that I will need to have the information generated from the empiricalanalytic and interpretive approaches and perspectives to work on to do the critical. Further, I will be inclined to undertake the critical approach when the outcomes from the empirical-analytic and the interpretive approaches do not appear to be working in the way that I anticipated!
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Assumptions Each Perspective makes about how knowledge is to be produced

The attached table 18 seeks to gather the elements of the different ways the major research perspectives address the same issues, in the form as presented in the Learning Guide, and in a way that seeks to represent what the literature is saying. The process of tabulating, in this way - structuring - raised a number of issues for me. These include: how hard-and-fast the boundaries are; my propensity to want to decorate the material with qualifications and provisos, and so clog the table that it too became almost useless; the limits of such a structural approach. This latter issue may well indicate that, so far as theory forming goes, I belong, to some extent, in the post-structuralist camp. The other camps, of tidy, parsimonious theory making, do not always satisfy my experience of the world, and especially the limitations of model making, even though my natural propensity is for convergent thinking, and the simpler the model to help me manage detail, the better! I have to say that I have difficulties with the literature that I have read, in this arena. 19 It seems to me that much of the writing about these issues is done by practitioners most familiar with one particular model. Further, it would be my judgement that they find it difficult to articulate their embedded assumptions within that model. 20 They then write about the other models and only see the defining features of those models at a superficial level, (because they havent practiced in that model) and only highlight what they want to compare and contrast, and to identify the offending simplicities that result. For instance, when I look at the issue of cause and effect the nature of the world being determinate, indicated as a characteristic of the empirical-analytic perspective, and indicated in a way that seems to imply that it is not found in the other perspectives I find I cannot exclude concepts of cause and effect from the interpretive perspective or the critical perspectives. There are differences in the way the different perspectives deal with cause and effect, and the level of claims they make about cause and effect, but cause and effect is still assumed in all perspectives. Indeed, without cause and effect, in principle, I would doubt that there could be any activity of inquiry, of research, at least not as we know it. Our view of the world is predicated on some concept of rationality, developed from cause and effect. In the empirical-analytic perspective, by and large, such causes and effects are seen as relatively simple, relatively direct, able to be investigated in quantitative terms and represented in mathematical formulae, and are explored by reductionist processes splitting up the whole into its parts, and dealing with parts, bit by bit, and building up a composite from such parts, and such part-relationships. In some strands of science, of the empiricalanalytic perspective, like ecology and quantum mechanics, there is more recognition of some uncertainty about immediacy of cause and effect and the potential of multiple interactions in a dynamic system. The strength of the empirical-analytic perspective is the knowledge generated about the natural world which works it gives us enough information to get on with activities on the basis of fairly accurate predictions. This gives us a sense of control over the material world.
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In the interpretive perspective, the search for meaning, even if only limited to reporting in on someone elses understanding, includes stories of cause and effect. For something to have meaning implies some sort of idea of reason. And an action in the human arena is assumed to have been based on such meaning/ reason. The inquiry now might well be into what that reason was. In such an inquiry we may well find that someone elses reason is either the same as ours, or different. If different, we may well be encouraged to inquire more and more until we have a fuller picture of what that difference is, in its totality. Similarly, in the critical perspectives (and in my understanding I am following Habermas 21 , and tending to lump feminism and post-structuralism underneath the same umbrella) inquirers are looking to understand reasons. At this level of inquiry less tangible causes, indeed causes which are human constructs, may well be the agents of action, determining the effects. For example, the reasons for inclusion or exclusion may give a sense of privilege or powerlessness to those who are included or excluded based on those reasons, and the construct for such reasons many well be very arbitrary. 22 To inquire into these levels of our own existence, to understand context, to investigate the construct, we need mechanisms and techniques which are capable of recognising and challenging the constructedness of the world being investigated. To continue with the task at hand, and to compare the assumptions made about how knowledge is to be produced. The way I understand it is: the empirical-analytic perspective assumes that there are relationships (structuralist frame). Consequently, knowledge is about knowing what these relationships are, such that there is sufficient sense of certainty about those relationships to be able to predict future interactions and control change by utilising those relationships. To produce this knowledge, mechanisms are designed to determine the relationship. Typically, relationships fall into one or other, or a combination of type, material composition, history (time series dependency, origins, and development), or goal (what is the effect of a dynamic mechanism) 23 . So: definition, and measurement, and empirical observations which are replaceable (can be reproduced by any other trained observer) are made. Standardised (operationally defined) procedures and parsimonious explanations and logically developed designs to test those explanations are used. These are the characteristics of this perspective. 24 The world examined is that outside the researcher (the object to be researched), and independent of the researcher (the researchers position can be constructed to be objective), and can also be represented in theories because every event has a cause and regularities can be observed, and we can develop commonly agreed upon perceptions of it. 25 The position of the post-modernist thinker in the empirical mode is the awareness that the knowledge generated is a human construct, not necessarily the truth. What we find when we look is based on what we looked for, since it is a construct, and the mechanisms we use to make and test such a construct determine what can be found. 26 By comparison, in the interpretive perspective, I understand that we are now focusing on the sphere of human activity, and here there are human understandings about relationships in those activities. Now knowledge is knowing what these understandings are, to have a sense of certainty about those understandings such there is a reasonableness about the activities which dispels the kind of perplexity which would otherwise require us to make further inquiry. The tools for this kind of inquiry include the processes of reasoning: gathering evidence, building arguments to support explanations. This reasoning is undertaken to investigate those understandings. We construct our understanding of these relationships in words/ language, with a variety of levels of abstraction and complexity. Since it is a
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construction, of ours, we are also able create new concepts, to redefine the meaning of the words we use to build understanding and so the understanding becomes elusive. 27 In the communicative process between humans, between author and reader, between speaker and hearer/ and speaker and hearer, there is an interpersonal interaction where joint meaning is made (or not made). The common understanding is negotiated. It is not possible to reach one-to-one correspondence, a complete match, on all the factors/ dimensions of this common understanding, since no two people have the same perceptions of meaning because part of the meaning/ understanding is derived from the experience of the participants, and no two experiences are the same. In this kind of inquiry observations are made, understanding sought by questioning and theorising. 28 The researcher, who can be observer, or participant, or both, is engaged in analysing and interpreting. 29 And because it is human activity being investigated, the researcher has now an inside view as well, and needs to have some awareness of how that subjectivity, that reflexivity and interactivity with the humanity being investigated, impacts on the findings. 30 It is my understanding that in the critical perspectives, it is the world of human activity, as we seek to understand it, and as we construct meaning about it, which comes into view. Research itself comes under scrutiny. The human constructs of social institutions, our culture, our economics, our law, our politics, etc, now get looked at for their origins, for their effects, for what were the values used to make choices between ways to go and what choices were made, and who made them, and how did they then impose this preference on others to develop the current hegemony. And what all this goes to show is that my understanding, my construct now, is informed by what others have thought and communicated. I could not have worked up this explication of my current understanding, I could not have agreed that all approaches have their merits and be able to accept their findings as valuable, informative and useful to me, without having been taken through this process. But I would also note that I have read research papers in the past, and taken on board their findings, without knowing all this detail about perspectives, etc. I have also read research papers and other documents and dismissed their material as being biased, or useless, without analysing in detail why this is my judgement of them. I have been able to recognise that the argument, the evidence brought forward, the assumptions implied or explicit, etc, is, in some cases reasonable, and in other cases is not reasonable, and when it is reasonable, that it needs to be heard by me, for what I can learn from it. Perhaps it is having lived for many years in a world informed by a theory of relativity which makes this understanding possible.
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Choice of Text:
A key research text which has challenged me and my practice, and become a stimulus for my current concerns in the field of education, especially in the area of developing professional expertise, is Kressel, K "Practice-Relevant Research in Mediation: Toward a Reflective Research Paradigm" Negotiation Journal, 1997, 13 (2) p.143-160
Problem explored:
In this article, Kressel is exploring the issue of how the knowledge of practice of practitioners might be developed by the activity of research; and in particular, the reciprocal paradox: how the activity of research might be used to develop effective practitioner knowledge. It is a problem echoed throughout a range of practices and professions. Researchers research. Practitioners practice. The outcomes of research seem to have little or no impact on the practice of practitioners. The outcomes of research are either incomprehensible or considered irrelevant to practice. The knowledge developed by research does not appear to be readily transferable to practice. The activities and issues researched do not appear to focus on the everyday concerns of the practitioner. Kressel cites a number of supporting arguments presented in the literature, both of mediation practice, and of other professional practices. Kressel raises the issue in the light of (1) a growing literature in mediation research; (2) the call for assurance of the quality of mediation services as these services expand as an integral part of court practice; (3) prevailing disagreements about what constitutes effective mediation practice.
Perspective of the research:

Kressel frames this problem primarily within in the empirical perspective: we still lack clear models by which to conduct empirical studies of mediation that practitioners would find relevant (paragraph 1, p.144), but foreshadows limitations with typical applications of that model: The empirical literature is also based on research models that assign priority to precision, control, and the aggregation of data. This reduces the chance of developing results that have clear meaning to practitioners whose concerns run to the concrete. (paragraph 2, p.143). As a result, there are some indications of a capacity to be critical about this approach, and to propose ways in which such critique could be enhanced. This is indicated in We also failed to generate and evaluate alternatives to our reflective hypotheses. Such evaluation of alternatives is a particularly difficult task when the research team is studying its own beliefs in a context where important human concerns are at stake. It may therefore be desirable to include on the research team a member who is not involved in the mediation of cases being studied, but who has the primary function of challenging team hypotheses and suggesting alternative explanations to be assessed. (paragraph 3, p.157)
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In his response to this problem Kressel explores a conceptual model for knowledge and knowledge development in practice that of Schons reflective practitioner. 31 He raises some of the critiques he sees of the level to which this concept has been translated into research practice: It seems that, when it comes to reflective research, pretty much anything goes as long as the study is a qualitative, in-depth account of practitioner cogitation. Procedural and methodological templates for conducting reflective research, akin to those that are so well-developed for the conduct of traditional empirical studies, do not yet exist. Each reflective researcher proceeds in idiosyncratic ways, tied to others of a similar bent only by the most general conceptual and methodological commitments (Schon 1991). (paragraph 5, p.144) These are the critiques of the traditional empirical analyst. Kressel then turns to a study of divorce mediation conducted by himself and his colleagues, to see if he can illustrate how Schonian ideals can be translated into concrete research procedures, and I will discuss some of the conceptual and methodological issues raised. (paragraph 1, p.145) A description of The Custody Mediation Project (Essex project) is given, and the work that Kressel and his colleagues were engaged in with that project. The intent of the project was to do research that would be of direct value to practice by elucidating the behavior and thinking of mediators as they grappled with hard cases. (paragraph 2, p.145) Reference is made to the fact that the substantive findings of the work have been reported previously. What Kressel is now doing is looking back on how they went about doing that research, and how they built those findings from their practice experience. He claims All these findings have since been integrated into our respective mediation practices and our training of divorce mediators. (paragraph 1, p.146) Within Kressels framing, the following indicate an empirical perspective: Focus on the evidence of experience the whole material studied is what was the experience of the four participants in the research project, as mediators in a mediation, and then as peer colleagues debriefing in a conscious attempt to elucidate the behavior and thinking of mediators. Key expressions of this include: When my colleagues and I did something that worked we sought to articulate the cognitive schema behind our intervention; when we behaved in less effective ways, our reflective research goal fell naturally toward ferreting out the unhelpful or incomplete cognition that had gotten us into trouble. (paragraph 1, p.143) In the Essex project, our efforts to develop a workable model of divorce mediation grew directly out of a focus on the individual cases on which we worked. For each case, we scrutinized the activity of the mediator in relationship to the particular dynamics and circumstances of the parties with whom the mediator was engaged. Not all cases were equally informative. With time, we came to learn more from the cases which gave us the greatest difficulties. (paragraph 2, p.148) Several important values of the reflective stance are illustrated by the Essex experience. (paragraph 3, p.155) The collection of hard qualitative data the audio tapes of mediation sessions (paragraphs 4, p.149, 3, p.150, 2 p.151)
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the approach of limiting the focus of study to material that is likely to be a promising subject of reflection amidst the noise of clinical activity. (paragraph 3, p.147) the use of standardised structures (albeit simple, relatively nave, unfocused devices) to assist the collection of data (paragraphs 2-5, p.149) the experiment in the light of hypothesising (paragraph 5, p.154)
There are also elements, within Kressels framing, of the interpretive perspective: the participant-observer his section on the legitimacy of self-study as a research mode (paragraphs 3-7, p.146, and paragraphs 1-2, p.147) In choosing to study ourselves, my colleagues and I made what, from the perspective of traditional research design, is a highly controversial, even unacceptable decision. (paragraph 4, p.146) the development of analytical categories for further detailed exploration negative surprises; departures from routine; and recurrent moments (paragraphs 5-6, p.149, paragraphs 1-4, p.150, paragraphs 1-2, p.151) - though note: My crude typology is a retrospective accounting of the kinds of mediation circumstances that were informative (paragraph 4, p.157) theorising (paragraphs 2-6, p.148, paragraph 1, p. 149; paragraphs 3-4, p.150, paragraph 1-2, p.151; paragraphs 5-6, p.154, paragraph 1, p.155) 32 recognition of context and the complex of interaction with context: For reflective researchers the case study is the method of choice, since the case provides the embedded context that conditions the understandings of the practitioner whose performance is the object of study. (paragraph 1, p.148)
Knowledge Claims:
There are knowledge claims in terms typical of the empirical-analytic perspective. Reference is made to other reports of the research conducted and outcomes and findings (paragraph 1, p.145). There is supportive information from quantitative measures of the results of the mediations conducted within the project (paragraphs 5, p.145; 4, p.148; 2, p.150 and 1, p.152). There are suggestions about how the approach taken by the project could be improved in terms of developing more objectively grounded findings (paragraph 2, p.147). Overall, the claims made are limited, indicating that Kressel sees this research as a preliminary exploration (paragraphs 3, p.147 and 2, p.157) and he identifies some of the other factors which need to be researched to be able to strengthen claims (paragraphs 5, p.149; 2, p.158). The claims are made in terms of suggests, became increasingly clear, we learned, seem, useful findings, gradually became apparent, the clearest thing I can say. Further, there are knowledge claims made in terms of the interpretive perspective. The group was able to identify two distinctive, but initially implicit, mediator problem-solving models and to develop insight into recurring types of co-parenting conflict dynamics and strategic ways of handling them (paragraph 6, p.145). The group was able to use the Schonian model to mine the intuitive wisdom embedded in our collective practice and refine it into a useful form (paragraph 1, p.146). The findings are framed in the form of the development of understanding, and the use (and usefulness) of that understanding in mediation practice. There are episodes on the way to understanding, complex routes to the articulation of problem
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solving by identifying repetitive structures and recurring patterns, and the formation of the belief that (paragraphs 3, p.150, 2, p.151). There is a discussion about the nature of truth (paragraphs 5 & 6, p.153, and 1-4, p.154) which indicates that Kressel saw the research process as falling somewhere between the development of clinically useful fictions and attempting to verify these by a crude verification procedure which is then described in some detail. As I read the text, I find that the critical element of Kressels consideration of the problem is limited to (1) his reservations about the usefulness of some elements and practices of the dominant empiricist tradition to deliver useful knowledge for practice and (2) his awareness of the nature of the models they are exploring and developing that these are the individually held beliefs of the mediators and that to effectively challenge these there may be the need for other contributors to the research process. (paragraphs 2, p.143, and 2 & 4, p.156; 2, p.151 and 3-6, p.148; 2, p.157) His own experience of having to adjust his own thinking (theoretical understanding) in order to be more effective in the mediating context is perhaps an important lesson in the development of critical faculties. (paragraph 3-6, p.148) 33
Evidence Assembled:
The evidence assembled to support these knowledge claims primarily relate to the empirical perspective. The findings produced by the research project, as evidenced in other research reports, are clearly referred to. (paragraphs 1, p.145; 1, p.149; 3, p.150; 2, p.151; 1p.152; 6, p.154; 1,p.155; and the bibliography). Some quantitative measures of the relative success of the projects operation, implied as a result of research focus and findings, and the consequent improvement in practice actions: strategies and understandings informing alternative strategies, are given (paragraph 5, p.145). The exploration of the theoretical aspects of the development of a reflective research paradigm, and the issues involved is primarily developed by exploring the experiences of the project team and their research processes in the light of interactions with other literature. (paragraphs 1, p.143; 1, 2 & 4, p.144; 1, 3, & 5, p.147; 4, p.151; 2, 4, & 5, p.152; references detailed in the bibliography)
Assumptions embedded in the report:

As I have indicated above, this report has elements of all three major research perspectives. Consequently, it exhibits assumptions representing elements of the empirical-analytic (E-A), the interpretive (I), and the critical (C) perspectives. Sometimes (and more often than in other empirical approaches) these assumptions are made explicit. Assumptions concerning the nature of the world being researched: Cause and effect is assumed as the basis on which improved practice can be developed (typically E-A) (paragraph 1, p143). There is cause and effect in interactions. It is the basis of the concept that the mediators interventions can contribute to the problem solving of the disputants, the settlement of the dispute (typically E-A, with elements of I) (paragraphs 1; p.144; 6, p.145; 2, p.151). Further, tests can be conducted of the relative effectiveness of
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alternative practices, based on cause and effect (E-A) (paragraphs 2, p.147; 5,6, p.153 & 1-6, p.154 & 1, p.155). Another assumption is that there are patterns of behaviour which can be observed, and for which gradually improving (more and more workable from the point of view of the mediator [and perhaps the disputants]) explanations can be developed (E-A, I) (paragraphs 6, p.145; 1, p.147; 2, 4 & 6, p.148- p.152; 5-6, p.154). Another aspect of the nature of the world assumed and therefore investigated is that there is more than one layer to the process of assisting in the resolution of disputes (E-A, I). Kressel identifies a process layer: where interrogatory questioning, settlement or problem-solving approach are required (E-A, I) (p. 150-151), and an interaction layer: where joint agreements are negotiated; and where strategies, instructed by a model of understanding of interacting agents behaviours, is applied (I) (p.151). Assumptions concerning the best way of knowing that world: As indicated in the citations above, the assumptions concerning the best way of knowing this kind of world, include: standardised procedures for investigation of practice (E-A, I); empirical approach data collection, testing tentative theories and refining theories (E-A); the interpretive approach of questioning to elucidate understanding/s (I); observation of events in their context, and acknowledgement of the importance of context in determining aspects of the interaction (E-A + I); the value of engagement in critical reflection in the company of practicing peers (C); and the usefulness of being able to compare different levels of competence of practitioners and engage in critically reflective discussions/ interactions between them, eg novice questioning expert, differences identifying expert practice, etc (EA + I + C) Assumptions concerning the position of the researcher and the relationship of the researcher to the researched: There are at least two levels operating in the problem explored in this article. Firstly, the report is dealing with the research of practice. Here the researcher is participant, observer, interpreter, analyst (I + E-A + C). More importantly, Kressel argues the case for a self-reflective approach: the researcher is the researched, both at a personal level, and in the peer group discussions. The two-sided experience of this role may well encourage the development of improved techniques, to deal with the risks of subjectivity that arise in such an approach. Such improvements would address the issue of validity. Another benefit of this self-reflective approach will arise from the focus on usefulness the problems investigated will be problems experienced by the practitioners and the results are being directed to immediate application in their own practice. This is a working out of praxis, a concept used in critical theory. 34 The second level of research relates to the task of exploring working models about what is going on in the dispute. Here the researcher is participant-observer, observer-interpreter, observer-analyst, (I + E-A + C). The researcher is also formulating theories about the disputants and the disputes as an outside observer. There may be some instances where the researcher/ mediator might share those hypotheses with the participants (disputants) in order to test observations and inferences ie what is the meaning of what is going on for the participants themselves. (I + E-A + C).
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What is omitted:
The comment that research is not arcane is made to encourage other practitioners to go down this track. What is not made clear, but which I have inferred from the information presented, and my understanding of the professional formation of psychologists, is that Kressel did have a working model of research himself, and that this may have served to both initiate (Project) a research style, as well as provide some procedures to inform their inquiry process (Mediator Session Report & Closing Case Conference Report; auditing audiotapes of sessions; testing hypotheses by trial actions in next case applicable and reporting back for another round of reflective analysis, etc). He takes up Schons point that action science cannot be achieved by researchers who keep themselves removed from the contexts of action, nor by practitioners who have limited time, inclination, and competence for systematic reflection. (paragraph 6, p.146) While it might be my view that what is going on in reflective research is natural inquiry 35 , it is not at all clear that this can occur in the systematic or disciplined way necessary for effective findings, without a good deal of extra effort and having a deliberate focus on all the interactive elements raised by Kressel.
Kressels Toward a Reflective Research Paradigm

Finally, I need to remark on Kressels acknowledgement of the different perspectives applicable in research, and his concept of working toward a paradigm. I trust that I have conveyed earlier, my understanding that the approach of bounding perspectives, and allocating characteristics to one rather than another is a risk of modelmaking. Part of model-making seems to be trying to make tidy things which are perhaps not tidy. We use model making to help us manage our thinking about a world in which there is a host of detail, and complexity. Kressel here, in recognising that he is drawing on a range of research perspectives, also draws on the current chat about paradigms. He concludes his report with: In sum, although the procedures my colleagues and I employed helped us to develop a meaningful custody mediation model and make practical sense of the disputes that presented themselves at our door, the Essex project represents only an exploratory first step in the direction of developing a truly self-conscious reflective research paradigm. Further efforts are needed if reflective research is to fulfill its potential for engaging the serious practitioner and the reflective empiricist in developing a science of mediation practice. (paragraph 2, p.158) This analysis has helped me see, a bit more deeply, some of what Eisner (1989) was saying about the usefulness of paradigms for practice, ie their use is limited, and the practitioner (including the research practitioner) gets on with the job at hand with whatever tools appear to deliver on the problems presenting. It throws another light on what McIntyre (1995) has to say about research being problematic. I can now see why working at making some of these understandings clearer to the researcher is a necessary part of researcher formation, especially for the truly self-conscious reflective researcher the target of the (inclusive) critical perspective. But I also know why many adult learners baulk at such a process: the relevance is not immediate; and the concepts needing to be worked at do not appear immediately practical; and the days of having the leisure to learn new and hard things slowly, by repeated practices, appear to have gone for most of us.
p.14
What is perhaps a bit more interesting, and tantalising, is the question of what the next development in research perspective might be, which would transcend the critical in the way that the critical transcends the earlier traditions of the empiric and the interpretive. It rather looks like, by definition, it cannot be transcended. But apparent absolutes have been overturned before now.
p.15
Bibliography:
Carr, W Kemmis S. (1986). Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and Action Research [Melb]: Deakin Univ Pr, rev ed c1986 De Laine, M. (1997). Ethnography: Theory and applications in health research. Sydney: Maclennan & Petty. Eisner, E.W. (1990). The meaning of alternative paradigms for practice, Chap 5 in E.G. Guba (ed) The Paradigm Dialog. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage. Fook, J. (1996). The reflective researcher: social workers' experience with theories of practice research. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. Gummesson, E. (1991). Qualitative Methods in Management Research. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage. Hammersley, M Atkinson, P. (1995). Ethnography: Principles in Practice. London: Routledge, 2nd ed 1995 (1st ed 1983) Kerlinger, F.N. (1986). The scientific approach, Chap 4 in Foundations of Behavioural Research. New York: Holt Rinehart Winston. 4th edition. Kressel, K. (1997). "Practice-Relevant Research in Mediation: Toward a Reflective Research Paradigm" Negotiation Journal, 1997, 13 (2) p.143-160 Lillard, PP. (1996). Montessori today: a comprehensive approach to education from birth to adulthood. New York: Schocken. McGaw, B Boud, D Poole, M. Warry, R. and McKenzie, P. (1992). Educational Research in Australia. Report of the Strategic review of research in education. Canberra: AGPS McIntyre, J. (1995). Research in adult education and training, Chap 8, in Foley, G (ed.) Understanding Adult Education and Training. Sydney: Allen & Unwin Schutz, A. (1953). Commonsense and scientific interpretation of human action. In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Quarterly. 14 (1): September. Reprinted in R. Zaner and R. Idhe (1973) (eds). Phenomenology and Existentialism. New York: Capricorn Books Toulmin, S, Rieke, R, Janik, A. (1984). An Introduction to Reasoning. New York: Macmillan, 2nd ed. 1984 (1st ed 1978) Usher, R. (1996). A critique of the neglected epistemological assumptions of education research. Chap.2 in D. Scott and R. Usher (eds). Understanding Educational Research. London: Routledge UTS Faculty of Education 1998, Learning Guide Research Perspectives in Education. UTS Faculty of Education, Sydney, revised 1999.
p.16
END NOTES:
1
The current ferment (or should one say polemic there is much of the polemic in the ferment) about paradigms. This is remarked on by McIntyre (1995); Guba (1990); and many others. And I might add: a leopard who is finding it difficult to change her spots. I am getting to know where the spots are, what is their colour and shape, at least!
Initial here refers to my return to post-graduate studies 1996-8, and a more disciplined approach to explicating my thinking. This was formulated in the context of working at a Master of Dispute Resolution and having two research papers to prepare, and baulking at surveys and analysis. My understanding was then explored in some detail in the finalising research project/ paper which sought to explore what was involved in the concept of a reflective research paradigm in Kressels terms reflective research of practice is my personal provisional designation. Prior to this, it should be noted, my first degree was B.Sc. (Gen Sc) Dip Ed, and majoring in Chemistry. My studies in Dip Ed science teaching method (1967) exposed me to the question of teaching scientific method and the work of Conant and Koestler [Koestler, Arthur The Act of Creation. London: Pan, 1966 (c. 1964)]; and the exercise of working through that assignment gave me, I think, a broader understanding of scientific method, and thinking, and theory formulation, and the role of human creativity/ inventiveness in model forming, than I find acknowledged in my recent reading of paradigms of inquiry.
4
My most recent explication, before this round of reading and writing was in the following terms: What else is "research" but a method of inquiry?, with different categories of research, different ways of inquiring, appropriate to the arena being investigated. October, 1998 MDR Research Paper Kipling, R Just so stories
This would appear to be similar to Husserls approach as noted by Garrick in the Learning Guide, p.22. I would need to read more of Husserl to be sure that what I do matches with his approach. My expression here gives the appearance that I have been captured by the current dominant discourse of economic rationalism and the power of the marketplace.
This would appear to indicate my indebtedness (another economic metaphor!) to the heritage of Enlightenment thinking Learning Guide, p.22. It is also a significant element of the Christian doctrine of a purposeful creation and salvation and redemption, as exemplified in Genesis 1:27-28, Ephesians 2:8-10 and Ephesians 4:11-13 much of which preceded and informed the Enlightenment. Another possible correspondence with Husserl, as indicated by Garrick in the Learning Guide, p.22 Causality cause and effect essential to a concept of morality, having responsibility because of agency.
10
I can think of at least one instance when location in space will affect results where there is a difference in height from sea level, atmospheric pressure measurements will not be the same, and the temperature at which water boils will be different. My current conception of closure is framed by discussions in the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator model, as one of the personality preference dimensions. Usher (1996) also uses this idea in his discussion of control and power and privileging of epistemologies.
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11
In our minds we can project future occurrences, at least imagine them. Such imaginings can develop anxiety and fear. We can let such anxieties and fears immobilise us, take the power of action away from us. This is one of the sources of the power of the dominant. It is its most subtle source of power, and consequently its most difficult to surface to consciousness and to overcome for emancipation. These are some of what the critical perspectives seek to deal with.
This I understand to be the empirical analytic process in argument based on type [see Toulmin, S, Rieke, R, Janik, A An Introduction to Reasoning. New York: Macmillan, 2nd ed. 1984 (1st ed 1978), p.320-328]; AND
14
p.17
ALSO Kants phenomemology as indicated by Garrick, Learning Guide, p.23. I can categorise and allocate this process to two different areas. This indicates, for me, the fuzziness of boundaries (at least for me). Are we talking about the same thing, or something different? If the same thing, then the use of definitions, and differentiations, and the confusion arising, and the rhetoric of privileging one over another, is but an expression of Babel [Genesis 11:1-9], power plays, and an indication that we are dealing with constructs. How folk understand the meanings of words is itself a construction, and possibly an unresolvable dilemma in communication. The building of a paradigm, and a community of understanding, is then a process of consensus building by selection: what is in and what is out, and a process of control by being able to decide what to include and what to exclude. And, because we are using language we are also limited by the nature of language and the development of discourse in the particular language we are using. This means there are grounds and opportunities for inquiry using the techniques of deconstruction, Learning Guide, p.20; hermeneutic phenomemonlogy, Learning Guide, p.21, semiotics, Learning Guide, p.26 and symbolic interactionism, Learning Guide, p.27
16 15
It appears that I am definitely still the Enlightenment girl. Learning Guide, p.20
I take Gummessons and others views of the hermeneutic cycle, spiral, for the development of understanding, as a reasonable model of my experience of the development of understanding.
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Research Perspectives summary table: http://www.scribd.com/doc/63436905
The reading includes the material compiled for the Reading Guide for Research Perspectives in Education, and the following: (Cover to Cover) Hammersley, M Atkinson, P Ethnography: Principles in Practice. London: Routledge, 2nd ed 1995 (1st ed 1983) De Laine, M Ethnography: Theory and applications in health research. Sydney: Maclennan & Petty, 1997 Carr, W Kemmis S Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and Action Research [Melb]: Deakin Univ Pr, rev ed c1986 (Some cover to cover, some only patches, most read during 1998.) Argyris, C Intervention theory and method: a Behavioural Science View. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1970 Argyris, C Reasoning, Learning and Action. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1982 Argyris, C Putnam, R Smith, DM Action Science. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1985 Argyris, C Schon, D Theory in practice. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1974 Argyris, C Schon, D Organizational learning. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978 Argyris, C Schon, D Organisational Learning II: Theory, Method, and Practice. Reading, Mass.: AddisonWesley, 1996 DeBono, E Conflicts: a better way to resolve them. London: Penguin, 1991 (c.1985) DeBono, E I am Right - You are Wrong: From This to the New Renaissance: From Rock Logic to Water Logic. London: Penguin, 1990 Fook, J The reflective researcher: social workers' experience with theories of practice research. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996 Frey, Lawrence R (ed) Group Communication in Context: studies of natural groups. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994 Frey, Lawrence R (ed) Innovations in group facilitation techniques: applications in natural settings. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Pr., 1995 Gummesson, E Qualitative Methods in Management Research. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, c.1991 Hoshmand, LT Orientation to inquiry in a reflective professional psychology Albany: SUNY Pr, 1994 Hoshmand, LT Martin, J Research as praxis: lessons from programmatic research in therapeutic psychology. NY: Teachers College Pr, 1995 King, PM Kitchener, KS Developing Reflective Judgment: understanding and promoting intellectual growth and critical thinking in adolescents and adults. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, c.1994 Koestler, Arthur The Act of Creation. London: Pan, 1966 (c. 1964) Kramer, R M, Messick D M (eds) Negotiation as a social process: New trends in theory and research. Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1995.
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p.18
Schon, DA (ed) The Reflective Turn: Case Studies in and on educational practice. New York: Teachers College Press, 1991 Schon, DA The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. New York: Basic Books, 1983 Schon, DA Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987 Schon, DA "The new scholarship requires a new epistemology." Change. 1995, 27:6, p.26-29 Yin, RK Case Study Research: Design and Methods Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1984, rev ed 1989, 2nd ed 1994 Yin, RK Applications of Case Study Research Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1993 (Again, some cover to cover reading, and some patches; most read during 1999.) Ravetz, Jerome R. 1987. Usable Knowledge, Usable Ignorance; Incomplete science with policy implications. Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 9 (1):87-116. Campbell, Donald T. 1982. Experiments as Arguments. Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 3 (3):327337. Dunn, William N. 1982. Reforms as Arguments. Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 3 (3):293-326. Toulmin, S, Rieke, R, Janik, A An Introduction to Reasoning. New York: Macmillan, 2nd ed. 1984 (1st ed 1978) Wadsworth, Yoland. 1991. Everyday Evaluation on the Run. Melbourne: Action Research Issues Centre. Patton, Michael Q. (1982) Practical Evalutation. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Esp chap 4. Gay, LR Educational Evaluation and Measurement: competencies for analysis and application. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E Merrill, 1985, 2nd ed Gay, LR Diebl, PL Research Methods for Business and Management. New York: Macmillan, 1992 Hawe, P Degeling, D, Hall, J Evaluating Health Promotion: a Health Workers Guide. Sydney: MacLennan & Petty, 1990 (The following were almost incomprehensible for me.) [In this regard I found Stephen Brookfields remarks I have tried to write the book in an accessible and personal way. ... If you are familiar with neo-Marxist, phenomenological, and hermeneutic argot, you can participate in the conversation as an insider, on equal terms. But if you are not, the inaccessibility of this discourse excludes you from the circle. (Brookfield, S Becoming a critically reflective teacher. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995, p.xv) particularly encouraging.] Guba, Egon G., (ed.) 1990. The Paradigm Dialog. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. McLaren PL Giarelli, JM (ed) Critical Theory in Educational Research. New York: SUNY Pr, 1995. I noticed this particularly with Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) and deLaine (1997), my most recent reading. Hammersley and Atkinson were trying to commend a model of reflexivity in ethnography. The one thing I did not get clearly from my reading of their material was an understanding of what they mean by reflexivity. As I am struggling with that concept myself, this was particularly disappointing. DeLaine comes from a background of symbolic interaction. Again, while her text dealt with the variety of perspectives, including some on symbolic interaction, her attempts to give a balanced presentation of each meant that the material on symbolic interaction was scant, and what was there lacked the conciseness (superficiality?) of the other treatments. This raises for me the conundrum/ dilemma of being able to deal with the arena one is most familiar with. I had noticed this earlier when I was reading Yin (1994, 1993) and grappling with understanding empirical, and empiricism and they way they are used in texts. I suspect that when you try to write about the familiar, all the provisos and qualifications that you know, from your experience of what it is and how you do it, means that the written material starts to get confused (at least, I know mine does). If you then work on clarity, you can achieve this by statements that feel dogmatic. If these are then picked up by other authors, because they are succinct, and used in the next round of critiquing, then later users become more and more distanced from the real experience of the practitioner, and now start making unfounded or poorly based conclusions about the nature of this other kind of research.
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Learning Guide, p.19, and pp.89-94; previous work with Carr & Kemmis (1986) To give an example of this: the Blue-Eye, Brown-Eye lessons for teaching, experientially, about racism.
22
Toulmin, S, Rieke, R, Janik, A An Introduction to Reasoning. New York: Macmillan, 2nd ed. 1984 (1st ed 1978), p.320-328
24
23
Based on Athanasous summary, Learning Guide, p. 57-8
p.19
25
Based on Athanasous summary, Learning Guide, p.57-8
And I find this position not too distant from that represented by the naming task and the delegation of authority indicated in Genesis 2:19-20 and Genesis 1:28
27
26
Again, I find a parallel explanation for this experience in Genesis 11:1-9 Based on McIntyre, Learning Guide, p.69-71 Based on McIntyre, Learning Guide, p.69-71 Based on McIntyre, Learning Guide, p.75 from Schutz, Carr & Kemmis & Hammersley & Atkinson.
28
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30
Kressels sources here are: Schon, DA (ed) The Reflective Turn: Case Studies in and on educational practice. New York: Teachers College Press, 1991 Schon, DA The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. New York: Basic Books, 1983 Schon, DA Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987
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Note: I do not see theorising (the development of theory) as exclusive to the interpretive, the critical and post-structural perspectives and absent from the empirical as seems to be implied in Athanasous summary on page 58 of the Learning Guide which appears to limit the theorising activity in the empirical-analytic perspective to confirmation testing theories. He was summarising from the two articles critiqued, and in these there were no signs of trying to develop new theoretical understandings. To some extent this highlights the difficulties and limitations of structural analysis categorising as belonging to one and not the other. Our world, at least of ideas and constructs, is not as clear cut in its boundaries as the world of objects, which are in part defined by those very boundaries! This remark indicates much of where I am coming from: experience is an important part of learning, as this level. It has the potential of alerting and raising the issue. Learning Guide, p. 85 One of my conclusion in my MDR Research Paper, 1998
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Dianne Allen RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION (Assignment 1) RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES Revised format and annotations

Dianne Allen, 2000

My Current Understanding of Where I am at in Understanding the Nature of Research:

Assumptions Each Perspective makes about how knowledge is to be produced

Perspective of the research:

Assumptions embedded in the report:

Kressels Toward a Reflective Research Paradigm

Research Perspectives summary table: http://www.scribd.com/doc/63436905

Based on Athanasous summary, Learning Guide, p. 57-8

Based on Athanasous summary, Learning Guide, p.57-8

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