Mind Association

The Right to Life Author(s): H. J. McCloskey Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 84, No. 335 (Jul., 1975), pp. 403-425 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253558 . Accessed: 22/08/2011 04:05
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The Rightto Life

H. J. McCLOSKEY
Althoughthe issues withwhichthis paper is concernedare of the greatestimportance,the paper itselfis a modest one which representsan attemptto bring togetherstrandsin contemporary Westernthoughtabout respectfor human life. I am concerned to withthebasis oftheright life,whether humanbeingspossess all it, and why,whatthe rightinvolvesand enjoins,what constitutes lack of respectforit,whatare its limits, how, in whatwaysand to what degreesit is a primafacie or conditional right.The themeof of thepaper is an examination theright lifewithreference the to to rationaleof contemporary humanistthoughton the matter.My thesisis thatthe right lifeis a right to possessedby personsand by certainpotentialpersons,thatits groundis and mustbe foundin the nature of man, in man's autonomy,that it is not merelya negativerightas Locke and so many since him have seen it as being, a rightnot to be killed, but a rightto receive aids and facilities to protect and preserve one's life against dangers, and that, and of humanly naturally created, beinga right recipience, or conditional it is a primafacie a the right, right, claimsof which muston occasion be subordinate the claimsof otherrights to and to values. What I am concerned oppose is the view thatall human inalienable beingspossessthe rightto life,an absolute,inviolable, rightto lifeat that. ElsewhereI have arguedthatrights to be exWhatis a right? are plained not as powers, claims, expectations,liberties,but as to entitlements do, have, enjoy,or have done,whichare possessed I thepossessoroftheright.1 shallnothererepeatthearguments by I urged in that discussion,and will simplynote that whilstthe i.e. explanationof rightsas entitlements, in termsof a synomyn may not seem veryilluminating, does in factassistin the underit standingof the natureof rights, includingthe rightto life,and it does avoid the errorsto which otheraccounts lead, for example,
I

See 'Rights', Philosophical Quarterly, 15, I965. In this article I attend especially to accounts in terms of claims and powers, but parallel points can be developed in respectof those in termsof expectationsand liberties. 403

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of in of thinking rights and dutiesas correlative some simple and uniform way, and of rightsas always rightsagainst some determinateperson or persons. It involvesthat rightsbe entitlements be which can meaningfully ascribed,exercisedby or on behalfof theirpossessors,be yieldedup, etc. The rightto lifeas a distinct right.It is possible to approach the right lifeas an aspectof,as beinginvolvedin, otherrights. to Thus to and equally,in it obviouslyis presupposedin the right liberty, and self-perfecting. some one If the rightto be self-developing and the possideprivesus of our life,he deprivesus of our liberty and bilityof our being self-perfecting, indeed,of our otherrights as well. Hence a case may be made out forthe rightto lifefrom otherrights.Here I am concernedwith the case forthe rightto life as such. My contentionwill be that the rightsto life and libertyare distinctrightsalthoughtheyhave a commonbasis in man's autonomy, latterhoweverconstituting the only part of the basis of each right. Defences theright lifeas a right all human of to of beings. When one nature of the rightto life, it is considers the basic, important remarkable how littlehas been writtenconcerning What has it. been written much less helpfulthan one mightreasonably is have to hoped. Much involvesreference God, and to man, as created by God. I propose to set aside such theisticaccounts. If, as I believe can be shownto be the case, God does not exist,thenthe rightto life must be groundedon factsand considerations other than God's existence and will. Further,the theistic accounts knownto me are open to serious,general,ethicalobjections.Two as such accounts which are well-known, coming fromChristian philosophers, JohnLocke and St. Thomas Aquinas, may usefully be commented here. on Locke argued forthe rightto life on theisticgrounds,namely, lack the rightto that we are God's property, that we therefore take life,our own or thatof anotherperson: 6. ... The stateof Nature has a law of natureto governit, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankindwho will but consult it, that being all no equal and independent, one oughtto harmanotherin his life, health, libertyor possessions; for men being all the

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of workmanship one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servantsof one sovereignMaster, sent into the world by His orderand about His business; theyare His property, whose workmanship they are made to last duringHis, not another'spleasure.... Everyone as he is bound to preserve and not to quit his stationwilfully, by the like so himself, reason,when his own preservation comes not in competition, oughthe as much as he can to preserve the restof mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender, away or take impairthe life,or what tends to the preservation the life, of the liberty health,limb,or goods of another. 7. And thatall menmay be restrained frominvading others' rights, and fromdoing hurtto one another,and the law of Naturebe observed, whichwilleth peace and preservation the of all mankind, the executionof the law of Nature is in that state put into everyman's hands, wherebyeveryone has a rightto punishthe transgressors thatlaw to such a degree of as may hinderits violation.(Second Treatiseof Civil Government.) In spite of Locke's statement that everyone ought as much as one can to preservethe rest of mankind,he and those following him who invoked this argumentconstruedit as one for a very limitedright, rightnot to be killed,and not fora right lifeof a to the kind we so commonly todayare claimedto possess. Aquinas, in Summa Theologica, dealing with awkwardinin stances of murder,adultery,theftreported in the Old Testament,also explainedlifeas being the property God. However, of he did notconcludefrom thisthattherewas an absolute,inviolable rightto life,but rathera duty and a rightto take innocentlife when God so commands.Here Aquinas wrote: All men alike, both guiltyand innocent,die the death of nature; which death of nature is inflicted the power of by God on account of originalsin, accordingto I Kings ii, 6: 'The Lord killethand makethalive'. Consequently,by the commandofGod, deathcan be inflicted anyman,guilty on or innocent, withoutany injusticewhatever. II, 94, 5, ad. 2, (I, Dominican Fathers'translation.) If thisviewis acceptedas correct, takelifeat God's command, to is not to invade the rightto life; it is simplyto assist God in the and controlof his property. management

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Such accounts rest on a view of morality in part or in toto as in consisting conformity the will of God, therebeingnothing with intrinsically right or wrong about taking human life, nothing sacred in itselfabout human life,all morality and rightsin this area stemming from will,seemingly, arbitrary of God. the the will (See my 'MoralityWithoutReligion',Question, I974.) Killing 7, is explainedas beingwrongwhen,because, and onlybecause it is counterto God's will. Since some killingis seen by most theists to be desirableand even essentialon various grounds,it is conceded by them that God permitsand even enjoins some killing. Thus, on this view, the rightto life,such as it is in its negative is form, whollydetermined God's permissions by and restrictions. For practicalpurposes, the theorydictateswhateverthose who have access to God's will claim it to involve or permit.Yet a majorconcern thosewho havesoughtto establish of thatwe possess a rightto life has been to finda basis to secure life againstthe incursionsof those seekingto kill,includingthose seekingto kill on behalfand in the name of God. Such a defenceof the rightto life obviouslyleaves much to be desired.Yet we findthat many theistsaccept thiskind of view, implicitly not explicitly. if Stevas would seem to be rightin pointingto this kind of view as the dominantChristianview of our community when he writes: The Christian attitude based on theprinciple thesanctity is of of life. 'The innocentand just man thou shalt not put to death' says the book of Exodus (23: 7) and the book of Daniel (I3: 53) has a similarprohibition. second principle A also operates,that life is not at the absolute disposal of the holderbut is a gift God in whosecontrol lies. Man has no of it absolute controlover his lifebut holds it in trust.(N. St. J. Stevas, TheRight Life,London, Hodder and Stoughton, to I963, p. 5so) This approach does not constitute fruitful of inquiry.It a line is significant Aquinas seemed to be aware of thisas he sought that to provide an account of the morality respectforhuman life, of not in termsof a commandor will of God theory morality, of but in terms natural of law. Beforeconsidering natural account, this law it is worthnotingthe attempt establishand defineman's right to to life by reference his possession of a soul. The argument to appears to be thatbecause man has a soul, he, as possessorof the soul, possessesrights, includingthe right life.Such attempts to to

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establish rights,in particular,the rightto life, impress me as curious,forseemingly is the soul, not the body, that is to be it respected.Indeed, since the soul is claimed to be immortal, is it hard to see how the right lifecan arise as an issue in respectof to it. Men cannot destroythe souls of other men, nor their own. Hence the problemarisesforthosearguingfora right lifefrom to man's alleged possessionof a soul, of explaining whyand how the possessionof a soul makesforman, as possessorof a soul, having a rightto life as a physicalbeing. Reference a soul commonly to involvesan appeal to the argument that we are God's property. Some of the difficulties which confront that view have already been noted. Some theistshave been aware of problemsresulting fromattempts derivethe rightto life fromthe factthat men to possess souls. Consider here the discussionof H. Davis, S.J.: Some doctorsapprehendno moral objectionto the destructionof a humanmonster birth.Their plea is thatto destroy at it is an act of mercyto it and its parents.If it is given the benefitof baptism,it is sent to heaven instead of perhaps livingon to its own greatdistress and thatof others.We can born of woman may be human. assume thata livingmonster . . .Therefore, to destroya monsterborn of woman might be murder.As to conserving life of such a monster, the the doctor,nurse,and parentsmust take as much care of it as care and theywould take of any child. If morethanordinary skill are needed, they must be used. (Moral and Pastoral 6th Theology, edition,London, Sheed and Ward, I949, vol.
2, p. I97.)

The doctorsimpressme as being veryrational, the more so as killingor lettingdie such beings may save them fromhell. It is notable that Davis himselfseeks to ground the rightto life of human beings,includinghuman monsters, termsof a natural in law ethic. I suggestthatthose who wish to argue fromman's possession of a soul need to stressthe unityof soul and body. Even thenthe problembreaksout as to why,otherthanthatwe are the property of God, we should respectthe lifeof the body-soul. To considernow the Thomistic naturallaw account of rights, in particular, the rightto life,as this is probablythe most carefullythoughtout, most widely accepted, and most celebrated account of human naturalrights.As I understandthe theoryof

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naturallaw of St. Thomas Aquinas, both the dutyand the right are seen to relateto our naturalend, in the case of the duty to to respectlife,and the right life,to our naturalends as substances. was a theory but the rights (Aquinas here did not speak of rights of by veryeasy and naturaldevelopment his theory his followers.) is The most relevantpart of Aquinas's writing the much quoted passage whichruns: Since, however,good has the natureof an end, and evil the hence it is thatall thosethingsto which natureof a contrary, apprehendedby are naturally man has a naturalinclination as reason as being good and, consequently, objects of pursuit, and their contrariesas evil and objects of avoidance. Whereforethe order of the precepts of the natural law is Because in man accordingto the orderof naturalinclinations. withthe is there firstof all an inclination good in accordance to as inasmuch naturewhich has in common he withall substances, according every substance seeksthepreservation itsownbeing, of is whatever a to its nature; and by reasonof thisinclination, off meansofpreserving humanlifeand of warding its obstacles to belongs thenaturallaw. (I, II, 94, 3-italics mine.) Thus theright and dutyare claimedto relateto us as substances. We have an inclination (appetite)in commonwithsubstancessuch is as stonesto preserve ourselves.This contention a puzzlingone; it is not easy to grasp the sense of the expressions,inclination, appetite,according to which stones, things,and human beings appetitesin common,to preservethemselves. have inclinations, of morality purMore fundamentally, how, froman ego-centred one's suing one's naturalend, does one move to a dutyto restrain pursuitfor the sake of others' pursuitof theirnaturalends? In why,on thisethic,shouldwe respectthelivesofothers, particular, betweenwhatis neceswhenthereis a conflict the moreespecially our our saryforour attaining naturalends,including self-preservaof tion, and what is necessaryfor the self-preservation others, for wheretheyare not unjust aggressors, example,wherethereis food*for all. (The incorporationof the Hareian insufficient would help here but principle of consistency/universalizability would by no means resolveall problemsas, in the eyes of the upthe holdersof the theory, would undulyundermine ego-centriit and in respectof others dutiesinvolving putting cityof the theory, is on a par with duties concerning one's self.) Equally important

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thatit is intrinsically the claimthatthenaturallaw ethicestablishes and hence alwayswrongto take (innocent)life.Exponentsof the theoryclaim that it followsfromthe argumentof the passage quoted above thatthereis an absolute,inviolabledutyto respect (innocent) human life, and that the rightto life is equally an absolute, inviolable,inalienableone. Yet discussionswhich conlike stitute anything eventhebeginnings a deductionare notably of absent fromtreatiseson the natural law. The problem for the Thomist is made virtually insoluble because he wishes to argue and thatit is not all lifethatit is intrinsically absolutely, always, withoutexception,wrongto take, but simplyinnocentlife; and not always innocentlife, but innocentlife intentionally taken; thatit is not alwaysintrinsically wrongto takeguilty life,although it may be wrongto do so, that it may not be wrongdeliberately but unintentionally take innocentlife,where the knowngood to intended is proportionally good enough to justifythe known, deliberately caused, but unintendedkillingof innocentpersons. How, fromthe basic premissesof the naturallaw, Seek good and one's nature,can one avoid evil,Pursue one's naturalend, Perfect arriveat an intrinsic duty of this qualifiedkind, and at the socalled inviolable,inalienablerightto life? A defenceof an absolute,inviolable,but negativerightto life on has been attempted the basis ofthe contention thatit is always, under all circumstances, wrongto take human life. Certainpacifistshave argued in this way, oftenon the basis of religionand reference the sixthcommandment. to The basic objectionsto the to attempt establishsuch an absolute,albeit negativerightto life relate to the moral premiss. If it is derived as it commonlyis froma religiousmorality whereinmorality definedin termsof is the will of God, it is open to the kinds of criticisms which relate to the difficulties with which G. E. Moore was concernedin his discussionof the naturalistic fallacy.If the moral premissis not so based, otherproblemswhichwill emergein the positivediscussions of this paper arise which suggest that it should not be accepted. It is commonlyclaimed, for example, as in the American Declarationof Independence,thatthe rightto life is a rightthat is self-evident. is not self-evident me thatall born of human It to parentsand only such, possess the rightto life. Further,if they possess it, they must possess it in virtueof some feature, trait, capacityas humans. Of this, more needs to be said to make the

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and in any way plausible. The subsequent disclaim intelligible cussion here will bear on this,and on what is self-evident. A positiveapproach.The various approaches noted to date here are unpromising. shall therefore I make a freshstartalong the linesof considering attitudes our towardsanimals,and therational or justification lack of it, of them.Most of us believe thathuman beingspossess a rightto life,whereaswe thinkof some, most,all animals as being much lesser beings,lackingrights, being in the cases of most if not all animals,incapable of possessingrights, in particular, right life. the to To enlarge: Even those of us who are concernedat the monstrouscruelty thatis needlessly being perpetrated againstanimals in the productionof food and in pointlessscientific demonstrations and experiments, are generallyreluctantto speak of the rights animalsto freedom of from unnecessary, pointless pain, and to life.Rather, speak of our dutiesin respectof animals,of our we dutiesto avoid needlesssuffering animals,and thetakingoftheir to lives,theletting themdie,without of goodreason.I havevery briefly and tentatively touched on why this is so in 'Rights' in termsof animals as things,complexmachinesperhaps,but things;things seem not to be capable of being possessorsof rights. Nonetheless we rightly believe thatwe need a (good) reason to be justifiedin killingmanyalthoughby no means all kindsof animals.However, the factthatwe do need to have a reasonto be justifiedin taking the lives of certain animals-and this holds whateverwe may thinkof the meritsor demeritsof what are commonlytaken to constitute reasons-is something justificatory verymuch less and A different fromthe factthatanimalshave rights. man would not be said to possess a rightto lifeif it were merely the case thatwe required a reason, possibly of the kinds reasonablyaccepted in respect of animals, to be justifiedin killing him. If we could harmkill morally legitimately him because he was a pest,vermin, fulto our interests concerns, or because we wantto eat him,or to use his body forscientific because we can no longer experiments, care for him (our aged parent),or because he was conveniently a sufferingbrokenhip or pelviswhichrequiredlong,inconvenient, and treatment rest, would notproperly said to possess he be painful to a right lifein any significant sense of thatexpression. Even if it be the case that much more tellingreasons are needed than are animals,we should still now acceptedas adequate to justify killing

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not be involvedin attributing right insisting such reasons. a in on in Further,thereare conceptualdifficulties the way of ascribing rights mostif not to all animals.Here it is worthexamining to the kinds of considerations which those who seek to make out a to case foranimals havingthe rightto lifewould have to point and seeminglyhave to claim as holding of animals, by considering variousmembersof the animalkingdom. Considerthe amoeba. What possible reason could anyonehave forsuggesting thatit possessesa right life?What of thejellyfish to and the sea urchin?Or, to move higherup the animal kingdom, the fish,or the snake have the rightto life? does the ant, the fly, It is clear that,as it becomes more probablethata creature has a capacityforpain the more relevantbecomes the case forrefraining fromactingtowardsit in wayswhichwould cause it pain, ifit could experiencepain. This is distinct fromtherebeing a reason for abstainingfrompainlesslykillingit. More important the for from ascribing the purposes of this paper, both are different animala right life.It is onlywhen animalscome to have valued to a traitsbesides thatof sentience, capacityforsuffering well as as forpain,a capacity experience to emotions and notsimpiy pleasure, and such like traits, intelligence, thatis, when we believethatwe can anthropomorphize and truly project human traits such as reflechuman consciousnessand self-consciousness, self-identity, tion, feeling, etc., thatwe inclineto questionour rightarbitrarily to takethe lifeof an animal,or to let die or not save one we could save. It is with animals such as dolphins, chimpanzees,apes, and to a lesser degree,horses,dogs, cats, gorillas,in particular, that this is felt,even thoughmice, rats,pigs, sheep, cattleshow It many of the same traits.This is important. is in so far as we, rightly or wrongly, attribute human-type characteristicsto animals,thatwe inclinetowardsascribingto them a rightto life as well as otherrights.With dolphinsand chimpanzees,it is the evidence available that forces us to re-examineour attitudes. Consider the followingaccount of Pauline the dolphin, of its sociable nature and dislike of solitude, and how the author, RobertStenuitwho reports behaviourin his book The Dolphin: its Cousin to Man (Penguin, I971) anthropomorphizes dolphin. the He writes: Pauline, a young female recently captured and injured, arrivedin the tank in a state of shock. In spite of adrenalin she remainedlistlessand let herself sinkas soon as injections

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leftto herself. Brownattachedfourbuoysto herbodyto keep her on the surface.She floatedlike this for three days, into different everything, refusing move or to take any food. to Then Brown introduceda companion into the tank. The male immediately approachedher. Did he speak to her? She immediately reacted,moved,triedto swim. Her buoys were removedand she began, stiffly painfully, swim,while and to the male gave her an occasional push towardsthe surface. Thanks to his help she recoveredcompletely. They became inseparable. Two months later she died . . . The male lamented her death with continuouswhistling.He circled endlesslyaround the lifelessbody and fromthatday refused all food. For threedays his lamentations could be heard. For threedays he continuedto swim in a hopeless circle,and at the end of the thirdday he died. Autopsieshave neverbeen on loverswho have died of 'heartbreak', performed romantic thatthe autopsytheyperformed but Brownand Norrisreport in this case 'revealed the presence of a perforated gastric ulcer'. They add: 'The ulcerwas probablyaggravated the by animal's refusalto eat thus causingthe perforation, perithe tonitisto whichthisgave rise,and death' (pp. I50-I). Stenuitgoes on to drawa parallelwiththe love betweenRomeo and Julietwhich led to theirdeaths.Accountsare to be foundof the behaviour of chimpanzeeswhich lead equally to anthropothem.1 morphizing I suggestthat at least part of the reason such accounts incline to rather some people to attribute rights dolphinsand chimpanzees thanto fliesand mosquitoeslies in the factthatthe qualityof life to we attribute such animalsmakes us regardtheirlives as being of value. Pointlessly, needlessly,to destroythem is to destroya valuable existent.Just as, to destroya valuable paintingis to of commitan act of vandalism,so too withthe destruction a valuable animal existent.However, if we can save a human life only or by using a Grecian vase as a weapon againstan aggressor, by to killinga dolphinthathas gone beserk,thenwe maybe entitled do so, and hence not be exposed to the charge of vandalism. Equally, as regardsthe valuable animal existentand the workof or art,not to save such a lifewhen it can withouteffort sacrifice be saved, is like allowinga greatworkof art deteriorate decay and
See J. van Luwick Goodall In the Shadow of Man, London, William

Collins& Co., 1971.

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when it can easilybe preserved.In each case, therewould be an inappropriate, censurable disregardof a valuable existent.To the rightto life to the assert this, however,is not to attribute animal declaredto be a valuable existent, just as it is not to attrito to a bute a right existence a workof artto acknowledge dutyto protectand preserveand not destroy wilfully. we have good it If reasonsfordestroying them,the dolphinto providefood essential a forthe survivalof a child strandedon an island after shipwreck, or the vase to protectourselvesagainst an unjust aggressor, we or the have not infringed overridden rightsof an animal or work of art. The proper descriptionof our action is to be found in termsof the moral claims of the course of action of killingthe the vase, as overriding those of alternative dolphin, destroying that it cannot be solely courses of action. I suggest,therefore, on the basis of the possession of excellencessuch as sentience, that rights,entitlements, possessed be rationality, emotionality, for be and grounded,and the rightto lifein particular defended, example,on behalfof animals. It is whenthe notionof choice,possible or actual choice,enters the picturethatthe idea of a rightpossessed by the holderof the rightgets some sort of grip. When thereis evidence of the possibilityof choice and of the makingof rationalchoices including moralchoices,and more so, when thereis evidenceof a language used to expressthoughts, decisions,wishes,choices,thatwe move the the to from idea of dutiesconcerning being the idea of the being or as a possessor potentialor possible possessorof rights.It seems not simplyto be our duty to act in certain then quite evidently ways towardsthe being who can and does choose to do certain to things;such a being comes to be thoughtto have entitlement, have some sort of rightto respectfor his existenceand choices, to whichimposedutieson others. and he/it be a possessorofrights Consider Pauline. If Pauline could reallythink,fall in love with the unnamedmale, wish not to be separatedfromhim,and could expressall this in a languageunderstandable us, such thatwe by could be in no doubt that Pauline could exercise choice, make decisionsbased on rationally and thoughtout considerations, the a like,thenwe should not simplybe disregarding duty,but ignorto ing a right, show lack of respectforits lifeand its wish to conthe tinue to live. This is even more evidently case if we were to of think Pauline as havinga graspof moralconceptsand a capacity formoralchoice. This is because the idea of a chooser,a decider,

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who has a fullcapacityforrationaldecisionand choice, seems to be centralto our idea of a holderof rights. If I am rightin this, we need to consider why choice and decision, includingmoral choice and decision, are so basic and important.The reason seems to lie in part in the idea of the immense worth of free existence,in part in the idea that the are if decider'slifeand development his to determine, and because is them.The thought thata deciderand chooser he can determine who makes his decisions, must be rational,he must be a thinker, whichaffect him,how he is, whathe becomes,whathe does. Such to a being,logically, can possess rights, entitlements be, to do, to become, to have done. He is not a thingto which thingssimply happen. He is a being capable of possessing,deciding, doing, becoming; he is capable of accepting or rejecting rights, of The problemis why or exercising yielding and forgoing up rights. we believethatsuch a being in factpossessesrights, includingthe thatonlysuch beings,or beingswho right life,and whywe think to are either or chooserscan be and are possessors actually potentially of rights. My contentionis that it is autonomous beings that may be to can possessorsof rights.The argument that end is that things be the objects of duties,of important, graveduties,but thatthey Hence rationality cannot be possessorsof entitlements. alone, in to so far as it can be explained withoutreference freedomand and to for creativity hence be attributed things, example,to computers,cannotbe a groundforascribingrights.Similarly, whilst in sentience seems to mark a morallyprofounddifference the world between those thingswhich possess it, and those which lack it, sentiencealone also seems not to qualifya being to be a possessor of rights. This appears evident with lower sentient animals. It is only when sentiencecomes to be combined with that the being possessingthem comes to be a more rationality serious candidate to be a possible possessor of rights.Yet even herewe have reservations, reservations do nothave in respectof we rational, freeagents,and this is in part at least because rights are thought of as things which are possessed, enjoyed, exercised, yieldedup, forgone, etc. I suggestthatthe inclination that some have to argue thatrational, nonemotional, imaginative, sentient, autonomousbeings may be possessorsof rightsspringsfromthe factthatwe thinksome sortof autonomyinto the rationality and imaginative, emotionalcapacitiesof such beings. Certainly, we if

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do have doubtsand uncertainties about whether being is or can a be a possessorof rights, our doubts are resolvedif we learn that the being possesses autonomy, thatis, is rationaland free. A problemwhichariseshere,and ariseswhether be autonomy it or simplyrationality emotionality and that is claimed to be basic to possessionof rights, relatesto younginfants. Professor D. As B. Ellis has pointedout to me, whatis trueof an X is not necessarily true of a potential and thatthis is truein the sphereof rights. X, Hence it would not necessarily hold thatinfants be possessors can to of rightsby virtueof theirpotentiality be autonomousbeings. to is Yet the pressureto attribute rights infants considerable, and this is, I suggest,because of theirpotentiality. Indeed, many of and the duties which springfromthem,derivefrom theirrights, as theirpotentialities free,rational,creativebeings-for example, the right to education to mention only one such right. Thus reference potentiality to heremightseem to solve the problem.In cannot be fact,problemsremain,as with the foetus.Potentiality of the whole story,at most potentiality autonomyis a necessary for condition qualifying a possiblepossessor as but not a sufficient this by way of a science fiction kind of of rights.I can illustrate example. Suppose it comes to be possible to create autonomous human life in a test tube by mixingthe appropriatechemicals. Clearlythe mixtureof chemicalswhen first put in the test tube cannotbe a possible possessorof rights.It is a mere collectionof life things.Until thereis an 'it' which possesses independent the arise. Even then, as question of rights cannot meaningfully in discussions of abortion,particularly the early stages in the of development the foetusbringout, considerableconceptualand it normative problemsremain.In thiscontext is worthnotingthat some otherhumantrait and autonomy to stressinsteadoffreedom does not help. Again the infant, foetus, the such as rationality the sperm-ovumimmediatelybefore, during and after union, the in but chemicalmixture the testtube,possessthe potentiality they do not equally qualifyas possible possessorsof rights.There are obvious problemshere. be thatsuch problems arisebecause mywhole It might suggested approach is wrong-headedand misguided, that rightsare not to intrinsic persons,thatthereare no beingswho, of theirnature, qualify as possible possessors of rights,that rather,rightsare accorded to certainbeings,that we can accord rightsas we will, forexample,on utilitarian grounds.

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I have here three briefcommentsto make. Firstly,paradigm rights talk is of intrinsic rights, that accorded rights talk is parasitic on talkabout rights intrinsic, possessed and not simply as as accorded,and thatwhatwe typically accord is a rightas if it were intrinsic. Secondly,rights seem in factto be possessed and not do simplyto be accordedin the cases of the basic rights men; we of accord people most of the rightswe accord them because we believe that they possess them. Thirdly,there are limitsto the objects to which rightscan be accorded withoutchangingthe conceptof a right thatis accorded.We can talkof greatpaintings, famousbuildings,trees,and the like, as possessingthe rightsto existenceand care; we can perhapsaccord themtheserights;but whenwe do so, whatwe are ascribing and accordingare not rights in the ordinarysense of rights.We have changed the concept. This is evidentwhen it is asked forexample,how such rights can be exercised, yieldedup, forgone, and the like. It is the heartof my contention thatthose who attribute rights to animalswithoutanthropomorphizing them are misusing,misapplying,or revisingthe concept of a right.That is why I am concernedto suggestthatanimalswhichlack the relevant human excellencesnoted here cannotbe possessorsof rights, and hence, the right life.To look now at the case forascribing right to the to lifeto rational, autonomousbeings. The thought concerning autonomous beingsas possessorsofthe right lifewould appear to be thatof the theistnotedearlier, to but turned on its head. The autonomousbeing as such possesses a right respectforhis existence an autonomousbeing,and also to as forhis autonomy;the personaffected, who has a will,reason,who can determine what/how wantsto be, to act, to be acted upon, he ceteris paribuspossesses the rightto respectfor his autonomyas well as forhis existenceas an autonomousbeing.He bothmaybe, and is, a possessorof rights. Autonomousbeingslogicallymay be possessorsof rights, and what makesthis to be the case, qualifies themalso to be possessorsof certainrights, particular, right in the to respectfortheirexistenceas autonomousbeings,to life,and to He liberty. has a right respectforhis lifeas respectforautonoto mous existence;and he has a rightto respectforhis decisionsas theybear on his life. The latteris the Lockean argument turned on its head in thesense thatit is akinto sayingthattheman who is a decider,a chooserwho has a will of his own, possesses himself, is his own 'property', as such,has property and in rights and to his

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person. His autonomyis his most precious possession,and gives him his propertyrightin and to himself.His autonomyas a paribus,other persons do not have chooser means that, ceteris as rights overhimand his person;it is his existence an autonomous to beingthatgiveshim the right a say about his life,even in those contextsin which he may lack the power to secure his life. I is herebecause of what autosuggestthatautonomy so important and nomyinvolves,namelyrationality the capacityforinformed, rationalchoice. It is this that gives rise to at least a primafacie and interests right an autonomousbeingthat,wherehis welfare of are concerned,his wishes should be heard and attendedto. a of to Thus I am suggesting defence theright lifein threeparts: (i) as restingon the nature of autonomousexistence,(ii) as involved in respectforautonomyas givingthe autonomousperson rightsover his own existence,and (iii) as respectfor autonomy as is dictated in respect for the rightto liberty.One requires a good reason to be justifiedin overridinganother's will in a that person in his enjoymentand matterwhich vitallyaffects use of his life. Additional supportingconsiderations mightbe urged fromthe value of the goods that autonomousbeings,persons, can achieve.To destroya person,or not assist him to live, is not simplynot to respectautonomousexistence; it is also to for ignorepotentialities greatgoods. However,I suggestthatthese which relate to duties in are simply supportingconsiderations oflife,and are notproperly partof the defenceof the right respect life.They involvedifferent dutiesto different to personsaccording Were the rightto life to be grounded on to theirpotentialities. the rightto life would vary in extent and such considerations, with the individual'spotentiality good. for stringency The rightto life that is claimed here to hold of autonomous beings is obviouslynot simplya rightnot to be killedbut a right to live,and notto be let die. To killor let die an autonomous being withlack of respect,as a thingof no value is to treathis existence to or worth.Thus the right lifeis not simplya negativeright, but a positiverightto recipience. Beforediscussingthis aspect of the rightto lifeit is important to note a tensionthat breaksout betweenthe variousgroundsof the rightto life. Respect for autonomouslife as of worth as a ground of the rightto lifewould involvethe conclusionthat the is rightto suicidewhichmostofus wishto acknowledge nota right which is compatiblewithnor one which followsfromautonomy.
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On the other hand, respect for life as the person's possession would seem to involve that he has the rightto dispose of it as he pleases. Certainly,respect for him as an autonomous being his involvesacceptinghim as such, recognizing rightto determine suicide his destiny, takehis lifeifhe so chooses.Hence legalizing to accessible and voluntary euthanasia,and makingthemreasonably to those who, with good reason, seek the means thereto,are dictatedby one of the groundsthat dictatesrespectforlifeitself. However,the would-be suicide would have a dutyto respecthis own existenceas an autonomousbeing, and hence would require a good moral reason, for example, in terms of grave, pointless as illness,insanity, betrayalof othersas in suffering in a terminal to war under torture, be morally justifiedin takinghis life. The same thoughtseems to underliethe acceptance of euthanasiaof autonomous beings by Christians and rationalist humanists, whatare believedto be or whatwould be namelythatofrespecting theirrational the wishes,whilstacknowledging value and worthof autonomousexistence.Christians typically approve of euthanasia of ordinary die, by withholding onlywhenit takestheform letting or only extraordinary lifesaving measures,fromthose whose lives and supporta can be saved; humanistsare preparedto entertain more positive form of euthanasia. However, to be justified, autonomous euthanasiaof autonomousbeings (and of potentially mustbe based onjudgmentsconcerning what infants children) and is or would be the will and rationalwish of the being concerned; and even then it must be supported by grave moral reasons, the nature of which cannot concern us here. In brief,justified euthanasiamust alwaysbe a kind of proxyvoluntary involuntary euthanasia. Those who argue that it is permissibleto withhold this. meansof savinglifedo not alwaysacknowiedge extraordinary Whilsttouchingon euthanasia,it should be noted that thereare who are neither actual nor political beingsbornof humanparents, and autonomousbeings,neitheractuallynot potentially rational, who are made so by disease and injury.In termsof theacothers, and countsI havecanvassedhereofpossiblepossessorsofrights, of to of theground theright life,such beingsdo notand cannotpossess the rightto life. This impressesme as one of the virtuesof the it that involves this.Havingsaidthis, is important Kantianaccount, it to go on and observethatsuch beingswould nonetheless come unof derthemorality dutiesin respectoflife.The casesI have inmind here are those of the human monsterwith an undevelopedbrain

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or of intoan autonomous and no possibility potentiality developing being, those whose brains have suffered irreversible damage or such that they are more akin to things than to deterioration but not as persons,and who can be kept alive as livingorganisms persons,and then only with the help of machines,for example, motorvictimswith irreversible brain damage. To kill or let die to such beingsis not to failto respecttheirright life-they are not or have ceased to be beings thatpossess such a right.This is not to say that they may capriciouslybe let die or be killed. They thereare pragremainwithinthe concernsof morality. Further, matic, political and moral, practicalreasonswhich make it very be desirable that a distinction drawn between killingan animal and killinga human being, lettingan animal die and lettinga or human being die, whether not the human being is a personor potential person.Nonetheless, important consequencesdo follow. We do not have the duties of recipiencewhich arise out of the right lifetowardssuch beings,thatis to say,we do not have the to to same dutiesto provideaids and facilities save theirlives as we do with those who possess the rightto life. Further,there are moral dangersin accordingto beingswho are neither personsnor potentialpersons, the status of persons possessing the rightto life. Such beings have no wills, no powers to make rational to decisions,exercisechoice,northe potentiality become choosers, such thatwe can anticipatetheirdecisions,makejudgmentsconcerningthem,and act on the basis of them on theirbehalf.The 'harmto whichtheymay be exposed, the pain and suffering they may come to experience,togetherwith the very considerable suffering theyusually bringto those upon whom theyare made makeit important we frankly that and legallydependent, recognize of thattheydo not come underthe morality the right acknowledge to lifeas a rightof recipience.Their positionis more akin to that of a higheranimal doomed to a lifeof suffering, to be a great and burden on others.Whilst there are the practical and distressing to noted earlierrelating the dangersof callousness considerations and loss of respectforthe lives of personsif a cavalierattitudeis takentowardsthelivesofsuch beings,thereare equallycompelling utilitarianconsiderationsfor stressingthe differences between them and possessors of rights. We rightlyacknowledge the difference betweenthem and possessorsof rights, betweenthem and persons and potential persons, in withholding from them certainlife-prolonging drugs and treatment, althoughless often

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and more honestin than we oughtand would if we were franker our thinking about such beings. As a society,we acknowledgeit also to some extent in the allowing to die of infantswho are monsters.Humanists are surprisingly reticentabout euthanasia althoughthey are vocal enough about abortion.The principles of to relating certainforms euthanasiaimpressme as parallelwith kindsof justifiable abortion.The irrethose that apply to certain to useless sponsibleuse of medicalexpertise keep alive,to prolong as suffering, organiclifewhichfallsfarshortof existence a person, be and makesit imperative thatthisissue frankly fearlessly faced. to It would be useful here briefly contrastmy account of the to accountsofthisright. Actutilitarian(a) right lifewithutilitarian thata rightto lifeshould be ascribed ism involvesthe contention only when it is usefulto do so. If greateroverallutilitydictates because rightsare not killing,no rightneeds to be overridden, intrinsicto those to whom they are attributed.What I have of argued in variousplaces elsewherebears on the difficulties the provides a act utilitarianposition here. (b) Rule utilitarianism more promisingbasis for accounting for the right to life as humanistsin our societyseek to explain it. The rule utilitarian could explain the rightin termsof a useful rule which accords personsin comas, the insane,etc., but rights persons,infants, to or not to foetuses, arguingthat such a rule has utility maximum as utility an acceptedrule.Euthanasia,as it is acceptedby humanthe stresson the need for graverreasons for ists, in particular, intothe approved thanforletting rather die, can be written killing of rule. It allows too for the incorporation respect for certain animal life-a growingtrendin humanist thought-to the extent and in the ways utilitydictates.It is possible that it is only in of accountthattheprevailing humanist terms such a ruleutilitarian attitudesto the rightto life can be set out in a coherentway. Attractive thoughit is on this count,I suggestthatthis approach will not do both because of the standard criticismsdeveloped developed by (for example,those first against rule utilitarianism PhiloJ. J. C. Smartin 'Extremeand RestrictedUtilitarianism', sophicalQuarterly, 1956) and because it seems to be seriously 6, in mistaken deriving the rightfroma rule ratherthan locatingit in the individualwho possesses the right. The rightto life which springsfromman's Right of recipience. is autonomy, a rightof recipience.It is a rightnot to have one's

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death broughtabout, not to be let die, to be saved if one wishes to be saved. To pass by on the streeta person bleedingto death motoraccident,to ignorea child's criesfor as a resultof a hit-run help as it drownsin a backyardswimming pool, to allow a blind man to step intothepathofa car,is to show a gravelack ofrespect for the rightto life. This clearlyfollowsfromthe rightas one based on man's autonomy,that is on respect for autonomous existence,and not simplyforthe wishes of the person who posof of The history the development thought sesses autonomy. about of the rightto life is in many respectsan abstractof the history as in about rights general,involving it does, a move from thought the construing rightto life as a negativeright,a rightnot to be deprivedof life, and hence a rightto protection againstpersons our threatening life in a directway, to seeing the rightas one of recipience,a right to have one's life made secure against the ravagesof natureand disease as well as againstthe consequences of humanactionsin so faras thisis practically possible.The right has come to be seen to involvethe provisionof aids and facilities in to secure life,aids and facilities termsof medical and hospital services, employment opportunities,social welfare measures or for generally those who cannotgain employment who are unseen to involve parents,the employable,etc. It is now rightly state,and privateindividuals,imposingduties on them to act to secure, protect,and save life. We do not need to be deliberate to aggressors show lack of respectforthe rightto life. We show if lack of respectforthisright we knowingly, deliberately, whether kill or intentionally unintentionally, another,as in war in respect and equally, if we let a person die of innocentnon-combatants, when we can save him and are the onlypersonso placed as to be able to do so, or when we knowthatno one else is likelyso to act as to save him. We can bringabout the death of a personwithout being open to the chargeof havingkilledhim or not havingsaved him. We can encourage a person to keep on drinkingheavily on beforedriving a dangerousroutehome; we have not killedhim is to if our intention to have him betraya confidence us and not to have him kill himself.Yet we have shown lack of respectfor his life and for the lives of others.Respect for the rightto life may involve very drasticinterference the statenot simplyby by way of social welfarelegislationof the kind we now have but in many other ways, for example, by populationcontrol,by compulsion in respect of assistance to others, as in compulsory

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'donations' of blood, organs,and the like. Obviously otherconwill bear on what is siderations includingconcernforotherrights the overriding duty of the state in this area. Here I am simply of concernedto bringout the farreachingimplications the right to lifeas a rightof recipience. It The right lifeas a primafacie conditional to right. is commonly that the right claimed, especiallyby Roman Catholic moralists, Thus Stevas in The Rightto to lifeis an absolute,inviolableright. Life, quotingPius XII, observes: human life . . . and only the It is never lawfulto terminate or some highergood, or of preserving hope of safeguarding prolonging this same human life,will justifyexposingit to danger(p. 49). make J.A. Ryanand F. J.Boland in Catholic Principles Politics of the same, familiar claim,observing: The rightto life is said to be absolute because no human kill man as a meremeansto the powermaylicitly an innocent realizationof any end whatever.The life of the individual person is so sacred that,as long as the righttheretohas not been forfeited the perverseconduct of the subject himby to self,it may not be subordinated the welfareof any other individual or any number of individuals.Not even to preserve its own existencemay the State directlyand deliberman to death. (New York, The ately put an unoffending Macmillan Co., I952, p. I4.) A closer look at traditionalthinkingsuggests that serious of thinkers our Western philosophicaltraditionhave not really the construed rightto lifeas an absolute,inviolableone. Thus we allow thatit may be rightand findthatRoman Catholicmoralists to even obligatory kill the guiltycriminal-and the net has often who of the guiltydeservesdeath. been cast widelyin determining deliberately They have arguedthatit may be rightand obligatory to and knowingly take the life of an unjustaggressor where the nor criminally lattermay be one who is neither morally guiltybut threatto one's life. The rightto selfone who is an involuntary is defenceagainstunjust aggressors extendedto justify just wars, but unintentional and the deliberate, as knowing (indirect opposed of who are non-participants the in to direct)killing innocent persons

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ends, the war, who are unavoidablykilled in pursuingmilitary value of which is deemed to justifythe knowingkillingof the innocentpersons.The limitation the rightto life by reference of to the rightof self-defence, interpreted it is, in conjunction as with the principleof double effect and proportional good, is a one veryconsiderable one, the more so accordingto how sensitive is about whatconstitutes threat one's life.It is also contended a to thatthe statemay legitimately forceindividualsto risktheirlives in the defenceoftheircountry. These conscripts, theinnocent like persons they are sent out deliberately, knowingly, unintenbut tionallyto kill as in bombingraids, are in Roman Catholic eyes, innocentpersons. To allow the rightto life of innocentpersons to be limitedin theseways,or to declare,as Thomistsseem to do, thatsuch actionsdo not infringe rightto life,is veryseverely the to limitthe rightto life,eitherin its essence or enjoyment. The innocent personwho is deliberately inintentionally, but knowingly killed,obviouslyhas nothad his right liferespected.Here it has to been put to me that the rightto life is an absolute one against direct killing but not against justifiable indirect killing. This obviouslywill not do. The innocent person'sright lifehas been to if overridden, he is deliberately killed-justifiablyoverriddenif the killing morally is are justified.Otherlimitations acknowledged in allowingthat it may be morallyrightto let die those who are a suffering terminalillness, and who are doomed to suffering, wherethe aids necessaryto prolonglife are extraordinary. Other Christianscommonly acknowledgethatthe rightto life is a conditional one, that in the above cases, the rightto life may be overridden otherconsiderations. we go outsidethe Christian If by in tradition our cultural we tradition, find thatithas been commonplace formoralists, example,Plato and Aristotle, maintain for to that thereare many legitimate groundsfortakinglife,including innocent life. I suggestthat,like otherrights, rightto life is involvedin the conflicts such that it cannot always be the overriding, absolute, inviolable rightit is so misleadinglycommonlyclaimed to be. Indeed, some of the conflicts whichoccur,are withinthe rightto life itself.Further,as a rightof recipience,it is and must always be practically all impossibleto fulfil the demandsto whichit may and does giverise.We are constantly in facedwithsituations which we can save the lives of some only by neglecting save the lives to ofothers.A choicehas to be made as to who is to receivethe heart,

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the kidney,the use of the kidneymachine,etc. More generally, futureat least, no our resourcesare such thatforthe foreseeable matterhow much of the national budget is devoted to health, of preventive medicine,medical research,the prevention motor and otheraccidents,choices will have to be made and decisions taken as to how the money available is to be spent, and hence who will benefit and who will not, who will live and concerning who will die. Further,thereare collisionsbetweenthe claims of the rightto life and of otherrights.Consider the obvious clash to to betweenthe right lifeand the right education.The demands of neitherare fullymet in our society.With highertaxationand spending, demandsof the two rights the less waste in government thattheycould be fully could be morefully met,but it is unlikely The met. This is because theirdemandsare almostinexhaustible. rightto educationis simplyone among manyrightswhich clash with the rightto life. Anothersuch rightis the rightto liberty. fromrestraint and confineThe rightto liberty involvesfreedom ment; respect for the rightto life of others involves that my if froman infectious liberty curtailedby quarantining I suffer be disease which may be fatalto anotherperson. Thus the rightto and treatment, whetherhe wants it or life dictatesquarantining fromtuberculosis, typhoid,cholera, not, forthe person suffering and the like. However, the claims of libertymay on meningitis, to occasion overridethose of the right life,as in some cases of incurable carriers,or with diseases which may only in rare cases be fatal. Similarly,concern for the rightto life would dictate traffic maximum thosewhich different rules,different speeds from and for other would stem fromconcernforthe rightto liberty, rights.Much the same points can be made in respect of other rights. Besides being involvedin conflicts withrights, demandsof the the rightto life may conflict with those emanatingfromother values, values such as happiness,justice, respectforpersons.We are all familiar is withexamplesin whicha conflict shownto arise betweenthe good to be achieved by way of the happinessof the many and the invasionof the rightto life of an innocentperson Justice itself may punishment. by way of unjust,useful,deterrent even dictate such invasions,justice on the wider scale dictating life case. injusticeand lack of respectforinnocent in theparticular The same may be truein respectof the value, respectforpersons. The detailsof specific examplesmay be disputed,but the general

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point I am makingmust be accepted,namely,thatthe resolution cannotalwaysproperly in terms favouring be of the ofthe conflicts rightto life. to This meansthatat mostthe right lifeis a prima facie or conditionalright.This, I believe,has been acknowledged, implicitly if not always explicitly, all great moralistsof our Western by thosewho have been mostscrupulousabout civilization, including who insistthatthe rightto life the takingof human life,pacifists is inviolableand sacredand such thatitshouldalwaysbe respected. What has obscured theirawarenessof the conditionalnature of to is the right lifefrom manyincludingpacifists the factthat they have not fullyappreciatedthatthe rightto life is a rightof recipience which createsduties which give rise to clashes with other duties,rightsand values, where some at least of the lattermust Once it is seen that the rightto life is a sometimesbe fulfilled. it the issues inprina facie right, is easier to get into perspective volved in certainkinds of killings,lettingsdie, not saving. The on moral be rightmay licitly overridden occasion. The important what constitute question is then seen to be that of determining moral reasons for overriding the rightto life. An exsufficient aminationof that question involves a further inquiry to which this paper is a modest,thoughvitalpreamble.
LA TROBE UNIVERSITY