Article Pianciola Sartori On Waqf

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Central Asian Survey

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Waqf in Turkestan: the colonial legacy and the fate of an Islamic institution in early Soviet Central Asia, 1917-1924
Niccol Pianciola; Paolo Sartori Online Publication Date: 01 December 2007 To cite this Article: Pianciola, Niccol and Sartori, Paolo (2007) 'Waqf in Turkestan: the colonial legacy and the fate of an Islamic institution in early Soviet Central Asia, 1917-1924', Central Asian Survey, 26:4, 475 498 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/02634930802017929 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634930802017929
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Central Asian Survey (December 2007) 26(4), 475 498

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Waqf in Turkestan: the colonial legacy and the fate of an Islamic institution in early Soviet Central Asia, 1917 1924
` NICCOLO PIANCIOLA and PAOLO SARTORI1
ABSTRACT The paper investigates early Soviet policies regarding the institution of waqf (charitable endowment) in Turkestan, questioning the issue of the postcolonial character of the early Soviet administration. After taking into consideration practices related to waqf management in modern Muslim states and European colonial empires, the paper briey describes the tsarist administrative approach to the issue. We then address the ambiguity inherent in Soviet policies on waqf requisition and restitution during Civil War years. In the section that follows we deal with different groups of Muslim intellectuals that attempted to use the Soviet state in their mutual struggle over authority in Central Asian society and describe the creation and functioning of the bureaucracies responsible for managing waqf. Finally, we outline some provisional conclusions on the legacy of tsarist colonialism for Soviet power in Central Asia and the role played by progressive Muslim intellectuals.
Introduction With the fall of the tsarist empire, which had seen and treated Central Asia as a colony, and the creation of the new Central Asian republics as integral parts of the Soviet Union, we witness a transition in the ways the region was administered. The techniques of governance and administrative practices used by tsarist authorities in Turkestan had features in common both with other contemporary European colonial empires and with Muslim states attempting to consolidate their hold over social groups and socio-economic institutions that for centuries had been independent from political power. The USSR in Central Asia was instead a post-colonial state which, in the rst years after its formation, enacted explicitly anti-colonial policies aimed at eliminating inequalities in the distribution of resources (the most important was the redistribution of land and access to water
Paolo Sartori is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Oriental Studies, Martin-Luther University Halle Wittenberg, Muhlweg 15, 06114 Halle (Saale), Germany (E-mail: paolo.sartori@orientphil.uni-halle.de). ` ` ` Niccolo Pianciola, is acting Professor of History of Eastern Europe, Universita di Trento, Facolta di Lettere e Filosoa, Via Santa Croce, 65 I-38100 Trento, Italy (E-mail: niccop@gmail.com). 0263-4937 print/1465-3354 online/07/040475-24 # 2007 Central Asian Survey DOI: 10.1080/02634930802017929
` NICCOLO PIANCIOLA AND PAOLO SARTORI

from Slavic colonists to pastoral Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in Semireche).2 Moreover, the policy of indigenization (korenizatsiia) led to the inclusion of Central Asians in regional administration.3 Many of them were progressive intellectuals and ulama. They joined the administration in places where they hoped to inuence the evolution of society and culture in the direction they had indicated for years before the fall of tsarism. Given the new states utopian, anticolonial and modernizing ideology, they now saw their project as achievable.4 Charitable endowments (waqf, pl. awqaf ),5 were an issue at the heart of the progressive Muslims effort to modernize education in the region, since it was these endowments that funded the school system in early Soviet Central Asia. Moreover, waqf was involved in the other major area of reform, the land issue. Policies on waqf were therefore linked both to policies of cultural transformation and those of social reform in the regions principal economic activity, agriculture. These progressive Muslims were opposed by traditionalist ulama who wielded religious and legal authority in Central Asian society and were against the reform of education and the state management of waqf. The matter was further complicated by the fact that up to the mid 1920s, any gure of religious authority, not only progressive ulama, was seen by Moscows envoys to Central Asia as a valuable ally in the struggle to secure their grasp on a region still ravaged by insurgency. It was in this context that in the rst half of the 1920s, among educated Muslims in Central Asia, a erce battle was fought over waqf. Beyond investigating early Soviet policies regarding waqf, this essay addresses the broader issue of the transmission of administrative knowledge from the tsarist empire to the Soviet Union in Central Asia, problematizing the issue of the colonial character of the early Soviet administration. We have tried to exemplify the problems involved in the transition from tsarist to Soviet state in the concrete policies implemented regarding key social institutions like charitable endowments, dealing with the individuals and bureaucracies that managed them. After taking into consideration practices related to waqf management in modern Muslim states and European colonial empires, the paper briey describes the tsarist administrative approach to the issue. We then address the problem of the Soviet protoadministration that dealt with waqf during Civil War years in Turkestan, showing the ambiguity inherent in Soviet policies on waqf requisition and restitution. In the section which follows we deal with different groups of Central Asians that attempted to use the Soviet state in their mutual struggle over authority in Central Asian society and describe the creation and functioning of the state bureaucracies responsible for managing waqf endowments. Finally, we try to reach provisional conclusions on the issue of the legacy of tsarist colonialism for Soviet power in Central Asia, the colonial features of the early Soviet administration in the region, and the role played by progressive Muslim intellectuals who became part of the Soviet power structure. We hope to show that studies of particular institutions such as waqf, codied under different legal systems (shara and the law of the state) in both tsarist times and early Soviet Central Asia, can be a fruitful way to elaborate on the relations between colonizers and colonized, as well as former colonizers and the formerly colonized, and to put the actors 476
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back into the network of meanings and norms that the great upheaval of war and revolution in some cases tore apart and in others congured in different patterns. State-building in the modern age led administrations to take over assets previously controlled by religious organizations in the Christian world and charitable institutions among Muslims. Parallel to this, secular states replaced religious groups and charitable organizations in reproducing culture through education, and in providing welfare. In the modern Muslim world, this process took many forms. One of them was a struggle between state and religious authorities for control over charitable endowments, as these played an essential role in Muslim communities, both from a religious and economic point of view. Waqf revenues provided salaries for imams, mudarris and mullahs, and so made existence possible for primary and secondary schools (maktabs and madrasas), mosques, shrines and Su convents, thus serving to reinforce Islamic religious authority. Moreover, charitable endowments funded important welfare institutes such as orphanages. The majority of pious endowments consisted of land whose value tended to increase over time, as such property enjoyed more legal protection from government interference than other forms of estates. It is estimated that at the beginning of the 19th century between a half and two thirds of the land in the Ottoman Empire was waqf property. In the same period, half the land in Algeria and a third in Tunisia was controlled by pious foundations. In Egypt before Muhammad Alis agrarian reform, it is estimated that around a fth of the land was waqf property, while in 1914 the extension of waqf land was around 10 15% of cultivated land.6 Precise statistics are not available for Central Asia before and after the tsarist conquest (estimates range between one tenth and one fth of cultivated land).7 During the 19th century, all the major Muslim states established institutions to control the resources stemming from waqf. This phenomenon had to do with the states attempts to control resources and deploy them for their own projects: agrarian reform, creating a more open land market and curtailing the revenues of the traditional elites. In the Ottoman Empire a Ministry for waqf was founded in October 1826. In Egypt, a central administration for waqf was created in 1835 by Muhammad Ali, abolished three years later, re-established in 1851 by Abbas I and turned into a Ministry in 1864. While even in the 19th century, state-builders like Muhammad Ali in Egypt requisitioned signicant expansions of waqf land, it was in the 20th century that the process reached its height. In Turkey, the discriminating date was 1924: the caliphate and the Ministry of Islamic Law were abolished; waqf properties and their administration were incorporated into the secular Kemalist state under the supervision of a Board for Pious Endowments.8 Two years later family waqf was abolished and public ones nationalized. After the Second World War, some Arab states adopted legislation that limited the validity of family waqf and the socialist Arab military regimes abolished waqf in their countries.9 The expansion of the states role coincided with authority being taken away from the ulama, i.e. the scholars of Islamic law. In fact, waqf constituted a major part of the domain of the ulama, because they were among waqfs 477

direct beneciaries and overseers. On the one hand, they greatly proted from the pious endowments which covered expenditures for madrasa maintenance and paid their teachers salaries; on the other hand, acting as qadi.e. judges in shara based courtsthe scholars of Islamic law determined the stipulation of endowment deeds (waqyya/waqfnama). In addition, the qad could be asked to hear lawsuits concerning waqf,10 as public and familial endowments were treated respectively as a subject of the Islamic doctrine of rent11 and of the law of inheritance. Like Muslim rulers, colonial powers also had to tackle questions arising from waqf management. The colonial powers handling of waqf differed signicantly between European settlement colonieswhere the administrations goal was to take land away from the local population and give it to settlersand colonies where European agricultural colonization was not implemented. A case of the rst kind is Algeria. Here the French, after a rst attempt at conscating waqf lands,12 were called upon to settle a bitter controversy between the colonists and the Muslim judiciary. Wanting to acquire land for agricultural purposes, French settlers had incautiously taken over waqf lands which, from the point of view of the shara, could not legally be sold or purchased on the market. Frustration on the part of the newcomers led to action being taken by the colonial administration. Along with the enforcement of new legal enactments concerning the ownership of land, a campaign of disrepute of family waqf was mounted. This was done mainly by French Orientalists, who argued that Muslim family endowments were illegal from the perspective of Islamic law as they deviated from the pious goals that are the basis of the establishment of a waqf.13 The second variation is exemplied more clearly by the evolution of the institution of waqf in British India. Among the well-known differences between British India and French Algeria,14 the most important was that, unlike the French, the British allowed Indians a limited degree of political representation. In this context, Muslim politicians and lawyers, with the support of political associations, the press, the ulama, wealthy landholders and some British ofcials,15 used the judiciary and legislative processes to save family endowments from the disappearance they had been condemned to by the decisions taken by the High Court of India between 1879 and 1893.16 The approach to the question of waqf adopted by the tsarist authorities in Central Asia is similar to both that of the French in Algeria, and the British in India. As in India, the colonial government was largely indifferent to waqf, so long as land was productive and Muslims paid their taxes.17 As in Algeria, the colonys government was in the hands of the armybut, unlike Algeria, the sedentary regions of Turkestan (where the great majority of the regions waqf land was concentrated) never became a settlement colony.18 In Turkestan only the Semireche oblast, inhabited by Kazakh and Kyrgyz herdsmen, was heavily colonized by Eastern Slavic peasants. In 1897 the Slavic rural population of Semireche comprised two thirds of the total gure for Turkestan.19 Other Russian and Ukrainian settlements were present in the oblasts of Ferghana, Transcaspia and 478
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Syr-Darya,20 but agricultural colonists remained a smaller fraction of the total population of these regions. In Ferghana and Syr-Darya they were concentrated in areas with a pastoral Kazakh and Kyrgyz population.21 It was only for scal reasons that the tsarist administration dealt directly with waqf. In the regions rst statute, the Provisional Statute for the Government of the Semireche and Syr-Darya Oblasts (July 1867),22 the only article in which waqf was named was the one dealing with taxation. This article considered only rural property and stated that waqf lands would be taxed like other kinds of land, with the exception of those waqf lands that had been exempted from taxation under the Khan of Kokand and the Emir of Bukhara. In order for the exemption to be conrmed, the waqf deeds complete with the Khan or Emirs seal attesting exemption had to be presented to the tsarist administration. These waqf lands were therefore dened by Russian administrators as obelennye, literally, justied. Newly formed waqf on the other hand was to be subject to normal land taxation.23 The rst example of data collection concerning waqf was the land survey undertaken to organize taxation, immediately after the establishment of Turkestans general governorship. In 1868, this investigation was initiated in Tashkent, after the Chancellery of the City Commandant (nachalnik goroda) received a petition from the mutawall of the local madrasa, Abdul-Qasim Khan Ishan Tura Khan. The administrator complained that merchants, who on Sundays occu pied plots of land whose rent had been bequeathed to the madrasa under the terms of a waqf deed, refused to pay what they owed. The city ofcer stated he was unable to resolve the question and proposed that a commission of Muslim administrators qualied on Islamic property rights be established to collect all the documents relating to waqf at the oblast level.24 The rst result, was a survey of the incomes that Tashkents main madrasas received under the terms of waqf deeds.25 In the regions of Samarkand and Katta-Kurgan, the colonial authorities encountered a different problem. There the question was how to divide waqf lands between Bukhara and Russian Turkestan for scal reasons.26 Aleksandr Kun (an administrator with an Orientalist background)27 was given the task of drawing up a list of waqf properties connected to madrasas and mosques. After the survey, in 1869 an attempt was made to tax family endowments.28 In June 1886, the Statute for the Administration of Turkestan was promulgated. Here too, the administration only dealt with waqf from a scal point of view, exempting from taxation unpopulated waqf land (i.e. land on which no peasant villages were present) (Art. 286). Revenues from mixed waqf lands were partly used for mosques and schools and partly to benet individuals. They were also subject to taxation (Art. 289).29 Russian Orientalists duly highlighted the limits of tsarist administrative knowledge on waqf. In a work published in 1904, Nikolaj Nalivkin30 stressed that up to that moment the administration had had a distorted conception of the institution of pious endowments as it only saw waqf from a scal point of view. According to Nalivkin, many administrators had the wrong idea about rights concerning waqf, as the 1886 Statute compelled the tsarist administration to collect those endowment deeds bearing the Khan or Emirs seal which exempted waqf land 479

from state taxation, even though Nalivkin estimated that only a tenth of the waqfnama had such a feature.31 Most probably Russian ofcers feared that touch ing tax-exempt waqf land would have stirred public discontent. Accordingly tsarist administrators only looked for exempted waqfs (at least in the countryside). Once these had been found, the administration collected waqfnamas, but the great majority remained unread and unchecked.32 Despite repeated proposals from Governor Generals that pious foundations assets be more closely monitored, in the last decades of the tsarist regime the situation remained virtually unchanged.33 Governor General N. A. Ivanov proposed more controls on pious foundations in 1903, but his request went unheeded. The following year, his effort led to the convocation of an extraordinary conference on the waqf issue with the participation of regional experts and administrators. Similarly, Senator Pahlens commission (which visited Turkestan in 1908) produced only general indications on the subject, like the proposals put forward in the last years of tsarism.34 Waqf during the change in regime and the consolidation of Soviet power (1918 1922) Lenins decree on land dated 8 November 1917 established that all lands belonging to nobility, the Crown, monasteries and churches were nationalized and were to be given to peasants. Similar measures were extended to Turkestan by a deliberation of the Tashkent Sovnarkom, in December 1917, which established the abolition of private property, the prohibition of trading in land and the formation of a Committees for Land and Water (zemelno-vodnye komitety). The government was to take control of all lands that were not directly worked by their owners and oversee their distribution to the poor.35 No exception was provided for waqf lands. These measures and the restitution of waqf at the beginning of the 1920s led historians to the conclusion that land and other waqf assets were requisitioned during the civil war.36 The Tashkent government was however powerless to apply the decrees on land nationalization in most of Turkestan, because during most of the Civil War Bolshevik power there was limited to the Russian quarters of the towns.37 Throughout 1918 and 1919, endowments were not generally requisitioned by Bolshevik turkestantsy. Only in isolated cases were waqf lands incorporated into the Commissariat for Agricultures funds.38 In 1918, waqf properties were formally managed by the Commissariat for Education and in early February 1919 they were transferred to the Narkomnats, headed by Grigorii Andreev (Dzhurabaev).39 The fact that they were not requisitioned does not mean that in 1918 1919 there were no important changes in the way they were managed. From the documentation that has come down to us, it appears that, if nothing else, in some cases and some places, many mutawall were replaced by the new authorities. A Russian member of the Kokand Soviet reported in late 1919 that Since January . . ., all the former mutawall have been replaced and the old city community has named Muslim Com munists and members of the Party in their place.40 Kokand might be an unusual 480
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case, given the massacre that took place there and destruction of part of the old city at the beginning of 1918.41 In other locations in Ferghana there is evidence of Bolshevik involvement in the election of mutawall (this was in contrast with Islamic lawmutawall were indicated in a waqfnama by whoever established the waqf ). On 5 September 1918 an election was held in Namangan to replace the mutawall of the waqf beneting the Airitam mosque, a certain Ishan Baba Ismail Khoja Ishan. The 84 electors, inhabitants of the mahalla of Airitam, had to choose between three candidates probably named by the Executive Committee of the Namangan Soviet, which had called the meeting and appointed the head of the citys Commissariat for Nationalities, the Tatar Tahir Fathullin, to oversee the voting. In the end a certain Tamal Khoja Tashkhojaev was elected.42 The Executive Committee of the Namangan soviet then had to ratify the election.43 It is likely that these procedures were followed to answer to local initiatives, without, however, representing a uniform policy in Turkestan, at that time racked by Civil War and famine.44 In any case, waqf properties were not substantially affected. In April 1919, just after Muslim Communists were included in Turkestans Bolshevik government with the institution of Musbiuro in March 1919, the Narkomnats statute created a section in the commissariat to deal with waqf. Discussions ensued. From strongly ideological positions, some (including a certain Alferov) argued that waqf was a harmful institution that should be abolished by liquidating waqf property.45 They were contrasted, however, by those who believed waqf could not be compared with the Orthodox Churchs assets, which should be conscated as they only beneted the clergy. According to its defenders inside the Narkomnats, waqf was already, in terms of its very conception, nationalized, as it had a social and frequently charitable function, for example enabling the poor to study. Additionally, according to the Narkomnats leaders, waqf as an institution was a system of social protection and could not be taken away in times of economic crisis and total lack of Soviet welfare institutions in Turkestan.46 In December 1919, a message from the Narkomnats to the Commissariat for Agriculture claried that, following the joint decision of the Turkestan Executive Committee (henceforth TurTsIK) and the Musbiuro, for the time being there would be no change to the situation concerning endowments in Turkestan. This communication did not reect the debates that had gone on inside the Narkomnats and used a much less nuanced language: because of the conservatism and ignorance of the Muslim masses, brought up with a strong notion of Islamic law, that also includes rights concerning waqf .47 Turkestan Bolsheviks attitude towards waqf was ambiguous. An ofcial from the Narkomnats waqf section (set up in July 1919) laconically noted that, as the Narkomnats statute had appointed a waqf properties administration for Turkestan, this could only lead to a single logical conclusion: current law considers admissible recognising the existence of waqf properties in the region, not limited in any way . . ..48 In a draft project on managing waqf written in the second half of 1919, it was specied that not only public waqf (the document called it spiritual, dukhovnyi) 481

should be preserved. Even the existence of family waqf (dened as private chastnyi) was allowed. Only family waqf overseen by administrators who left no descendants would be managed by the Narkomnats.49 Nevertheless, new waqf could not be created, as legislation on waqf was exceptional (iskliuchitelnyi) in character.50 As the Commissariats bureaucrats highlighted, management of Turkestans waqf properties by the Narkomnats would be the rst experience of state control of revenues from Turkestani endowments.51 However, this control remained only on paper. At the end of 1919, the Commissariat of Internal Affairs reported to the TurTsIK that the waqf section of the Narkomnats limited its work to some correspondence with other institutions: The waqf section of the Narkomnats has done nothing. To date, a point of view has not even been determined for managing waqf properties.52 This observation was certainly realistic: on 10 December 1919, we nd the Narkomnats waqf section asking the Narkompros what the procedure for appointing a mutawall was.53 The following day, a decree from the TurTsIK decided the passage of the waqf section to the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairsprobably to make the chain of command from the centre to the periphery more effective.54 On 20 December 1919 the head of the waqf section sent the Commissar of Internal Affairs a draft project for dealing with waqf property.55 The waqf section proposed transmitting the management of waqf land to the uezd and town sections of the Narkomnats (uezdno-gorodskikh natsionalnykh otdelov). These sections would check that management of waqf properties was carried out in conformity with the endowment deeds.56 In this way, waqf management would be carried out at local level and consisted of checking that the status quo (respecting the waqf deed stipulation) was maintained. No strong central institution of management was foreseen, even though formally the coordination and central management remained with the Commissariat of Internal Affairs waqf section. This draft, together with other Narkomnats documents from 1919, shows that there was no desire to abolish waqf inside the Soviet proto-administration from 1918 to 1921. However, in 1919 (as in 1922) it was believed that public waqf had more legitimacy as its aim was to nance education for the poor (The waqfs main objective is to give material and spiritual help [ pomoshchi materialnoi i dukhovnoi] to those who are propertyless and poor, who want to receive an education, Art. 2). This kind of waqf was called cultural by Soviet legislators. It is also noteworthy that the endowment deeds still had legal signicance in Islamic law, as Art. 8 and 10 read: The expropriation [otchuzhdenie] of waqf property or changes in its management can only occur in cases foreseen by the shara; Earnings from waqf must be distributed according to precise indications in waqfnama.57 After the short inclusion in the Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the waqf section was ultimately assigned to the Commissariat of Education (Narkompros) in January 1920. On 6 March 1920 Munawwar Qar Abd al-Rashdkhan-ughl (Abdurrashidkhanov)probably the most inuential modern-oriented Muslim intellectual in Tashkentbecame the temporary chairman of the Commissariats waqf section.58 The section was transferred to the Narkompros at the same time 482
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as Turkestans political situation became more stable: Frunze had entered Tashkent at the head of the Red Army on 22 February. On 24 March, Moscow issued a statute for Turkestans autonomy that overrode the Muslim Communists proposals and also brought Russian Bolsheviks in Tashkent back into line.59 Turkestans Communist Party became a branch of the unied Party of the Russian Federation.60 It does not look as though the Narkompros introduced any signicant innovations regarding waqf over the entire following year and a half, although in October 1920 the members of the waqf section discussed a draft statute ( polozhenie) to regulate the issue.61 Only in 1921, did the matter cease to a be a question discussed exclusively in Tashkents Commissariats bureaucracies and become a subject of public resolutions. In the meantime, Munawwar Qar had fallen into disgrace with Cheka and remained in prison from March until December 1921.62 Papers on the waqf issue produced by the understaffed administration during the chaotic years of the Civil War can only help us to understand the intentions of the Russian Bolsheviks of Turkestan, rather than analyse policies that in fact were not applied. However, this documentation allows us to revise the traditional narrative about waqf during the Civil War in Turkestan, as a period of nationalization and the requisition of properties bequeathed to religious institutions through pious endowments. The Sixth Regional Congress of the Turkestan Communist Party, held in Tashkent on 11 and 12 August 1921, approved a resolution on waqf: rst of all, Muslim pious endowments were not divided into public and familial ones, as the French had done in Algeria. Instead, the Congress decided to distinguish Muslim endowments in terms of their social signicance: mosques, shrines (mazar), Su convents (khanqah), and qar-khana were labelled religious, while primary and secondary schools along with orphanages were deemed to be cultural. The Congress decided that the Soviet power would categorically refuse to conscate the religious waqf. As far as the cultural were concerned, it was felt that they might be subject to Soviet laws concerning land holdings if requested by the local population, while otherwise their revenues would be at the disposal of the Narkompros,63 but it was only one year later that concrete measures on waqf restitution were taken. These measures were put into effect as part of the application of the New Economic Policy in the ex-colony, one year after its adoption at the Tenth Party Congress in Moscow: on 11 April 1922, the Turkestan Executive Committee approved a decree on a single tax in kind, thanks to which numerous pre-existing taxes were reduced to one, equal to around 10% of Turkestans gross agricultural production.64 It is reasonable to assume that the proclaimed restitution was decided in the spring of 1922, especially because, starting in March, the Bolsheviks violently seized assets of the Orthodox Church in Russia, taking advantage of a devastating famine in the Volga region. From the governments point of view, the 1922 decrees on waqf (and to some extent the founding of the GVU) also served to reassure important sectors of Central Asian society that the same policy towards waqf would not be put into effect. Party directives instructed Bolshevik propagandists explaining the governments position on 483

waqf to highlight the difference between policies towards the Orthodox Church and those towards Islamic institutions in general and waqf in particular.65 These decisions about waqf had been taken by members of the Partys upper echelons. Moscow agency is clearly shown by a Politburo decree of 18 May 1922, based on a presentation On Turkestani and Bukharan affairs by Stalin himself, at that time Commissar for Nationalities. Point two of this decree stated expressly that the government should return waqf lands to their previous owners.66 Restoring Waqf On 20 June 1922, the TurTsIK published a decree for the restitution of waqf to madrasa and mosques (o vozvrashchenii vakufov medressam i mechetiam Turkrespubliki).67 The revenues from the restored endowments were to be used exclusively to pay the salaries of those working in madrasas and mosques and for building repair. As the resolution on waqf of the Sixth Regional Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan had stated, arable waqf lands had to be given to peasants and the disputes regarding these lands were to be settled according to Soviet legislation. Restoration must not, however, be seen as a restitution of what never wasin the vast majority of casesconscated. As shown in the previous section, the state never really managed to appropriate the revenues generated by Muslim pious endowments. Restoration of waqf was instead part of the application of the NEP in Turkestan and helped re-establish trade that had been disrupted by the period of war and revolution. The economic crisis caused by the war and previous collapse of tsarism and requisitions by the Turkestan Bolsheviks (particularly towards the cities Muslim merchants), had completely disrupted the regions normal economic life. Moreover, in the chaotic years of the Civil War, tenants sometimes stopped paying rent to the mutawall, for example, on their shops in the bazaar, or mosque administrators and personnel agreed to change the conditions of a lease in their favour.68 Consequently, over the following months, a commission was created in Samarkand with the task of making tenants pay the mutawall for leasing waqf land that they occupied.69 A further, albeit indirect, conrmation of the fact that the 1922 decree was not a real restitution of waqf lands is the absence in the archival documentation of voices from below asking for restoration of previously requisitioned waqf property. Future research might of course change this picture, but no traces were found in the archives of petitions asking for restitution. Documents of this kind would have presumably ooded the ministries in Tashkent if the assets in the hands of Soviet government had been signicant.70 According to the decree,71 waqf and the madrasas were to be administered at the uezd level by a collegial body of ve members: two mudarris, one qad, one repre sentative of the local education department (ONO), and one maktab teacher.72 The only Russian in this body was an ONO representative. These institutions were to be organized in Kokand, Andijan, Namangan, Staryi Margilan, Samarkand and Khojand. The elections of the candidates were left to assemblies of mudarris, qad and maktab teachers and needed to be conrmed by the Ispolkom. These 484
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organs were told to oversee the registration of all the madrasas in the uezd, reporting waqf properties: the location and size of shops, baths and caravansarais. To this purpose they were asked to collect all waqfnama, which had previously been gathered by the Peoples Commissariat for Nationalities. Their duties included overseeing the appointment of madrasa staff. But the close management of waqf revenues was still a duty of the mutawall. According to the decree, mutawall were to continue to ll in nancial registers, write reports, gather all revenues (but spend them only with the permission of the collegial body described above), be responsible for the upkeep of madrasas and waqf buildings, pay state taxes, and (with the approval of the collegial body), sign leases for waqf properties. The decree itself was clear. Nonetheless, the role the ulama, specically Muslim jurists and judges, would have concerning the waqf was not claried. The latter were represented by the mahkama-i shariyya, a Muslim collegial judicial body that had been operative at the uezd level since 1919.73 As early as 10 August 1922, Muslims had started discussing this issue publicly. The journal Haqqat (The Truth) published an open letter signed by a student (Talaba). He wrote that according to rumours, the mahkama-i shariyya was to undertake the tasks of reforming the madrasa, outlining new programmes and dealing with waqf issues. Moreover he asked to see the ideas, the advice, and the decisions of the ulama, and especially those of the mahkama-i shariyya, published in the press.74 The answer came in the following issue of the periodical. It stated that according to the government decree, new collegial bodies for pious endowments (waqf shuras ) were to be constituted and placed under the control of the mahkama-i shariyya.75 The Narkomyust supported the involvement of the mahkama-i shariyya and considered it congruous with the general idea of giving the waqf back to the Muslims, since, according to the Narkomyust, they were in fact represented by the mahkama-i shariyya. The Commissariat even accepted that the waqf collegial bodies at the uezd level would be overseen by the mahkama-i shariyya. Accordingly, elections for running the mahkama-i shariyya included a position of supervisor of waqf issues (waqf mudr).76 Mahkama-i shariyya were opened in Kokand, Andijan, Namangan and Margelan for the Fergana oblast; then, in Samarkand and Khojand for the Samarkand oblast. The Tashkent mahkama-i shariyya oversaw the entire Syr-Darya oblast.77 The decision to give the Muslim judiciaries authority over waqf revenues left the Soviet statenamely the Narkomyust and the Narkomprosdeprived of the possibility to exploit these resources for reform in education. Modernization, as conceived by the Communist government in Turkestan, implied a strong commitment in the educational and cultural sphere, starting from the reform of madrasa curricula, the improvement of educational standards, and increasing literacy among the Muslim population. Waqf revenues could have been used to achieve these tasks, but not if they were in mahkama-i shariyyas hands. Only a decade before, the reform of Islamic education had become a matter of division among the Turkestani ulama and had shaped the discourse on progress (taraqq) in 485

the Muslim public sphere. After the publication of the rst decree on waqf, it took nearly six months for the Soviet authorities to realize their mistake, namely that they did not foresee the possibility that mahkama-i shariyya would not work for their interests. Accordingly, they drew up a new decree, aimed at taking waqf revenues out of the control of the mahkama-i shariyya. The second decree was published on 28 December 192278 and introduced a substantial change in the administration of pious endowments, namely the creation of a Central Waqf Administration (Glavnoe Vakufnoe Upravlenie), an organ within the Narkompros staffed by progressively oriented Muslim intellectuals. It had three branches: propaganda, education, and nance. The rst one was also entrusted with the resolution of questions regarding cases of illegal conscation of waqf property. The second branch was meant to deal with the reform of primary and secondary schooling, and the training of mullahs and Muslim judiciaries according to modern principles. The third one had to verify the administration of income and expenditures. The GVU was supposed to act as the centre of a network of local waqf sections operating at the local level (na mestakh). In fact, uezd collegial bodies, which according to the rst decree were supposed to oversee waqf revenues, were to be replaced by waqf sections at the uezd and town level (uezdno-gorodskie vakufnye otdely). These institutions also comprised three branches: religious, economic and organizational. The creation of the religious section was conceived as a measure to counterbalance at the local level the authority over religious waqfnamely those attached to mosques, Su convents, shrines, and qar-khanaexerted by the Muslim judiciaries and the divines unwilling to collaborate with the Soviet authorities.79 The Tashkent mahkama-i shariyya reacted immediately. In a petition to Turar Ryskulov, head of the Sovnarkom, it explained that the newly approved decree on waqf would oust the mahkama-i shariyya from the administration of both the cultural and religious waqf as these would be placed under the jurisdiction of the GVU and its religious sections. In fact the Tashkent Old City Executive Committeeheaded by Mannon Ramzi, a Muslim who had recently become a Party member and espoused militant Communist ideas80had ordered the mahkama-i shariyya to transmit all its dossiers on religious endowments to the local waqf section. The Tashkent mahkamai shariyya asked the Sovnarkom to intervene, leaving it with authority at least over religious matters.81 This event was to open a series of confrontations over the waqf issue in 1923. Disputes over Waqf The year 1923 opened badly for the mahkama-i shariyya. The GVU was staffed by two militant proponents of the new-method (usul-i jadd ): Khal Muhammad Akhun-ughl (Akhunov)previously a member of a benevolent society called Nashr-i maarifwas appointed as its head; Munawwar Qar was elected as a member of its board. In January they outlined a draft Statute for the GVU. This immediately had an impact in the erce turf war being fought between different state agencies, a clash about which we still know very little. Khojanov, Head of 486
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the Narkompros, rejected the draft Statute claiming that Akhunov was subtly trying to establish for himself a second Narkompros. On 3 February, Akhunov reported the conict to the TsIK,82 stating that Khojanov alleged that Abdurashidkahnov was behind the draft Statute and reminding TsIK that according to Article 9 of the decree on the restitution of waqf published on 22 December 1922 waqf management deals with educational and teaching matters for the madrasa, old and new schools. In conformity with this point, the Statute is not beyond the framework of this decree. The GVU enjoys the right to supervise school matters, although the Narkompros is responsible for general supervision.83 What exactly did the GVU plan to do about waqf? On 11 February 1923, Akhunov sent a detailed explanation of his views to the Sovnarkom:
After the publication of the [rst] decree of TurTsIK on 10 June 1922, 75 properties that belonged to waqf were taken over by the waqf sections [Vakufnyi oytdel]. These were managed by the Muslim spiritual administration [Dukhovnoe Upravlenie, i.e. Mahkama-i shariyya], except for the city of Tashkent. This institution exploited revenues that came from waqf properties, whatever their nature: they were plundered by the clergy and fanatical religious parasites. [Accordingly, the revenues] did not benet poor Turkestani peasants or proletarians for cultural goals, notwithstanding the fact that [the spiritual administration] had been founded to assist the poor. Therefore, it can be concluded that it certainly did not further education. Vigilance and control over their activities, as well as checks on income and expenses by government institutions were absent. I fully understand that waqf in the Republic of Turkestan represent great wealth and with rational use it could bring colossal enrichment to the sphere of education for the native population. So it is necessary to take this waqf property out of the hands of the clergy and put it under proper management. It is necessary, therefore, to set up a powerful, completely independent organisation with direct assistance from the highest levels of the Republic.84
This report was a political manifesto and was the rst of a long series of attacks the GVU launched against the mahkama-i shariyya, but these attacks did not prove to be effective. On the contrary, after one month, on 11 16 March, the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan met in Tashkent and endorsed the mahkama-i shariyya in the frame of the anti-religious propaganda campaign. In sum, they aimed at the sovietization of Islamic primary schools relying on both the national intelligentsia (called Jadids, by the Soviet authorities) and the mahkama-i shariyya, which in turn was perceived as the progressive clergy. This meant that GVU had to work with the Muslim judiciaries of the mahkamai shariyya.85 The GVU then applied to the highest echelons of the government power structure. On 7 June 1923, the GVU wrote to the Sovnarkom of the TASSR in the hope that the issue would be brought to Moscow by the President of the TurTsIKKhidiralievwho was leaving on a mission.86 The GVU sent two reports. One of them was written by Alievits temporary spokesperson87the other by Ivanov, a Russian jurist serving the GVU, who explained in detail that mahkama-i shariyya was a survival of the past, lacking any juridical basis. He stressed that the decree issued by TurTsIK on 28 December 1922 said nothing about the mahkama-i shariyya. He insisted that in Articles 13, 14 and 17 of the Statute on the application of the decree, it was written that waqf sections 487

had to organize a religious branch. The duties of this branch were the very same ones claimed by the mahkama-i shariyya for itself. On this basis Ivanov argued that the latters existence served no purpose and unnecessarily burdened waqf revenues.88 The GVUs request was to no avail and the GVU was forced to tolerate and work with the mahkama-i shariyya. The GVU had been reporting so extensively to the Sovnarkom and to the TurTsIK that this insistence alarmed the Control Commission of the Turkestani Communist Party, which convened a Commission for the Solution of the Waqf Question to meet in Tashkent from 8 to 18 September 1923 in order to draft a denitive Statute on Muslim pious endowments. The Commission brought together all members of the GVU, Urazaev, head of the Narkomyust, Prigodisnkij from the NKVD and Semenov from the Tsuardep. It tried to state clearly what the legal status of the waqf in Turkestan was. In order to do so, the Commission coopted Zahr al-Dn Alam,89 a Muslim jurist from Andijan, who had been a member of the Shuray-i Islamiyya in 1917the rst prominent political party to appear in Tashkent under the Provisional Governmentand had entered the Tashkent mahkama-i shariyya in October 1922 and managed to be re-elected up to 1926.90 This cooptation meant that the GVU had to cooperate at least with the Muslim judiciaries in Tashkent. The liaison between the GVU and the Muslim judiciaries was immediately evident: the Commission accepted the proposal that within the territory of Soviet Turkestan new waqf could be established only for cultural purposes and this was to be done in shara-based courtswhere the qad had to redraft the waqfnamaand consequently be registered with the GVU.91 The rst step the Commission took was to state that all the existing waqf in Turkestan and their properties which satisfy the cultural need of the indigenous population are to be conceived as state properties, and therefore as the patrimony of the local society (obshchestvennoe dostoianie).92 This passage was of crucial importance in the entire discussion on waqf that ensued. In fact, previously (12 July 1923) Ivanova Russian jurist working for the GVUhad attempted to demonstrate that waqf should not be considered a religious institution. Relying on the example of late Ottoman Turkey, where Muslim endowments were regulated by secular law and run by an apposite ministry, Ivanov explained that waqf ought to be seen as a state institution.93 This was done only for one purpose: to convince the Soviet state that cultural waqf should be exempted from taxation. Notwithstanding the negative opinion of the representative of the Peoples Commissariat for Finances,94 the Congress ruled in favour of cultural waqf being exempted from taxation. Accordingly, only religious waqf (mosques, shrines, Su convents and qar-khana) would be subject to state taxation.95 The second basic step the Congress undertook was to state that all control over religious waqf and the administration of the cultural ones was exclusively a GVU concern.96 It is likely that this decision was taken to appease members of the GVU. No other institutions, for example the mahkama-i shariyya, could claim any authority over the waqf, whatever their nature was. In addition, the decision was surely taken in order to concentrate other waqf revenues in the GVUs hands. In fact, the Congress ruled that all waqf subject to the Central Municipal Economic Administration (Glavnoe 488
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upravlenie kommunalnogo khoziaistva) was to pass to the GVU.97 What did not come under GVU control were populated waqf lands situated outside of the city, which were to continue to be used by the people who were working them (as the previous two decrees on the restoration of waqf had ruled). This land was to become state property and be given to the peasants under the terms of the current labour norms (trudovye normy)98 but, as will be seen in the description of the situation in Andijan which follows, it is probable that in many places the revenue from waqf lands continued to be collected and that this rule was not applied. The TurTsIK approved the Commissions rulings, but expunged the passage on tax exemption. Accordingly a decree was drafted and approved on 22 October 1923.99 To become state law, it was transmitted to the Narkomyust for nal approval. The Narkomyust contested the expression obshchestvennoe dostoianie as it suggested the possibility that waqf properties could benet individuals, thus creating a conict with the Soviet Civil Code. Moreover, the Narkomyust argued that making waqf tax exempt would curtail the only source of income for the project of modernization and sovietization of the local schools. Interestingly enough, in Tashkent, waqf revenues were used by the state to fund not only madrasas, but also 24 Soviet schools with 2100 students.100 On the basis of these points, on 30 October 1923, the Narkomyust rejected the entire draft decree.101 Soviet law on waqf remained vague until 1925, when the Conference on waqf admitted that this institution was still out of state control. This was just a few months before the proclamation of the beginning of the land water reform (zemelno-vodnaia reforma) in Uzbekistan, when the lands belonging to the cultural waqf would be subject to requisition and were added to the state land fund for distribution to the peasants. It was the rst step towards the abolition of waqf, which came at the end of the 1920s in all Central Asian republics.102 The local level (na mestakh) While struggling for compromises with the Muslim judiciaries and the highest levels of the Soviet administration in Turkestan, the GVU had to enforce the decree at the local level, relying on its waqf sections. These were constituted in every uezd administrative centre and their work depended, albeit formally, on the instructions issued by the GVU in Tashkent. On 10 April 1923, four months after the publication of the second decree on the restitution of waqf, the people at the waqf section of Katta-Kurgan petitioned the GVU, warning that they had not received a new programme of studies for the upcoming academic year. Moreover, they did not know how to behave in case the madrasa instructors, whom the Katta-Kurgan waqf section paid, rejected the new programmes.103 The GVU answered vehemently:
The holidays have started now, so nothing will be given to the madrasa students until lessons start again. We will only assign one or two more progressive mudarris [taraqq-parwarraq] in the future, when the students are back, hoping that the reform and [new] programme have been
489

approved and that madrasas are solid in structure. [. . .] From now on measures must be taken to make all parasites and fanatics who do not accept the reform cry over the [new] madrasa [islahni qabul tmaydurghan bir khl tiknkhur mutaassiblarn bukundan bashlab madrasalardan uz iglashdurmaqgha charalar kursh krak].104
On the basis of the information coming from the periphery, it is reasonable to assume that the GVU very soon understood that dealing with the local waqf sections was a nearly impossible task, further complicated by factors that were outside the GVUs control: gaps in the command chain; European staff with no knowledge of local languages; negligence and robbery. In this respect, communications between the Andijan waqf section and the GVU are a telling example. The Andijan waqf section was established in May 1923,105 but only in June was its director able to issue a rst report. The overview given in this account is disastrous. The director, Nasr al-Dn Qarzada,106 complained to the GVU that since February the section had been troubled with uncertainty: various people had been appointed and dismissed, while the instructions coming from Tashkent could not be followed as they got lost on the way. Because of budget restraints, the Andijan waqf section had even had to borrow some 3000 roubles. Moreover, the Andijan waqf section had succeeded in corrupting its image among the local population: the former head of the agricultural branch (khwajaliq shubas), a certain Burhan Mashrab, disregarding the directors orders and acting autono mously, had unofcially leased (ghayr-i rasm suratda) some waqf lands.107 The section did not even have exact data on the waqf it was responsible for. When it asked the mutawalls to transmit the waqf deeds, the administrators claimed that all the waqfnama had been conscated by Munawwar-Qar.108 At the local level, the confrontation between the state-run waqf institutions and the Muslim judiciaries was even more erce than at the centre. Qarzada reported that the Andijan mahkama-i shariyya had leased all the madrasa waqf properties in the uezd, asking for a tax of 5 10 per cent of each propertys rent. He asked the GVU to intervene and take severe measures (qat charalar) in order to stop these traitors who had magnied the name of the ulama (ulama ismin kutargan khainlar).109 The director went on to complain that the mahkama-i shariyya was spreading propaganda against the waqf section, sardonically asking how the shara viewed the concentration of all waqf revenues in the waqf sections coffers. At this point, Qarzada added: This is strange! It has not yet been made clear whether the mahkama-i shariyya is playing on the side of the government or on the side of the dark masses (qarakhalq)?.110 It was not only for econ omic reasons that Qarzada complained about the mahkama-i shariyya. In fact, in June the latter still had sufcient authority to appoint the director of the religious branch of the Andijan waqf section.111 Just two weeks after submitting its rst report, the Andijan waqf section again sent the GVU the same information. Apparently Tashkent had asked the section to send part of the waqf revenues it was supposed to collect. Qarzada pointed out that the waqf section had realized that the mahkama-i shariyya had embezzled all the 490
WAQF IN TURKESTAN
prots originating from waqf properties and revenues paid for all of 1922 and until 1 June 1923 and the prots stemming from some waqf assets until 1 January 1924. Approaching the end, the reports tone becomes desperate: Obviously we cannot send you the money you requested for 15th July. [. . .] Your exhortation is fair, you are asking for money, money, money . . . . The report the waqf section sent had some questions which have not received an answer yet. Why?112 Each month the Andijan waqf section was challenged by new problems. On 26 August 1923, the Andijan waqf section wrote a letter to the GVU informing them that, according to the orders Tashkent was conveying, the economic branch had started to verify all rent contracts (waqf mulklar jaras tughrsdag shartnama lar) to know whether they could be conrmed or not. As all the employees were Europeans and the contracts were not written in Russian, the economic branch could not full its duty. The board of the Andijan waqf section therefore asked the GVU for permission to resolve this issue on its own and to extend this permission to the waqf sections in Tashkent, Marghilan and Kokand in order to speed up their work.113 The chaos reached a peak in the autumn of 1923. On 12 September the Andijan waqf section sent GVU the following report: On 10 September we received an order from the [Andijan] Revolutionary Committee [Revkom] informing us that every local waqf section must transmit 50 per cent [of waqf revenues] to the Narkompros, which would send inspectors twice a month. Strange! Whose orders and decrees shall we follow? Those of the TurTsIK? The GVU? The oblast Revkom? Or the local section of the Narkompros? We are asking you to resolve this question as soon as possible! . . . This is odd indeed! Is every locally based authority in Turkestan ruling on its own ? [Ajaba! Turkistan ulkasning har bir mahalladag hukumat qanun bashqa bashqam?].114 At the end of November the situation was unchanged. The Andijan waqf section did not know if it was to follow the orders of the newly appointed representative of the Fergana oblast Revkom.115 Even how the previous decree should be interpreted was still unclear: on 26 November in the Andijan uezd, new endowments lacking any documentation whatsoever were discovered. The local waqf section petitioned Tashkent, asking whether they were to consider them all cultural (madan) waqf, or a mix of cultural and religious (dn) ones,116 so at least the latter would be subject to a 10 per cent tax. By late November and December 1923, discussions over waqf in Andijan had become increasingly troubled by erce struggles with the mahkama-i shariyya. Qarzada informed the GVU that he had taken the decision not to pay the salaries of the Muslim judiciaries in the mahkama-i shariyya, as they had stirred up public opinion against the local waqf section. He explained that this was the only measure that could be taken to stop the actions of the mahkama-i shariyya. Qarzada sar castically added that the GVU must surely have received a sermon (maruza) delivered by the mahkama-i shariyya against the waqf section. He ended his report stating: You asked us if for the reform of the old-method maktabs and madrasas we rely on the more progressive scholars (taraqq-parwarraq ulama). The answer is that in our waqf section not a single one (hch bir 491

ulamadan) has been used [for that purpose]. We do not have any! Zahr al-Dn Aclam was the only one, but now he works in Tashkent.117 Reading the reports from Andijan, one has the impression that the state was completely powerless at the local level. The reports do not give signicant gures about the revenues the local waqf sections had at its disposal: the Andijan waqf section did not report on how it was using available resources, but rather on its lack of authority.
Conclusions: the legacy of colonialism in the mirror of Waqf The recent historiography of Central Asia in the rst half of the 20th century has highlighted the need to look at Soviet policies in the region from a comparative perspective, taking into account what happened in modernizing states such as Turkey and Iran between the two wars.118 In this respect, it is nevertheless important to consider that in Soviet Central Asia the relationship between the state, Islamic institutions and society was very different if compared with independent Muslim states. In the case of Muslim pious endowments, while in the Ottoman Empire and Iran, endowments had undergone a process of centralization and state supervision since the 17th century,119 the Soviets in Turkestan were the heirs to a colonial empire whose administrators had been extremely slow to achieve any grasp of the regions Islamic institutions. The kind of governance that the tsarist empire practiced in Central Asia was a regime of occupation hovering over a society. Its knowledge of the indigenous society was limited and when it intervened it was because it was forced to do so. Consequently its actions tended to be haphazard. As institutional heir to the colonial tsarist administration, the Soviet regime lacked the tools to design a reform policy of an Islamic institution like waqf, as the decrees demanded, or push through a programme of cultural reform through waqf, as the Muslim intellectuals who staffed the GVU wanted. This legacy directly inuenced the way the Soviets governed Central Asia in the ten years after they came to power, and, probably, also (but this aspect must be further researched) how they intervened in their frontal attack on Islamic institutions in Central Asian society from 1927 on. Historians agree that the Bolsheviks in Turkestan could not rule local society and its particular institutions without the help of Muslim activists and intellectuals who were also sympathetic to the new authorities agendas. Bolsheviks could not examine or control waqf without the knowledge of Muslim jurists, who in previous years had ercely fought either against or in favour of new method (usul-i jadd ) for Muslim education. This makes the fate of waqf fundamentally different from the fate of Russian Orthodox Church property. The point here is that also the opposite is true: in a post-colonial situation such as early Soviet Turkestan, progressive Muslim jurists that entered the state administration had to cope with its colonial features, with Russians with a limited grasp of administrative knowledge on the waqf issue stafng the local departments (as in the case of Andijan, mentioned above). 492
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Waqf is therefore a good case study both for understanding the characteristics of the tsarist and Soviet state in Central Asia, as well as for studying the evolution of power relationships within the Muslim societys educated classes. From this preliminary investigation, some points have emerged that require further research. First of all, the so-called restitution of 1922 was actually a legal and administrative systematization of the status quo. In other words, the Soviet government in Tashkent did not have (and had not had for the whole period 1918 1922) the power to requisition waqf lands because, quite simply, they did not know what they were (and even if they had known, they would not have had the power to requisition them). As described above, the propagandistic decision to return waqf was taken in Moscow at the beginning of 1922 most probably should seen in relation to contemporary policies of violent requisitions against the Orthodox Churchs assets. The decision was especially necessary given the instable situation in Central Asia. The government needed the ulamas support in the struggle against insurgents, while it was trying to gain control of the regionmany areas of Turkestan totally escaped government control as late as 1922.120 The capacity to administer an institution like waqf that was crucial to local society, did not improve with the consolidation of Soviet power nor was it better once the taraqq-parwarlar became involved. Muslim intellectuals were put at the head of Soviet institutions, such as GVU for example, that had ambitions to alter the social and cultural situation. Such institutions however had to cope with the legacy of tsarist colonialisms administrative weakness in Central Asia. The newly created Soviet bureaucratic machine tried to appropriate tsarist administrative knowledge on the waqf issue. From 1919 on the Narkomnats collected dossiers of archival documents produced by the tsarist administration in the period 1900 1917 but found very little useful knowledge in these sources. Munawwar Qar and other modern-oriented Muslim intellectuals who staffed and directed the Glavnoe Vakufnoe Upravlenie were also involved in the last confrontation with anti-reformist exponents of the ulama over the control of waqf revenues and reforms in education, but they also had to cope with the characteristics of Turkestans post-tsarist administration. Addressing this point, Adeeb Khalid, pointed out that:
Munawwar Qar, Awlani, Ayni, Ajzi, and Haji Muin, to name only a few of the most important gures, . . . saw themselves creating a new civilizationmodern, Soviet, Central Asian, Turkic, and Muslim all at once. They hoped to coopt the state to the work of modernization . . . . As such, the Jadids in the 1920s were hardly the pawns of a monolithic Soviet regime; rather, they are best compared with fellow modernists in Iran and (especially) Turkey in the same decade, who also used the newly established apparatus of a modern centralized nation-state to revolutionize society and culture.121
They were not pawns, but nonetheless they could not effectively use the institutions they thought would lead Central Asian society towards modernity. The characteristics and shortfalls of the post-tsarist administration in Turkestan had an important role in stopping modernist Muslim intellectuals from realizing their objectives. As we have seen, during the 1920s, it is likely that waqf revenues 493

were exploited to pay the salaries of madrasa staff and to restore buildings of religious signicance. For the modernist intellectual this was not modernization. The Soviet modernizing transformation, which quickly turned into Stalins revolution from above, had very different characteristics from what Central Asian progressive ulama had hoped. Notes and references
1. Parts 1, 2 and 6 of this paper were written by N. Pianciola; parts 3, 4, 5 by P. Sartori. An earlier version of this paper beneted from the comments and suggestions of Adeeb Khalid, Marco Buttino, Jurgen Paul, Andrea Graziosi, Guido Franzinetti and an anonymous reviewer for Central Asian Survey. 2. Vladimir L. Genis, Deportatsiia russkikh iz Turkestana v 1921 godu (Delo Safarova), Voprosy istorii, No 1, 1998. 3. Terry Martin, The Afrmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923 1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp 125 181. 4. Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). 5. As a rule, there are two types of waqf: public (khayr) and familial (ahl). The rst are endowments whose founder alienated his property for charitable purposes, therefore providing institutions like schools, mosques and hospitals with revenue. The second are endowments, whose founder bequeathed part of his property to his descendants. From the legal point of view, this difference is irrelevant, while for social and economic reasons, these two forms were of different nature. In Central Asia waqf developed a mixed nature, i.e. both public and familial. 6. For these estimates see David S. Powers, Orientalism, colonialism and legal history: the attack on Muslim family endowments in Algeria and India, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol 31, No 3, 1989, p 537. 7. The issue awaits further research. Estimates based on Soviet historiography can be found in old works such as ` ` Helene Carrere dEncausse, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia (London: Tauris, 1988, or French ed. 1966) and Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 19171927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957). Park relates that endowment properties comprised between 8 and 10 per cent of the cultivated acreage in Central Asia at the end of tsarist rule, and approximately 20 per cent of cultivated acreage in the Bukharan Emirate (ibid, p 217). 8. T. Zarcone, La Turquie modern et lislam (Paris: Flammarion, 2004), p 140. 9. For instance, family waqfs were abolished in Egypt in 1952. Cf. Wakf, Encyclopedie de lIslam, 2nd edn, Vol. XI (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp 65109. The section on waqf in Central Asia was written by R. D. McChesney. See also his case study of Balkh in Afghanistan: R. D. McChesney, Waqf in Central Asia. Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 14801889 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 10. S. Knost, The waqf in court: lawsuits over religious endowments in Ottoman Aleppo, in M. Khalid Masud, R. Peters and D. S. Powers, eds, Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and Their Judgements (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp 427450. 11. On this issue, see B. Johansen, Legal literature and the problem of change: the case of the land rent, in B. Johansen, Contingency in a Sacred Law. Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp 446464. 12. A. Christelow, Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p 23. 13. Powers, op cit, Ref 7, pp 535 571. 14. In India, European domination was the product, initially, of commercial enterprise rather than direct military conquest. India was not subjected to British agricultural settlement; a far greater number of Indians Hindu and Muslim alikewere present in the colonial bureaucracy in South Asia than in North Africa. 15. Powers, op cit, Ref 6, p 563. 16. The best work on waqf in British India is G. C. Kozlowskis, Muslim Endowments and Society in British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 17. Powers, op cit, Ref 6, p 563. 18. Even though a limited number of Russian and Ukranian peasants settled in the Ferghana and Syr-Darya oblasts, only the Semireche oblast, inhabited by Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomadic pastoralists, was legally open to agricultural colonization during tsarist times.
494
WAQF IN TURKESTAN
19. Nishiyama Katsunori, Russian colonization in Central Asia: a case of Semirece, 18671922, in Komatsu Hisao, Obiya Chika, John S. Schoeberlein (eds), Migration in Central Asia: Its History and Current Problems (Osaka: The Japan Center for Area Studies, 2000), p 69. 20. In this latter administrative unit especially in the so-called Hungry Steppe, a region to the southwest of Tashkent, important agricultural and irrigation projects began to be implemented in the last years of tsarism. 21. Syr-Darya was the second oblast in Turkestan in terms of Slavic agricultural colonization. In 1911 in SyrDarya, 8 per cent of the total usable land had been occupied by Slavic settlers (mainly concentrated in the Kazakh pastoral areas), while in Semireche the gure was 14 per cent. Cf. State Archive of the Southern Kazakhstan Oblast (GAIuKO), f. 243, op. 1, d. 435, ll. 2, 1ob, report on the economic conditions of Southern Kazakhstan (1924). 22. Despite its purported provisional nature, the statute remained the colonys fundamental law until 1886. 23. Proekt polozheniia ob upravlenii Semirechenskoi i Syr-Darinskoi oblastei (11 July 1867), Art. 295, in M. G. Masevich (ed.), Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana, Vol 1 (Alma-Ata: Izd. ANKazSSR, 1960), p 306. 24. Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan (hereafter TsGARUz), f. R-36, op. 1, d. 455, ll. 23ob. 25. Ibid, ll. 2325. 26. In many cases waqf established in Bukhara included lands in the Samarkand region and vice versa: Alexander Morrison, Russian rule in Samarkand, 18681910. A comparison with British India, PhD dissertation, Oxford University, 2005, p 66. 27. Aleksandr Liudvigovich Kun (18401888) studied at the Faculty of Oriental Languages of the Sankt Petersburg University. A protege of the famous Orientalist V. V. Grigorev, he moved from Orenburg to Turkestan in 1867, where he served in the Samarkand region. In 1873 he authored a booklet for administrative use on Land rights and tax systems in Muslim Law. He took part in the Khiva (1873) and Kokand (1875) expeditions. Apparently, in both cases he was in charge of taking over Khans archives and other valuable documents and manuscripts kept by Central Asian rulers. From 1876 to 1882 he worked as the chief inspector of schools in Turkestan. In 1882 he left Central Asia for Vilno (Vilnius), where he died. Cf. B. V. Lunin (ed), Istoriograia obshchestvennykh nauk v Uzbekistane. Bio-bibliogracheskie ocherki (Tashkent: FAN, 1974), pp 203208. 28. R. S. Kats, Iz istorii vakufnogo voprosa v dorevoliutsionnom Turkestane i Sovetskom Uzbekistane, 22 February 1945, Archive of the Uzbek State Historical Museum, Samarkand, M-916, pp 8, 10. We would like to thank Marco Buttino for allowing us to use this source. The gure given in the article cited is 59,991 tanap for waqf lands in the Samarkand region. Based on archival documentation (TsGARUz, f. 1, op. 14, d. 22, l. 43). Morrison however reported the gure of 51,991 tanap (Morrison, op cit, Ref 26, p 66). 29. Polozhenie ob upravlenii Turkestanskogo kraia (2 June 1886), in Masevich (ed), op cit, Ref 23, pp 352379. The articles that deal with waqf are no. 265, 266, 267, 285, 286, 289 and 299. 30. Vladimir Petrovich Nalivkin (18521918) was one of the most important tsarist scholars of Central Asia. He arrived in Turkestan with the army, taking part in the conquest of Khiva and Kokand, but he left shortly afterwards. He was one of the most extraordinary personalities of the Russian presence in Central Asia and he wrote, together with his wife, a study on the women in the sedentary population of Ferghana based on direct observation (V. P. Nalivkin and N. Nalivkina, Ocherk byta zhenzhchiny osedlogo tuzemnogo naseleniia Fergany, Kazan, 1886). In 1917 he headed the committee of the Provisional Government in Turkestan after the February Revolution. Cf. M. Buttino, La rivoluzione capovolta. LAsia Centrale tra il crollo dellImpero zarista e la formazione dellUrss (Naples: lancora del Mediterraneo, 2003); and Z. Validi Togan, Vospominaniia. Borba musulman Turkestana i drugikh vostochnikh tiurok za natsionalnoe sushestvovanie i kulturu, Moscow, 1997 (orig. Istanbul 1969). See also his Tuzemtsy ranshe i teper (orig. Tashkent, 1913), republished in Musulmanskaia Srednaia Aziia. Traditsionalizm i XX vek (Moscow: RAN, 2004), and biographical notes in ibid, pp 13 17, 276 280. 31. V. Nalivkin, Polozhenie vakufnago dela v Turkestanskom krae, Ezhegodnik Ferganskoi oblasti, Vol. 3, 1904, p 37. 32. Ibid, p 41. 33. A. M. Iuldashev, Agrarnye otnosheniia v Turkestane (konets XIX nachalo XX vv.) (Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 1969), p 75. 34. S.N. Abashin, Islam v biurokraticheskoi praktike tsarskoi administratsii Turkestana (Vakufnoe delo dakhbitskogo medrese 18921900), Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva 155, no. 7 (Moscow: Russkaia panorama, 2003), p 183. Given how little research has been done on the subject, these can only be temporary conclusions. 35. Buttino, op cit, Ref 30, pp 246247. 36. For an early Western account based on Soviet secondary literature, see Park, op cit, Ref 7. On requisition of waqf, see S. Tursunov, Natsionalnaia politika Kommunisticheskoi Partii v Turkestane (19171924 gg.) (Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 1971) p 233; Buttino, op cit, Ref 30, p 248.
495

37. On the chaotic situation in Turkestan during the revolution and the Civil War, see Buttino, op cit, Ref 30, and A. Khalid, Turkestan v 19171922 godakh: borba za vlast na okraine Rossii, in Tragediia velikoi derzhavy: natsionalnyi vopros i raspad Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Sotsialno-politicheskaia mysl 2005), pp 189226. 38. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 394, l. 86ob (20 December 1919). 39. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 389, l. 11ob (15 March 1919) (message from the Commissariat for Nationalities to the Provisional Revolutionary Soviet). The Commissariats secretary complained that the passage of waqf management from one commissariat to another took too much time. The transfer was decided on 6 February 1919 (TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 394, l. 86). Andreev (18891939) was a Russian born in Kzyl-Orda uezd who worked as a teacher in Turkestans Russian-native schools and then taught Uzbek in the Tashkent commercial school. After the revolution and Civil War, he was known principally as a writer on historical and revolutionary subjects. Cf. Lunin, op cit, Ref 27, pp. 8487. 40. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 404, l. 44ob (10 December 1919). 41. Buttino, op cit, Ref 30, pp 292301. 42. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 152, l. 63 (5 September 1920). 43. Ibid, l. 62 (7 September 1920). 44. For example, on 20 January of 1920 the mutawall of a madrasa in the city of Kokand was elected by a con sultative assembly of the mullahs and the elders of the local community, TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 628, l. 13. On famine as a crucial factor in local politics during the Civil War in Turkestan, see Buttino, op cit, Ref 30, pp. 237 268. 45. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 394, l. 71 (9 May 1919). 46. Ibid, ll. 7078ob. 47. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 394, l. 86ob (20 December 1919). This statement was obviously drawn up by an European ofcer of Narkomnats. The colonial tone of the phrase is condescending, but similar phraseology was habitual for Bolsheviks in reference to Russian peasants as well. 48. Ibid, l. 75 (24 May 1919). 49. Ibid, ll. 66ob 69 (undated, but probably July December 1919), Pravila o poriadke ustroistva upravleniia i zavedivaniia vakufnym imushestvam Turkestanskoi Respubliki, especially Art. 4 and 10. This step was almost word for word identical to Article 265 of the Turkestan Statute of 1886. 50. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 394, l. 76. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid, l. 90. 53. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 404, ll. 44 44ob. 54. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 389, l. 8. 55. Further conrmation of institutional chaos at this time is the fact that the head of the section of the Commissariat for Nationalities asked for instructions to be sent to the various provinces before the Commissariat for Nationalities board, and especially, the TurTsIK, had given their approval, because if they had waited for sanction from these two institutions, they would have risked the initiative reaching a deadlock yet again. 56. TsAGRUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 394, l. 86ob (20 December 1919), Doklad zavedivaiushago vakufnym otdelom komissaru vnutrennykh del Turkestanskoi Respubliki. The project is in ibid, ll. 83-83ob (nd, but 1919). The text refers to the Commissariat for Nationalities and not the Home Commissariat, so we can deduce that the project was stopped between July and the beginning of December 1919, when the waqf section was still under the Commissariat for Nationalities. 57. Ibid, ll. 8383ob (nd, but 1919). 58. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 389, l. 20ob (6 March 1920). Munawwar Qar was immediately requested to nd a suitable person to become permanent head of this section of the Commisariat. 59. For the role of Musbiuro Communists and their proposal at the beginning of 1920, see Buttino, op cit, Ref 30, pp 399 402. 60. Only limited power was recognized to the Tashkent government, as Moscow directly controlled defence, foreign affairs, railways, mail and telegraphs, nance and the economy. (Buttino, op cit, Ref 30, p 402). However, education and agriculture, the main areas where waqf was an important factor, were left, at least formally, to the governments of the individual Soviet republics. 61. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 628, l. 6 (October 1920). 62. Munavvar Qori Abdurashidxonov, Tanlangan asarlar (Tashkent: Manaviyat, 2003, p 53). 63. Rezoliutsii i postanovleniia sezdov kommunisticheskoi partii Turkestana 1918 1924 gg. (Tashkent: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo Uzbekskoi SSR, 1958), p 109. 64. R. Ia. Radzhanova (ed), Turkestan v nachale XX veka: k istorii istokov natsionalnoi nezavisimosti (Tashkent, Shark, 2000), p 452. 65. TsGARUz, f. R-17, op. 1, d. 45, ll. 16 16ob, Stenogracheskie otchety zasedanyi 6 sezda kommunist. Partii i 10 sezd Turk.respub. 19211923 gg.
496
WAQF IN TURKESTAN
66. Many thanks to Adeeb Khalid for this reference. The document was published by Dina Amanzholova (ed), Rossiia i Tsentralnaia Aziia, 1905 1925 gg. Sbornik dokumentov (Karagandy: Karagandinskii GosUniversitet im. Buketova, 2005). See also Radzhanova, op cit, Ref 64, p 393 for a reference to the waqf issue in the decree. 67. TsGARUz, f. R-25, op. 1, d. 1414, ll. 55 59. 68. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 628, l. 14. The document is a petition dated 29 March 1920, addressed to the Peoples Commissariat for Enlightenment. The inhabitants of the Mr Abad district of Tashkent complained that the mullahs and imams working in two of the districts old mosques had agreed with the mutawall to change the conditions in the leases of some shops, which was part of a waqf supporting the mosques. The petitioners asked the Commissariat to intervene and restore the previous leasing conditions. 69. Kats, op cit, Ref 28, p 13. 70. The research concerning the period 1920 1924 proted from the material gathered in the Narkompros fond in TsGARUz. It is signicant that certicates issued by qadi courts on waqf property are nearly completely absent from this collection. 71. The articles in the decree are suspiciously similar to the articles on waqf in the 1886 Statutemaking the Soviet decree a sort of legislative restoration of the status quo ante. Particularly Article 3 of the Soviet decree ratifying the distribution of agricultural waqf lands to peasants is clearly derived from Art. 265 of the 1886 Statute. The 1922 decree states: The right of use to all waqf lands of agricultural interest is granted to dehkan and all matters pertaining to this land are regulated following the laws of Soviet power on land use (TsGARUz, f. R-38, op. 2, d. 254, l. 24, 10 June 1922). This is the text of the 1886 Statute: The populated land [naselennye zemli, where peasant communities were present], that is part of waqf land and recognized by government, shall remain in use by the agricultural communities, based on Articles 255 261, 263 and 264 of this Statute [i.e. the articles regulating land use in the colony, equivalent to the laws of Soviet power on land use in the 1922 decree] (Polozhenie ob upravlenii Turkestanskogo kraia, 2 June 1886, reported in Masevich, op cit, Ref 23, p 373). 72. A similar collegial body was to be established at the oblast level if the number of madrasas was less than 40 in whole oblast (for instance in the Tashkent oblast). 73. Differently from the Northern Caucasus where it acted as a shariatic tribunal, in Soviet Turkestan the mahkama-i shariyya was an institution staffed by Muslim jurists, who advised the indigenous population on legal matters. At the same time, in issuing authoritative judicial opinions ( fatwa) and publishing articles in the local press, mahkama-i shariyya sided with the major campaigns launched by the Soviet government, such as the modernization of Islamic education, anti-Basmachi propaganda and land-reform. The procedure which led to the establishment of an institution such as this in the year 1919 is still a controversial issue. The expression mahkama-i shariyya was certainly in use in Turkestan in the late years of the tsarist empire to refer to the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly established by Catherine II in Ufa, cf. Malumat zhurnal, al-Islah, 1 March 1916, p 159. This may suggest a close analogy between the two institutions For other infor mation, see P. Sartori, The Tashkent Ulama and the Soviet State (19201938): a preliminary research note based on NKVD documents, in P. Sartori and T. Trevisani (eds), Patterns of Transformation In and Around Uzbekistan (Reggio Emilia: Edizioni Diabasis, 2007), pp 161184. On mahkama-i shariyya in North Caucasus during the Soviet period, see V. Bobrovnikov, Makhkama shariya, in Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiiskoi imperii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar, Vol 1 (Moscow, 2006), pp 263265. 74. Talaba, Achq khatt, Haqqat, No 1, 10 August 1922, back cover. 75. Mahkama-i shariyya idaras, Achq khattga jawab, Haqqat, No 2, 15 September 1922, cover page verso. 76. Mahkama-i shariyyada, Turkistan, 14 October 1922, p 3. 77. TsGARUz, f. R-904, op. 1, d. 40, l. 146. 78. TsGARUz, f. R-39, op. 2, 133, ll. 13. 79. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 2272, ll. 24, Polozhenie o poriadke i sposobe provedeniia dekreta TurTsIKa ot 28-go Dekabria 1922 g. 80. His autobiography can be found in RGASPI, f. 62, op. 4, d. 633, ll. 100100ob. We thank Adeeb Khalid for this reference. 81. TsGARUz, f. R-25, op. 1, d. 1029, ll. 7373ob. The original Uzbek-language message of the Tashkent Old City Executive Committee to the mahkama-i shariyya can be found in TsGARUz, f. R-25, op. 1, d. 1029, l. 74. 82. TsGARUz, f. R-25, op. 1, d. 1423, ll. 112-133ob, V Turkestanskii Tsentralnyi Ispolnitelnyi Komitet. Ot predsedatelia Glavnogo Vakufnogo Uprovleniia pri Narkomprose Khalmukhameda AkhunovaDoklad. 83. TsGARUz, f. R-25, op. 1, d. 1423, l. 112. 84. TsGARUz, f. R-25, op. 1, d. 1425, ll. 116 117, Zamestiteliu predsedatelia soveta narodnykh komissarov Turkrespubliki tovarishchu Parkutskomu, ot predsedatelia Glavnogo Vakufnogo Upravleniia Turkrespubliki Akhunova KhalmukhamedaDokladnaia zapiska.
497

85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. Rezoliutsii i postanovleniia, op cit, Ref 63, p 178. TsGARUz, f. R-25, op. 1, d. 1425, l. 91, V sekretariat Sovnarkoma TASSR. Ibid, ll. 9293ob. Ibid, l. 94. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 2274, l. 23. Zahr al-Dn Aclams election in 1926 inamed Tashkents Muslim population. Cf. TsGARUz, f. R-904, op. 1, d. 32, ll. 1010ob. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 2274, l. 25. Ibid, l. 23. TsGARUz, f. R-25, op. 1, d. 1425, ll. 105 105ob. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 2274, ll. 28 28ob. Ibid, l. 30. Ibid, l. 24. Ibid, l. 26. These norms stated that a certain amount of farm land should be distributed on the basis of the number of people who were able to work on it, in accordance with a dened ratio. TsGARUz, f. R-25, op. 1, d. 1414, ll. 49 51. TsGARUz, f. R-25, op. 1, d. 1425, ll. 92 93ob. TsGARUz, f. R-24, op. 1, d. 2273, ll. 14 14ob. Kats, op cit, Ref 28, p 17. The TsIK decree on Uzbekistan, initiating its land water reform was published on 2 December 1925; cf. Park, op cit, Ref 7, p 220. According to Joseph Castagne, La Reforme agraire au Turkestan, Revue des Etudes Islamiques, No. 11 (1928), pp 396 397, and E. L. Shteinberg, Ocherki istorii Turkmenii (Moscow, 1934), pp 116117, waqf in Turkmenistan had already been totally supressed in 1925. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 2284, l. 20. Ibid, l. 19. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 2299, l. 30ob. The names of the Andijan waqf sections staff can be veried in ibid, 6. Ibid, l. 29ob. Ibid, l. 27ob. Ibid, l. 28ob. Ibid, l. 27ob. Ibid, l. 6. Ibid, ll. 3131ob. Ibid, l. 2. TsGARUz, f. R-34, op. 1, d. 2280, l. 136. Ibid, l. 8. Ibid, l. 10. Ibid, ll. 15ob 15. Cf. Adeeb Khalid, Backwardness and the quest for civilization: early Soviet Central Asia in comparative perspective, and Adrienne Edgar, Bolshevism, patriarchy, and the nation: the Soviet emancipation of Muslim women in pan-Islamic perspective, Slavic Review, Vol 65, No 2, 2006, pp 231251 and 252272. A study of policy towards Muslim women with a strong comparative approach is Marianne Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan. Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). For the Ottoman case see Vakf. IV, Encyclopedie de lIslam, op cit, Ref 9, p 97. Under the Safavids, in Iran the waqf was administered by a state institution called sadr, on this issue see B. Fragner, Social and internal economic affairs, in P. Jackson and L. Lockhart (eds), The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol 6 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp 519 521. On 16 March 1922 the GPU wrote from Samarkand that in many districts the Basmachi had created their own systems for collecting contributions and taxes in kind. Because of the terror they aroused, in several cases Soviet organizations supplied commodities and other goods requested by the guerrillas (A. Berelowitch and V. Danilov (ed), Sovetskaia derevnia glazami VChK-OGPU-NKVD. Dokumenty i materialy. Vol 1. 19181922 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998), p 587). Khalid, op cit, Ref 4, pp 299 300.
103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118.
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Central Asian Survey

Central Asian Survey (December 2007) 26(4), 475 498

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