matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object.

So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.a

[5.] [T]o judge the law as normative is to judge it to be just and to admit that it ought to be obeyed. The concepts of the normativity of the law and of the obligation to obey it are analytically tied together. Kelsen, therefore, regards the law as valid, that is, normative, only if one ought to obey it.s
16.l If certain acts of certain physical persons are valid as acts not of these persons but of another person, distinguished from them, then a special case of imputation is present. The material fact located (gelegen) in the activity of these persons is not imputed to these persons themselves but to another person. The imputation point does not, however, come within the scope of another human being. Imputation proceeds, so to speak, through the human beings, acting physically, and through their psychical will and does not stop with another physical person either, as is the case, for example, with liability for damages brought about by children or employees and which will be imputed to the father or to the employer respectively. Rather,

all the lines of imputation are united in a common, thought [or conceptualized] point that stands beyond every physical subject.6

l7.l If there is the necessity of an absolute 'must' when the law of nature links cause and effect, so there is the equally rigorous 'ought' when the law of normativity (Rechtsgesetz) sets out the synthesis of conditioning and conditioned material facts. In the sphere of the law, [that is, in] 'legal reality',...delict is linked to punishment with the same necessity as, in the sphere of nature or in 'natural reality', cause is linked to e-ffect.7

David Hume, ATreatise on Humrtn Nature (first publ. l73g-40),2nd edn., ed. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), III.i.1. (at pp. 468-9) (emphasis in original).

5JosephRaz,'Kelsen'sTheoryof
105, repr. in Normativity and

thiBasicNorm', AmericaiJournalof Jurisprudence,Ig(1974),94-lll,at Norms. Criticql Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed. Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) [hereafter: NI'11,41-67, at60.
6

Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Tbingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1911), 183 (emphasis in original), repr. in Hans KelsenWerke, ed. Matthias Jestaedt, voI. 2 (Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008),293-4. 7 Hans Kelsen, "'Forward" to the Second Printing of Ma in Problems in the Theory of Public /-aw' (first publ. 1923), in Normativity and Norms (n. 5),3-22, at 5.