Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

104269 November 11, 1993 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.,Respondents. VITUG, J.: For consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of nonsuability of the state.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution, 1dated 27 November 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, denying the petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on petitioner's property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract 3on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards, the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another contract, dated 01 May 1990, between the same parties. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, 4before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-90 (or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket number), against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. 5commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit Toyota Crown. 6These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal,

effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On 27 November 1991, the NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution; viz: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are issued: chanrobles virtual law library 1. The enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner in NLRC RABX Cases Nos. 10-10-00455-90; 10-10-0481-90 and 10-10-0051990 are temporarily suspended for a period of two (2) months, more or less, but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991 to enable petitioner to source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it; chanrobles virtual law library 2. Meantime, petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within the period above-stated and to deposit the sums of money equivalent to the aggregate amount. it has been adjudged to pay jointly and severally with respondent Sultan Security Agency with the Regional Arbitration Branch X, Cagayan de Oro City within the same period for proper dispositions; chanrobles virtual law library 3. In order to ensure compliance with this order, petitioner is likewise directed to put up and post sufficient surety and supersedeas bond equivalent to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary award issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court or by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the money claims in case of failure or default on the part of petitioner to satisfy the money claims; chanrobles virtual law library 4. The City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of petitioner levied on execution within ten (10) days from notice of the posting of sufficient surety or supersedeas bond as specified above. In the meanwhile, petitioner is assessed to pay the costs and/or expenses incurred by the City Sheriff, if any, in connection with the execution of the judgments in the above-stated cases upon presentation of the appropriate claims or vouchers and receipts by the city Sheriff, subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Sheriff, subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs; chanrobles virtual law library 5. The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement against each other for any payments made in connection with the satisfaction of the judgments herein is hereby recognized pursuant to the ruling in the Eagle Security case, (supra). In case of dispute between the judgment debtors, the Executive Labor Arbiter of the Branch of origin may upon proper petition by any of the parties conduct arbitration proceedings for the purpose and thereby render his decision after due notice and hearings; chanrobles virtual law library 7. Finally, the petition for injunction is Dismissed for lack of basis. The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued is Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof, a Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of two (2) months but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991, conditioned upon the posting of a surety or supersedeas bond by petitioner within ten (10) days from notice pursuant to paragraph 3 of this disposition. The motion to admit the complaint in intervention is Denied for lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed by Duty Sheriff is Noted SO ORDERED. In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More

importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent," 7reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. 8It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 9True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. 10We have had occasion, to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. 11 chanrobles virtual law library The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. 12The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law 13 or a special law. 14In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." 15 Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim 16 or when it enters into a contract. 17In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 18 chanrobles virtual law library In the Unites States of America vs. Ruiz, 19where the questioned transaction dealt with improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay, we held: The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them - between sovereign and governmental acts ( jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary act ( jure gestionisis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State

immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for not dedicated to commercial or business purposes. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . . Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Thus, in Carabao, Inc., vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission, 20we ruled: (C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed." We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it. tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. 21 In Republic vs. Villasor 22this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must

be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. 23 chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED.

CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORIANO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, and ROSELLA ROBALE, respondents. G.R. No. 84645 March 19, 1993 ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO GRAMPA, ANGELITO GUTIERREZ, BERNABE LAKINDANUM, ROBERTO YUMUL, LEOPOLDO ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR. EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA ROBALE, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, respondents. The Solicitor General for the Republic of the Philippines. Structural Alternative Legal Assistance for Grassroots for petitioners in 84645 & private respondents in 84607. CAMPOS, JR., J.: People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. It is quite ironic that then, some journalists called it a Black Thursday, as a grim reminder to the nation of the misfortune that befell twelve (12) rallyists. But for most Filipinos now, the Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter in our history books. For those however,

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO, MAJ. FILEMON GASMEN, PAT. NICANOR ABANDO, PFC SERAFIN CEBU, JR., GEN. BRIGIDO PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE, PFC ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT. JOSE MENDIOLA, PAT. NELSON TUASON, POLICE CORPORAL PANFILO ROGOS, POLICE LT. JUAN B. BELTRAN, PAT. NOEL MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS TRAINEE (3CT) NOLITO NOGATO, 3CT ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS, 3CT AGERICO LUNA, 3CT BASILIO BORJA, 3CT MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO GERVACIO, 3CT MANUEL DELA CRUZ, JR., MARINE (CDC) BN., (CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL), MOBILE DISPERSAL TEAM (MDT), LT. ROMEO PAQUINTO, LT. LAONGLAANG GOCE, MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA CRUZ, POLICE CAPTAIN RODOLFO NAVAL, JOHN DOE, RICHARD DOE, ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER DOES, petitioners, vs. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN

who have become widows and orphans, certainly they would not settle for just that. They seek retribution for the lives taken that will never be brought back to life again. Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 84645, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Orders of respondent Judge Sandoval, 1 dated May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing the complaint for damages of herein petitioners against the Republic of the Philippines in Civil Case No. 88-43351. Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy, docketed as G.R. No. 84607, seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil Case No. 88-43351 entitled "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." The pertinent portion of the questioned Order 2 dated May 31, 1988, reads as follows: With respect however to the other defendants, the impleaded Military Officers, since they are being charged in their personal and official capacity, and holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government, the principle of immunity from suit can not conveniently and correspondingly be applied to them. WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant Republic of the Philippines is hereby dismissed. As against the rest of the defendants the motion to dismiss is denied. They are given a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this order within which to file their respective pleadings. On the other hand, the Order 3, dated August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by both parties, for a reconsideration of the abovecited Order, respondent Judge finding no cogent reason to disturb the said order. The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment by members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco Administration Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City. The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments. The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January 15, 1987. The two days that followed saw a marked increase in people at the encampment. It was only on January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to meet with then Minister Heherson Alvarez, only to be informed that the Minister can only meet with him the following day. On January 20, 1987, the meeting was held at the MAR conference room. Tadeo demanded that the minimum comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez, for his part, can only promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President Aquino, during the cabinet meeting on January 21, 1987.

Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their seventh day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices. They hoisted the KMP flag together with the Philippine flag. At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with Tadeo and his leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and just allow the government to implement its comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo, however, countered by saying that he did not believe in the Constitution and that a genuine land reform cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated discussion ensued between Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a negotiating panel from each side to meet again the following day. On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacaang to air their demands. Before the march started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media. He uttered fiery words, the most telling of which were: ". . . inalis namin ang barikada bilang kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero kinakailangan alisin din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola sapagkat bubutasin din namin iyon at dadanak ang dugo . . . ." 4 The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacaang, from Quezon Memorial Circle, at 10:00 a.m. They were later joined by members of other sectoral organizations such as the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML). At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio where they held a brief program. It was at this point that some of the marchers entered the eastern side of the Post Office Building, and removed the steel bars surrounding the garden. Thereafter, they joined the march to Malacaang. At about 4:30 p.m., they reached C.M. Recto Avenue. In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to break through the police lines and rush towards Malacaang, CAPCOM Commander General Ramon E. Montao inspected the preparations and adequacy of the government forces to quell impending attacks. OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the vicinity of Malacaang. The civil disturbance control units of the Western Police District under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim were also activated. Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA elements and that an insurrection was impending. The threat seemed grave as there were also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University would be forcibly occupied. In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically tasked to investigate the facts surrounding the incident, Commission for short) stated that the government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola in a formation of three phalanges, in the following manner:

(1) The first line was composed of policemen from police stations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and the Chinatown detachment of the Western Police District. Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, was designated as ground commander of the CDC first line of defense. The WPD CDC elements were positioned at the intersection of Mendiola and Legarda Streets after they were ordered to move forward from the top of Mendiola bridge. The WPD forces were in khaki uniform and carried the standard CDC equipment aluminum shields, truncheons and gas masks. (2) At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards behind the WPD policemen were the elements of the Integrated National Police (INP) Field Force stationed at Fort Bonifacio from the 61st and 62nd INP Field Force, who carried also the standard CDC equipment truncheons, shields and gas masks. The INP Field Force was under the command of Police Major Demetrio dela Cruz. (3) Forming the third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control Battalion composed of the first and second companies of the Philippine Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio. The marines were all equipped with shields, truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites) slung at their backs, under the command of Major Felimon B. Gasmin. The Marine CDC Battalion was positioned in line formation ten (10) yards farther behind the INP Field Force. At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks, occupying the entire width of Mendiola street, followed immediately by two water cannons, one on each side of the street and eight fire trucks, four trucks on each side of the street. The eight fire trucks from Fire District I of Manila under Fire Superintendent Mario C. Tanchanco, were to supply water to the two water cannons. Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two Mobile Dispersal Teams (MDT) each composed of two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an assistant grenadier, a driver and the team leader. In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4 of Malacaang stood the VOLVO Mobile Communications Van of the Commanding General of CAPCOM/INP, General Ramon E. Montao. At this command post, after General Montao had conferred with TF Nazareno Commander,Colonel Cezar Nazareno, about the adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was agreed that Police General Alfredo S. Lim would designatePolice Colonel Edgar Dula Torres and Police Major Conrado Francisco as negotiators with the marchers. Police General Lim then proceeded to the WPD CDC elements already positioned at the foot of Mendiola bridge to relay to Police Colonel Torres and Police Major Francisco the instructions that the

latter would negotiate with the marchers. 5 (Emphasis supplied) The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place between the marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment that a clash occurred and, borrowing the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". The Commission stated in its findings, to wit: . . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of pillboxes, stones and bottles. Steel bars, wooden clubs and lead pipes were used against the police. The police fought back with their shields and truncheons. The police line was breached. Suddenly shots were heard. The demonstrators disengaged from the government forces and retreated towards C.M. Recto Avenue. But sporadic firing continued from the government forces. After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt. Romeo Paquinto and Lt. Laonglaan Goce sped towards Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at the remaining rallyist still grouped in the vicinity of Mendiola. After dispersing the crowd, the two MDTs, together with the two WPD MDTs, proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio upon order of General Montao to disperse the rallyists assembled thereat. Assisting the MDTs were a number of policemen from the WPD, attired in civilian clothes with white head bands, who were armed with long firearms. 6 (Emphasis ours) After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead, although according to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able to give the name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers. Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot wounds and twenty (20) suffered minor physical injuries such as abrasions, contusions and the like. In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11, 7 (A.O. 11, for brevity) dated January 22, 1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body was composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria and Mr. Antonio U. Miranda, both as members. A.O. 11 stated that the Commission was created precisely for the "purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission was expected to have submitted its findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do so. Consequently, the deadline was moved to February 16, 1987 by Administrative Order No. 13. Again, the Commission was unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on February 27, 1987, it submitted its report, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 17, issued on February 11, 1987.

In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit: (1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together with the other sectoral groups, was not covered by any permit as required under Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985, in violation of paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under paragraph (a), Section 14 of said law. (2) The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were armed with .38 and .45 caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a prohibited act under paragraph 4(g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. (3) The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field Force, the Marines and supporting military units, as well as the security officers of the police and military commanders were in civilian attire in violation of paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880. (4) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military crowd dispersal control units in dispersing the marchers, a prohibited act under paragraph (e), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. (5) The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden clubs with spikes, and guns by the marchers as offensive weapons are prohibited acts punishable under paragraph (g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. (6) The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials and were determined to march to Malacaang, emboldened as they are, by the inflammatory and incendiary utterances of their leader, Jaime Tadeo "bubutasin namin ang barikada . . Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom na magsasaka ay gagawa ng sariling butas. . . (7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces. Upon approaching the intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers began pushing the police lines and penetrated and broke through the first line of the CDC contingent. (8) The police fought back with their truncheons and shields. They stood their ground but the CDC line was breached. There ensued gunfire from both sides. It is not clear who started the firing.

(9) At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the rioting crowd. (10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because (a) there was no order to use them; (b) they were incorrectly prepositioned; and (c) they were out of range of the marchers. (11) Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the rioters. After the crowd had dispersed and the wounded and dead were being carried away, the MDTs of the police and the military with their tear gas equipment and components conducted dispersal operations in the Mendiola area and proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the remnants of the marchers. (12) No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official reason was given for its absence. 8 From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended 9 the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers. In connection with this, it was the Commission's recommendation that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to undertake investigations regarding the identities of those who actually fired their guns that resulted in the death of or injury to the victims of the incident. The Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District and the INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be prosecuted for violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The Commission's recommendation also included the prosecution of the marchers, for carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose identities have yet to be established. As for Jaime Tadeo, the Commission said that he should be prosecuted both for violation of paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 for holding the rally without a permit and for violation of Article 142, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code for inciting to sedition. As for the following officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E. Montao; (2) Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3) Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar Nazareno; and (5) Maj. Felimon Gasmin, for their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola, administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed. The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the government. Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by the victims. Thus, on July 27, 1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao group) filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the Government. 10 This formal demand was indorsed by the office of the Executive Secretary to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on August 13, 1987. The House Committee on Human Rights, on February

10, 1988, recommended the expeditious payment of compensation to the Mendiola victims. 11 After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to institute an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident, before the trial court. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43351. On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16, 1988, maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights. Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint as against the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver by the State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration therefrom, but the same was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988. Consequently, Caylao and her copetitioners filed the instant petition. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and personnel impleaded as defendants in the court below, filed its petition for certiorari. Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically identical issues, the two (2) petitions were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision. The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit. Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to be sued. Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 12 It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. 13 This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." 14 In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads: 1 Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court. 15 In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body. Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit. Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; (3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. Although the military officers and
16

personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. 19 As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military and police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter. While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another." 23 The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 169304 March 13, 2007

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT, USEC. MA. MARGARITA GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ, Petitioners, vs. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC., Respondent.

DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Assailed via petition for review are issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84457, to wit:a) Decision[1] dated May 12, 2005 which affirmed the order issued by Judge Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264 denying petitioners motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 68208; and b) Resolution[2] dated August 9, 2005 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in thePhilippines. On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27,[3] Series of 1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products. A.O. No. 27 was later amended by A.O. No. 10,[4] Series of 2000, providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH).Part V of A.O. No. 10 reads, in part: 1.Drug Manufacturer, Drug Trader and Drug Importer shall be allowed to apply for accreditation. 2.Accreditation shall be done by the Central Office-Department of Health. 3.A separate accreditation is required for the drug suppliers and for their specific products. xxxx

12.Only products accredited by the Committee shall be allowed to be procured by the DOH and all other entities under its jurisdiction.[5] (Underscoring supplied) On May 9, 2000[6] and May 29, 2000,[7] respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic Penicillin G Benzathine.Based on the schedule provided by petitioner DOH, it appears that processing of and release of the result of respondents request were due on September 2000, the last month of the quarter following the date of its filing.[8]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids[9] for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract). Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondents request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract.When the bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid at P82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS Laboratories (YSS) bid of P95.00 per unit.In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondents Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS. Respondent thus filed a complaint[10] for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City praying, inter alia, that the trial court nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract (IFB No. 2000-10-11 [14]) to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct defendant DOH, defendant Romualdez, defendant Galon anddefendant Lopez to declare plaintiff Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company and adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff, for [the therein specified damages].[11] In their Comment,[12] petitioner DOH, Secretary Alberto Romualdez, Jr. who was later succeeded by petitioner Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit, and individual petitioners Undersecretaries Margarita Galon and Antonio Lopez argued for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit in view of the express reservation made by petitioner DOH to accept or reject any or all bids without incurring liability to the bidders, they positing that government agencies have such full discretion. Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion[13] (motion to dismiss) praying for the outright dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity.Additionally, they alleged that respondents representative was not duly authorized by its board of directors to file the complaint. To petitioners motion to dismiss, respondent filed its comment/opposition[14] contending, in the main, that the doctrine of state immunity is not applicable considering that individual petitioners are

being sued both in their official and personal capacities, hence, they, not the state, would be liable for damages. By Order of December 8, 2003, the trial court[15] denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,[16] petitioners filed a petition for certiorari[17] with the Court of Appeals, before which they maintained that the suit is against the state. By the assailed Decision[18] of May 12, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Order.And by Resolution of August 9, 2005, it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for review which raises the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss. The petition fails. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government.In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review,[19] and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party. [20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In its complaint, respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity.Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit.[21]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Moreover, part of the reliefs prayed for by respondent is the enjoinment of the implementation, as well as the nullification of the award to YSS, the grant of which may not be enforced against individual petitioners and their successors except in their official capacities as officials of the DOH. [22]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus.Under Section 1, Rule 58[23] of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person.Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.[24] As regards individual petitioners suability for damages, the following discussion on the applicability of the defense of state immunity from suit is relevant. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have now adopted as part of the law of the land.[25]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.[26]The suit is regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them. [27]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.Shauf v. Court of Appeals[28] elucidates: It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff.As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.,[29] Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others.Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.[30]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of illegal[ly] abus[ing] their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law[31] is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles.For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.[32] It bears stressing, however, that the statements in the immediately foregoing paragraph in no way reflect a ruling on the actual liability of petitioners to respondent.The mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his personal capacity does not automatically remove the same from the protection of the doctrine of state immunity.Neither, upon the other hand, does the mere invocation of official character suffice to insulate such official from suability and liability for an act committed without or in excess of his or her authority.[33]These are matters of evidence which should be presented and proven at the trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.The assailed Decision dated May 12, 2005 and Resolution dated August 9, 2005 issued by the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997] MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, Petitioner, v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, Respondents.

DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,1 is invoked by petitioner in its

bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution. The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC 1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders: a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met: a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a

managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.8 Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a selfexecuting provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the

Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State. Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding. Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place. Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner. We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is

self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of selfexecuting, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.15 Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens? THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED? MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens ? MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera(underscoring supplied by respondents). MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style. MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the selfexecuting nature of constitutional provisions. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not selfexecuting and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation20 speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity,21 the sanctity of family life,22 the vital role of the youth in nationbuilding,23 the promotion of social justice,24 and the values of education.25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance26 refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights27 and on education.28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato29 cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare,30 the sanctity of family life,31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building32 and the promotion of total human liberation and development.33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur. On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very

words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission34 explains The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people. We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.37 During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic. For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and

management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that theFilipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized. MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS. xxxx MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference? MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens? MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President. MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention? MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino. MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities. MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary xxxx MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again. MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question. MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference? MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously. MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred? MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes. MR. FOZ. Thank you.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo43 Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the common good. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.44 The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.46 When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since theFilipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being. Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to theFilipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law. This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum. The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not

have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of action. Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here. Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul -a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country.51 This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007

"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion." Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice,Respondent. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads: SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003." SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation. In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance? We shall discuss these issues jointly. Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3 In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following: xxxx Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual

citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no concern and competence over. Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance is involved. Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained. xxxx Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance. Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House. xxxx Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship. Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4 (Emphasis supplied.) From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the

supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.7 For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.8 To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship. Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.12 The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 171396

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171409 May 3, 2006

NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171485 May 3, 2006

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171483 May 3, 2006

G.R. No. 171424

May 3, 2006

LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTORGENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary.1 Superior strength the use of force cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty. Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts "with a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity."2 These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional. Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free people combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license?3 On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus: NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners, vs. HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171400 May 3, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,Respondents. G.R. No. 171489 May 3, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x

decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. She cited the following facts as bases: WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDFCPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004; WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President; WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media; WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country; WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy; WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State; WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government; WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present dangerto the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people; On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus: WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004; WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government; WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country; WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy; WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State; WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government; WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people; WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency; NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country; I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads: WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency; WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary; WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger. During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners counsels. The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues. On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to "show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." 5 On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.6 Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground. On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National Peoples Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the "Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I." On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: "All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty."

On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his groups plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Armys elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo."8 B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio. Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal declared: "The Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it."9 On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field." He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the Presidents ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006. Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.10 By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region. For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."11 Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.12 According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.13 A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a strong presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government." The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow "standards set by the government during the state of national emergency." Director General Lomibao stated that "if they do not follow the standards and the standards are - if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for "balanced reporting" from broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is threatened.14

Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions. When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police. Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody. Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite. Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay indefinitely. Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in these petitions. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent. In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017. In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute

"usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so." In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1)they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances. In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of Article III, (c) Section 2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code." And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are "unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for being moot;second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the peoples right to free expression and redress of grievances. On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may be summarized as follows: A. PROCEDURAL: 1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic. 2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424(Legarda) have legal standing. B. SUBSTANTIVE:

1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017. 2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional. a. Facial Challenge b. Constitutional Basis c. As Applied Challenge A. PROCEDURAL First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks. I- Moot and Academic Principle One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation -The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.22 But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity."23 Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.24 Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.25 The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021. Such contention lacks merit. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,26 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical

use or value.27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness.29 The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative."30 The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34 All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans Separate Opinion inSanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice. II- Legal Standing In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."37 In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."38Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down inBeauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:40 "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied." However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman.43 The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,45 Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works47 and AntiChinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.48 However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,50 this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.51

Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance." Pertinent are the following cases: (1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi; (2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,53 wherein the Court held that "given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement; (3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that "Balikatan 02-01" involves the exercise of Congress taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,55that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed. By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal standing. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples organization does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered. In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court reiterated the "direct injury" test with respect to concerned

citizens cases involving constitutional issues. It held that "there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act." In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson. Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions. The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners inG.R. No. 171409, CachoOlivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing. In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights. In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,63 and Taada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,66 the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the

transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules. It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases."1avvphil.net This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people68 but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.69 B. SUBSTANTIVE I. Review of Factual Bases Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation. The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,72Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining "political questions," particularly

those questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government."75 Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances, "under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.77 There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question.78Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that "in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God."79 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80 -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar toLansang. While the Court considered the Presidents "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.81 It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of powerbut also of duty.82 As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious

threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and Doctrines of Several Political on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency G.O. No. 5 Theorists

relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.87 John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: "I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship."88 Nicollo Machiavellis view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory, thus: Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra constitutional measures; for although they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying it.89 Machiavelli in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective constitutional restraints.90 Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by constitutional democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.91 Frederick M. Watkins saw "no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of liberal institutions," provided it "serves to protect established institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of political life."92 He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance:increasing administrative powers of the executive, while at the same time "imposing limitation upon that power."93 Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a dictatorship: "The period of dictatorship must be relatively shortDictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in characterFinal authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never rest with the dictator himself"94 and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be "strict political conservatism." Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.95 "It is a problem of concentrating power in a government where power has consciously been divided to cope with situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and to what end." 96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers, to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the constitutional order."97

This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency. A glimpse at the various political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion. John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative "power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and sometimes even against it."84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that "the people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven."85 Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government in time of emergency. According to him: The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse... If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the peoples first intention is that the State shall not perish.86 Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he termed it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling to rely upon an "appeal to heaven." Instead, he

Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar, Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of "constitutional dictatorship" as solution to the vexing problems presented by emergency.98 Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the "constitutional dictatorship," thus: 1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional order 2) the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator 3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provisions for its termination 4) all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements 5) no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . . 6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in character or effect 7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . . 8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship. . . 9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . . 10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted 11) the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship99 Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins. He would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional investigating committees.100 Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying that, "the suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of

grave danger to the nation is not based upon sound constitutional theory." To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term "dictator" is used in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering emergency powers. However used, "constitutional dictatorship" cannot be divorced from the implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the "concept of constitutionalism" articulated by Charles H. McIlwain: A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping government responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism with "limited" as distinguished from "weak" government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed.101 In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists - from Locks "theory of prerogative," to Watkins doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwains "principle of constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks. Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jacksons "balanced power structure."102Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations. a. "Facial Challenge"

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens. A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for. First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.103 A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104 the US Supreme Court held that "we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment" (freedom of speech). Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it was held: It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum ofconduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further: The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the

unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties. In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that: [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, theimpact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists. Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted. Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."110 It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017 Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017. The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: "by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion" Second provision: "and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;" Third provision: "as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency." First Provision: Calling-out Power The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,111 this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to declare a "state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyos authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides: SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. President Arroyos declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privatelyowned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.

Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power. The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."113 In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,114 an authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides: A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires. Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. Second Provision: "Take Care" Power The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,115 the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath

or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its laws."116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the Department of Interior and Local Government.119 Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." \ Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted120 from Former President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-inChief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"? PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following: Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders. President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.121 This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. Third Provision: Power to Take Over The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states: x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.

The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads: Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017? The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial law" thinking of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over "the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national emergency." Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers. This is an area that needs delineation. A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise. Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads: SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (callingout power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other.123 Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must policy declared by Congress.124 be exercised to carry out a national

It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the Presidents military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nations lawmakers, not for its military authorities. Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the Presidents power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. . ."126 Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a limited view of "emergency." Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception.127 Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic,128 b) natural disaster,129 and c) national security.130 "Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. 131 This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus: MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committees definition of "national emergency" which appears in Section 13, page 5? It reads: When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,125 held:

MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat example, calamities or natural disasters.

from external

aggression,

for

during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privatelyowned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE" One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow. Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury." In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the basis was PP 1017. And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were "turned away and dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017. Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional? Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.136 The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an

MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots? MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term "national emergency." MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government service.132 xxxxxx MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national emergency" refers to military national emergency or could this be economic emergency?" MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations. MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133 It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis. "x x x After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively." Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her

invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights. Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.138 This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago. President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are "acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who receives them.139 They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object.140 For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must bereasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence." Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is invariably associated with "invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase "acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism. In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition of terrorism" confronts not only our country, but the international community as well. The following observations are quite apropos: In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the "fight against terrorism" has become one of the basic slogans when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups operating internationally. Lists of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to criteria that are not always known to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests. The basic problem underlying all these military actions or threats of the use of force as the most recent by the United States against Iraq consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism. Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.

The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One countrys terrorist is another countrys freedom fighter." The apparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term "terrorism" may further be demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the time, but later became internationally respected statesmen. What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts from eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense? Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate "terrorism" with any violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is concerned. The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting categorization of organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims the Kashmiri resistance groups who are terrorists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan the earlier Contras in Nicaragua freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the Socialist camp or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of those perceptions. How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the same group and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of terrorism will "fluctuate" accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a "liberation struggle," not of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa. The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because of these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double standards" on this vital issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence. This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of sovereign states and not of peoples, in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! has become even more serious in the present global power constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former great

powers of the Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.141 The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon. So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled "Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations." The word "terrorism" is mentioned in the following provision: "That one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion temporal x x x." P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define "acts of terrorism." Since there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal. We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.) The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."142 The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.143

In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried to push him" inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No. 880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh,he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and x x x. Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.146Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.147 But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble. Section 4 of Article III guarantees: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. "Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from

the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required. The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, thus: Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge. On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacaangs directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that "freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent."149 Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated. Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.150 The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a persons right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure. G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press. Petitioners narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily Tribunes offices were searched without warrant;second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at about

1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices. Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was "meant to show a strong presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they do not follow the standards and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national security is threatened.151 The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure.Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives. Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff152 this Court held that -As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum" newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive

government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.153Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.154 Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribunes offices and the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible "for any purpose," thus: JUSTICE CALLEJO: You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the clippings. Is that not in admission of the admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the Tribune? SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO: Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and these are inadmissible for any purpose.155 xxxxxxxxx SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those past issues. So why do you have to go there at 1 oclock in the morning and without any search warrant? Did they become suddenly part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what? SOLGEN BENIPAYO: Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions. SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based on Proclamation 1017. SOLGEN BENIPAYO: It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says that the police could go and inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: Is it based on any law? SOLGEN BENIPAYO: As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no. SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever? SOLGEN BENIPAYO: Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I dont know if it is premature to say this, we do not condone this. If the people who have been injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there are remedies for this.156 Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor General, illegal and cannot be condoned, thus: CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory. SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO: I dont know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a misapplication of the law. These are acts of the police officers, that is their responsibility.157 The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and "should result in no constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter." The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal. In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral part of thisponencia. SUMMATION

In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5. On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLUKMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities. It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty.

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.158 WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution isCONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of theTribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement, and

ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Petitioners, vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 178554 KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its Chairperson Elmer Labog, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLUKMU), represented by its National President Joselito V. Ustarez and Secretary General Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, represented by its Executive Director Daisy Arago, Petitioners, vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of National Defense, HON. RAUL GONZALES, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, in his capacity as PNP Chief of Staff, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 178581 BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN (ret.), CARLITOS SIGUIONREYNA, DR. CAROLINA PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, RENATO REYES, DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY CLARO CASAMBRE, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES,

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 178890 KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, represented herein by Dr. Edelina de la Paz, and representing the following organizations: HUSTISYA, represented by Evangeline Hernandez and also on her own behalf; DESAPARECIDOS, represented by Mary Guy Portajada and also on her own behalf, SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA SA AMNESTIYA (SELDA), represented by Donato Continente and also on his own behalf, ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP), represented by Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon, UCCP, and PROMOTION OF CHURCH PEOPLE'S RESPONSE, represented by Fr. Gilbert Sabado, OCARM, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 179157 THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), represented by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista, COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY (CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL and FORMER SENATORS SERGIO OSMEA III and WIGBERTO E. TAADA, Petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 179461 BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST), GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISA'T UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA REPORMANG AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSOS RURAL POOR ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS & EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIO LAJARA, TEODORO REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO, SALLY P. ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE BELTRAN, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMEN T SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,1signed into law on March 6, 2007. Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor UnionsKilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers3 who are also bringing the action

in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554. The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers,4 and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581. On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers5 who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890. On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL),6Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157. Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council9 composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon. The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.

The petitions fail. Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear: Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functionshas acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.10 In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Petitioners lack locus standi Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.11 Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary12 summarized the rule on locus standi, thus: Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is

invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.) Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers. While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi. Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372. KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the [S]tate."14 Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372. BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.15 The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations. The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can

be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable. Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.16 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.) No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members. While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of America17(US) and the European Union18 (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.19 Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372. Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration21 of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations. More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the questions being raised.22 Of recent development is the filing of the first case for proscription under Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department of

Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.24 Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group. Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them. In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.26 The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered. Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged. Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of "political surveillance," the Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed. Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, "which must be settled early" and are of "far-reaching implications," without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of

the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public. Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress,28 whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.29 RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.30(emphasis and underscoring supplied.) As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.32 Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC33 cannot be more emphatic: [C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events.34 Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application for a license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.35 The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections36 for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real litigants. The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum. The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.38 Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,39 allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."40 The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the provision of material support to organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy.42 Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing one. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.43 Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the

petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.44 The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism46under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute. Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48 The Court clarifies. At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes."50 It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.51 While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,52 the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense53 under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.54 The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estradacase, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads: A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.) The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights). To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.58 As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.59 A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facialinvalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause

others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.60 Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.63 The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed."64 [T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.65(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants. The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can

only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely"as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.) In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases,67 observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,68 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression."71 Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent chargeagainst them While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its entirety." 72 It stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant."73 American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity." For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as "among the most important guarantees of liberty under law."75 In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,76 the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdezand Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism77 must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech. Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating speech rather than conduct. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible. [I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied) Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct.80 Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.1avvphi1

IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety. In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief." As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecutionunder RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. --- Justice Jose P. Laurel1 The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments.2 The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.3 Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it.4 For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases5 both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010." The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.7 The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 193036

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read: EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 1

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor. The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an independent collegial body. SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. In particular, it shall: a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate; b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other papers; c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and the House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being investigated by the Commission; d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be; e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be; f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under

WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives; WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and notorious violation of this mandate; WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged sector of society; WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the peoples trust and confidence in the Government and its institutions; WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants; WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds; WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all; WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose; g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and their private sector coprincipals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws; h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its functions and duties; i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate; j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence; k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the objectives and purposes of this Order. SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x. SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x. SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x. SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x. SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x. SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.

SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x. SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall provide the necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible. SECTION 12. Office. x x x. SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x. SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before December 31, 2012. SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x. SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. x x x. SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order. SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof. SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010. (SGD.) By the President: BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

(SGD.) PAQUITO Executive Secretary Nature of the Truth Commission

N.

OCHOA,

JR.

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.8

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions. The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys past."9 They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice. Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.10"Commissions members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms."11 Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims. The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer12 puts it: The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural speech: "To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they have committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over again." The Thrusts of the Petitions Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that

they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the "Truth Commission." (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission" with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987. (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. (e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" violates the consistent and general international practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of international law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution. (f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of poverty. (g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even a statute."13 In their Consolidated Comment,14 the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), 15 Presidential Decree

(P.D.) No. 141616 (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970, 17 and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies. 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress. 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction. 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes. The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action Commission(PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance Efficiency(PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations(PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.18 From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be resolved: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1; 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; 3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and 5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief. Essential requisites for judicial review Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present. Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he

must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.19 Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue. Legal Standing of the Petitioners The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.20 The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,21 To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.22 With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations.23 It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo24 explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied." However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed inTileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted] Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."25

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,26 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,27 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance28 laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco29are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.30 Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President.31 Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed32 since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.33 He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish."34 Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.35 Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.36 Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority. The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the

President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized.37 According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.38 This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.39 It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct factfinding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.40 The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline subordinates,41 his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes42 and in order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know.43 The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,44 where it was held that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the government.45 The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,46 But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express

grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied] In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. 47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.48 The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.49 The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause: WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government. Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says "it was enacted to prepare the transition from presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of government, the legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective anymore upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987 Constitution. SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entire National Government is deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, correct. SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.50 While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. 51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:52 x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise ofspecific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x. Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,54 the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled: The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied] It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed. On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission."55 Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.56 As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department.57

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasijudicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law."58 In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies. The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus: "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted] Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.60 Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.61

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation."62 The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them,63 is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.64 At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,65 it was written: This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied]. Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied] The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties. The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes. Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the

recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." 66 Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.67 The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the "same magnitude of controversies and anomalies"68 were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, "there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption."69 In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force."70 Position of respondents According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the "previous administration" as the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said administration.71 Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for "the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct."72 To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited the following: First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the

truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants. Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the previous administration. Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede the current administration. Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.73 [Emphases supplied] Concept of the Equal Protection Clause One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.74 "According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed."75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities."77 "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."78 The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.79 Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including

the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80 It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test ofreasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."82 For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.83 "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."84 The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union85 and reiterated in a long line of cases,86 The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of

the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted] Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are: WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all; SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor. SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied] In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the "previous administration" only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."88 The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG

ventures to opine that "to include other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness." 89 The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and the evil it breeds."90 The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the bodys limited time and resources. "The law does not require the impossible" (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).91 Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. Whilereasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,92 Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied] It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.93 Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.94 While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of "substantial distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an "adventure in partisan hostility." In the case of US v. Cyprian,95 it was written: "A rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights." To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.96 "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the

influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class."97 The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection clause."98 "Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its reach."99 It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.100 In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step" process.101 "With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked."102 In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination."103 To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.104 The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides: SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order. The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration."105 The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,106 that the "PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause." The decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action. A final word The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial

Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress. The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments. To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: "And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them."107 Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional. It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.108 The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles. "The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude."109

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for "ours is still a government of laws and not of men."110 WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1. SO ORDERED.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: . . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5 The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents. Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect." Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial. As their cause of action, they specifically allege that: CAUSE OF ACTION 7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations. 8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass. 9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area. 10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin oldgrowth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests. 11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes. A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A". 12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults. 14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. 15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae. 16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B". 17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs. 18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with. 19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other; (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and; (c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution); b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid); c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.); d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.) 21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation. 22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6 On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion. On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8 On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto. Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192

creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment. It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question. Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires. On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally. As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process. Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former. This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,

wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition. After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant. Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government. The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11 We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question: MR. VILLACORTA: Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution? MR. AZCUNA: Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12 The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted. Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,

development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy: Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources. This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads: Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations. (2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources. The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides: Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy. (2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. A cause of action is defined as: . . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18 It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary. In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted: In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . . The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that: The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24 We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted

benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides: . . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . . Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held: . . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26 . . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27 cannot be invoked. In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification

of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated: The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit: Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31 Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right. WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent. MENDOZA, J.: In issue in these cases is the legitimacy of the presidency of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 146738, the petition for quo warranto seeks a declaration that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada is the lawful President of the Philippines and that respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is merely acting President on account o the former's temporary disability. On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 146710-15, the petition seeks to prohibit respondent Ombudsman Aniano Desierto from investigating charges of plunder, bribery, malversation of public funds, and graft and corruption against petitioner Estrada on the theory that, being still President, he is immune from suit. In both cases, a preliminary question is raised by respondents whether the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's presidency is a justiciable controversy. Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo contends that the matter is not justiciable because of "the virtual impossibility of undoing what has been done, namely, the transfer of constitutional power to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as a result of the events starting from the expose of Ilocos Sur Governor Luis 'Chavit' Singson in October 2000."1 In support of this contention, respondent cites the following statements of

this Court concerning the Aquino government which it is alleged applies to her administration: . . . [T]he legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.2 From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from there is derived" the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution."3 But the Aquino government was a revolutionary government which was established following the overthrow of the 1973 Constitution. The legitimacy of a revolutionary government cannot be the subject of judicial review. If a court decides the question at all qua court, it must necessarily affirm the existence and authority of such government under which it is exercising judicial power.4 As Melville Weston long ago put it, "the men who were judges under the old regime and the men who are called to be judges under the new have each to decide as individuals what they are to do; and it may be that they choose at grave peril with the factional outcome still uncertain."5 This is what the Court did in Javellana v. Executive Secretary6 when it held that the question of validity of the 1973 Constitution was political and affirmed that it was itself part of the new government. As the Court said in Occena v. COMELEC7 and Mitra v. COMELEC,8 "[P]etitioners have come to the wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. . . . It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution." In contrast, these cases do not involve the legitimacy of a government. They only involve the legitimacy of the presidency of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and the claim of respondents is precisely that Macapagal-Arroyo's ascension to the presidency was in accordance with the Constitution.9 Indeed, if the government of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is a revolutionary one, all talk about the fact that it was brought about by succession due to resignation or permanent disability of petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada is useless. All that respondents have to show is that in the contest for power MacapagalArroyo's government is the successful one and is now accepted by the people and recognized by the community of nations. But that is not the case here. There was no revolution such as that which took place in February 1986. There was no overthrow of the existing legal order and its replacement by a new one, no nullification of the Constitution. What is involved in these cases is similar to what happened in 1949 in Avelino v. Cuenco.10 In that case, in order to prevent Senator Lorenzo M. Taada from airing

charges against Senate President Jose Avelino, the latter refused to recognize him, as a result of which tumult broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement, as the Court noted, and Avelino suddenly adjourned the session and, followed by six senators, walked out of the session hall. The remaining senators then declared the position of President of the Senate vacant and elected Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president. The question was whether respondent Cuenco had been validly elected acting president of the Senate, considering that there were only 12 senators (out of 24) present, one senator (Sen. Confesor) being abroad while another one (Sen. Sotto) was ill in the hospital. Although in the beginning this Court refused to take cognizance of a petition for quo warranto brought to determine the rightful president of the Senate, among other things, in view of the political nature of the controversy, involving as it did an internal affair of a coequal branch of the government, in the end this Court decided to intervene because of the national crisis which developed as a result of the unresolved question of presidency of the Senate. The situation justifying judicial intervention was described, thus: We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill; the normal and ordinary functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the non-attendance to sessions of about one-half of the members; warrants of arrest have been issued, openly defied, and remained unexecuted like mere scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be arrested are prominent persons with well-known addresses and residences and have been in daily contact with news reporters and photographers. Farce and mockery have been interspersed with actions and movements provoking conflicts which invite bloodshed. . . . Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned.11 In voting to assume jurisdiction, Chief Justice Paras wrote: "[T]his Court has no other alternative but to meet the challenge of the situation which demands the utmost of judicial temper and judicial statesmanship. As herein before stated, the present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of this Court."12 Questions raised concerning respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's presidency similarly justify, in my view, judicial intervention in these cases. Nor is our power to fashion appropriate remedies in these cases in doubt. Respondents contend that there is nothing else that can be done about the assumption into office of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. What has been done cannot be undone. It is like toothpaste, we are told, which, once squeezed out of the tube, cannot be put back. Both literally and figuratively, the argument is untenable. The toothpaste can be put back into the tube. Literally, it can be put back by opening the bottom of the tube that is how toothpaste is put in tubes at manufacture in the first place. Metaphorically, the toothpaste can also be put back. In G.R. No. 146738, a writ can be issued ordering respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to vacate the Office of the President so that petitioner Joseph E. Estrada can be reinstated should the judgment in these cases be in his favor. Whether such writ will be obeyed will be a test of our commitment to the rule of law. In election cases, people accept the decisions of

courts even if they be against the results as proclaimed. Recognition given by foreign governments to the presidency poses no problem. So, as far as the political question argument of respondents is anchored on the difficulty or impossibility of devising effective judicial remedies, this defense should not bar inquiry into the legitimacy of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration. This brings me to the main issue, whether respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's ascension to the Presidency was in accordance with the Constitution. Art. VII. 8 provides in pertinent parts: In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified. The events that led to the departure of petitioner Joseph E. Estrada from office are well known and need not be recounted in great detail here. They began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling (jueteng), and other forms of corruption were made against petitioner before the Blue Ribbon Committee of the Senate. On November 13, 2000, petitioner was impeached by the House of Representatives and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against petitioner were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to petitioner, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against petitioner. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Aquilino Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against petitioner. The events, as seen through the eyes of foreign correspondents, are vividly recounted in the following excerpts from the Far Eastern Economic Review and Time Magazine quoted in the Memorandum of petitioner in G.R. Nos. 146710-15, thus:

advocated a quick coup to depose the President. Chief of Staff Reyes and Defense Secretary Mercado had made their fateful call to Estrada after luncheon attended by all the top commanders. The officers agreed that renouncing Estrada was the best course, in part because some commanders were urging more drastic resolution. If the military did not come to a consensus, there loomed the possibility of factional fighting or, worse, civil war. [TIME, "People Power Redux", id at p. 18]

4.

It finally took a controversial Supreme Court declaration that the presidency was effectively vacant to persuade Estrada to pack up and move out to his family home in Manila still refusing to sign a letter of resignation and insisting that he was the legal president [FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "More Power to the Powerful",supra, ibid.]. Petitioner then sent two letters, one to the Senate President and the other to the Speaker of the House, indicating that he was unable to perform the duties of his Office.13

To recall these events is to note the moral framework in which petitioner's fall from power took place. Petitioner's counsel claimed petitioner was forced out of Malacaang Palace, seat of the Presidency, because petitioner was "threatened with mayhem."14 What, the President of the Philippines, who under the Constitution is the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces, threatened with mayhem? This can only happen because he had lost his moral authority as the elected President. Indeed, the people power movement did not just happen at the call of some ambitious politicians, military men, businessmen and/or prelates. It came about because the people, rightly or wrongly, believed the allegations of graft and corruption made by Luis "Chavit" Singson, Emma Lim, Edgardo Espiritu, and other witnesses against petitioner. Their testimonies during the impeachment trial were all televised and heard by millions of people throughout the length and breadth of this archipelago. As a result, petitioner found himself on January 19, 2001 deserted as most of his cabinet members resigned, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police withdrew their support of the President, while civil society announced its loss of trust and confidence in him. Public office is a public trust. Petitioner lost the public's trust and as a consequence remained President only in name. Having lost the command of the armed forces and the national police, he found Himself vulnerable to threats of mayhem. This is the confession of one who is beaten. After all, the permanent disability referred to in the Constitution can be physical, mental or moral, rendering the President unable to exercise the powers and functions of his office. As his close adviser wrote in his diary of the final hours of petitioner's presidency: The President says: "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na-masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this-it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)15 Angara himself shared this view of petitioner's inability. He wrote in his diary: "Let us be realistic," I counter. "The President does not have the capability to organize a counter-attack. He does not have the AFP or the Philippine National Police on his side. He is not only in a corner he is also down."16

1.

The decision immediately sent hundreds of Filipinos out into the streets, triggering rallies that swelled into a massive four-day demonstration. But while anger was apparent among the middle classes, Estrada, a master of the common touch, still retained largely passive support among the poorest Filipinos. Citing that mandate and exploiting the letter of the Constitution, which stipulates that a written resignation be presented, he refused to step down even after all of the armed forced, the police and most of his cabinet withdrew their support for him. [FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "More Power to The Powerful", id, at p. 18]. When an entire night passed without Estrada's resignation, tens of thousands of frustrated protesters marched on Malacaang to demand that the president leave office. An air force fighter jet and four military helicopters buzzed the palace to remind the president that had lost the reins of power. [FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra, ibid]. While the television cameras were focused on the rallies and the commentators became lost in reveries about People Power revisited behind-the-scenes negotiations had been going on nonstop between military factions loyal to Estrada and those who

2.

3.

This is the clearest proof that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled at least as of 11 P.M. of Friday, January 19, 2001. Hence the negotiations for the transfer of power to the respondent Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It belies petitioner's claim that he was not permanently disabled but only temporarily unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office and therefore can only be temporarily replaced by respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo under Art. VII, 11. From this judgment that petitioner became permanently disabled because he had lost the public's trust, I except extravagant claims of the right of the people to change their government. While Art. II, 1 of the Constitution says that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them," it also says that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican state." This means that ours is a representative democracy as distinguished from a direct democracy in which the sovereign will of the people is expressed through the ballot, whether in an election, referendum, initiative, recall (in the case of local officials) or plebiscite. Any exercise of the powers of sovereignty in any other way is unconstitutional. Indeed, the right to revolt cannot be recognized as a constitutional principle. A constitution to provide for the right of the people to revolt will carry with it the seeds of its own destruction. Rather, the right to revolt is affirmed as a natural right. Even then, it must be exercised only for weighty and serious reasons. As the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 of the American Congress states: We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient Causes; and accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security.17 Here, as I have already indicated, what took place at EDSA from January 16 to 20, 2001 was not a revolution but the peaceful expression of popular will. The operative fact which enabled Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to assume the presidency was the fact that there was a crisis, nay a vacuum, in the executive leadership which made the government rife for seizure by lawless elements. The presidency was up for grabs, and it was imperative that the rule of succession in the Constitution be enforced. But who is to declare the President's permanent disability, petitioner asks? The answer was given by petitioner himself when he said that he was already tired and wanted no more of popular demonstrations and rallies against him; when he and his advisers negotiated with respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's advisers for a transition of powers from him to her; when petitioner's own Executive Secretary declared that petitioner was not only in a corner but was down.

Nor is it correct for petitioner to say that the present situation is similar to our situation during the period (from 1941 to 1943) of our occupation by the Japanese, when we had two presidents, namely, Manuel L. Quezon and Jose P. Laurel. This is turning somersault with history. The Philippines had two presidents at that time for the simple reason that there were then two governments the de facto government established by Japan as belligerent occupant, of which Laurel was president, and the de jure Commonwealth Government in exile of President Manuel L. Quezon. That a belligerent occupant has a right to establish a government in enemy territory is a recognized principle of international law.18 But today we have only one government, and it is the one set up in the 1987 Constitution. Hence, there can only be one President. Having reached the conclusion that petitioner Joseph E. Estrada is no longer President of the Philippines, I find no need to discuss his claim of immunity from suit. I believe in the canon of adjudication that the Court should not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied. The only question left for resolution is whether there was massive prejudicial publicity attending the investigation by the Ombudsman of the criminal charges against petitioner. The test in this jurisdiction is whether there has been "actual, not merely possible, prejudice"19 caused to petitioner as a result of publicity. There has been no proof of this, and so I think this claim should simply be dismissed. For the foregoing reasons, I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases.

EN BANC [G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., Respondents. [G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001] JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, Petitioner, ARROYO, Respondent. RESOLUTION PUNO, J.: For resolution are petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Courts Decision of March 2, 2001. In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds: I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI, SECTION 3 (7) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THEREON. II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS RULING WOULD VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS. III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY. V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE COURT TO ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE INCUMBENT OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED CAPACITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A BIASED FREE DECISION. In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues: 1. WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RESIGNED AS OF JANUARY 20, 2001; 2. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE: HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA; 3. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY RULE; vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-

4. WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE PETITIONERS INABILITY TO GOVERN CONSIDERING SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION; and 5. WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY HAS AFFECTED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL. We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit. I
Prejudicial Publicity on the Court

Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are wellestablished and cannot be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up the irresistible pressure for the petitioner to resign. These are: (1) the expose of Governor Luis Chavit Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the I accuse speech of then Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3) the joint investigation of the speech of Senator Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice; (4) the investigation of the Singson expose by the House Committee on Public Order and Security; (5) the move to impeach the petitioner in the House of Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin demanding petitioners resignation; (7) a similar demand by the Catholic Bishops conference; (8) the similar demands for petitioners resignation by former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for petitioner to resign; (10) the resignation of the members of petitioners Council of Senior Economic Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the Department of Trade and Industry; (11) the defection of then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47) representatives from petitioners Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12) the transmission of the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the unseating of Senator Drilon as Senate President and of Representative Villar as Speaker of the House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the prosecutors motion to open the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit in a secret bank account under the name of Jose Velarde; (17) the prosecutors walkout and resignation; (18) the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to the House of Representatives to resolve the issue of resignation of their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the EDSA Shrine and its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of support of then Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services; (21) the same withdrawal of support made by the then Director General of the PNP, General Panfilo Lacson, and the major service commanders; (22) the stream of resignations by Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs; (23) petitioners agreement to hold a snap election and opening of the controversial second envelope. All these prior events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news accounts. The reference by the Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they happened does

not make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news account only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as false. We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo. We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a persons subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence. We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some events posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the petitioner containing hisfinal statement which was issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioners issuance of the press release and his abandonemnt of Malacaang Palace confirmed his resignation. [1 These are overt acts which leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned. In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of Janaury 20, 2001, the claim that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath of office at half past noon of the same day has no leg to stand on. We also reject the contention that petitioners resignation was due to duress and an involuntary resignation is no resignation at all. x x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government action. Thethreepart test for such duress has been stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side. The view has also been expressed that a resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employers conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances test, the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employees purely subjective evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only option to be resignation for example, because of concerns about his or her reputation is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives for example, resignation or facing disciplinary charges does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress or coercion, and was therefore involuntary. This is so even where the only

alternative to resignation is facing possible termination for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for termination existed. In this regard it has also been said that a resignation resulting from a choice between resigning or facing proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion without procedural view if the employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice posed. Futhermore, a resignation by an officer charged with misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate authority has already determined that the officers alternative is termination, where such authority has the legal authority to terminate the officers employment under the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any measure authorized by law and the circumstances of the case.[2 In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation. He proposed to the holding of snap elections. He transmitted to the Congress a written declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was forced to resign because immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis na ba ako? which implies that he still had a choice of whether or not to leave. To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe that the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners resignation. The Malacaang ground was then fully protected by the Presidential Security Guard armed with tanks and high-powered weapons. The then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other military officers were in Malacaang to assure that no harm would befall the petitioner as he left the Palace. Indeed, no harm, not even a scratch, was suffered by the petitioner, the members of his family and his Cabinet who stuck it out with him in his last hours. Petitioners entourage was even able to detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade goodbye to his followers before finally going to his residence in Polk Street, Greenhills. The only incident before the petitioner left the Palace was the stone throwing between a small group of pro and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in minor injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled through the Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence, no shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify the conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign. II
Evidentiary Issues

Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence. We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. [3 The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February

12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001, [4 and the third part, published on February 6, 2001. [5 It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so. Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered bythe hearsay rule. [6 Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. [7 There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. [8 Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.[9 The emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows: xxx On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other persons accounts of what happened, and verdicts are usually sustained and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted because no objection was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict). Although volumes have been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay evidence. Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative statements from the definition of hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra). Furthermore, many states have added to their rules the residual, or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the admission of hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra). Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted): The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be influenced by the evidence. However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not conceive of hearsay in that manner. Prejudice refers to the jurys use of evidence for inferences other than those for which the evidence is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the jurys ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimate inference to be drawn from the evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude testimony because a witness was particularly smooth or convincing, there would be no doubt as to the usurpation of the jurys function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the evidence rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of photographs of a victims final state, the exclusion of hearsay on the basis of misperception strikes at the root of the jurys function by

usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence, the type of information routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives. Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are either incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only altenative to a general rule of admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely inferior. More important, the assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay seem insupportable and, in any event, are inconsistent with accepted notions of the function of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules should be abolished. Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now available which is, however, derived from simulations that suggests that admitting hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors discount the value of hearsay evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992); Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman & Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991). Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question whether the benefits outweigh the cost: The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It also includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of the court salaries, administrative costs, and capital costs are borne by the public. As expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an enormous public subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other costs as well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law schools, students spend over half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and enormous academic resources are expended on the rule. Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but would abolish rule only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992).[10 A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.[11 It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions are not covered by the hearsay rule: [12 Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the probative value of any other persons asssertion, argued that it had a special value when offered against the party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits

the partys statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he continued, admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the opponents own declaration, and he does not need to cross examine himself. Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former assertion. (Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154, McCormick) According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath. A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583). The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go. We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted. It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. [13 Jones explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariouslyis that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made.[14 To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common sense. [15 In the Angara Diary , the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commanderin-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation . Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him. [16 Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still are.) [17 This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation . True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacaang after taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?) [18 Secretary Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. TheDiary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations.Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara. Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). [19 Jones very well explains the reasons for the rule , viz: What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible in evidence against such principal. [20 Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following: [21 a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions; b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like; c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter; d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and

e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness. Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered by the prohibition against hearsay evidence: [22 1088. Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of comon issues, forming a general class, in proof of which hearsay is so obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by virtue of any exception to the general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases, is as of course. For example, where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person. Where his acts or statements are against his interest, they are plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as to admissions against interest. And even where not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in issue as to constitute one of the very facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity. As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our law on evidence and petitioners attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur. Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence were violated in our Decision, viz: The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of evidence, such as the rule on authentication of private writings xxx A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law provides that before any private writing offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. xxx B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary. It is secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity. It was however used by this Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the original or duplicate original of the diary. The Best Evidence Rule should have been applied since the contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry.

The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, [w]hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.[23 Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as follows: Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents. Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Sec. 4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry. (b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals. (c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that: Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.[24 xxx

In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it. (empahsis supplied) Franciscos opinion is of the same tenor, viz: Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is sought to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of exclusion might have successfully been invoked if proper and timely objection had been taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the admission of secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say here that the objection should be made in proper season that is, whenever it appears that there is better evidence than that which is offered and before the secondary evidence has been admitted. The objection itself should be sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for the courts consideration.[25 He adds: Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no objection is made to its reception.[26 In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section 20 of Rule 132, viz: Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that: A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263, and others) However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly identified before it was admitted in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835).[27 Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro, [28 which frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is a significant difference , however, between the Muro case and the cases at bar. In the Muro case, Judge

Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper account without affording the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated February 20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra , petitioner had been given an opportunity to inspect the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his o bjections in an Omnibus Motion, after theAngara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof. III
Temporary Inability

Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution in that congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. The situation presents itself when majority of the Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President informs Congress that his inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet. It is also urged that the presidents judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot review. We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the submission in G.R. No. 146738 thatCongress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII. [29 We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now feels aggrieved by the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from Congress itself. The power is conceded by the petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court. The recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It is significant that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors as thepeoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern and the members of the international community had extended their recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and it has a constitutional duty of fealty to the supreme will of the people x x x. This political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to the people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before a court of justice. Needles to state, the doctrine of separation of power constitutes an inseparable bar against this courts interposition of its power of judicial review to review the judgment of Congress rejecting petitioners claim that he is still the President, albeit on leave and that respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President.

Petitioner attempts to extricate himself from his submission that Congress has the ultimate authority to determine his inability to govern, and whose determination is a political question by now arguing that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question. Petitioners change of theory, ill disguised as it is, does not at all impress. The cases at bar do not present the general issue of whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or a de facto President. Specific issues were raised to the Court for resolution and we ruled on an issue by issue basis. On the issue of resignation under section 8, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the issue is legal and ruled that petitioner has resigned from office before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. On the issue of inability to govern under section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the Congress has the ultimate authority to determine the question as opined by the petitioner himself and that the determination of Congress is a political judgment which this Court cannot review. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question. Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru resolutions which brushed off his temporary inability to govern and President-on-leave argument . He asserts that these acts of Congress should not be accorded any legal significance because: (1) they are post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied. We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the declaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-President assumes the presidency. In the cases at bar, special consideration should be given to the fact that the events which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. To be sure, however, the petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the Honorable Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, recognized respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the presidency post facto. Petitioner himself states that his letter alleging his inability to govern was received by the Office of the Speaker on January 20, 2001 at 8:30 A.M. and the Office of the Senate at 9 P.M. of the same day. [30 Respondent took her oath of office a few minutes past 12 oclock in the afternoon of January 20. Before the oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement which states : [31 Joint Statement of Support and Recognition from the Senate President and the Speaker Of the House of Representatives We, the elected leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, are called upon to address the constitutional crisis affecting the authority of the President to effectively govern our distressed nation. We understand that the Supreme Court at that time is issuing an en banc resolution recognizing this political reality. While we may differ on the means to effect a change of leadership, we however, cannot be indifferent and must act resolutely. Thus, in line with our sworn duty to represent our people and in pursuit of our goals for peace and prosperity to all, we, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, hereby declare our support and recognition to the constitutional successor to the Presidency. We similarly call on all sectors to

close ranks despite our political differences : May God bless our nation in this period of new beginnings. Mabuhay and Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino. (Sgd.) AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR. Senate President (Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA Speaker of the House of Representatives This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the presidency was followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming this recognition. Thus, Resolution No. 176 expressed x x x the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goal under the Constitution. [32 Resolution No. 82 of the Senate and Resolution No. 178 of the House of Representatives both confirmed the nomination of then Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as Vice-President. [33 It also passed Resolution No. 83 declaring the impeachment courtfunctus officio. [34 Both Houses sent bills to respondent Arroyo to be signed by her into law as President of the Philippines. [35 These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic. Petitioners insistence that respondent Arroyo is just a de facto President because said acts of Congress x x x are mere circumstances of acquiescence calculated to induce people to submit to respondents exercise of the powers of the presidency [36 is a guesswork far divorced from reality to deserve further discussion. Similarly way off the mark is petitioners point that while the Constitution has made Congress the national board of canvassers for presidential and vice-presidential elections, this Honorable Court nonetheless remains the sole judge in presidential and vice presidential contests. [37 He thus postulates that such constitutional provision [38 isindicative of the desire of the sovereign people to keep out of the hands of Congress questions as to the legality of a persons claim to the presidential office. [39 Suffice to state that the inference is illogical. Indeed, there is no room to resort to inference. The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how vacancies and election contest in the office of the President shall be decided. Thus, section 7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a) the President-elect fails to qualify, (b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of the death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President.Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may arise from the contingency. In case of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by this Court sitting en banc. In case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue. In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court. In light of these clear provisions of the Constitution,

it is inappropriate, to say the least, for petitioner to make inferences that simply distort their meanings.
IV

7, 2001,the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio. Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. [43 Assuming arguendo that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Petitioners claim of double jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment court. At best, his claim of previous acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to prosecute. As Bernas points out, a failure to prosecute, which is what happens when the accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure of the prosecution to prove the case. Hence, dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits. [44 This Court held in Esmea v. Pogoy [45, viz: If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecutions motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently fails to prove the defendants guilt, the court upon defendants motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissall amounting to an acquittal of the defendant. In a more recent case, this Court held: It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.[46 Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against him. Even assuming arguendo that there was a move for its dismissal, not every invocation of an accuseds right to speedy trial is meritorious. While the Court accords due importance to an accuseds right to a speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be invoked loosely. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. [47 The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are apropos: Rule 115, Section 1(h). Rights of accused at the trial. -- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: (h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

Impeachment and Absolute Immunity

Petitioner contends that this Court disregarded section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution which provides: (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally prosecuted. A plain reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion. The provision conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation will justify petitioners non sequitur submission that the provision requires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and punishment for the offenses he is now facing before the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out from the impeachment proceedings should be considered failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal. [40 He explains failure to prosecute as the failure of the prosecution to prove the case, hence dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits. [41 He then concludes that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy. [42 Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject petitioners submission. The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001 hearing of the impeachment cases when by a vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused to open the second envelope allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The next day, January 17,the public prosecutors submitted a letter to the Speaker of the House tendering their resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco immediately moved for the indefinite suspension of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the public prosecutors. The Roco motion was then granted by Chief Justice Davide, Jr. Before the House could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on January 20,2001,petitioner relinquished the presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic. Thus, on February

Rule 119, Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.-- Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable length of time for good cause. The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the impeachment proceedings was unjustified, much less that it was for an unreasonable length of time. Recalling the facts, on January 17, 2001, the impeachment proceeding was suspended until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue on the resignation of the public prosecutors. This was justified and understandable for an impeachment proceeding without a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment process. However, three (3) days from the suspension or January 20, 2001, petitioners resignation supervened. With the sudden turn of events, the impeachment court became functus officio and the proceedings were therefore terminated. By no stretch of the imagination can the four-day period from the time the impeachment proceeding was suspended to the day petitioner resigned, constitute an unreasonable period of delay violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial. Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused. We reiterate that the impeachment proceeding was closed only after the petitioner had resigned from the presidency, thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the termination of the impeachmment case against him, forhe brought about the termination of the impeachment proceedings. We have consistently ruled that when the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused, there is no double jeopardy. [48 Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioners rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President. Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during his termof office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz: Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily? Fr. Bernas: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during histenure he is immune from suit. Mr. Suarez: So there is no need to express it here. Fr. Bernas: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things. Mr. Suarez; On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President. I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.[49 Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. [50 From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Indeed, petitioners stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the cases at bar were filed not really for petitioner to reclaim the presidency but just to take advantage of the immunity attached to the presidency and thus, derail the investigation of the criminal cases pending against him in the Office of the Ombudsman.
V

Prejudicial Publicity on the Ombudsman

Petitioner hangs tough on his submission that his due process rights to a fair trial have been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. In our Decision, we held that there is not enough evidence to sustain petitioners claim of prejudicial publicity. Unconvinced, petitioner alleges that the vivid narration of events in our Decision itself proves the pervasiveness of the prejudicial publicity. He then posits the thesis that doubtless, the national fixation with the probable guilt of petitioner fueled by the hate campaign launched by some high circulation newspaper and by the bully pulpit of priests and bishops left indelible impression on all sectors of the citizenry and all regions, so harsh and so pervasive that the prosecution and the judiciary can no longer assure petitioner a sporting chance. [51 To be sure, petitioner engages in exageration when he alleges that all sectors of the citizenry and all regions have been irrevocably influenced by this barrage of prejudicial publicity. This

exaggeration collides with petitioners claim that he still enjoys the support of the majority of our people, especially the masses. Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or the transaction speaks for itself) to support his argument. Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. [52 It is not a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its mere invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with the requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. [53 We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually applied only in tort cases, to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no court in the whole world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial publicity. We again stress that the issue before us is whether the alleged pervasive publicity of the cases against the petitioner has prejudiced the minds of the members of the panel of investigators. We reiterate the test we laid down in People v. Teehankee, [54 to resolve this issue, viz: We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out , a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as hey happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lost their impartiality. x x x . Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage

of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developedactual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails to prove how the impartiality of the panel of investigators from the Office of the Ombudsman has been infected by it. As we held before and we hold it again, petitioner has completely failed to adduce any proof of actual prejudice developed by the members of the Panel of Investigators. This fact must be established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left to loose surmises and conjectures. In fact, petitioner did not even identify the members of the Panel of Investigators. We cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur as suggested by the petitioner. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the burden to the panel of investigators to prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said publicity. Such a rule will overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The cases are not wanting where an accused has been acquitted despite pervasive publicity. [55 For this reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for petitioner to conjure possibility of prejudice but must prove actual prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to sustain his plea. It is plain that petitioner has failed to do so. Petitioner agains suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period to allow passions to subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial publicity against him would die down. We regret not to acquiesce to the proposal. There is no assurance that the so called 2-month cooling off period will achieve its purpose. The investigation of the petitioner is a natural media event. It is the first time in our history that a President will be investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged commission of heinous crimes while a sitting President. His investigation will even be monitored by the foreign press all over the world in view of its legal and historic significance. In other words, petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of publicity. But what is important for the petitioner is that his constitutional rights are not violated in the process of investigation. For this reason, we have warned the respondent Ombudsman in our Decision to conduct petitioners preliminary investigation in a circus-free atmosphere. Petitioner is represented by brilliant legal minds who can protect his right as an accused.
VI

Recusation

Finally, petitioner prays that the members of this Honorable Court who went to EDSA put on record who they were and consider recusing or inhibiting themselves, particularly those who had ex-parte contacts with those exerting pressure on this Honorable Court, as mentioned in our Motion of March 9, 2001, given the need for the cold neutrality of impartial judges. [56 We hold that the prayer lacks merit. There is no ground to inhibit the twelve (12) members of the Court who merely accepted the invitation of the respondent Arroyo to attend her oath taking. As mere spectators of a historic event, said

members of the Court did not prejudge the legal basis of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took her oath. Indeed, the Court in its en banc resolution on January 22, 2001, the first working day after respondent Arroyo took her oath as President, held in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit: A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take Her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001. This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party. The above resolution was unanimously passed by the 15 members of the Court. It should be clear from the resolution that the Court did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as a case but as an administrativematter. If it were considered as a case, then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined the legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the letter as an administrative matter and emphasized that it was without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party. In further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issued another resolution to inform the parties and the public that it xxx did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution. Thus, there is no reason for petitioner to request for the said twelve (12) justices to recuse themselves. To be sure, a motion to inhibit filed by a party after losing his case is suspect and is regarded with general disfavor. Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tantodepriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. [57 The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. [58 IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and his Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 are DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997 JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996: MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference committee report. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion? MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker? THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved. (Gavel) MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute. (It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed) THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed. MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week. (It was 3:40 p.m.) On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions. Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts. Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious. More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the years or nays,but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the

presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, 4the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, 5the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session. Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration. Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court. The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed. In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8 After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed. First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 2627. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review. But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'" In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal." In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution." In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly.Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules." In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the

Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure." In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them." Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held: We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18. We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote: Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of

members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. 18 In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power. Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21 If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII. 1 power. Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved. What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same

time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report. No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved. In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said: Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in. xxx xxx xxx Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against. 22 Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the

deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25 Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances; upon the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process. Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows. ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996. It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added) This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman. It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. 30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of the question. 31 Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII. 1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not he concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34 At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report. 37 Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate. But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts." 39This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory: The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40 This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. 41 It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI. 26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42 In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations: . . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 45 To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence. Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court. Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4) provides: Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 49 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001 BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics. The Case

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. The Factual Antecedents With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785;

of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2 Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline. The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote: "We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window. "It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections. "However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3 On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5 On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8 Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the partylist elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court. Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15 Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues: "1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law? "2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. "3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations. "4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16 The Court's Ruling The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision. First Issue: Recourse Under Rule 65 Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21 The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear. In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives. Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25 Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26 Second Issue: Participation of Political Parties In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. "Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution. "Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30 During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33 "MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista? MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido." Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system." For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office." Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

"x x x "For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. x x x" Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections. Third Issue: Marginalized and Underrepresented That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows: "(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.) Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature."35 The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a partylist system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible." The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and 2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but 3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-defined constituencies." "Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style. The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37 The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the partylist system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states: "SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38 The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41 The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43 While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts. It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the partylist elections. As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections. The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system. Refutation of the Separate Opinions The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations. The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47 Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof." Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to. But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will

benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute. Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply. Fourth Issue: Grave Abuse of Discretion From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections. When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50 In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166. What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law. Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations. Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system. Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors. Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows: "JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors? ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52 Third, in view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
53

"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group. REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55 Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."58 Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."59 Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens

"MR. OPLE. x x x In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition? MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54 The following discussion is also pertinent:

and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives. Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows: "SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term." Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented. Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."61 Epilogue The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives." Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the partylist system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization. In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941. WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.1wphi1.nt The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition. This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

the Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32, will this act not violate the above-cited Constitutional provision considering that the total members would now rise to 270. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 179271 July 8, 2009 C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not attain the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the term "additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the House of Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a partylist representative. D. For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid down in Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives is not mandatory," has been abandoned.1 On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), filed a motion for leave for partial reconsideration-inintervention, alleging that: The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has deprived without due process and in violation of the equal protection clause, parties with more significant constituencies, such as CIBAC, Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties who did not even meet the 2% threshold.2 Following the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) submitted to this Court on 27 April 2009 National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 09-001. NBC Resolution No. 09-001 updated the data used by this Court in its Decision of 21 April 2009. The total votes for party-list is now 15,723,764 following the cancellation of the registration of party-list group Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement (FPJPM). Moreover, the total number of legislative districts is now 219 following the annulment of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus, the percentage and ranking of the actual winning party-list groups are different from Table 3 of the Decision in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295. The Number of Members in the 2007 Elections of the House of Representatives

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent. ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor. AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 179295 BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. RESOLUTION CARPIO, J.: The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to intervene in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295. The House of Representatives filed a motion for clarification in intervention and enumerated the issues for clarification as follows: A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. Accordingly, the alloted seats for party-list representation should only be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives seeks clarification on which of the party-list representatives shall be admitted to the Roll of Members considering that the Court declared as winners 55 party-list representatives. B. The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named party-list representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such number of representatives that would complete the 250 member maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of

Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

The 1987 Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the House of Representatives at 250. However, the 1987 Constitution expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives provided a law is enacted for the purpose. This is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Legislature has the option to choose whether the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives is done by piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general increase. Legislation that makes piecemeal increases of the number of district representatives is no less valid than legislation that makes a general increase.

Thus, for purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district representatives. Navotas City became a separate district on 24 June 2007, more than a month after the 14 May 2007 elections. The Number in the 2007 Elections of Party-List Seats

Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part: The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. x x x The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district representatives. This ratio automatically applies whenever the number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical formula for determining the number of seats available to party-list representatives is Number of seats to legislative districts available x .80 As we stated in our Decision of 21 April 2009, "[t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law." Thus, for every four district representatives, the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list seat. We use the table below to illustrate the relationship between the number of legislative districts and the number of party-list seats for every election year after 1987. Number Number of Legislative Party-List Districts Seats 200 206 New Districts: Biliran Mandaluyong City Makati (2nd District) Apayao Guimaras Muntinlupa City 50 51 of .20 =

In 1987, there were only 200 legislative districts. Twenty legislative districts were added by piecemeal legislation after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution:
Republic Act 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 7160 7675 7854 7878 7896 and 7897 7926 8470 8487 8526 9229 9230 8508 and 9232 9232 9269 9355 9357 9360 9364 9371 9387 Year into Law 1992 1994 1994 1995 1995 1995 1998 1998 1998 2003 2003 1998 and 2003 2003 2004 2006 2006 2006 2006 2007 2007 Signed Legislative District Biliran Mandaluyong City Makati (2nd District) Apayao Guimaras Muntinlupa City Compostela Valley Taguig City (2nd District) Valenzuela City (2nd District) Paraaque (2nd District) San Jose del Monte City Antipolo (1st District) Antipolo (2nd District) Zamboanga City (2nd District) Dinagat Island Sultan Kudarat (2nd District)

Number of seats available party-list representatives

Election Year 1992 1995

Total Number of Membe the House of Representat 250 257

Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District) Marikina City (2nd District) Cagayan de Oro (2nd District) Navotas City

1998

209 New Districts: Compostela Valley Taguig City (2nd District) Valenzuela City (2nd District)

52

261

The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats. Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Court upholds this 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid exercise of legislative power.1avvphi1 In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up. However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat allocation. To continue the example above, if only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election and each party received only one thousand votes, then each of the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are further entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of seat allocation. Similarly, a presidential candidate may win the elections even if he receives only one thousand votes as long as all his opponents receive less than one thousand votes. A winning presidential candidate only needs to receive more votes than his opponents. The same policy applies in every election to public office, from the presidential to the barangay level. Except for the guaranteed party-list seat, there is no minimum vote requirement before a candidate in any election, for any elective office, can be proclaimed the winner. Of course, the winning candidate must receive at least one vote, assuming he has no opponents or all his opponents do not receive a single vote. In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round of party-list seat allocation, there is no need to belabor the disparity between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning parties in the 2007 party-list elections. In the same manner, no one belabors the disparity between the votes obtained by the highest and lowest ranked winners in the senatorial elections. However, for those interested in comparing the votes received by party-list representatives vis-a-vis the votes received by district representatives, the 162,678 votes cast in favor of TUCP, the last party to obtain a party-list seat, is significantly higher than the votes received by 214 of the 218 elected district representatives.4 The Actual Number in the 2007 Elections of Party-List Representatives

2001 2004

209 214 New Districts: Paraaque City (2nd District) San Jose del Monte City Antipolo (1st District) Antipolo (2nd District) Zamboanga City (2nd District)

52 53

261 267

2007

219 New Districts: Dinagat Island Sultan Kudarat (2nd District) Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District) Marikina City (2nd District) Cagayan de Oro (2nd District)

54

273

2010

220 New District: Navotas City (assuming no additional districts are created)

55

275

We see that, as early as the election year of 1995, the total number of members of the House of Representatives is already beyond the initial maximum of 250 members as fixed in the 1987 Constitution. Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list seats. However, the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives went unnoticed as the available seats for party-list representatives have never been filled up before. As of the oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, there were 220 legislative districts. Fifty-five party-list seats were thus allocated. However, the number of legislative districts was subsequently reduced to 219 with our ruling on 16 July 2008 declaring void the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan.3 Thus, in the 2007 elections, the number of party-list seats available for distribution should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54.

The data used in Table 3 of our Decision promulgated on 21 April 2009 was based on the submissions of the parties. We used the figures from Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 6:00 p.m. of 31 August 2007. The NBC issued NBC Report No. AN WARAY 33 on 11 June 2008, updating the 31 August 2007 report. The parties did not furnish this Court with a copy of NBC Report No. 33. In any case, we stated in the dispositive portion of our Decision that "[t]he allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedureused in Table 3 of this decision." Party-List Canvass Report No. 32 is not part of the procedure.1avvphi1 The computation of the COMELEC in NBC No. 09-001 applying the procedure laid KABATAAN down in our Decision requires correction for purposes of accuracy. Instead of multiplying the percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for party-list by 36, the COMELEC multiplied the percentage by 37. Thirty-six is the proper multiplier as it is the difference between 54, the number of available party-list seats, and 18, the number of guaranteed seats. Only the figures in column (C) are affected. The allocation of seats to the winning party-list organizations, however, remains the same as in NBC No. 09-001. Our modification of the COMELECs computation in NBC No. 09-001 is shown below: Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party List, in % (A) 7.44% 6.23% 4.81% 3.95% 3.94% 3.12% 2.97% 2.69% 2.61% 2.60% 2.45% 2.38% 2.36% 2.21% 2.16% 2.11% Guaranteed Seat (First Round) (B) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Additional Seats (Second Round) (C) 2.68 2.24 1.73 1.42 1.42 1.12 1.07 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

328,814 321,516 251,804 235,152 229,267 229,036 228,700 219,363 213,095 200,030 196,358

2.09% 2.04% 1.60% 1.50% 1.46% 1.46% 1.45% 1.40% 1.36% 1.27% 1.25%

1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0

2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 54

N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.

Votes Garnered

188,573 1.20% (B) plus (C), in Applying the whole integers three 177,068 cap 1.13% seat (D) (E) 170,594 1.08% KASANGGA 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 N.A. N.A. ABAKADA N.A. N.A. COCOFED N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 169,869 166,897 165,012 162,678 156,007 1.08% 1.06% 1.05% 1.03% 0.99%

1,169,338 979,189 755,735 621,266 619,733 490,853 466,448 423,165 409,987 409,168 385,956 374,349 370,323 347,527 340,002 331,623

ELA

cher

YAN

AD

CO

Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) and Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino (ALIF) both have pending cases before the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly deferred the proclamation of both BATAS and ALIF as the outcome of their cases may affect the final composition of party-list representatives. The computation and allocation of seats may still be modified in the event that the COMELEC decides against BATAS and/or ALIF. To address Roa-Borjes motion for partial reconsideration-in-intervention and for purposes of computing the results in future party-list elections, we reiterate that in the second step of the second round of seat allocation, the preference in the distribution of seats should be in accordance with the higher percentage and higher rank, without limiting the distribution to parties receiving two-percent of the votes.6 To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would mathematically prevent the filling up of all the available partylist seats.

PAWIS

In the table above, CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated to TUCP, the last ranked party allocated with a seat. CIBAC's 2.81% (from the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% for its guaranteed seat) has a lower fractional seat value after the allocation of its second seat compared to TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's fractional seat after receiving two seats is only 0.03 compared to TUCP's 0.38 fractional seat. Multiplying CIBAC's 2.81% by 37, the additional seats for distribution in the second round, gives 1.03 seat, leaving 0.03 fractional seat. Multiplying TUCP's 1.03% by 37 gives a fractional seat of 0.38, higher than CIBAC's fractional seat of 0.03. The fractional seats become material only in the second step of the second round of seat allocation to determine the ranking of parties. Thus, for purposes of the second step in the second round of seat allocation,7 TUCP has a higher rank than CIBAC. Roa-Borjes position stems from the perceived need for absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. However, the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied) The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" in Section 5(1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts shall be apportioned according to proportional representation. However, this principle of proportional representation applies only to legislative districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be "those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system," giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list seats. Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof x x x." However, this proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b)8 of the same law which mandates a three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list organization from dominating the party-list system. Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent cut-off for those entitled to the guaranteed seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the Constitution, which does not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list system. To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:

1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts. 2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes. 3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution. 4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The wellsettled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution. These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that party-list representatives shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time, these four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking down only that provision of the Party-List Act that could not be reconciled anymore with the 1987 Constitution. WHEREFORE, the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is clarified accordingly. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000 PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

PEOPLE OF THE vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts1is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. The issue raised is one of the first impression. Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law. The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that 1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the police power of the State. 2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation. 3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people. 4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard. 5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress. 6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate. 7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate. 8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail. The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him

as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases. True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law. We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Governmentexecutive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department. Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, . . . Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal. The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows: Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same. For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:

. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session. The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that (2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide. However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. Accused-appellant's reliance states, inter alia, that on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2, which

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.4 The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement. It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system. Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit: a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives; b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City; c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City; d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle. He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit. a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his place of confinement. b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City. c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people. will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the abovequoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified. One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accusedappellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:5 The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence. The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail. We remain unpersuaded.1wphi1.nt No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been

discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts. When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office. In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection. The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."6 This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.7The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed. Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law? The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accusedappellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.8 The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.9 We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement

are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.10 Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.11 More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.12 The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will.13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."15 It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in society.16Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.17 Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State. WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal. The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not. The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution: The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.) The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this provision. Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1 The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged. Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication began with the following paragraph: In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.1wph1.t

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee. Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants. Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee. CONCEPCION, C.J.: This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says are "available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds: It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.) Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other operational technique the following: (a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military; (b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2) typewriters only" to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections"; (c) Radio announcements administration; extolling Vargas and criticizing the

Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments". Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support. The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat". We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers. It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique; (e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950

The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine Government held a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to purchase it for P3,000,000 within the same period of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation Republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that option by tendering to the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on June 21, 1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to P3224,000. Since 1939 the Government has remained in possession of the estate. On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who made a down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within one year and the remainder in annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that failure on his part to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind to sale to him. Aside from the down payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of the purchase price of said estate. The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On May 14, 1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and promise to pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten successive installments of P110,000 each. The nine-month period within which to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947, without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of nine months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme Court.1 It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs that the Philippine Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset. On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as follows: RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL. WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates for the aggregate sum of five million pesos; WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated October 31, 1949, the Buenavista Estate could have been bought for

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs. LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons, respondents. J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo Taada, and Vicente J. Francisco for respondents. OZAETA, J.: This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads as follows: Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now, therefore, be it. Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further order of the Senate or by the special committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the said special committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith. The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here, may be briefly stated as follows: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.

three million pesos by virtue of a contract entered into between the San Juan de Dios Hospital and Philippine Government in 1939; WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to purchase the Buenavista Estate because the occupation government had made tender of payment in the amount of three million pesos, Japanese currency, which fact is believed sufficient to vest title of Ownership in the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanese military notes during the occupation; WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 194, for seven hundred and fifty thousand pesos, and by virtue of the recission of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it. RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five members to be appointed by the President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of the said Committee to determine whether the said purchase was honest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have the power to conduct public hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents before it; and may require any official or employee of any bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government to assist or otherwise cooperate with the Special Committee in the performance of its functions and duties. Said Committee shall submit its report of findings and recommendations within two weeks from the adoption of this Resolution. The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case. At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:

Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving the disposition of funds, I take the position that the transactions were legal, that no laws were being violated, and that all requisites had been complied with. Here also I acted in a purely functional capacity of representative. I beg to be excused from making answer which might later be used against me. I have been assured that it is my constitutional right to refuse to incriminate myself, and I am certain that the Honorable Members of this Committee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the justness of my position. At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a member of the committee, interrogated him as follows: Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own typewritten statement, were legal? Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so. Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to your own statement, did not violate any law? Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so. xxx xxx xxx

Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner that no laws were violated, how is it that when you were asked by the Committee to tell what steps you took to have this money delivered to Burt, you refused to answer the questions, saying that it would incriminate you? Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people. xxx xxx xxx

Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of because you would be incriminated, or you would be incriminating somebody? Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for any use of it. But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator Sumulong, interrogated the petitioner, the latter testified as follows: The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on October 29, 1949, is payable to cash; and upon cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949, what did you do with that amount?

Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person. The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000? Mr. ARNAULT. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these P440,000 which you cashed on October 29, 1949? Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt. The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the P440,000 was a Filipino? Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know. The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of Burt to whom you delivered this big amount of P440,000? Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name. The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you delivered the big amount on October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for the amount? Mr. ARNAULT. No. The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt? Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask. The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of Burt, this big amount of P440,000 which forms part of the P1- million paid to Burt? Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect. The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction? Mr. ARNAULT. Burt. The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing? Mr. ARNAULT. No. The CHAIRMAN. By cable?

Mr. ARNAULT. No. The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction? Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction. The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to deliver these P440,000 to a certain person whose name you do not like to reveal? Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person. The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt was verbal? Mr. ARNAULT. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt? Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago. The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Burt was still here in the Philippines? Mr. ARNAULT. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive the money? Mr. ARNAULT. No. The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the Philippines gave you the verbal instruction? Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946. The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit receiving these P440,000? Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know. The CHAIRMAN. You do not know? Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know. The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal instruction why that certain person should receive these P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me. The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that certain person without receipt? Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and where could I meet him. The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as 1946? Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that. The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the prosecution of the two cases involving the Buenavista and Tambobong estates? Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of. The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government official? Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know. The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person? Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the name. The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949, you knew already that person? Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times. The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name? Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name. The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish name? Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J. The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name? Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.

The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your recollection is Spanish; can you remember the first letter with which that family name begins? Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F. The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name? Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know. The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered this P440,000? Mr. ARNAULT. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Several times? Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times. The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila? Mr. ARNAULT. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or three times, you never were able to find out what was his name? Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of course, we have not done business. Lots of people in Manila know me, but they don't know my name, and I don't know them. They sa{ I am "chiflado" because I don't know their names. The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female? Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male. The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least? Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less. The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain person? What is his complexion: light, dark or light brown? Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili), but smaller. He walks very straight, with military bearing. The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom you gave the P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. No. The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain person, you never came to know his residence? Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office. The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person? Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6. On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, which approved and read to him the following resolution: Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled: That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt consisting of contumacious acts committed by him during the investigation conducted by the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to probe the Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of October 21, 1949, and that the President of the Senate propounded to him the following interrogatories: 1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person whose name it is impossible for you not to remember not only because of the big amount of money you gave to him without receipt, but also by your own statements you knew him as early as 1946 when General Ernest H. Burt was still in the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of money to him without receipt, and the last time you saw him was in December 1949? Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer alleging that the questions were incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be allowed to stand on his constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Not satisfied with that written answer Senator Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the petitioner, propounded to the latter the following question: Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you for the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000, you said that you can [could] not remember his name. That was the reason then for refusing to reveal the name of the person. Now, in the answer that you have just cited, you are refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000 on the ground that your answer will be selfincriminating. Now, do I understand from you that you are abandoning your former claim that you cannot remember the name of that person, and that your reason now for your refusal to reveal the name of that person is that your answer might be self-incriminating? In other words, the question is this: What is your real reason for refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000: that you do not remember his name or that your answer would be self-incriminating?

xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure that the accused should not be required to testify unless he so desires. The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question. The question is very clear. It does not incriminate him. xxx xxx xxx

Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the Senate Committee on the first, second, and third hearings to which I was made in my letter to this Senate of May 2, 1950, in which I gave all the reasons that were in my powers to give, as requested. I cannot change anything in those statements that I made because they represent the best that I can do , to the best of my ability. The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has nothing to do with the question. Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you gave during the investigation for not revealing the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 is not the same reason that you are now alleging because during the investigation you told us: "I do not remember his name." But, now, you are now saying: "My answer might incriminate me." What is your real position? Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made at the first, second, and third hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused from answering the question. I beg to be excused from making any answer that might be incriminating in nature. However, in this answer, if the detail of not remembering the name of the person has not been included, it is an oversight. Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do you remember or not the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000? Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember . Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person, how can you say that your answer might be incriminating? If you do not remember his name, you cannot answer the question; so how could your answer be self-incriminating? What do you say to that? Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see how to answer those questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have no means of knowing what the situation is about. I have been in jail 13 days without communication with the outside. How could I answer the question? I have no knowledge of legal procedure or rule, of which I am completely ignorant.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person? Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said. The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of the name of that person? Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember. The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened a short time ago and, on the other hand, you remember events that occurred during your childhood? Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain. The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove quoted whereby the petitioner was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-atArms and imprisoned until "he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith." The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to wit: That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered and directed to continue its investigation of the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates deal of October 21, 1949, more particularly to continue the examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith. The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18, 1950. The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and prolonged consideration because it is the first of its kind to arise since the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was adopted. For the first time this Court is called upon to define the power of either House of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt; and we are fully conscious that our pronouncements here will set an important precedent for the future guidance of all concerned. Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to lay down the general principles of law which form the background of those issues. Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the Government in three independent but coordinate Departments Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power is vested in the Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member. (Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision

Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered. The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very clear. It does not incriminate the witness. xxx xxx xxx

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to be excused from making further answer, please. Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to the President of the Senate, dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that you cannot reveal the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 because if he is a public official you might render yourself liable for prosecution for bribery, and that if he is a private individual you might render yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did you make those statements when you cannot even tell us whether that person to whom you gave the P440,000 is a public official or a private individual ? We are giving you this chance to convince the Senate that all these allegations of yours that your answers might incriminate you are given by you honestly or you are just trying to make a pretext for not revealing the information desired by the Senate. The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question. Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question is restated and explained.) Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me and signed it. That is all I can say how I stand about this letter. I have no knowledge myself enough to write such a letter, so I had to secure the help of a lawyer to help me in my period of distress. In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the petitioner questions tending to elicit information from him as to the identity of the person to whom he delivered the P440,000; but the petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did not remember. The President of the Senate then propounded to him various questions concerning his past activities dating as far back as when witness was seven years of age and ending as recently as the post liberation period, all of which questions the witness answered satisfactorily. In view thereof, the President of the Senate also made an attempt to illicit the desired information from the witness, as follows: The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory. Answer: Did you deliver the P440,000 as a gift, or of any consideration? Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person, that is all.

empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for contempt. It may also be noted that whereas in the United States the legislative power is shared by and between the Congress of the United States, on the one hand, and the respective legislatures of the different States, on the other the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to States being reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people in the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore be said that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the Congress of the United States or any State Legislature. Our form of Government being patterned after the American system the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and practices we can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242.) But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.). Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is not necessary to do so in this case. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of the legislative power. In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee created by it, to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. The transaction involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of public funds, of which Congress is the constitutional guardian. It also involved government agencies created by Congress to regulate or even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating committee has recommended and the Senate approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any other department head from discharging functions and exercising powers other than those attached to his own office, without ]previous congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near relatives of any President of the Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the Government is a party, more particularly where the decision lies in the hands of executive or administrative officers who are appointees of the President; and (3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress Administration of big landed estates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become effective without previous congressional confirmation.2

We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner in support of his contention that his commitment is unlawful. First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. It is argued that since the investigating committee has already rendered its report and has made all its recommendations as to what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its findings, there is no necessity to force the petitioner to give the information desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit: "In justice to Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of suspicion that now pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely establish the identity of that person . . ." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who appeared and argued the case for the respondents, denied that that was the only purpose of the Senate in seeking the information from the witness. He said that the investigation had not been completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution No. 8; that, by Resolution No. 16, his committee was empowered and directed to continue its investigation, more particularly to continue its examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith; that the bills recommended by his committee had not been approved by the House and might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation; and that those bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not subject to review by this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to qualify this proposition. As was said by the Court of Appeals of New York: "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a

legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the United States in the said case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that where the questions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry a witness rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that where the alleged immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power. Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the issue under consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry. It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the Committee as a result of the uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet been approved by the lower house and by the President and that they may be withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is completed they should be found unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to prevent the Congress from approving other measures it may deem necessary after completing the investigation. We are not called upon, nor is it within our province, to determine or imagine what those measures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for overruling the question propounded by the Senate to the witness. The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. The inquiry there in question was conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to charges, published in the press, that senators were yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before the Senate and were speculating in stocks the value of which would be affected by pending amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of stock brokers dealing in the stock of the American Sugar Refining Company, appeared before the committee in response to a subpoena and asked, among others, the following questions: Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or securities, known as sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator? Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?

He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of Congress for contempt of the Senate. Upon being convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in that case was whether the committee had the right to compel the witness to answer said questions, and the Court held that the committee did have such right, saying: The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The resolution directed the committee to inquire whether any senator has been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate." What the Senate might or might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible, as contended in argument, but is plain that negative answers would have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part of the Senate within its constitutional powers. (Emphasis supplied.) It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is incumbent upon the judicial rather than upon the legislative branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or in law for such assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that resolution expressly requires the committee to determine the parties responsible for the deal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has acted in the due performance of its constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable of being so construed. On the other hand, there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the parties responsible for the deal. Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing that the questioned transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and unless the Senate shall determined those parties are and shall taken such measures as may be within its competence to take the redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction. As we have said, the transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of public funds. That certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the duty of the constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate. If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S.E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.) The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the petitioner, is not applicable here. In that case the inquiry instituted by the House of Representatives of the United States related to a private real-estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook and Company had had an interest in the pool but become bankrupts, and their estate was in course of administration in a federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement of the bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his action was subject to examination and approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some of the creditors, including the United States, were dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the House directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature and history of said real-estate pool and the character of said settlement, with the amount of property

involve, in which Jay Cooke and Co. were interested, and the amount paid or to be paid in said settlement, with power to send for persons and papers, and report to this House." The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the resolution contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the matter was one in respect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate and the trustee's settlement were still pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and other creditors were free to press their claims in that proceeding. And on these grounds the court held that in undertaking the investigation "the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the government, because the power was in its nature clearly judicial." The principles announced and applied in that case are: that neither House of Congress possesses a "general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the power actually possessed is limited to inquires relating to matters of which the particular House has jurisdiction, and in respect of which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by judicial proceeding, it is not within the range of this power , but must be left to the court, conformably to the constitutional separation of government powers. That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There the court found that the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here if it is not disputed that the subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction of the Senate, (2) There the claim of the Government as a creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, which had had an interest in the pool, was pending adjudication by the court; while here the interposition of the judicial power on the subject of the inquiry cannot be expected, as we have pointed out above, until after the Senate shall have determined who the parties responsible are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its competence to take to redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction. It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong criticisms from legal scholars. (See Potts,Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699; James L. Land is, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 154, 214-220.) We quoted the following from Professor Land is' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the case purely as an attempt by the House to secure to the Government certain priority rights as creditor of the bankrupt concern. To him it assumed the character of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay Cooke and Co., with the Government, acting through the House, attempting to override the orderliness of established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before the courts but before Congress. That bankruptcy proceedings had already been instituted against Jay Cooke and Co., in a federal court gave added impetus to such a conception. The House was seeking to oust a court of prior acquired jurisdiction by an extraordinary and unwarranted assumption of "judicial power"! The broader aspect of the investigation had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay Cooke and Co.'s indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only part of the great administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of public monies, that the particular failure was of consequence mainly in relation to the security demanded for all government deposits, that the facts connected with one such default revealed the possibility of other and greater maladministration, such considerations had not been put before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the every-day nature of the particular investigation and the powers there exerted by the House, powers whose exercise was customary and familiar in legislative

practice. Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the inquiry, place in its proper background, should have been regarded as a normal and customary part of the legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made the demand of the court in Killbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results that may be achieved. The power of Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for abstract speculation but one to be determined only after an exhaustive examination of the problem. Relationship, and not their possibilities, determine the extent of congressional power. Constitutionality depends upon such disclosures. Their presence, whether determinative of legislative or judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor the Court can predict, prior to the event, the result of the investigation." The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521; 61. ed., 881. The question there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded its power in punishing, as for contempt of its authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who had written, published, and sent to the chairman of one of its committees an ill-tempered and irritating letter respecting the action and purposes of the committee in interfering with the investigation by the grand jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of the House of Representatives. Power to make inquires and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not involved. The court recognized distinctly that the House of Representatives had implied power to punish a person not a member for contempt, but held that its action in this instance was without constitutional justification. The decision was put on the ground that the letter, while offensive and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any of its proceedings or in the exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of the facts and the issues decided in that case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to the present case. There the contempt involved consisted in the district attorney's writing to the chairman of the committee an offensive and vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the witness to answer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which the Senate has the power and jurisdiction to make . But in that case, it was recognized that the House of Representatives has implied power to punish a person not a member of contempt. In that respect the case is applicable here in favor of the Senate's (and not of the Petitioner's ) contention. Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This contention is based on the opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-Real, in the case of Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it appears that on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a member of the House of Representatives while the latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend the session which was then about to begin, as a result of which assault said representative was unable to attend the sessions on that day and those of the two days next following by reason of the threats which Candido Lopez made against him. By the resolution of the House adopted November 6, 1929, Lopez was declared guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives and ordered punished by confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of twenty-four hours. That resolution was not complied with because the session of the House of Representatives adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, and was reiterated at the next session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was subsequently arrested, whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, six justices voted to grant the writ: Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-real, on the ground that the term of imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt

occurred; and Justices Johns, Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground that the Philippine Legislature had no power to punish for contempt because it was a creature merely of an Act of the Congress of the United States and not of a Constitution adopted by the people. Chief Justice Avancea, Justice Johnson, and Justice Romualdez wrote separate opinions, concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the Legislature had inherent power to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order of commitment could only be executed during the particular session in which the act of contempt was committed. Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no decisive pronouncement was made. The opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based mainly on the following passage in the case of Anderson vs. Dunn, supra: And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment. as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra: And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the two limitations which were expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the power even when applied to subjects which justified its exercise is limited to imprisonment and such imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred. Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avancea held: From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the penalty is limited to the existence of the legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and not to any particular session thereof. This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such penalty is the right which the Legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is enforceable during the existence of the legislative body. Many causes might be conceived to constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue to be a menace to its preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which contempt was committed. If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the legislative body exercising it is in session, then that power and the exercise thereof must perforce continue until the final adjournment and the election of its successor. Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations and from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where as in the case before us, the members composing the legislative body against which the contempt was committed have not yet completed their three-year term, the House may take action against the petitioner herein."

We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by Justice Malcolm are obiter dicta. Anderson vs.Dunn was an action of trespass against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives of the United States for assault and battery and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been arrested for contempt of the House, brought before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by the Speaker, and then discharged from custody. The question as to the duration of the penalty was not involved in that case. The question there was "whether the House of Representatives can take cognizance of contempt committed against themselves, under any circumstances." The court there held that the House of Representatives had the power to punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of the defendant. In Marshall vs. Gordon, the question presented was whether the House had the power under the Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district attorney in writing a vexatious letter as a contempt of its authority, and to inflict punishment upon the writer for such contempt as a matter of legislative power. The court held that the House had no such power because the writing of the letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative duty and did not endanger the preservation of the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon that ground alone, and not because the House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of the petitioner from custody. The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it appears that the Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select committee of five senators to investigate various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of Justice after Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty became its supervising head. In the course of the investigation the committee caused to be served on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M. Daugherty and president of the Midland National Bank of Washington Court House, Ohio, a subpoena commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of giving testimony relating to the subject under consideration. The witness failed to appear without offering any excuse for his failure. The committee reported the matter to the Senate and the latter adopted a resolution, "That the President of the Senate pro tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or his deputy to take into custody the body of the said M.S. Daugherty wherever found, and to bring the said M.S. Daugherty before the bar of the Senate, then and there to answer such questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry as the Senate may order the President of the Senate pro tempore to propound; and to keep the said M.S. Daugherty in custody to await the further order of the Senate." Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court in Cincinnati for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal court granted the writ and discharged the witness on the ground that the Senate, in directing the investigation and in ordering the arrest, exceeded its power under the Constitution. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the contentions of the witness was that the case ha become moot because the investigation was ordered and the committee was appointed during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926. In overruling the contention, the court said: . . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's authority to the period of the Sixty-eighth Congress; but this apparently was changed by a later and amendatory resolution authorizing the committee to sit at such times and places as it might deem advisable or necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: "Neither House can continue any portion of itself in any parliamentary function beyond the end of the session without the consent of the other two branches. When done, it is by a bill constituting them commissioners for the particular purpose." But the context shows that the reference is to the two houses of Parliament when adjourned by prorogation or dissolution by the King. The rule may be the

same with the House of Representatives whose members are all elected for the period of a single Congress: but it cannot well be the same with the Senate, which is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so divided into classes that the seats of one third only become vacant at the end of each Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next Congress, save as vacancies may occur through death or resignation. Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing body, may continue its committees through the recess following the expiration of a Congress;" and, after quoting the above statement from Jefferson's Manual, he says: "The Senate, however being a continuing body, gives authority to its committees during the recess after the expiration of a Congress." So far as we are advised the select committee having this investigation in charge has neither made a final report nor been discharged; nor has been continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its activities have been suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain that the committee may be continued or revived now by motion to that effect, and if, continued or revived, will have all its original powers. This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the case cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably like that in Southern P. Terminal Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S., 498, 514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission did not become moot through the expiration of the order where it was capable of repetition by the Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried into effect and the investigation proceeded with from the point at which it apparently was interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we think a judgment should be rendered as was done in the case cited. What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the witness from custody be reversed. Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every Congress is four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the Petitioner was adopted during the first session of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and ended in May 18, 1950. Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power

of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of selfpreservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved. But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this proposition. The Senate has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it is within its competence to make. That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should be avoided. As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed. Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 if that person be a public official be (witness) might be accused of bribery, and if that person be a private individual the latter might accuse him of oral defamation. The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford him safety. At first he told the Committee that the transactions were legal, that no laws were violated, and that all requisites had been replied with; but at the time he begged to be excused from making answers "which might later be used against me." A little later he explained that although the transactions were legal he refused to answer questions concerning them "because it violates the right of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people . . . I simply stand on my privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for the use of it." But after being apparently convinced by the Committee that his position was untenable, the witness testified that, without

securing any receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain person, a representative of Burt, in compliance with Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that as far as he know, that certain person had nothing to do with the negotiations for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he gave him the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again two or three times, the last time being in December, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in height. Butt the witness would not reveal the name of that person on these pretexts: " I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't remember the name." We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, what is the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to a person to him unknown. "Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that Mason was called to testify before a grand jury engaged in investigating a charge of gambling against six other men. After stating that he was sitting at a table with said men when they were arrested, he refused to answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1) "Was there a game of cards being played on this particular evening at the table at which you are sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being played at another table at this time?" The foreman of the grand jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all of said questions are proper and that the answers thereto would not tend to incriminate the witness." Mason was again called and refused to answer the first question propounded to him, but, half yielding to frustration, he said in response to the second question: "I don't know." In affirming the conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of the United States among other things said: In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved from answering merely because they declared that so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, "I don't know ," given by Mason to the second question, after he had refused to reply under a claim of constitutional privilege. Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit: Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him. as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not

sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person. ( 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., secs. 1135,1136.) It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N.E. [2d], 210 [Ill. App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question. (Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.) As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under the Constitution. The witness in this case has been vociferous and militant in claiming constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his duties and obligations to the Government which protects those rights under the law. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr. Justice Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it is not certain that the laws under which he suffers were made for the security." Paraphrasing and applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish the restraint of his liberty pending the fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which his liberty is restrained were made for his welfare. From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered, with costs.