Hypotheses on Misperception Author(s): Robert Jervis Source: World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Apr., 1968), pp.

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HYPOTHESES

ON MISPERCEPTION

By ROBERT JERVIS*

an N determining he will behave, actormusttryto predict how The his will actions affect values. howothers actandhowtheir will intentions. and an of must develop image others oftheir therefore actor one; turn however, outtobe an inaccurate theactor may, Thisimage and both actions their misperceive others' of for may, a number reasons, of the note In research I wishto discuss types misperintentions. this tendto make.The intentions whichstates of states' ceptions other it but is of concept intention complex, herewe can consider to comit the feels will actin a widerangeof the prise waysin which state and usually notspecific are of These future contingencies. ways acting actor a or reasons national individual plans. well-developed For many but may not knowhow he will act undergivenconditions, this here. cannot dealt be with problem
I. PREVious TREATMENTS OF PERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

in their have misperception historians discussed diplomatic Although have relations of students international events, of treatments specific have two of this However, sets scholars applied ignored topic. generally and between that within to analysis thedocuments flowed content WorldWar I. But thedata in preceding governmentsthesixweeks form doesnotproduce havebeenputintoquantitative in a waythat and and of accurate measures perceptions intentions thatmakesit on useful evidence misperception.1 to impossible gather who dealt general The second of group theorists haveexplicitly with in international of consists those, relations of questions misperception Kenneth Amitai extent, likeCharles and,to a lesser Etzioni, Osgood, have analyzed cold war in who the and Boulding J.David Singer,
* I am grateful theHarvardCenter support. forInternational Affairs research for to Studies at note was presented the International An earlierversionof this research in Association panel of the New England PoliticalScience Association April i967. fromcomments RobertArt,Alexander George,Paul Kecskemeti, I have benefited by Morton Schwartz,and Aaron Paul Leary, Thomas Schelling,JamesSchlesinger, Wildavskv. 1 See, forexample, and Ole Holsti,RobertNorth,and RichardBrody,"Perception Politics International ed., Quantitative in Actionin the I9I4 Crisis," J. David Singer, and studies analysis content of discussion theStanford (New York i968). For a fuller Studyof see of problems quantification, my "The Costsof theQuantitative thegeneral ApN. eds., Contending in Relations," Klaus Knorrand James Rosenau, International Politics(forthcoming). to proaches International

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of terms a spiralof misperception.2 approachgrowspartly of This out themathematical theories L. F. Richardson3 partly of findof and out ings of social and cognitive psychology, many of which will be discussedin thisresearch note. statetheir These authors case in general, not universal, if but terms, do not providemanyhistorical cases thatare satisfactorily explained by theirtheories. Furthermore, they do not deal with any of the numerous instances thatcontradict theirnotionof the self-defeating aspectsof the use of power.They ignorethe factthatstatesare not and that the findings psychology individuals of can be applied to organizations theirtheoretical onlywith greatcare. Most important, is analysis forthemostpartofreduced valuebecauseit seemslargely to of theirassumption be a product thatthe SovietUnion is a basically of behavior a product is status-quo powerwhoseapparently aggressive fearof theWest.Yet theysupplylittleor no evidenceto support this of view. Indeed,the explanation the differences opinionbetween for theorists theproponents deterrence notin differing and thespiral of lies viewsof international general valuesand morality,4 relations, differing or differing methods analysis,5 in differing of but of perceptions Soviet
intentions. II. THEORIES-NECESSARY
AND DANGEROUS

of Despitethelimitations their thesewriters approach, have touched on a vitalproblemthathas not been given systematic treatment by of theorists international from relations. The evidence bothpsychology and history overwhelmingly supports view (which maybe labeled the tend to fitincominginformation Hypothesis i) thatdecision-makers into theirexistingtheoriesand images. Indeed, theirtheoriesand imagesplay a large part in determining what theynotice.In other words,actorstend to perceivewhat theyexpect.Furthermore (Hya theory have greater will pothesis ia), impacton an actor's interpretationof data (a) the greater the ambiguity the data and (b) the of
2See, for example, Osgood,An Alternative War or Surrender to (Urbana i962); Etzioni,The Hard Wayto Peace (New York i962); Boulding, "NationalImagesand iii International Systems," Journal Conflict of Resolution, (June I959), I20-3I; and Singer, Deterrence, ArmsControl, Disarmament and (Columbusi962). 3 Statistics Deadly Quarrels(Pittsburgh of i960) and Armsand Insecurity (Chicago For nonmathematicians i960). a finesummary Richardson's of workis AnatolRapoport's"L. F. Richardson's Mathematical Theoryof War," journal of Conflict ResoI lution, (September I957), 249-99. 4 See PhilipGreen, Deadly Logic (Columbusi966); Green,"Methodand Substance xvi in theArmsDebate,"WorldPolitics, (Julyi964), 642-67;and Robert Levine, A. xiv "Fact and Moralsin theArmsDebate,"WorldPolitics, (January i962), 239-58. 5 See AnatolRapoport, and Strategy Conscience (New York i964).

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the higher degree confidence which actor of with the holds theory.6 the Formany purposes canusetheconcept differing ofperwe of levels ceptual thresholds deal withthefact to and that takes it more, more unambiguous, information an actorto recognize unexpected for an phenomenon an expected than one. An experiment Bruner by and Postman "that determined therecognition threshold . . . inconfor gruous playing cards(thosewithsuitsand colorreversed) sigis nificantly higher thanthethreshold normal for cards."7 onlyare Not peopleable to identify normal (and therefore expected) cardsmore quickly easily and than incongruous therefore (and unexpected) ones, butalsothey at first incongruous for may take cards normal ones. we However, should assume, thespiral not as theorists do,that often it is necessarily irrational actors adjust for to incoming information to fitmoreclosely their existing and beliefs images. ("Irrational" here describes acting underpressures the actorwouldnot admitas that if of and conscious them.) legitimatehewere Abelson Rosenberg label as "psycho-logic" pressure create "balanced" the to a struccognitive ture-i.e., in which relations one "all among 'goodelements' one's [in attitude are structure] positive null), all relations (or among'bad elements' positive null), and all relations are between (or good and bad elements negative null)." Theycorrectly are showthatthe (or "reasoning involves] [this wouldmortifylogician."' those a But who havetried apply and similar to this cognitive theories international to relations usually have that many in casesthere overlooked fact the are the and important logicallinks between elements theprocesses they describe be which cannot called"psycho-logic."am hereusingthe (I term not senseof drawing "logical" in thenarrow onlythoseconclusions follow that in but from necessarily thepremises, rather the sense conforminggenerally of to of rules agreed-upon forthetreating For is that evidence.) example, Osgoodclaims psycho-logicdisplayed whentheSoviets a and praise manor a proposal peoplein theWest react distrusting object this of the believes by But praise.' if a person that Russians aggressive,is logical himto be suspicious the for are it oftheir moves. Whenwe saythat decision-maker a "dislikes" another
6

7 Jerome A and "On thePerceptions Incongruity: Paradigm," of Bruner Leo Postman, (Durham,N.C., and and David Krech,eds.,Perception Personality in Jerome Bruner I949), 2IO. 8 Robert Behavioral Science, and MiltonRosenberg, "Symbolic Psycho-logic," Abelson iII

Dynamicsand Images of the Enemy,"in David 1955), 382; Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Fagen,Enemiesin Politics(Chicago i967), 70. Finlay, Ole Holsti,and Richard

(New York and the Conceptof Structure Theoriesof Perception Floyd Allport,

9 P. 27.

(January I958), 4-5.

HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION

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this state usually that that other haspolicies means hebelieves that state conflicting those hisnation. with of Reasoning experience and indicate tothedecision-maker the"disliked" is apttoharm state's that state his Thus in thesecases there no need to invoke"psychointerests. is and be that logic," it cannot claimed thecasesdemonstrate substithe tution "emotional of for consistency rational consistency.'"10 The question therelations of beliefs cognitions among particular and canoften seen part thegeneral be as of of topic therelation incoming of bitsof informationthereceivers' to already established The images. to datainto wider a need fit of frameworkbeliefs, ifdoing does even so to notseem do justice individual to is facts, not, at least notonly, or is a psychological that drive decreases accuracy ourperceptions of the of to theworld, is "essential thelogicofinquiry."1 but Factscan be inand terpreted, indeed identified, withtheaid ofhypotheses only and is Pure theories. empiricism impossible, it wouldbe unwiseto and in of revise theories thelight every of information doesnot bit that conform them.12 hypothesis be expected account to No can easily to for and all theevidence, ifa prevailing is supported many view by theories andbya large it poolof findings should be quickly not altered. Too can little rigidity be as bad as toomuch.13 in Thisis as true thebuilding socialand physical of as science it is
11I haveborrowed phrase this from Abraham Kaplan,who uses it in a different but related in context The Conductof Inquiry(San Franciscoi964), 86. 12 The spiral are theorists not theonlyonesto ignorethelimits empiricism. of Roger thatmostconsumers producers intelligence thatintelligence Hilsman found and of felt shouldnot deal withhypotheses, shouldonlyprovidethe policy-makers "all but with and National Decisions [Glencoe I956], 46). The the facts"(Strategic Intelligence closeinterdependence between and hypotheses facts overlooked is partly becauseof the with "policypreferences." tendency identify to "hypotheses" 13 Karl Deutsch a discusses related interestingly whenhe argues, question "Autonomy and recallfrom bothintakefromthe present . requires memory, selfhood and can of be seenin just thiscontinuous and a limited balancing a limited present past.... if is possible either self-determination No further or openness memory lost.. . . To is ceaseto be able to takein new information], approach that[systems theextent they the actionbecomesalmostcompletely of behavior a bulletor torpedo:theirfuture dewithout an termined their by past.On theotherhand,a person memory, organization but valuesor policy. . . -all theseno longersteer, drift:theirbehavior without deDriftwoodand the pends littleon theirpast and almostwhollyon theirpresent. of kindof loss of self-control ." (National.. bulletare thuseach theepitome another ism and Social Communication [Cambridge, Mass., I954], i67-68). Also see Deutsch's makes a The Nervesof Government (New York i963), 98-I09, 200-256. A physicist to "It similar argument: is clearthatif one is too attached one's preconceived model, It one will miss all radicaldiscoveries. is amazing to what degreeone may fail to whichdoes notfittheinitialimage.... On theother an register mentally observation unknownphenomenon, and hand,if one is too open-minded pursueseveryhitherto to in one is almostcertain lose oneself trivia" (MartinDeutsch,"Evidenceand Inin in ference NuclearResearch," Daniel Lerner, Evidenceand Inference ed., [Glencoe
I958], I02).

10ibid., 26.

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inpolicy-making.14 itis terribly While difficultknow to a when finding throws serious doubt accepted on theories should followed and be up and wheninstead was causedby experimental it mistakes minor or in errors thetheory, is clearthat it scientists wouldmakeno progress ifthey followed Thomas Huxley's injunction "sitdownbefore to fact as a merechild, prepared giveup every be to preconceived notion, follow nature or humbly wherever leads, youwilllearn nothing."1 As Michael Polanyi "It explains, istrue that enough thescientist must be prepared submit anymoment theadverse to at to verdict obserof vational evidence. notblindly.... Thereis always possibility But the as that, in [thecasesoftheperiodic system elements thequanand of tum a theory light], deviation notaffect essential of may the correctness of a proposition....The process explaining of awaydeviations in is fact quiteindispensablethedaily to routine research," though of even thismaylead to themissing a great of For discovery.16 example, in i795, theastronomer Lalandedidnotfollow observations conup that tradicted prevailing the and hypotheses couldhaveledhimto discover theplanet Neptune."7 Yet we shouldnot be too quick to condemn suchbehavior. As Thomas Kuhnhasnoted, "There no suchthing research is as without counter-instances."'8 ofbasictheories-what If a set Kuhncallsa paradigm-hasbeenable to account a massof data,it should be for not trifled As Kuhnputs "Lifelong with. it: lightly resistance, particularly from those whose productive careers committed toan older have them tradition normal of science science [i.e., within accepted the paradigm], is nota violation scientific of standards an indexto thenature but of scientific research itself. source resistance theassurance The of is that theolder will paradigm ultimately all itsproblems, nature solve that
14 Raymond Bauer,"Problems Perception theRelations of and Between U.S. and the theSovietUnion,"Journal Conflict of v Resolution, (September i96i), 223-29. 15 Quotedin W. L. B. Beveridge, The ArtofScientific Investigation, ed. (London 3rd 16 Science, Faith,and Society(Chicago i964), 31. For a further discussion this of problem,see ibid., i6, 26-41,90-94; Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London 1958), 8-I5, 30, 143-68, 269-98, 3Io-II; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution

1957), 50.

(Chicago i964); Kuhn, "The Functionof Dogma in Scientific in Research," A. C. Crombie, Scientific ed., Change (New York 1963), 344-69;the comments Kuhn's on paperby Hall, Polanyi, and Toulmin,and Kuhn's reply, For a related ibid.,370-95. discussion thesepoints of froma different see perspective, NormanStorer, The Social System Science(New York i960), ii6-22. of 17 "He found thattheposition one starrelative others . . had shifted. of to . Lalande was a good astronomer knew thatsucha shift and was unreasonable. crossed He out his first observation, a questionmarknextto the secondobservation, let the put and matter go" (Jerome Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow,and George Austin,A Study of Thinking [New York i962], o05). 18 The Structure Scientific of Revolution, 79.

HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION

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into canbe shoved theboxtheparadigm at provides. Inevitably,times that stubborn pig-headed indeed and as ofrevolution, assurance seems itsometimes Thatsameassurbecomes. itis alsosomething But more. anceiswhat makes normal science puzzle-solving or science possible."1 Thusitis important seethat dilemma how"open" be to to the of to newinformation that is one at inevitably plagues attempt underany in in standing anyfield. Instances which seems be ignored to evidence can or twisted fittheexisting to theory often explained this be by instead by illogical nonlogical of or dilemma psychological pressures true toward This consistency. is especially ofdecision-makers' attempts toestimate intentionsother the of since must states, they constantly take account thedanger theother is of that state trying deceive to them. discussed thusfar,together The theoretical framework with an examination manycases, of and 2: suggests Hypothesis scholars detoo to cision-makersapttoerr being wedded theestablished are by view andtooclosed newinformation, as opposed being willing to to too to alter their theories.20 Another ofmaking point toargue this is way that and actors to tend establish theories expectations their In prematurely. politics, course, is often this of necessary because theneedfor of action. Butexperimental that indicates thesametendency occurs evidence also ontheunconscious Bruner Postman and level. found "perhaps that the barrier therecognition incongruous of greatest single to stimuli the is to tendency perceptual for hypothesesfixate receivingminimum a after ofconfirmation.... there occurred these had in Once casesa partial confirmation hypothesis itseemed nothing ofthe ... that couldchange thesubject's report."21
9lIbid.,150-5I. Requirements effective of politicalleadership may lead decision-makers voice to fewer doubts thanthey have aboutexisting policies and images, thisconstraint but can Similarcalculations politicalstrategy onlypartially explainthisphenomenon. of may contribute severalof the hypotheses to discussed below. 21 P. 221. Similarly, experiments in dealingwith his subjects'perception other of people,CharlesDailey foundthat "premature judgmentappearsto make new data harderto assimilate than when the observer withholds judgmentuntil all data are mistakes own inferences facts" his seen.It seemsprobable . . thatthe observer . for of of Conclusion of ("The Effects Premature Upon the Acquisition Understanding a Person,"Journal Psychology, of xxx [January 1952], For othertheory and I49-50). "On Perceptual evidence thispoint,see Bruner, on Readiness," Psychological Review, of LXIV (March I957), 123-52; Gerald Davidson, "The NegativeEffects Early Exxxxii (Junei964), 278Journal Personality, posureto Suboptimal Visual Stimuli," of 95; AlbertMyers,"An Experimental Analysisof a Tactical Blunder,"Journalof LXIX Abnormal SocialPsychology, (Novemberi964), 493-98;and Dale Wyattand and Journal Abnormal or Donald Campbell, "On theLiability Stereotype Hypothesis," of of XLIV (October 1950), and Social Psychology, 496-500. It should be noted that this more likely(David Braybrooke and tendency makes "incremental" decision-making of A CharlesLindblom, Strategy Decision [New York i963]), but the results this of fromhis goals. process maylead theactorfurther
20

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However,when we apply theseand otherfindings politicsand to discuss kindsof misperception, shouldnot quicklyapplythe label we of cognitive We distortion. shouldproceedcautiously two related for reasons.The first that the evidenceavailable to decision-makers is almostalwayspermits severalinterpretations.shouldbe notedthat It there casesof visualperception whichdifferent are in stimuli can produce exactlythe same pattern an observer's on retina.Thus, for an observer usingoneeyethesamepattern wouldbe produced a sphere by thesize of a golfball whichwas quite closeto theobserver, a baseby ball-sized sphere thatwas further away,or by a basketball-sized sphere stillfurther away. Withoutotherclues,the observer cannotpossibly determine he whichof thesestimuli is presented with,and we would notwantto call his incorrect perceptions examplesof distortion. Such cases,relatively in visualperception, frequent international rare are in relations. The evidenceavailableto decision-makers almostalways is veryambiguous cluesto others' sinceaccurate intentions surroundare ed bynoise22 deception. mostcases,no matter and In how long,deeply, and "objectively" evidenceis analyzed,people can differ their in the interpretations, there are no general rules to indicatewho is and correct. distortion that is The secondreasonto avoid the label of cognitive and judgment, obscureenoughin the distinction betweenperception individual is in psychology, almostabsentin the makingof inferences that international politics.Decision-makers who reject information contradicts views-or who developcomplex their of interpretationsitoftendo so consciously and explicitly. Since the evidenceavailable containscontradictory to information, make any inferences requires thatmuch information ignoredor given interpretations will be that seemtortuous thosewho hold a different to position. availableto a decision-maker Indeed,ifwe consider onlytheevidence the at the timeof decision, view laterprovedincorrect may be supone-or even by more. portedby as much evidenceas the correct been too unsympathetic thepeoplewho were Scholars have often with it difficult point to provedwrong.On closer examination, is frequently and those those todifferences between who wereright who werewrong and to to withrespect theiropenness new information willingness to for modifytheirviews.WinstonChurchill, example,did not openvieweach Nazi actionto see if theexplanations mindedly provided by for thanhis ownbeliefs. accounted thedatabetter theappeasers Instead,
22 For a use of this concept in politicalcommunication, RobertaWohlstetter, see Pearl Harbor (Stanford i962).

HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION

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into information his he each likeChamberlain, fitted bitofambiguous the not should leadus tooverlook That ownhypotheses. hewascorrect cognitive to and of fact hismethods analysis useoftheory produce that of from differ those theappeasers.23 did consistency notbasically in of A consideration the importance expectations influencing of of in belief theprevalence that also perception indicates thewidespread or thinking" be incorrect, at leastmaybe basedon inmay "wishful between on literature theinteraction data.The psychological adequate but here, it be and is and affect perception immense cannot treated strong wereconsidered that that phenomena at first should noted be can often be better on for of evidence theimpact affect perception Thus, of as the treated demonstrating influence expectations.24 in ofthe States' misestimation United cases relations, likethe international at glance in mayseem first climate CubainAprili96i, which political adebe may thinking, instead more of tohavebeeninstances wishful (e.g., held by explained thetheories by thedecision-makers quately Of desires have may are Communist governments unpopular). course, so but expectations, since many by an impact perception influencing on maynot of desires the factors affect expectations, netinfluence other begreat. and relations is There evidence both psychology25 international from seem clash, expectations tobe more and when expectations desires that Vietnam that like States would tobelieve North The important. United to or is aboutto negotiate thattheUSSR is ready giveup whatthe but domination, ambiguous States is United believes itsgoalofworld
23 Similarly, to the Coulondre, Frenchambassador Berlinin 1939, was one of Robert in service becauseof his earlier Partly the to thefewdiplomats appreciate Nazi threat. He agreement. of to sensitive thethreat a Berlin-Moscow theUSSR, "he was painfully address Russia in his Reichstag thatHitlerhad not attacked notedwithforeboding each new relaying the and summer, ambassador of April28.... So it wentall spring his and adding to his admonitions revolution of diplomatic evidence the impending "The Voice in the Ford and Carl Schorske, counteraction" (Franklin pleasfordecisive eds., The Diploin Coulondre," GordonCraig and Felix Gilbert, Robert Wilderness: but werecorrect, it is difficult Vol. III [New York i963] 573-74).His hypotheses mats, who were incorrect, the between way he and thoseambassadors differences to detect to However, the information. notedand interpreted selectively likeNevilleHenderson, of perceptions Hitler'sintentions, the thatthefearof war influenced appeasers' extent in that of viewsdid have an element psycho-logic was not present their theappeasers'

Error on the Part of Human Donald Campbell,"Systematic 24See, for example, i and Information Control, (1958), 346-50; and Systems," Links in Communications in Factorsin Perception," of Analysis Motivational "The Experimental Leo Postman, (Lincoln,Neb., S. Theoryand Researchin Motivation Judson Brown,ed., Current Bias as Relatedto 25Dale Wyattand Donald Campbell,"A Studyof Interviewer of Journal Opinionand International and Expectations Own Opinions," Interviewer's iv Research, (SpringI950), 77-83. Attitude
I953), 59-I08.

opponents' position.

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POLITICS

is evidence seento confirm opposite the whichconforms conclusion, totheUnited sensiStates' expectations. Actors apttobe especially are to tiveto evidence grave of danger they if think they takeaction can protect themselves against menace the onceithasbeendetected.
III. SAFEGUARDS

Can anything be said to scholars decision-makers then and other than "Avoid being either openortooclosed, be especially too but aware ofthelatter be danger"? Although decision-makers always faced will and confusing to withambiguous and evidence will be forced make inferences aboutothers which will often inaccurate,number be a of safeguards be suggested may which couldenablethemto minimize their errors. First, most and obvious, decision-makers be aware should thatthey notmake"unbiased" do interpretations of eachnewbitof incoming information, rather inevitably but are influenced heavily by thetheories expect be verified. they to Theyshould knowthatwhat to often as and inference mayappear them a self-evident unambiguous so seems only of To witha because their beliefs. someone preexisting different the or theory samedata mayappearto be unimportant to another Thus manyevents less indesupport explanation. provide for pendent support thedecision-makers' than images they mayat first realize.Knowledge thisshouldlead decision-makersexamine of to that more evidence others contradicts views. their closely believe decision-makers attitudes contain conSecond, shouldsee if their sistent supporting or that beliefs arenotlogically Thesemay be linked. of nor Whileit is notlogically examples true psycho-logic. surprising is itevidence psychological of pressures find people to that whobelieve Russia aggressive very is that are of suspicious anySoviet other move, kinds consistency more of are suspect. example, For most peoplewho that feel itisimportant the for United States winthe inVietnam to war alsofeelthat meaningful a is victory possible. And most peoplewho defeat would feel neither U.S. national endanger nor security be costly of in terms other values feelthat cannot also we win.Although there areimportant the of logical linkages between twoparts eachofthese views(especially theories guerrilla of through warfare), do not they to seemstrong to the enough explain degree which opinions the are in correlated. in Similarly, Finland thewinter 1939, of those whofelt that would Finnish to grave consequences follow agreementgive Russia a military also believed base thatthe Soviets wouldwithdraw their if demand Finlandstoodfirm. And those who feltthatconcessions wouldnotleadtolossofmajor values believed Russia also that would

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ON MISPERCEPTION

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if In fight needbe.26 this country, whofavored nuclear ban those a test tended argue to that fallout very was harmful, onlylimited that improvementstechnology in wouldflow a from further testing, that and test wouldincrease chances peaceandsecurity. ban the for Thosewho opposed test were todisagree all three the ban apt on points. Thisdoes notmean, course, thepeopleholding of that suchsetsof supporting viewswerenecessarily wrongin anyone element. The Finnswho wanted make to concessionstheUSSR were to in probably correct both parts their of argument. decision-makers But if should suspicious be they holda position which in elements arenotlogically that connected support sameconclusion. condition psychologically the This is comand fortable makes decisions do easier reach to (since values competing nothavetobe balanced against off eachother). The chances thus are considerable atleast that part thereason a person of why holds some of these views related psychology notto thesubstance the is to and of evidence. Decision-makers alsobe aware should that actors suddenly find who an themselves having important shared interest other with actors a have to tendency overestimate degree common the of This interest involved. is tendency especially strong those for actors (e.g.,theUnited States, at leastbefore i950) whosebeliefs aboutinternational relations and morality thatthey cooperate with"good"states imply can only and that states withthose there willbe no majorconflicts. theother On that a of hand,states haveeither tradition limited with cooperation others or held that (e.g.,Britain) a strongly theory differentiates occasional from allies27 permanent (e.g.,theSoviet it Union)find easier toresist tendency neednotdevote this and special efforts combating to its danger. A third for would safeguard decision-makers be to maketheir asand predictions follow that sumptions, from beliefs, the them explicit as as possible. actor An should todetermine, try before events occur, what evidence wouldcount and against theories. knowing for his By what to expect wouldknowwhattobe surprised and surprise he by, could to actor indicate that that beliefs his needed reevaluation.28 A fourth is The safeguard more complex. decision-maker try should
Raymond Aron,Peace and War (GardenCityi966), 29. Cf. Kuhn, The Structure Scientific of Revolution, A fairly 65. high degree of knowledge neededbefore is one can stateprecise One expectations. indication the of lack of international is relations theory thatmostof us are not sure what "naturally" either"puzzles" to be further flows fromour theories and what constitutes explored or thatcastdoubton thebasictheories. withtheparadigm "anomalies"
27
28

I36-39.

The Diplomacyof the WinterWar (Cambridge, 26Max Jacobson, Mass., i96i),

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toprevent individuals organizations letting and their maintask, from political and future, identity and become tospecific tied theories images of other actors.29 thisoccurs, If for subgoals originally sought their

contribution higher to endswill takeon value of their own,and informationindicating possiblealternative routes the originalgoals will to not be carefully considered. example, U.S. ForestServicewas For the unableto carry itsoriginal out purposeas effectively when it began to seeitsdistinctive competence in promoting bestuse oflandsand not the forests rather preventing types forest but in all of fires.30 thatclaim to be unbiasedmay not realizethe extent Organizations to whichtheir definition their of rolehas becomeinvolved withcertain beliefs abouttheworld.Allen Dulles is a victim thislack of underof whenhe says,"I grantthatwe are all creatures prejudice, standing of CIA officials, by entrusting including but coordination to intelligence our central intelligence whichis excludedfrom service, policy-making and is married no particular to military hardware, can avoid, to we the greatest possibleextent, the bending of factsobtainedthrough to intelligence suit a particular This stateoccupational viewpoint."31 mentoverlooks factthatthe CIA has developeda certain the view of international relations and of the cold war whichmaximizesthe imof portance its information-gathering, and subversive espionage, activities.SincetheCIA would lose itsuniqueplace in thegovernment it if were decidedthatthe "back alleys"of worldpoliticswere no longer vitalto U.S. security, is notsurprising theorganization it that interprets information a waythatstresses continued in the needforitstechniques. should realize the validity Fifth, decision-makers and implications of RobertaWohlstetter's that "a willingness play with to argument material from different anglesand in thecontext unpopular well of as as popularhypotheses an essential is ingredient a good detective, of the whether end is thesolution a crime an intelligence of or estimate."32 However,it is oftendifficult, and psychologically politically, any for one personto do this.Since a decision-maker usuallycannotget "unbiased" treatments data, he should insteadseek to structure of conflicting biasesintothedecision-making process. The decision-maker, in other shouldhave devil'sadvocates words, around.Just as Neustadt as, points the out,33 decision-maker wantto create will conflicts amonghis
See PhilipSelznick, Leadership Administration in (EvanstonI957). Ashley Fire Schiff, and Water:Scientific Heresyin theForestService(Cambridge, Mass.,i962). Despiteits title, thisbook is a fascinating valuablestudy. and 31 The Craft Intelligence of (New York i963), 53. 32 P. 302. See Beveridge, fora discussion theidea thatthe scientist 93, of shouldkeep in mind as manyhypotheses possible as when conducting analyzing and experiments. 33Presidential Power (New York i960).
29 30

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in subordinatesorder makeappropriate to choices, he willalsowant so toensure incoming that information is examined from different many with different in mind. someextent perspectives many To hypotheses this kindof examination be doneautomatically the will through divergence goals, of training, in experience, information exists and that casesthisdivergence notbe will anylarge organization. in many But sufficient. viewsof thoseanalyzing data will stillbe too The the homogeneous, thedecision-maker haveto go outofhisway and will notonly cultivate tocreate to but differing viewpoints. While that all would needed be would tohavesome exambe people the ining datatrying validate it wouldprobto unpopular hypotheses, be ably more effectivethey if and in actually believed had a stake the
views theywere trying support. in I94I someonehad had the If to task of proving view thatJapanwould attackPearl Harbor,the the government mighthave been less surprised the attack. And onlya by personwho was out to show thatRussiawould take objectively great riskswould have been apt to note thatseveralships with especially largehatches goingto Cuba wereridinghigh in thewater, indicating of thepresence a bulkybut lightcargothatwas not likelyto be anyAnd manypeople who doubtthe missiles. thingotherthanstrategic wisdomof the administration's Vietnampolicywould be somewhat reassured therewere people in the government if who searchedthe and statements actionsof both sidesin an effort provethatNorth to Vietnam was willingto negotiate thattheofficial and of interpretation such movesas the Communist activities duringthe Tet truceof i967 was incorrect. Of courseall thesesafeguards involvecosts.They would divertresources fromothertasksand would increaseinternal dissension. Determining whether these costs wouldbe worth gainswould depend the on a detailed of analysis how thesuggested safeguards might implebe mented. Even if theywere adoptedby a government, course,they of would not eliminate chanceof misperception. the However,the safeguards wouldmakeit morelikely thatnational decision-makers would makeconscious choices aboutthewaydatawereinterpreted rather than merely assuming thatthey be seenin onlyone way and can mean can only one thing.Statesmen would thus be remindedof alternative imagesof others just as theyare constantly remindedof alternative policies. These safeguards partly are based on Hypothesis actorscan more 3: into easilyassimilate their established imageof another actorinformation contradicting image if the information transmitted that is and

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case, considered bybitthan it comes at once.In theformer bit if all data and eachpieceofdiscrepant canbe copedwithas it arrives each to of theconflicts theprevailing willbe smallenough go with view a at most or unnoticed, be dismissed unimportant,to necessitate to as to of slight modification theimage(e.g.,addition exceptions the of bein the rule).Whentheinformation arrives a block, contradiction and it tween and theprevailing is apt to be muchclearer the view will probability majorcognitive of reorganization be higher.
IV. SOURCES OF CONCEPTS

thus An actor's thresholds-and the imagesthatamperceptual influenced whathe has by biguous information toproduce-are is apt and that is experienced learned about.34oneactor toperceive another If in a given he must or develop, concept a for fits category first have, thatcategory. can usefully three levelsat whicha We distinguish can concept be present absent. can or First, concept be completely the anything cormissing. actor's The cognitive structure notinclude may can This responding thephenomenon is encountering. situation to he occur only science not in fiction, alsoin a worldofrapidchange but orin themeeting twodissimilar Thus image the of of systems. China's century, Western world extremely was inaccurate the in mid-nineteenth herlearning very were inadequate. was slow, her and responses woefully The Westwasspared similar a it struggle because had thepower only the to reshape system encountered. theactor it clearly one sees Once it more instance thenewphenomenon, is apttorecognize much of he in can quickly thefuture.35 Second, actor knowabouta concept the butnotbelieve itreflects actual Thus that an phenomenon. Communist andWestern of explanation decision-makerseachaware theother's are ofhow his system but thattheconcept corfunctions, do notthink
of also holds for perception shapes. argue that thisinfluence 34Most psychologists to societies differ respect theirpredispoin thatpeoplein different For data showing argument thatthis and for a convincing certain opticalillusions sitionto experience which environments, different physical difference be explainedby the societies' can fromampatterns drawinginferences of have led theirpeople to developdifferent biguousvisual cues, see MarshallSegall,Donald Campbell,and MelvilleHerskovits, The Influence of Culture on Visual Perceptions (Indianapolisi966). 35Thus when Bruner first were presented withincongruous subjects and Postman's and cards (i.e., cardsin whichsymbols colorsof the suitswerenot matching, playing for producing red spades or black diamonds),long exposuretimeswere necessary the perceived card and added this But correct identification. once a subjectcorrectly otherincongruous he of typeof card to his repertoire categories, was able to identify cards much more quickly.For an analogousexample-in this case, changesin the of photographs an enemy'ssecretweapons-testing analysisof aerial reconnaissance unknown objectmaybe present-see facilities by produced thebeliefthata previously The Mare's Nest (Bostoni964), 66-67, 274-75. David Irving,

HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION

467

to responds reality. Communist furthermore, that elites, deny anything couldcorrespond thedemocracies' to description themselves. of Third, theactor holda concept, notbelieve another may but that actor it fills at thepresent moment. ThustheBritish French and statesmen the of I930's helda concept states of with unlimited ambitions. realized They that Napoleons possible, they notthink were but did in Hitler belonged that category. Hypothesisdistinguishes three 4 these cases:misperception most is difficultcorrect thecaseofa missing to in and concept least difficultcorrect thecaseofa recognized presumably to in but unfilled concept. other All things beingequal (e.g.,thedegree whichthe to is concept central theactor's to cognitive structure), first rethe case quires morecognitive reorganization does thesecond, than and the second requires more than reorganization thethird. However, hypothesis notmean this does that will learning necessarily in be slowest thefirst case,forif thephenomena totally the are new actormaymake suchgrossly that inappropriate responses he will quickly acquire information clearly indicating he is facedwith that he something doesnotunderstand. thesooner actor And the realizes that are things not-or maynotbe-whatthey the seem, sooner is he apttocorrect image.36 his Three mainsources contributedecision-makers' to concepts interof national and relations of other states influence levelof their and the thresholds various for perceptual phenomena. an First, actor's beliefs about owndomestic his political are system apt to be important. In some like cases, that the of USSR,thedecision-makers' concepts tied are toan ideology explicitly that a provides frame reference viewing of for affairs. where isnotthecase, Even this foreign experience hisown with will determine theactor familiar andwhat system partly what is with he is aptto perceive others. in LouisHartzclaims, is theabsence "It of ofthe revolution which attheheart thewhole experience social is of American dilemma....In a whole series specific itenters of ways into ofcommunication therest theworld. find ourdifficulty with of We it difficultunderstand to 'socialquestion'. . . We are notfaEurope's . the miliar with deeper socialstruggles Asia and hencetendto inof even terpret reactionary as regimes 'democratic.' Similarly, "3 George Kennan that World in I theAlliedpowers, especially argues War and couldnotunderstand bitterness violence others' the America, and of internal conflicts:. . The inability theAlliedstatesmen picture ". of to tothemselves passions theRussian the of civil war [waspartly caused
37 The LiberalTradition America(New in
86

Bruner and Postman, 220.

York I955),

306.

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WORLD POLITICS

we bythefact in that] represent a society which manifestations ... the ofevilhavebeencarefully and buried sublimated thesocial in behavior of people, in their as consciousness. thisreason, For very probably, despite our widely and outwardly traveled cosmopolitan lives,the of mainsprings political in behavior sucha country Russiatendto as remain concealed from vision."38 our Second, concepts be supplied theactor's will by previous experiences. An experiment another illustrates Dearborn Simon from field this. and presented business executives from various divisions (e.g., sales,accounting, production) thesame with hypothetical andasked data them foran analysis recommendations the standpoint what and from of would best thecompany a whole. for be as The executives' heavviews ilyreflected departmental their perspectives.39 William Kaufmann W. shows howtheperceptions Ambassador of Joseph Kennedy wereaffected hispast:"As befitted former by a chairman theSecurities of and Maritime Exchange Commissions, primary his interest in lay economic The revolutionary matters.... character theNazi regime of wasnota phenomenon hecould that easily grasp.... Itwasfar simpler, andmore accord in with ownpremises, explain his to German aggresin siveness economic The terms. ThirdReich was dissatisfied, authoritarian, expansive and largely because economy unsound.""0 her was it Similarly hasbeenargued that Chamberlain slowto recognize was Hitler's intentions because thelimiting partly of nature hispersonal of background business and experiences.41 impact training exThe of and
38

partmental Identification Executives," of xxi Sociometry, (June I958), 140-44. 40 "Two American Ambassadors: Bullitt and Kennedy," Craigand Gilbert, in 358-59. 41 Hugh Trevor-Roper putsthispointwell: "Brought as a business up man,successful in municipal politics, [Chamberlain's] outlookwas entirely parochial. EducatedConservative aristocrats Churchill, like Eden, and Cranborne, whose familieshad long been used to politicalresponsibility, seen revolution had and revolutionary leaders in before, theirown history, understood and themcorrectly; the Chamberlains, but who had runfrom radicalimperialism timidconservatism a generation lifein to in of had Birmingham, no such understanding history the world: to themthe scope of or of humanpolitics was limited theirown parochial by and NevilleChamberhorizons, lain couldnot believethatHitlerwas fundamentally different fromhimself. ChamIf berlainwantedpeace,so mustHitler" ("Munich-Its LessonsTen Years Later," in Francis Loewenheim, ed., Peace or Appeasement? [Boston i965], 152-53). For a similar view see A. L. Rowse,Appeasement (New York i963), 117. But Donald Lammerspointsout thatthe viewsof manyprominent British public in figures theI930's do notfitthisgeneralization Munich[Stanford (Explaining i966], 13-140). Furthermore, that stressthe importance the experiences arguments of and views of the actors'ancestors not explainthe linksby which theseinfluence do the and Chamberlain read the same history actors Churchill themselves. books Presumably in schooland had the same basic information about Britain's past role in the world. is Thus what has to be demonstrated thatin theirhomes aristocrats Churchill like and humannaturethandid middle-class learneddifferent aboutpolitics things people

9 DeWittDearbornand Herbert Simon,"Selective Perception: Note on the DeA

Russiaand the WestUnderLenin and Stalin (New York i962),

I42-43.

HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION

469

seems be demonstrated thebackground theapto perience when of peasers compared that their is to of opponents. difference One stands out:"A substantially percentage theanti-appeasers higher of (irrespectiveof classorigins) thekindof knowledge had whichcomesfrom closeacquaintance, mainly professional, foreign with affairs."42 Since members thediplomatic areresponsible meeting of corps for threats to thenation's security before these growto major proportions since and they havelearned about in cases which aggressive were recogstates not nizedas such until very they be prone interpret late, may to ambiguous dataas showing others aggressive. should stressed that are It be that we cannot thattheprofessionals the I930'S weremoreapt to say of makeaccurate judgments other of states. Rather, mayhavebeen they more sensitive thechance to that others wereaggressive. would They then rarely an aggressor a status-quo take for power, wouldmore but often make opposite the error.43 in theyears Thus before World WarI the permanent officials the British in ForeignOffice overestimated German aggressiveness.44 A parallel demonstration in psychology theimpact training of of on perceptionpresented an experimentwhich is by in ambiguous pictures wereshownto bothadvanced and beginning police-administration students. advanced The group perceived more in violence thepictures thandid thebeginners. probable The explanation that"thelaw is enforcer cometo accept may crime a familiar as personal experience, onewhich himself notsurprised encounter. acceptance he is to The of crime a familiar as in experience turn increases ability readiness the or toperceive violence where cluesto it arepotentially available."45 This
like Chamberlain thattheseexperiences a significant and had impact. Alternatively, it could be argued that the patterns child-rearing of prevalent among the aristocracy influenced children's the in personalities a way thatmade themmore likelyto see others aggressive. as 42lbid.,i5. 43Duringa debateon appeasement the House of Commons, in Harold Nicolson "I declared, knowthatthoseof us who believein thetraditions our policy. . . who of that great one believe function thiscountry to maintain of is moralstandards Europe, in to maintain settled a pattern international of not relations, to makefriends withpeople who are demonstrably . . . -I knowthatthosewho hold suchbeliefs accused evil are of possessing ForeignOffice the mind.I thankGod thatI possessthe ForeignOffice mind"(quotedin Martin Gilbert, The Rootsof Appeasement [New York i966], i87). But thequalities Nicolson mentions applauds and to may be related a morebasicattributeof "theForeignOffice mind"-suspiciousness. 44George The End ofIsolation(London I963). I am also indebted FredMonger, to erick for Collignon hisunpublished and manuscript several on conversations thispoint. 45Hans Toch and RichardSchulte, "Readiness Perceive to Violenceas a Resultof Police Training," British Journal Psychology, (Novemberi96i), 392 (original LII of italics It omitted). shouldbe stressed one cannotsaywhether not theadvanced that or policestudents the perceived pictures The "accurately." pointis thattheir training pre-

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sensithe diplomats' to lends experiment weight theviewthat British selecof a to states tivity aggressive was nottotally product personnel tion procedures. will of whichfrequently be themostdiA third source concepts, relaof relevant a decision-maker's to perception international rectly pointsout,one is history. HenryKissinger As tions, international posedby the were reason whystatesmen so slowto recognize threat themonlyto had accustomed events Napoleonwas thatprevious it.46 not system, overthrow to the whowanted modify existing actors can traumas historical more striking: side The other ofthecoinis even a establish state's They future perceptions. caneither influence heavily An or stateinvolved can be used as analogies. imageof theother ten that at least for of by case example theformer is provided thefact felt statesmen after Franco-Prussian mostof Europe's War the years his plans had that Bismarck aggressive whenin fact maingoalwas to The was the the quo. Of course evidence ambiguous. protect status designed keeppeace, to which were maneuvers, Bismarckian pOst-187i for designed setthestage to maneuvers looked unlike pre-I871 not the agwar. But thatthepOst-187I wereseen as indicating maneuvers of earlier to attributabletheimpact Bismarck's plans largely is gressive of image him. actions thestatesmen's on can of with A state's unfortunate experience a type danger previous of Whilethis it sensitivity may danger. sensitize toother examples that in it it to the leadthestate avoid mistake committed thepast, mayalso situation likethepast is to that lead it mistakenly believe thepresent "Thosewhorememaround: couldbe turned maxim one.Santayana's to As mistakes." Paul berthepastarecondemned maketheopposite of bothdefenders critics the unconditional and Kecskemeti shows, in Warthought terms theconof World surrender oftheSecond plan Fox found thattheScandiof Annette Baker ditions WorldWar L"47 in WarII were strongly inpolicies World navian countries' neutrality in vital war,eventhough fluenced their by experiences theprevious Thus success of were aspects thetwosituations different. "Norway's WorldWar] in remaining though non-belligerent the [during First
Whether balancethey on situations. themto see violence ambiguous in would disposed is and better decisions veryhard to determine. an For make fewerperceptual errors an can thattraining lead peopleto "recognize" expected stimulus experiment showing and WilliamF. is even when thatstimulus in factnot shown,see IsraelGoldiamond and Between Hawkins,"Vexierversuch: Log Relationship The Word-Frequency RecognitionObtainedin the Absenceof StimulusWords,"Journal Experimental of Psychology, LVI
46,

47Strategic Surrender (New Yorki964),

WorldRestored (New York i964),

(December 1958),

457-63.

2-3. 215-41.

HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION

471

could that theircountry gave the Norwegiansconfidence pro-Allied And the lessondrawnfromthe unfortunate again stayout of war."48 in factor Norway'sdecisionto of results thispolicywas an important join NATO. The applicationof the Munich analogy to variouscontemporary has on, events been muchcommented and I do not wish to arguethe that pointsat stake.But it seemsclearthattheprobabilities substantive who has to be met by forceare not any stateis facingan aggressor of by altered thecareerof Hitlerand thehistory the 1930's. Similarly his announcing plans is not increased of theprobability an aggressor's Mein Kampf. it by (if anything, is decreased) thefactthatHitlerwrote and to are Yet decision-makers moresensitive thesepossibilities, thus theyapply to evidenceas indicating ambiguous moreapt to perceive a given case, than theywould have been had therebeen no Nazi Germany. Historicalanalogies oftenprecede,ratherthan follow,a careful to (e.g., Truman'sinitialreaction the news of of analysis a situation invasionof of theinvasion SouthKorea was to thinkof the Japanese does notshowus which however, Manchuria).Notingthisprecedence, mind. Truman of many analogieswill come to a decision-maker's of Europeanwars thatwere of couldhave thought nineteenth-century to havingnothing do to no interest the United States.Severalfactors influence whatanalogiesa decisionunderconsideration withtheevent of to is makeris apt to make.One factor thenumber cases similar the is Another theimis withwhichthedecision-maker familiar. analogy of to of system whichthedecisionportance thepastevent thepolitical and suchan event occurred thegreater The moretimes maker a part. is will to its consequences were,the morea decision-maker be sensitive danger involvedand the more he will be apt to see the particular another instance thiskind of event. of as stimuli indicating ambiguous personalinvolveA third is factor the degreeof the decision-maker's The lastego, and position. mentin the past case-in time,energy, not will affect onlythe event'simpacton the devariable mentioned but the structure, also the way he perceives cision-maker's cognitive in eventand thelessonhe draws.Someonewho was involved getting the into South Korea afterthe attackwill remember Korean troops in considering the War differently someonewho was involved from should use possible of nuclearweaponsor in decidingwhat messages involvement usuallygive will be sentto theChinese.Greater personal if own theeventgreater impact, especially the decision-maker's views
48

The PowerofSmallStates(Chicago 1959), 8i.

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validated theevent. neednotaccept total were by One a application of to learning theory nations believe "nothing likesuccess."49 to that fails It also seems thatif manycritics likely argued thetimethatthe at decision-maker wrong, willbe even was he more toseeother apt situain tions terms theoriginal of event. example, For because Anthony Edenleft government account hisviews waslater the on of and shown tohavebeencorrect, probably more to see as Hitlers he was apt other leaders with whom had conflicts Nasser).A fourth he (e.g., factor is thedegree whichtheanalogy compatible to is withtherestof his A is belief of system. fifth theabsence alternative and concepts analoand in gies.Individuals states vary theamount direct indirect of or political experience havehad whichcan provide they different ways data. ofinterpreting Decision-makers areawareofmultiple who posofstates' intentions be lesslikely seizeon an analogy sibilities to may The of of prematurely. perception citizens nations like the United haverelatively history international which little of States politics may influenced thefewmajorinternational be moreaptto be heavily by to that events havebeenimportant their country. is three factors indicate an event moreapt to shape that The first rather thantheremote if in present perceptionsit occurred therecent thestatesman then will it occurred it knowabout at past.If recently, in of handevenifhe was notinvolved themaking policy the at first are to the war, Thusifgenerals prepared fight last time. diplomats may the to to reaction be prepared avoid lastwar.PartoftheAnglo-French canbe explained theprevailing beliefs theFirst that Hitler World by causedby misunderstandings could and War was to a largeextent And and havebeenavoided farsighted nonbelligerent by diplomacy. and Chinacan be explained of partoftheWestern perception Russia to was view appeasement an inappropriate that bythe response Hitler.50
V. THE EVOKED SET

data not The waypeople perceive is influenced only their by cogniabout other actors alsobywhatthey but and structure theories tive are the at thetime receive information. with concerned Information they
49WilliamInge, Outspoken Essays,FirstSeries (London I923), 88. 50 Of course,analogiesthemselves are not "unmovedmovers."The interpretation is and of pastevents not automatic is informed generalviewsof international by relaaboutthe pastinfluence present, And just as beliefs the tionsand complex judgments. of It influence to viewsaboutthe present interpretationshistory. is difficult determine of thedegreeto whichtheUnitedStates'interpretation the reasonsit wentto war in American foreign policyin the i920's and i930's and how much the I9I7 influenced of the of isolationism thatperiodinfluenced histories the war.

HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION

473

that in memory is of is evaluated light thesmallpartoftheperson's of set."Myperceptions thedarkstreets "evoked active-the presently I if will the homefrom movies be differentthefilm I passwalking If than ithadbeena comedy. I amworking if with spies sawhaddealt talk system I hearsomeone about and education on aiding country's a he I state, am aptto think in development that needfor economic the on, if whereas I had beenworking say, with is concerned education, I wouldhaveplaced country, in stability that political to trying achieve in framework.5' hisremarks that from differare a that ThusHypothesisstates whenmessages sent 5 than by of and entbackground concerns information is possessed the Person andperson willread A B is likely. misunderstanding receiver, ifA mesrelated quitedifferently has seenseveral thesamemessage Thisdifference be compounded will about. that sages B doesnotknow that has A the if, isfrequently case, andB eachassume theother the as can he samebackground does.This meansthatmisperception occur intended expected. nor Thus Roberta is evenwhendeception neither parts found onlythatdifferent of theUnitedStates not Wohlstetter intentions of had Japan's perceptions dataabout government different in saw theincoming information because they and messages partly in officersthefield but misunderstood different contexts, alsothat very Short[in advised General from "Washington Washington: warnings at action' anymo'hostile PearlHarbor]on November to expect 27 on from 'attack American possessions withit by ment, which meant "52 this to understood phrase mean'sabotage.' Short but out,' General to did Washington notrealizetheextent whichPearlHarborconand to it of the sidered danger sabotage be primary, furthermore had Short received intercepts the of that believed General incorrectly in available Washington which messages diplomatic thesecret Japanese was Another implithat attack a distinct possibility. indicated surprise if information is known to is of cation this hypothesisthat important A of of of of part thegovernmentstate andpart thegovernment only be misunderstoodthose of parts by may messages state international B,
51For some psychological on Brunerand A. experiments this subject,see Jerome and Journal of Identification Perceptual Organization" "Perceptual Leigh Minturn, Feshbachand RobertSinger, LIII GeneralPsychology, (JulyI955), 22-28; Seymour of of "The Effects Fear Arousaland Suppression Fear Upon SocialPerception," journal and Social Psychology, (NovemberI957), 283-88;and Elsa Sippoal, LV of Abnormal of XLVI, Monographs, Sets,"Psychology "A GroupStudyof Some Effects Preparatory of of No. 2IO (1935), 27-28. For a generaldiscussion the importance the perceiver's evokedset,see Postman, 87.
52 Pp.

73-74.

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WORLD POLITICS

in that thereceiver's government do notmatch, theinformation they that of the the have, part thesender's government dispatched message.53 of can from problems those Two additional hypotheses be drawn the 6 that a sending messages. Hypothesisstates whenpeoplespend great a dealoftime drawing a planormaking decision, tend think up they to that message the it about they wishto convey be clearto therewill ceiver.54 they aware what tothem important Since are of is the pattern in their actions, often that pattern be equally they feel the will obvious and toothers, they overlook degree which message apparto is the the enttothem to only because know they what lookfor. Thosewhohave not participated the endless in meetings maynot understand what information sender trying convey. the is to George Quester shown has howtheGerman to a lesser the and, to extent, British desire maintain limits bombing thefirst on in target months WorldWar of eighteen II wasundermined partly thefact by that eachsideknewthelimits it was seeking itsownreasons anyapparent and for "exceptions" (e.g., attack Rotterdam) incorrectly that theGerman on and felt these limits andreasons were equally clear theother to side.55 often notrealize do inthatactions Hypothesisholdsthatactors 7 to a not tended project given image may havethedesired effect because do theactions out themselves notturn as planned. Thusevenwithout of structures backgrounds, and appreciable impact different cognitive an an action For a mayconvey unwanted message. example, country's and representatives notfollow may instructions so maygive others impressions contrary those homegovernment to the wished convey. to and of to their over The effortsWashington Berlin settle dispute Samoa in thelatei88o's were behavior their of complicated theprovocative by on Theseagents only not increased intensity the the of agents thespot. but to become localconflict, led thedecision-makers moresuspicious state to that oftheother because tended assume their they were agents of instructions that actions theother represented and the side obeying In official thattheother is policy. suchcasesbothsideswill believe of whichis friendly. into reading hostility a policy theirs Similarly,
53For example,Roger Hilsman pointsout, "Those who knew of the peripheral reconnaissance flights thatprobedSovietair defenses duringthe Eisenhower administration theU-2 flights theSovietUnion itself . . werebetter and over . able to underwere saying and doing thanpeoplewho did not standsomeof the things Soviets the know of theseactivities" Move a Nation [GardenCity i9671, 66). But it is also (To at possiblethat thosewho knew about the U-2 flights timesmisinterpreted Soviet was influenced or at leastknewof, that messages incorrectly by believing thesender by, theseflights. 54I am grateful ThomasSchelling discussion thispoint. on for to 5DeterrenceBeforeHiroshima(New York i966), I05-22.

HYPOTHESES

ON MISPERCEPTION

475

referred to bombing to shows thattheattempt limit Quester's study as neither wasabletobomb accurately side partly because above failed of the effects its did it as itthought couldandthus notrealize physical
actions.56 VI. FURTHER
HYPOTHESES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PERCEIVER

seem several other hypotheses of Fromtheperspective theperceiver is for tendency decisionthere an overall 8 tohold.Hypothesisis that Thereseem thanthey are.57 hostile states more as makers seeother to are others planning incorrectly believing cases statesmen of tobe more beinglulledby a than their interest of statesmen majoractsagainst Thereare manyreasons thiswhichare too for potential aggressor. feel of tobe treated (e.g.,someparts thebureaucracy it here complex decisionis their of to responsibilitybe suspicious all otherstates; and it to feel are makers often they "playing safe" believe actas though in when cases; and often, theother state werehostile questionable to they it to are people notfeelthey a threat others, find difficult do howas It be that believe others seethem a threat). should noted, may are whoseperceptions described this by ever,thatdecision-makers to further ownvalues trying their wouldnotnecessarily by hypothesis The outcomes well as as for correct thistendency. valuesof possible and must their probabilities be considered, it maybe thattheprobaout arms-tension arising of mispercepof cycle bility an unnecessary sucha cycle, seem todecisionless of may by tions, multiplied thecosts of another stateis believing thantheprobability incorrectly makers of eventuality. multiplied thecosts this by friendly, tendto see thebehavior others of as that Hypothesisstates actors 9 and than disciplined, coordinated itis.Thishypothemore centralized, are true too events sisholds inrelated complex Frequently, many ways. or into Actors hesitant admit even are to pattern. squeezed a perceived cannot explained their be theories.58 see thatparticular incidents by not that Thoseevents caused factors areimportant oftheperparts by actors see are seenas though they were. Further, ceiver's image often in united thanthey factare and generally as others moreinternally a the are others followingcoherent policy. overestimatedegree which to side's to the of are Thedegree which other policies theproduct internal
different formulation thisview,see Holsti,27. of For a slightly version thisview and seemto believe of hold an extreme consciously The Soviets in is See thatnothing accidental. thediscussion NathanLeites,A Studyof Bolshevism (GlencoeI953), 67-73.
57 58

56Ibid.

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internal or subordinates' follownot bargaining,59 misunderstandings, inginstructions isunderestimated. is thecasepartly This because actors to tend be unfamiliar thedetails another with of state's policy-making processes. Seeing only finished the product, find simpler try they it to to constructrational a explanation thepolicies, for eventhough they know that suchan analysis couldnotexplain their ownpolicies.60 io: for a also Familiarity accounts Hypothesis because state most gets forstate's from other's the about ofitsinformation theother policies office's for of it to eignoffice,tends taketheforeign position thestand casesthisperception as In will theother government a whole. many is divided when or the be an accurate butwhen other one, government without office theother foreign is acting specific authorization, misperception result. example, ofthereason may For part whyin i9i8 Allied the "that Japanese preparing to governments incorrectly thought were if takeaction[in Siberia], needbe,withagreement theBritish with and French alone,disregarding absence American the of consent,"6 Alliedambassadors talked had wasthat mostly Foreign with Minister whowas amongtheminority theJapanesle of Motono, favoring this America's NATO alliesmayhavegainedan inacpolicy. Similarly, of to the curate was picture thedegree which American government had greatest to contact withparts committed theMLF because they that favored MLF. Andstates tried the ofthe that government strongly about from German togetinformation Nazi foreign policy diplomats misled officials generally because these were wereoften of ignorant or with outofsympathy Hitler's The Germans theJapanese and plans. misinformed ownambassadors order sometimes their purposely in to their deceive enemies more effectively. thatactors ii tendto overestimate degree the Hypothesis states to in others acting response whatthey to are which themselves when do in with behave accordance theactor's theothers but desires; whenthe of is it behavior theother undesired, is usually seenas derived from internal If action to injure threaten forces. theefectofanother's is or
59A. W. Marshallcriticizes Westernexplanations Soviet military of posturefor to See his "Problems Estimating of failing take thisinto account. Military Power,"a at paper presented the i966 AnnualMeetingof the American PoliticalScienceAsso60 It has also been notedthatin labor-management disputes both sides may be apt fromabove,eitherfromthe interthat to believeincorrectly the otheris controlled the unionoffice from company's or central national headquarters (Robert Blake,Herbert in and Shepard, Jane Mouton, Managing Intergroup Conflict Industry [Houstoni964], It has been further and Republican i82). notedthatbothDemocratic members the of House tend to see the otherpartyas the one that is more disciplined and united (CharlesClapp,The Congressman [Washington i9631, I7-I9). 61George Kennan,RussiaLeaves the War (New York i967), 484.

ciation, i6.

HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION

477

side thatsuchwas theother's thefirst thefirst is aptto believe side, purpose. example thefirst ofthehypothesisprovided An of part is by Kennan's of official unofficial account theactivities of and American representatives protested the new Bolshevik who to government several itsactions. of WhentheSoviets against their changed position, these representatives waslargely felt it because their of influence.62 This sort interpretation be explained onlyby thefact of can not thatit is gratifyingtheindividual to making butalso,taking other it, the side ofthe coin in mentioned Hypothesisbythefact theactor most 9, that is familiar withhis own inputintothe other's decision and has less knowledge other of ii influences. second The partof Hypothesis is illustrated thetendency actors believe thehostile by of to that behavior ofothers to be explained theother is by side'smotives notbyits and reaction thefirst Thus Chamberlain notsee thatHitler's to side. did behavior related partto hisbelief was in that British the wereweak. Morecommon thefailure seethat other is reacting of is to the side out fearofthefirst which lead to self-fulfilling side, can prophecies and ofmisperception hostility. spirals and is often Thisdifficulty compounded an implication Hypothesis by of 12: when actors that haveintentions they nottry conceal do to from thatothers others, tendto assume they inaccurately perceive these tentions. rarely they do believe others be reacting a Only that may to muchlessfavorable imageof themselves theythink than theyare
projecting.63

A how Forstate to understand state perceives policy often B A's is suchunderstanding involve conflict A's because difficult a with may of that image itself. Raymond Sontag argues Anglo-German relations WorldWar I deteriorated before because "theBritish not partly did to think themselves selfish, unwilling tolerate of as or like to 'legitiThe German did mate' expansion. Germans notliketothink themof as or to selves aggressive,unwilling recognize 'legitimate' British vested
interest."64
Butterfield 63Herbert notesthat theseassumptions contribute the spiralof can to "Hobbesian fear.. . . You yourself feelthe terrible mayvividly fearthatyou have of enter but intotheother theother party, youcannot man'scounter-fear, evenunderor nervous. For you know thatyou yourself standwhyhe shouldbe particularly mean fromhim save guarantees yourown him no harm,and thatyou want nothing for for and safety; it is neverpossible you to realizeor remember thatsincehe properly cannotsee the insideof yourmind,he can neverhave the same assurance your of that intentions you have" (History and Human Conflict [London I95I], 20). 64European Diplomatic History 187I-1932 (New York I933), I25. It takes great whichseem only the naturalconsequence deto mentaleffort realizethatactions of can as themany fending yourvitalinterests look to others thoughyou are refusing
62 Ibid., 404, 408,500.

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thatif it is hard foran actorto believethat Hypothesis suggests i3 evenharderforhim to theothercan see him as a menace,it is often to to While he see thatissuesimportant him are not important others. mayknowthatanother actoris on an opposingteam,it maybe more is an different difficult himto realizethattheother playing entirely for seemsvitalto true game.This is especially whenthegamehe is playing him.65 The finalhypothesis, HypothesisI4, is as follows: actorstend to consistent withtheirtheories may also the overlook factthatevidence be consistent withotherviews.When choosingbetweentwo theories for we have to pay attention onlyto data thatcannotbe accounted by one of thetheories. it is commonto findpeople claimingas proof But data thatcould also support alternative views.This of theirtheories to thepointmade earlierthatany singlebit of is phenomenon related a of can information be interpreted within framework hypotheses only a And while it is truethat"we maywithout viciouscirand theories. some datumas a factbecauseit conforms the very to cularity accept and rejectan law forwhichit countsas another instance, confirming excluded law,"66 shouldbe of we by allegation factbecauseit is already thata piece of information lest seemsin manycases careful we forget a onlybecausewe alreadybelievethat to confirm certain hypothesis and thatthe information with as much to can hypothesis be correct a For one hypothesis. example, of thereasons validity support different and whytheGermanattackon Norwaytookboththatcountry Enghad detected land by surprise, eventhough they Germanshipsmoving not towardNorway, was thattheyexpected an attackbut an attempt the blockadeand reachthe by the Germansto breakthrough British
chanceof increasing their influence. rebutting famous In the Crowe"balanceof power" memorandum I907, which justified policyof "containing" of a Germanyon the grounds thatshe was a threat British to national security, Sanderson, former a permanentundersecretarytheForeignOffice, in wrote, has sometimes "It seemedto me that to a foreigner readingour pressthe British Empiremustappearin the lightof some huge giant sprawling over the globe,with goutyfingers all and toes stretching in everydirection, whichcannotbe approached without eliciting scream"(quoted in a Monger,3I5). But few otherEnglishmen could be convinced thatothers mightsee themthisway. 65 GeorgeKennan makes clear that in i9i8 this kind of difficulty was partlyresponsible the inability eitherthe Allies or the new Bolshevik for of to government the in understand motivations the otherside: "Thereis . . . nothing naturemore of an absolute its value whichdistorts own visionof everything . . It will readily else. into underbe seenthatpeoplewho havegot themselves thisframe mindhave little of otherthanthe one in whichtheyare involved. for standing the issuesof any contest on The idea of peoplewasting timeand substance any otherissue seemsto thempreposterous" (Russia and the West,II-I2).
66Kaplan, 89. egocentricalthan the embattleddemocracy.... It .
.

. tends to attach to its own cause

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479

The course theships consistent either of was with Atlantic. initial plan, buttheBritish Norwegians thiscourse meanthattheir and took to that predictions being were borne out.67 is nottoimply theinterThis should pretation madewas foolish, onlythatthedecision-makers but beenaware with have that evidence alsoconsistent an invasion the was views. andshould havehada bitlessconfidence their in the The longer ships the wouldhaveto travel sameroute whether inforthe they were going oneoranother twodestinations, more to of to their mation wouldbe needed determine plans.Takenas a metaThus this to of phor, incident applies generally thetreatmentevidence. as longas Hitler German madedemands control ofethnically for only that areas, actions his couldbe explained either thehypothesis he by to hadunlimited ambitions bythehypothesis he wanted unite or that (e.g., all theGermans. actions But against non-Germans thetakeover ofCzechoslovakia Marchi938) couldnotbe accounted bythe for in latter And the hypothesis. it was thisaction that convinced appeasers to on that Hitler had to be stopped. is interesting speculate what It theBritish reaction wouldhavebeenhad HitlerleftCzechoslovakia to on alonefora whileand instead madedemands Polandsimilar would those eventually in thesummer I939. The twopaths he made of could thenstillnot have diverged, further and misperception have occurred.
67 Johan Jorgen Holst, "Surprise, Signals,and Reaction:The Attackon Norway," Cooperation Conflict, i (i966), 34. The Germans and No. in made a similar mistake November 1942 when they interpreted presence an Allied convoyin the Medthe of iterranean confirming as their beliefthatMalta would be resupplied. They thuswere takenby surprise when landingstook place in NorthAfrica(William Langer,Our VichyGamble[New York i966], 365).