Mo Ya Lim Yao vs.

Commissioner of Immigration GR L-21289, 4 October 1971 Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator s agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should

have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code. ISSUE: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon? HELD: The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo s citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitor s stance is assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer s entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC and Montejo Facts: Roy Montejo questioned Marcos candidacy as representative of the 1st district of Leyte on the ground that she is not a resident thereof as required by the Constitution. Montejo contended that Tacloban was Marcos domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight (8) years old. Moreover, Marcos resided and used to be a registered voter in San Juan and in Manila. Issue: Whether or not Mrs. Marcos meets the residency requirement to run as representative in Leyte Held: Yes. Marcos is domiciled in Tacloban, hence she meets the Constitutional requirement on residency. Residence and domicile are synonymous in election law. Mere absence of an individual from his/her permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. Also, when she

married the former President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium. The Supreme Court held that even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle. In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognize certain situations where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De La Vina v. Villareal, a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage when the husband has given cause for divorce. The Supreme Court also allowed the wife to either obtain a new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In the instances where the wife actually opts, under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo v. Vazquez-Arroyo, the Court held that it is not within the province of the courts at this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to the other PT&T vs. NLRC 272 SCRA 596 Facts: Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a reliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee who s having a maternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her employment was to immediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods, this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave. The reliever status was then formally completed until she was asked again to join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the job application form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. Grace has also made the same representation on her two successive reliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&T having discovered the discrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the said discrepancy and she was reminded about the company s policy of not accepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated that she wasn t aware of such policy at that time and all along she hadn t deliberately hidden her true civil status. However, PT&T remained unconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissed from the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances. Issue: Whether or not PT&T is liable against Grace s illegal dismissal due to certain company policy. Ruling: Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Where s a company policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runs afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the fundamental policy of the State toward marriage. The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T is that it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the

nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Grace s illegal dismissal and the latter shall claim for damages. Estrada vs. Escritor A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Pias, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation and challenged Estrada, to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court . Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Pias learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband. Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that she s been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah s Witnesses, and having executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness (which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct. Issue: Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct. Ruling: Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage. Ruling: On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisite of marriage, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the

irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage. Wassmer vs. Velez 12 SCRA 648 Facts: Francisco Velez, defendant, and Beatriz Wassmer, plaintiff-appellant, following their mutual love, decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, defendant left a note to Beatriz stating therein the postponement of their wedding due to opposition of defendant s mother and that he will be leaving. But on September 3, 1954, defendant sent another telegram stated that he will be returning very soon for the wedding. However, defendant did not appear nor was he heard from again. Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of the defendant, trial court granted the petition and ordered the defendant to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a petition for relief from orders, judgments and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration. Beatriz moved to strike it cut but the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear for the stage of possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement. Defendant wasn t able to appear but instead on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant s petition for relief. It was granted but again defendant and his counsel failed to appear. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court but this time defendant s counsel informed the court that chances of settling case amicably were nil. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff damages. Ruling: The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered, actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through. Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 Facts: Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Complainant contended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife, and Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which was solemnized at the respondent s residence which does not fall within his jurisdictional area. Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for solemnizing marriages which did not comply with the requisites in the FC. Ruling: The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the present spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not able to present a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wife s presumptive death thus, he is still considered married to his first wife. A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places; or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these were complied with therefore there is an irregularity. Araes vs. Judge Occiano A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others. Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner s right, upon Orobia s death, to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on the complaint. Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence. Issue: Whether or not respondent s guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Ruling: Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Vda. De Chua vs. CA G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998 Facts: Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents. Issue: Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious. Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994 Facts: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro s parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro s parents. Thus, it was only in

March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro s brother, with the consent of Cardenas. Issue: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas. Ruling: The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. The above rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not being found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting parties. There being no marriage license, the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio. Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139 Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property . Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter. Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be

recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in evada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. Republic vs. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114 Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva were married with two children. Lady Myros the left for the United States with one son and 1st became a naturalized American citizen, 2nd obtained a valid divorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry, and 3rd contracted a marriage with Innocent Stanley, an American. Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Article 26(2) of the Family Code The Office of the solicitor General contends that the invoked article was not applicable and raises this pure question of law, they further posit that Orbecido should file for Legal Separation or Annulment instead. Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). Ruling: YES. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. To rule otherwise would be tosanction absurdity and injustice. For the application of Article 26(2), there must have been (1) a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner, and that (2) a valid divorce decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating her to remarry. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the following must be proven: (1) divorce as a fact, (2) foreign law, (3) divorce decree capacitated one to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained by the alien spouse. Annulment or Legal Separation need not be the proper remedies for such would be in the case of the former, long, tedious, and infeasible, and in the case of the latter, is futile to sever marital ties PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ART II,SEC.12 Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. CHAPTER 3 - OFFICIALS AND OFFICES COMMON TO ALL MUNICIPALITIES Article One. - The Municipal Mayor SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws. (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: (1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the municipal government, and in this connection, shall: (i) Determine the guidelines of municipal policies and be responsible to the sangguniang bayan for the program of government;

(ii) Direct the formulation of the municipal development plan, with the assistance of the municipal development council, and upon approval thereof by the sangguniang bayan, implement the same; (iii) At the opening of the regular session of the sangguniang bayan for every calendar year and, as may be deemed necessary, present the program of government and propose policies and projects for the consideration of the sangguniang bayan as the general welfare of the inhabitants and the needs of the municipal government may require; (iv) Initiate and propose legislative measures to the sangguniang bayan and, from time to time as the situation may require, provide such information and data needed or requested by said sanggunian in the performance of its legislative functions; Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of municipal funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint; (vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan, represent the municipality in all its business transactions and sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance; (vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities; (viii) Determine, according to law or ordinance, the time, manner and place of payment of salaries or wages of the officials and employees of the municipality; (ix) Allocate and assign office space to municipal and other officials and employees who, by law or ordinance, are entitled to such space in the municipal hall and other buildings owned or leased by the municipal government; (x) Ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully discharge their duties and functions as provided by law and this Code, and cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the municipality who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties; (xi) Examine the books, records and other documents of all offices, officials, agents or employees of the municipality and in aid of his executive powers and authority, require all national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the municipality to make available to him such books, records, and other documents in their custody, except those classified by law as confidential; (xii) Furnish copies of executive ordersissued by him to the provincial governor within seventy-two (72) hours after their issuance: Provided, That municipalities of Metropolitan Manila Area and that of any metropolitan political subdivision shall furnish copies of said executive orders to the metropolitan authority council chairman and to the Office of the President; (xiii) Visit component barangays of the municipality at least once every six (6) months to deepen his understanding of problems and conditions therein, listen and give appropriate counsel to local officials and inhabitants, inform the component barangay officials and inhabitants of general laws and ordinances which especially concern them, and otherwise conduct visits and inspections to the end that the governance of the municipality will improve the quality of life of the inhabitants; (xiv) Act on leave applications ofofficials and employees appointed by him and the commutation of the monetary value of leave credits according to law; (xv) Authorize official trips outside of the municipality of municipal officials and employees for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days; (xvi) Call upon any national official or employee stationed in or assigned to the municipality to advise him on matters affecting the municipality and to make recommendations thereon, or to coordinate in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects, and when appropriate, initiate an administrative or judicial action against a national government

official or employee who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties while stationed in or assigned to the local government unit concerned; (xvii) Subject to availability of funds, authorize payment of medical care, necessary transportation, subsistence, hospital or medical fees of municipal officials and employees who are injured while in the performance of their official duties and functions; (xviii) Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding; (xix) Conduct a palarong bayan, in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as an annual activity which shall feature traditional sports and disciplines included in national and international games; and (xx) Submit to the provincial governor the following reports: an annual report containing a summary of all matters pertaining to the management, administration and development of the municipality and all information and data relativeto its political, social and economic conditions; and supplemental reports when unexpected events and situations arise at any time during the year, particularly when man-made or natural disasters or calamities affect the general welfare of the municipality, province, region or country. Mayors of municipalities of the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political subdivisions shall submit said reports to their respective metropolitan council chairmen and to the Office of the President; (2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the municipality and, in addition to the foregoing, shall: Ensure that the acts of the municipality's component barangays and of its officials and employees are within the scope of their prescribed powers,functions, duties and responsibilities; (ii) Call conventions, conferences, seminars or meetings of any elective and appointive officials of the municipality, including provincial officials and national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the municipality at such time and place and on such subject as he may deem important for the promotion of the general welfare of the local government unit and its inhabitants; (iii) Issue such executive orders as are necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of laws and ordinances; (iv) Be entitled to carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction; (v) Act as the deputized representative of the National Police Commission, formulate the peace and order plan of the municipality and upon its approval, implement the same and exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces in the municipality in accordance with R.A. No. 6975; (vi) Call upon the appropriate law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the municipal police forces are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators; (3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code,particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall: (i) Require each head of an office or department to prepare and submit an estimate of appropriations for the ensuing calendar year, in accordance with the budget preparation process under Title Five, Book II of this Code; (ii) Prepare and submit to the sanggunian for approval the executive and supplemental budgets of the municipality for the ensuing calendar year in the manner provided for under Title Five, Book II of this Code;

(iii) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the municipality are collected, and that municipal funds are applied in accordance with law or ordinance tothe payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the municipality; (iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance; (v) Issue permits, without need of approval therefor from any national agency, for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, excluding prohibited games of chance or shows contrary to law, public policy and public morals; (vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure within the period prescribed by law or ordinance; (vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality; and (viii) Institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for violation of ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or charges, and for the recovery of funds and property; and cause the municipality to be defended against all suits to ensure that its interests, resources and rights shall be adequately protected; (4) Ensure the delivery of basic services and the provision of adequate facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code and, in addition thereto, shall: (i) Ensure that the construction and repair of roads and highways funded by the national government shall be, as far as practicable, carried out in a spatially contiguous manner and in coordination with the construction and repair of the roads and bridges of the municipality and the province; and (ii) Coordinate the implementation of technical services rendered by national and provincial offices, including public works and infrastructure programs in the municipality; and (5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (c) During his incumbency, the municipal mayor shall hold office in the municipal hall. (d) The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.