CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY DURKHEIM, EMILE On the Division of Labor in Society.

New York: Free Press, 1964, book 1, chs. 1-4, 7; book 2, ch. 2; book 3, chs. 1-3. _________. 'Types of Suicide.' TS, pp. 213-18. _________. 'Anomic Suicide.' TS, pp. 916-29. _________. 'On the Normality of Crime.' TS, pp. 872-76. _________. Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. New York: Free Press, 1947 (orig. 1915). 'Introduction'; book 1, ch. 1; book 2, ch. 7; book 3, ch. 1; 'Conclusion.' ON THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY. BOOK1, CHP 1: 'THE METHOD OF DETERMINING THIS FUNCTION' In this chapter, Durkheim asks what the division of labor (DOL) in society is. First, he states that since the DOL increases both the reproductive capacity and skill of the workman, it is the necessary condition for the intellectual and material development in societies (12). However, the DOL also has a moral character which is more important. It can create a feeling of solidarity between two or more people (17). To explain how the DOL contributes to feelings of solidarity, Durkheim (DH) uses the simple example of a married couple. He claims that if the DOL between the sexes were reduced to a certain point, material life would disappear, only to leave behind sexual relationships. The DOL goes beyond purely economic interests; it constitutes the establishment of a social and moral order sui generis. However, DH admits that in marriage people are also bounded because of their similarities. In this sense, they are bonded outside the DOL (22). The marriage analogy cannot explain the significance of the DOL for large societies. DH asserts, 'these great political societies cannot sustain their equilibrium save by the specialization of tasks; the DOL is the source...of social solidarity (23). DH states here that Comte was the first to point out that the DOL was something other than a purely economic phenomenon. Comte argued that it was the 'continuous distribution of different human tasks which constitutes the principal element in social solidarity' (23). The DOL has a moral character because the needs which it fulfills for social solidarity, order, and harmony are moral needs (24). Law The most visible symbol of social solidarity is law (24). Law is the organization of social life in its most stable and precise form. All the essential varieties of social solidarity are reflected in law (25). We can classify different types of law to see which types of social solidarity correspond to them. Two types of law exist. The first type is repressive (covers penal law), which imposes some type of 'damage' on the perpetrator. The second type is restitutive, which does not necessarily

imply any suffering on the part of the perpetrator but consists of restoring the previous relationships which have been disturbed from their normal form (covers civil, communal, procedural law). BOOK1, CHP 2 'MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY, OR SOLIDARITY BY SIMILARITIES,' In this chapter, DH demonstrates how repressive law reflects a society characterized by mechanical solidarity. Penal rules express the basic conditions of collective life for each type of society (32). The nature of crime 'disturbs those feelings that in any one type of society are to be found in every healthy conscious' (34). in 'Lower forms' of society (those most simply organized) law is almost exclusively penal or repressive (37). Penal law demonstrates the strength of the resistance of collective sentiment to a given crime (38). The collective conscience is the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society that forms a determinate system with a life of its own (39). Durkheim defines an act as criminal when it offends the collective conscience (39). It is actually public opinion and opposition which constitutes the crime. An act offends the common consciousness not because it is criminal, but it is criminal because it offends that consciousness. A crime is a crime because we condemn it (40). All crimes floe directly or indirectly from the collective conscience (43). The role of an authority with power to govern is to ensure respect for collective practices and to defend the common consciousness from its 'enemies.' In lower societies, this authority is greatest where the seriousness of the crime weighs the heaviest. Here the collective consciousness posses the most power (43). DH argues that in antiquity, people punished for the sake of punishment. However, nowadays society punishes in order to instill fear in potential criminals (46). Yet, punishment has still remained an act of vengeance and expiation (atonement). What society avenges, and what the criminal must expiate, is the 'outrage to morality' (47). It is the attack upon society that is repressed by punishment. Punishment is a 'reaction of passionate feeling, graduated in intensity, which society exerts through the mediation of an organized body over those of its members who have violated certain rules of conduct' (52). Punishing crime sustains the common consciousness. Two consciousnesses exist within humans: one which represents individual personalities and the other which represents the collectivity (61). The force which is shocked by crime is the result of the most vital social similarities and its effect is to maintain the social cohesion that arises from these similarities (61). Punishment publicly demonstrates that the sentiments of the collectivity are still unchanged (despite the deviant ways) of the offender and thusthe injury that the crime inflicted on society is made good. In fact, the primary intent of punishment is to affect honest people (63).

In this chapter, Durkheim shows that a social solidarity exists because a certain number of states of consciousness are common to all members of the same society. This is the solidarity which repressive law embodies. BOOK1 CHP 3 'SOLIDARITY ARISING FROM THE DOL, OR ORGANIC SOLIDARITY' To start his discussion of restitutory law which corresponds to the organic state of society, DH contrasts it to repressive law. Whereas repressive law corresponds to the 'center of common consciousness,' restitutory sanctions either constitute no part at all of the collective consciousness, or subsist in it weakly. Second, whereas repressive law tends to stay diffused throughout society, restitutory law works through more specialized bodies: ie, courts, magistrates, and lawyers (6970). Despite the removed role of restitutory law from society, society still intervenes in restitutory sanctioning. The formation of a contract directly concerns the parties involved: nonetheless, if a contract has a binding force, it is society which confers that force. If society does not give its blessing to the obligations that have been contracted, then these obligations are reduced to only moral promises. Hence the presence of society in restitutory law, although not necessarily felt, is nonetheless essential. Part of restitutory law, the corpus of real rights (the right to property and mortgage), corresponds to negative solidarity. Negative solidarity can consist of links between persons and things. However, relationships between people, though in no way 'real,' can also express negative solidarity. This occurs when the relationships are created to prevent or repair damage. These relationships do not imply co-operation (74). Hence, the rules relating to real rights form a definite system whose function is not to link the different parts of society together, but to clearly mark the barriers which separate them. Negative solidarity is actually only possible where positive solidarity is present. for a man to recognize that others have rights, he must limit his own. This 'mutual limitation' is only realizable in a spirit of understanding and harmony. To need peace, men must already be united in a bond of sociability (different from Hobbes). Aside from 'real' rights which DH considers ultimately expressive of negative solidarity, the rest of restitutory law (domestic law, contractual law, communal law, procedural law)expresses a positive cooperation which derives essentially from the DOL (77). For instance, civil law (adoption, divorce, etc)determines how various family functions are allocated and expresses the solidarity that unites the members of the family as a result of the domestic DOL (78). The relationship of the DOL to contractual law is similar. Contracts typically involve reciprocal obligations that involve co-operation. Law plays a part in society analogous to the nervous system in an organisms. The system regulates the various body functions so they work together in harmony. The nervous system thus expresses the degree of concentration that the organism has reached as a result of the physiological DOL. Likewise, we can ascertain the measure of concentration that a society has reached through the

social DOL, according to the development of cooperative law with its restitutory sanctions. There are two types of positive solidarity. The first kind, mechanical solidarity, links the individual to society without any intermediary. Society is organized collectively and is composed of beliefs common to all members of the group. The bond which unites the individual with society is completely analogous to that which links the thing to the person. The individual consciousness depends on the collective consciousness. In the second kind of solidarity, organic solidarity, the society is a system of different functions united by definite relationships (83). This brings about the DOL. Here each individual must have a sphere of action and a personality which is his own. Individuality grows at the same time as the parts of society. Society becomes more effective at moving in concert though at the same time each of its elements has more movements that are peculiarly its own. BOOK1 CHP 4 'ANOTHER PROOF OF THE PRECEDING THEORY' The preponderance of repressive law over cooperative law must be greater when the collective type of solidarity is more pronounced and the DOL more rudimentary. yet to the degree that tasks become specialized, the balance between society and the type of law becomes upset and begins to change (88). The more primitive a society is, the more resemblances there are between its members. By contrast, members of advanced, 'civilized' societies are quite distinguishable from one another (89). Organic similarities correspond to psychological similarities between members of primitive societies. Furthermore, members of advanced societies are increasingly organically and psychologically different. Diversity becomes greater as types become more developed (91). Hence, the higher the social type, the more developed the DOL. The two forms of law Durkheim distinguishes preceding this chapter vary at diverse levels on the social scale. In the lowest societies, the state of law seems wholly repressive. DH shows from the Pentateuch (ancient Hebrew law) that cooperative and restitutory law amounted to little in primitive societies (93). In fact, the whole society under Hebrew law appeared repressive. Society insisted on expiation and not mere reparation (94). Repression dominates the entire corpus of law in lower societies because religion (repressive in nature) permeates all legal activity (94). Although repressive law has not diminished in importance in modern times, restitutory law has expanded greatly and has grown more complex with the development of society (97). Yet, contractual law (procedural/restitutory)is still not entirely separated from penal (repressive law), because often the refusal to comply with a contract results in a fine (97). However, repressive and restitutory law still vary fairly directly with the degree of society's development. Repressive law, typically involving sanctions for crimes against the whole community is common in lower, mechanical societies. law is simply an expression of morals. Where acts of violence are frequent, they are tolerated. their criminal character is in inverse proportion to their frequency. Thus, in lower societies crimes against the individual are common and placed on

the lower rung of the penal ladder. Instead, crimes against the community take priority. This is because in lower societies the evolution of the collective consciousness is widespread and strong, while the DOL has not yet taken place (99). BOOK1 CHP 7 'ORGANIC SOLIDARITY AND CONTRACTUAL SOLIDARITY' Durkheim bases this detailed discussion of organic solidarity and contracts on a dispute against Spencer. Spencer claims that industrial solidarity is spontaneous and that there is no need for a coercive apparatus to produce or maintain it. Social harmony is simply established of its own accord. Durkheim asserts that, were this the case, the sphere of social action would diminish greatly because it would no longer be needed except to enforce negative solidarity (149). This is not the case. Spencer also argues that the normal form of exchange is contract. For this reason, the extent of central authority diminishes. As freedom of action increases, contracts become more general. This general social contract requires the free agreement of human wills and is irreconcilable with the DOL. DH states that this type of spontaneous, general social contract has never existed. Societies are spontaneously contractual only to the extent that an individual chooses to remain in the society in which he was born, and hence he abides by that society's rules. For Spencer, society would be no more than the establishment of relationships between individuals exchanging the products of their labor without any social action intervening to regulate that exchange (152). Durkheim disputes Spencer by claiming that social intervention is on the rise. the legal obligations which society imposes on its members are becoming more and more complex. restitutory law is growing. If social intervention no longer has the effect of imposing certain uniform practices on everybody, it consists more in defining and regulating the special relationship between the different social functions (153). Spencer would answer that not every kind of control has decreased, just positive control. Durkheim counters that positive control is far from disappearing; in fact, restitutory law is continually growing (154). [negative control = regulations which make a person refrain from acting e.g., do not help a farmer with his crop, simply prevent him from stealing his neighbor's.] [positive control = regulations which make a person act eg,impose a certain method of farming upon a farmer] Durkheim next states that although Spencer is correct in claiming that contractual relationships are multiplied as society is divided up, he has failed to note that non-contractual relationships are developing at the same time (155). Durkheim argues that 'private law,' typically contractual, is really quite public. For instance, marriage and adoption, although private matters, were formerly endorsed by the church and are now endorsed by civil authority (155). As domestic obligations become more numerous, they tend to take on a private character.

The role played by contract is continually decreasing, and social control over the way obligations are regulated is increasing. This is due to the progressive disappearance of segmentary organization. Everything segmentary is increasingly absorbed into larger society. The contracts that remain are entirely removed from the sphere of individual negotiation and are submitted to the regulatory force of society. contractual law exists to determine the legal consequences of our acts which we have not settled beforehand. It expresses the normal conditions for attaining equilibrium and constrains us to respect obligations for which we have not contracted. it is the role of society to determine what contractual conditions are capable of being executed, and if necessary, to restore them to their normal form (162). And just as society plays a role in shaping contracts, contracts play a role in shaping society. An extensive network of relationships which contribute to social solidarity can stem from contracts. Durkheim also disputes Spencer's idea that exchange of information takes place freely on the market place without a need for a regulating apparatus. Using a biological analogy, Durkheim insists that the 'sympathetic nerve system of society must include, apart from a system of transmission paths, truly regulatory organs which amplify or moderate stimuli according to need (165). The state's role as regulator becomes increasingly larger and diverse the higher the type of society (167). The growth of government is attributable to the progress of the DOL and to the process of transformation from segmentary societies to organized societies. First, the central organism faced with less resistance from the segmented forces, begins to develop and become more powerful. The local organs, instead of preserving their individuality, come to merge into the central mechanism (168-9). As a society becomes more and more organically organized, disturbances even of a general character begin to have repurcussions on higher centers, which then become obliged to intervene (170). Social life is derived from a dual source: the similarity of individual consciousnesses and the social DOL (172). The similarity of consciousnesses gives rise to rules, which under the threat of repressive measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices. The more pronounced the similarity, the more completely social life is mixed up with religious life (172). On the other hand, the DOL gives rise to legal rules that determine the nature of a divided up society, but punishment for law breakers in this case involves only reparative measures which lack any expiatory character (172). In organic society, members' dependence on the state continues to grow. As a result, they are continually reminded of their common solidarity. Thus DH argues that altruism is not Spencer's conception of an ornament to social life, but it is the fundamental basis of social life. Every society is a moral society, because men cannot cohabitate without agreeing and cooperating. Hence, even societies characterized by organic solidarity and the DOL are moral because cooperation has an intrinsic morality. this morality grows as the individual personality grows stronger (as opposed to in mechanical solidarity when morality depends on common sentiment) (173-4).

There are 'two great currents of social life.' The first has origins in social similarityand is segmentary. it gradually becomes overshadowed by the second type of society, which is composed of individual differences and organic cooperation. Nonetheless, the segmentary structure never completely disappears (174). BOOK 2 CHAP 2 'THE CAUSES' In this chapter, DH explains the causes of the DOL. First, the segmentary organization of society must recede. The segments lose their individuality and they coalesce so that the 'social substance' is free to enter upon new combinations. Social life becomes more general and relationships become more numerous. Individuals who were formerly separated from each other draw together and engage in active exchanges (moral or dynamic density) (201). The DOL is in direct proportion to the moral density of society. (Moral density also increases with the growth of physical density). the increase of social density can occur in three ways: 1: the increasing spatial concentration of a people 2: the growth of towns (towns do no exist in segmentary societies) (the development of urban centers is not pathological, but is representative of higher society) 3: increase in number and efficacy of means of communication (201-2). Although societies can increase in volume (absolute size), they do not necessarily increase in density. A society which grows larger but does not increase its social contacts can remain segmentary and not evolve into a division of labor (204).The growth and condensation of societies does not permit a greater DOL, but they necessitate it. Spencer claims that the variety of environments in which individuals live channels them to specialize in different paths of labor (eg: seashore ---]fisherman). If this specialization increases with the size of societies, it is because the internal differences increase at the same time. Durkheim asks however, is this diversity alone sufficient to bring about the DOL (206)? If such differences make the DOL possible, they do not impose that division. WHY do men specialize (208)? Labor become increasingly divided as societies grow in density not because of external circumstances, but because the struggle for existence becomes more strenuous (208). Men differentiate their specialties in order to decrease competition and to coexist (DH draws a comparison to Darwin's law of animal differentiation --]survival) (209). Hence, any concentration in the social mass necessarily determines the progress of the DOL (210). To the extent that the social constitution is segmentary, each segment has its own organs that are kept at a distance from similar organs by social partitions. but as these partitions disappear with the advancement of society, the segments begin to struggle to substitute each other. This struggle eventually diminishes, resulting in specialization. Thus higher societies make room for all their members (213). humans specialize and increase the DOL in order to survive in new

conditions of existence. Greater economic productivity is merely a consequence of the DOL, and not a cause or motivation (217). The DOL must be carried out between members of a society that is already 'constituted.' (Those people facing competition who are not already in a bounded society will simply flee each other.) The DOL actually causes the activities which it differentiates to converge and brings people closer together (217). For this to occur, the members of society must not only be liked materially, but they must have moral ties (218). Thus, organic society must arise from a mechanical society which already has a structure of collective beliefs. (this is directly opposite to Spencer's theory that a society is produced by cooperation. DH argues that cooperation necessarily supposes the pre-existence of society (219). For the DOL to function, groups which apparently perform distinct tasks must actually intermingle and be absorbed into one another (221). BOOK 2 CHP 5 'CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOREGOING' In very simple societies, members can easily replace each other in tasks. Comte and Spencer would argue that in higher societies, as social organization is perfected, it becomes more and more impossible for members to switch out of roles. However, DH disagrees. He claims that the phenomena of substitution is also observable in even the highest levels of society (271). A member of society must always be ready to change functions to accommodate a break in social equilibrium. as labor is divided up more in human societies, this elasticity increases. consequently the function becomes more and more independent of the organ (member of society) which performs it. For instance in higher societies, men performing different social functions are distinguished less and less by physical features (2 The DOL is a necessary consequence of the growth of volume and density of society. as the number of individuals between whom social relations are established increases, men can only maintain their position by specializing more. Men go forward because they must. Civilization is but an after-effect (not a cause) of the DOL (276). Furthermore, individuals are more a product of common social life than a determining factor in it. Individuals depend on the diversity of social conditions to differentiate themselves (277). The more numerous and diverse individuals are, the more strongly and rapidly they react together . As a result, social life becomes more intense. This intensification constitutes civilization (278). The product of these social relationships becomes an entity in itself (society sui generis). Spencer purports that the individual has every interest in establishing relationships which serve him alone. This activity shapes society, and social progress consists solely of improving these relationships for the maximization of individual ends. Durkheim contends, 'Spencer does not see in societies a true reality, existing by itself by virtue of specific and necessary causes, one that consequently bears down upon man, imposing upon him its own nature and to which he is forced to adapt in order to continue living' (281). (society sui generis) In effect, man does not shape society. according to DH, 'it is because society changes that we must change' (282). DH labels this concept a mechanistic theory of progress.' Because the ideal of civilization depends upon the ever changing social environment, we will never be without our goals for society (282).

According to DH, man is more or less entirely guided by social life. He credits very little to the human psyche alone. He claims that man develops his psychological life in response to his level of sociability (284). Plus, man has only gained the ability to reason because he is a social animal. Social life even influences his emotions. as man's social life grows in complexity, so does his psyche. We should not present social life as the result of individual natures alone -- as does Spencer. Individual natures emerge from social life; consequently, social facts are not just a mere development of psychological facts (286). Everything found in the consciousness of individuals comes form society. BOOK 3 CH 1 'THE ANOMIC DOL' The DOL is typically a normal phenomenon, but from time to time it enters a pathological state (291), In certain points of the social organism, certain functions are not adjusted to one another. As labor becomes increasingly divided up, these phenomena become more frequent .(eg: bankruptcies, commercial crises, hostility between labor and capital). DH applies the following ideas from Comte: The DOL, if pushed too far, can become a source of disintegration, The individual may isolate himself in his own special activity, forget his fellow workers, and no longer have any idea of what the common task consists (294). Although the diversity of functions is both useful and necessary, unity does not arise spontaneously. The task of realizing and maintaining it must be carried out by the state (295). DH states that the organ of government develops with the DOL, by mechanical necessity. As social functions grow and differentiate, more events impact upon the controlling organ whose role as regulator consequently increases. However, the government cannot be omnipotent; in reality, the unity of organized societies stems from the spontaneous consensus of its parts. the government can only 'bestow its blessing' on society. thus, as labor is divided up, a progressive decomposition over the whole of society can occur (297), furthermore, functional diversity creates a moral diversity . The collective sentiments become powerless to contain the centrifugal tendencies brought about by the DOL. Although Comte saw the DOL as a source of solidarity, he did not perceive this solidarity as sui generis. for this reason, he saw the disappearance of order in the DOL as a morbid phenomenon and a threat to social cohesion. However, DH contends that the weakening of the collective consciousness id normal. It is not possible for social life to be without struggle. Solidarity between organs in society cannot abolish competition but only moderate it (302). The regulatory process which stems from solidarity emerges form the DOL. The DOL evokes definite ways of acting that relate to the unchanging conditions of social life. these habits become transformed into rules of conduct. If solidarity does not arise from the DOL, it is because the relationships between the organs in the system are not well regulated -- they are in a state of anomie. The rules which stem from social solidarity where organs are in close contact fix the conditions of equilibrium to some degree. however, if contacts between organs are blocked, they cannot be repeated enough for rules to take on a definite form. Hence, the rules constituted from these relationships are only general and vague (304). For example, the conditions of industrial life create low levels of contact between organs (worker and worker, worker and family, worker and capitalist). Because these transformations occur with such rapidity, conflicting interests which result from the change have not had time to strike a new equilibrium (306).

DH recognizes that the DOL has been blamed for turning workers into 'lifeless cogs' (306). But, he argues that the DOL does not produce these circumstances as a result of its nature. Under normal conditions, the DOL requires that the individual worker interact with his coworkers. he works toward a goal which he can conceive of fairly distinctly, and he feels that he is of some use. Then, the DOL is a source of solidarity. BOOK 3 CHP2 'THE FORCED DOL' For the DOL to create social solidarity, it is not enough that everyone have a task -- the task must be agreeable to him. If the DOL produces unrest, it is because the distribution of social functions does not correspond to the distribution of natural abilities. Constraint binds people to their functions, and only a troubled form of solidarity can exist (311). Normally, labor is divided according to the distribution of aptitude in society. The DOL produces social solidarity when it arises spontaneously (32). perfect Spontaneity corresponds to absolute equality in the external conditions of struggle for a position in the DOL. Constraint occurs when this struggle becomes impossible (313). Perfect spontaneity cannot exist in any society. inequalities build up through time. For instance, the hereditary transmission of wealth makes the external conditions of the 'struggle' very unequal. The 'higher' the society, the less these inequalities exist (313-4). In an organic society, the sentiments held in common do not possess a great deal of strength to keep the individual bound to the group. Subversive tendencies emerge more readily than in mechanical societies. hence, in organized societies it is indispensable that the DOL work to attain the goal of spontaneity. these societies should attempt to eliminate all external inequalities. They cannot sustain solidarity unless their constituent parts are solidly linked (315-6). Equality in the external conditions of the struggle is needed to secure each individual to his function and to link these functions with each other,. This proposition introduces a long discussion from DH on the importance of equality in contracts. He states that contracts necessarily develop with the DOL. There is a consensus of a certain kind that is expressed in contracts and represents (in the 'higher species' an important factor in collective thought (316). Durkheim also contends that 'there can be no rich or poor by birth without there being unjust contracts' (319). these injustices are found more often in less advances societies, where contractual relations are less developed. Yet as labor becomes more divided up and the social doctrine weakens, these injustices become more unbearable and people start creating contracts to make relationships more fair. Lastly, DH makes a pitch for the importance of society over nature. Contracts regulate social life because if not, people will take advantage of each other. In the broad scheme, liberty and equality are products of regulation. Man as a social being regulates things in nature, 'stripping them of their amoral character.' '[Man] cannot escape from nature save by creating another world in which he dominates it. that world is society' (321). BOOK 3 CHP 3 'ANOTHER ABNORMAL FORM.' The last abnormal form of the DOL occurs when the 'organs' of the system do not function smoothly and continuously together to furnish efficient production of social solidarity. Although the DOL might be highly developed, it is very poorly

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integrated. This does not always occur because there is a lack of a regulatory organ, but because the regulator does not distribute work in such a way that each individual is kept sufficiently busy to increase the functional activity of every worker (324). Every increase in functional activity can create an increase in social solidarity when as a result of becoming more active, the functions become more continuous. When all functions at the same tame become even more active the continuity of each one of them will be increased even more (326). As actions are more solidly linked to one another , they become more dependent on one another (326). The more individuals which work in a society, the more each individual will specialize. At the same time, each worker must increase his activity to meet the needed amount of product. Hence, a second reason for why the DOL fosters social cohesion: 'It fosters the unity of the organization by the very fact that it adds to its life.' THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE INTRO. 'SUBJECT OF OUR STUDY: RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.' According to DH, a religious system is most primitive when it is found in a society with the simplest form of organization, and when it is possible to explain the religious system without using any element borrowed from a previous religion. The study of simple religions shows us an essential and permanent aspect of humanity, as well as leads to an understanding of the religious nature of man (13). At the foundation of all systems of beliefs there are a number of fundamental representations, concepts, and ritual attitudes which, despite the diversity of their forms, have the same objective significance and fulfill the same functions everywhere (17). Primitive civilizations offer privileged cases of the study of religion. These societies are characterized by simplicity and conformity of thought and conduct. The religion Durkheim will analyze in this book is foreign to any idea of a god or divinity. The 'forces' to which the rites are addressed are very different from those in modern religions, yet they aid us in understanding modern religions (19). When primitive religious beliefs are systematically analyzed, the principal categories of understanding are found . In fact, they are a product of religious thought (22). Religion is eminently social. Religious representations express collective realities. Religious rites are a manner of acting which arises from assembled groups and are destined to excite certain mental states in these groups. The categories of understanding are of religious origin; they are social affairs and the product of collective thought (22). these categories include time, specie, class, force, personality, and efficacy (23-5). DH states that society is the highest representation of nature. 'The social realm is a natural realm which differs from the others only by greater complexity' (31). However, nature does not differ radically from one case to another. The relations that exist between things are essentially similar across realms (31). Although the categories of time, space, class, cause and personality are constructed out of social elements, their social origin points to the fact that they have a foundation in the realm of nature (32).

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Thus DH unites two opposing viewpoints in his theory of knowledge (the categories of understanding). The apriorists believe that knowledge is made up of empirical fact and representation. On the other hand, the empiricists only study positive knowledge. DH claims that the theory of knowledge (wherein the categories of thought have a dual social and natural nature) combines all the principles of the apriorists and the empiricists. According to him, the categories of understanding are no longer single empirical facts but are 'complex instruments of [human thought]' (32). _________________________ In this chapter DH also postulates on the dual nature of man. There are two beings in man: an individual whose foundation is in his body and whose circle of activity is very limited, and a social being which represents the intellectual and moral order of society (29). BOOK 1 CHP 1 'DEFINITION OF RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA AND OF RELIGION' In this chapter Durkheim defines religion. In the first two sections, he sets forth definitions of religion which are erroneous, in order to assist readers in freeing their minds of misconceptions. to begin with he argues that the supernatural is not a characteristic of the religious (39). in order to say something is supernatural, it must happen out of the natural order of things (41). However, the idea of a necessary order did not exist before the construction of the positive sciences. Furthermore, religion's main goal is to explain every day events. It is not true that the notion of religion coincides with the extraordinary or the unforeseen. hence the idea of the supernatural is not of primitive origin; man has forged it as he has developed science (43). Next, DH asserts that all religions cannot be associated with divinity or the worship of a supreme deity. Some religions, Buddhism for example, stress other practices instead. In Buddhism, salvation is the worshippers' primary concern -not Buddha (47). DH also contends that even with the deistic religions, there are many rites which are completely independent of any idea of gods (e.g.: the Bible forbids wearing garments of flax and hemp) (49). hence, all religious powers do not emanate from divine personalities (50). DH now begins his discussion of religion. first, he characterizes all the elementary phenomena which comprise religion (51). Religious phenomena can be classified in two fundamental categories: beliefs and rules. Beliefs are states of opinion and consist in representations, whereas rites are determined modes of action (51). All religious beliefs classify things as either profane or sacred. Sacred things are considered superior in dignity and power to profane things, particularly men (52). Men typically consider themselves inferior to anything sacred; yet if man depends on gods, this dependence is reciprocal. without the offerings and sacrifices of man, gods would die (53). Despite the heterogeneity of sacred and profane things, it is possible for the profane to pass into the world of the sacred. For example, this occurs when men are initiated into religious life with certain ceremonies (54).

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However, the sacred and the profane are so heterogeneous that their differences eventually break down into antagonism. men are exhorted to withdraw themselves completely fro the profane world in order to lead an exclusively religious lives. the profane and the sacred cannot approach each other and keep their own nature at the same time (55). Hence, we arrive at the criteria for religious beliefs. 'Religious beliefs are the representations which express the nature of the scared things and their relations with each other or with profane things. Rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of these sacred objects' (56). The totality if these beliefs, when organized in a way so as to form a system having a certain unity and a strict independence from other systems, constitutes a religion . A religion is not made up of a single idea; it is a whole made up of distinct parts. All religions recognize a plurality of sacred things, in addition to the system of cults -- each with some autonomy (56). Because of the variety of cults, there exist groups of religious phenomena which do not belong to any specific religion. If a cult survives while the group of people which practiced it disintegrates, the cult may remain as folk lore. There is a distinction between magic and religion. Magic , like religion, is made up of beliefs and rites. It also has its dogmas, but they are less speculative because they have utilitarian ends. However, whereas religion has a church and a community of worshippers with common beliefs, there is no church in magic (60). The magician has a clientele and it is quite possible that none of them know each other (59-60). magic lacks the moral community formed by all the believers in a single faith (61). From this DH derives a more detailed definition of religion: 'a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things...things set apart and forbidden -- beliefs and practices which unite all those who adhere to them into one moral community ' (62). Because religion is inseparable from the church, it is clear that religion is eminently collective (63). BOOK 3 CHP 4 'THE POSITIVE CULT -- CONT'D' Religious rites are observed not for the physical effects they might produce, but to remain faithful to the past and to maintain the groups normal physiognomy. Rites remake individuals and groups morally (414-5). DH uses the cases of the Warramunga, the Intichuma, and the Arunta to illustrate the above proposition. Although they are separate entities, each tribe has a rite which commemorates a single ancestor. This rite recollects the past and also brings it to the present through a dramatic representation. The officiant is not an incarnation of the ancestor, but an actor playing a role(416). These ceremonies are dramas which are believed to act on the course of nature (418). However, their most important function is to sustain the vitality of the mythic beliefs common to the group, and hence, revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness. Through ritual, individuals are strengthened in their social natures. The rite exercises a moral action more so than a physical action.

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Not all rituals are performed with the external goal of acting on nature for material ends. Some simply represent the past for the sake of representing it (420). When the participants leave the ceremony, they go with a sense of moral well being (423). Ceremonies attach themselves to totems, which are incapable of physical effect. They can only exist in representations whose object is to commemorate the past (424). Aside from illustrating the nature of a certain cult, ritual representations also serve recreative and aesthetic purposes. Rituals restore the moral of the group. They allow men to pass from the real world to an imaginary one. They even pass from the commemorative rite to public merrymaking. Some religious ceremonies, whose soul object is to distract, were probably ancient rites. Even games and art have retained a religious character (425). Recreation is one of the forms of moral remaking, which is the principal goal of the rite. A religious rite can have a plurality of specific purposes. For instance, fasting is a penance, a preparation for communion, and it even confers 'positive virtues.' Inversely, many rites can produce the same effect and mutually replace one another. For instance, to assure the reproduction of the totemic species, one can resort to oblations, imitative practices, or commemorative representations. This proves the plasticity and extreme generality of useful action which stems from the rites (431). Most importantly, common sentiments are expressed in common acts. The particular nature of these acts is secondary. 'CONCLUSION' In the final chapter, Durkheim equates religion to society. He says that society is the cause of the sui generis sensations of the religious experience. Furthermore, social action dominates religious life (466). In addition, the fundamental categories of thought and science have religious origin. In fact, nearly all great social institution, moral and legal rules, have a basis in religion. Religion is the concentrated reflection of collective life, and its principal purpose is to influence moral life (466-7). Religion systematically idealizes. Collective life 'awakens' religious thought in order to bring about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic activity. Thus man places another world -- a sacred, ideal; world -- above his every day profane life (469). In creating new ideals, society remakes itself (470). Although certain religious symbols mat disappear with time, every society will always feel the need to reaffirm the collective sentiments which make up its unity (474-5). There are two elements of religious life. Feasts and rites (the cult)are a system of practices oriented toward action. The second is a system of ideas whose object is to explain the world (476). religion attempts to explain realities by connecting things with each other -- to systematize them. Scientific logic actually stems from the methodology of religion. DH next begins a discussion on the concept as a collective representation. Although a concept may not apply to every individual, it corresponds to the way

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in which society considers the things of its own experience (483). By the mere fact that society exists, there is a whole system of representations by means of which men understand each other. A collective representation guarantees objectivity because it is collective. It was been able to maintain and generalize itself because it has sufficient reason -- the men who accept it verify it by their own experience. Thus, DH takes it as an axiom that religious beliefs contain a truth which must be discovered (486). DH reiterates that the categories of knowledge (time, space ,etc.)are social. Since they are concepts themselves, they are the work of the group (488). The relationships which they express could only have been learned through society (491). Time, space, and class were all created out of cooperation (492). Yet logical organization differentiates itself from its original social organization as societies expand and integrate. Social moulds must readapt. human thought is not a primitive fact, but it is a product of history (493). Hence there is not really such a great antinomy between science and religion. Both systems of thought are directed toward the universal and imply that the individual can raise himself above his own point of view and live an impersonal life. Impersonal reason is synonymous with collective thought. BOOK 2 CHP 7 'ORIGINS OF THESE BELIEFS' In this chapter, DH discusses how men have constructed the belief in totems. A totem in religion is ' a symbol, a material expression of something else' (236). it symbolizes god, but also the society which worships it (the clan). In fact, the god of the clan is nothing else than the clan itself, personified under the visible form of the totem (typically animal or vegetable) (236). The totem's efficacy comes from its psychical power over its worshippers as well as its moral authority over the society (238). Because people do not perceive what the cause of the force of the collective conscious is, they believe it comes from a force outside themselves. This is the moral conscience and men have always represented it with religious symbols (242). Consequently humans get the impression that there are two sorts of reality: on the one hand there are profane things, and on the other, there are sacred things. Society constantly creates sacred things out of ordinary ones (243). humans add sacred qualities to objects (261). Society consecrates men and ideas. The individual cannot penetrate the sacred without 'entering into relations with extraordinary powers that excite him to the point of frenzy' (250). Hence, in the midst of this effervescence, DH contends, the religious idea seems to be born (250). By concentrating itself almost entirely on in specific moments, collective life has been able to attain its greatest intensity and efficacy, as well as give men a more active sentiment of the double existence they lead (251). DH explains how collective forces come to be thought of under the forms of totems, especially in the shape of an anima or plant. he first contends that the transfer of sentiments to a thing comes from the fact that the idea of a thing and the idea of its symbol are closely related in our minds. The result is that emotions

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provoked by the one extend to the other. Since widespread emotions are common to a group, they must be associated to something that is common to all (primitive clans: plants and animals). This is the totemic emblem(252). The totemic emblem is like the visible body of god; it represents the collective force of the clan -- its religious force (253). Religious forces are moral powers because they translate to the way in which the collective conscious acts on individual consciousnesses (254). Totems have a dual purpose: they animate and discipline minds, but they also [are believed to] make plants grow and animals reproduce. Religion is a system of ideas with which individuals represent to themselves their own society, and the obscure but intimate relations which they have with it (257). Religion strengthens the bonds attaching the individual to the society of which he is a member (258). The clan chooses to rally around an emblem because not only does it clarify the sentiment society has of itself, but it also serves to create this sentiment (262). If social sentiments are connected with something that endures (emblem), the sentiments themselves become more durable. Emblems constantly bring collective sentiments to the fore (263). Social life is only made possible by a vast system of symbols. Yet the clan is not the only society which uses totemic practices. generally speaking, a collective sentiment can become 'conscious of itself' only by being fixed on some material object. Social necessity brings about this fusion of things and social life facilitates their union. Durkheim also reiterates that because religion fostered the idea that there are internal connections between things, it opened up the way for science and philosophy. This is of course, because religion is a social affair which stems from collective thought. BOOK 3 CHP1 'THE NEGATIVE CULT AND ITS FUNCTIONS: THE ASCETIC RITES.' In this chapter DH will illustrate the characteristic attitudes which the primitive observes in the celebration of his cult, and will classify the most general forms of his rites as well as explain their origins. DH asserts that every cult has a double aspect --negative and positive. Two sorts of rites are closely associated to this double aspect (337). The purpose of the negative cult (or rites) is to separate sacred and profane beings. These rites forbid certain ways of acting in the form of interdictions. Religious interdiction implies the notion of sacredness (338-9). Some examples of religious interdictions are: Australian tribe members (profane) are forbidden to carry the bones of a dead men (sacred) unless they are wrapped in bark. A moral general example is: people (profane) cannot consume certain forbidden animal meats (sacred). (341-2). moreover, if certain foods are forbidden to the profane because they are sacred, other foods are forbidden to sacred person because they are profane. In either case, contact between the two is forbidden.

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Nothing which either directly or indirectly concerns the profane life should be confused with the religious lie (344). In general all acts characteristic of the ordinary life are forbidden while religious events are taking place (345-6). These rules are strongest for the public cult, or public practice of religion, as opposed to an individual's private practice of religion (which DH contends is still influenced by social religion) (347). Up to this point, the negative cult appears only to be a system of abstentions. Nonetheless, it is found to exercise a positive action on the religious and moral nature of the individual. The individual cannot lead any religious life unless he begins to withdraw somewhat from temporal life. In this manner then, the negative cult is a condition of access to the positive cult (348). For instance, the result of the numerous interdictions of the negative cult in primitive religions is to bring about a radical change in the initiate to the given religion. after he takes part in the rather primitive negative rites, he acquires a sacred character and is considered reborn by the rest of the group (350). y The understanding of the positive effects of negative rites allows us to better understand the purposes of asceticism. Both ancient and modern religions attribute a sanctifying and strengthening power to suffering (354-5). DH explains the reason for this :'suffering is the sign that...certain of the bonds attaching [the individual] to his profane environment are broken; so it testifies that he is partially freed from his environment' (355). In order to serve his gods (the positive cult), the individual must sacrifice his profane interests (356). But asceticism and the negative cult do not serve only religious purposes. Religious interests are only the symbolic form of social and moral concerns. Not only do the gods demand suffering and abnegation from their followers, but so does society. To fulfill his duties to society, the individual will always have to suppress his instincts, whatever the dogmas or mythologies of the time (356). The main reason for the necessity of the separating powers of the negative cult is the 'contagiousness' of the sacred world. Certain rites, objects, or people are sacred, yet they cannot help but to come into contact with the profane, by virtue of the multitude of other things they are associated with. The sanctity of sacred things is contagiously transmitted to everything which evokes the idea of them (359). Hence, even the least proximity (material or moral) can draw religious forces out of their domain. Precautions in the form of the negative cult are essential to keep things in their separate domains (358-360). From this, DH concludes that 'every profanation implies a consecration'(560). The extreme facility with which religious forces diffuse is not surprising. Religious forces are collective moral forces which are made up of ideas that stem from society sui generis (362). The sacred contagion' is not a process where religious forces leave the objects in which they are embodied. The religious value of objects was conferred to them by society. Thus, the same religious principle can animate very different objects and this explains how plants, animals, people, and even rocks are made into totems (i.e. Jesus - lamb - fig leaves- -crosses). To close this chapter, DH draws a relationship between religion and the sciences (for the ten millionth time). Scared contagion, by showing the connectedness of things, opened the way for future scientific thought which utilizes the important concept of relationships between things that do not appear to be connected (365).

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Note: negative rites: separate the sacred from the profane via prohibitions positive rites: stess the individual's commitment and membership in the social community piacular (expiatory) rites: confirm the loss of group members by specifying ways of cpoing. 'funeral are for the living.' 'ANOMIC SUICIDE' TS 916-29 DH prefaces this chapter with the statement that society not only attracts the sentiments and activities of individual with unequal force, but it is a power controlling them (241). He then asserts that it is a well-known fact that economic crises have an aggravating effect on suicidal tendency (241). in both Vienna and France of the late 19th century, suicides increased with the number of bankruptcies 242. The increase in poverty, however, is not the cause for the increase in suicides. In fact, even fortunate crises which enhance a country's prosperity affect suicide like economic disasters (243). If financial crises increase suicides it is not because they increase poverty, it is because they are disturbances of the collective order. During a disturbance of the social equilibrium, men become more disposed to self destruction (246). No person can be happy unless his needs are insufficient proportion to his means (246). Moreover, satisfactions received only stimulate needs further; thus the more one has, the more one wants (248). Any obstruction to man's actions to satisfy his needs can be quite painful Human passions must be limited by an exterior, regulating force. This must be a moral force which regulates moral needs (248). Society must play this moderating role; it is the only moral power superior to the individual (249). If the individual respects regulations, is docile to collective authority, and has a 'wholesome moral constitution,' he will know better than to ask for more. Hence, this puts an end to his desires. Yet it is not enough that the average level of needs for an individual be fixed by public opinion. Society must also fix the way opportunities are open to individuals (250). It must require sacrifices and concessions of its members in the name of public interest (251). Typically, the people subject to social regulation are in agreement with it (251). However, a state of upheaval can occur when society is going through some sort of abnormal crisis. When society is so disturbed, it is incapable of exercising a regulatory influence. From this comes the rise in suicide rates (252). During this time of upset, individuals must struggle to readjust to new social classifications. Society cannot adjust them instantaneously to their new lives (252). individuals no longer know limits to their own desires, thus worsening the state of deregulation or anomy (253). Poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. On the other hand, the less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limitation appears (254). Anomy is actually a chronic state in the sphere of trade and industry. The progress of capitalism has freed industrial relations from all regulation (254). religion has lost its power of preaching asceticism, and the government has become a tool and a servant to economic life. the liberation of human desires has only been made worse by the development of industry (255). Anomy, therefore, is a regular factor in suicide in modern societies. Egoistic suicide results from man's no longer finding a basis for his own existence and altruistic suicide occurs because man believes his basis for existence is situated beyond life. Yet, anomic suicide results from man's activities lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings (258).

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Economic anomy is not the only anomy which may give rise to suicide. domestic anomy can also cause suicide. In countries where divorce is prohibited, wives are more likely to commit suicide than husbands. However, wives are less likely to commit suicide in countries where divorce is allowed. On the contrary, in countries where divorce is allowed, the husband is more likely to commit suicide (266). DH explains the above phenomena by explaining his idea of the purpose of marriage. According to him, it is the regulation of sexual relations. It forces a man to attach himself to the same woman forever and this forms the state of moral equilibrium from which the husband benefits (270). On the other hand, the unmarried man faces a different situation. His desire for women can go unchecked. The uncertainty of his indeterminateness condemns him to constant change and anomy (271). Women's sexual needs are less developed because their mental lives are less developed. hence, they do not require strict social regulation as men do. Thus, marriage is not as useful to them for limiting suicides. Marriage only makes it more difficult for women to change their living situations if they become intolerable. Consequently, anything that makes marriage more flexible can only improve women's situation. Divorce protects them from suicide (272). 'TYPES OF SUICIDE' TS 213-18 At the onset of this article, DH sets up three propositions: 1: Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of religious society 2: ' ' ' ' ' domestic society 3: ' ' ' ' ' political society Thus, suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups, of which the individual forms a part (213). Egoistic suicide springs from excessive individualism, wherein the individual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of the social ego (214). Egoism is the generating cause of egoistic suicide. In addition, the bond attaching man to life relaxes because the one attaching him to society is weak. The individual yields to the slightest shock of circumstance because the state of society has made him a ready prey to suicide (216). Just as excessive individuation can lead to suicide, so can insufficient individuation. In altruistic suicide, society binds the individual too tightly. In this case, the ego is not its own property; it is completely blended into a group spirit. Since this type of suicide is characteristically performed as a duty to a group, DH calls it 'obligatory altruistic suicide.' However, DH does acknowledge that not all altruistic suicide is obligatory (217). Other forms are 'optional altruistic suicide,' and 'acute altruistic suicide' (this second one can be likened to mystical suicide from religious fervor ). Altruistic suicide was typically found in lower, ancient societies which were based on mechanical solidarity. today, the most common type of altruistic suicide is death in war (217). DH concludes by contending that there is really not such a big difference between altruistic and egoistic suicide. he recognizes that many people find something moral in altruistic suicide, but he asks, 'isn't the notion of individual autonomy in egoistic suicide also moral?' furthermore, when a man commits altruistic suicide, he still values the individual personality, even in others. thus, every sort of suicide is merely the 'exaggerated of deflected form of a virtue.' The way those types affect moral conscience then, does not differentiate them into separate types (218).

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RULES OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD PP50-146 In chapter 3, DH presents the rules sociologists should use to distinguish normal social phenomena from pathological social phenomena. Average types depict normal phenomena and all others are morbid (pathological) phenomena, which have dire consequences for society. Pathological types can only be defined in relation to a given species. What is pathological for one group may not be for another (56). Three rules for establishing the normality of phenomena: 1: a social fact is normal, in relation to a given social type at a given phase of its development, when it is present in the average society of that species at the corresponding phase of its evolution. 2: one can verify the results of the preceding method by showing that the generality of the phenomenon is bound up with the general conditions of the collective life of the social type considered. 3: this verification is necessary when the fact in question occurs in a social species which has not yet reached the full course of its evolution. (64). DH contends that many essential social phenomena come to light when the proper methodology is used. for instance, although many criminologists assume crime is pathological, they are incorrect (65). First of all, crime is normal because no society is exempt from it (67). If the collective conscience of a society is strong, it will designate certain acts as criminal. What confers the criminal character of an act is not its intrinsic quality, but the definition which the collective conscience assigns to it. Crime is necessary because it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of social life and it is useful because these conditions are indispensable to the evolution of morality and of law (70). Through crime, individual originality is able to express itself. it directly prepares changes in society because where crime exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently flexible to take on a new form. Crime sometimes helps determine the form they will take (71). Hence, the criminal plays a definite role in social life. In fact, if a crime in a society drops below an average rate, this could be indicative of a severs social disorder. with a drop in the crime rate, a revision in the theory of punishment becomes necessary (72). DH closes this chapter by stating that the principal object of all sciences is to define and explain the normal state and distinguish it from its opposite (74). The generality of phenomena must be taken as a criterion of their normality (75). In chapter 4, 'The Classification of Social Types,' Durkheim asserts that it is not possible to institute the laws of science only after reviewing all the facts they express. Too many varied facts exist (79). It is better to substitute a limited number of types for the indefinite multiplicity of individuals. This will not only order pre-existing knowledge, but will create new knowledge (80). Because the nature of the group depends on the nature and number of component elements and their mode of combination, we must use these general characteristics as their basis. the general facts of social life follow from this basis. We can call the classification of social types 'social morphology.'

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DH proposes to classify social groups according to the degree of complexity in organization which they represent. The simplest group is the 'horde,' and then the 'clan' which is a compound of hordes, and then the 'city -state' which is an aggregate of clans, etc (83-84). Within these types, one can distinguish between groups by the level of integration of their sub-groups (85). However, the more complex a social group is, the less definite its contours. Nonetheless, DH chooses to call each social group a 'species,' even if it is formed only once (86-7). In chapter 5, DH establishes guidelines for the explanation of social facts. He argues that to show the usefulness of a fact, it is not enough to explain how it originated or why it is what it is. Instead, 'when the explanation of a social phenomenon is undertaken, we must seek separately the efficient cause which produces it and the function it fulfills' (95). the question is not whether the cause has a distinct purpose, but whether or not a correspondence between the function and the result exists which is useful to the organism (95). DH asserts that theories of psychology are insufficient as premises for social reasoning, but they can test the validity of propositions established inductively. The ultimate explanation of collective life consists in showing how it emanates from human nature in general (98). Social phenomena do not derive from individual consciousnesses and hence, sociology is not a corollary of individual psychology. Social life is not merely an extension of the individual being. the external impulse to which he submits cannot come from within him (101). Thus, we must seek to explain social life in the nature of society itself. a whole is not identical to the sum of its parts; hence, society is not just a mere sum of individuals. It is the system formed by individuals' association (103). The group acts differently than its members would if they were isolated (104). The concept of the social milieu as the determining factor of collective evolution is of utmost importance to DH. The pressure it exerts on groups within the milieu modifies their organization (116), If we reject the social milieu, sociology cannot establish any relations of causality (117). The causes of social phenomena are internal and do not spring from the individual (121). Many attempts to explain social facts have lost all ideas of social discipline. On the contrary, DH's principle creates a sociology which sees the spirit of discipline as the essential condition of all common life (124) In chapter 6, DH sets forth rules for the establishing of sociological proofs. Since social phenomena are not within the control of the sociological experimenter, he must employ the comparative method by conforming to the principal of causality. the basis of sociological comparisons must be the following proposition: A given fact always has a single corresponding cause (128). If suicide appears to depend on more than one cause, it is because in reality there are several kinds of suicides (129). However, social phenomena are much too complex for the effect of all the causes to be removed except for one in a given case. DH suggests using the method of concomitant correlations or variation. With this method, it is not necessary that the variables outside those which are being compared be excluded (130). Concomitant variation shows how two facts can mutually influence each other in a continuous manner (130). Sometimes this method introduces a common cause to two or more social phenomena (132). Because societies are formed by many elements from preceding historical eras, one cannot explain a social fact of any complexity except by following its

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complete development through all social species (139). Furthermore, to arrive at a fair comparison across societies, one must compare the societies at the same period in their development (140). In his conclusion, DH first contends that his method is entirely independent of philosophy; it abandons generalizations and enters the world of facts (142). Second, his method is 'objective;' it is dominated by the idea that social facts are things and must be treated as such. If sociological phenomena are only systems of objectivized ideas, to explain them is to rethink them in their logical order. Only methodical experiments can extract the 'truth' from things. Third, DH's method is exclusively sociological (144). A social fact can be explained only by another social fact, and this explanation is possible by pointing out the principal factor in collective evolution -- the social milieu. The above three characteristics make sociology a distinct and autonomous science (145). 'ON THE NORMALITY OF CRIME,' pp. 872-75 in Theories of Society, edited by Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kaspar D. Naegele, and Jesse R. Pitts. New York: Free Press. Crime is normal, an inevitable and necessary part of every society. (It may take abnormal forms, such as when the crime rate is unusually high.) 'A society exempt from it would be utterly impossible' (872). Since people differ from 'the collective type,' there are some divergences which tend toward the criminal. However, whatconfers a 'criminal character' on divergences from the collective type is not 'the intrinsic quality of a given actbut that definition which the collective consciousness lends them' (873). Crime has an 'indirect utility' (874): In order for transformations in law and morality to be possible, 'thecollective sentiments at the basis of morality must not be hostile to change, and consequently must have butmoderate energy.... Every pattern is an obstacle to new patterns, to the extent that the first pattern is inflexible'(873-4). This 'moderate energy,' which permits change, also permits crime. If there were no crime, it wouldbe evidence that change was not possible: 'To make progress, individual originality must be able to expressitself' (874). However, crime also has a direct utility. Crime 'in certain cases directly prepares these changes [progress]. Where crime exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently flexible to take on a new form, and crime sometimeshelps to determine the form they will take' (874), Example, Socrates; freedom of thought was once a crime. Socrates' crime prepared the way for a 'new morality and faith which the Athenians needed, since the traditionsby which they had lived until then were no longer in harmony with the current conditions of life' (874). Thus,'[c]ontrary to current ideas, the criminal no longer seems a totally unsociable being.... On the contrary, heplays a definite role in social life' (874). Then Durkheim goes on a little jag about pathology and how the normality of phenomena should be defined,which I am not going to give much more shrift than this, though you may want to read it in detail: 'If,however, the most widely diffused facts can be pathological [for instance, crime], it is possible that the normaltypes never existed in actuality; and if that is the case, why study the facts?... The principle object of allsciences of life, whether individual or social, is

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to define and explain the normal state and to distinguish it fromits opposite.... In order that sociology may be a true science of things, the generality of phenomena must betaken as the criterion of their normality' (875). This is actually an important issue, and sheds light on whyEmile sets up his concepts the way he does. KARL MARX (1818-1893) The Marx-Engels Reader. 2nd ed. Edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978, pp. 3-5, 70-81, 143-75, 203-17, 224-26, 236-44, 302-12, 319-29, 469-91, 594-617. (all page numbers refer to Tucker, unless otherwise indicated) MARX ON THE HISTORY OF HIS OPINIONS (PP. 3-5) This is the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), where Marx establishes his materialist conception of history. The economic structure of society is the sum of people's relations to production, which correspond to a definite stage of their material productive forces. This economic structure is the foundation for legal and political superstructures as well as social consciousness. When the material forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, a social revolution, which would transform the economic conditions of production and the ideological forms of consciousness, is possible. A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (PP. 16-25) Background information on Hegel and Feuerbach (Averneri, pp. 8-27) Marx became interested in Hegel's philosophy because of his dissatisfaction with Kant's "antagonism between the 'is' and the 'ought.'" Hegel's philosophy offered a way to eliminate this dichotomy by "realizing idealism in reality." Marx later realizes that this dichotomy remains in Hegel's philosophy, hidden in the inner contradictions of his theory of social and political institutions. Feuerbach provided Marx with a methodological device to critique Hegel - the transformative method. Hegel argued that thought was the subject and existence was the predicate. Feuerbach, however, wanted to ground the subject in space and time and thereby develop a materialistic philosophy. His transformative method takes the human and the subject and thought as the predicate. The Critique Marx critiques Hegel's political philosophy in order to get at the roots of the Hegelian system. His discussion of sovereignty (pp. 18-19) is an example of his application of the transformative method to critique Hegel. Hegel saw the state as an entity abstracted from the social and historical forces which created it. He ignored the social context of human relations and rationalized existing social organizations. This is apparent in Marx's discussion of ancient, medieval, and modern politics (pp. 21-23). Lastly, Marx criticizes Hegel's notion that the bureaucracy is the "universal class." Marx argues that the 'apparent idealism of

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the bureaucracy's dedication to the general well-being of society is nothing but a mask for it's own coarse, materialistic ends" (Averneri, p. 23). "Democracy is the true unity of the general and the particular" (p. 21). It is the state of society in which the individual is no longer juxtaposed against society. ON THE JEWISH QUESTION (PP. 26-46) Written in 1843, Marx reviews two studies on the Jewish question written by Bruno Bauer, another Young Hegelian. The question is how to emancipate the Jews. The answer is that we have to emancipate ourselves before we can emancipate others. Political emancipation is not the final and absolute form of human emancipation. Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual human has absorbed into her/himself the abstract citizen; when s/he has become a species-being and has recognized her/his own powers as social powers so that s/he no longer separates this social power from himself as political power. The perfected political state is the specieslife of a person, as opposed to her/his material life. A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT: INTRODUCTION (PP. 53-65) Written in 1843, Marx argues for a "radical revolution" to achieve self-realization. This is the first time he writes of the proletariat as the vehicle for revolution. Marx begins this essay with a criticism of religion, which he claims is the premise of all criticism. Feuerbach used religion as the basis of his transformative method. Marx follow his lead by saying that "man makes religion; religion does not make man" (p. 53). Also, religion creates the illusion that people are happy, but people must abandon this ideal and demand real happiness, which can only be found in the material world. Marx then criticizes the state of affairs in Germany and the problem of the rule of private property over nationality. Germany has long been the "theoretical consciousness" of other nations but not it needs a revolution which will "raise it not only to the official level of modern nations, but to the human level" (p. 60). Marx calls for a partial revolution in which "a section of civil society emancipates itself and attains universal domination" (p. 62). The proletariat is the ideal class to lead the revolution because it is "a class in civil society which is not a class of civil society" and because it's sufferings are universal The proletariat will find its intellectual weapons in philosophy. "Philosophy is the head of this emancipation and the proletariat is the heart" (p. 65). THESES ON FEUERBACH (PP. 143-145) Here Marx is criticizing the 18th century materialist view that consciousness is nothing but a reflection of the material, environmental condition of human existence. This view portrays people as passive and inhibits possibilities of change (Averneri, pp. 66-67).

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Marx also emphasizes the importance of practice over theory. Social change is revolutionary practice. "The philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point it to change it" (p. 145). Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (pp. 66-105) Estranged Labor "With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of men. Labor produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the worker as a commodity. ... (T)he object which labor produces confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer" (p. 71). Four characteristics of the alienation of labor: (See also Giddens, pp. 12-16; Swingewood, pp. 65-67) 1.) The relation of the worker to the product of labor as an alien object exercising power over him/her. The worker does not control the fate of his/her products and therefore does not benefit from them. 2.) The relation of labor to the act of production within the labor process. Since labor is forced it offers no intrinsic satisfactions. It becomes a means to an end rather than an end in itself. 3.) Estranged labor turns man's species being into a being alien to him, into a means to his individual existence. The alienation of men from their species being is a social separation from socially generated characteristics and propensities (Giddens, p. 16). 4.) Man is estranged from man. All economic relations are social relations; human relations, in capitalism, tend to become reduced to operations of the market (Giddens, p. 14). Note of clarification: The difference between objectification and alienation (Swingewood, p. 65) Hegel does not distinguish between the two ideas. For Marx, objectification is a process through which humanity externalizes itself in nature and society and thus necessarily entering into social relations. Alienation occurs only when humanity, having externalized itself, encounters its own activity, its essence, operating as an external, alien, and oppressive power. Private Property Private property is the product of alienated labor and the means by which labor alienates itself (p. 79). "Communism is the positive transcendence of private property, or human self-estrangement, and therefore is the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man. It is a complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being" (p. 84). The transcendence of private property is the complete emancipation of all human senses and attributes. The Meaning of Human Requirements (pp. 93-101) The need for money is the true need produced by the modern economic system. The power of money decreases exactly in inverse proportion to the increase in the volume of production.

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The Power of Money (pp. 101-105) "Money is the pimp between man's need and the object, between his life and his means of life. But that which mediates my life for me, also mediates the existence of other people for me" (p. 102). Money is the alienated ability of mankind. Society and Economy in History (pp. 136-142) Marx wrote this letter in 1846 as a critique of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's The Philosophy of Poverty. He later expanded it into a book called The Poverty of Philosophy. He attacks Proudhon's individualistic economic model and develops his argument for a historical materialist approach to understanding society and economy. According to Marx, society is the product of humans' reciprocal action. All human relations are based on material relations. The economic forms in which men produce, consume and exchange are transitory and historical. Because Proudhon does not take a historical approach, he fails to recognize the importance of such "economic evolutions" as the division of labor and machinery. Proudhon is also a classical materialist and Marx criticizes this approach for overlooking the fact that human nature itself is the ever-changing product of human activity, i.e., of history (Averneri, p. 71). This relates to Marx's critique of Feuerbach's mechanistic materialistic position in the Theses of Feuerbach. THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY (146-200) Written by Marx and Engels in 1845-46, this is essentially an elaboration of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, with particular emphasis on the "materialist conception of history." Marx complains that Old Hegelians comprehended everything by reeducating it to a Hegelian logical category, and the Young Hegelians criticized everything by attributing it to religious conceptions; but no one had yet tried to connect German philosophy with German reality (pp. 148-149). Stages of development of the division of labor: 1.) tribal: elementary division of labor; extension of natural d of l existing in family 2.) ancient communal: urban system of masters and slaves; communal private property 3.) feudal state: rural system of lords and serfs; little d of l; feudal organization of trades into guilds Marx emphasizes the need to look at different societies and see how the social and political structure of each is connected to production The production of the means to satisfy biological needs is the production of material life itself. The satisfaction of the first need leads to new needs. The production of new needs is the first historical act. Marx stresses that needs are historical and not natural (p. 156; Averneri, p. 73). The d of l implies a contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community. In communist society, no one has one exclusive sphere of activity and society regulates the general production (p. 160).

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Communism is a "world-historical" movement comprised of individuals directly linked up with world history (p. 162). Civil society is the form of intercourse determined by the existing productive forces that transcends the state and the nation (p. 163). Concerning the Production of Consciousness: The ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas (p. 172). The Real Basis of Ideology: The greatest division of material and mental labor is the separation of town and country. This is the separation of capital and landed property and the beginning of property having its basis only in labor and exchange (p. 176). Big industry universalized competition and thus produced "world history" for the first time (i.e., people were not dependent on the whole world to satisfy their wants). Relation of State and Law to Property: Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the State has become a separate entity, outside civil society. The State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests. Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse (p. 193). Only in the community is personal freedom possible (p. 197). WAGE LABOR AND CAPITAL (PP. 203-217) Published in 1849, Marx sets out the economic content of his argument for the first time. Wages are the sum of money paid by the capitalist for a particular labor time or for a particular output (p. 204). Labor power is a commodity which the worker sells to capital. The worker sells his life activity in order to secure the necessary means of subsistence. The worker belongs not the individual capitalist, but to the capitalist class (pp. 204205). The cost of the production of labor power is the cost required for maintaining the worker as a worker; the price of labor is the price of the necessary means of subsistence (p. 206). Wage minimum is the cost of production of simple labor power, i.e., the cost of existence and reproduction of the worker. Commodities are products which are exchangeable for others. Exchange value is the ratio in which commodities are exchangeable (if this ratio is expressed in money, then exchange value is simply the price of a commodity) (p. 208).

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The more productive capital grows, the more the d of l and application of machinery expand, the greater the competition among workers, and the more wages contract (p. 216). Nevertheless, the rapid growth of capital is the most favorable condition for wage labor because it may improve the material existence of the worker (pp. 211, 217). THE GRUNDRISSE (PP. 224-226, 236-244) Written in 1857-58, Marx states his view on the method of political economy and develops his thesis on production as the basic category. Production: There are characteristics which all stages of production have in common, and which are established as general ones; but the so-called general preconditions of all production (e.g., property and the protection of acquisitions) are nothing more than these abstract moments with which no real historical stage of production can be grasped (p. 226). Exchange: 1.) there is no exchange without the d of l 2.) private exchange presupposes private production 3.) the intensity, extension, and manner of exchange are determined by the development and structure of production Method of Political Economy: Labor has become the means of creating wealth in general and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form (pp. 240-241). Bourgeois society is the most developed and most complex historical organization of production. Studying bourgeois society is the key to understanding the structure and relations of production of former types of society (e.g., feudal, ancient, etc.); but this is possible only through the self-criticism of bourgeois society (pp. 241-242). CAPITAL, VOLUME I (PP. 294-438) Written in 1867, Marx aims to explore the capitalist mode of production and the conditions of production and exchange corresponding to that mode. PART I: COMMODITIES AND MONEY (PP. ) Capitalism is a system of commodity production. A commodity is a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort. There are two characteristics to every commodity: 1.) use value is the utility of a thing independent of the amount of labor time used to produce it. Use-value is realized only through use or consumption. It is the substance of all wealth. 2.) Exchange value is the proportion in which values in use of one sort are exchanged for those of another sort. It is a quantitative relation.

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Values is the labor power expended in production. It is measure by the quantity of value-creating substance, i.e., labor. It varies directly as the quantity, and inversely as the productiveness of the labor incorporated in it. The labor time socially necessary is that required to produce an article under the normal conditions of production and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time. The two-fold character of labor = useful labor + simple labor power Useful labor is that which makes a product a use-value. Simple labor power is that which, on the average, apart from any special development, exists in the organism of every ordinary individual. Money-form is the value-form of commodities common to them all. Relative value is the value expressed in relation to something else; it presupposes the presence of another commodity. Equivalent value is the second commodity whose value is not expressed but it provides the material in which another value is expressed. Fetishism occurs when the social character of human labor appears to people as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labor. A definite social relation between people assumes the form of a relation between things. An expression of human creativity appears to be a natural object (Averneri, pp. 117119). This fetishism is due in part to money, which conceals the social character of private labor. PART II: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MONEY INTO CAPITAL The circulation of commodities is the starting point of capital. M - C - M = capital M' = M + M (M = surplus value)M - C - M' = general formula of capitalLabor power is the capacity for labor. It is the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in people which they exercise whenever they produce a usevalue.The value of labor power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the laborer. PART III: THE PRODUCTION OF ABSOLUTE SURPLUS VALUE

The elementary factors of labor-process: 1.) work itself 2.) subject of work 3.) its instruments Surplus value is whatever the worker produces over and above the proportion of the working day needed to produce the worker's own value. Absolute surplus value is produced by the prolongation of the working day. Relative surplus value is produced by the curtailment of the necessary labor time plus an alteration in the respective length of the two components of the working

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day, that in which the laborer works for him/herself and that in which s/he works for the capitalist. PART IV: PRODUCTION OF RELATIVE SURPLUS VALUE (PP. 376-417) Machinery produces relative surplus-value by depreciating the value of labor power, cheapening the commodity, and raising the social value of the article produced above its individual value. This only lasts until machinery becomes more general in a particular field. Then, the use of machinery converts variable capital (invested in labor-power) into constant capital (machinery), which does not produce surplus value (p. 405). Machinery does not free the laborer from work, but makes that work uninteresting. PART V: PRODUCTION OF ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE SURPLUS VALUE (PP. 417-431) The composition of capital: capital value variable constant material means of labor production power living

The growth of capital involves the growth of the variable constituent (i.e., the proletariat). This is the basis of the "reserve army" (p. 423). The absolute law of capitalist accumulation = the greater the social wealth, the larger the reserve army, the greater the pauperization. PART VIII: SO-CALLED PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION (PP. 431-438) Accumulation is not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its starting point. The starting point of the development that gave rise to the wage-laborer as well as to the capitalist was the servitude of the laborer. THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (PP. 469-500) Marx and Engels were commissioned in 1847 to write a manifesto for the Communist League. With highly charged rhetoric, they restate many of the basic premises of Marx' earlier works. They argue that: 1.) Economic production and the structure of every historical epoch constitute the foundation for the political and intellectual history of that epoch.

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2.) All history has been a history of class struggles. 3.) This struggle has now reached a stage where the exploited and oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppress it (the bourgeoisie) without freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression, and class struggles. It is important to note that in his polemical writings, Marx frequently oversimplified his view of class struggle into the opposition between 2 classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. However, he believes in a more complex class structure including "transition classes," as is evident in The Eighteenth Brumaire (Swingewood, pp. 84-86). The immediate aim of Communists is the formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, and the conquest of political power by the proletariat. The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property in general, but the abolition of bourgeois property because it exemplifies the exploitation of the many by the few. The first step of revolution is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class. Then it is necessary to wrest all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have the world to win. Workers of the world unite!!!!! CLASS STRUGGLE IN FRANCE 1848-50 (PP. 586-593) Marx sets out to explain why the workers' insurrection in France in 1848 failed. In February 1848, King Louis Philippe was forced to abdicate because of protests of Parisian workers. In June there was another workers' insurrection, which was crushed by the military. In December, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was elected president and in 1851 he made himself emperor by coup d'etat. Marx says that the revolution was based on social relationships which had not yet come to the point of sharp class antagonisms. The Provisional Government which had emerged in February was largely bourgeoisie. They had used the workers only as fighters for bourgeois causes. Though the proletariat did not win the revolution, they won the terrain for the fight for their revolutionary emancipation. Any merely political insurrection of the proletariat trying to create politically conditions not yet immanently developed in the socio-economic sphere is doomed to fail (Averneri, p. 194). A real revolution is only possible when modern productive forces and bourgeois productive forms come in collision with one another. THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE (PP. 594-617) Marx wants to "demonstrate how the class struggle in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity

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to play a hero's part" (p. 594). He is treating an actual historical event from the viewpoint of the materialist conception of history. Marx divides the French Revolution into 3 main periods: 1.) The February period: while the proletariat reveled in the vision of the wide prospects that had opened before it, the old powers of society had assembled themselves and taken over. 2.) The period of the Constitution (May 4, 1848 - May 1849): This was the foundation of the bourgeois republic. The proletariat tried to revolt with the June insurrection, but everyone else had united against this "party of anarchy," these "enemies of society." 3.) The period of the Constitutional Republic (May 29, 1849 - December 2, 1851): Under Bonaparte, the favored section of the bourgeoisie concealed its rule under cover of the crown. Bonaparte represented the small peasants. The great mass of the French nation is formed by the simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack from a sackful of potatoes. They do not form a class because there is no national union or political organization. Bonaparte sees himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the middle class, but by protecting its material power, he allows it to regain political power. Bonaparte wants to make the lower classes happy within the framework of a bourgeois society. He would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes, but he can't give to one class without taking from another. CLASS STRUGGLE AND MODE OF PRODUCTION (P. 220) In a letter to his friend Joseph Weydemeyer, Marx writes about what he considered most innovative in his analysis of the human historical process. He acknowledges that others before him had discovered the existence of classes and the struggle between them. What Marx did was to prove: 1.) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, 2.) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and 3.) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society. CLASSES (PP. 441-442) The three big classes of modern society are the wage-laborers, capitalists, and landowners. The law of development of the capitalist mode of production is to divorce the means of production from labor and to concentrate the scattered means of production into large groups, thereby transforming labor into wagelabor and the means of production into capital. Marx is concerned with defining what a class is. He starts with the hypothesis that a class can be defined by its sources of revenues. For example, wage-laborers live on wages, capitalists on profits, and landownders on ground-rent. However, he begins to argue that this is not a sufficient definition because it would lead to the infinite fragmentation of interest and rank. This manuscript is incomplete and Dahrendorf picks up on this subject and tries to complete Marx's definition of a class PARSONS, TALCOTT

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Talcott Parsons on Institutions and Social Evolution: Selected Writings. Edited by Leon R. Mayhew. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, chs. 1-5 (early writings), ch. 6 ('The Pattern Variables'), ch. 7 ('Integration and Institutionalization'), ch. 9 ('Illness and the Role of the Physician'), ch. 15 ('On the Concept of Influence'), ch. 19 ('Evolutionary Universals in Society'). _________. Essays in Sociological Theory. Glencoe IL; Free Press, 1954, ch. 2 ('The Professions and Social Structure'), ch. 5 ('Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the U.S.'). _________. ''Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations.' Administrative Science Quarterly (1956):63-85, 225-39. _________. 'An Outline of the Social System.' TS, pp. 30-79. TALCOTT PARSONS ON INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF THEORY IN SOCIAL RESEARCH In this short chapter, Parsons expresses his concern for what appears to be the complete divorce between the empirically-minded and the theoretically minded in which each does their type of research while degrading the work of the other. For instance, Parsons says, ''certain of the empirically minded are not merely not interested in attempting to contribute to theory themselves, they are actively anti-theoretical'' (67). He makes the same point of the theoretically minded. Although he is very sympathetic toward empiricists who do not like to structure their research on firm theoretical grounds, he argues the whether they would like to admit it or not, scientific endeavors cannot and do not make much contribution to scientific knowledge unless they are ''guided by the logical structure of a theoretical scheme.'' Parsons sees the principle functions of analytical theory in research in the following four ways: 1) it provides a basis of selection for the important facts from the unimportant, given the wealth of miscellaneous facts we have 2) it provides a basis for organization of the facts 3) it reveals the gaps in the existing knowledge and their importance 4) it provides a source of ''cross fertilization'' of related fields CHAPTER 2: THE PLACE OF ULTIMATE VALUES IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY Basically what Parsons says in this chapter is that people strive to achieve ends and they do so given the opportunities or means that are available to them (means-ends chain). However, people's ''ultimate ends'' as well as how they achieve them are not chosen randomly. Instead, the means by which people achieve their goals, etc., are defined and established by the group of which they are a part. Parsons calls this a ''common system of ultimate ends.'' Actions are governed by normative rules of the group or institution. In other words, Parsons' concept of action is grounded in a normative framework. CHAPTER 3: THE ACTION FRAME OF REFERENCE A frame of reference is the starting point for analysis and is determined by the particular vantage point and purposes. Mayhew says that ''the grounding of the normative in the very concept of action as a necessary element of an action frame of reference, gives the study of norms a solid theoretical foundation'' (8).

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Norms have special importance in social life; they provide an action frame of reference for analyzing social structure and its functions. CHAPTER 4: HOBBES AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER Hobbes believed that people are guided by their passions. The good is simply what man desires. However, there are many limitations on the extent to which these desires can be realized. Therefore, in order to ''control'' people's desires, society has created a social contract that exists between members of society. Through this contract men agree to give up some liberties to the sovereign power and in return they receive security, or immunity, from aggression by the force or fraud of others. Through this authority, the desires and passions are held in check and order and security are maintained. Without it, men will attempt to achieve their ends in the most efficient means available, in other words, force or fraud. This will eventually lead to a state of war. It is this social contract of Hobbes that is most interesting to Parsons. Hobbes' social contract is synonymous with Parson's normative framework. He says that an ordered social life cannot be founded on rational calculation alone; there must be a normative framework to establish criteria of choice that will provide for social control of disruptive conduct. CHAPTER 5: PATTERN VARIABLES Pattern variables are ''the principle tools of structural analysis outlining the derivation of these categories from the intrinsic logic of social action -- the inherent dilemmas of choice facing actors'' (10). In this chapter Parsons argues that there are a strictly limited and defined set of alternatives or choices that can be made, and the relative primacies given to choices constitute the ''patterning of relational institutions.'' These choices or alternatives are called orientationselection. There are five pattern variables of role-definition that Parsons discusses, although he says that there are many more possibilities. The first is the gratification-discipline dilemma: affectivity vs. affective-neutrality. The dilemma here is in deciding whether one expresses their orientation in terms of immediate gratification (affectivity) or whether they renounce immediate gratification in favor of moral interests (affective-neutrality). parsons says, ''no actor can subsist without gratifications, while at the same time no action system can be organized or integrated without the renunciation of some gratifications which are available in the given situation'' (107). The second set of pattern variables of role-definition are the private vs. collective interest dilemma: self-orientation vs. collectivity orientation. In this case, one's role orientation is either in terms of her private interests or in terms of the interests of the collectivity. Parsons explains, ''a role, then, may define certain areas of pursuit of private interests as legitimate, and in other areas obligate the actor to pursuit of the common interests of the collectivity. The primacy of the former alternative may be called ''self-orientation,'' that of the latter, ''collectivity-orientation'' (107). The third pair of pattern variables are the choice between types of valueorientation standard: universalism vs. particularism. Simply put, ''in the former case the standard is derived from the validity of a set of existential ideas, or the generality of a normative rule, in the latter from the particularity of ... an object or of the status of the object in a relational system'' (109). Example: the

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obligation to fulfill contractual agreements vs. helping someone because she is your friend. The fourth pair of pattern variables are achievement vs. ascriptive role behavior: the choice between modalities of the social object. Achievement-orientation roles are those which place an emphasis on the performances of the people, whereas ascribed roles, the qualities or attributes of people are emphasized independently of specific expected performances. The final pair of pattern variables are specificity vs. diffuseness: the definition of scope of interest in the object. If one adopts an orientation of specificity towards an object, it means that the definition of the role as orienting to the social object in specific terms. In contrast, in a diffuse orientation, the mode of orientation is outside the range of obligations defined by the role-expectation. CHAPTER 7: INTEGRATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN THE SOCIAL SYSTEM Institutionalization: By institutionalization Parsons meant the integration of roles and sanctions with a generalized value system or normative framework which all members share. He states, ''institutionalization is an articulation or integration of the actions of a plurality of actors in a specific type of situation in which the various actors accept jointly a set of harmonious rules regarding goals and procedures'' (118). Institutionalizing Roles: Parsons says that the social system of the institution must contain an allocative process by which the problem of who is to get what, who is to do what, and the manner and conditions under which it is to be done is made explicit. If this is not done, the social system will fail and will make way for another system. If it does occur, integration will be achieved. The function of allocation of roles, facilities, and rewards, therefore, must be established within the social system. Access to roles is determined by qualifications. Access to facilities is determined by position. One is given facilities to help to achieve the goals set forth by the duties of the position they occupy. The purpose of facilities is the fulfillment of role-expectations. Rewards have the function of maintaining or modifying motivations. Therefore, access to rewards is determined by achievement or how well one does her work. The Integration of the Social System: Social integration of the social system takes place when members are governed by a common value-orientation, when the common values are motivationally integrated in action as a collectivity, and when the people are given and take responsibility for their role-expectation in that they take responsibility for the definition and enforcement of the norms governing the allocative processes and take responsibility for the conduct of communal affairs. CHAPTER 9: ILLNESS AND THE ROLE OF THE PHYSICIAN Parsons defines illness as a deviant behavior because, as a sick person, whether mentally or physically, one is not able to perform the functions or obligations to society. He states, ''behavior which is defined in sociological terms as failing in some way to fulfill the institutionally defined expectations of one or more of the roles in which the individual is implicated in the society'' (146). He deals with four issues here: the processes of genesis of illness, the role of the sick person as a social role, aspects of the role of the physician and their relation to the

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therapeutic process, and the way in which both roles fit into the general equilibrium of the social system. In the first issue, that of the processes of genesis of the illness, mental illness is assumed. Parsons suggests that the genesis of illnesses results from something that has gone wrong in a person's relationships to others during the process of social interaction. The support a person receives from those surrounding her in which she is made to feel a member of the group as well as the upholding of values of the group may be lacking resulting in the person becoming pathological. In the second issue, the role of the sick person is considered a social role. First, the sick person is made exempt from normal social obligations. Then she is exempted from certain responsibilities of her own state. Third, given the role of the sick relinquishes one from the claim to full legitimacy. Fourth, being sick is defined as needing help; the sick person makes the transition to the additional role of patient and as such has certain obligations to fulfill. The third issue, the aspects of the role of the physician and their relation to the therapeutic process are discussed. Parsons says that there are four main conditions of successful psychotherapy. The first is support which signifies the acceptance of the sick person as a member of a social group. The second is a special permissiveness to express wishes and fantasies which would ordinarily not be permitted in normal social relationships. The third is that the therapist does not reciprocate the expectations of the patient. The fourth is the conditional manipulation of sanctions by the therapist -- the giving and withholding of approval. The final issue that Parsons discusses is how the illness/sick person, the physician, and well as the psychotherapy are built into the structure of society. CHAPTER 15: ON THE CONCEPT OF INFLUENCE Ways of Getting Results in Interaction: Parsons argues that there are at least four ways of getting results in interaction. The first is through inducement of offering someone something that they want so that they will comply. The second is through deterrence of suggesting that by not complying something bad will happen to the person. The third means is through activation of commitment or suggesting to the person why it would be wrong, in the person's viewpoint, to refuse to comply. The fourth means is through persuasion or offering reasons why it would be a good thing for him or her to comply, independent of situational advantages. Parsons presents the following diagram to illustrate his point: CHANNEL SANCTION Positive Negative Intentional persuasion Situational inducement deterrence

activation of commitments

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This he calls his paradigm of modes of gaining ends. Parsons defines influence as ''a means of persuasion. It is bringing about a decision on alter's part to act in a certain way because it is felt to be a 'good thing' for him, on the one hand independently of contingent or otherwise imposed changes in his situation, on the other hand for positive reasons, not because of the obligations he would violate through noncompliance'' (236). In other words, one has influence because of who they are, because they hold some title, etc., that makes people believe in them. Parsons states, ''the same statement will carry more weight if made by someone with a high reputation for competence, for reliability, for good judgment, etc., than by someone without this reputation ... It is not what he is saying ... but what 'right' he has to expect to be taken seriously.'' (238-9). Persuasion is done in common interest. It is not in the interest of the persuader, but in the interest of the person being persuaded that the outcome would benefit. An example of this is a doctor and a patient. The doctor has influence because of who she is. She has a degree and training that gives credibility, and the aim she has is for the good of the patient. Types of Influence. There are four types of influence: political, fiduciary, influence through appear to different loyalties, and influence oriented to the interpretation of norms. In political influence, there is a directly significant relation between influence and power. Fiduciary influence refers to the ability to allocate resources in a system where both collectivities and their goals are plural and justification of each among the plural goals is problematic. Influence through appeal to differential loyalties refers to commitments grounded in institutionalized values. It is a matter of justifying assuming particular responsibilities in the context of a particular collectivity. The final type of influence, that of influence oriented to the interpretation of norms, refers to the interpretation of legal norms of the judicial process. CHAPTER 19: EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS IN SOCIETY Four features of human societies at the level of culture and social organization were cited as having universal and major significance as prerequisites for sociocultural development: technology, kinship organization based on an incest taboo, communication based on language, and religion. Primary attention, however, was given to six organizational complexes that develop mainly at the level of social structure. The first two, particularly important for the emergence of societies for primitiveness, are stratification, involving a primary break with primitive break with primitive kinship ascription, and cultural legitimation, with institutionalized agencies that are independent of a diffuse religious tradition. Fundamental to the structure of modern societies are, taken together, the other four complexes: bureaucratic organization of collective goal-attainment, money and market systems, generalized universalistic legal systems, and the democratic association with elective leadership and mediated membership support for policy orientations. Although these have developed very unevenly, some of them going back a very long time, all are clearly much more than simple inventions of particular societies. Perhaps a single theme tying them together is that differentiation and attendant reduction in ascription has caused the initial two-class system to give way to more complex structures at the levels social of stratification and the relation

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between social structure and its cultural legitimation. First, this more complex system is characterized by a highly generalized universalistic normative structure in all fields. Second, subunits under such normative orders have greater autonomy both in pursuing their own goals and interests and in serving others instrumentally. Third, this autonomy is linked with the probability that structural units will develop greater diversity of interests and subgoals. Finally, this diversity results in pluralization of scales of prestige and therefore of differential access to economic resources, power, and influence. ''SUGGESTIONS FOR A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS'' 1. MAIN ARGUMENT Parson's version of sociological explanation of organizational theory. He attempted to define organization by locating it systematically in the structure of the society in relation to other categories of social structure. He defines an organization as ''a social system oriented to the attainment of a relatively specific type of goal, which contributes to a major function of a more comprehensive system, usually the society'' (63). 2. OUTLINE (AGIL SCHEME) He referred to his basic classification of the functional problem of social systems (AGIL). This classification distinguished four main categories: -the value system - which defines and legitimized the goals of the organization (L) -the adaptive mechanisms - which concern mobilization of resources (A) -the operative code - mechanisms of the direct process of goal implementation (G) -the integrative mechanisms (I) 1) - (L) Its value system defining the societal commitments of which its functioning depends. This value system must be a subvalue system of a higherorder one, since the organization is always defined as a subsystem of a more comprehensive social system. From this concept, Parsons maintained two conclusions. First, the value system of the organization must imply basic acceptance of the more generalized values of the superordinate system. Secondly, on the requisite level of generality, the most essential feature of the value system of an organization is the valuative legitimation of its place or role in the superordinate system. 2) - (A) Its mechanisms of resource procurement. The problem of mobilizing fluid resources concerns one major aspect of the external relations of the organization to the situation in which it operates. The resources which the organization must utilize are the factors of production as these concepts are used in economic theory; land, labor, capital and organizations (refers to the function of combining the factors of production in such ways as to facilitate the effective attainment of the organization's goal). 3) - (G) Its operative mechanism centering about decision making in the fields of policy, allocation, and integration. The policy decision meant decisions which relatively directly commit the organization as a whole and which stand in relatively direct relation to its primary functions. Parsons noted that the critical feature of policy decisions is the fact that they commit the organization to a

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whole to carry out their implications. The allocative decisions relate to the distribution of resources within the organization and the delegations of authority. From these points, there are two main aspects of the allocative decision process; one concerns mainly personnel, the other financial and physical facilities. The coordination decisions concern with the integration of the organization as a system. 4) - (I) Its institutional patterns which link the structure of the organization with the structure of the society as a whole. The problem concern rather the compatibility of the institutional order under which the organization operates with other organizations and social units, as related to integrative exigencies of the society as a whole. This integrative problem can be generalized to both human agents and interorganizational integration. Conclusion: The same basic classification of the functional problems of social systems was used to establish point of reference for a classification of types of organization, and broadest outline of a proposed classification was sketched. Then, Parsons suggested some illustrative cases by a rapid survey of some of the principal business, military, and academic organizations. THE PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE This chapter and the piece on age and sex can be seen as attempts to apply Parsons' theories to real life situations. In the case of business and the professions, he's looking at how our ''society'' as an organism, maintains itself. Two of Parsons' four functional needs of society - integration (coordinating system parts) and latency (managing tensions between parts and generating new parts) - are solved in this article by what he calls ''functional specificity''. (compare to Durkheim). Parsons begins by wondering why the professions are so highly developed, and why there is such a highly refined division of labor nowadays. (He rejects the idea that it is simply individuals' utilitarian self-interest. He says it is part of society, institutional. **He wants to prove that ''the acquisitiveness of moderns business is institutional rather than motivational.'' Here institutional = cultural = given part of social structure.) Three important elements distinguish our society from others and contribute to the unique importance of professions in our society. 1. In our society, scientific rationality - that is, not accepting traditional explanations just because they are traditional, and therefore searching for better ways and explanations - is ''institutional, a part of a normative pattern.'' This is to say, scientific rationality is not just something that comes natural to all human beings. 2. Furthermore, certain people have authority in certain realms but in no others. For instance, regardless of their financial backgrounds or upbringing, doctors are given authority in the field of medicine because it is their specialty. This is what Parsons calls the ''functional specificity'' of technical competence or authority. In contrast to commercial relations, which are functionally specific, kin relations are functionally diffuse. Your grandma has authority because she's your grandma, not because of their technical expertise. (Liken functional specificity to Weber on

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bureaucracy - office-holders can give orders because of authority of the office.) Parsons calls for a thorough study of functional specificity, since it is a product of our unique modern D of L. 3. Related to the last thing, there are two kinds of relations among people, universalistic and particularistic. The more contexts in which you know someone, like a relative or a friend, the less possible it is to abstract that person's personality from the particular role they play at one time. For instance, a person who has her elderly parent living with her will treat the parent much differently than she would treat a tenant who is a stranger. The mother is regarded as a particular individual, mom. The other tenant is regarded as any other tenant would be, by a ''universalistic'' rule for how landlords treat tenants. (Think of Simmel, content and form of relations - parent relations have more content because of different contexts, not a purely formal relation.) But are professions and business really all that different? No, if we think of them both as having the goal of ''success.'' People wish to succeed at whatever vocation their talent brings them to, be they doctors, scientists, painters or financial analysts. But this is only the case in the normal condition of society, a ''well-integrated'' situation. If achievement fails to bring recognition, or if you get recognition for doing nothing or the wrong thing, this causes strain. (Think of Merton) Strain leads to profiteering in the professions and shady practices in business. It is not accurate to say that business folks are purely egoistic nor that professionals are purely altruistic. Both have the same sorts f motivation, and differences in normative behaviors are institutionally defined definitions of the situation. System is maintained by a complex balance of diverse social forces. AGE AND SEX IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES This is another attempt to make Parsons' theories relevant. This piece deals mostly with the functional needs of integration and latency, where different age and sex groups can be seen as the different elements of an organism. To some extent, it deals with the question of how to reconcile individual with social needs. Parsons asserts that our society is unique in that our children of both sexes are treated alike, relative to other societies. The main reason for this similarity is that children are given education that focuses mostly on liberal arts rather than vocations. In spite of the ''conspicuous'' exception that in the job world, men and women in this society share an underlying structural equality. (I'm just telling you what he says.) Education through college is merit-based and there is little discrimination until you get to postgrad, where the strict focus on vocation leads to more sexbased discrimination. Elsewhere Parsons asserts that it is functional to have a woman at home raising the children and making the man's home life run smoothly, so he can dedicate himself to his career. Women need to be educated, he implies, because they need to life up to expectations which come with being the wife of a man of a certain status. He is where she gets her status.

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If she isn't smart enough to find ways to entertain herself by following the ''good companion'' pattern, a women may choose to follow the glamour gal routine, going for clothes and makeup. Striving for success in these two realms is functional because these patterns keep women from competing with men. However, since these women have liberal arts educations, they may undergo such strain that it is no surprise that they often exhibit neurotic behavior. This sex-based differentiation comes from adolescent ''youth culture,'' where boys value things counter to adult male responsibility (like sport, booze, and girlies) and girls go for the glamour gal look. The girls' role is counter to their adult expectation of becoming mommies, but nonetheless prepares them to accept their place relative to the men's world. As people age, women whose children are grown get bored and either shop more or work for benefit organizations. Men and women both romanticize the days when their options were open to them, so men may drink and hang out with younger, attractive women. Women may get neurotic. All this is an example of how society tries to regulate its functions, in spite of strain. Here we find problems of latency, where tensions arise between parts, such as women who are smart and educated enough to have ''men's'' jobs but would then force too much competition. There are also problems of integration or coordinating the parts of the system, especially in the case of preparing boys for the adult world in a society where their role models are absent ('cause they're at work all the time). I don't think I need to spend much time briefing you all on potential criticisms of this particular little chapter (Don't men themselves have anything to do with keeping women out? Since when has there been gender equality in the schools? Why is this system functional anyway!?!). Let's say, in the unlikely chance we get asked about it, we'll have a field day. SIMMEL, GEORG Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms.. Edited by Donald N. Levine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971, chs. 3, 5, 6, 7, 16, 24. _________.The Sociology of Georg Simmel. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff. Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1964, Pt. 2 [ch. 1 ([the sociological] significance of [group size]), ch. 3 ('The Isolated Individual and the Dyad'), ch. 4 ('The Triad')], pp. 307-16 ('Knowledge, Truth, and Falsehood in Human Relations'), pp. 379-95 ('Faithfulness and Gratitude'). ON INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL FORMS ED. DONALD LEVINE I. PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES CHAPTER 3: THE PROBLEM OF SOCIOLOGY (1908) Society: exists where a number of individuals enter into interaction (interaction is the key to everything with Simmel), which arises on the basis of certain drives or for the sake of certain purposes. Unity (or sociation) in the empirical sense constitutes the interaction of elements (ie. individuals in the case of society).

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Individuals are the loci of all historical reality, but the materials of life are not social unless they promote interaction. This follows since only this sociation can transform the a mere aggregation of isolated individuals into specific forms of being with and for one another. In terms of Simmel's famous form/content dichotomy: any social phenomenon is composed of two elements which in reality are inseparable (distinction is only analytical). 1) Content: the interest, purpose, or motive of the phenomenon or interaction 2) Form: the mode of interaction among individuals through/in the shape of which the specific content achieves social reality. Furthermore, the existence of society requires a reciprocal interaction among its individual elements, mere spatial or temporal aggregation of parts is not sufficient. According to Simmel, THE TASK OF SOCIOLOGY is to analytically separate these forms of interaction or sociation from their contents and to bring these together under a consistent scientific viewpoint. Form/content analysis rests upon two principles: 1) the same form of sociation is observed in dissimilar contents and in relation to differing purposes; and 2) content is expressed through a variety of different forms of sociation as its medium. According to Simmel you can have a little society or a lot of society. Basically there is no such thing as society ''as such'' - the 'quantity' of society boils down to the degree or kind of interaction or sociation that occurs. Simmel conceives sociology as the science of social forms (in a sense affording form analytic primary over content - although in reality they are inseparable). He makes use of a helpful analogy of geometry as the study of forms (ie. shapes) which may exist in an unlimited variety of physical materials. Simmel believes that sociology should leave the examination of the content of societal interaction to other sciences (such as psychology or economy) in the way that geometry leaves content analysis to the physical sciences. Q: Is the task of a science to discover timelessly valid laws or to present and conceptualize real, unique historical processes? A: Not surprisingly Simmel doesn't answer this question straight-forwardly. On the one hand a conceptual object (form) may be abstracted from social phenomena which holds unique properties and operates according to laws relating to the objective nature of these phenomena across distinct spatiotemporal instances. On the other hand, sociation may be examined in terms of the actual unfolding of social interaction in specific times and places (a historical type of analysis). ?: So what is he saying? IMHO, social interactions in reality are complex phenomena (integrated form/content) and it is appropriate for some scientific disciplines to explore the ways in which actual cases of sociation unfold. Sociology, however, should concern itself with abstracting generalizable social

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forms from a cross section of actual phenomena and identifying specific characteristics, features, and dynamics of these forms that remain valid across a wide array of forms. Basically, he thinks that the dilemma can be resolved by reconceptualizing sciences as specifically concerned with either formal or content-related aspects of actual phenomena or objects. All this said, how are we supposed to study society? Simmel acknowledges that serious problems of methodology face sociology - a product of the complex nature of the subject matter and the task of formal analysis that he proposes. In the end, though, he believes that the sociologist must employ intuitive procedures to express sociological relevance by means of examples. This involves a comparative analysis of specific occurrences (content) and the deductive analysis - or reconstruction - of the relations, connections, and dynamics that can be observed among facially disparate examples. II. FORMS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION CHAPTER 5: EXCHANGE (1907) Simmel views exchange as the purest and most concentrated form of significant human interaction. In fact, much action that may initially appear to be unilateral actually involves reciprocal effects (ie. is a form of exchange) and generally all interactions may more-or-less be conceived of as exchange. One characteristic of exchange is that the sum of values (of the interacting parties) is greater afterward than it was before - ie. each party gives the other more than he had himself possessed. The Nature of Economic Exchange Economic Exchange - regardless of whether it involves material objects, labor, or embodied labor - entails the sacrifice of some good that has other potential uses. To some extent value attached to a particular object (ie material or in the form of labor) comes about through the process of exchange itself. The Isolated Individual behaves as if in relations of exchange, but in this case with the natural order rather than with a second free agent. Sacrifice is a major component of exchange and may in some case take the form of an ''opportunity cost'' in the traditional economic sense. In addition, the give-and-take between sacrifice and attainment within the individual underlies every two-sided exchange. (By formulating exchange in this way, Simmel furthers his argument for the generalization of exchange, even in the case of the isolated individual.) Exchange as Creative Process Simmel believes that exchange is just as productive or creative of values as is ''production'' in the common sense. Along these lines exchange constitutes a displacement of materials between individuals, while production involves an exchange of material with nature. Value and exchange (as an actually

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inseparable factor) constitute the foundation of our practical life in the sense that we relate to the objects around us by conferring them with value in The Significance of Sacrifice Sacrifice is not always just an external barrier to our goals; it is rather the inner condition of the goal and of the way to is. Only through elimination the resistance that stands between us and our goals do our powers, abilities, and capacities have an opportunity to demonstrated and prove themselves. This follows along Simmel's general principle that (absolute) unity evolves through a dialectical process of synthesis and contradiction. Exchange (here expressed as labor) can occur in two forms distinguished on the basis of the sacrifice involved: 1) absolute - the sacrifice is the desire for comfort and leisure where work is annoying and troublesome; and 2) relative - indirect sacrifice (of non-labor) occurs in cases where the work is performed indifferently or actually carries a positive value - an opportunity cost dynamic is working here. The Relativity of Value Value is not contained within an individual object; but rather is a product of a process of comparison, the content of which does not lie within these things themselves. We project the concept of determinacy of value back into the thing, which we presumed the objects to have had before the comparison. ie: value is relative and exists only within a dynamic of comparison. The Source of Value We can conceive of economic activity (a form of exchange) as a sacrifice in return for a gain where the value of the gain from an object derives from the measure of the sacrifice demanded in acquiring that object. Value is always situationally determined in such a way that in the moment of the exchange - of the making of the sacrifice - the value of the exchanged object forms the limit which is the highest point to which the value of the object being given away can rise. Therefore an exchange is always ''worth it'' to the parties involved, at least at the actual instant the exchange takes place. Simmel suggests that sacrifice itself can produce value. We need only thing of the case of ''easy money'' and how easily it is spent: the easy-come-easy-go principle. Economic value therefore does not reside in some the self-existence of an object, but comes to an object only through the expenditure of another object which is given for it. The Process of Value Formation: Creating Objects through Exchange Simmel quotes the fairy godfather of the U of C (ie Kant): ''The conditions of experience are at the same time the conditions of the objects of experience.'' hmmmm.... Turning to the matter at hand, Simmel goes on to say that the possibility of economy is at the same time the possibility of the objects of economy. The transaction between two possessors of objects which bring them into the 'economic' relation (ie reciprocal sacrifice) at the same time elevates each of these objects to the category of value. Simmel also states that exchange is neither giving or receiving per se, but rather is a new third process that emerges when those processes are simultaneously the cause and effect of each

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other. I chalk this up as a classic ''simmelism'' - exchange is the dynamic (dialectical?) interaction between giving and receiving. Primitive Exchange,br> Subjectively, the action of exchange stands outside evaluation of the equality or inequality of the items exchanged. In this respect, factors of utility and scarcity do not themselves generate value, beyond the instances where useful or scarce objects are desired in exchange. A wholly onesided desire for an object must first be satisfied through actual possession of the object in order for other objects to be compared to it. Before this stage the object of obsessive desire is in a sense ''priceless'' before it can obtain value by comparison with other objects (and the potential of exchange). This discussion highlights the dynamics underlying the relative value of things. Value and Price As stated above in slightly different terms: in each individual case of exchange no party pays a price which under the circumstances is too high for the thing obtained. The concept of a generalized equivalence of price and value can be approached from two considerations: 1) relative stability of relations which determine the majority of exchange transactions, and 2) analogies which set uncertain value-relations according to the norms of existing ones A standard of value arises - at least in part - from the fact that labor power acts on various materials and fashions products so that it creates the possibility of exchange - labor power is perceived as a sacrifice which one makes for the sake of the fruits of labor. (This line of thought marks point at which Simmel's work may be compared to theorists who engage in a more detailed and explicit analysis of labor power and its dynamics.) Simmel notes the universal correlation between scarcity-value and exchange value, but stresses the reverse relation whereby we can modify the level or degree of scarcity. Simmel also states that the aversion to economic exchange in primitive cultures results from a lack of a generally accepted standard of value and the intimate link between the individual and the product of their labor. (ie a lack of a normative context for the process of exchange) The Cultural Foundations of Exchange In early cultures sacral and legal forms, as well as public and traditional arrangements helped to develop the transsubjective element the very nature of exchange demands. Exchange is originally a matter of (customary, fixed) social arrangements, until individuals become sufficiently acquainted with objects and their respective values to be able to set the terms of exchange from case to case. Simmel declares exchange a sociological structure sui generis: a primary form and function of interindividual life. Further, exchange is the economic realization of the relativity of things - which can evolve only through a reaching out beyond the individual possible only in a plurality (hence the social nature of exchange).

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CHAPTER 6: CONFLICT (1908) Conflict resolves divergent dualisms, in such a way as achieves some kind of unity, even though one of the conflicting parties may be injured or destroyed. Therefore, conflict has the positive characteristic of resolving the tension between contrasts. Indifference (as in the rejection or termination of sociation) is a purely negative phenomenon. Simmel also contends that conflict is necessary for (societal) change to occur since a purely harmonious group (a pure ''unification'') is not only empirically unreal, but could not support real life process. Society, then, is actually the result of both the positive and negative categories of interaction, which manifest themselves as wholly positive. This brings up the issue of the apparent dualisms Georg is always bandying around. When he actually addresses the subject he makes the point that he does not promote the traditional notion of polar differentiations. Rather he thinks that we must think of these polar differentiations as of one life. We might construct these conceptual categories to help us understand reality, but the actual reality we seek to comprehend (ie life) exists as an integrated, unitary phenomenon. So Simmel supports the notion of unity rather than dualism. A similar line of thought can be seen in Ch 24 of this same text - which we will be getting to later. Some of the confusion around the concept of unity, Simmel believes lies in its two-fold meaning: 1) unity as consensus and concord of interacting individuals (as opposed to dissensus and discord) 2) unity as total group-synthesis of persons, energies, and forms In certain cases of interaction, opposition is actually an element in the relationship itself. Conflict may not be only a means of preserving the relation, but also one of the concrete functions which actually constitute the relation itself. This is a case of conflict in its latent form (he cites marriage, the Hindu caste system, and the necessary distance and aversions of urban life as examples). Simmel notes that conflict must cooperate with unity in generating social structure. His analysis returns to the notion that elements of a relationship (or a social structure) may not actually be experiences as conflictual/unifying but that this tendency to interpret separateness may constitute an artifact of hindsight and post facto perspective. Reality is dynamic and unity, but our interpretations and attempts to comprehend it tend to impose a dualistic/categorical matrix for interpretation. Antagonism does not itself produce sociation, but it is a sociological element almost never present in it. Fighting is in some cases a means determined by a superior purpose, while in other cases there are inner engergies which can be satisfied only through conflict (fighting as an end in itself). Antagonistic game: game carried on without any prize for victory, but which exists only for the fight itself. Antagonists unite under the same set of rules/norms in order to fight.

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Legal Conflict: has an object and can successfully be terminated through voluntary concession of that object, therefore legal conflict is not conflict for the sake of fighting (cf antagonistic game). Legal conflict with respect of form is an absolute instance, where claims on both sides are exercised with pure objectivity and with all means permitted; it is further pure conflict in the sense that nothing enters its whole action which does not belong to the conflict as such and serves its purpose. This eliminating of all that is not conflict (for example personal elements) can tend to result in a formalism which becomes independent of all contents. Legal conflict rests on a broad basis of unities and agreements between the enemies, since both are equally subordinated to the law. Conflicts over causes: cases where the parties involved in a conflict have the same objective interests - the conflict interests (and therefore the conflict itself) are differentiated from the personalities involved. There are two possible arrangements here: 1) the conflict can focus on purely objective decisions, leaving all personal elements outside itself and in a state of peace, or 2) conflicts may involve the persons in their subjective aspects without leading to any alteration or disharmony of the so-existing objective interests common to both parties. In the case of (1) above, there are two possible outcomes: a) useless embitterments and other forms of personalization of conflict may be eliminated, or b) parties may develop a consciousness of being mere representatives of supra-individual claims - ie. fighting for a cause. Simmel notes that the latter may result in the radicalism and mercilessness of conflict observed in many idealistically-inclined persons. Simmel cites Marxism as a struggle for superpersonal goals. Here, the objectifications of conditions of labor are no longer a personal struggle or repression since antagonists are not personal, but have been elevated/generalized to the level of classes - ie. the bourgeoisie and working class as opposed to specific owners or workers. In this instance as in other similar cases where an individual is in the position of fighting for a larger superpersonal aim, this common basis of the conflict increases - rather than decreases - the irreconcilability, intensity and stubborn consistency of the fight. Common qualities vs. memberships as bases of conflict Two kinds of commonality may form the bases of particularly intense antagonism: 1) common qualities and 2) common membership is a larger social structure Dissonance appears (relatively) more intense and extreme against a generally homogenous and harmonious background of relations between parties. The more we have in common with another party as whole persons, the easier it is for our totality to be involved in every single relation to that party. Therefore conflict among similar parties tends to occur more often in the context of intimate relationships in which betrayal/conflict seems relatively more intense especially in contrast with the harmonious state of past relations - et tu Brute? A final instance of conflict on the basis of common membership is the case of the renegade. Here conflict results from separation of previously homogenous elements. Recall of the earlier state of agreement and the fact that there is ''no

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going back'' makes conflict more sharp and bitter than if no relationship had existed in the past. CHAPTER 7: DOMINATION (1908) Yet another one of those one-word titles - kind of like Cher, Sting, Bono, Edge, Weiland, etc. anyhow.... Domination may facially appear as a desire to completely determine the actions of another party. This is not really the case since what ego truly seeks is that her/his influence should be reflected and act back upon her/him. Domination is, therefore a case of interaction, rather than a unidirectional dynamic. The notion of society is, in fact, dependent on the independent significance of (both) interaction parties - ie. a societas leonina is no society at all. Authority relations actually possess more freedom on the part of the party subjected to the authority than is generally supposed. An authority structure can come about in two different ways: 1) Individual: a person of superior significance or strength acquires an overwhelming weight of his opinions, a faith, or a confidence which attain a character of objectivity (ie: to ''take someone's word as gospel'') 2) Institutional: a supra-individual power clothes a person with a reputation, dignity, power of ultimate decision which would never flow from that person's individuality Simmel suggests that the voluntary faith of the party subjected to authority supports the notion that such relations are not totally determined by the superordinate. As evidence he cites the very ''feeling of oppressiveness'' of authority which he supposes would be absent in if the autonomy of the subordinate were eliminated. Prestige (as distinguished from authority) lacks the element of super-subjective significance and lacks the identity of the personality with an objective power or norm. As such, prestige is determined solely by the strength of the individual and often leaves less room for criticism than is possible with the distance inherent between the parties in more objective authority relations. Superordination Superordination may be exerted by 1) an individual, 2) a group, or 3) an objective force (social or ideal). Subordination of a group under an individual can lead to decisive unification of the group in one of two ways: 1) A pre-existing organic group consists of an internal unit with its head. Here the ruler leads the group forces and will of the group finds unitary expression or body. 2) A group unites in opposition to its head and forms a party against the head. Here superordination by the ruler is the actual cause of sociation among group members. Simmel also brings up the point that not just equal, but also unequal, relations of group members to the dominating head can give solidity to the social form characteristic of subordination under the individual. Here the varying distance or

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closeness to the leader creates a differentiation. In such a case, the formal characteristics of subordination under the individual may obtain even where the superordinate is a ''collective individual'' so-to-speak (Simmel uses the example of ''the Brahman'' in the Hindu caste system). Common enmity is a particularly potent catalyst to groups solidarity in cases where the common adversary is also the common ruler. Simmel suggests that there is at least a latent character of enmity in most relations to the ruler which exist as a combination of obedience and opposition. Contrary to the foregoing, in some cases common subordination of a group to a ruling power can lead to dissociation. Simmel cites a ''threshold phenomenon'': when enmity between social elements exceeds a certain limit common oppression has a dissociative effect. There are two reasons: 1) once there is a domination resentment in a certain direction additional strain only served to intensify the general irritation, and 2) common suffering by pressing suffering elements closer together reveals more strikingly their inner distance and irreconcilability. The Higher Tribunal another unifying element of subordination; a party (abstract or consisting of a person or group of individuals) which exists on a higher plane to which all members of a group occupy an equally subordinate position and to which one appeals for decisions or whose interference one accepts because it is felt to be legitimate. Removing discord between parties is often easier is they both stand under such a higher power. Such a higher tribunal may be preexisting, or a transformation of elements could bring about a new situation where parties are places upon a new and common basis. Subordination under a Plurality The significance (or effect) of superordination by a plurality for the subordinates varies greatly from case to case. One of the most important factors distinguishing this form of subordination (from that under an individual) lies in that character of objectivity obtaining to the relationship. This characteristic excludes certain feelings, impulses, and leanings that are effective in individual (but not in collective) actions. The source of variation in the subjective condition of these relationship lies in the particular expression of this ''objective'' characteristic in actual instances. For example in certain cases subordination under a plurality may give the relationship an air of distance or impartiality that can benefit the subordinate. On the other hand this objectivity often displays a negative character in case of collective behavior namely, the suspension of certain norms to which the single individual ordinarily adheres. The brutality and mercilessness observed in crowd action or riots, Simmel believes, results because a collective has no subjective state of mind and is unable to mentally recreate suffering - an essential source of compassion - in the same way as an individual can. Simmel distinguishes between two kinds of collectivities: 1) an abstract plurality such as a church, state, or similar entity that could be described as a 'legal person.' Such a group is the result of a plurality as a selfconsistent and particular structure - the embodiment of an abstraction.

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2) a physically co-present mass which is simple a group of people gathered in physical and temporal proximity/contact. It is to this latter kind of plurality that Simmel primarily attributes the negative attributes of the suspension of personal differences, which occurs in both types of collectivities. A classic example of this second type is the 'crowd' so-called - in fact Simmel seems to jump on the 'crowd mentality' bandwagon that was making the rounds at the turn of the century (maybe he shared a seat with Gustave LeBon:) Subordination under a Principle Subordination to an impersonal objective principle precludes a real, immediate interaction to the effect that the individual is deprived of some degree of freedom - ie we are subordinated in a relationship to an idea or ideal construction that we did not initiate and which we have little/no ability to alter. However, for modern objective individuals - according to Georg - subordination to a law which functions as the representative of impersonal, uninfluencable powers is a more dignified condition than to be engaged in a more personal relation of subordination. Changing gears a little, Simmel finds that Plato recognizes that the best means of counteracting selfishness among rulers is government by impersonal law. On the other hand Plato also believed that in the ideal state, the welfare of the whole required that the ruler stay above the law. Rigidity was felt to be a serious weakness of law, since rigid laws were poorly able to adapt to changing conditions. Plato felt that there should be laws that must never be broken only in the case where there were no true statesmen. Subordination under objects was one form of sub. under a principle that Simmel found particularly harsh and unconditional, since as much as a person is subordinated by virtue of belonging to a thing, s/he psychologically sinks to the category of mere thing. Some examples would be Russian serfdom, patriarchal relations (belonging to a person), and to some extent in the case of the modern factory worker. Conscience: the superordinate principle can be interpreted as a psychological crystallization of an actual social power - the case of the moral imperative. The content of morality comes from social norms which are internalized into the individual through the process of socialization. So the moral command has the dual character of being at the same time personal and impersonal. At a higher state of morality, however, the contrast between individual and totality disappears and the norm acts as an end in itself which must be satisfied for its own sake - an abstract ideal. In practice, however, motivation for adhering to norms is mixed: a combination of individual, social, and abstract objectives. CHAPTER 9: SOCIABILITY Society must be considered a reality in a double sense. On the one hand are the individuals in their directly perceptible existence, the bearers of the processes of association, who are united by these processes into the higher unity which is the society. On the other hand, there the interests which, living in the individuals, motivate such a union.

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It is for the sake of special needs and interests that individuals unite (in economic associations, blood fraternities and the like). Above their special content, though, all associations are accompanied by a feeling for, by a satisfaction in, the very fact that one is associated with others and that the solitariness of the individual is resolved into togetherness, a union with others. There is in all effective motive to associate a feeling of worth in, a valuing of the form of association as such, a drive which presses toward this form of existence. The impulse to sociability distills our of the realities of social life (content) the pure essence of association (form), of the associative process as a value and a satisfaction. Play draws its great essential themes from the realities of life: chase and cunning; proving of physical and mental powers, the contest and reliance on chance. By freeing these themes (forms) from the substance of real life, play gets its cheerfulness but also the symbolic significance that distinguishes it from pure pastime. Similarly, sociability makes up its substance from numerous fundamental forms of serious relationships among individuals, a substance spared the frictional relations of real life. But out of its formal relations to real life, sociability takes on a symbolically playing fullness of life and a significance which superficial rationalism always seeks only in the content. Only the sociable gathering is ''society'' without qualifying adjectives, because it alone presents the pure, abstract play form, all the specific contents of the one-sided and qualified societies being dissolved away. Sociability is, then, the play-form of association. Since sociability in its pure form has no ulterior end, no content, and just involves the satisfaction of the impulse to sociability - the process remains strictly limited to its personal bearers. Therefore, the character of purely sociable association is determined by the variety of personality traits possessed by the participants. It is important that the persons should not display their individualities with too much abandon. Particularly relevant here is the sense of tact, which guides the self-regulation of the individual in her/his personal relations to others where no outer or directly egoistic interests provide regulations. In sociability, whatever the personality has of objective importance, of features which have their orientation toward something outside the circle, must not interfere with purely sociable interaction. The most purely and deeply personal qualities must be excluded from sociability it would be tactless to do otherwise. There is an upper and a lower sociability threshold for the individual - s/he should remove the objective qualities of personality, but should stop short of displaying the purely subjective and inward parts of her/his personality. According to Kant: everyone should have that measure of freedom which could exist along with the freedom of every other person. Simmel says something similar of sociability: everyone should have as much satisfaction of the sociability impulse as is consonant with the satisfaction of the impulse for all others. Put in a slightly different way: everyone should guarantee to the other that maximum of sociable values which is consonant with the maximum of values received by that person. Sociability creates an ideal sociological world, one in which the pleasure

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of the individual is always supposed to be contingent upon the joy of others. The world of sociability is an artificial, ideally democratic one, made up of beings who have renounced both the objective and the purely personal features of the intensity and extensiveness of life in order to bring about themselves as pure interaction. Inasmuch as sociability is the abstraction of association, it demands the purest, most transparent, most engaging kind of interaction - that among equals. This kind of dynamic which is right and proper in the sociable context becomes a lie when this is mere pretense and the interaction is guided by purposes other than pure sociability. Conversation is the epitome of sociability as the abstraction of the forms of sociological interaction. In sociable conversation, the content is not important per se, but the form the conversation takes as an end in itself is crucial to its function/purpose. In order that this play may retain its self-sufficiency at the level of pure form, the content must receive no weight of its own account. It is not the content of sociable conversation is a matter of indifference; it must be interesting, gripping, even significant - only it is not the purpose of the conversation that these qualities should square with objective results, which stand by definition outside the conversation. The content of conversation, however, is to be kept above all individual intimacy, beyond everything purely personal that would not fit into the categories of sociability. IV. FORMS OF INDIVIDUALITY CHAPTER 16: SUBJECTIVE CULTURE (1908) Simmel believes that nature and culture are only two different ways of looking at the same phenomenon, since the state of culture can be caused by its ''natural'' originating conditions. The concept of nature carried two different meanings: 1) it signifies the allinclusive complex of phenomena connected in causal chains - nature purely as a course of events, and 2) it signifies a particular phase in the development of a subject - nature takes on a narrower/local meaning at the point beyond which cultural development replaces it. Cultivation: the transformation of a subject that involved the development of a latent (natural) structural potential that cannot be realized by the subject itself, but require an external agency such as culture for expression. The Culture of a subject is the emergence of an altered state of existence through a process of interaction between natural forces and an intentional teleological intervention with follows the natural proclivities of the subject. As such, only humans are appropriate objects for culture, since only they contain developmental potential whose goals are determined purely in the teleology of

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its own nature - ie. the human being is intentionally goal directed and can alter his/her development through the deliberate application of technique at a certain point. Culture exists only to the extent that the individual draw into his/her development external forms. Along these lines, even the highest accomplishments in specific fields (such as objects of art or works of religious faith) only have cultural significance to the extent that they become a general means for the cultivation of many individual souls. The more these products are separated from the subjectivity of their creator, the more integrated in to the objective order - the more these objects contain a cultural significance. There are two sides to the concept of Culture: Objective Culture: ideals or objects in such a state of development, elaboration, or perfection that they can lead the individual psyche to fulfillment or indicate a path to a heightened state of existence for individuals or collectivities. Subjective Culture: the extent to which the individual (or collectivity) makes use of these objective cultural products for the purpose of development - it designates the level of development thus attained. The relationship between objective and subjective culture: Subjective culture is the overarching goal such that objective culture (a state of cultivation or manipulation) exists as a means toward the end of the subjective cultural development of a person/collectivity. There can be no subjective culture without objective culture, but objective culture can possess a degree of independence to the extent that cultural/cultivating objects may exist yet fail to be utilized for the purpose of cultural development. In periods of high social complexity and extensive division of labor, accomplishments of culture can come to occupy an independent realm. The cultural object comes to be more perfected and intellectual and also more objectified along the lines of the internal logic of its own instrumentality. The supreme cultivation of subjects does not, however, increase proportionally. In effect objective culture outpaces subjective culture. This disparity between the level of objective cultural production and the cultural level of the individual represents one of the main sources of dissonance in modern life - as manifested in a dissatisfaction with technical progress. CHAPTER 18: GROUP EXPANSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUALITY (1908) Group Expansion and the Transformation of Social Bonds Individuality in being and action generally increases to the degree that the social circle encompassing the individual expands. Quantitative expansion of the group will produce an increase in social differentiation. Competition tends to develop the specialty of the individual in direct ratio to the number of participants. Strangely, this process will inevitably produce a gradual increasing likeness

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between two isolated groups (of increasing size). How is this so? Simmel says that there are only a limited number of fundamental human formation that can accompany groups expansion and differentiation. The more of these formations that are present in a group - i.e. the greater the dissimilarity of constituent elements - the greater the likelihood that an ever increasing number of structures will develop in one group that have equivalents in another. In short, likening will come about if for no other reason than because even within very diverse groups, the forms of social differentiation are identical or approximately the same. Accompanying a process differentiation of social groups there arise a need and an inclination to reach out beyond the original spatial, economic, and mental boundaries of the group and, in connection with the increase in individualization and concomitant mutual repulsion of group elements, to supplement the original centripetal forces of the lone group with the centrifugal tendency that forms bridges with other groups. Simmel also notes that the modern association gravitates toward an all-embracing union of organizations by virtue of interpenetrating division of labor, leveling that results from equal justice and the case economy, and solidarity of interests in the national economy. The Relation between Personal and Collective Individuality This basic idea can be generalized to the proposition that in each person (other things being equal) there exists an unalterable ratio between individual and social factors that changes only in form. If the social circle in which we are active enlarges, there is more room in it for the development of our individuality; but as parts of this whole, we have less uniqueness: the larger whole is less individual as a social group. Expressed a different way, the elements of a distinctive social circle are undifferentiated, while the elements of a circle that is not distinctive are differentiated As an example of this condition, Simmel cited the example of the Quakers. Although espousing religious principles of the mode extreme individualism and subjectiveness, Quakerism binds its members to a highly uniform and democratic way of life that seeks to exclude individual differences. Quakers are therefore individual only in collective matters, and in individual matters they are socially regulated. The basic relation as a dualistic drive: we live as an individual within a social circle, with tangible separation from its other members, but also as a member of this circle, with separation from everything that does not belong to this group. Simmel believes that this principle can apply to characteristics other than group size, for example fashion. Along these lines, in one group the totality may have a very individual character at the same time as its parts are very much alike; conversely with another group the totality may be less colorful and less molded on an extreme while its parts are strikingly different from one another. We are able to exert some control over such matters, though. For example in a narrow circle, one can preserve one's individuality in one of two ways: (1) lead the circle, or (2) exist in it only externally, being independent of it in all essential matters.

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Simmel observes that the latter requires either great stability of character or eccentricity - both traits which are rather conspicuous in small group situations. According to Simmel, we are surrounded by concentric circles of special interest enclosing us narrowly or broadly. Although commitment to a narrow circle is generally less conducive to the strength of individuality (than is the case with general circles), it is psychologically significant that in a very large cultural community belonging to a family promotes individuality. The family as a collective individual offers its members a preliminary differentiation that at least prepares them for differentiation in the sense of absolute individuality. On the other hand, the family offers members shelter behind which that absolute individuality can develop until it has the strength to stand up against the greatest universality. In fact, the family has a peculiar sociological double role: (1) it is the extension of one's own personality; and (2) it constitutes a complex within which the individual distinguishes him/herself from all others, and in which s/he develops a selfhood and an antithesis. This nature of the family highlights an epistemological difficulty in sociology that is particularly the case of intermediate level structures: on the one hand, such circles function as entities with an individual character, but on the other hand they also function as higher-order complexes that may include complexes of a lower order. Simmel identifies three levels of collecitvity: the single individual, smaller circles composed of them, and large groups embracing everyone (or at least multiple individuals or intermediate complexes). In general, he feels that the first and third parts are oriented toward one another and create a common antithesis against the middle level, manifested in objective as well as subjective relational patterns between people with these levels. A personal, passionate commitment by the individual human being usually involves the narrowest and the widest circles, but not the intermediate ones. Part of this can be accounted for by the fact that larger circles tend to encourage individual freedom, while more limited groups tend to restrict it. The meaning of individuality, according to Simmel, can be separated into two more specific meanings: (1) individuality in the sense of freedom and responsibility for oneself that comes from a broad and fluid social environment; and (2) in the qualitative sense that an individual being distinguishes her/himself from all others, that being different has a positive meaning and value for that person's life. The first corresponds to a 18th cent. Enlightenment view of individuality (valuing what human beings have in common), while the latter corresponds to a 19th cent Romantic formulation (which values what separates us). Simmel refers to an ''objective mind'' - the traditions and experiences of one's group, set down in thousands of forms; the art and learning that are present in tangible structures; all the cultural materials that the historical group possesses as something subjective and yet accessible to everyone. This generally accessible Mind provides both the material and the impetus for the development

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of distinct personal mental types. It is the essence of ''being cultured'' that our purely personal dispositions are sometimes realized as the form of what is given as a content of objective culture (Geist), sometimes as the content of what is given as a form of objective culture. Only in this synthesis does our mental life attain its full idiom and personality. As the circle increases, so do its cultural offerings and therefore the possibilities of our fully developing our inner lives, personalities. The preeminent historical instance of the correlation between social expansion and the individuation of life contents and forms is provided by the emergence of the cash economy. The cash economy changes conditions along two lines: (1) the effects of money extend in to unboundable distances, and ultimately engender from the whole civilized world a single economic circle; and (2) money causes an enormous individualization of the participant in the economy. Considerations of individuality in the political sphere tend to turn on questions of either the creation of an embracing public realm and the enhancement of the significance of its central organs, or on the autonomy of individual elements. In the religious realm, polytheism with a set of separate gods with control over discrete portions of existence tends to correspond toward the dynamics earlier identified as characteristic of ''narrow circles.'' Believers in different circles were often separated from each other be sharp internal and local boundaries, and often mutual indifference or hostility. The advent of an integrated monotheistic deity (e.g. Christianity) more closely resembles the broader circles identified above. Here, there seemed to be a dual trend within Christianity - on the one hand a thorough leveling of all believers (more character of Protestantisms), and on the other a tendency toward papal absolutism (Catholicism). Ethics and Interests The expansion of the circle that fills the view and interest of individuals may frequently five rise to a particular form of egoism that engenders a real and ideal restriction of social spheres - promoting a greatheartedness that extends beyond the narrow interest circle of solidary comrades. Expansion, however, may also allow for the development of a more narrow, instrumental self-interest as is seen in the economic realm. Through the elaboration of functional social organs, the large circle gains a special intrapersonal freedom and autonomy of being for its members, which permits the originally direct interaction of individuals to crystallize and be transferred to particular persons and complex structures. In effect the person must no longer devote his/her entire personality to such functional interactions (i.e. less personal investment involved in going to the 7 - 11 to buy a quart of milk than in going down the road to get it from a neighboring farmer with a cow). This leaves more room for personal individualization. CHAPTER 19: FASHION

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Imitation The charm of imitation can be found partly in the fact that it makes possible an expedient test of power which, however, requires no great personal and creative application but is displayed easily and smoothly - because its contents are a given quantity. Imitation further gives to the individual the satisfaction of not standing alone in his/her actions. Where imitation is a productive factor, we can see it as representing one of the fundamental tendencies of our (human) character - the part of us that contents itself with similarity, uniformity, adaptation of the special to the general, and which accentuates the constant element of change. Imitation, however, tends to be a negative and obstructive principle where prominence is given to change, individual difference, independence and relief from generality. FASHION Fashion: (1) is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adaptation; (2) leads the individual upon the road which furnishes a general condition, which resolves the conduct of every individual into a mere example; (3) satisfies in no less degree the need of differentiation, the tendency towards dissimilarity, the desire for change and contrast by means of a constant change of contents (of fashion); and (4) differs between the different classes such that fashions of the upper stratum of society are never identical with those of the lower. Fashion is a product of class distinction and operates like a number of other forms (e.g. honor), the double function of which consists of revolving within a given circle and at the same time emphasizing it as separate from others. Union and separation are, therefore, the two fundamental functions inseparably amalgamated in the form of fashion. Even though the individual object with it creates/recreates generally represents a more or less individual need, fashion is a product of social demands (as evinced by its collective, classed nature). Although fashion occasionally will affect objectively determined subjects such as religious faith, scientific interests, even socialism or individualism, it does not become operative as fashion until these subjects can be considered independent of the deeper human motives from which they have arisen. The rule of fashion applies to externals (clothing, social conduct, amusements) for here no dependence if placed on real vital motives of human action. It is acceptable to imitate with respect to these superficial fields, where it would be a sin to follow in important matters. The motive of foreignness, which fashion employs in its socializing endeavors, is restricted to higher civilization, because novelty (which foreign origin guarantees in extreme form) is often regarded by ''primitive'' races as an evil. Simmel contends that in (modern) civilization the exceptional, bizarre, conspicuous, or whatever departs from the customary norm exercises a peculiar (unique) charm entirely independent of material justification.

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Two social tendencies are essential to the establishment of fashion: the need of union and the need of isolation. The very character of fashion demands that it should be exercised at one time only by a portion of the given group, the greater majority being on the road to adopting it (i.e. real fashion is not something everybody can express at the same time). The distinctiveness of a fashion is destroyed by mass adoption. By reason of this peculiar play between the tendency towards universal acceptance and the destruction of its very purpose to which this general adoption leads, fashion includes a peculiar attraction of limitation, the attraction of a simultaneous beginning and end, the charm of novelty coupled to that of transitoriness. The fashionable person is regarded with mingled feelings of approval and envy; we envy her/him as an individual but approve of that person as a member of a set or group. Fashion furnishes an ideal field for individuals with dependent natures, whose self-consciousness, however, requires a certain amount of prominence, attention, and singularity. Fashion can raise even the unimportant individual by making him/her the representative of a class, the embodiment of a joint spirit. In a sense, a person can achieve a sense, expression of differentiation at an individual level by, ironically, conforming to a set of standards held by a wider group. You can have too much of a good thing, though. In the case of a type Simmel identified as ''the dude,'' exaggerated adherence to the demands of fashion subsumes the individualistic and peculiar character of fashion - making this type into a follower of the highest order. It is also interesting to note that the same combination which extreme obedience to fashion acquires can also be attained by opposition to it. Whoever consciously avoids following the fashion does not attain the consequent sensation of individualization through any real individual qualification, but through the mere negation of the social example. This amounts to inverse imitation, but is similar in many respects. Women and fashion Simmel believes that the fact that fashion expresses and at the same time emphasizes the tendency towards equalization and individualization, and the desire for imitation and conspicuousness, perhaps explains why it is that women, broadly speaking, are its staunchest adherents. He believes that as a consequence of women's historical socially disadvantaged status, they (like all groups in a weak position) tend to adhere strictly to custom (which is ''appropriate''), and steer clear of individualization. Fashion is an ideal form of expression/individualization for such groups because it on the one hand involves imitation, with the individual relieved of responsibility for her/his tastes and actions. Yet there is still a certain conspicuousnes, an emphasis on an individual accentuation of personality. It should probably be added that fashion generally applies in aspects of society considered superficial or of secondary importance in promoting a social position of dominance. Therefore more powerful groups are likely to let fashion slide. For a woman, then, fashion in a certain sense gives a compensation for her lack of position in a class based on a calling or profession - giving a sense of solidarity with a larger group.

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By reason of its peculiar inner structure, fashion furnishes a departure of the individual, which is always looked upon as proper. No matter how extravagant the form of appearance or manner of expression, as long as it is fashionable, it is protected against those painful reflections which the individual otherwise experiences when s/he becomes the object of attention. All concerned actions are characterized by the loss of this feeling of shame. Further, fashion is also a social form of great expediency because (like law) it affects only the externals of life, only those sides of life turned to society. It provides us with a formula by means of which we can unequivocally attest our dependence upon what is generally adopted, our obedience to the standards established by our time, our class, and our narrower circle. But at the same time, it enables us to withdraw the freedom given us in life from externals and concentrate it more and more in our innermost natures. Simmel contends that the real variability of historical life is vested in the middle classes, and for this reason the history of social and cultural movements has fallen into a different pace since this class has become a dominant force. For this reason, fashion, which represents the variable and contrasting forms of life, has since then become much broader and more animated. Social advance above all is favorable to the rapid change of fashion. The modern world has brought some specific changes that have expanded fashion: technological advances in material production and expansion of the market economy. Both of which increase the scope of fashion and contribute to a general increase of the rate of cyclical changes in fashion. In effect, since individual fashions are easier to produce and spread, they tend to be less durable. CHAPTER 20: METROPOLIS AND MENTAL LIFE ***NOTE The summary for this chapter consists of a diagram that can not presently be provided over the web nor can it be condensed to text. The diagram-summary is available on the disk version of these summaries. VI. FORMS VERSUS LIFE PROCESS: THE DIALECTICS OF CHANGE CHAPTER 24: CONFLICT IN MODERN CULTURE (1918) Culture refers to a state where life produces certain forms in which it expresses and realizes itself - forms which are frameworks for the creative life which soon transcends them. Form acquires a fixed identity, a logic and lawfulness of its own; a rigidity which inevitably places it at a distance from the spiritual dynamic which created it and which makes that form independent. (In a round-about way, Simmel is - or will be - making the argument that the pure existential content of life constantly seeks expression, but this is only possible through form, which imposes a structure and fixity alien to life in its purest sense. What is building here is an ultimately fundamental conflict between content and form on the most basic level of life.)

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History as an empirical science is devoted to examining the succession of cultural forms and through analysis of their changes, aims to discover the real carriers and causes of change in each particular case. This constant change in the content of culture bears testimony to the infinite fruitfulness of life. Life in its true state is formless yet it constantly generates forms for itself (against which life is always in latent opposition). Therefore, life perceived the ''form as such'' as something forced upon it. Simmel notes the concern in his day regarding the increasing lack of form in modern life. He notes, however, that aside from a mere negative dying out of traditional forms there is also a simultaneous positive drive towards life which is actively repressing these forms. Georg goes off on something of a tangent regarding the ''central idea of the epoch'' (which - on the surface at least - resembles Mannheim's 'spirit of the age'). The significance of this section to the rest of the chapter (imho) is basically illustrative to the more central themes. To summarize, every age is characterized by a dominant cultural form which represents the expression of the highest level of human advancement. For instance - Classical Greece: idea of being; Christian Middle Ages: concept of God; Renaissance: concept of nature; 17thC: concept of natural law, and later spiritual personality (ego); 19thC: society?; late 19th/early 20thC: concept of life. Simmel notes that in his contemporary society the spirit of the age - so to speak was not so much cultural and unitary as in earlier epochs, but was much more fragmentary and to the extent that it did exist was based more on specialized occupational experience than on culture per se. In effect there is no dominant form through which life is expressed in modern life. In the case of art, for example, Simmel draws a contrast between Impressionism and Expressionism. The former, he notes, has as its intention a representation or imitation of a being or an event (ie. some form of life/existence). Expressionism, on the other hand, has as its aim the manifestation of inner emotion in the work exactly as experience by the artist such that the emotions are extended and continued in the art. In its ultimate sense, Expressionism seeks to escape from form in the expression of the artistic impulse to that the art may not just represent but be the impulse itself. Unlike other art traditions, the Expressionist art form does not have meaning by itself - ie. there is no necessary correspondence between the artistic impulse and the means through it is expressed as art. Simmel also uses the examples of youth culture (and the search for originality), recent philosophical movements (something about Pragmatism), and contemporary religion (popularity of mysticism) to further illustrate the dialectic relationship between form and content and the seeming lack of form in modern culture - but (imho) not nearly to the effect as his more extended discussion on art.

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The meat-and-potatoes (or potatos if you are a certain ex VP) of Simmel's argument is the following: There is a basic conflict inherent in the nature of cultural life. Life must either produce forms or proceed through them. Forms, however, belong to an entirely different order of being than life as such demanding some content above and beyond life. Forms in their rigidity, in effect, contradict the fluid, dynamic essence of life. Form and life are thesis and antithesis. Life wishes to obtain something that it cannot achieve: to transcend all forms and exist in its ''naked immediacy'' - life per se. The concept of life, however, cannot be freed from logical imprecision since the process of conceptualization itself always involves the generation of form. In conclusion, Simmel suggests that perhaps formlessness is merely the appropriate form of contemporary life.

FROM THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL TRANS KURT WOLFF PART I: QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE GROUP CHAPTER 1: ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBERS FOR SOCIAL LIFE Simmel feels that certain aspects of social life are strongly related to groups size. For instance, there is a tendency for greater group size to be associated with a greater level of structural differentiation (specialized organs to promote and maintain the interests of the group) as well as with a lesser degree of personal interaction (as seen in urban life). I. SMALL GROUPS A. Socialism: only works in small groups that are homogenous and where each individual can personally see the contributions of the other group members and the returns of socialism. A complex division of labor, however, is necessary to bind a large groups of people together via specialization and interdependence. As pertains to socialism, in a large group the division of labor would carry over into private life and result in feelings of inequality. Comparisons between individual achievement would become difficult. B. Religious Sects: the tie of solidarity lies in the self-awareness that they are a small group singled out from the larger whole. These sects need the larger group as a contrast against which to realize their own specific nature. (Weber goes into greater detail about religious sects and the characteristics that distinguish them from larger churches - particularly selectivity - in ''Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism'' in Gerth and Mills). C. Aristocracies: aside from a relatively limited size, it also appears that there is an absolute size limit beyond which an aristocracy cannot be maintained. The aristocratic class must be surveyable by every member and each element must

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be personally acquainted with every other. Relations by blood and marriage as well as practice of primogeniture prevent expansion of the group. In fact aristocratic class consciousness is often only realized in the context of excluding outsiders. In safeguard its own survival, the small group (eg. a political aristocracy) must to preempt the personalities of its members and adopt a more confrontational stance against adversaries than would be seen in a larger group. II. LARGE GROUPS: THE MASS Generally speaking, large groups show less radicalism and decisiveness than smaller groups. The mass, however is an exception to the rule. When activated by political, social, or religious movements large groups can be ''ruthlessly radical,'' especially when gathered in physical proximity and under the influence of nervous excitement. The key is that the mass can only be animated and guided by simple ideas - this is basically the ''lowest-common-denominator view of crowd dynamics. III. GROUP SIZE, RADICALISM, AND COHESIVENESS Small parties are more radical than large ones, with the ideas that form the basis of the group itself put a limit on the radicalism. Small groups are more unitary and thus display a greater degree of solidarity, which in turn results in the potential for greater radicalism. A large party, on the other hand, must moderate its positions in order to cater to its heterogeneous constituency and maintain its support. The issue of completeness of a groups must be distinguished from that of size per se. A group's stance toward completeness often has important implications for the way in which that party deals with non-membership and competition. IV. PARADOXES IN GROUP STRUCTURE Large groups create organs/structures that take the place of the personal interaction of small group situations in mediating the needs and actions of individuals. They are the abstract form of group cohesion, but can no longer exist once the groups exceeds a certain size. Beyond this point, they achieve a superpersonal character with which they confront the individual - the alienation of organs in large groups such that they attain an objective/abstract character. V. NUMERICAL ASPECTS OF PROMINENT GROUP MEMBERS Structural differences among groups related to numerical differences are even more distinct in the roles played by certain prominent and effective members. Maintaining proportionality, exceptional groups are more effective in society with larger absolute numbers. So the relationship between elements depends not only upon their relative proportions, but also their absolute numbers. VI. CUSTOM, LAW, MORALITY

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The three general norms of custom, law, and morality develop into objective and super-social phenomena. The process can schematically be represented as follows: content ---] normative form ---] particularistic content -(objectification/abstraction)--] ideal Over the course of history the same contents of relations have been clothed in different motivations or forms - eg. what has in one place/time been a custom has in others been expressed as a law or a matter of private morality. Morality: develops in the individual through a second subject that confronts him in himself - by virtue of the fundamental capacity of our mind to place itself in contrast to itself and to view and treat itself as if it were somebody else. (This general process bears some resemblance to Mead's generalized other, Cooley's looking glass self, and -believe it or not- Hegel's idea). Morality is experienced as an internal, individualistic phenomenon that could be described as individual conscience. Law is an external type of normative form that mediates the relations between individuals. Law in general has the following features: - develops in larger groups with an increasing unity among its parts - coercively enforced through an object legal system, therefore, - requires social organs to maintain - has a code: precisely defined and externally enforces content of law - law is universally applied (at least in principle) - has a highly objectified content/character Custom is another type of external norm involved in the interrelations of individuals - with the following characteristics: - exists within small groups or within solidaristic parts of a larger society - develops in instances where legal coercion is not permissible and individual morality is not reliable - it is normatively enforced through the immediate interactions between individuals - has a strong component of internalization - custom is class/estate specific CHAPTER 3: THE ISOLATED INDIVIDUAL AND THE DYAD THE ISOLATED INDIVIDUAL Although isolation may appear to be a strictly individual condition, it in no way implies the absence of society. In fact, isolation can only attain it's positive significance only as society's effect at a distance. In effect isolation is a form of interaction (characterized by distance) between an individual and an imagined/abstract society.

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Isolation may also exist as an interruption or periodic occurrence in a given relationship between individuals - some relationships may be defined by this denial of isolation. A tension exists between isolation and interaction for the individuals within social groups (cf. Simmel on urban life - simultaneous proximity and distance). Isolation is a very specific relation to society that both cause and effect of change in social groups. Freedom has a dual nature. It has a negative connotations: the absence of social content. But is also has a positive aspect for the social individual: a specific relationship of that individual to the environment. Implications for Freedom for the structure of society: 1) For the social individual, freedom is neither a state that always exists and can be taken for granted, nor a possession of a material substance that can be acquired all at once. As a result freedom emerges as a continuous process of liberation - freedom taking the form of conflict between the individual and conflicting social demands/social ties. Therefore Freedom is an act of maintaining individual autonomy in the face of conflicting and competing forms of sociation that attempt to claim precedence over the individual. 2) Freedom is something positive in the sense that a person does not just want to be free, but in addition wishes to use that freedom for some purpose - in particular, that individual seeks to exert her/his own will over others. THE DYAD Simmel presents a justification of why the dyad constitutes a form: 1) a high degree of variation in the individualities and unifying motives does not alter the identity of these forms; and 2) these forms may exist between groups as well as individuals. The dyad possesses unique characteristics that distinguish it form other forms of sociation. The dyad does not attain a super-individual life beyond that the individual might feel to be independent of him/herself. Each of the two fools confronted only be the other, not an overarching collectivity. This form of sociation is further dependent upon the specific identities of the two members ie. any two people won't do. Death is an inherent part of the life of the individual and the dyad. Triviality: a characteristic tied in with the inseparability of the dyad from the immediacy of its interaction. Triviality connotes a measure of frequency, of the consciousness that the content of life is repeated, while the value of this content depends on a certain measure of rarity. Intimacy: like the dyad depends on the principle that the sociological process remains within personal interdependence and does not result in a structure that develops beyond its elements. The whole effective structure of intimacy is based on what each of the two participants gives or shows only to the one other person and to nobody else. Intimacy is, therefore, based on exclusivity of content of a

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relationship between members, regardless of the nature or identity of that content. Also absent from the dyad is a delegation of duties and responsibilities to the impersonal group structure. MONOGAMOUS MARRIAGE Marriage does not seem to appear to have the essential sociological character of the dyad - absence of a super-personal unit. There is a feeling that marriage is something super-personal which is valuable and sacred in itself, and which lies beyond whatever un-sacredness each of its elements may possess. (Although Simmel does not put it this way, this follow from the fact that marriage is - or can be - an institution independent of the process of interaction that constitutes the dyad.) The rise of the group unit from the structure of marriage is facilitated by the incomparable closeness of the relationship which promotes a suspension of egoism of each not only in favor of the other, but for the sake of the general relationship per se. Another source of this character of marriage is the socially regulated and historically transmitted nature of the marriage form. Marriage, for instance, technically requires the official recognition of an external authority (law or religion). Modern marriage, however, seems to have a weaker objective character than unions of the past - a greater generalization of a social form corresponds to a greater degree of individuality, creativity, and differentiation within that relationship. Just to liven things up....Simmel addresses the peculiar nature of sex (I guess some kinds of sex would be more peculiar than others, anyhow...). Sexual intercourse is an ultimately intimate act between individuals that nonetheless exists as the most fundamentally universal relation across humanity - and is in fact an a priori for the survival of the species. Marriage also exhibits a duality: it requires sex, but it also requires more than sex (sex is a necessary but not sufficient component of marriage). EXPANSION OF THE DYAD Dyad v. Triad: Among three elements, each one operates as an intermediary between the other two, exhibiting the twofold function of such an organ which is to unite and to separate - such an arrangement is not possible with only two elements. Addition of the third element also provides the opportunity of the development of an external super-individual character and the internal development of parties (the taking of sides and formation of majority in a dispute). Types of individuality: Strong personality usually intensifies the formation of a plurality through opposition, while the Decided personality tends to avoid groups where it might be confronted by a majority (and is almost predestined for dyadic relationships).

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In comparison to larger groups, the dyad: 1) favors a relatively greater individuality of their members, but 2) also presupposes that the groups form does not lower individual particularity to an average level. Friendship is a truer case of the dyad than marriage, because the former is more dependent on the individualities of its elements. Marriage, on the other hand, is based of difference that is primarily species-differentiation (ie the complementary character of the sexes - according to Simmel, that is). Dyadic relationships are dramatically changes by the addition of one additional elements. However there is little or no significant alteration of the characteristics of the triad with the addition of more elements. In a way the marginal significance or effect of additional units of a relationship disappears or at least diminishes greatly after the third. Although there is no question of status in a dyad, the sociological situation between the superordinate and subordinate is changes after the third element is added. Rather than solidarity, larger groups are characterized by party formation. Formation of standpoint occurs along a continuum ranging from impartiality to the radical exclusion of all mediation. A point on this continuum is occupied by every decision made concerning groups that a party has contact with - by every decision involving intimate or superficial cooperation, benevolence, or toleration, our prestige, etc. In essence every decision we (or any party) make traces an ideal line around us that contributes to defining ourselves through our position in various relations. The more close and solidary an individual's relation is to a social circle, the more difficult it is for him/her to live with others that are not in complete harmony. CHAPTER 4: THE TRIAD Having in the previous chapter described the significance of the addition of a third element to a relationship (dyad), Simmel now goes on to describe the dynamics that underlie several specific forms of interaction between parties of three - ie triads. The Non-Partisan and the Mediator Isolated elements are unified by their common relation to a phenomenon that lies outside them. For a dyad, it may be the third element that serves to close the circle between the two (Simmel uses the example of the addition of a child to a marriage). This can occur in two ways: 1) the third element may directly start or strengthen the union of the two, or 2) the relation of each element of the dyad to the third may produce a new and indirect bond between them. Non-Partisan: third element functions by 1) producing concord of two colliding parties and withdraws after creating direct contact between the unconnected elements; or 2) acting as an arbiter who balances contradictory claims and eliminates what is incompatible in them. The third party's role is one of affective

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mediation - depriving conflicting claims of their affective character by neutrally formulating them and presenting them to the two parties. The mediator simply guides process of coming to terms, while on the other hand the arbitrator must end by taking sides. The non-partisanship required for mediation has one of two presuppositions. The third element is non-partisan either by: 1) standing above the contrasting interests and opinions (ie. not concerned), or 2) being equally with both sides. In the first case, the mediator must, however, be subjectively interested in the parties involved in this conflict towards which s/he has this objective stance - a fusion of personal distance and personal interest characteristic of the non-partisan position. The second instance poses special difficulties for the mediator with regards to the tension of personal interests in both sides involved, and often does not result in successful mediation. The Arbitrator: second form of accommodation by means of an impartial third element. In this case, the conflicting parties must agree both to arbitration and to the specific third party to serve as arbitrator, to whom they relinquish the final decision of the conflict in question. These features imply a commitment on the part of both parties to a resolution of the conflict. The Tertius Gaudens (for those who remember their Latin - or don't - ''the third who enjoys'' - kind of mysterious sounding) In some instances the relationship between parties and non-partisan emerges as a new relationship: elements that have never before formed an interactional unit may come into conflict. A third previously unconnected non-partisan element may spontaneously seize upon the opportunity that conflict between the other two offers. In one kind of arrangement, the advantage of the tertius accrues from the fact that the two in conflict hold each other in check and the third is able to make a gain that would be otherwise denied by the two. On the other hand, the advantage for the tertius is a product of the action one of the two conflicting parties intents to bring about for its own purposes. The tertius, however, may make his/her own direct or indirect gain by turning toward one of the conflicting parties in a non-objective fashion. There are two main variants of this type of relation: 1) the two are hostile toward one another and compete for the favor of the third element; or 2) they compete for the favor of the third element and therefore are hostile. The advantage of impartiality for the tertius derives from its ability to make a decision depending on certain circumstances - ones that would be most beneficial to the third. There is a great deal of variability in the character of the tertius gaudens both with respect to the degree of advantage gained and the amount of power that must be expended to achieve it. For instance, the sheer power of the tertius need not be great with respect to the two conflicting parties - it is only important that the superadded power of the tertius give one of the two superiority. An example of this would be the inordinate influence of small parliamentary parties in cases

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where their support is needed to shift the balance of power between two evenly matched adversaries. One of the most crucial elements of the tertius is its freedom of action and ability to choose between several alternative courses of action - something that is often not possible for large parties that are definitely committed to a prescribed course of action. The advantage of the tertius disappears if the conflicting parties should become a unit. Divide et Impera (more Latin! divide and rule) In this case, the third element intentionally produces the conflict in order to gain a dominating position. In the most basic case of ''divide and rule,'' a superior prevents the unification of elements that do not yet positively strive after unification - but might eventually do so. Here it is the form of association itself with is feared, since it may be combined with a dangerous content - from the point of view of the dominant party. A more direct case would be one in which the superordinate party actually prevents two parties which seen unification from doing so. An even more active part of the third party is required in the case in which it seeks to create jealousy between two other elements. By doing this, the third seeks to maintain an already existing prerogative by preventing a coalition of the other two from arising. This may take such a course as the unequal distribution of values which breeds jealousy and distrust between two parties. The most extreme form of divide et impera involved the unleashing of positive battle between two parties, which may be motivated by the third's intentions regarding the two other parties or objects lying outside them. In cases where the third element is directed toward the domination of the other two parties, two sociological considerations are important: 1) certain elements are formed in such a way that they can only be fought successfully by similar elements, and 2) the third may support one of them long enough for the other to be suppressed, whereupon the first is easy prey for the third. PART IV: THE SECRET AND THE SECRET SOCIETY CHAPTER 1: KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, AND FALSEHOOD IN HUMAN RELATIONS Knowledge of One Another The first condition of having to deal with somebody at all is to know with whom one has to deal. Knowledge of another person is reciprocal, but generally not equal on both sides. One can, however, never know another person absolutely since this would amount to a sharing of experiences. We, nevertheless, form some personal unity out of those of his fragments through which another is accessible to us. The unity that may develop depends upon what that other person permits us to see about him/herself. Psychological knowledge of a person is not mere stereotype of that person, but depends (like knowledge of all external

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nature) upon the forms which the cognizing mind brings to it and in which it receives the give. KNOWLEDGE OF EXTERNAL NATURE V. KNOWLEDGE OF PERSONS A particular person is conceived of differently by various other persons. Every relationship gives rise to a picture of each of the involved individuals in the other; a picture which interacts with the actual relation. On the other hand, the real interaction between these persons is also based upon the mental conceptions which they have of each other. Here we have a circuit of relations between real persons and mental conceptions. Differences in actual relations of persons A and B to C create different mental images of C on the part of A and B and account for disparity in the way A and B view C. Truth, Error, and Social Life Our conduct is based upon our knowledge of total reality - knowledge which is, in turn, characterized by peculiar limitations and distortions. We preserve and acquire not only so much truth, but also so much ignorance and error, as is appropriate for our practical activities. The truth as well as self-deception can play adaptive roles as we deal with the exigencies of life. The Individual as an Object of Knowledge With regard to the inner life of a person with whom we interact, s/he may intentionally either reveal the truth about her/himself or deceive us by lie and concealment. No other object of knowledge can reveal or hide itself in this way, since no other object is able to modify its behavior in view of the fact that it is perceived by another. The Nature of the Psychic Process and of Communication Mental processes involve a filtering and organization of information into a more logical form than that in which the stimuli actually exist in nature. In communication to another, the fragments we reveal about our inner life are not a representative selection of our psychological being, but are made from the standpoint of reason, value, and the relation to the listener and her/his understanding. What we say (or otherwise express to others) is not an immediate and accurate presentation of what actually occurs in us during the particular moment of communication, but is a transformation of our inner reality, which is teleologically directed, reduced, and recomposed in respect to our relations to that other person. The Lie The lie consists in the fact that the liar hides his/her true idea form the other. A lie must involve a lying subject. Sociological structures vary significantly depending on the amount of lying which operates in them. The lie may have more dire consequences in modern life since with increasing complexity of society follows an increasing interdependency upon others for knowledge of information that we cannot directly obtain ourselves. The quantity of potential

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opportunities for lying and their impact are generally increased. The generally greater distance between individuals makes it not only easier to lie, but also makes detection of a lie more difficult. The lie may have some positive applications: in the case where a first organization of a group is at stake, organization will take place through the subordination of the weak under the physically and intellectually superior. The lie of superiority may be used in order to maintain this organization and the state of subordination. In general, intra-group interaction based on truthfulness will be more appropriate as the welfare of the many (as opposed to the few) is the norm of the group. PART V. CHAPTER 1: FAITHFULNESS AND GRATITUDE Faithfulness Faithfulness is significant as a sociological form of the second order, as the instrument of relations which already exist and endure. This phenomenon is necessary for society to exist and persist for any length of time. Faithfulness entails a specific psychic and sociological state, which insures the continuance of a relationship beyond the forces that first brought it about, which survives these forces with the same synthesizing effect they themselves had originally - in a sense, an inertia of existing sociations which is one of the a priori conditions of society. The external sociological situation of togetherness appropriates the particular feelings that properly correspond to it even though they did not justify the beginnings of the relationship. Once the existence of a relationship has found its psychological correlate (faithfulness), this faithfulness is followed also by the feelings, affective interests, and inner bonds that properly belong to the relationship. Faithfulness or loyalty is the emotional reflection of the autonomous life of the relation. Aimed solely at the preservation of the relationship to the other, faithfulness if a consummately sociological feeling. Gratitude Like faithfulness, gratitude originates in the interactions of human beings. In a sense it is the moral memory of mankind. It establishes a bond of interaction, of the reciprocity of service and return service even where not guaranteed by external coercion - in this capacity it supplements the legal order. One of the most powerful means of social cohesion, gratitude connects human actions with what has gone before, enriches them with the element of personality, and gives them the continuity of interactional life. Gratitude, further, is a type of exchange that does not require a return in kind (ie in the same form). Generally there are not interactions involving the giving and taking of things in which both sides of the exchange are exactly equal. The giving of a gift must not be considered isolation - especially as regards equivalency - but in relation to the total

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personalities of the two parties. In a sense, gratitude actually consists, not in the return of a gift, but in the consciousness that it cannot be returned - that there is something which places the receiver into a certain permanent position with respect to the giver. The first gift, given in spontaneity, has a voluntary character which no return gift can have; it has a freedom without any duty. A gift once accepted, may engender an inner relation which can never be eliminated completely, because gratitude is perhaps the only feeling which can be morally demanded and rendered under all circumstances. WEBER, MAX Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. New York: Bedminister Press, 1968, vol. 1, Conceptual Exposition, pp. 3-38 (Basic Terms), 212-54 (Legitimate Domination), 926-40 ( Class, Status, Party), 956-1005 (Bureaucracy). _________. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons. New York: Scribner, 1976. _________. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Translated by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 77-156, 267-301, 323-59 (Vocation essays, World Religion essays); (cf. corrected translation of pp. 293-94 in Appendix of Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity). _________. Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences. Translated and edited by Edward Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1949, pp. 50112 (Objectivity essay). _________. General Economic History. New York: Collier, 1961, chs. 22, 27-30 (skip pp. 239- 49 [pp. 323-37 in Free Press edition]). MAX WEBER: BASIC TERMS (THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF SOCIOLOGY) DEFINITIONS OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL ACTION: Sociology is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action to arrive at a casual explanation of its course and effects. Sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical processes. (History, on the other hand, is interested in the causal analysis of particular events, actions or personalities.) Action is human behavior to which the acting individual attaches subjective meaning. It can be overt or inward and subjective. Action is social when, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual(s), it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby guided. Social action may be oriented to past, present, or predicted future behavior of others. Others may be concrete people or indefinite pluralities. Not all action is social: if it ain't oriented to the behavior of others, it ain't social. Also, it is not merely action participated in by a bunch of people (crowd action) or

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action influenced by or imitative of others. Action can be causally determined by the behavior of others, while still not necessarily being meaningfully determined by the action of others. If I do what you do because it's fashionable, or traditional, or leads to social distinction, its meaningful. Obviously the lines are blurred (pp 113-114), but it's important to make a conceptional distinction. Modes of Orientation of social action: Uniformity of social action = action which is wide-spread, frequently repeated by the same individual or simultaneously performed by many individuals and which corresponds to a subjective meaning attributable to the same actors. Usage: probability of a uniformity in the orientation of social action, when the probability is determined by its actual practice ('it is done to conform with the pattern). Custom: usage when the actual performance of the action rests on long familiarity. Non- conformance is sanctioned externally. Action can also be uniform if the actor acts in his self-interests. The uniformity rests insofar as behavior is determined by purely rational actions of actors to similar ulterior expectations. Types of Social Action, identified by mode of orientation: 1) rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends. individuals can choose and adjudicate between both means and ends, though these considerations may be with reference to other absolute values. 2) rational orientation to an absolute value, involving conscious belief in the absolute value entirely for its own sake and independent of prospects for external success. Can choose b/t means, but only with relation to absolute, fixed end. Absolute values are always irrational. 3) affectional orientation. If this is uncontrolled reaction to some exceptional stimulus, it is not meaningful -- grey areas. 4) traditional orientation. If this is strict imitation, it is not meaningful -- grey areas. THE METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY There are 2 kinds of meaning: 1) actually existing meaning in a given concrete case of a particular actor, or average or approximate meaning attributed to a given number of actors; and 2) theoretically conceived pure types of subjective meaning attributed to hypothetical actor(s) in a given type of action (like an ideal type). The line between meaningful action and reactive behavior w/o subjective meaning is blurry.

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The basis for understanding meaning may be either rational (logical or mathematical -- clear intellectual grasp of things) or emotionally empathetic or artistically appreciative (though sympathetic participation we grasp the emotional context in which the action took place). For purposes of ideal type analysis, it's convenient to treat irrational (from the point of view of rational pursuit of a given end) action as deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action. We compare this analytically clear type to empirical reality, and that increases our understanding of how actually action is influences by irrational factors. The more sharp and precise the ideal type (and thus the more abstract and unrealistic) the more useful it is in clarifying terminology and formulating classifications and hypotheses. Some phenomena are devoid of subjective meaning. What is intelligible about an object is its relation to human action in its role either of means or of end, a relation which actors can be said to be aware of and to which their action has been oriented. If you can't make this relation (for example a hindering or favorable circumstance) it's not meaningful in the sense we care about. There are 2 kinds of understanding: 1) direct observational understanding of subjective mean of a given act (eg, if i start to shout at you, you could directly observe my irrational emotional reaction by virtue of my shouting). 2) explanatory understanding: we understand motive, or, what makes an individual do a particular thing in a particular circumstance. Since we are interested in the subjective meaning of action, we must place an action in the complex of meaning in which it took place. A motive is a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor and/OR the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question. In most cases, actual action goes on in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness or actually unconsciousness of its subjective meaning. The ideal type case of meaning is where meaning is fully conscious and explicit: this rarely happens in reality. Adequacy on the level of meaning: a subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when its component parts in their mutual relation are recognized as a 'typical' complex of meaning. Eg, according to our current norms of calculation and thinking, the correct solution to an arithmatical problem. Casual adequacy: there's a probability it will always actually occur in the same way. Eg, statistical probability, according to verified generalization from experience, that there would be a correct or incorrect solution to the arithmatical problem. Depends on being able to determine that there's a probability a will follow b. Subjectively understandable action exists ONLY as the behavior of one or more individual human beings. States, for instance, are results of particular acts of

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individual persons. There is no such things as a collective personality that acts. These concepts of collective entities DO HAVE meanings in the minds of individual persons, and so actors orient their actions to them as if they existed or should exist. Functional analysis is a good starting point for sociology. We need to know what kinds of action is functionally necessary for survival, and also for the maintenance of a cultural type and the corresponding modes of social action. We are interested, though, in the subjective meaning of actions to component individuals. The interesting question, then, is what motives determine and lead the individual members and participants in this situation to behave in such a way that the situation came into being in the first place. THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP Social relationship: the behavior of actors in so far as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of the others and is oriented to the behavior of others. Mere group membership is not sufficient. The relation of the actors may be solidary, or the opposite. Eg, a 'state' ceases to exist when there is no longer a probability that certain kinds of meaningfully oriented social action will take place. The subjective meaning need not be the same for all parties to the relationship. The relationship may be temporary or long term. Its subjective meaning may change over time. The Concept of Legitimate Order The validity of an order is the probability that people will orient their action to it. Types of Legitimate Order Legitimacy of an order can be upheld in 2 ways: 1) purely disinterested motives a) purely affectual, b) rational belief in absolute validity of an order as an expression of ultimate values, c) religious attitudes, through belief in need to follow order for salvation 2) entirely through self-interest based on ulterior motives Convention: system of order where infraction meets with sanctions of disapproval and orders are considered binding. Law: system of order where the above is enforced by a functionally specialized agency (e.g., the police). A system of order with external sanctions may also be guaranteed by disinterested subjective attitudes. Eg, it can be both morally wrong and illegal to murder. Bases of Legitimacy

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Legitimacy may be ascribed to an order by those subject to it in the following ways: 1) tradition, belief in legitimacy of what has always existed. 2) affectual attitudes, legitimizing the validity of what is newly revealed or is a model to imitate 3) rational belief in its absolute value 4) legality. Readiness to conform with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedure. Submission to an order is almost always determined by a variety of motives. CLASS, STATUS, PARTY All communities are arranged in a manner that goods, tangible and intangible, symbolic and material are distributed. Such a distribution is always unequal and necessarily involves power. ''Classes, status groups and parties are phenomena of the distribution of power within a community'' (927). Status groups makes up the social order, classes the economic order, and parties the legal/political order. Each order affects and is affected by the other. POWER Power is the ''chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action'' (926). Power may rest of a variety of bases, and can be of differing types. ''Economically conditioned power is not identical with power... The emergence of economic power may be the consequence of power existing on other grounds. Man does not strive for power only to enrich himself economically. Power, including economic power, may be valued for its own sake. Very frequently the striving for power is conditioned by the social honor it entails. Not all power entails honor.'' Power is not the only basis of social honor, and social honor, or prestige, may be the basis of economic power. ''Power, as well as honor, may be guaranteed by the legal order, but... [the legal order] is not their primary source. The legal order is rather an additional factor that enhances the chance to hold power or honor; but it cannot always secure them'' (926-7). CLASS Class is defined in terms of market situation. A class exists when a number of people have in common a specific casual component of their life chances in the following sense: this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income under conditions of the commodity or labor markets.

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When market conditions prevail (eg, capitalism), property and lack of property are the basic categories of all class situations. However, the concept of classinterest is ambiguous. Collective action based on class situations is determined by the transparency of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the class situation. If the contrast between the life chances of different class situations is merely seen as an acceptable absolute fact, no action will be taken to change the class situation. A class in and of itself does not constitute a group (Gemeinschaft). ''The degree in which social action and possibly associations emerge from the mass behavior of the members of a class is linked to general cultural conditions, especially those of an intellectual sort'' (929). ''If classes as such are not groups, class situations emerge only on the basis of social action.'' STATUS GROUPS AND HONOR Unlike classes, status groups do have a quality of groups. They are determined by the distribution of social honor. A specific style of life is shared by a status group, and the group itself is defined by those with whom one has social intercourse. Economic elements can be a sort of honor; however, similar class position does not necessitate similar status groups (see old money's contempt for the nouveau riche). People from different economic classes may be members of the same status group, if they share the same specific style of life. The way in which social honor is distributed in the community is called the status order. Criteria for entry into a status group may take forms such as the sharing of kinship groups or certain levels of education. The most extreme of a status system with a high level of closure (that is, strong restriction of mobility between statuses) is a caste system. There, status distinctions are guaranteed no only by law and convention, but also by religious sanctions. Relationships between Class and Status group; between Class situation, Status Situation, and Stratification. Status groups can sometimes be equal to class, sometimes be broader, sometimes more restrictive, and sometimes bear no relation to class (duh). In most cases, status situation is the apparent dimension of stratification: ''stratification by status goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities'' (935). Class situation can take precedence over status situation, however. ''When the bases of the acquisition and distribution of goods are relatively stable, stratification by status is favored'' (935). Technological and economic changes threaten stratification by status, and ''push class situation to the foreground.... Every slowing down of the change in economic stratification leads, in due course, to the growth or status structures and makes for a resuscitation of the important role of social honor'' (930). PARTIES

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''Parties reside in the sphere of power'' (938). ''Parties are... only possible within groups that have an asssociational character, that is, some rational order and a staff of persons'' (938). Parties aim for social power, the ability to influence the actions of others, and thus may exist in a social club, the state, or a cohort of graduate students at the University of Chicago. Parties may represent class or status interests, or neither. They usually represent a mix. ''The structure of parties differs in a basic way according to the kind of social action which they struggle to influence.... [T]hey differ according to whether or not the community is stratified by class or status. Above all else, they vary according to the structure of domination'' (938-9). THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM abbreviations: MWC = modern, western capitalism INTRODUCTION Though knowledge and observation of great refinement have existed elsewhere, only in the West has rationalization in science, law and culture developed to such a great degree. The modern West absolutely and completely depends for its whole existence, for the political technical, and economic conditions of its life, on a specially trained organization of individuals, so that the most important functions of everyday life have come to be in the hands of technically, commercially and above all legally trained government officials. Nowhere else does this exist to such a degree as it does in the West. The most fateful force in modern life is capitalism. The impulse to acquisition has existed always and everywhere and has in itself nothing to do with capitalism. Capitalism is the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise. This enterprise must be continuous, because in a capitalistic society, anyone who did not take advantage of opportunities for profit-making would be doomed to extinction. A capitalistic economic action rests on the expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities for exchange, on (formally) peaceful chances for profit. Where this is rationally pursued, calculations in terms of money are made, whether by modern bookkeeping or more primitive means. Everything is done in terms of balances of money income and money expenses. Whether the calculations are accurate, or whether the calculation method is traditional or by guess-work affects only the degree of the rationality of capitalistic acquisition. Characteristics of modern Western capitalism: rational industrial organization (that is, attuned to a regular profit and not to political nor irrational speculative opportunities for profit); separation of business from the household; rational

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bookkeeping. Capitalistic adventurers (in search of booty, whether by war or exploitation) have existed everywhere, but only in the modern West has developed... the rational capitalistic organization of (formally) free labor. The rationality of MWC is dependent on the calculation of technical factors, and so is dependent on the development in science of the exact and rational experiment. C'ism did not cause this development: but, the continuing development of this type science is supported by capitalistic interests in practical economic applications. The peculiar rationalism of Western culture extends to many fields -- science, mystical contemplation, military training, law and administration. Each of theses fields may be rationalized in terms of very different ultimate values and ends, and what is rational from one point of view may well be irrational from another. The development of economic rationalism is partly dependent on rational technique and law, but it also requires people to have a favorable disposition toward adopting certain types of practical rational conduct. In this book, we will treat ONLY ONE SIDE OF THE CAUSAL CHAIN, the connection of the spirit of modern economic life with the rational ethics of ascetic Protestantism. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION Catholics show a stronger propensity to remain in their crafts, and become master craftsmen, while Protestants are attracted to a larger extent to the upper ranks of skilled labor and administrative positions in factories. Protestants own a disproportionate share of capital. All other things equal, Protestants have been more likely to develop economic rationalism than Catholics. Weber seeks the explanation in 'the permanent intrinsic character of their religion,' and not only in their temporary external historico-political situations. The Reformation meant not the elimination of the church's control over everyday life, but a substitution of a new form of control for the previous one. While the Catholic church was fairly lax, Calvinism 'would be for us the most absolutely unbearable form of ecclesiastical control of the individual which could possibly exist.' Protestantism must not be understood as joy of living or in any other sense connected with the Enlightenment. Early Protestantism (e.g., Luther, Calvin) had nothing to do with progress in an Enlightenment sense. Not all Protestant denominations had an equally strong influence on the development of members' business acumen and spirit of hard work. THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM

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The spirit of capitalism is ''an historical individual: a complex of elements associated in historical reality which we united into a conceptual whole from the standpoint of their cultural significance'' (47). Ben Franklin is an example of someone who espouses a philosophy of avarice which is: the ideal of an honest man of recognized credit. It includes a duty on the part of an individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself. It is not mere business astuteness, it is an ethos; infraction of its rules is not foolishness or bad business, but forgetfulness of duty. In this ethic, economic acquisition is no longer considered a means of subsistence: it is the ultimate purpose of a man's life. This is combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life. (NOTE: From the standpoint ''of the happiness of, or utility to, a single individual, this ethic appears entirely transcendental and absolutely irrational'' (53)). People now are born into a capitalistic economy which presents itself to them as the unalterable order of things in which they must live. In so far as a person born now is involved in the system of market relationships, he must conform to capitalistic rules of action. Today's capitalism selects the subjects it needs through economic survival of the fittest. The interesting question, according to Max, is WHERE DID THIS SITUATION COME FROM? It did NOT arise as the superstructure or reflection of economic situations. For example, the spirit of capitalism such as espoused by our buddy Ben Franklin was present before capitalistic order. In order to arise, the spirit of capitalism had to struggle with its 'most important opponent,' traditionalism. For instance, workers will respond to an increase in piece rates by doing less work, collecting the usual amount of money, and going home early. Men do not ''by nature'' wish to earn more and more money, they simply wish to live as they are accustomed to and to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose. Another way of attempting to increase productivity is to lower wages or piece rates, so that workers must work harder and longer to earn the same amount as before. This method has its limits. It (and capitalism) requires a surplus population which can be hired cheaply in the market. Also, too large a surplus population can encourage the development of labor intensive methods, rather than more efficient methods: low wages do not equal cheap labor. And, if you pay people too little, their efficiency and attentiveness decreases. Thus, it would be better if labor were performed as if it were an absolute end in itself. This can only be the process of a long and arduous education (for example, being raised Pietist). Capitalism ''now in the saddle'' can fairly easily recruit the required workers, but this was not always the case.

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Capitalism can exist with a traditionalistic character. The animating spirit of the entrepreneur may be the traditional rate of profit, the traditional amount of work, the traditional manner of labor-management relations, and the essentially traditional circle of customers and manner of attracting new ones. Take the example of the putting out system. In such a system, this leisureliness can be destroyed, without any essential change in the form of work organization (such as vertically integrated factories). The spirit of capitalism is the cause of this change. Where the spirit of capitalism appears and is able to work itself out, it produces its own capital and monetary supplies as the means to its ends, but the reverse is not true (69). Protestantism was not merely a stage prior to the development of a purely rationalistic philosophy, however. Rationalism shows a development which by no means follows parallel lines in the various departments of life. Since life may be rationalized from fundamentally different basic points of view and in very different directions, we must ask the origin of the irrational element which lies at the basis of this particular concrete form of rational thought: the conception of a calling. LUTHER'S CONCEPTION OF THE CALLING The idea of a calling -- a life-task, a definite field in which to work -- is peculiar to Protestants. Protestantism had a further new development, which was the valuation of the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the moral activity of an individual could assume. The only way of living acceptably to God was solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the world (his calling), NOT by trying to surpass worldly morality by monastic asceticism (80). Remember important part of Reformation: By faith, not works, shall ye be saved. You are justified by faith, etc. So all those indulgences earned by crawling on your knees up stairways, etc. don't get you anything. For the time being (before Calvin et al. got hold of it), the idea of the calling remained traditionalistic and its only ethical result negative: worldly duties were no longer subordinated to ascetic ones; obedience to authority and acceptance of things as they were, were preached. THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF WORLDLY ASCETICISM However, this idea of the calling was not sufficient for the development of the spirit of capitalism. We needed the effects of forms of ascetic Protestantism: Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism and the Baptist sects. An important thing to keep in mind is that these folks were not motivated by acquisitive lusts, but rather by salvation of the soul.

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Calvinists believed in predestination. God designated before the creation of the world who would be saved and who would get to rot in hell. All creation exists for the sake of God, and has meaning only as means to the glory and majesty of God. Human merit or guilt plays no part in the possession of grace, since that would make God's decrees subject to human influence. This doctrine 'must above all have one consequence... a feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness of the single individual' (104). The individual was forced to follow the path of his own destiny decreed for him from eternity without help from others or from the Church -- complete elimination of salvation through the Church and the sacraments (which Lutheranism retained). This meant the elimination of magic from the world. [It also meant the doing away with a periodical discharge of the emotional sense of sin (confession).] Now, the elected Christian should glorify God in life by fulfilling God's commandments to the best of his ability. This requires social achievements of the Christian because God decrees that social life shall be organized according to his commandments. Fear and lack of knowledge of whether or not one is going to rot in hell led to a need for ordinary men to find certitudo salutis (certainty of salvation). Pastoral advice to these poor, tortured dudes contained two themes: 1) an absolute duty to consider oneself chosen and to combat all doubts as temptations of the devil, since lack of self-confidence is the result of insufficient faith, hence of imperfect grace. 2) Intense worldly activity as the most suitable means to attain that selfconfidence [thus we eliminate the free rider problem]. The Calvinist sought to identify true faith by its fruits: a type of Christian conduct which served to increase the glory of God. Good works do not affect salvation, but they are indispensable as a sign of election. In practice, this means God helps those who help themselves. The Calvinist creates a conviction of his own salvation. For Catholics, good works were not a part of a rationalized system of life -- they could be performed sporadically, to atone -- whereas for Calvinists they are. The God of Calvinism demanded not single good works, but a life of good works combined into a unified system. The moral conduct of the average man was subjected to a consistent method for conduct as a whole. The end of this asceticism was to be able to lead an alert, intelligent life: the most urgent task the destruction of spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment. The most important means was to bring order into the conduct of its adherents. Hence we have methodically rationalized ethical conduct. The Calvinistic doctrine of predestination was only one of several possible motives which could have supported the methodical rationalization of life. However, it had not only a unique consistency (by virtue of being based on logical deduction, rather than religious experience) and was psychologically extraordinarily powerful. PIETISM

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This sect sought to make the invisible Church of the elect visible on this earth. By means of intensified asceticism these folks hoped to enjoy the blissfulness of community with God in this life. Sometimes this latter tendency led to displays of emotion, which were antithetical to Calvinist restraint. Other than that, however, the practical effect of Pietistic principles was an even stricter ascetic control of conduct in the calling: 1) Methodical development of one's own state of grace to a higher and higher degree of certainty and perfection in terms of the law was a sign of grace. 2) a belief that God's Providence works through those in such a state of perfection. Since some of these folks believed grace subject to repentance, by the creation of methods to induce repentance even the attainment of divine grace became in effect an object of rational human activity. METHODISM Though rebirth, an emotional certainty of salvation as the immediate result of faith was an important factor, the emotional act of conversion was methodically induced. Emotion, once awakened, was directed into a rational struggle for perfection. This provided a religious basis for ascetic conduct after the doctrine of predestination had been given up by these folks. Nothing new was added to the idea of the calling. THE BAPTIST SECTS The church was viewed as a community of personal believers of the reborn. Salvation was achieved by personal, individual revelation; it was offered to everyone, though not everyone took it. The injunction was to be in the world but not of it, so worldly enjoyments and unnecessary social intercourse with non-reborn folks was avoided. The Holy Spirit worked in daily life, and spoke directly to any individual who was willing to hear. This leads to an eventual elimination of all that remained of the doctrine of salvation through the Church and sacraments. This accomplished the religious rationalization of the world in its most extreme form. CONSCIENCE IS THE REVELATION OF GOD TO THE INDIVIDUAL. The rationalization of conduct within the world, but for the sake of the world beyond, was the consequence of the concept of calling of ascetic Protestantism. ASCETICISM AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM

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In Puritan thinking, the real moral objection to possession of wealth is to relaxation in the security of possession, the enjoyment of wealth with the consequence of idleness and the temptations of the flesh, above all distraction from the pursuit of a righteous life. It is only because possession involves this danger that it is suspect at all. Not leisure and enjoyment, but only activity serves to increase the glory of God. Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins. Thus, inactive contemplation at the expense of work is right out. Labor is an approved ascetic technique, but is also considered in itself an end of life as ordained by God. Unwillingness to work is symptomatic of the lack of grace. Wealth does not exempt anyone from this. The division of labor, which has a providential purpose in the thought of the Puritans, leads to qualitative and quantitative improvements in production, and thus serves the common good. But, in addition, specialization is encouraged by the calling, to which it provides an ethical justification; for, ''outside of a calling the accomplishments of a man are only casual and irregular and he spends more time in idleness than in work.'' If God presents to His elect a change for profit, he must pursue it: the Christian must follow the call by taking advantage of the opportunity. The acquisition of wealth in the performance of a calling is morally permissible and enjoined. -- Asceticism turned against the spontaneous enjoyment of life. So, sport, for instance, is acceptable only if it serves a rational purpose, say, increasing physical efficiency. -- The powerful tendency toward uniformity of life, which today so immensely aids the capitalistic interest in the standardization of production, had its ideal foundation in the repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh (eg, non-ascetic, flashy or attractive clothing). The Puritan outlook on life 'stood at the cradle of modern economic man' (174). This religious epoch bequeathed to its utilitarian successors ''an amazingly good... conscience in the acquisition of money, so long as it took place legally'' (176). In addition, the power of religious asceticism provided owners with sober, conscientious and industrious workmen. And, it provided comforting assurance that the unequal distribution of goods in the world was ordained by God. The religious basis had died away by Ben Franklin's time. Limitation to specialized work is now a condition of any valuable work in the modern world. ''The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production and today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force.''

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THE RELIGIOUS REJECTIONS OF THE WORLD AND THEIR DIRECTIONS Motives for the Rejections of the World: The Meaning of Their Rational Construction Individual spheres of value presented here as ideal types have a rational consistency rarely found in reality. This essay proceeds from the most rational forms reality can assume; it attempts to find out how far certain rational conclusions, which can be established theoretically, have been drawn in reality. Perhaps, also, we can find out why those rational conclusions have not been drawn. Typology of Asceticism and Mysticism Two contrasting abnegations of the world: 1) active asceticism that is a God-willed ACTION of the devout who are God's tools. Rationally active asceticism, in mastering the world, seeks to tame what is creatural and wicked through work in a worldly vocation (inner-worldly asceticism); 2) contemplative POSSESSION of the holy as found in mysticism. The individual is not a tool, but a vessel of the divine. Desired: other-worldly religious state; contemplative flight from the world. Active asceticism may confine itself to controlling wickedness in the actor's own nature; in this case, it avoids any action in the orders of the world (asceticist flight from the world). In external bearing, it thereby comes close to contemplative flight. Conversely, the mystic may determine s/he need not flee from the world, and so be an inner-worldly mysticist, remaining in the orders of the world. Directions of the Abnegation of the World: Formulated abstractly, the rational aim of redemption religion has been to secure for the saved a holy state, and thereby a habitude that assures salvation. This takes the place of an acute and extraordinary, and thus a holy state which is transitorily achieved by means of orgies, asceticism, or contemplation. Most prophetic and redemptory religions have lived not only in an acute, but a permanent state of tension in relation to the world and its orders. The more the religions have been true religions of salvation, the greater has this tension been. The tension has been greater the more religion has been sublimated from ritualism and towards 'religious absolutism.' Indeed, the further the rationalization and sublimation of external and internal possession of -- in the widest sense -- things worldly has progressed, the stronger has the tension on the part of religion become. For the rationalization and conscious sublimation of man's relations to the various spheres of values, internal and external, as well as religious and secular, have then pressed towards making conscious the internal and lawful autonomy of the individual spheres; thereby letting them drift into those tensions which remain hidden to the original naive relation with the external world.

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The more comprehensive and the more inward the aim of salvation has been, the more it has been taken for granted that the faithful should ultimately stand closer to the savior, the prophet, the priest, the brother in the faith than to natural relations and to the matrimonial community. Prophecy has created a new social community; thereby the relationships of the sib and of matrimony have been devalued. Communities of villages, members of the sib, the guild or of partners in seafaring, hunting and warring expeditions have known two elemental principles: first, the dualism or in-group and out-group morality. For in-group morality the principled obligation to give brotherly support in distress has existed. All this followed the principle of ''your want of today, may be my want of tomorrow'' (this principle was not rationally weighed, but it played its part in sentiment). Accordingly, haggling in exchange and loan situations, as well as permanent debtenslavement and similar kinds of enslavement, were confined to outgroup morality and applied only to outsiders. The religiosity of the congregation transferred the ancient economic ethic of neighborliness (I'll help you out today, since I may need you to help me out tomorrow) to the relations among brothers of the faith. What had previously been the obligations of the noble and the wealthy became the fundamental imperatives of all ethically rationalized religion (to care for orphans and widows, to give alms). The principle that constituted the communal relations among the salvation prophesies was the suffering common to all believers (whether or not the suffering actually existed or was a constant threat, whether it was internal or external). The more imperatives that issued from the ethic of reciprocity among neighbors were raised, the more rational the conception of salvation became, and the more it was sublimated into an ethic of absolute ends. THE ECONOMIC SPHERE The tension between brotherly religion and the world has been most obvious in the economic sphere. All the primeval magical or mystagogic ways of influencing spirits and deities have pursued special interests. The sublimated religions of salvation, however, had been increasingly tense in their relationships with rationalized economies. A rational economy is a functional organization oriented to money-prices which originate in the interest-struggles of men in the market. Calculation is not possible without estimation in money prices and hence without market struggles. Money is the most abstract and impersonal element that exists in human life. The more the world of the capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is to any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness. Ultimately no genuine religion of salvation has overcome the tension between their religiosity and a rational economy.

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The paradox of all rational asceticism is that rational asceticism has created the very wealth it rejected. There have only been two consistent avenues for escaping the tension between religion and in the economic world in a principled and inward manner: 1) the Puritan ethic of the vocation. Puritanism, as a religion of virtuosos, renounced the universalism of love and rationally routinized all work in this world into serving God's will and testing ones state of grace. Puritanism accepted the routinization of the economic cosmos, which , along with the whole world, it devalued as creatural and depraved. It involved a renunciation of salvation in favor of the groundless and always only particularized grace. Actually, this standpoint of unbrotherliness was no longer a genuine religion of salvation. A genuine religion of salvation can exaggerate brotherliness to the height of the mystic's acosmism of love. 2) Mysticism. The mystic's benevolence does not inquire into the man to whom and for whom it sacrifices. Mysticism is not interested in his person. Mysticism is a unique escape form this world in the form of an objectless devotion to anybody, not for man's sake, but purely for devotion's sake. THE POLITICAL SPHERE The consistent brotherly ethic of salvation religions has come into an equally sharp tension with the political orders of the world. Local (community, tribe, household, etc.) gods and magic were not a problem The problem arose when these barriers of locality, tribe and polity were shattered by universalistic religions. And the problem arose in full strength only when this god was a god of 'love.' The problem of tension with the political order emerged for redemption religions out of the basic demand for brotherliness. In politics as in economics, the more rational the political order became, the sharper the problems of these tensions became. The brotherliness of a group of men bound together in war appears valueless in brotherly religions; it is seen as a mere reflection of the technically sophisticated brutality of the struggle. It's consecration appears as the glorification of fratricide. The only two consistent solutions (first three guesses don't count...): puritanism and mysticism. Puritanism believes God's commands should be imposed on the world by the means of the world -- violence, so ''just war'' is not a problem for Puritanism (God is on their side). The mystics take a ''radical political attitude'' of ''turning the other cheek'' which makes them appear ''necessarily vulgar and lacking in dignity in the eyes of every self-assured worldly ethic of heroism.'' Organic social ethics (where religiously substructured) stands on the soil of brotherliness, but, in contrast to mystic and acosmic love, is dominated by a cosmic, rational demand for brotherliness. It point of departure is the experience of the inequality of religious charisma. The fact that the holy should be accessible

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to some and not all is unbearable to organic social ethics. It therefore attempts to synthesize this inequality of charismatic qualifications with secular stratification by status, into a cosmos of God-ordained services which are specialized in function. Certain tasks are given to every individual and every group according to their social and economic position as determined by fate. Without something like the Indian doctrine of Karma (which says there's a reason why you're bottom dog), every organic social ethic unavoidably represents an accommodation to the interests of the privileged strata of the world. From the standpoint of inner-worldly asceticism, the organic ethic lacks the drive for an ethical and thorough rationalization of individual life. In such matters, it has no premium for the rational and methodical patterning of personal life in the interest of the individual's own salvation. The organic pragmatism of salvation must consider the redemptory aristocracy of inner-worldly asceticism, with its rational depersonalization of life orders, as the hardest form of lovelessness and lack of brotherliness. It must also consider the redemptory pragmatism of mysticism as a sublimated and unbrotherly indulgence of the mystic' s own charisma. Both inner-worldly asceticism and mysticism ultimately condemn the social world to absolute meaninglessness (or, at least they hold that God's aims concerning the world are utterly incomprehensible). The rationalism of religious and organic doctrines of society cannot stand up under this idea; for it seeks to comprehend the world as an at least relatively rational cosmos in spite of all its wickedness: the world must hear at least traces of the divine plan of salvation. The organic ethic of society is an eminently conservative power hostile to revolution. Virtuoso religion is a potentially revolutionary force. Its revolutionary turn may assume two forms: 1) (from inner-worldly asceticism, with an absolute divine law) it becomes a religious duty to realize this divine natural law. This corresponds to an obligation to crusade. 2) (from mysticism) The commands of the world do not hold for the man who is assured in his obsession with god. THE AESTHETIC SPHERE The development of intellectualism and the rationalism of life make art become a cosmos of more and more consciously grasped independent values which exist in their own right. Art comes to provide a salvation from the routines of everyday life, and begins to compete directly with salvation religion. [The refusal of modern man to assume responsibility for moral judgements tends to transform judgements of moral intent into judgements of taste.] THE EROTIC SPHERE

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The brotherly ethic of salvation religion is in profound tension with the greatest irrational force of life: sexual love. The more sublimated sexuality is, and the more principled and relentlessly consistent the salvation ethic of brotherhood is, the sharper is the tension between sex and religion. A principled ethic of religious brotherhood perceives that inner, earthly salvation by mature love competes in the sharpest possible way with devotion to a supra-mundane God. Inner-worldly and rational asceticism (vocational asceticism) can accept only the rationally regulated marriag THE INTELLECTUAL SPHERE The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge comes to the fore wherever rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked through to the disenchantment of the world. Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasing pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm; but only today does religion become the irrational or anti-rational supra-human power. The less magic or merely contemplative mysticism and the more pure doctrine a religion contains, the greater is its need of rational apologetics. The more religion became book-religion and doctrine, the more literary it became and the more efficacious it became in provoking rational lay-thinking, freed of priestly control. However, there is no ''unbroken'' religion working as a vital force which is not compelled at some point to demand the credo non quod, sed quia absurdum (some saint said this, but i can't remember which one, it means ''i believe it because it is absurd''. i think it was said in reference to the trinity), the sacrifice of the intellect. Redemptory religion defends itself against the attack of the self-sufficient intellect, by raising the claim that religious knowledge moves in a different sphere. The need for salvation, consciously cultivated as the substance of religiosity, has resulted from the endeavor of a systematic and practical rationalization of life's realities. All religions have demanded as a specific presupposition that the course of the world be somehow meaningful, at least in so far as it touches upon the interests of men (this claim arises first as the problem of unjust suffering and just compensation for the unequal distribution of individual happiness in the world). From here, the claim has tended to progress toward an ever increasing devaluation of the world. For, the more intensely rational thought has seized upon the problem of a just and retributive compensation, the less an entirely inner-worldly solution could seem possible, and the less an other-worldly solution could appear probable or even meaningful. The intellect, like all culture values, has created an aristocracy based on the possession of rational culture and independent of all personal ethical qualities of man. The aristocracy of intellect is hence an unbrotherly aristocracy. Worldly man has regarded the possession of culture as the highest good. In addition to

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the burden of ethical guilt, however, something has adhered to this cultural value which was bound to depreciate it with still greater finality, namely, senselessness (if the cultural value is to be judged in terms of its own standards). The pure inner-worldly perfection of self by a man of ''culture'', the ultimate value to which ''culture'' has seemed to be reducible is meaningless for religious thought. This meaninglessness follows for religious thought from the obvious meaninglessness of death when viewed from the inner-worldly standpoint. The cultivated man can die weary of life, but never satiated with it; for, the perfectibility of the man of culture, in principle, progresses indefinitely, as do the cultural values. Culture appears as man's emancipation from the organically prescribed cycle of natural life. For this reason, culture's every step forward seems condemned to lead to an every more devastating senselessness. The advancement of cultural values seems to become a senseless hustle in the service of worthless, moreover self-contradictory, and mutually antagonistic ends. The advancement of cultural values appears the more meaningless the more it is made a holy task, a ''calling.'' The need for salvation responds to this devaluation by becoming more otherworldly, more alienated from all structured forms of life, and by confining itself to the strict religious essence. The reaction is the stronger the more systematic the thinking about the ''meaning'' of the universe becomes, the more the external organization of the world is rationalized, the more the conscious experience of the world's irrational content is sublimated. AND NOT ONLY THEORETICAL THOUGHT LED TO THIS DISENCHANTING OF THE WORLD, BUT ALSO THE VERY ATTEMPT OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS TO PRACTICALLY AND ETHICALLY RATIONALIZE THE WORLD. These specific intellectual and mystical attempts at salvation in the face of these tensions succumb in the end to the world dominion of unbrotherliness. One the one hand, their charisma is not accessible to everyone. Hence, in intent, mystical salvation means aristocracy; it is an aristocratic religiosity of redemption. And, in the midst of a culture that is rationally organized for a vocational workaday life, there is hardly any room for the cultivation of acosmic brotherliness, unless it is among the strata of the economically carefree. Under the technical and social conditions of rational culture, an imitation of the life of Buddha, Jesus or Francis seems condemned to failure for purely external reasons. GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY CHAP 22, THE MEANING AND PRESUPPOSITIONS OF MODERN CAPITALISM C'ism is present wherever the industrial provision for the needs of a human group is carried out by the method of enterprise. A rational capitalistic enterprise is one with capital accounting, according to the methods of modern bookkeeping and

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the striking of a balance. In a given economy, parts may be capitalistically organized, and other parts not so. An epoch is capitalistic if the provision of its wants is organized capitalistically to such a degree that the whole economic system would collapse if we take away the capitalistic form of organization. General presuppositions for the existence of modern day capitalism (thinking along the ideal type line): 1) Rational capital accounting. This involves the appropriation of all physical means of production as the property of autonomous private enterprises. 2) Freedom of the market, in the sense of the absence of irrational limits on trading in the market. 3) Rational technology, to permit the required calculability. This implies mechanization. 4) Calculable law, the dependability of calculable adjudication and administration. 5) Free (not slave or serf) labor, people legally in the position to, and economically compelled to, sell their labor on the market without restriction. 6) Commercialization of economic life: general use of commercial instruments to represent share rights in enterprise and also in property ownership. CHAP27, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNIQUE Real distinguishing characteristic of the modern factory: the concentration of ownership of workplace, means of work, source of power and raw material in the hands of the entrepreneur. Key: Shift from nature's power (water) to more manageable, reliable, calculable forces (like steam). This, along with mechanization, permits rationalization of work. Development of use of coal, and subsequent production of iron had 3 important consequences: 1) released technology and productive capabilities from the limits inherent in the qualities of organic industry (eg, horses get tired, the wind doesn't always blow, etc.) 2) mechanization of the production process thorough the steam engine liberated production from the organic limitations of human labor (it ain't just horses that get tired; and people can't lift as much, work as fast, as reliably, etc.) 3) through union with science, the production of goods was emancipated from the bonds of tradition and came under the dominance of freely roving intelligence. Recruitment of the labor force for this new form of production was carried by means of indirect compulsion. The enclosure movement and changes in agricultural production left a bunch of people wandering around without jobs, who were forced into jobs by being threatened with the ''workhouse'' if they didn't take jobs in the new factories. From the beginning of the 18th c., there

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began to be laws to regulate employers conduct toward their employees, to ensure laborers were paid in money and not in kind. War needs and luxury consumption fed capitalism's growth. However, all those silly folks who've argued that war was the driving force are wrong. While the desire of nobility and the upperclasses for luxury goods was important, the increasing production of tapestries and carpets was a key marker of the democratization of luxury, which is the crucial direction of capitalistic production. The decisive impetus for c'ism could only come from mass market demand. C'ism's characteristics 1. C'ism alone produced a rational organization of labor. 2. Lifted barrier between internal and external economics, internal and external ethics, and the entrance of the commercial principle into the internal economy with the organization of labor on this basis. 3. disintegration of primitive economic fixity with the entrepreneur organization of labor. The reason this development took place only in the West is due to special features of the West's general cultural evolution: rational law, rational empirical science, a state with a professional administration, specialized officialdom, men with a rational ethic in the conduct of life. CH 28, CITIZENSHIP Outside the occident there have not been cities in the sense of a unitary community. Occidental cities originally arose through the establishment of a fraternity; it was in its beginnings first above all a defense group, an organization of those economically competent to bear arms, to equip and train themselves. These folks owned their own arms: this is key. In places like Egypt, Asia, India and China, irrigation was a big issue, and so kings' bureaucracies developed. The king and his staff required the compulsory service of the dependent classes; they in turn were dependent on that bureaucracy. The king also held a military monopoly. In the west, self-equipment and religious brotherhoods (eg, crusaders) meant kings did not have a military monopoly, and so cities could be formed in a western sense, based on mutual defense. Also, ideas and institutions in the orient connected with magic, which supported such systems as caste systems, did not exist in such strength in the occident. CHAP 29, THE RATIONAL STATE Modern capism can survive only in the modern rational state. Characteristics of the Modern Rational State: 1) Expert officialdom and rational law. Key: rationalization of procedure... formal

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juristic thinking inherited from Roman law. 2) Economic policy that is continuous and consistent and not dependent on ritualistic/traditional considerations. The first appearance of a rational economic policy was mercantilism: external economic policy consists in taking every advantage of the opponent, to strengthen the hand of the government in its external relations. Mercantilism signifies the development of the state as a political power, this development is to be done directly by increasing the tax paying power of the population. However, mercantilism wasn't free market: the govt supported monopolies, gave colonial privileges, etc. It disappeared when free trade was established. CH 30, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CAPITALISTIC SPIRIT While several factors fed into the development of capitalism, ''in the last resort the factor which produced capitalism is the rational permanent enterprise, rational accounting, rational technology and rational law, but not these alone. Necessary complementary factors were the rational spirit, the rationalization of the conduct of life in general, and a rationalistic economic ethic'' (260). In the middle ages, the position of the church on economic ethics was that it excluded ''higgling'' (cute word; he means haggling), overpricing and free competition and included the principle of a just price and the assurance to everyone of a chance to live. Since Judaism made Christianity possible and gave it the character of a religion essentially free from magic, it rendered a service by removing one of the most serious obstructions to the rationalization of economic life (magic). Prophesies (rather than oracles by lot, etc.) have released the world from magic and in so doing have created the basis for our modern science and technology, and for capitalism. Basically, then, Weber chats re: the spirit of capitalism, which you know all about from somewhere else. As noted earlier, the breakdown of the dual economic ethics was key. A note on class conflict: ''It was possible for the working class to accept its lot as long as the promise of eternal happiness could be held out to it. When this consolation fell away it was inevitable that those strains and stresses would appear in economic society which since then have been growing rapidly. This point had been reached at the end of the early period of capitalism, at the beginning of the age of iron, in the 19th century'' (270). THE TYPES OF AUTHORITY AND IMPERATIVE CONTROL/THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION (DEPENDS ON YOUR TRANSLATION) BASIS OF LEGITIMACY

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Domination is defined as the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of people. A certain minimum of voluntary submission is necessary; thus on the part of the submitter there is an interest (whether based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience. - Not every claim protected by custom or law involves a relation of authority. For instance, if I ask Charles to pay me for the work i do as fulfillment of our contract, I am not exercising authority over him. - The legitimacy of a system of authority may be treated sociologically only as the probability that to a relevant degree the appropriate attitudes will exist and the corresponding conduct ensue. - Obedience means the action of the person 'obeying' follows a course such that the content of the command can be taken as the reason for his/her action. 3 PURE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 1. Rational/legal grounds. belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. Authority held by legally established impersonal order, extends to people only by virtue of offices they hold. 2. Traditional grounds. established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them. Authority held by person of the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority; matter of personal obligation and loyalty within the scope of tradition. 3. Charismatic grounds. devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative pattern or order revealed by him. Leader obeyed by personal trust in him, his revelation, heroism, coolness, as far as those qualities fall within the scope of the obeyers belief in his charisma. RATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY WITH A BUREAUCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF Typical person in authority occupies an office. Person who obeys authority does so only in his capacity as a member of the corporate group, and what he obeys is only the law. Fundamental Qualities: 1) continuous organization of official functions bound by rules 2) specified spheres of competence involving a) sphere of obligations as marked out by a specialized division of labor, b) provision to incumbent of necessary authority to do his sphere of thangs, c) necessary means of compulsion clearly defined and their use subject to definite conditions. 3) organization of offices follows principle of hierarchy. 4) rules which regulate conduct of an office can be either technical rules or norms. when their application is fully rational, specialized training is necessary.

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5) office holder separated from ownership of means of production and administration (first of all, separation of house from workplace) 6) complete absence of appropriate of position by incumbent 7) acts, rules and decisions are formulated and recorded in writing BUREAUCRACY, almost the same... 1) office holders personally free and subject to authority only within the scope of their impersonal official obligations 2) hierarchy of offices 3) sphere of competence 4) free selection into office; filled by free contractual relationship; always free to resign 5) candidates appointed, not elected, on basis of technical qualifications 6) remuneration is by fixed salaries of $$ 7) office is sole or primary occupation of incumbent 8) constitutes a career; system of promotion 9) official can't own means or appropriate position 10) official subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in conduct of office. Monocratic bureaucracy is capable of attaining the highest degrees of efficiency and is the most rational means known of carrying out imperative control over people. Makes possible a high degree of calculability. Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. General Social Consequences of bureaucratic control 1) tendency of levelling in the interest of broadest possible recruitment in terms of technical competence 2) tendency to plutocracy due to interest in greatest possible length of technical training 3) dominance of spirit of formalistic impersonality. Sine ira et studio, w/o anger or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm. All subject to formal equality of treatment. TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY Traditional authority is bound to the precedents handed down from the past and to this extent is oriented to rules. Leaders' commands legitimated in one of two ways: 1) in terms of traditions which themselves directly determine the content of the command and the objects and intent of authority. 2) a matter of the chief's free personal decision, in that tradition leaves him some leeway.

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When resistance occurs, the accusation is that the chief is not following the tradition. The system itself is not questioned. A chief can have an administrative staff: patrimonial recruitment of staff comes from people who have a traditional tie of personal loyalty to the chief (children, slaves, clients, etc.). Extrapatrimonial recruitment comes from people in a purely personal relation of loyalty (vassals, etc.) The staff lacks: clearly defined spheres of competence subject to impersonal rules; rational ordering of relations of superiority and inferiority; regular system of promotion and free contract; technical training as a requirement; fixed salaries in $$. Gerontocracy and Patrimonialism are forms of traditional authority w/o a personal administrative staff of the chief. G is rule by elders, and P is where there's rule by someone designated by inheritance. There is still a general idea of everyone being a member of the group, though there is by no means equal distribution of power. With the development of a purely personal administrative staff, we get patrimonialism. Members of the group are now treated as subjects. A patrimonial retainer can be supported by: maintenance at his lords table, by allowances from the chief (primarily in kind), by rights of land use in return for services, by appropriation of property income, fees, or taxes, by fiefs. CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY The basis for obedience lies in the conception that it is the duty of those who have been called to a charismatic mission to recognize its quality and to act accordingly... it's a matter of personal devotion to the possessor of the quality. There is no legal wisdom oriented to judicial precedent. Charismatic authority is specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules. It repudiates the past, and is in this sense a revolutionary force. It is hostile to everyday economic considerations. It can only tolerate irregular, unsystematic, acquisitive acts. In traditional periods, it is the greatest revolutionary force. Reason is equally revolutionary, and works from without by altering the situations of action, or it intellectualizes the individual. Charisma may involve a subjective or internal reorientation which may result in a radical alteration of the central system of attitudes, a completely new orientation towards different problems and structures of the world. The Routinization of Charisma In pure form, charismatic authority exists only in the process of originating. It

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becomes either rationalize or traditionalized, or a combo of both for the following reasons: 1) ideal and material interests of the followers in the continual reactivation of the community 2) interests of the administrative staff, disciples or followers of the char'ic leader in continuing their positions, so that their own status is stable on a day to day basis. As soon as the position of authority is well established, and above all as soon as control over large masses of people exists, it gives way to the forces of everyday routine. There is an objective necessity of patterns of order and organization of the administrative staff in order to meet the normal, everyday needs and conditions of carrying on administration. In addition, there is a striving for security, requiring legitimation of positions of authority and social prestige and economic advantages held by the followers. The process of routinization is thus not confined to the problem of succession, and does not stop when it is solved. The most fundamental problem is the transition from the charismatic administrative staff and its mode of administration to one that can handle everyday conditions. Possible Types of Solution: 1) search for new charismatic leader on basis of criteria that will fit him for position of authority 2) revelation thorough oracles, lots, etc... legitimacy is then dependent on technique of selection, which means a form of legalization 3) by designation by leader of his successor 4) designation of successor by charismatically qualified staff, and successors recognition by the community... legitimacy can come to depend on technique of selection, again legalization 5) hereditary charisma... this may lead to either traditionalization or legalization (divine right, etc.) 6) charisma transmitted by ritual means from one bearer to another, or created in a new person... this may become charisma of office (eg, the Big Potato, the Pope himself). Routinization also takes the form of the appropriation of powers of control and economic advantages by the disciples. Again, it can be either traditional or legal, depending on whether or not legislation of some sort is involved. This is how we get differences between, say, the clergy and the laity. METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES OBJECTIVITY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL POLICY

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The purpose of this new journal (where this essay appeared) is ''the education of judgement about practical social problems'' and ''the criticism of practical social policy.'' Questions to be addressed: What is the validity of the value-judgements which are uttered by the critic? In what sense, if the criterion of scientific knowledge is to be found in the 'objective' validity of its results, has he (the critic) remained within the sphere of scientific discussion? In what sense are there in general 'objectively valid truths' in those disciplines concerned with social and cultural phenomena? The science of social institutions and culture arose for practical considerations, with the purpose of producing value-judgement as measures of state policy. Knowledge of what ''is'' was conflated with knowledge of what ''should be''; this was because natural laws and evolutionary principles dominated the field. This journal will try to reject this conflation, since ''it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which the directives for immediate personal activity can be derived.'' Value-judgements should not be eliminated, but subjected to scientific criticism. Science can help an actor choose between alternative ends by analyzing the appropriateness of a means for an end, and by providing information on what a desired end will cost in terms of the loss of other values. The acting person can then choose from among the values involved according to his own conscience or personal view. Science can show him that all choosing involves the espousal of certain values. Every science of cultural life must arrive at a rational understanding of the ideas which underlie every concrete end. Science can judge these ideas and ends ONLY according to a logical and historically defined standard of value which can be elevated to a certain ''level of explicitness'' beyond individual sentiment. Science can tell a person what s/he can do, not what s/he should do. Put another way, treating the ideas as a coherent system of thought, science can point out to an actor what is possible within his or her value system, and what would be contradictory to that value system. Problems of social policy are not based on purely technical considerations of specific ends, but involve disputes about the normative standards of value which lie in the domain of general cultural values. This conflict over general cultural values does not occur solely between 'class interests' but between general views on life and the universe as well (take that, Karl). It is NOT POSSIBLE to establish and to demonstrate as scientifically valid 'a principle' for practical social science from which the norms for the solution of practical problems can be unambiguously derived. While social science needs the discussion of practical problems in terms of fundamental principles, that is, the reduction of unreflective value-judgements to the premises from which they are logically derived, the search for a ''lowest common denominator'' of in the form of generally valid value judgements is not empirical, impractical and entirely

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meaningless. We cannot establish on the basis of ethical imperatives or norms for concretely condition individual conduct, normatively desirable cultural values. (57) Objective science must distinguish between value judgements and empirical knowledge, and try to see factual truths. However, value-judgements of the practical interest of the scientist will always be significant in determining the focus of attention of analytical activity (my values direct me in what I think are interesting or important questions or matters to investigate -- this gets called, value-relevance elsewhere: there is no harm, according to Max, in allowing your values, personal interests or social commitments to guide you in the selection of research topics; however, once you start researching, you need value-neutrality). This journal will pursue logical analysis of the content of ideals, while not ignoring how ideals motivate value-judgements. It will present social policy, i.e., the statement of ideals, in addition to social science, i.e., the analysis of facts. In nonscientific discussions of policy, it must be made clear where the investigator stops analyzing and where the evaluating and acting person begins to present his sentiments (make value judgements). Again, individual sentiments don't have to be eliminated, nor can they be, but they should be kept strictly separate from scientific analysis. ''An attitude of moral indifference has not connection with scientific 'objectivity'.'' As said before, every recognition of a scientific problem reflects specific motives and values on the part of the investigator. This journal, a good journal, will try to avoid developing on a character on the basis of the values of its common contributors. A social science problem is one which throws light on the ''the fundamental socioeconomic problem: the scarcity of means'' (64) For us, phenomena have the following cultural significance (since we are interested in socio-economic data), ''economic,'' ''economically-relevant,'' ''economically-conditioned.'' This journal (thus, by extension, our buddy Max), considers all of these as important since material interests influence all aspects of culture w/o exception (67). Our science, the science of economic cultural phenomena seeks particular causes for these phenomena, so it is also interested in historical knowledge. We want to investigate the general cultural significance of the socio-economic structure of the human community and its historical forms of organization (66-7). Treatment of these social problems will (hopefully) result in solutions for social policy. This limited scope (focus on the socio-economic aspect of cultural life) is deliberately one-sided, because general social science is ambiguous without some specification of the way in which this social is to be investigated. This journal is interested, however, in the economic interp of history, not the materialist conception of history as a causal formula (take that, Karl). Karl's materialist conception is popular among laymen and dilettantes (not to mention,

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so I hear, hat-wearing, feminist vegetarians) who are not satisfied until they find economic causes for every freakin' thing under the sun. The explanation of everything by economic causes alone is never exhaustive in any sense whatsoever in any sphere of cultural phenomena, not even in the economic sphere itself. We choose this one-sided approach, however, as a way to investigate cultural reality by specific technical means and using qualitatively similar categories (remember, though, material interests are found in every aspect of culture). There is no absolutely objective scientific analysis of culture independent of special and one-sided viewpoints according to which social phenomena are selected, analyzed, and organized for expository purposes. These view points are necessary in order to engage in an empirical science of concrete reality which seeks to understand the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary manifestations and the causes of their being historical so and not otherwise. The infinite multiplicity of life means that we can select only a segment of it for scientific investigation. Ideal Type: Formulated by exaggerating one side of reality, or selecting multiple aspects of reality and synthesizing them into a unified analytical construct. The analysis of reality is concerned, for Max, ''with the configuration into which (hypothetical!) 'factors' are arranged to form a cultural phenomena which is historically significant to us'' (75). The ideal type is derived inductively from the real world. You compare the type with empirical reality to see how it differs. Then, you look for the causes of the deviations. MAX WEBER: Methodology of the Social Sciences THE MEANING OF ETHICAL NEUTRALITY IN SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS --Value-judgements are practical evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to our influence. --In teaching, a lecture should be different from a speech, and teachers should not impose their ideas on their students simply because students are prevented from leaving and from protesting. There is no specialized qualification for personal prophesy, and for that reason it is not entitled to freedom from external control. Students should gain from teachers today: 1) the ability to fulfill a given task in a workmanlike fashion; 2) the ability to recognize facts, even those which may be personally uncomfortable, and to distinguish them from his/her own evaluations; 3) learn to subordinate himself to his task and repress the impulse to exhibit his personal tastes or other sentiments unnecessarily. --The unresolvable questionunresolvable because it is ultimately a question of evaluationas to whether one may, must, or should champion certain practical values in teaching, should not be confused with the purely logical discussion of the relationship of value-judgements to empirical disciplines such as sociology.

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--The distinction between empirical statements of fact and value-judgments is difficult. However, all recognizable value judgements should be made rigorously explicit to both the researcher him/herself and his/her audience. -- Weber does not believe in value free sociology, he believes in striving for value-neutral sociology --The specific function of science is to ask questions about the things which convention makes self-evident. --''Understanding'' explanations do justice to a person who really or evidently thinks differently. They are scientifically valuable 1) for the purposes of a causal analysis which seeks to establish the motives of human actions and 2) for the communication of really divergent evaluations when one is in discussion with a person who really or apparently has different evaluations from one's self. --The shallowness of our routinized daily existence in the most significant sense of the word consist in the fact that the persons who are caught up in it do not become aware, and above all do not wish to become aware, of the motley of irreconcilably antagonistic values that they hold... value-spheres cross and interpenetrate (18). --The discussion of value-judgements can have only the following functions: 1) the elaboration and explication of ultimate, internally consistent value-axioms, from which the divergent attitudes are derived. People are often in error, not only about their opponents' evaluations, but also their own. The procedure for this analysis begins with concrete particular evaluations and analyzes their meanings and then moves to the more general level of irreducible evaluations. It is not empirical and it produces no new knowledge of facts. It's validity flows from its logic. 2) deduction of implications for those accepting certain value-judgements which follow from certain irreducible value axioms when these axioms alone are used to evaluate certain situations of fact. This deduction depends partly on logic, and partly on empirical observation for the most complete casuistic analyses of all such empirical situations subject to practical evaluation. 3) determination of the factual consequences which the realization of a given practical evaluation must have: 1) in the event of being bound to certain indispensable means, 2) in the event of the inevitability of certain, not directly desired repercussions (these empirical observations may lead us to determine the end cannot be achieved, or that in its achievement there may be other, undesired consequences which make our end too dangerous to pursue. We may be made to reconsider our ends, means and repercussions, so that they become a new problem for us, or we may discover new axioms which we had not previously taken into consideration). --Problems in social science are selected by value-relevance -- relevance for values of the researcher/problem-selector. The task of a value-neutral science, once the problem of interest is chosen, is the reduction of, say, a communist standpoint to its most rational and internally consistent form, and the empirical investigation the pre-conditions for its existence and its practical consequences. This analyses, though, can never tell us whether or not we should be communists; no science can. Strictly empirical analysis can provide a solution to

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a problem only where it is a question of a means adequate to the realization of an absolutely unambiguous end. --When the normatively valid is the object of empirical investigation, its normative validity is disregarded. Its existence and not its validity is what concerns the investigator. --An example of what NOT to do: Because the state is tremendously important and has a great deal of power in modern life, people conclude that it represents the ultimate value and that all social actions should be evaluated in terms of their relations to its interests. This is an inadmissible deduction of a value-judgement from a statement of fact. Bad, bad, bad. POLITICS AS A VOCATION Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. First, a general chat on states. Politics is any kind of leadership in action (Class, Status, Party: remember, social clubs and grad school cohorts can have parties, just as states can). For this lecture, we will understand politics as the leadership or influencing the leadership of a political association, today (1918) a state. The decisive means of politics is violence. A state is defined by the specific means peculiar to it, the use of physical force. The state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Politics, then, means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state. The state is a relation of men dominating men by means of legitimate violence (you already know the three ways it can get legitimated, so I'm not telling you). Leaders may arise on those three foundations as well. How do the politically dominant powers maintain that dominance? Organized domination calls for continuous administration, requires that human conduct be conditioned to obedience to the power-bearers. It requires control over the material goods necessary for the use of physical violence. Thus, it requires control of the personal executive staff and the material implements of administration. All states may be classified by whether the staff of men themselves owns the administrative means, or whether they are separated from it (necesse. for bureaucracy). Now to chatting about politics as a vocation. There are two ways to make politics your vocation: you can live for it or off it. It you live for it, you make it your life in an internal sense, either because you enjoy power or because you serve some cause. If you live off it, you strive to make it your permanent source of income (cf Dan Rostenkowski). All party struggles are struggles for the patronage of office, as well as struggles for objective goals (see

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D.R. again). Setbacks in participating in offices are felt more severely by parties than is action against their objective goals. The development of politics into an organization which demanded training in the struggle for power, and int eh methods of this struggle as developed by modern party policies, determined the separation of public functionaries into two categories: administrative officials and political officials. Political officials can be transferred any time at will, and can be dismissed or at least temporarily withdrawn. Cabinet ministers often are much less in control of their areas than divisional heads, who are long-term, administrative appointees; a minister is simply the representative of a given political power constellation. The genuine official, even a political official, conducts his business sine ira et studio (at least formally, as long as the vital interests of the ruling order are not in question). To be passionate, on the other hand, is the element of the politician and above all of the political leader. ''Since the time of the constitutional state, and definitely since democracy has been established, the demagogue has been the typical political leader'' (96). The current state of affairs is a ''dictatorship resting on the exploitation of mass emotionality'' (107). Next to the qualities of will, the force of demagogic speech has been above all decisive in the choice of strong leaders. ''What kind of man must one be if he is to be allowed to put his hand on the wheel of history?'' (115). He must have passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion. Passion in the sense of matter-of-factness, of passionate devotion to a cause, to the god or demon who is its overlord. Responsibility to the cause must be the guiding star of action. For this, a sense of proportion is needed Warm passion and a cool sense of proportion must be forged together in one and the same soul. The politician must combat vanity, in order to be matter-of-factly devoted to his cause and preserve some distance, not least from himself. Lack of objectivity and irresponsibility are the two deadly sins of politics; vanity, the need to personally stand in the foreground, temps the politician to commit these sins. The final result of political action regularly stands in completely inadequate and often paradoxical relation to its original meaning (oh, cheery old Weber). Because of this fact, the serving of a cause must not be absent if action is to have inner strength. Exactly which cause looks like a matter of belief (117). Some kind of faith must exist in a politician, ''otherwise it is absolutely true that the curse of the creature's worthlessness overshadows even the externally strongest political successes'' (117). Then is a discussion of two ethics, the ethic of ultimate ends and the ethic of responsibility. They are fundamentally different and irreconcilably opposed. The ethic of ultimate ends, formulated in religious terms, is: ''The Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord.'' If an action of good intention leads to bad results, then, in the actor's eyes, not he, but the world, or the stupidity of

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other men, or God's will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil. The ethic of responsibility, on the other hand, requires one to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's action. The man who believes in an ethic of responsibility takes into account precisely the average deficiencies of people. He does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he will say, these results are ascribed to my action. On the other hand, the ultimate ends dude feels a ''responsibility'' only to keep his intentions good. In many cases, the attainment of good ends is bound up with the price of using morally dubious or dangerous means, and must face the possibility of evil ramifications. From no ethics in the world can it be concluded when and to what extent a good ends justifies ethically dangerous means and ramifications. (121) The ethics of absolutism goes to pieces on the problem of justification of means by ends. Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the salvation of the soul. If, however, on chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be damaged and discredited for generations because responsibility for consequences is lacking. A man following an ethic of responsibility will arise at a place where he must say, Here I stand; I can do no other. Here, the ethic of ultimate ends and the ethic of responsibility are supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man, a man who can have the calling for politics (127). THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WORLD RELIGIONS The world religions, to Max, are Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam, and they are chosen because they have a large number of followers, and for no other reason. He will also consider Judaism, since it is an important precursor to Christianity and Islam and because of its significance for the development of the economic ethic of the West. The term 'economic ethic' points to the practical impulses for action which are founded in the psychological and pragmatic contexts of religion. The religious determination of life conduct is only one of the determinants of the economic ethic. The religiously determined way of life is itself profoundly influenced by economic and political factors. Those strata which are decisive in stamping the characteristic features of an economic ethic may change in the course of history; nevertheless, as a rule one may determine the strata whose styles of life have been at least predominately decisive for certain religions. For example, Confucianism was the status ethic of prebendaries, men with literary educations who were characterized by a secular rationalism. Christianity began its course as a doctrine of itinerant artisan journeymen. It is not the case for Weber that ''the ruling ideas of any epoch are the ideas of the ruling classes,'' however. And, however incisive the social influences, economically and politically determined, may have been upon a

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religious ethic in a particular case, it receives its stamp primarily from religious sources, and most predominantly from the content of its annunciation and promise. One of the foci of religious ethics has been the evaluation of suffering. By treating suffering as a symptom of secret guilt and of a crime in the sight of G/god/s, religion has psychologically met a very important need. The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that he has a right to his good fortune. Good fortune wants to be legitimate fortune. Religion provides the theodicy of good fortune for those who are fortunate. Salvation religions are religions of suffering. Under the pressure of typical and ever-recurrent distress, the religiosity of a 'redeemer' evolved. This religiosity presupposed the myth of a savior, hence (at least relatively) a rational view of the world. In Judaism, the term messiah was originally attached to the saviours from political distress, as transmitted by the hero sagas. In Judaism, and in this clear-cut fashion only in it and under very particular other conditions, the suffering of a people's community, rather than the suffering of an individual, became the object of hope for religious salvation. The usual rule was that the savior bore an individual and universal character at the same time that he was ready to guarantee salvation to the individual and to any individual who would turn to him. The tribal and local gods, gods of the city and the empire, have taken care only of the interests that concern the collectivity as a whole. In the community cult, the community as such turned to its god. The individual, however, turned to the sorcerer and magician for help with his personal evils. Hereditary dynasties of mystagogues or trained personnel under a head determined in accordance with certain rules developed. Collective religious arrangements for individual suffering per se, and for salvation from it, originated in this fashion. The typical service of magicians and priests becomes the determination of the factors to be blamed for suffering; that is, the confession of sins. Where religious development was decisively influenced by prophecy, sin was no longer merely a magical offense: it was a sign of disbelief in the prophet and his commandments. While prophets have not generally been descendants of depressed classes, it has generally been the depressed classes who need a redeemer. Thus, most prophetically announced religious of redemption have been located in the lessfavored social strata. For these, such religiosity has been either a substitute for, or a rational supplement to, magic. The need for an ethical interpretation of suffering and of the meaning of the distribution of fortunes among men increased with the growing rationality of conceptions of the world. There have been three rationally satisfactory answers to questions about the basis of the incongruity between destiny and merit: Karma, dualism (from Zoroastrianism) and the predestination decree of the deus

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abscondidus (the absconded god; kind of a cool phrase). These solutions are rationally closed, and are found in pure form only as exceptions. Ecstatic states (orgies, quietistic edification, contemplative mortification, etc) have been sought first of all, for the sake of the emotional value they offered the devout. Rationalized religions have sublimated the orgy into the sacrament. Every hierocratic and official authority of a church fights against virtuoso religion and its autonomous development. The church is the holder of institutionalized grace, and seeks to organize the religiosity of the masses. The kind of empirical state of bliss or experience of rebirth that is sought after as the supreme value by a religion has varied according to the character of the stratum that was foremost in adopting it. The conception of the idea of redemption is very old, if one understands by it a liberation from sickness, hunger, etc., ultimately from suffering and death. However, redemption attained a specific significance only where it expressed a systematic and rationalized image of the world and represented a stand in the face of the world. Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the world images that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. From what and for what one wished to be redeemed, and let us not forget, could be redeemed, depended upon one's image of the world. Behind every religion lies a stand toward something in the actual world which is experienced as specifically senseless. Thus, the demand has been implied: the world order, in its totality, could, and should somehow be a meaningful cosmos. The various great ways of leading a rational and methodical life have been characterized by irrational presuppositions, which have been accepted simply as given and incorporated into life. What these presuppositions have been is historically and socially determined, to a very large extent, through the peculiarity of those strata that have been the carriers of the ways of life during its formative and decisive period. The interest situation of these strata, as determined socially and psychologically, has made for their peculiarity. Where prophecy has provided a religious basis, this basis could be one of two fundamental types of prophesy: exemplary and emissary. Exemplary prophesy points the way to salvation by exemplary living (usually contemplative and apathetic-ecstatic ways of life). Emissary prophesy addresses its demands to the world in the name of a god. These demands are ethical, and often of an active acetic character. The civic strata, conditioned by the nature of their life, which is greatly detached from economic bonds to nature, tend toward a practical rationalism in conduct. Their whole existence has been based on technological or economic calculations and upon the mastery of nature and man. These strata tend toward religions of active asceticism. Wherever the direction of the whole way of life has been

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methodically rationalized, it has been profoundly determined by the ultimate values toward which this rationalism has been directed. All kinds of practical ethics that are systematically and unambiguously oriented toward fixed goals of salvation are rational, partly in the same sense as formal method is rational, and partly in the sense that they distinguish between valid norms and what is empirically given. All ruling powers need legitimacy, which comes in three kinds... In the main, it has been the work of jurists to give birth to modern Western states, as well as modern Western churches. Jurists work in the realm of formal rationalization, they follow procedures, etc. With the triumph of formalistic (rather than substantive) juristic rationalism, the legal type of domination appeared in the West

CHOOLEY, CHARLES H. 'Primary Groups.' TS, pp. 315-18.

PRIMARY GROUPS Primary groups are characterized by intimate face-to-face associations and cooperation. Examples: family, play-group of childhood, community group of elders (practically universal). They are primary in several senses, but most importantly in that they play a big part in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. They give the individual his earliest and most complete sense of social unity, and form a comparatively permanent source out of which more elaborate relations spring. Intimate association leads to the fusions of individualities in a common whole, so that one's self for many purposes becomes the common life and purposes of the group. This wholeness is a 'we' in that it involves the sort of sympathy and identification for which we is that natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his/her will in that feeling. This unity is not usually harmony and love: it is always differentiated and usually competitive, admitting of self-assertion and appropriate passions, which are socialized by sympathy to the discipline of the common spirit. Individuals are ambitions, but the chief object of his ambition is some desired place in the thought of the others, and he feels allegiance to common standards of service and fair play. Besides the universal kinds of primary groups, there are many others whose form depends upon the particular state of the civilization. In our own society, people being mobile, form clubs, fraternal societies, etc. based on congeniality which

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may give rise to real intimacy. Primary groups reflect the spirit of their larger family -- eg, the German family reflects German militarism (where does he get this stuff?). Primary groups are the springs of life not only for individuals, but also for social institutions. For instance, peasants may form self-governing communes, which a continuations of clans. Human nature. Human nature are sentiments and impulses both characteristic of humans (rather than, say, iguanas) and common to people at large and not particular to any race or time. Particularly, it is characterized by sympathy, and things into which it enters such as love, resentment, and the feelings of social right and wrong. CHC's racist comment: There are racial differences, so that some large part of humankind is incapable of high social organization. But, the general impulses are common between us and even these lower peoples. 'Their faces shown in photographs are wholly human and many of them [even] attractive [imagine!]' We can also compare different stages in the development of one race (eg, Teutons to Germans). The fact that we can read literature from other epochs and still have sympathy with it shows the generic likeness of human nature. MOST IMPORTANTLY, human nature does not exist in individuals, it exists in groups or primary phases of societies, as relative general and simple conditions of the social mind. It is developed and expressed in simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies. This is the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and sentiments in the human mind in all societies. MAN DOES NOT HAVE IT AT BIRTH; HE CANNOT ACQUIRE IT EXCEPT THROUGH FELLOWSHIP, AND IT DECAYS IN ISOLATION. We must see and feel the communal life of family and local groups as immediate facts, not as combinations of something else (for instance, individuals). For every individual fact, we may look for a social fact to go with it. If there is a universal nature in persons there must be something universal in association to correspond to it. FREUD, SIGMUND 'The Libido's Attachments to Objects'and 'The Ego and the Superego.' TS, pp. 729-39. _________. 'Anxiety as Motivation' and 'Mechanisms of Defense.' TS, pp. 799-818. _________. 'Internal Sources of Behavioral Instability and Their Control.' TS, pp. 940-44. 'THE LIBIDO'S ATTACHMENT TO OBJECTS' TS 729-733 Libido is the means by which the sexual instinct achieves expression. According to Freud, human sexual life, or the 'libido function' goes through a series of successive phases before it is mature (when the body is ready to reproduce).

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Before this point, sexual life is composed of independent activities which seek 'organ pleasure' (729). the theory of libido and narcissism: Sexual instincts are more closely connected to the psychic condition of anxiety than the ego (self-preservative) instincts are(730). Narcissism is a psychic condition that occurs when the libido (typically attached to certain objects in order to gain some satisfaction from them) abandons its objects and sets the ego in their place (self love). Under normal conditions, the ego-libido can transform itself into object libido without difficulty and can subsequently be reabsorbed into the ego (731). Freud calls Narcissism the 'libidinal complement of egoism.' Egoism represents the non-sexual interests of the person concerned, whereas Narcissism involves the satisfaction of libidinal needs. When the ego completely gives itself over to a sexual object it gives its narcissism to the object as well as its altruism (the antithesis of egoism) (731). To provide a partial explanation for the causes of narcissistic neuroses such as dementia praecox (schizophrenia), Freud claims that the object libido should be able to transform itself into the ego libido. However, libido remains libido and is never transformed into egoistic interests. The withdrawal of object libido into the ego occurs every night before sleep and reverses its path upon a person's awakening. yet wen the libido becomes narcissistic and can no longer find its way back to its objects, this condition is pathogenic. overaccumulation of narcissistic libido is intolerable (732). The symptoms of schizophrenia do not appear to be exclusively determine by the forcing of the libido and the overaccumulation of it as narcissism in the ego. Other Symptoms may be traced back to the efforts of the libido to reach its objects again (733). 'THE EGO AND THE SUPEREGO.' TS 733--739 Freud begins this essay by listing some characteristics of the ego with regard to the id. he states that the ego uses borrowed forces to control the id and that the ego constantly carries out the wished of the id as though they were its own. The ego is closely connected to the consciousness, as evidenced by the intellectual operations it carries out in the preconscious, and by mental self criticism in the unconscious (unconscious guilt). The lowest (basest/corporal) and highest aspects of the ego can be found in the unconscious. However, typically corporal sensations are connected to the body ego. There is a higher level built into the ego -- the 'ego ideal' or the superego. The superego is less closely connected with consciousness than the rest of the ego.

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MELANCHOLIA: Melancholia occurs when an object which was lost has been reinstated in the ego. For instance, when a person has to give up a sexual object, a change in his ego takes place which reinstates the object within the ego. This way, the ego makes it possible for the id to give the object up. Hence, the ego's character is a residue ('precipitate') of abandoned object cathexes (cathexes are objects on which the ego concentrated its psychic energy at one time). The ego contains a 'record of past choices' which show up in one's character. Through the transformation of an erotic object choice into the modification of the ego, the ego can obtain control over the id and deepen its relations with it. Sometimes, the ego forces itself upon the id as a love object. This transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido implies an abandonment of external sexual aims. THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX When a boy is very young, he develops an object cathexis of his mother and as his feelings become more and more intense for her, he starts to regard his father as an obstacle. he wants to get rid of the father and develops an ambivalent relationship with him. The Oedipus Complex dissolves as the boy grows older. he must give up his object Cathexis with his mother. In order to retain some affection toward his mother, he starts to identify with his father. (by the way, this whole situation is analogous for the girl -- just switch the sexes in the explanation.) Bisexuality can result if the child retains some affection for the parent of the same sex. The relative intensity of the identification either with the mother or the father in any individual will affect the preponderance in him toward homosexuality or heterosexuality. The modification of the ego that takes place in the child during the dissolution of the Oedipus complex effects the formation of the superego. The superego has the task of repressing the Oedipus complex for the rest of the child's life. [Freud claims that the male sex has taken the lead in developing these 'moral acquisitions' (mastering the O. Complex) and that they have been transmitted to women through 'cross inheritance' (738).] The superego dominates over the ego in the form of conscience, and it is representative of the child's relationship to his parents. It is also the expression of the most powerful impulses expressed by the libido in the id. By setting up the super ego, the ego masters its O. Complex and at the same time places itself in subjection to the id. The ego represents reality and the external world; the superego represents the id and a person's internal world. Hence, no external vicissitudes can be experienced

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by the id except by way of the ego. These experiences, when repeated often, transform themselves into experiences of the id and are preserved through genetic inheritance. 'ANXIETY AS MOTIVATION.'TS 799-808 HOW ANXIETY ARISES IN THE HUMAN PSYCHE: First of all, the ego fears its super ego: 'The hostility of the superego is the danger situation which the ego must avoid' (799). The punishment meted out by the superego on the ego is an extension of the punishment of castration. The superego is the father impersonalized, and the dread of the father's threat of castration is converted to social anxiety or dread of conscience. To avoid such punishment, the ego obediently carries out the demands of the superego. if it is prevented from doing this, a distress results which is the equivalent of anxiety. Freud also discusses a newer conception of anxiety. through regularly repeated losses of objects, the ego has been prepared for castration -- hence, anxiety becomes the reaction to a loss or separation. (the first anxiety experience is separation from / castration of the mother) (800). Anxiety is something felt -- it is an affective state. It has three components: 1: a 'specific unpleasurable quality' 2: 'efferent or discharge phenomena' (Physical symptoms of nervousness) 3: the perception of these (800). An increase of excitation underlies anxiety, which discharges itself, thus creating the 'unpleasure element in anxiety. ------------------------------Freud likens anxiety in humans to the birth process. The newborn will repeat the affect of anxiety in every situation which reminds him of birth (802). Nonetheless, Freud admits that the earliest phobias of childhood do not trace back to the birth experience, and at this time he cannot explain them. The ego fears the superego's anger, punishment, and confiscation of its love. It responds to this fear with anxiety. Hence, the ego is the real seat of anxiety and is not expressed in the superego. The id cannot experience anxiety either, because it 'is not an organization and cannot estimate situations of danger' (804). Yet, processes are frequently initiated in the id which give the ego reason to develop anxiety. The earliest repressions are motivated by the ego's fear of two processes in the id. The first is when something happens in the is which activates on of the danger situations to which the ego is sensitive, and the second is when a situation analogous to the birth trauma develops in the id (804).

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In addition to these cases, anxiety develops as a discharge from an excess of unutilized libido (804). For women, the loss of love is a determinant of anxiety which contributes to the typically feminine condition of hysteria. for men, the threat of castration and the dread of the superego can be determinants of anxiety which lead to compulsion neurosis. Supplementary remarks on anxiety anxiety is undeniably related to the expectation of danger anxiety is related to neurosis True anxiety *true anxiety is related to a known danger which threatens from some external object Neurotic Anxiety *neurotic anxiety is in regard to a danger which we do not know *it stems from an instinctual demand *it is the internal repetition of the expectation of a trauma THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRIEF, ANXIETY, AND MOURNING *? When does separation from the object give rise to anxiety, to mourning, and to grief? The initial cause of anxiety, introduced by the ego, is the loss of perception of the object which becomes equated with the loss of the object. Whereas anxiety is the reaction to the danger which the object loss entails, grief is the reaction to actual object loss (807). * How the concept of psychic (inward/emotional ) pain has come to be equated with physical pain when an object is lost: When we feel physical pain in a hurting body organ, we put a cathexis on the psychic representation of that body part. (ie, we concentrate on it and it seems to have a role and image of its own in our bodies). In the case of psychic pain due to object loss, the idea of the object (which is highly cathected) plays the role of the hurting body part. this equates psychic pain to physical pain. the continuous character of the cathectic process brings about the same state of psychic helplessness as in anxiety, but it is expressed in the form of pain (808). *mourning The task of mourning is to carry out the retreat from the object (now gone) which was under cathexis. The painful character of this separation accords with the explanation given in the preceding paragraph. That is, the pain experienced during mourning is brought about by the unattainable, 'longingful' cathexis of the object (808).

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' MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE.' TS 809-818 REPRESSION Repression is a preliminary stage of condemnation. It is actually located between flight from an object and condemnation of that object (808). Its essence lies in turning something away and keeping it at a distance from the conscious (809). The first phase of repression is 'primal repression,' which consists in the psychical or ideational representative of an instinct being denied entrance into the conscious. With this first phase a fixation is established where the representative persists unaltered and the instinct remains attached to it (809). The second phase, 'repression proper,' affects mental derivatives of the repressed representative or other trains of thought which have connections to the repressed representative. Although repression hinders the instinctual representative's *entrance into the conscious, it does not hinder its existence in the unconscious. In the unconscious, the representative 'establishes itself further,' (809) puts out more mental derivatives, and establishes more connections (809). In fact, it develops more profusely if it is removed from the conscious. Repression does not withhold all the derivatives of what was primally repressed from the conscience. if these derivatives have become sufficiently removed from the repressed representatives (through distortion and the adoption of intermediate links), the have free access to the conscious (809). Characteristics of repression First, repression acts in a highly individual manner. Each single derivative of the repressed representative has its own effect. Second, repression is mobile. the repressed exercises a constant pressure in the direction of the conscious which must be balanced by an unceasing counterpressure. thus, the maintenance of repression requires a consistent expenditure of force. In addition, the mobility of repression finds expression in dreams (810). Though Freud admits that he understands little about the mechanism of repression, he makes the following assertions: 1: the mechanism of repression does not coincide with the mechanism of forming substitutes 2: the various mechanisms of repression have at least one thing in common: a withdrawal of the cathexis of energy (or of libido, in the case of sexual instincts) (812). How the ego, superego, and id relate in the process of repression

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Repression occurs in the ego when the ego (possibly at the behest of the superego) refuses to associate with the instinctual cathexis which has been aroused in the id. The ego, through the process of repression, is able to keep the reprehensible impulse from becoming conscious (812). Thus, as a result of repression the intended cause of the excitatory process in the id does not occur. ________________________________ *instinctual representative: an idea or group of ideas which is cathected with a definite quota of psychical energy (libido or self interest) coming from an instinct (811) DISPLACEMENT Freud analyzes displacement in the context of dreams and describes 'dream displacement' in the following manner: 'in the course of the dream work the psychical intensity passes over from the thoughts and ideas to which it properly belongs onto others which in our judgment have no claim to any such emphasis' (815). hence, dream content becomes unrecognizable. The more confused a dream appears to be, the more the process of displacement has had a hand in its construction. Freud claims that dream content can typically be traced to events which occurred the day immediately preceding the dream (the 'dream day.') In addition to displacement, condensation can also occur. In condensation, two ideas in the dream thoughts which have something in common are replaced in the dream by a composite idea. If displacement takes place in addition to condensation, an 'intermediate common entity' is constructed. This intermediate entity is a compromise between the two ideas and not a composite of them. PROJECTION Projection is a symptom of paranoia which can show up in homosexual fantasy. for instance, a man will claim he hates another man even though he loves him. He projects onto the other man an image of persecution as a reason for his hatred: ' I do not love him -- I hate him because he persecutes me.' Another example occurs in erotomania. A man claims: 'I do not love him -- I love her.' In the same need for projection, this proposition is transformed into: 'I do not love him -- I love her, because she loves me.' The third example occurs in delusions of alcoholic jealousy. Freud sets up a scenario where a man is angry at his female companion so he goes drinking with his male friends. he finds comfort in their company. In his unconscious, these men become objects of his libidinal cathexis. He will ward off these feelings with

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the following contradiction: 'It is not I who loves the man -- she (female companion) loves him.' Delusions of jealousy in women are exactly analogous: 'It is not I who loves the women -- he loves them.' (817) The fourth exempla of paranoic projection is megalomania: 'I do not love at all -- I do not love anyone.' This becomes transformed into 'I love only myself ,' or asexual overestimation of the ego. 'INTERNAL SOURCES OF BEHAVIORAL INSTABILITY AND THEIR CONTROL'TS 940-944 In this essay, Freud bases most of the discussion on his concept of guilt. He states that the normal conscious sense of guilt is due to tension between the ego and the superego and is the expression of the condemnation of the ego. guilt is present to high degree in two mental illnesses: obsessional neurosis and melancholia (942). In obsessional neurosis the patient's ego rebels against the imputation of guilt and the impulses which are being criticized by the superego never form part of the ego. In melancholia, the ego admits the guilt and submits to punishment by the superego.. The object of the superego's wrath becomes part of the ego through identification (942). In hysteria (a third mental disorder),the mechanism by which the sense of guilt is kept unconscious is as follows: the hysterical ego defends itself from the painful perception of the criticism of the super ego through repressive means. thus, the ego is responsible for the sense of guilt which remains in the unconscious. Guilt remains in large part in the unconscious. In many criminals, especially youthful ones, their unconscious guilt plays a role in the crimes they commit (942). In all of the above situations, the super ego displays its independence of the conscious ego and its closeness to the unconscious id (942). How does the superego simultaneously manifest itself as a sense of guilt and develop such severity toward the ego? In melancholia, the excessively strong super ego which has obtained a hold in the consciousness 'rages' against the ego with 'death instinct' (suicidal tendency). However, in obsessional neurosis, the patient never tends toward self destruction. His love impulses toward an object transform themselves into impulses of aggression against that object. Although these tendencies remain in the id, the super ego behaves as if the ego were responsible for them. the ego

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defends itself vainly against the forces of the id and the punishing superego through interminable self-torment and a systematic torturing of the object (943). How is it that in melancholia the superego can become a gathering place for suicidal tendencies? First, the more a man controls his aggressiveness, the more intense become the aggressive tendencies of his super ego against his ego. Second, the super ego arises from an identification with the father (desexualization/sublimation). After sublimation, the erotic component no longer has the power to bind the destructive elements that were previously combined with it, and these are released in the form of inclinations to aggression and destruction (943). The roles of the ego in relation to the id and the superego 1: All of the experiences of external life enrich the ego. The id is also an outer world to the ego and the ego strives to dominate it. It withdraws libido from the id and transforms the object cathexes of the id into ego constructions. With the aid of the superego, the ego draws upon experiences of past generations stored in the id. 2: The ego tries to mediate between the world and the id, typically by 'throwing a disguise' over the id's conflicts with reality and with the superego. However, Freud claims that this position midway between the id and reality often tempts the ego to become opportunist and false (944). Other important functions of the ego 1: the ego arranges the processes of the mind in a temporal order and tests their correspondence with reality. 2: by interposing the process of thinking, the ego secures a postponement of motor discharges from mental processes (943-4). HOBBES, THOMAS 'Of the Natural Condition of Mankind.' Theories of Society. Edited by Talcott Parsons et al., pp. 99-101. OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND. Hobbes begins his essay by illustrating how war comes about. There is really no difference so great between men that one man could claim a 'benefit' which another man would not also have equal ability to claim. But each men believes himself to be more deserving than any other. If two men desire a thing which they both cannot have, they become enemies (99). The principal causes of 'quarrel' between men are Competition (for gain), Diffidence (for safety), and Glory (for reputation). When men live in a state which

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lacks a common regulating power, they automatically live in a condition of 'war.' War is not only actual fighting, but also the potential to fight. This second condition exists whenever there is no regulator to prevent fighting (eg: American Indians). During War, there is no place for cooperation between men because they live with no security other than their own strength (100). During war, where every man is against every other man, the notions of right, wrong, and justice have no place. These are qualities that relate to men 'in society' and not 'in solitude' (ie: war). Law can only exist in 'society.' Thus, the passions of man and the actions which stem from them are not sins until a society exists to develop laws which forbid them (101). The fear of death motivates men to create the conditions for a peaceful society. Thus, pure reason suggests 'the Articles of Peace' and the 'Laws of Nature' which draw men into common agreement (101). LINTON, RALPH 'Status and Role.' TS, pp. 202-08. STATUS AND ROLE A status is the position an individual has in a particular pattern of reciprocal behavior between individuals or groups of individuals. As distinct from the individual who occupies it, a status is simply a collection of rights and duties (driver versus driver's seat). Generally, the status of an individual means the sum total of all the statuses he occupies. It is his position with relation to the total society. A role is the dynamic aspect of a status. When an individual puts the rights and duties which constitute his status into effect, he is performing a role. Status and role serve to reduce the ideal patterns of social life to individual terms. They become models for organizing the attitudes and behavior of the individual so that these will be congruous with those of the other individuals participating in the expression of the pattern. Ascribed statuses are those which are assigned to individuals without reference to their actual abilities, and can be predicted and trained for from the moment of birth, for example, sex, age, family relationship, class, caste, etc. But even with respect to ascriptive statuses, culture determines the status rather than biology. Achieved statuses are statuses, not assigned to individuals by virtue of birth, but left open to be filled through competition and individual effort. The majority of statuses in all social systems are of the ascribed type, which Linton considers necessary for the ordinary business of living. The social ascription of a particular status, with the intensive training that such ascription makes possible, is a guarantee that the role will be performed adequately, if not

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brilliantly. If a society waited to have its statuses filled by achievement, certain statuses might not be filled at all. Individual talent is too sporadic and too unpredictable to be allowed any important part in the organization of society. The ascription of status sacrifices the possibility of having certain roles performed superlatively well to the certainty of having them performed passably well. Achieved statuses get prominence in changing societies where development of new social patterns call for the individual qualities of thought and initiative. MAINE, HENRY 'On Contract.' TS, pp. 429-36 'ON CONTRACT' Maine traces the roots of the contract to ancient law through the history of jurisprudence. First, he argues, certain ceremonial aspects of ancient law are dispensed with or simplified. Then, the 'mental engagement' of the law isolates itself among technicalities. This mental engagement was called 'convention' by the Romans and it is the nucleus of a contract. A contract is convention plus obligation. Obligation is the 'bond' with which the law joins together persons in consequence of certain voluntary acts. The intermediary stages between convention and contract are shown by the different types of contracts in Roman law: Verbal, Literal, Real, and Consensual. The first two are self-explanatory. The Real contract, based on the delivery of an object of some sort, is significantly different from the previous two contracts because it is based on moral considerations rather than technical forms or customary habits. The Consensual contract consists of an obligation that is based on consensus, the mutual assent of the parties involved. The collective existence of every community is consumed in transactions based on consensual contracts since they are the most efficient. MEAD, GEORGE H. TS, pp. 163-617 ('The I and the Me'), pp. 739-40 ('Taking the Role of the Other'), pp. 829-30 ('Internalized Others and the Self'), pp. 999-1004 ('From Gesture to Symbol'). THE I AND THE ME (pp.163-68), Internalized Others and the Self (pp.829-30) (Both are about the play and the game) Mead is concerned with the process by which individuals construct the concept of self. The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his/her unity of self may be called the 'generalized other.' The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community. It is in the form of the

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generalized other that the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members: for it is in this form that the social process or community enters as a determining factor into the individual's thinking. Two important concepts of development of self are the play and the game. In play, the individual (Mead uses the examples of children or primitive people, gack!) takes on different roles and acts them out. The individual stimulates him/herself to the response which he is calling out in the other person, and then acts in some degree in response to that situation. He is calling out the generalized other. Play is very free-flowing and precedes the game. In the game, individuals enter into social activities and take on the attitudes of all other people involved towards him/herself and others. The game is more structured and is governed by rules, as is social behavior in general . The child must know what everyone is going to do in order to carry out his/her own actions. What goes on to make up the organized self is the organization of attitudes which are common to the group. Personality is possible only through community, and selves can only exist in definite relationships to other selves. TAKING THE ROLE OF THE OTHER (PP, 739-740) In the same way in which the individual is conscious of him/herself, he/she is also aware of the other. It is only through juxtaposition of self and other that an individual becomes self-aware. Consciousness of both the self and the other are equally important for the individual's own self-development and for the development of the organized society or social group to which he/she belongs. The individual reads the situation as both him/herself, and as the other, and responds, in action, words, gestures and behavior after placing him/herself in both roles. The immediate effect of such role-taking lies in the control which the individual is able to exercise over his/her own response. And thus it is that social control, as operating in terms of self-criticism, exerts itself so intimately and extensively over individual behavior or conduct, serving to integrate the individual and his/her actions into the social process. Self-criticism is then essentially social criticism. FROM GESTURE TO SYMBOL (PP. 999-1004) The vocal gesture has an importance which no other gesture has, but it still yet another way in which the individual calls out the other. Through the use of vocal gestures we arouse in ourselves those responses which we call out in other persons. While lower animals merely imitate each other in call and response, human beings do more with the exchange of voice and language, we do the generalized other thing. Thought is the difference between the intelligent conduct of animals and a reflective individual. Thought hinges on the internal exchange between self and the generalized other. For that thought to exist, there must be symbols- language. The vocal gesture is thus also a significant symbol. Response to a gesture confers meaning.

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The meaning of an object is the common response in one's self as well as in the other person. Meaning arises within the relation between the gesture and the subsequent behavior that is indicated by the gesture. Meaning therefore exists objectively (against the notion of an 'idea' or a state of consciousness). Meaning emerges from social acts and actions, and it develops in terms of symbolization. Symbolization constitutes objects which would not exist except for the context of social relationships wherein symbolization occurs. Social process relates the responses of one individual as meanings, to the gestures of another. MERTON, ROBERT K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 1968, ch. 2 ('Sociology in the Middle Range'), ch. 3 ('Manifest and Latent Functions'), ch. 4 ('The Bearing of Sociological Theory on Empirical Research'), ch. 5 ('The Bearing of Empirical Research on Sociological Theory'), ch. 6 ('Social Structure and Anomie'), ch. 10 ('Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior') ch. 13 ('Self-Fulfilling Prophecy'). ________. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Edited by Norman W. Storer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, ch. 1 ('Paradigm for the Sociology of Knowledge'), ch. 13 ('The Normative Structure of Science'), ch. 14 ('Priorities in Scientific Discovery'). SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE CHAPTER 2: SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE RANGE There are two tendencies in sociological inquiry which Merton finds unacceptable and attempts to criticize. One is radical or narrow empiricism which stresses solely on the collection of data without any attention to a theory. The other is the abstract theorizing of scholars who are engaged in the attempt to construct a total theoretical system covering all aspects of social life (e.g. Parsons). Merton proposes sociological theories of the middle range as a solution to the two extreme positions. According to Merton, middle range theory starts its theorizing with delimited aspects of social phenomena rather than with a broad, abstract entity such as society or social system. Middle range theories may seem to be similar to general, total theories in the sense that they also involve abstractions. However, unlike those in the general theories, the abstractions in theories of the middle range are firmly backed up by observed data. Middle range theories have to be constructed with reference to phenomena that are observable in order to generate an array of theoretical problems as well as to be incorporated in propositions that permit empirical testing (39). The examples of middle range theories are a theory of reference groups, of social mobility, of role-conflict, of the formation of social norms, etc. Merton's objective in proposing the notion of middle range theory can be summarized by his statement that: 'Our major task today is to develop special theories applicable to limited conceptual ranges -- theories, for example, of deviant behavior, the unanticipated consequences of purposive action, social perception, reference

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groups, social control, the interdependence of social institutions -- rather than to seek the total conceptual structure that is adequate to derive these and other theories of the middle range' (51). 'Sociological theory, if it is to advance significantly, must proceed on these interconnected planes: 1. by developing special theories from which to derive hypotheses that can be empirically investigated and 2. by evolving a progressively more general conceptual scheme that is adequate to consolidate groups of special theories' (51). Note: 1. see summary of pros and cons of middle range theory on p. 68 2. see definition and description of paradigm on p. 69-72 CHAPTER 3: MANIFEST AND LATENT FUNCTIONS In this chapter, Merton presents a review of chief concepts and modes of reasoning of functional theory. His aim is to improve functional analysis by pointing out its major problems and finding the way to remedy them. According to Merton, all variations of functional analysis always involve two major confusions. One is the tendency to confine observation merely to the contributions of items or practices to the social or cultural system in which they are implicated. The other is the tendency to confuse the subjective category of motive with the objective category of function. To solve these two conceptual confusions, Merton introduces two, new analytical concepts - i.e. the notion of multiple consequences and a new balance of an aggregate consequences to deal with the first problem, and the notion of manifest and latent functions to tackle the second (see summary on p. 105). 1. The Problem of an Overly Positive Interpretation The common tendency among functional analysts to advocate merely the positive contribution of certain items and practices to a social system is based on three fundamental postulates which Merton is to criticize. These three postulates are: 1. The postulate of functional unity of society, or the assumption that in any social system, there exists a certain kind of unity or solidarity which will 'benefit every single member.' Thus, in analyzing certain items or practices, such are always interpreted in references to this unity. Merton argues against this assumption, saying that one cannot assume 'full' integration of all societies since even a mere institution can tell that different societies do not have the same kind and degree of integration. However, to establish a statement concerning different kinds and a range of degrees of integration, one has to rely mainly on empirical findings, not on intuition. Finally Merton concludes that in regard to issue of functional unity, functional analysts have to specify which and what kind of social unit/system they are going to analyze. The reason is different social units always have different degrees of integration, and hence the manner in which certain cultural items or practices contribute to differing social units may not be similar. Besides, such items of culture must be recognized to have multiple consequences, some of them

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functional and others, perhaps, dysfunctional. 2. The postulate of universal functionalism (84), or the assertion that all persisting social and cultural forms are inevitably functional or having a mere positive function to a society (84). Against this postulate, Merton contends that we need to look for the negative or dysfunctional side as well as functional consequences of these forms. And if the sociological research is to have bearing on social technology, sociologists have to be able to assess the net balance of functional consequences, i.e. the sum between the benefit and disadvantage that a certain cultural or social form brings about. 3. The postulate of indispensability, which contains two propositions, namely: 3.1 the indispensability of certain functions, or the assertions that there are certain functions which are indispensable in the sense that unless they are performed, the society will not persist (87). This assertion sets forth a concept of functional prerequisites, or preconditions functionally necessary for a society. 3.2 the indispensability of existing social institutions and cultural forms, or the assertion that the presence of existing cultural or social forms implies their indispensability to a society. Like his earlier criticism of the first two postulates, the two assertions concerning the postulate of indispensability is refuted by Merton's concept of multiple consequences (i.e. functional and dysfunctional), and the new balance of aggregate consequences. 2. The Confusion Between Subjective Dispositions and Objective Consequences One of Merton's major contributions to the improvement of functional analysis is his distinction between manifest and latent functions. Merton states that such distinction is devised to preclude the confusion often found between conscious motivations for social behavior and its objective consequences (114). According to Merton, these two entities: motive and functions vary independently. One should not be confused the categories of subjective disposition with categories of generally unrecognized but objective functional consequences. Manifest functions refer to the objective consequences contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of the system which are intended and recognized by participants in the system. Latent functions, on the other hand, refer to those consequences which are neither intended nor recognized. Merton further clarifies that unintended consequences can be seen as having three sorts of functions (or three ways that they can be related to a social system). These are functional (beneficial), dysfunctional (harmful), and non-functional (irrelevant). Note: 1. see Merton's clarification of various meanings and usages of the term function which often cause conceptual confusion on p. 74-77. 2. see Merton's interesting discussion about how conservatism and Marxism can be seen as converging and diverging in regard to functional analysis. According to Merton, the logical structure of both conservatism and Marxism are similar in that such a structure is characterized by functional mode of reasoning. The difference between the two lies in their differing ideological content (see details in p. 91-96).

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CHAPTER 4: THE BEARING OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY ON EMPIRICAL RESEARCH CHAPTER 5: THE BEARING OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY The major theme running through these two chapters is the mutual relationship between theory and empirical research. The point that Merton aims to elucidate is how these two types of academic work are intimately connected as well as how one can be used to help develop or improve the other (and vice versa). In chapter 4, Merton's discussion centers on the nature and characteristics of sociological theory. Merton's discussion as such begins with his clarification of what sociological theory is like by analytically separating it from the other five scientific activities which a number of other scholars always confuse with theory itself. These activities are methodology, general sociological orientations, analysis of sociological concepts, post factum sociological interpretations, statements of uniformities. Merton, however, accepts that these five types of scientific work do have an intimate affinity to sociological theory. Yet, for the purpose of assessing the limitations and contributions of each, the six activities need to be kept distinct from one another because they significantly differ not only in terms of their scientific functions but also in terms of their bearings on empirical research. 1. Methodology Merton states that methodology should not be confused with theory. By methodology, Merton refers to the logic of scientific procedure, not a set of related propositions which characterizes theory. While methodology involves such issues as the design of investigation, the nature of inference, the requirements of a theoretical system, it does not contain the particular content of sociological theory. 2. General Sociological Orientations General sociological orientations involve broad postulates which indicate types of variables which are somehow to be taken into account rather than specifying determinate relationships between particular variables, i.e. determinate hypotheses. The bearing of these orientations on empirical research is to provide a general context for inquiry. They constitute the point of departure for the theorists in further developing specific, interrelated hypotheses (sometimes through the reformulation of empirical generalizations in the light of these general orientations: p. 142). 3. Analysis of Sociological Concepts 'An array of concepts does not constitute theory ... Its is only when such concepts are interrelated in the form of a scheme that a theory begins to emerge. Concepts then constitute the definitions or prescriptions of what is to be observed. They are the variables between which empirical relationships are to be sought' (143). Furthermore, conceptual clarification can sometimes help resolve antinomies in empirical findings. This can be done when such conceptual clarification leads to

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the reconstruction of data by indicating more precisely just what they include and what they exclude (145). 4. Post Factum Sociological Interpretation Post factum interpretation refers to the interpretation of data after the observations have been made rather than the empirical testing of a predesignated hypothesis. One should keep in mind that post factum explanations always remain at the level of plausibility. 5. Statements of Sociological Uniformities There are tow types of statements of sociological uniformities. One is the empirical generalization or an isolated proposition summarizing observed uniformities of relationships between two or more variables. The other is scientific laws of a statement of invariance. 6. Sociological Theory According to Merton, sociological theory refers to logically interconnected sets of propositions from which empirical uniformities can be derived. The function of a theory is to help ordering otherwise disparate empirical findings, also see details on p. 151-53. CHAPTER 5 Merton's thesis is that empirical research should not be seen as having the passive role of verifying and testing theory. In fact, empirical research does more than confirm or refute hypotheses. Merton points out the active role of empirical research. He states that empirical research 'performs at least four major functions which help shape the development of theory.' These functions are initiating a new theory especially when unanticipated, anomalous evidences are found, recasting a theory or exerting a pressure for elaboration of a conceptual scheme, refocusing a theoretical interest, and clarifying ill-defined concepts. CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ANOMIE One of the major critiques against functionalism is that functional analysis tends to be ignorant, if not unable, to explain system change (or social change in particular). In this chapter, Merton's objective is to counter such an attack by showing that even though functional analysis focuses its explanation largely on the order and maintenance of the system, it by no means exclude the system dynamics or the issue of system change from its theorizing. the system change, to functional analysts, can be seen as stemming both from the environment and the system itself. Internal change is a result of the 'malfunctioning' of the social system. This malfunction can stem from many causes, but among these causes, the one the Merton selects to elucidate is the conflict between cultural goals and institutional norms, both of which can be seen as either two of many elements or two analytical phases of social and cultural structure. Merton denotes cultural goals as a frame of aspirational reference defined firstly by social and cultural structure. Then institutional norms develop as a result of the same structure to regulate and control the acceptable modes of achieving these goals. The system is said to be in order or equilibrium in so far as these two

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entities are in agreement. Anomie or disorder arises when cultural goals and acceptable means defined by institutional norms come into conflict. Anomie generated by the conflict in social and cultural structure have an impact on individuals in that it constitutes the structural basis for different sorts of deviant behavior. Implied in Merton's argument is that once accumulated, anomie can move a society toward change via 'deviant agents.' According to Merton, there are five modes of adaptation by individuals within the society over which conflicts between cultural goals and institutional norms reigns. These are: 1. Conformity: the acceptance of both cultural goals and acceptable means defined by institutional norms. 2. Innovation: the acceptance of cultural goals, but such goals are attained by the use of means disapproved by institutional norms. 3. Ritualism: the excessive conformity to legitimate means with the ignorance of cultural goals which such means are to serve. 4. Retreatism: the passivity to both cultural goals and means approved by institutional norms. This may sometimes involve the withdrawal from the system. 5. Rebellion: the rejection of both cultural goals and institutionally approved means. Rather there is an attempt to establish new goals and means in place of the old ones. CHAPTER 10: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF REFERENCE GROUP BEHAVIOR The theme of this chapter centers on the relationships between a concept of relative deprivation and a theory of reference group behavior. Using the empirical data and some interpretive concepts in the book 'The American Soldier' to highlight such relationships, Merton also points out the reciprocal nature between concepts and theories in general. The Concept of Relative Deprivation According to Merton, the concept of relative deprivation has a kinship to such well-known sociological concepts as 'social frame of reference,' 'patterns of expectation,' or 'definition of the situation.' Relative deprivation is defined as a state of dissatisfaction resulting from the act of comparing one's own situation with that of others. By taking others as a significant point of reference, individuals can make three kinds of comparison. These are comparisons: 1. with others who were in actual association 2. with those who are in the same status or in the same social category 3. with those who are in different status or in a different social category or a combination of the three, i.e. with various unassociated others who are of a status similar in some salient respect and dissimilar in other respects (for details see p. 285, also see the discussion on Mead p. 292-5; 300-2). The Theory of Reference Group Behavior

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Merton states that the concept of relative deprivation can be regarded as a special concept in reference group theory. Here, Merton makes clear the difference between concept and theory, and the relations between the two. Theories, to Merton, need to have wider applicability than concepts. Concepts may describe phenomena in terms of their characteristics, but theories have to specify particular conditions under which these phenomenon are to occur, or not. The example of the concept of relative deprivation and the theory of reference group behavior may help to clarify the different functions of the two analytical works. Merton sees the concept of relative deprivation as helpful in clarifying what is counter intuitive. However, the power of such a concept in explaining phenomena is still inadequate since it cannot answer some questions, for example, under which conditions are associates within one's own groups taken as a frame of reference for self-evaluation and attitude formation, and under which conditions are associates within one's own groups taken as a frame of reference for selfevaluation and attitude formation, and under which conditions do out-groups or non-membership groups provide the significant frame of reference? Or if multiple groups or statuses are taken as a frame of reference by the individual, how are these discrepancies resolved? Theory of reference groups comes in at this point. To Merton, 'a theory must be generalized to the point where it can account for both membership- and nonmembership-group orientations ... In general, reference group theory aims to systematize the determinants and consequences of those processes of evaluation and self-appraisal in which the individual takes the values or standards of other individuals and groups as a comparative frame of reference (288).' In sum, even through concepts are a part of a theory, 'once the connection between concept and theory has been established, concepts can act as a catalyst quickening theoretical clarification and the formulation f problems for further empirical study (288).' Note: see reference group theory and social mobility p. 316-25, esp. the concept of anticipatory socialization (319-20). CHAPTER 13: SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY Self fulfilling prophecy, to Merton, is a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true. An example which would help clarify this notion of a rumor of insolvency once believed by enough depositors, would result in the insolvency of the bank. Merton sees the notion of self-fulfilling prophecy as having close connection with W.I. Thomas' notion of definition of the situation. Thomas states 'if men define situations as real, they re real in their consequences.' By the same token, selffulfilling prophecy can be seen as public definition of a situation that becomes an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments. Merton says that self-fulfilling prophecy 'is peculiar to human affairs. It is not found in the

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world of nature, untouched by human hands. Predictions of the return of Halley's comet do not influence its orbit. But the rumored insolvency of Millingville's band did affect the actual outcome. The prophecy of collapse led to its own fulfillment (477).'

THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE CHAPTER 1: PARADIGM FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE Knowledge is broadly defined as every type of idea or mode of thought and deals with the entire gamut of cultural products (e.g., ideas, ideologies, ethical beliefs, science, etc.) (pp. 7, 19). The sociology of knowledge is concerned with the relationship between knowledge and other 'existential factors' in society or culture (such as social position, class, role, values, ethos, etc.). Merton traces notions of the sociology of knowledge to classical theorists to differentiate his view from theirs. To sum their views regarding knowledge: 1.) Marx: base and superstructure; ideas have a material base 2.) Max Scheler: distinction between cultural sociology and the sociology of real factors 3.) Mannheim: explores variety of group formation and corresponding variety of perspectives and knowledge 4.) Durkheim: the genesis of categories of thought is to be found in the group structure and relations; the categories change with changes in social organization 5.) Sorokin: an idealistic and emanationist theory; knowledge is derived from 'cultural mentalities' These classical theorists have defined the relationship between knowledge and existential factors either in terms of causal or functional models or in terms of symbolic, organismic, or meaningful models. Merton also believes Znaniecki's concept of 'the social circle' is useful in this area. 'Searching out variations in effective audiences, exploring their distinctive criteria of significant and valid knowledge, relating these to their position within the society...constitutes a procedure which promises to take research in the sociology of knowledge from the plane of general imputation to that of testable empirical inquiry' (pp. 34-35). MERTON'S PARADIGM FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: 1. Where is the existential basis of mental productions located? a. social bases (e.g., social position, generation, mode of production, etc.) b. cultural bases (e.g., values, cultural mentality, etc.) 2. What mental productions are being sociologically analyzed? a. spheres of: moral beliefs, ideologies, ideas, social norms, etc.

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b. which aspects are analyzed?: their selection, level of abstraction, presuppositions, etc. 3. How are mental productions related to the existential basis? a. causal or functional relations b. symbolic or organismic or meaningful relations c. ambiguous terms to designate relations 4. Why related? Manifest and latent functions imputed to these existentially conditioned mental productions. a. to maintain power, promote stability, exploitation, provide motivation, etc. 5. When do the imputed relations of the existential base and knowledge obtain? a. historicist theories b. general analytical theories CHAPTER 13: THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE Merton is interested in one limited aspect of science as an institution and that is the cultural values and mores governing the activities termed scientific ('the ethos of science'). There are four institutional imperatives (mores) of science that derive from the institutional goal (the extension of certified knowledge) and the technical methods employed. These are: 1.) Universalism: claims to truth are subject to pre-established impersonal criteria, consonant with observation and with previously confirmed knowledge 2.) Communism: findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are assigned to the community 3.) Disinterestedness: even though the scientific community is characterized by high competition, there is a forceful structure of control to ensure integrity and reduce cheating and fraud 4.) Organized Skepticism: scientists are socialized to be critical Such institutional values and norms are transmitted by precept and example, reinforced by sanctions, internalized by scientists, and thus fashion the scientific conscience. CHAPTER 14: PRIORITIES IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY Here Merton analyzes priority disputes over scientific findings to elaborate the institutional mores of the scientific community that he outlined in Chapter 13. In addition to the four norms listed above, he explains how the emphasis on originality and humility play against one another in disputes over priority. Like other institutions, science has a system of allocating rewards for the performance

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of roles. These rewards are largely honorific (e.g. naming a discovery after the scientist or receiving the Nobel Prize). However, when such aspirations cannot be realized, deviant behavior may result (See discussion in Social Structure and Anomie). The more thoroughly scientists ascribe an unlimited value to originality, the more they are in this sense dedicated to the advancement of knowledge, the greater is their involvement in the successful outcome of inquiry and their emotional vulnerability to failure. Merton distinguishes between active and passive deviance. Examples of active deviance within the scientific community include fraud, forgery, 'trimming and cooking' (i.e. reporting only successes and not failures), plagiary, and slander against colleagues. Passive deviance includes retreatism, apathy, and fantasy. While Merton is careful to emphasize the rarity of deviance, he nonetheless stresses the weaknesses of value systems for maintaining social order. MOSCA, GAETANO. 'On the Ruling Class.' TS, pp. 598-603. ON THE RULING CLASS Mosca begins by citing several examples of ruling classes: Priestly aristocracies: develop in societies with strong religious beliefs and come to possess an important share of the wealth and political power. These groups tend to monopolize learning and try to control access to and dissemination of knowledge - as is seen in the frequent use of dead languages. Aristocracies of functionaries: develop where long-standing practice in directing the military or civil organization of a community creates and develops a class that is specialized in the art of governing. Heredity castes: governing class is specifically restricted to a given number of families and birth is the one criterion that determines entry into or exclusion from class membership. What ever the nature of the ruling class, however, Gaetano (gotta love that name) observed that: 1) All ruling classes tend to become heredity - in fact if not in law. In situations where entrance into positions of authority are determined by qualification theoretically open to all, it is often the case that only those with the proper kinship ties, wealth, influence, and resources (eg. 'connections' or a high-quality education) are able to gain entrance into such fields. 2) The de jure status of an established politically-dominant hereditary caste in a society was preceded by a similar status de facto. Groups in power will tend to attempt to establish a a formal hereditary basis of power through appeal to such authorities as supernatural origins which in later times takes scientific trappings (such as appeals to superior status with respect to social evolution). Any truly special qualities possesses by the aristocracy in question are most strongly dependent upon their particular upbringing, which cultivates certain intellectual and moral tendencies in them in preference to others. This helps to

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explain why aristocracies do not defend their rule on the basis of intellectual superiority along, but rather on the basis of their superiorities in character (such components of a moral order as will power, courage, pride, energy) and wealth. Mosca strongly opposes the validity of a truly heredity (ie genetic) basis for maintenance of power along family lines. If the evolutionary principle is valid (he asks) how does one explain the decline and loss of power of a ruling class/race (which in frequently observed) on the basis of organic heredity? Descendants of rulers should become increasingly better rulers - but this is not the case. Shifts in power actually are the result of an alteration in the constitution of power from such developments as a new source of wealth, changes in the practical importance of knowledge, or the rise of a new influential religion. Ruling classes decline inevitably when they cease to find scope for the capacities through which they rose to power, or when the talents and services they render loose their importance in the social environment. Whether by means of commerce and exchange of ideas with foreign peoples, a slow process of internal growth, or conquest by foreign invasions ruling classes are eventually overcome by the advent of new social elements that are strong in fresh political forces. Following a period of rejuvenation/revolution this new social group will work its way to the top of the social ladder and gradually acquire group solidarity and a monopoly on power - a monopoly they will seek to maintain by attempts to establish a heredity basis of rule. OGBURN, WILLIAM F. 'The Hypothesis of Cultural Lag.' TS, pp. 1270-74. THE HYPOTHESIS OF CULTURAL LAG The rapidity of change in modern life raises two important questions of social adjustment. 1) the adaptation of man to culture, or of culture to man; and, 2) adjustments between parts of culture. The various parts of modern culture are not changing at the same rate. Since there is independence and correlation between different parts of culture, a rapid change in one part requires readjustments in the related parts. For instance, industry and education are related. Each is a variable; if it is changes in industry that cause changes in education, industry in the independent variable and education the dependent. Unequal rates of change in interdependent parts of culture leads to what is called a 'maladjustment.' There is material culture (eg, food, houses), the rules for use of which are subject to laws, customs, beliefs, philosophies, mores, folkways, social institutions (nonmaterial culture). Those parts of the non-material culture which are adapted or adjusted to the material conditions we will call adaptive culture. Something like the family, which makes some adjustments to fit material culture, while some of its functions remain constant is partly adaptive.

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Changes in material culture lead to changes in adaptive culture, but sometimes there is a LAG. Sometimes old, hung-over customs are not only not satisfactorily adapted, but may also be actually social harmful. Adjustment in relative. A new non-material culture may be better adjusted to a new material culture, even though the old non-m culture was never perfectly adapted to the old material culture. There is seldom perfect adjustment or complete lack of adjustment. It is difficult to locate the period of maladjustment, when material conditions have changed but non-material culture has not yet adapted. It is hard to know when a piece of non- material culture, for instance a value, has changed (sometimes it has changed in some places and not others, etc.). It is also difficult to locate the point at which the maladjustment began, or, in other words, the point at which we should have had the new non-material culture (the new value, the new forest management policy, etc.). Now, for particular cultural forms, only parts of their functions are adaptive to material culture. Relationship to a particular material culture is only part of their purposes or functions (eg, the family's affectional function). Also, conceivably, changes in non-material culture could precede changes in material culture. The only example WFG gives is that we might institute a change in non-m culture as a form of adaptation to a foreseen change in material culture, if we had a very high degree of planning, prediction, and control. Never does he explicitly entertain the idea that changes in non-m culture could induce changes in m. culture. Non-m culture may change without being caused by changes in material culture. PARK, ROBERT E. 'Cultural Conflict and the Marginal Man.' TS, pp. 944-46. CULTURAL CONFLICT AND THE MARGINAL MAN Drawing from the work of Sumner, primitive societies can be though of as small ethnocentric groups scattered across a territory. Their size depends on the physical struggle for existence. The internal organization of the group is partly dependent on its size as well as its relation to all other groups. The loyalties which bind together the primitive society are in direct proportion to the intensity of the fears and hatreds with which they view their enemies/rivals in the larger intertribal or international world outside. With the expansion of the market came the transformation of primitive societies in to a wider and more rational social order - civilization. The movements and migrations that accompany this process bring about an interpenetration of peoples and fusion of cultures - with the result that there may be some people who stand in an ambiguous position to these different cultures.

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The Marginal Man: is such a person condemned to live at once within two different and antagonistic cultures. Among several examples of such a personality type, Park cites Simmel's Stranger 'who lives in intimate association with the world about him but never so completely identifies with it that he is unable to look at it with a certain critical detachment.' Park states that the notion of the marginal man is also based on the conviction that an individual's personality, while based on instinct, temperament and the like, achieves its final form under that individual's conception of him/herself. The individual's self-conception to the extent that is shaped by that person's particular social status/role, is not so much an individual as a social product. As the personality type of the marginal arises at a time and place there where is a significant merging of cultures and people, this person is often compelled to assume the role of stranger or cosmopolitan (see Ulf Hannerz's Cultural Complexity for a more detailed account of the cosmopolitan). Park noted, along these lines, that the marginal man is always the relatively more civilized human being. ROUSSEAU, JEAN 'On the Social Contract.' TS, pp. 119-25 ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT In this piece, Rousseau deals with the origin of society. I supposes that society originally came about when the primitive state of the human race was no longer adequate to provide for the subsistence and preservation of the human species. Some form of collective organization of individuals was necessary, but there arises the problem of how to get self-interested persons to act on the behalf of the common good without neglecting their obligations to provide for their own survival and needs. The answer is the Social Compact: a form of association that protects and defends with the whole force of the community, the personal and property of each individual. Although uniting with the rest each individual will still remain obedient to him/herself and remain as fully at liberty as before. This act of association converts the individual contracting parties into one moral collective body, subject to the direction of the general will. Rousseau believes that a person engaged in such an association can be viewed at the same time as: 1) a member of the sovereignty toward particular persons, and 2) a member of the state toward the sovereignty. It is in the interest of such a body politic that the supreme power (sovereign) should stand in the same position under the law as other members of society - ie the sovereign cannot impose laws which s/he cannot also break.

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The sovereign, in fact, is composed of the individuals of which the state is composed and can therefore not have interests contrary to theirs. An individual's particular will, however, may be contradictory or dissimilar to the general will, in which case it is the function of the social compact to compel this person's continued membership in the body politic. In this form of association, it is the case that an attack against one of the members is likewise an attack against the whole - and conversely an attack against the whole body injures the members. The transition of humankind from a state of nature to a state of society involves a very important change: the substitution of justice instead of instinct as the rule of conduct, and the attachment of morality to actions of which they were formerly destitute. By entering into the social compact, the individual gives up his/her natural liberty (ie. the unlimited right to do everything s/he is desirous of and can attain) in return for social liberty and an exclusive property in all those things of which s/he is possessed - as well as moral liberty. Natural liberty is limited by the inabilities of the individual, while social liberty is limited by the general will of the community. Under this form of community, property rights are determined not by might, but above all the right of prior occupancy which has the following conditions: 1) the property (Rousseau uses the example of land) must be unoccupied, 2) no greater quantity should be occupied than necessary for subsistence, and 3) possession should involve cultivation and not be merely a ceremony of taking possession. The right of the individual to her/his property, however, must be subordinate to the community's right over all. The social compact, rather than annihilating the natural equality among persons, substitutes a moral and legal equality to make up for that natural and physical difference which prevails among individuals, who although unequal in personal strength and mental abilities become equal by convention and right. Although an individual (the ruler or chief) may represent the sovereign, this person can not be the sovereign, which is composes of the individuals who make up the community. Along these lines, the general will can never guide the state in a direction disagreeable to the common good. Aside from being unalienable, the sovereignty is also indivisible - although politicians may at times try to give the illusion that it is not by dividing it in its objects (ie. into a collection particular departments and jurisdictions). It follows from the above discussion that the general will is always in the right and constantly tends toward the public good. It does not follow, however, that the interests of all individuals are equally attended by the public good. Disparity in information and communication, as well as partial associations tend to undermine the spirit of the general will. SMITH, ADAM

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'Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labor.' TS, pp. 104-06. _________. 'Of Wages and Profit in . . . Labor Stock.' TS, pp. 518-29. _________. Theory of Moral Sentiments. Liberty Classics, 1976, pp. 47-49, 54-57. OF THE PRINCIPLE WHICH GIVES OCCASION TO THE DIVISION OF LABOR The DOL is not the product of any foresight on the part of humans who recognize its many benefits. It is, rather, the gradual, necessary consequence of human nature's propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another. This propensity is common to all men, and found in no other animals. Though they may seem to bargain, they do not make fair and deliberate exchanges or negotiate terms. People depend on exchange relations, rather than affective relations to get the things they need to survive because they always need the help of many other people and life is too short to make that many friends. It is vain to expect other people to give you what you need out of benevolence: you must appeal to their self-love. You must show them that it is to their advantage and in their interest for them to do what you want them to do or give you what you need. Since it is by treaty, barter and purchase that we get from others most of the things we need, this 'trucking disposition' gives rise to the DOL. People have skills or propensities which make them better at some things than others (for whatever reason -- enjoyment, skill, etc.). People specialize in these things, and others want them, and are willing to trade the things they specialize in. 'Thus, the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labor... for such parts of the produce of other men's labor he may have occasion for... encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation.' However, the differences in skills we perceive are much less innate than they are products of habit, custom and education. The skill differences we see are often more a CONSEQUENCE than a cause of the DOL. If there were no 'trucking disposition,' everyone would have to do all the things necessary to survive, would have performed the same tasks, and so no division of labor would have given rise to differences of talents. OF WAGES AND PROFIT IN THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENTS OF LABOR AND STOCK There is a natural tendency to equilibrium in the employments of labor and stock in the same neighborhood, as long as people have perfect liberty oft chose their occupations and to change as often as they like. People seek advantageous situations and avoid disadvantageous employments. If one occupation were viewed as very desirable, lots of people would take it up and so wages would fall, so that it would be less advantageous and desirable.

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Now, wages and profit differ, according to different employments of labor and stock. But this arises partly because there are real or perceived differences in occupations and because economic policies do not 'leave things at perfect liberty.' INEQUALITIES ARISING FROM THE NATURE OF THE EMPLOYMENTS THEMSELVES. THERE ARE 5. 1) Agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employment (this may arise from difficulty, dirtiness, dishonorableness, etc.). Eg, miners get paid a lot because their jobs suck due to dirtiness and danger. Eg, People who work at jobs others pursue for pleasure (say, fishing) are less well paid because 'the natural taste for these employments makes more people follow them than can live comfortably by them' and since they produce so much, the profit that is collected by any one of them is small. 2) Easiness and cheapness or difficulty and expense of learning them. People have to be compensated for long, arduous and expensive educations (like grad school at U of C), and they must be compensated in a reasonable time. So, skilled labor is paid better than unskilled labor. The profits of stock seem to be little affected by the easiness or difficulty of learning the trade in which it's employed. 3) Constancy and inconstancy of employment in them. While some occupations may be easy to learn and not very dirty, if they are subject to inconstancy, they need higher compensation (eg, bricklaying). Someone with a hard to dirty, disagreeable and inconstant job that is low skill will sometimes make more than a skilled worker. The constancy or inconstancy of employment do not affect the profits of stock in any particular trade. Whether or not stock is constantly employed depends not on the trade, but on the trader. 4) Small or great trust which must be reposed in those who experience them. Eg, jewelers make a lot of money. As regards stock, trust is not a factor in profits. 5) Probability or improbability of success in them. 'The probability that any particular person shall ever be qualified for the employment to which he is educated is very different for different occupations.' Some occupations may have many entrants, because they are for other reasons very desirable: they maintain their high compensation rates because the failure rate is so high. People generally over-estimate their changes of success, since they are subject to 'overweaning conceit.' Risk or security also effects the profits of stock -- profits should rise with risk, though not necessarily in proportion to risk. Now, in order for this equilibrium thing to work, there need to be three other factors in effect. 1) the employments must be well-known and long-established in the neighborhood. Wages are high in newer trades, because people have to be enticed into them and profit levels are high to the first people who do them. As they become established, competition reduces profits. 2) They must be in their ordinary or natural state. Demand for labor can be seasonal, or related to other changing conditions (eg, we need more soldiers during wars). These quirky demand fluctuations will effect wages. With regards to

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stock profits, variations in the market prices of some commodities arise from accidental variation in the demand (public mournings raise the price of black cloth, so profits temporarily increase). Other commodities cannot be produced in known, fixed quantities (since they rely on weather rather than machines: eg, wheat), price and profit fluctuations here happen more often. 3) They must be the sole or principal employment of those who hold them. If a person is able to subsist in an employment that doesn't take most of his time, he will work at another job at wages lower than that job would normally command. INEQUALITIES OCCASIONED BY THE POLICY OF EUROPE Policies set things at inequality, in Europe during old Adam's time in the following three ways. 1) restraining competition to a smaller number than would ordinarily enter. Eg, exclusive privileges of corporations which restrict entrance to apprenticeships. Long term apprenticeships do this indirectly by increasing expense of education. Long apprenticeships are also bad because they make people lazy: people achieve an aversion to labor if for a long time they receive no benefit from it. Also, people of the same trade should not be encouraged by the government to meet together, because then they collude to screw us all over; thus, public registers of trade members are bad. Corporations (in this usage, guilds type things) do not better discipline trade. Workmen are disciplined by their customers, corps weaken the force of this discipline, since they require some workers to be hired whether they're good or not. 2) increasing competition beyond what it would naturally be. Pensions and scholarships and such things encourage more people to enter training for some occupations than would otherwise try to. All these people reduce wages because people, in exchange for employment, are willing to accept wages lower than those deserved due to their training. 3) obstructing free circulation of labor and stock, both from employment to employment and place to place. Apprenticeship does this, by preventing movement from place to place. Corporations' exclusive privileges do it, but obstructing movement of workers between different employments (occupations). OF THE SENSE OF PROPRIETY (47-49 AND 54-57) OF SYMPATHY How ever selfish people may be supposed to be, there are some principles in human nature which lead people to be interested in the fortunes of other and make others' happiness necessary to them, even though they receive nothing from it but the pleasure of seeing it. Pity and compassion are sentiments like that. Though we have no direct experience of how another feels, we conceive how we ourselves should feel in their situation. By imagination, we represent to ourselves what would be our own feelings if we were undergoing the same things. This imagining of being in the

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same situation, depending on the vivacity or dullness of the imagining, brings forth in us some degree of the same emotion as the person who is actually experiencing the pain or distress. This springing up of analogous emotions happens for all passions, not just pain and suffering. In every passion of which the mind of man is susceptible, the emotions of a bystander always correspond to what, by bringing the case home to himself, he imagines should be the sentiments of the person actually in the situation. OF THE PLEASURE OF MUTUAL SYMPATHY Again, our feelings of pleasure and pain are not always derived from selfinterested considerations. The correspondence of people's sentiments with our own is a cause of pleasure, and their lack of correspondence can be a cause of pain. The correspondence of others feeling to our own does not have this effect only because it enlivens our own feelings. For instance, sympathy enlivens joy and alleviates grief. We are more anxious to communicate to our friends our disagreeable than our agreeable passions. Because agreeable passions can satisfy and support the heart without any auxiliary pleasure. However, the bitter and painful emotions of grief and resentment more strongly require the healing consolation of sympathy. When we do tell someone our sorrows, it enlivens our own sorrow; however, the sweetness of the other's sympathy compensates for the bitterness of our sorrow, and so makes us feel better. Conversely, the cruelest insult that can be offered to the unfortunate is to make light of their calamities. Also, it is always disagreeable to us when we feel we cannot sympathize with someone else's sorrows; so, since we cannot enter into his or her grief, we are shocked by it and call it weakness. If we cannot go along with someone's joy, we call it folly or silliness. SPENCER, HERBERT 'The Nature of Society.' TS, pp. 139-43. THE NATURE OF SOCIETY Spencer argues that society is an entity which exists beyond the individuals which comprise it. It has a permanence to it which transcends the individual members. It also has a permanence. Spencer also sees society as organic in the sense that it resembles an organism. The three factors which society shares with an organism are:

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1. continuous growth ( also called integration) 2. differentiation ( from homogeniety to heterogeneity) 3. division of labor (increased coherence, mutual dependence) As societies grow, they become fixed and gain in definiteness. Spencer describes the process of growth as a series of successively larger social groupings which come about from the aggregation and re-aggregation of smaller socities. Underdeveloped societies are characterized by a low Div. of labor, while developed societies have a higher div. of labor and a higher integration of functions. Development of div of labor is able to take place only after society develops an advanced communication system and a distributive goods system. Lastly, societis can be classified as either militant or industrial. Militant societies are based on compulsory co-operation. Industrial socities are based on voluntary co-operation. THOMAS, W. I., AND ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN 'On Disorganization and Reorganization.' TS, pp. 1292-97. ON DISORGANIZATION AND REORGANIZATION Thomas and Znaniecki address the problem of how to reconcile the stability of social systems with the efficiency of individual activities. In early societies, individual efficiency was completely subordinated to the demand for social stability. Under these conditions, spontaneous social evolution was possible only by a series of small changes taking place from one generation to the next. However, when the primary group was brought rapidly into contact with the outside world with its new and rival schemes, the entire old organization was apt to break down (e.g. European immigrant). With the growing social differentiation and the increasing wealth and rationality of social values, the complex of traditional schemes (such as religion, state, industry, science, etc.) constituting the civilization of a group becomes subdivided into several independent complexes. No social complex, though, can regulate all the activities of that group, so each complex contends with others for supremacy within a group. The individual can no longer to be expected to make all these complexes his/her own; s/he much specialize. Thus, the antagonism between social stability and individual efficiency is further complicated as each complex tends to organize personal life exclusively in view of its own purposes. A traditional fixation of special complexes which requires efficiency does not solve this problem because it does not correspond to the spontaneous tendencies of individuals for two reasons. First, the individual may completely accept the social complex and drift toward routine and hypocrisy, which are unproductive. Or, second, the individual may reject certain schemes in the complex. This happens because many complexes are not chosen by the individual but ascribed according to position at birth (e.g., gender, race, etc.) or a role he takes later in

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life (e.g., marriage, profession). When this happens, the person must reject the entire complex, thus becoming a rebel. The individual then ends up passing form one system to another, again leading to unproductivity. Though these conditions are still predominant in civilized society, they cannot last long in modern times because of the development of a different type of social organization that puts higher demands on individual efficiency rather than individual conformity. On the one hand, increasing specialization can no longer constitute a sufficient basis for individual life organization in any field. On the other hand, there is a continually growing field of common values and common interests that is wide enough to make every specialized individual realize the narrowness of his/her specialty and to open before him/her wide horizons of possible new experiences. Thus there is an increasing tendency for 'vagabondage' (e.g., change of residence, profession, religion, etc.) or 'escapism' (e.g., novels, movies, alcohol, etc.). Given these changes, the individual must be trained not for conformity or stability, but for efficiency and creative evolution. The task of future society is to teach every individual how to become a dynamic, continually growing and creative personality. Such methods can only be found in socio-psychological studies of people. TOCQUEVILLE, ALEXIS DE Democracy in America. Garden City NY: Anchor Books, 1969, vol. 1, pt. 1 (chs. 4, 5), pt. 2 (chs. 1, 2, 4): pp. 58-98, 173-79, 189-95. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA A note (or disclaimer) on this text: as far as academic works go, Democracy in America is fairly readable and chock-full of interesting observations and insights on the state of American society as seen through the eyes of a visiting Frenchman over 150 years ago. Tocqueville addresses a number of intriguing issues - some are still relevant today, while others no longer pertain to the state of the nation as it has developed since the writing of this text. One important thing to keep in mind about this this text is that it is not a grand theoretical tome in the sense that we might think of Economy and Society or Kapital. There is no coherent unifying theoretical perspecitive to thread Tocqueville's observations together, although he does return to several themes repeatedly throughout - one important one being the sovereignty of the people. With chapters in Democracy in America ranging anywhere between two paragraphs and over one-hundred pages, it does pose some difficulties for summarizing. What I have tried to do below is capture the main points and important observations from the selections assigned. Without having to read more of the book, I think this is probably the most sensible way to approach Tocqueville - at least for the prelims.

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THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE IN AMERICA (PART I: CHAPTER 4) Tocqueville identifies the 'dogma of the sovereignty of the people' as one of the most important components underlying the nature of the American people. Unlike other nation, the sovereignty of the people is not hidden nor sterile, but recognized by the mores and laws of the nation alike. It spreads with freedom and attains unimpeded its ultimate consequences. This principle was one of the creative principles of most of the English colonies, although it can to dominate the governments of society much more strongly as time passed. In their early years, colonies were under the influence of the motherland, so that rather than being proclaimed ostensibly in the laws, this principle was hidden in provincial assemblies - particularly the township. Certain pseudo-aristocratic influences (education in New England and wealth in the South), however, acted to keep the exercise of social power concentrated in a few hands. But the American Revolution brought the principle of sovereignty out of the township and with victory this ideal became the law of the land. The impulse toward democracy was irresistible - even those of the upper class (whose interests were most impaired by the equalitarian principle) lent support to the movement in order to gain the goodwill of the new democratic order. Tocqueville cites as an example of this democratic spirit the expansion of the franchise which he believes will inevitably reach universal suffrage once concessions begin to be made. Tocqueville is greatly enchanted by the degree to which the people act in governing society: in the United States 'society acts by and for itself. There are no authorities except within itself.' He further comments on the dependence on the political administration to the people as the source of its custodial sovereign power (almost a stewardship): 'The people reign over the American political world as God rules over the universe.' THE NEED TO STUDY WHAT HAPPENS IN THE STATES BEFORE DISCUSSING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION (PART I: CHAPTER 5) The federal government was the last to take shape in the US; the political principles on which it was based were already spread throughout society before its time, existed independently of it, and only had to be modified to form the republic. The great political principles which rule American society grew up in the states. Political and administrative life grew up in three active centers: township, county, and state. The independence of the township is the most difficult to establish, as the township is most susceptible to the encroachments of authority. Local institutions, however, put liberty within the people's reach and teach them to appreciate and to make use of it. Tocqueville says that 'local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science.' Tocqueville takes the New England township as a model. The people exercise

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their authority as the supreme source of power most directly at the level of township. Here, where both law and administration are closest to the governed, the representative system has not been adopted (as it has at the state level). The public duties of the township are extremely numerous and minutely divided, but carried out only under the minimal administration of a few 'selectmen' elected yearly. It is the responsibility of these officials to call meetings and generally administer the will of the people. Q: In American society where all individuals are assumed to be as educated, virtuous, and powerful as their fellows, what is the basis of obedience to society? A: The individual obeys society because union with his/her fellows seems useful and such a union is impossible without a regulating authority So in the United States municipal liberty derives straight from the dogma of the sovereignty of the people. The township is subordinate to the state in much the same way as the individual to larger society. The township is generally autonomous, subordinate only in respect to larger interests that are the specific concern of that state. In essence, townships (like individuals) surrender a portion of their powers to the state for the benefit of the state (society) which will further serve its interests on a broader scale. A municipal spirit exists in the townships, as individuals' interests are excited by the sources of independence and power they recognize there. Attachment to the township does not derive so much from the township as place of birth as it does from the view of the township as a free, strong corporation of which an individual is part and which is worth the trouble of trying to direct. This municipal spirit is, further, a force of social cohesion that promotes attachment to place, order, and public tranquillity. A major characteristic of the American system of government is the wide distribution of power at the local level - shared among numerous people across many municipal duties. Tocqueville likens patriotism to a sort of religion strengthened by practical (civil) service. The county is not a 'natural' community in the sense of the township - there is no necessary relationship between its constituent townships, nor a common history, tradition, or communal life that holds it together. The county is, however, the primary judicial center - the township being too small for the administration of justice to be included among its functions. Administration Tocqueville notes the apparent lack of administrative hierarchy in America which he finds strongly contrasts a more European (ie French) model of government. In America, along with the high degree of freedom comes a more varied and diffuse social obligation than exists in other societies. The right to exercise social power has been divided up so that although the authority is great the officials are small (so to speak). Tocqueville, in fact, comments on the relative absence of a central authority above the township level. It is the legislative power based on popular sovereignty that coordinates the administration - by setting forth a detailed set of strictly defined obligations of the administrative officials.

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Society has only two ways of making officials obey its laws: 1) entrust them with discretionary power to control all the others and dismiss them if they disobey, or 2) give the courts power to inflict judicial penalties on offenders. The courts are the only possible intermediary between the central power and an elective administrative body. They alone can force the elected official to obey the law without infringing on the voter's rights. Therefore the extension of judicial power should be correlative to the extension of elected power to insure the stability of the state. All possible offenses that a public official can commit must fall into one of the following headings: - failure to perform what the law commands without zeal or eagerness - failure to do what the law commands - doing what the law forbids There must be some positive recognizable fact to serve as the basis of judicial action. Some regional variations in administration: - the further south: the less active is municipal life, the less direct the influence of the population on public affairs; town meetings are less frequent and deal with fewer matters; the power of the elected official is relatively greater and that of the voter less - farther away from New England - the more the county tends to take the place of the township as the as the center of communal life; the county becomes the administrative center and intermediary between the government and the common citizen Generally speaking, Tocqueville finds that perhaps 'the most striking feature of American public administration is its extraordinary decentralization. The Legislative Power of the State is entrusted to two bodies: 1) the Senate: generally a legislative body, but which may at times become an administrative or judicial one. 2) the House of Representatives: has no share in administrative power and its only judicial function is to prosecute public officers before the Senate. The purpose of the bicameral system was not to set up one house as an aristocratic body and the other as the representative of democracy, but rather to slow down the movement of the political assemblies and create an appeal tribunal for the revision of laws. The Executive Power of the State is represented by the governor who stands beside the legislature as moderator and advisor, armed with a suspensive veto. Further roles of the governor include commander of the militia, head of the armed forces and appointing justices of the peace. Tocqueville states that in America there is no administrative centralization, but very great centralization of government. Government centralization involved the concentration in one place or under one directing power of those interests that

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are common to all parts of the nation (such as enactment of general laws, national relations with foreigners). Administrative centralization, however, deals with those interests of special concern to certain parts of the nation (such as local enterprise). The former (broadly speaking) is good, and necessary for national viability. the latter in itself is bad and although it may be effective in mobilizing resources, ultimately diminishes civic spirit. Tocqueville believes that the in the case of an enlightened population aware of their own interests the collective force of the citizens will always be better able to achieve social prosperity than the authority of the government (he believed this was the case in America). However enlightened and wise a central power might be, it is never adequately equipped to alone oversee all the details of the life of a great nation. Tocqueville credits the accomplishments of the US not to an enlightened government apparatus, but rather to strong, zealous, robust, and ambitious democratic people. What Tocqueville most admires about America is not the administrative, but the political effects of decentralization. Each citizen takes pride in the nation and its successes, feels genuinely connected to it, and is more likely to become involved in and take a personal stake in issues commonly thought of as social (as opposed to individual). Further, while a European official stands for force, to an American the official stands for right. As is clear in other sections of this text, Tocqueville is concerned with the potential for development of despotism within contemporary nations. He believes that democratic nations are particularly susceptible to fall prey to the despot. But among possible safeguards, he views provincial institutions and liberties as among the most effective - characteristics which he counts among America's most important features. WHY PEOPLE GOVERN IN THE UNITED STATES (PART II: CHAPTER 1) In America the people appoint both those who make the laws and those who execute them; the people form the jury which punishes breaches of the law. The majority rules in the name of the people. PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (PART II: CHAPTER 2) Parties take shape when there are differences between the citizens concerning matters of equal importance to all parts of the country, as is the case with the general principles of government. Tocqueville views parties as an evil inherent in free governments - which may under certain circumstances be the cause of considerable social disorder and conflict. Great parties are those more attached to principles than to consequences, to generalities rather than to particular cases, to ideas rather than personalities. Small parties are generally without political faith; neither elevated nor sustained by lofty purposes; the selfishness of their character is openly displayed in their actions. America once had great

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parties, but they no longer exist. After the Revolution two great parties - the Federalists and the Republicans - entered into conflict over very general significant and consequential debates over how the government of the United States should be organized. This period was characterized by the virtue and talent of leaders on both sides who were genuinely concerned with matters of principle. In Tocqueville's time, however, he believed that the parties that threatened the Union relied not on principles but material interests (especially as divided along North/South lines on matters of tariffs and slavery). POLITICAL ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES (PART II: CHAPTER 4) Tocqueville believes that America has made better use of association as a powerful form of political action applied to a variety of aims than any other nation. This lies in the fact that in the US there are numerous permanent associations formed by the sheer initiative of individuals above and beyond those instituted by law. The spontaneous association of individuals arises from specific needs, whether that need be traffic control, organization of festivities, or combating moral troubles. There are, broadly speaking, three stages of association: 1) Association simply as public and formal support of specific doctrines by a certain number of individuals who have undertaken to cooperate in a stated way to make these doctrines prevail. 2) Freedom of assembly: a political association is allowed to form centers of action at certain important places in the country and eventually its activity becomes greater and its influence more widespread. 3) Use of associations in the sphere of politics; an application of the representative system to one party Freedom of the Press is both the principle and constitutive element of freedom in the modern world. The unlimited freedom of association, however, must not be entirely identifies with the freedom to write - for the former is both less necessary and more dangerous than the latter. In countries where associations are free, secret societies are unknown. Therefore, there are factions in America, but no conspirators (but don't ask Oliver Stone about that). Aside from individual freedom of action, Tocqueville considers the right of association the most inalienable of rights. Unlike associations in other countries, those in America are characterized by action as well as discussion. Citizens in America who form minority associations do so in order to: 1) show their numbers and lessen the moral authority of the majority; and 2) stimulate competition, to discover the arguments most likely to make an impression on the majority. Generally speaking, political associations in the US are peaceful in their objectives and legal in their means. TOENNIES, FERDINAND

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'Gemeinschaft and Gessellschaft.' TS, pp. 191-201. GEMEINSCHAFT AND GESELLSCHAFT Toennies classifies all human relationships in two types: living organisms and mechanical constructions. Those he sees as living organisms are the relations of Gemeinschaft, characterized by real, organic life and representing community, family, and private relations. Mechanical constructions are the relations of Gesellschaft, which are imaginary and constructed. They represent public life and society, characterized by the coexistence of independent people. Gemeinschaft exists wherever humans are related organically through their wills. In Gemeinschaft, the perfect unity of human wills as a natural condition exists despite actual separation between people. there are three types of Gemeinschaft relationships: Kinship, Friendship, and Neighborhood. Kinship Gemeinschaft is based on Family; the strongest relationship being between mother and child, then husband and wife, and then siblings. Gemeinschaft also exists between father and child, but this relationship is less instinctual than that of mother and child. However, the father-child relationship is the original manifestation of authority within Gemeinschaft. Kinship develops and differentiates into the Gemeinschaft of Locality, which is based on a common habitat. there is also Friendship, or Gemeinschaft of the mind, which requires a common mental community (eg: religion). In Gemeinschaft, authority arises from the common will and typically represents service to the people. Nonetheless, through increased or diminished duties and rights of authority, real inequalities can develop. However, they can only be increased to a certain limit until the unity of Gemeinschaft is dissolved. Understanding in Gemeinschaft is a reciprocal sentiment, representative of people's particular will. it binds humans to a totality. From it comes natural law, which is an order of group life which assigns a function to every individual's will and incorporates his duties and privileges. language is the real instrument of understanding; it is a system of agreed upon symbols which stems from affectionate relations between people. The three foundations of Gemeinschaft -Kinship, Locality, and Friendship, are also the three sources of understanding. Gesellschaft, 'deals with the artificial construction of an aggregate of human beings which superficially resembles the Gemeinschaft in so far as the individuals peacefully live together' (197). yet whereas in Gemeinschaft people are united in spite of all separating factors, in Gesellschaft people are separated in in spite of all uniting factors. like Hobbes' vision of a society without authority, people live in constant tension against all others. Although the wills and spheres of individuals are in many relations with each other, they remain independent and devoid of familiar relationships. Toennies uses the concept of commercial exchange to illustrate this type of social order.

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In order for an object (commodity) to have value in Gesellschaft, it must be possessed by one party to the exclusion of another and be desired by that other. The cost of an object is represented by labor, wherein each individual chooses to produce the commodity which is easiest for him to make. Thus in Gesellschaft, individuals seem to be working for the totality but are also pursuing their own interests. Gesellschaft consists of a group of people who are capable of promising or delivering something (an activity or object). All relations are based on the comparison of possible offered services. Like objects, activities can also have value and be exchanged. Convention emerges from the exchange of activities under Gesellschaft -- it is the simple form of the general will and it is a sort of contract. For order to exist in society, freedom must be limited or altered. Outside convention, relationships among people may be conceived of as latent war (eg: unregulated commercial competition could be considered a mild degree of this). POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY DANIEL BELL ''WHO WILL RULE? POLITICIANS AND TECHNOCRATS IN THE POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY'' The theme of rationality has been prominent in the works of such classical sociologists as Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons. Bell acknowledges that the development of every advanced industrial society, and the emergence of the post-industrial society, depend on the extension of a particular dimension of rationality. However, he is questioning the definition of that rationality. A post industrial society is one in which the majority of those employed are not involved in the production of tangible goods. The manual and unskilled worker class gets smaller and the class of knowledge workers becomes predominant. The character of knowledge also changes and an emphasis is put on theoretical knowledge rather than empirical. Theoretical knowledge is the impetus of innovation and growth. Because of this, universities will become central institutions and prestige and status will be rooted in the intellectual and scientific communities. Another feature of the post industrial society is the speeding up of the ''time machine,'' so that intervals between the initial forces of change and their application have been radically reduced. People now seek to anticipate change, measure the course of its direction and impact, control it, and shape it for predetermined ends. Symbolically, the birth years of the post industrial society were 1945-50. The developments of nuclear energy established the important relationship between

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science and government; cybernetics introduced ''social physics;'' and a new ''future-orientation'' arose. During this time, the fundamental themes of the technocratic age (rationality, planning, and foresight) were born. Technocracy is defined as a political system in which the determining influence belongs to technicians of the administration and of the economy. A technocrat is a person who exercises authority by virtue of his/her technical competence. The technocratic mind view emphasizes the logical, practical, problem-solving, instrumental, orderly, and disciplined approach to objectives, its reliance on a calculus, on precision and measurement, and a concept of a system (pp. 348349). The technocratic mode of production is bound to spread in our society because it is so efficient. However, that does not necessarily mean that the technocrats themselves will become a dominant class. The differences between how power is held in society (the nature of the system) and who holds power (the group) is show in the following table (359): PRE-INDUST Resource Social Locus Dominant Figures Means of Power Class Base land farm plantation landowner military direct control of force property military force inheritance seizure by armies INDUST machinery business firm business people indirect influ. on politics property polit. orgz. tech skill inheritance patronage education POST-INDUST knowledge university research inst. scientists researchers balance of technopolit. forces franchises, rights technical skill polit orgz education mobilization cooptation

Access

In post-industrial societies, the stratum of scientists will have to be taken into account in the political process. In addition, the scientific ethos will predispose scientists to act in a different fashion, politically, from other groups. Class denotes not a specific group of persons, but a system that has institutionalized the ground rules for acquiring, holding, and transferring differential power and its attendant privileges. In American society today, there are three modes of power and social mobility:

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Base of Power:

Property

Polit. Position

Skill

Mode of Access: Inheritance Entrepren. Ability Social Unit Family

Machine Education Membership Cooptation Group/Party Individual

Increasingly in post industrial societies, technical skill becomes an overriding condition of competence for place and position. Property decreases in importance as ''new'' forms of property arise. These new forms arise from a new definition of social rights whereby people make claims on the community to ensure equality and other rights. Though the weights of the class system may change, the nature of the political system, as the arena where interests are mediated, will not. Society has become national (i.e., crucial decisions are made by government rather than the market) and communal (i.e., more groups now seek to establish their social rights through the political order). The relationship between technical and political decisions in he post-industrial society will be a crucial problem of public policy. The conception of a rational organization of society has thus become confounded. Rationality as a means - as a set of techniques for efficient allocation of resources - has been twisted beyond recognition; rationality as an end is confronted with the cantankerousness of politics. The politics of the future will not be quarrels between functional economic interest groups for distributive shares of the national product, but the concerns of a communal society, particularly the inclusion of disadvantaged groups. ROBERT DAHL

WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY pp1-10: ''The Nature of the Problem'' Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America that the US was the most egalitarian country he'd ever encountered. However, Jammes Bryceargued that equality did not exist in the US in terms of material conditions and intellectual elitism. Although there were no formal marks of rank, there were grades and distinctiond of inequality in the US. However, he did acknowledge that a universl beleif in democracy still existed. **But if there is inequality of condition, must there not also be great inequalities in the capacities of different citizens to influence decisions of their various governments?

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To answer this question, Dahl looks at the unequal distribution of choices that influences voters in New Haven, Connecticut. He finds that it is not the political parties, interest groups, social and economic elite, or politicians who govern. It is the leaders and the masses who govern together. Dahl gets a large part of this idea from de Tocqueville and Gasset, who aregued that under certain conditions of development, (industrialization) older , strtaified class based structures of development are destroyed. In their place arises a mass of individuals with no secure place in the social system. They lack strong political ties and are thus ready to attach themselves to any political entrepreneur who will cater to their desires. Leaders cater to mass tastes and in return use the obedience and loyalty of the masses to weaken all opposition to their rule. Hence, instead of asking who governs? We should ask: Does the way in which resources are distributed encourage oligarchy or pluralism? What is the relative importance of the most widely distributed resource -- the right to vote? Are patterns of influence durable or changing? Is the operation of the political system affected in any way by what citizens believe/ profess to believe about democracy? Ch 8 : ''Overview: the Ambiguity of Leadership'' To gain legitimacy for their actions, leaders frequently surround their covert behavior with democratic rituals. The distinction between the rituals of power and the realities of power is frequently obscure. First of all, some people influence decisions more directly than others because they are closer to the stage when laws are vetoed. Second, the relationship between leaders and citizens in a plural istic democracy is frequently reciprocal. The Political Stratum: The members of the political stratum are a small group of individuals in a locale who are the main bearers of political thought and skills. The are active politically and involved in an inter-community net work of other political enthusiasts. The political stratum is not a static group: itis easily penetrated because competitive elections give politicians a powerful motive for expanding their coalitions. The members of the stratum are affiliated with different political parties. Although members of the stratum are directly and primarily involved in shaping political issues, they are also easily manipulated by politicians. If a politician sees no payoff in the interest of the stratum, his interest is likely to be small, Also, through reward and deprivation of political favors, the politician can manipulate the stratum to support him on certain issues. He may also find it in his interest to keep a shaky coalition. Leaders and sub-leaders

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Leaders are a relatively small proportion of the people, who exercise relatively great direct influence over all the important choices for the life of the association. To achieve their goals, leaders adopt strategies; however, their actions take place under extreme conditions of uncertainty. Subleaders assist leaders in carrying out their goals. Leaders pay subleaders with financial or political rewards. Policies Policies often contain direct or indirect, actual or expected payoffs of some kind to leaders and constituents. In fact, they are an important means by which leaders gain support. Overt policies are not always identical to or consistent with the covert commitments politicians make to their subleaders. Often, there is no conflict in this, because those who reap the benefits of the covert policies (typically subleaders and other political employees) do not care if the overt and covert policies do not match up. However, conflict can arise between overt and covert policies 1) when large elements of the political stratum develop stricter standards of political morality 2)if overt policies with great popularity among constituents require structural changes in the organization of government that would make it more difficult to honor traditional kinds of covert policies. The keener the political competition, the more likely the leaders will resolve conflicts in favor of their overt commitments. Democracy, Leadership, and Minority Control Even if the policies of political associations were usually controlled by a tiny minority of leaders, the policies of the leaders n local government would tend to reflect the preferences of the populace. Citizens have little direct influence on policies, but they have a large extent of indirect influence through means of elections. Nonetheless, the direct influence of leaders on policies extends well beyond the norms implied in the classical models of democracy developed by political philosophers. The relations between leaders, subleaders, and constituents produce a pervasive ambiguity in the distribution of influence that permeates the entire political system. Chp. 19 ''On the Species Homo Politicus '' Sometimes the actions of governments may threaten the primary goals of homo c ivicus. He may then deliberately set out to use the resources at his disposal in order to influence the actions of governments. However, after the danger passes, he'll revert to non-political strategies for attaining his primary goals. Homo civicus is not a political animal. Homocivicus can change into homopoliticus when the primary goals that animate him become durably attached to political action. Political man invariably seeks to influence civic man, but even in democratic systems, civic man only occasionally seeks to influence political man directly. Like civic man, political man develops

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strategies that govern the ways in which he uses the resources at his disposal. In pluralistic, democratic political systems, the range of acceptable strategies is narrowed by traditions of legitimacy. Resources A resource is anything that can be used to sway the specific choices or the strategies of another individual. It is anything that can be used as an inducement. Resources are not permanently fixed in amount. Political man can use his resources to gain influence and then use his influence to gain more resources. Hypotheses 1)A number of American cities have passed through a transition from where a system of resources of influence were highly concentrated to one in which they were highly dispersed. 2)dispersion does not represent equality of resources of resources, but fragmentation. Six characteristics of dispersed inequalities: 1)many different resources for influencing officials are available to different citizens. 2)these resources are unequally distributed 3)individuals best off in their access to one kind of resource are often badly off with respect to many other resources. 4)no one influence resource dominates all the others in all or even most key decisions 5)with some exceptions, an influence resource is effective in some issue areas or in some specific decisions but not in all. 6) Virtually no one is entirely lacking in some influence resources. The Use of Political Resources (Bk V) Ch 24 ''Overview: Actual and Political Influence'' An elementary principle of political life is that a political resource is only a potential source of influence. The extent to which individuals use their varying resources to gain influence over government decisions varies: 1) over the life cycle of the individual (highest is in the prime of life) 2) as different events take place and different issues are generated in the political system 3)with different issue areas 4)with different kinds of individuals Why individuals vary in their use of political resources: 1)variations in access to resources 2)variations in political confidence: estimates as to the probability of succeeding

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in an attempt to influence decisions 3)differences in alternative opportunities for using one's resources in order to achieve other goals 4)differences in estimates as to the value/''reward'' of a successful effort (the above four reasons are caused by subjective reasons such as personality, as ell as objective reasons such as class and wealth) Stability and Change (Bk VI) Ch 27 ''Stability, Change, and the Professionals'' There are three characteristics of great importance to the operation of a political system: 1)Slack in the system Political resources are ''slack in the system'' when most citizens use their resources for purposes other than gaining influence over government decisions. There is a great gap between people's actual influence and their potential influence. 2)The Professionals There are two contrasting groups of citizens in pluralistic liberal systems: a) those who use their political resources at a low level b) a tiny body of professionals within the political stratum who use their political resources at a high level. The professional political man has much more influence on political decisions than the average citizen. He has labor time devoted to politics, more resources, and more skills. 3)Skill Skill in politics is the ability to gain more influence than others, using the same resources. However, skill is not always enough, even for professional political men. They work in a context of high uncertainty. Professionals vary in the extent to which they use all the resources at their disposal. some are driven to ''pyramid'' their influence. The art of ''pyramiding'' Localities can change from conditions of petty sovereignty to executive centered orders. This happens when local leaders engage in ''pyramiding.'' First, the leader must have access to resources not available to his predecessor (these can be slack resources). by using these resources with higher efficiency, the new leader moves his actual influence closer to his potential influence. Because of this greater influence, the new leader improves his access to more resources. However, the policies of the leader must not provoke so strong a countermobilization that he exhausts his resources with no substantial increases in his influence. He could provoke a minority in the community to use its political resources at a markedly higher rate in opposition to his policies.

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The distribution of resources and the ways in which they are/are not used in a pluralistic system constitute an important source of both political change and political stability. The distribution of resources can actually prevent a leader form running away with the system. Widespread consensus on the American creed of democracy and equality is also a stabilizing factor. Ch 28 ''Stability, Change, and the Democratic Creed'' Theorists have usually assumed that stability in a democratic system must have widespread agreement on ideas about democracy (including de Tocqueville). However, stability dose not necessarily depend on widespread belief that the system is preferable. A democratic system can be stable if a substantial part ofthe electorate accepts the rules. In fact, often the majority of citizens will not employ their potential influence, and they have little skill, so a political system supported by a minority of leaders can conceivably be more stable. If any of the characteristics of power would shift to the majority, the system would become unstable. Consensus as a process Democratic beliefs, like other political beliefs, are influenced by a recurring process of interchange among political professionals, the political stratum, and the great bulk of the population. ''Consensus'' is a variable element in a complex and continuous process. Characteristics of the process of Consensus: 1)over long periods of time the great bulk of the citizens possess a fairly stable set of democratic beliefs at a high level of abstraction: ''the democratic creed.'' 2)most citizens assume that the American political system is consistent with the democratic creed. 3)widespread adherence to the democratic creed is produced and maintained by powerful social processes, such as formal schooling. 4)despite wide agreement on a general democratic creed, however, citizens frequently disagree on its specific applications. Nonetheless, they can adhere to inconsistent beliefs because the creed is so vague. Citizens can qualify universals in application while leaving them in tact in rhetoric. Also, most citizens know very little of political theory. 5) members of the political stratum are more familiar with the ''democratic'' norms, more consistent, and more explicit in their political attitudes. They are also more often in agreement on the norms. 6)political professionals have access to extensive political resources which they employ at a higher rate and with superior efficiency. 7)sometimes disagreements over the prevailing norms occur within the political stratum and among professionals, but they rarely involve the public. 8)among the procedures supported by the legitimists in the political stratum are some that prescribe ways of settling disagreements (e.g., appeals to judiciary authority)

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9)ordinarily then, it is not difficult for a stable system of rights and privileges to exist that does not have widespread public support and occasionally even lacks majority approval. 10)occasionally, a sizable segment of the political stratum develops doubts that it can ever achieve the changes it seeks through the accepted procedures internal to the professionals. Dissenters attempt to arouse public support so professionals will have to change. 11) an appeal to the populace may terminate in several ways. It may fail to create a stir, the legitimists may win, or the dissenters will win -- in which case they will become the next generation of legitimists. The Role of Democratic Beliefs Beliefs of ordinary citizens only become relevant when professionals engage in an intensive appeal to the populace. Even then, majority wishes are filters throughthe political stratum and public officials before they become policy. Consequences of consensus on the democratic creed 1)the creed gives legitimacy to an appeal to the populace 2)it insures that no appeal is likely to succeed unless framed in terms consistent with the creed. The consensus on political beliefs and practices has much in common with other aspects of the democratic system. Leaders lead and are led. Citizens extend unequal levels of influence over the content of political consensus. The widely held belief in the creed limits ways in which leaders can shape the consensus. The creed is not immutable, but open to the processes of change that constitute the relations of leaders and citizens in a pluralistic democracy. ANTHONY DOWNS AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, CBS 4 AND 8 CHAPTER 4, THE BASIC LOGIC OF GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING Traditionally, economic theory assumes that the social function and private motive of government both consist of maximization of social utility or social welfare. Anthony's hypothesis differs from this standard econ view in three ways: 1) in Tony's model, government's social function is not identical with its private motive; 2) Tony is interested only in the latter, which is the maximization of votes instead of utility or welfare (gov't's private motive is to get re-elected); 3) the gov't is a party competing with other parties for control of the electorate. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF GOV'T DECISION-MAKING A. The concept of marginal operations. 1. The gov't in our model wishes to maximize political support, so it carries out those acts of spending which gain the most votes by means of those acts of

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financing which lose the fewest votes. Since the gov't is competing with other parties not currently in office for control of the governing apparatus, its planning must take into account not only the voters' utility functions (what they want to maximize) but also the proposals made by its opponents. 2. Assume that the new gov't makes only partial alternation in the scheme of gov't activities inherited from the preceding administration; it does not recreate the whole scheme. 3. A vote against any party is not a vote against government per se, but is net disapproval of the particular marginal actions that party has taken. 4. Both the gov't and the voters are interested in marginal alternations in the structure of gov't activity. Marginal alternations are partial changes in the structure of gov't behavior patterns each administration inherits from its predecessor (that is, no one is interested in total revolution, just change). B. The Majority Principle Under conditions of certainty, the gov't's best strategy is to adopt choices favored by a majority of voters. If it fails to do so, its opponents will do so and will fight the election on this issue only, thereby insuring defeat for the incumbents. 1. The gov't subjects each of its decisions to a hypothetical poll and always chooses the alternative which the majority of voters prefer. It must do so because, if it adopts any other course, the opposition party can defeat it. Thus, to avoid defeat, the government must support the majority on every issue. II. Opposition against the majority principle: the opposition party can sometimes defeat a majority-pleasing government by using one of three possible strategies. The incumbent's defeat by these strategies is predicated on a lack of strong consensus in the electorate combined with the opposition's ability to refrain from committing itself until after the government acts. The strategies are... A. Complete matching of policies. The opposition party adopts a program which is identical in every way with that of the incumbent party. This manoeuver forces voters to decide how to vote by comparing the incumbent's performance rating with those of previous governments. B. A coalition of minorities. Under certain conditions (when there is a lack of consensus in the electorate), the opposition can defeat a government which uses the majority principle by taking contrary stands on key issues, i.e., by supporting the minority. C. The Arrow Problem. Again, there must be a lack of consensus in the electorate. If voters disagree in certain particular ways about what goals are desirable, the government may be defeated because it cannot follow the majority principle even if it wants to. If there are, for instance, three choices on a particular issue, and three voters, and each voter has a different first preference, Voter JPG Choice 1st f g h CBS JPS

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2nd

3rd

then, in such a case, no alternative has majority support for first choice. Any alternative the incumbent chooses can be defeated in a paired election by some other alternative. If the gov't picks f, both Chris and Janet prefer h (they both rank it higher than f). As long as the gov't must commit itself first, the opposition can chose some other alternative, match the government's program on all other issues so as to narrow the election to this one, and defeat the incumbents. The gov't in such a situation cannot adopt a rational policy; no matter what it does, it is wrong because the majority would have preferred some other action. III. THE PREVALENCE OF THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY A. The rule of the passionate majority. In a two party system, both parties nearly always adopt any policy that a majority of voters strongly prefer, no matter what strategies the parties are following. We cannot judge how passionate a majority is by its feelings about any one issue. The members of a passionate majority may only care slightly whether M is chosen rather than N; while the minority may frantically desire N. The crucial point is whether the citizens in the majority have a greater preference for their position on this issue than they do for minority positions they hold on other issues. Parties do not judge passion by comparing voters with each other; they compare the intensity of each voter's feelings on some issues with the intensity of his feelings on others. B.The Political Significance of Passionate Majorities. Majority rule prevails in government policy formation only when there is a consensus of intensities as well as a consensus of views. Consensus of intensities: most citizens agree on what issues are most important, even if they disagree about what policy to follow on each issue. Consensus of views: a majority of citizens have the same opinion about what policy to follow on a given issue. By encouraging specialization of viewpoint, the division of labor tends to break up passionate majorities and foster minority coalition governments. Gov'ts are engaged in political warfare as well as maximization problems. When it is following the majority principle, the gov't plans its budget by taking a hypothetical poll on every decision. When it is using some other strategy, it judges every action as a part of its whole plan for the election period. Unforeseen events then will force it to recalculate the whole plan in light of what it has already done. Since gov'ts plan actions to please voters and voters decide how to vote on the basis of gov't actions, a circular relation of mutual interdependence underlies the function of government in a democracy.

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CHAP 8, THE STATICS AND DYNAMICS OF PARTY IDEOLOGY If political ideologies are actually the means to the end of obtaining votes, and if we know something about the distribution of voters' ideological preferences, we can make predictions about how parties will change their ideologies as they maneuver to gain power. Conversely, we can state the conditions under which different parties' ideologies come to resemble each other, diverge from each other, or remain in some fixed relationship. 1. A two-party democracy cannot provide stable and effective government unless there is a large measure of ideological consensus among its citizens. If voter preferences are bimodally distributed, there will be two parties who differ ideologically in significant ways. Whichever party wins will attempt to implement policies which are radially opposed to the other party's ideology. This means that government policy is likely to produce chaos. The appearance of a balancing center party is unlikely, since any party forming in the center will be forced to move toward one extreme or the other to get votes, since there are so few voters with moderate preferences. 2. Parties in a 2-party system deliberately change their platforms so that they resemble one another. Parties in a multi-party system try to remain as ideologically distinct from each other as possible. In a two-party system where voter preferences are normally distributed, parties will grow more and more ideologically similar in an effort to garner votes. The possibility that parties will be kept from converging ideologically depends on the refusal of extremist voters to support either party if both became similar; abstention becomes (in a certain world, if the actor is future oriented) rational as a strategy extremist voters use against the party nearest them to keep that party from moving toward its opponent. Multiparty systems arise where preferences are multimodal. 3. If the distribution of ideological preferences remains constant across voters, the political system will move toward a position of equilibrium in which the number of parties and their ideological positions are stable over time. The number of parties at equilibrium depends on i) the nature of the limit on the introduction of new parties and ii) the shape of the distribution of voters. i) In order to survive, a party needs some minimum of voters to support it. This minimum depends on the type of electoral system. In a winner take all system, a party must win more votes than any other party running in order to survive. This arrangement encourages parties which repeatedly lose to merge until the survivors have a reasonable chance of winning; this tends to narrow the field to two parties. In a proportional representation system, the minimum amount of support to keep a party going is greatly reduced, so a multiparty system is encouraged. ii) multiparty systems are most likely to arise when the distribution of voter preferences is multimodal. Because of the distribution of voter preferences, parties will strive to distinguish themselves from one another. Voters in multiparty systems are much more likely to be swayed by matters of ideology and policy than are voters in two party systems (the latter being massed in the moderate range where both ideologies lie, and hence being more likely to be

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swayed by personality or some other nonideological factor; since they are not really offered much choice between policies, they may need other factors by which to discriminate between partiessee 5 below). 4. New parties can be most successfully launched immediately after some significant change in the distribution of ideological views among voters. There are two kinds of new parties: parties designed to win elections, and parties designed to influence already existing parties' policies. The latter are blackmail parties. Ross Perot's intention was to be a real party (to actually become president of the United States, the little fascist), but his effect was to be an influence party: the Democratic party's (and the Republican's) policy positions were changed because of him. A change in the distribution of voters can effect the development of new parties (eg, the enfranchisement of the working class); it is not the number of new voters, but the distribution of their preferences that matters (eg, women's suffrage didn't create any new parties, though it basically doubled the number of voters). 5. In a two-party system, it is rational for each party to encourage voters to be irrational by making its platform vague and ambiguous. Each party casts some policies into the other's territory (see the Democrats and crime) in order to convince voters there that its net position is near them. In the middle of the scale, where most voters are massed, each party scatters its policies on either side of the middle (this causes an enormous overlapping of moderate policies). Each party will sprinkle these moderate stands with a few extreme stands in order to please its far out voters (as Clinton did originally with the gays in the military thing). It is possible to detect on which side of the ideological continuum a party lies by looking at the extremist policies it espouses (this may be the only way to make such a detection, since both parties are so similarly moderate). Both parties are trying to be as ambiguous as possible about their actual net position. Ambiguity increases the number of voters to which a party can appeal. Since both parties find it rational to be ambiguous, neither is forced by the other's clarity to take a stand. This ambiguity makes it difficult for voters to act rationally: voters are encouraged to make their decisions based on some other factor than the issues (personality, habit, etc.). RON INGLEHART CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY In trying to understand the relationship between politics and economics, the rational choice model is incomplete because it ignores cultural factors. Inglehart argues that different societies are characterized to different degrees by a specific syndrome of political cultural attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, not immutable; and that they can have major political consequences. Culture is a system of attitudes, values, and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation. It is learned and my vary from one society to another.

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The political culture approach differs from rational choice in arguing that 1.) people's responses to their situations are shaped by subjective orientations (i.e., how they interpret their circumstances), which vary cross-culturally and within subcultures; and 2.) these variations in subjective orientations reflect different socialization patterns and are therefore difficult to undo. Thus action is due not only to external circumstances, but also to enduring differences in cultural learning. This is an attempt to link macro (economic) variables with micro (socialization) ones. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MODERN DEMOCRACY: Three factors are important: 1. the emergence of a politically powerful commercial-industrial bourgeoisie 2. the development of preconditions that facilitate mass participation in politics 3. the development of mass support for democratic institutions, and feelings of interpersonal trust that extend even to members of opposing forces Inglehart's emphasis is on the emergence among the general public of norms and attitudes that are supportive of democracy, especially interpersonal trust. Inglehart uses data from the annual Euro-Barometer surveys to examine the role of civic culture in the development of democracy. He measures civic culture with three variables: interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and percentage of people who support revolutionary change. Results: 1. There is a broad syndrome of related attitudes that show substantial and consistent cross-cultural variations. (This confirms his original assertion that cultural values are stable and enduring). 2. Nations that are characterized by high levels of life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, tolerance, etc. would be more likely to adopt and maintain democratic institutions than those whose publics lacked such attitudes. 3. Economic development (as measured by GNP) is not directly related to democracy but is mediated by linkages with social structure and political culture. The model looks like this: SOCIAL STRUCTURE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CIVIC CULTURE Inglehart does not advocate cultural determinism but an interactional model that takes economics, politics, and culture into account. -----[ ]------DEMOCRACY

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CULTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: Civic culture is only one aspect of a still broader cultural syndrome, which seems to reflect a long-term process of social and economic change. In the Protestant Ethic, Weber argues that culture is not simply an epiphenomenon determined by economics, but an autonomous set of factors that sometimes shape economic events as well as being shaped by them. In analyzing the relationship of religion to economic development, Inglehart argues that Protestantism led to capitalist development only insofar as the Protestant reformation was associated with a larger system of the breakdown of traditional cultures, which were associated with stability and therefore did not foster growth. While Protestant societies initially industrialized faster, these regions began to slow down relative to Catholic countries in the second half of this century. Why? For one thing, Catholic culture changed and the role of the merchant and profit-maker became less stigmatized. Also, people in Protestant countries that had experienced early economic growth were raised in relative prosperity and this led to the development of postmaterialist values, which in turn changed economic development. MATERIALIST/POSTMATERIALIST THESIS: Materialist values are those that emphasize physical sustenance and security. Postmaterialist values emphasize belonging, self-expression, and the quality of life. As modern societies have developed and become more prosperous, there has been a gradual but pervasive shift in values from materialist to postmaterialist and this has led to a diminishing emphasis on economic growth in these societies. This is do to: 1. scarcity hypothesis: people place greatest subjective value on those things which are relatively scarce 2. socialization hypothesis: one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's preadult years. Therefore, there is a time lag between socioeconomic conditions and the dominant value system. Postmaterialist values are a cohort effect and not a period effect since people don't go back to materialist values in time of economic scarcity. This thesis emphasizes the reciprocal relationship between economics and culture. Postmaterialist values are also associated with a ''New Class'' consisting of students, young professionals, technocrats, and politicians. NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: NSMs are based not on materialist issues (class) but based rather on postmaterialist issues, such as the environment, peace, equality. These issues have less and less to do with the class-split issues that used to be dominant in

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politics. Since they come from different value sets (PM values), they tend to split existing parties. The Old Left consists of the working class, who tend to favor economic growth and technological progress. The New Left consists mostly of the middle class, who tend to mistrust economic growth and technological progress. The reason for the growth of the NSMs rests in part of ''cognitive mobilization.'' This occurs when people are familiar with political participation and can be easily mobilized. Because of cognitive mobilization differences, the Old Left is more easily mobilized toward the right, while the New Left is mobilized to the left. Values, rather than class, are the best predictor of participation in a NSM, even when age, education, and political persuasion are controlled for. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET POLITICAL MAN In this book, Lipset explains the conditions which promote democracy, antidemocratic tendencies (working and middle class authoritarianism), and electoral tendencies. PART I. THE CONDITIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC ORDER. CH 2 ''ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY'' Lipset defines democracy in a complex society as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing government officials, and as a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for office. This definition implies a political formula or body of beliefs specifying which institutions are legitimate (the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves and considered right and proper), as well as implying that one set of political leaders be in office and other sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office. The above conditions are needed because if a political system is not characterized by a value system allowing the peaceful play of power, democracy can become chaotic. Furthermore, if the outcome of the political game is not the periodic awarding of effective authority to one group, unstable and irresponsible government will result. And if the conditions for perpetuating an effective opposition do not exist, the authority of individuals in power will steadily increase and popular influence in policy will become a minimum. Once established, a democratic political system gathers momentum and creates social supports (institutions) to ensure its continued existence. In this chapter, Lipset is most concerned with social conditions like education which serve to support democratic political institutions. He will not be dealing with those which serve to maintain them yet

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS Democracy is positively related to the level of economic development in European and American countries. Lipset looks at indices such as wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education. In each case,these indices are higher in the more democratic countries. Lipset hypothesizes these elements to be functionally interdependent. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE Economic development, by producing increased income and higher levels of education, largely determines the form of the class struggle by permitting those in the lower strata to develop more gradualist views of political change. Yet, this can only be the case for a fairly well off lower class. In the two wealthiest countries, US and Canada, communist parties are almost nonexistent and socialist parties are not major forces., due to a lack of sufficient lower strata discontent. There is an inverse relationship between nationalist economic development and extremist political groups. A large middle class in a country tempers conflict by penalizing extremist groups and rewarding moderacy. in addition, the propensity to from voluntary associations is a function of wealth. A country without a multitude of organizations separate from state power has a high dictatorial or revolutionary potential. (de Tocqueville -- ''mass society'' theory). THE POLITICS OF RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Extremist left movements often develop in time of rapid industrialization. This may be due to sharp discontinuities between the industrial and pre-industrial state (concerning a new surplus of unskilled agricultural workers). (e.g., Russian Revolution as documented by Trotsky). In Europe , a cluster of factors led to the development of democracy, such as economic development, and Protestantism. Lipset uses a mulitvariate system where the focus may be on any element, and its conditions and consequences may be stated without the implication that a he has arrived at a complete theory. It seems to me that he takes a largely functionalist view. For instance, open classes lead to the development of democracy which in turn fosters more open classes. Yet on the other hand, democracy can sometime create situations which will later undermine it -bureaucracy, for instance. CH4 ''WORKING CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM'' Studies shoe that the lower class way of life produce individuals with rigid and intolerant approaches to politics. The intolerant aspects of Communist ideology attract the low status working class. The low level of education of the working class makes them want the quick and easy solutions of extremist movements. DEMOCRACY AND THE LOWER CLASS

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The lower class is liberal on economic issues but conservative on non-economic issues such as civil liberties and internationalism. They are less committed to democracy. Authoritarian attitudes are 'normal'' and expected in the lower class. EXTREMIST RELIGION AND THE LOWER CLASS Millenarianism is a defense mechanism of the disinherited. religious sects are organized dictatorially. Direct connections between the social roots of political and religious extremism have been observed in a number of countries, because rigid fundamentalism and dogmatism are linked to the same underlying predispositions which find another outlet in allegiance to extremist political movements. THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF THE LOWER CLASSES The following are contributing elements to authoritarian predispositions in lower class individuals: low education; low participation in political/voluntary organizations; low literacy; isolated occupations/ living communities; economic insecurity; authoritarian family patterns The degree of education , closely correlated with social and economic status, is also highly correlated with undemocratic attitudes. Psychic deprivation goes with economic deprivation. Tolerance in the lower class is not encouraged, ad the lower class' economic frustrations are often taken out on other minority scapegoats. LOWER CLASS PERSPECTIVES The acceptance of the norms of democracy requires a high level of sophistication and ego security. An unsophisticated person has a poor frame of reference (solely a concern with the present and not the future) , emphasizes the concrete and ignores the abstract, and has more volatile expressive behavior. All of these characteristics predispose the lower class to support extremist political and religious movements. THE MAKING OF AN AUTHORITARIAN All of the above characteristics apply. Under normal conditions,political apathy is most frequent among the above described individuals -- but they can be activated by a crisis to support extremist movements. EXTREMISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE: A TEST OF A HYPOTHESIS The proposition that the lack of a rich frame of reference predispositions the working class toward authoritarianism doesn't necessarily suggest that the lower strata will be authoritarian -- just that they will choose the least complex

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alternative. Thus, in situations where extremism represents the most complex alternative, the lower class will be against the movement. HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND DEMOCRATIC ACTION Despite profoundly anti-democratic tendencies in lower-class groups, workers' political organizations and movements in the more industrialized democratic countries have supported both economic and political liberalism. Democratic norms became part of the institutional system because leaders knew they had no choice but to grant them as concessions to increasingly volatile masses. Democratic norms in many countries are now institutionalized, but followers don't necessarily understand them, they just adhere to them. The incorporation of workers into the body politic in the industrialized western world has reduced their authoritarian tendencies greatly, The working class does not always pose a threat to democracy. CH5 ''FASCISM:LEFT, RIGHT, AND CENTER'' In chapter five, Lipset points out that political extremism occurs in the center, as well as on the left and right. For instance, Fascism is highly correlated with the center and the middle class. It is similar to liberalism (in the 1950-60's sense of the word) in its opposition of big business, trade unions, socialist states, religion, and traditionalism. On the left (aside from those horrid communists) is Peronism, which appeals to the lower strata against the middle and upper classes. It differs from communism in that it is nationalistic. It is the creation of army officers seeking to destroy the corrupt privileged strata that has suppressed the masses. On the right, there are parties such as the Horthyites and the Christian Social Party. They seek to change political institutions in order to preserve cultural and economic ones. (vs. the left and center who use poltical means to change culture and social norms). FASCISM AND THE MIDDLE CLASS Fascism has the same basic goals as liberalism, except fascists are reactionary vs. reformist. They are anti-centralization, want to reduce the power of big capital and labor, and want to restore the old middle class to power.They appeal to the displaced masses of the middle class. The same criteria for authoritarianism applies to the middle class as it does to the lower (isolation, low education, etc.). The most authoritarian segments of the middle strata are small entrepreneurs in small communities or on farms. Also, the self-employed are more likely to be fascist. MC CARTHYISM,POUJADISM, ITALIAN FSCISM, GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN NAZISM Like other movements appealing to the self employed urban and rural middle classes, these movements were in large part products of the insoluble

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frustrations of those who felt cut off from the main trends of modern society. In each country, the movements secured more support in provincial areas. In addition, the petty bourgeois supported the movementsbecause of the deprivation they suffered due to the relative decline of their class. Also, they were citizens of communities whose status and influencewithin the larger society was rapidly declining. PERONISM:THE ''FASCISM'' OF THE LOWER CLASS This movement was formed around Peron, the president of Argentina from 1946 to 1955. The Peronists had a strong state ideology similar to that of Mussoloini. They primarily appealed to urban workers, but also impoverished ruralites. They had a string nationalist/xenophopic bent, and they glorified the position of the armed forces. This movemnt was simlar to the other two extremist camps in that they did glorify the army, but it differed in that it had a positive orientation toward workers, trade unions, and the class struggle. Peronism combined its radical labor party measures with nationalism and demagogy to become an extremist movement. It was ''anti-capitalist populist nationalism.'' As a variant of fascism, it was a fascism of the left because it was based in the social strata whose members would otherwise turn to socialism or communism. The Social Bases of Fascism Anti -democratic ideologies and groups can best be classified if it is recognized that ''left,'' ''right,'' and ''center'' refer to ideologies, each of which has a moderate and extremist version -- one parliamnetary, the other extraparliamentary. Extremist movements appeal to the disgruntled at every level of sociaety. These movements come in many different varieties. For example, a left extremist movement that is working class based may be militaristic, natiuonalistsic, and anti-Marxist. If we want to preserve parliamentary democracy, we must understand the source of threats to it, and threats from conservatives are as different from those originating in the middle class center as thesesare from communism. PART II: VOTING IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES CH 6 ''WHO VOTES AND WHO DOESN'T'' The greater the changes in the structure of the society that a governing group is attempting to introduce, the more likely the leadership is to desire and even require a high level of participation by its members. A situation which results in high participation by members of a group normally has a higher potential for democracy -- for the maintenance of an effective opposition - than one where few people show interest in the political process. A society in which a large proportion of the population is outside the political arena is potentially more explosive than one where most citizens are regularly electoral ly active. Perhaps non-voting is not necessarily apathy, but a response to the decline of major social conflicts, a reflection of the stability of the system, and an increases

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in cross pressures-- particularly those affecting the working class. Voting patterns are similar across many countries. Men vote more than women, the better educated more than the less educated, urbanites more than ruralites, high status people more than low status people. Many of the explanations for lower voting among the lower status groups coincide with the various experiences associated with lower status occupations, that have been cited to account for authoritarian values. FOUR FACTORS WHICH AFFECT VOTING TENDENCIES 1) The relevance of government policies Some groups are more affected by government policies than others -- those groups are more likely to vote (e.g., government employees). Groups which are subjected to economic pressures with which individuals could not cope are also more likely to vote (farmers, miners). Other groups more likely to vote are businessmen, persecuted groups (Jews, Catholics), and people moved by morality issues such as prohibition and gambling Groups affected by proposals for new programs of government (New Deal) will also be more likely to vote. Yet when a nation faces a crisis -- major changes in its social, economic, or political system or in its international position -- the electorate as a whole takes a greater interest in politics. 2)Access to information A partial explanation for a low voting rate may be that two groups may have an equal stake in government policies, but one group may have easier access to information about this stake than the other. The low turnout of workers and other low income people may also reflect the relative indirectness and invisibility of crucial economic relations. Components needed for better access to information are : a)insight resulting from education b)social-occupational experiences (the relationship of occ. activities to political skills) c)contacts with others who have more or less identical problems (factory workers vs. isolated farmers) -related to the factor of high interaction with those of the same needs and background is the development of interest group organizations devoted to organizing participation in politics. -those participating in one specific type of organization are more likely to be active in others and to attend political meetings. Also contact with an ''opinion leader'' is more important than exposure to formal political propaganda Class also determines the level of an individual's political participation with regard to time. The wealthier have more time to participate and less immediate, day-to-day constraints on their attention span. 3)Group Pressure to Vote

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The variations in voting behavior which correlate with socioeconomic class may also be related to different degrees of conformity to the dominant norms in various societies. Middle class people tend to conform more than working-class people to the dominant values of society and to accept the notion that this conformity will be awarded by attaining one's personal goals. 4)Cross Pressures Pressures which operate in opposing directions often make potential voters lose interest and withdraw. For the lower strata, though their social and economic inferiority predisposes them against the status quo, the existing system has many traditional claims to legitimacy which influence them,. The lower strata are therefore placed in a situation of not only lass but also conflicting information, and of opposing group interests. On the other hand, the well-to-do live in a relatively homogenous political environment In addition, because the lower class is exposed to higher strata values, it is able to aspire to them. They are faced with the need to reconcile their lower class values with upper-class values. This creates apathy. The more open the class structure, the more politically apathetic the working class will be. Conclusions Advocates of high levels of participation claim that democracies need consent and that consensus shouldn't be weak. Low levels of participation represent an under representation of the lower class. This reflects politicians' neglect and lower status members' lack of loyalty to the system. But is high participation actually a good thing?might it symbolize mass consensus for the present system? Reisman claims that government bodies function well with citizen apathy. Nonvoters often have cynical, antidemocratic ideas. Why would we want them to vote anyway? Tingsten's thesis is that a sudden increase in the size of the voting electorate probably reflects tension and serious governmental malfunction. This induce nondemocratic voters. Thus, a high or low voter turn out is not necessarily a bad thing. It depends on the context. The gradual development of high voter turnout, brought about with the understanding of the relevance of government and education, can be a good thing (I think Seymour's saying that a slow indoctrination to the values of democracy would be a good thing here). The system is only threatened when a crisis quickly draws normally non habitual voters to the electorate. CH7 ''ELECTIONS: THE EXPRESSION OF DEMOCRATIC CLASS STRUGGLE'' Conflict among different groups is expressed through political parties which represent a ''democratic translation of the class struggle.'' Parties primarily represent classes and their struggle represents the class struggle. But class is only one of the structural divisions in society which is related to part support. There is also religion, ethnicity, nationality, regional loyalties, sex, and age. These characteristics are sometimes (but not usually) more salient than class).

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Often, if a group is torn between voting for one party or another, it will vote for the more prestigious party. (This is partly why conservative parties are often more popular). Left Voting: a response to group needs Leftist voting is an expression of discontent and an indication that certain needs are not being met. Various groups vote left for the following reasons: 1)insecurity of income Groups like one crop farmers, fishermen, and miners often face a high security of income. They will typically vote left. 2)unsatisfying work Factory workers, for instance, often find their work monotonous and subject to arbitrary authority. The more skilled a worker is, the more he finds his work satisfying, and the more he will support conservative parties. 3)status Sometimes prestige matters more than income. White collar workers who actually make less than some blue collar workers still get more respect. Hence, they are more conservative. Lipset makes a tentative hypothesis that the more open the status-linked social relations of a given society, the more likely well-paid workers are to become conservatives politically. In a more closed society, the upper level of the workers will feel deprived and hence support left-wing parties. Social conditions affect left wing v oting Just because a group is suffering from some deprivation under the existing social system, it dopes not automatically follow that they will support political parties aiming at social change. Yet three conditions would facilitate such a response: 1)Channels of Communication A good condition for communication is having a common problem. Collective action can reult from this. Two general factors that correlate with leftist voting are the size of industrial plants and the size of the city. (a communications factor may be involved here). In a large plant, there is a higher degree of intra-class communication and less personal contact with people on higher economic levels. In large cities, social interaction is also more likely to be within economic classes. 2)Belief in opportunities for individual mobility Instead of political action, some try to better their lots within the system by working their way up the ladder of success. If this possibility exists there will be a corresponding reduction in collective efforts at social change. The bulk of the socially mobile vote for the more conservative parties.

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3)Traditionalism Often very poor, backwards regions of countries are politically conservative. Extreme poverty prevents political organization, but most of all, traditional values and ''loyalty to the powers that be'' make the areas so conservative. The effort to account for variations in the electoral behavior of different groups by pointing out different aspects of the class structure in various societies has involved a discussion of several factors, many of which operate simultaneously. Different variables combine to form a separate pattern in each society. CH 13 (POSTSCRIPT) ''THE END OF AN IDEOLOGY'' A basic premise of this book is that democracy is not only a means through which different groups can attain their ends or seek ''the good society;'' it is the good society itself in operation. Democracy requires institutions which support conflict and disagreement as well as those which sustain legitimacy and consensus. The differences between the left and right in the western democracies are no longer profound, partly because the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved. Some theorists (Reisman, for ex.) have presented a thesis that conflict based on class differencesand left-right issues is ending based on the assumption that the economic class system is disappearing. This means the end of inequality's political significance. But are these intellectuals mistaking the decline of ideology with the end of class conflict? The democratic class struggle will cotinue. There is not necaessarily acceptance of the class struggle but rather, increasing agreement on the representation functions of the political parties. Thus, it does appear that conformity is growing in the political systems of western democracies. This conformity is not altogether unhealhty;conformity leads to bureacratization which can cut down on the arbitrary power of authority. Stable democratic institutions in which political freesom is great and increasing will continue to characterize mature, industrialized, western societies. The conroversies about cultural creativity and conformity reflect the general trend of a shift away from ideology towards sociology. This is due to less interest in political inquiry, yet there is still a real need for political analysis, ideology, and controversy within the world communiuty -- especially in underdeveloped countries. Today, western leaders must communicate and work with noncommunist (even ifthey are socialist) revolutionaries in Asia and Africa at the same time they accept the fact that serious ideological controversies have ended at home. To clarify the operation of western democracy in the mid 20th century may contribute to the political battle in Asia and Africa. THE CONTINENTAL DIVIDE This book is about the U.S. and Canada, and political differences between the two countries.

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CHAPTER 1: REVOLUTION AND COUNTERREVOLUTION - THE INTRODUCTION The formation of Canada was due to people fleeing the US at the time of the Declaration of Independence. Thus, that initial founders of Canada did not agree with the principles on which the US was formed: all ''men'' are created equal. Free Trade and Cultural Distinctiveness At the time this book was written (1990), the free trade treaty was being ratified between the US and Canada. Canadians viewed this as scary, they were (and are) afraid that Canada will be ''sucked'' into the US, and just become another state or states of the US. On the other hand, people in the US never viewed the free trade treaty as threatening to the US culture or boundaries. Organizing Principles -Canada has been and is a more class-aware, elitist, law-abiding, statist, collectivity-oriented, and particularistic (group-oriented) society than the United States -The colonists' emphases on individualism and achievement orientation were important motivating forces in the launching of the American Revolution. The crystallization of such attitudes in the Declaration of Independence provided a basis for their reinforcement and encouragement throughout subsequent American history. Thus, the US remained throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries the extreme example of a classically liberal or lockean society, one that rejected the assumptions of the alliances of throne and altar, of ascriptive elitism, or mercantilism, or nobless oblige, of communitarianism. -By contrast, both English and French speaking Canadians sought to preserve their values and culture by reacting against liberal revolutions. English speaking Canada exists because its people opposed the Declaration of Independence. French-speaking Canada, whose leaders were mostly Roman Catholic clerics, sought to isolate itself from the anticlerical, democratic values of the French Revolution. The elites of both linguistic groups consciously attempted to create a conservative, monarchical, and ecclesiastical society in North America. Perspectives on the American Revolution -Is Lipset's perspective of revolution vs. counterrevolution the correct way to look at the US vs. Canada? His answer is that it depends on how revolutionary the American Revolution actually was. Some see it as a moderate revolution which did little to change social relationships and which had little ideological impact. -Lipset argues that the American Revolution was quite revolutionary indeed. (e.g. as much property was confiscated in the US as in the French revolution on a per capita bases. Many more people were political emigres from America than from France). -Also, he contends that the US revolution had a large impact on France when the French soldiers from the land phase of the American revolution went home and started radical agrarian reform. - ''Although the US was a slave society when its leaders declared that all men are created equal, Thomas Jefferson, who wrote that statement, felt - and was

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eventually proved correct - that it would undermine slavery, that the idea of equality would have a continuing effect, once it was proclaimed as a basis for American independence.'' The Canadian Identity - ''Canadians feel that monarchy can be viewed as a superior 'guarantee of liberty and freedom.''' -The presumed grater political intolerance in the US is a consequence of the Revolution, that repression of minority opinion must occur in a society with unlimited popular rule. -British and American Tories fought for the protection of the role of law and traditional values including the rights of dissidents, eccentrics, and cranks. -Canada has the ability (due to unified and influential elites) to control the system so as to inhibit the emergence of populist movements expressing political intolerance. (e.g. McCarthyism, KKK) CHAPTER 2: THE AMERICAN IDEOLOGY -the reason you are an American is not because you line within its borders, rather because you accept what it ideologically stands for. (like religion) - ''In Europe and Canada, nationality is related to community; one cannot become un-English or un-Swedish. Being an American, however, is an ideological commitment. It is not a matter of birth. Those who reject American values are unAmerican.'' Antistatism -No other country has as weak (limited) national government as the US. It has a system of checks and balances, and divided government. Citizens indicate in public opinion surveys that they prefer the House to be of one party and the president to be of the other, overwhelmingly. -The country was founded in opposition to a strong state. The Revolution Continued The writers of the constitution, whether or not they believed in equality themselves, ''had started and legitimated a process that grew out of their control.'' (i.e. women, black, everyone used this concept to become equal) Meritocracy Hard work and economic ambition were perceived in the US as the proper activity of a moral man. (N.B. similarity to what Weber has to say). Whereas in European countries economic materialism was viewed as vulgar and immoral. The Ideology -Subsumed in four words: anti-statism, individualism, populism, and egalitarianism. -Socialist party movement have failed to catch on in the US because they have little appeal since the social content of socialism property relations apart, is

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identical with what American think they already have - namely, a democratic, socially classless society that is anti-elitist. Individualism ''The American radical is much more sympathetic to anarchism, libertarianism, and syndicalism than to state collectivism. If the US ever gets a major radical movement, it will be closer to anarchism than to socialism.'' Populism -The will of the people should dominate elites. Public choice is superior to professionalism. -Populism was not part of the original revolutionary ideology, but has become part of the American creed. -Populism is much stronger in the US than Canada (e.g. use of referenda, elections of more officials rather than appointment.) Liberalism -In the US, conservatism is associated with the national tradition of suspicion of government, with classical liberalism. (e.g. Ronald Reagan and Milton Frieman) Most importantly, the American Left also adhere to these values. -H.G. Wells: ''the Americans' right-wing and left-wing are just different species of liberalism.'' NICO POULANTZAS THE CONCEPT OF POLITICS On the whole, this is a repetitious, foggy, somewhat boring chapter that deals with how the state fits into a Marxist revolutionary programme. It is chock-full of a wide variety of marxist-babble and theory-jargon that makes it hard to follow/understand at points. In fact, it is not even clear at first that NP only has a couple points that he repeatedly rehashes - his ideas are camouflaged pretty well in his writing. Anyhow ... I would strongly recommend not to read this article and to just look at this summary. I have tried to retain some of the original jargon so you can have a feel for it (painful as it may be) since I could see that Steinmetz might dig NP in the original Poulanteese I). POLITICS AND HISTORY NP opens the chapter with a couple preliminary remarks: 1) Social classes are the effects of certain levels of structures, of which the state forms a part. 2) There is a distinction between: a) the political: the jurido-political superstructure of the state b) politics: political class practices (political class struggle)

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Crucial to the analysis at hand is the historical component of Marxist theory, exemplifies by the following propositions: 1) Every class struggle is a political struggle 2) The class struggle is the motive force of history {this is no newsflash to anyone who has read any Marx at all} According to a historicist reading of these propositions, the field of the political would include not a particular structural level and a specific practice, but in general, the 'dynamic/diachronic' aspect of every element, belonging to any level of the structures or practices of a social formations. In short, the political is a generalized term in Marxist theory that can transcend more particular or local formations. Further, the historicist view of Marxism is as a ''genetic'' science of growth in general and, politics being the motive force of history, it is ultimately a science of politics, or even a science of revolution - identified with a simple unilinear growth. There are several consequences of the last idea: 1) an identification of politics with history 2) an over-politicization of the various levels of structures and of social practices 3) an abolition of the very specificity of the political {i.e. by conceiving the political as historical, the political takes on some of the generalized characteristics of history within the Marxist framework.} NP uses two quotations to support his analysis here. The first is from Gramsci and although I couldn't tell what it was saying - NP says that it suggests ''an overpoliticization of a voluntarist kind; it provides the counterweight to economism within the same problematic.'' (whatever). The second quotation is from Parsons and highlights the political as the centre of integration for all the aspects of the social system (this little part makes a lot more sense in terms of the rest of this reading than does that mysterious thing from Gramsci). NP believes that on an epistemological level, there is a continuity between the general conceptions of historicism and functionalism. Particularly, the political becomes the simple principle of social totality and the principle of its development, in the synchronic-diachronic perspective which is characteristic of functionalism. According to Marxism, the political must not only be located in the structure of a social formation as a specific level, but furthermore as that critical level in which the contradictions of a formation are reflected and condensed. From Althusser, the Marxist concept of the process of social transformation can be understood not as a universal and ontological type of history, but rather as a theoretically constructed concept of a mode of production as a complex whole in dominance. The concept of history no longer has any connection with simple linear growth. Further, the various levels of a social formation are characterized by an uneven development and dislocations which are the basis for understanding a formation and its development.

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NP then turns his attention the issue of political practice. By practice, he means transformation of a definite object (raw material), resulting in the production of something new (the product) which often constitutes a break with the given elements of the object. The big question with regard to political practice is: What is its object? NP says: It's the 'present moment' (you dummy). {What the hell is that supposes to mean? You think he could use better terminology.} Basically the 'present moment' is that strategic point (in time and space, I suppose) that various contradictions fuse in the sense that they reflect a certain structure of dominance. This is the starting point from which you can begin to interrelate the nature of various social levels (as pertains to the evils of capitalism, for instance) into a coherent concept. Then (and only then) are you able to act upon this social situation order to transform it. Starting to beat a dying horse, NP states that political practice is the ''motive force of history'' only in so far as its product finally constitutes the transformation of the unity of a social formation in its various stages and phases according to a strategic objective. II) THE GENERAL FUNCTION OF THE STATE The big question: Why is the basic problem of every revolution that of state power? Inside the structure of several levels dislocated by uneven development, the state has the particular function of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation and maintaining equilibrium for the social complex. ,p> Given this function of the state, political practice may possess two very different aspects/results: 1) Non-transformation: political practice of the state as agent for maintenance of unity of a social formation; state as stabilizer 2) Transformation: political practice produces/brings about social change by recognizing the state as locus of conflict and cohesion (and thus the key to breaking social unity). The cohesive function of the state takes on different forms depending on the mode of production and social formations being considered, and is particularly crucial during periods of transition between dominant modes of production. III) MODALITIES OF THE STATE Although the function of order or organization of the state presents various modalities related to the levels on which it is exercised in particular cases (i.e. the economic, political, ideological, etc. level), the global role of the state is political. However, NP interprets Marx and Engels as believing that the function of the state primarily concerns the economic level, and particularly the labour process (the productivity of labor). He, of course, says this after finishing a long jag about how that state doesn't really have any true particularistic functions, but

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rather exists and operates as an essentially generalized phenomenon. I suppose we can chalk this up to a general Marxist belief that the economic is it (ergo, the state as a universalistic social unity must have an economic function). From the recognition of the various facets of the state's function (i.e. judicial, ideological, organizational, and strictly-political roles), NP concludes that these functions are political to the extent that they aim primarily at the maintenance of the unity of a social formation based in the last analysis on political class domination. Just a couple concluding points to this lovely piece: 1) The state's role as the cohesive social factor is not reducible to ''intervention'' by the state at various levels, and particularly at the economic level. 2) Though the state has the global function of cohesive factor in the social unity, this does not mean that it always maintains the dominant role at any particular time, not that when this dominant role is held by the economic that the state no longer has the function of cohesive factor. STEIN ROKKAN DIMENSIONS OF STATE FORMATION AND NATION BUILDING: A POSSIBLE PARADIGM FOR RESEARCH ON VARIATIONS IN EUROPE This article contained of a lot of snippets of the political history of Western Europe, recounted with a quiet ''as everyone knows'' undertone. Well, I'm admittin', a lot of that stuff I didn't know (the history of linguistic divisions in Finland, for instance), and so I can't put in any coherent story for you. Thus, I'm leaving most of it out. Rokkan's model is supposed to be a synthesis of the insights of Parsons and Hirschman (Exit, Voice and Loyalty). I'm not entirely sure I understood this article. Main Argument: The main reasons for variation in the timing and the quality of transition to mass politics in the nation-states of Western Europe are: 1) remoteness from or closeness to the central trade belt, leading to distinctiveness or sharedness of legal, religious and linguistic standards 2) within the central belt, whether there was a certain degree of autonomy from the center. The key reason for the smoothness of the process of nation-building in European states, as compared to the postcolonial states, was the low level of overall political mobilization at the time of state-building in Europe. Rokkan breaks down the development of a nation-state into four phases: two center-generated thrusts through the territory, the first military-economic, the second cultural; and two phases of internal restructuring opening up opportunities for the periphery, the first symbolic-cultural, the second economic.

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Phase I: Penetration: the state-building process. A period of cultural, political and economic unification at the elite level (eg., Western Europe from the High Middle Ages to the French Rev.) Phase II: Standardization: brings in larger and larger sectors of the masses (conscript armies, compulsory schools, emerging mass media create channels of contact b/t the elites and those in the periphery; this fosters a sense of identity with the total political systemsometimes through conflict with other identities (linguistic, religious, etc.)). Phase III: Participation: brings the masses into active participation in the workings of the territorial political system through extended franchise, organization of political parties, etc. Phase IV: Redistribution. Expansion of administrative apparatus of the territorial state: growth of agencies of redistribution, including public welfare services, taxes, etc. The strongest of the early European nation-states were built up around territories with a long history of concentration in the ownership and control of land. Cities depended for their survival on the freedom of the trade networks which often went against the interests of the centralizing states. When the states were remote from the central trade belt, such conflicts of interest were minimal; there were fewer occasions to defend the state's boundaries and an early growth of distinctive legal, religious and linguistic standards (England, Norway, Sweden). In the central trade belt, whenever cities were relatively autonomous, there was scope of participation (Netherlands, Switzerland); in both those cases, participation and redistribution phases (III and IV) were easily reached. In those regions of the trade belt where cities were weak, the necessity on the part of the central agency to protect its border choked trade and, consequently, representation. To put it only slightly differently, the cities depended for their survival on the freedom of trade networks, and, controlled the greatest resources against the centralizers. But the ability of cities to resist depended heavily on the structure of alliance options within each territory: who else needed exit options? Wherever cities were weak and isolated, the territorial centralizers succeeded: the result was a reduction in exit opportunities and a corresponding increase over time in the pressures for voice. However, these absolutist-centralist states not only tried to close off their borders, they also blocked channels of representation within the territory. As Hirschman says, you cannot cut off both exit and voice options without endangering the balance of the system: thus, these absolutistmercantilist states had to go through much more violent transitions to mass democracy (phases II-IVe.g., France, Spain). What turned out to be crucial in the development of nation-states in Europe was that the fragmented center belt was made up of territories at an advanced level of culture, both technologically and organizational (can you say, ethnocentrism

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boys and girls). The main facilitators of smooth nation-building in Western Europe were: a well-developed agricultural economy; a network of highly autonomous cities institutionally distinct from the surrounding agricultural lands; the fact that these cities, as well as rural areas, were linked together culturally through a common religion as a cross-territorial corporate church, through the operation of a major organization for long-distance communication through craft literacy in one dominant standard language, Latin; and, the transactions across these varied territories were controlled under a body of inherited normative precepts, those embodied in Roman law. The development of these states was further facilitated by the development of literate bureaucracies and legal institutions; the growth of trade and the emergence of new industries, developments which allowed the militaryadministrative machineries to expand without destroying their resource base; the development of a national script and consequent attempts to unify the peripheral territories culturally through a standard medium of internal communication. The extraordinary synchrony of all these developments during the years from 1485 to 1789 is key in the rapid growth of consolidated nation states in Europe. What proved decisive for the further growth of these political systems were the low levels of overall mobilization at the time of state-building. The decisive thrust toward consolidation took place before the lower strata could articulate any claims for participation. This gave the national elites time to build up efficient organizations before they had to face the next set of challenges (standardization, participation and redistribution). The western states got to take care of the task of state building before they had to face the ordeals of mass politics. CAROLYN WEBBER AND AARON WILDAVSKY A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD Chapter 10: A Cultural Theory of Governmental Growth and (Un)balanced Budgets Political life may be thought of as an ongoing referendum on the existing regime. The various political cultures compete for shares of victory in that referendum. Although the depression of the 1930s was originally perceived as an outcome of not adhering to the precepts of neoclassical economics, there appeared within the framework of neoclassical economics a new doctrine that belied earlier orthodoxy. There was a new advocacy of governmental intervention through varying rates of taxation and especially by varying expenditure to manage the economy. This Keynesian economics was dominant in the bulk of the Western world by the end of WWII. The new economics strengthened governmental hierarchy by increasing its capacity to affect market forces so as to protect the populace against adversity. Budgeting, which in the past was largely concerned with achieving balance at relatively low spending levels, became associated wit securing a therapeutic imbalance. Keynesian budget theory was part of the social

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change that gave budgeting greater significance, and fundamentally altered its direction by infusing with moral legitimacy high spending for social purposes. But fiscal questions were not invented in this century, they are as old as government itself. During most of history, correspondence between receipts and expenditures has been an aberrant condition. Only within the past 100 years or so have societies achieved the technical-organizational capacity (if they wished) to sustain that correspondence. Earlier rulers relied heavily on such expedients as taxation, debasing the currency, confiscation, or sale of offices, lands, and titles to make ends meet. These tactics, however, were seldom (if ever) carried out as part of a significantly future-oriented budgetary policy or forecast, and often had very negative results for the government - alienation of subjects, debasing public morality, and trade instability. W and W believe that what stands out as a significant feature in the history of financial developments is problem succession. Basically, old solutions give rise to new problems that are in their turn superseded. No policy instrument is good for all seasons, as it were. Only in the past fifty years of taxing and spending have governments been willing (able) to move quickly, where development of budgetary techniques are concerned. W and W cite two probably causes: 1) The ever larger proportions of national product consumed by governments, and 2) The increasing interrelatedness of the world economy. Combined, they mean that the consequences of actions rebound on decisionmakers more swiftly than before, so budgets matter more to more people and their consequences are more immediately felt. Taxing and spending are (no surprise) never a straightforward matter - no solution is ever perfect for everyone, and even if it were changing condition will bring up new problems and make the old solution obsolete or even dysfunctional (ie. problem succession). W and W want to concentrate in this chapter on 3 big questions: 1) Why does government grow? 2) Why are budgets so seldom balanced? and 3) Why has expenditure control collapsed in the West? Their thesis is that when people choose how to construct their institutions, they also create different kinds of budgetary dilemmas. WHY GOVERNMENT GROWS This big question can be decomposed into several smaller issues: 1) Why government spending in Western democracies may grow in small or large steps, but never declines as a proportion of GNP 2) Why governments in some nations grow faster than others 3) Why political parties maintain or even increase the general level of prior commitments rather than reduce them, even if they pledged to reduce spending to get into office

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4) Why most of the growth of government is attributed to programs that contain a significant redistributive component - eg. health, education. 5) Why Western nations and the USSR spend approximately the same proportion of GNP on social-welfare programs W and W argue that a cultural theory of governmental growth is the best explanation. This approach asks the cultural question: ''Which political cultures shared values legitimating social practices - would reject ever greater governmental growth, and which would perpetuate it?'' They hypothesize that the size of government is a given society is a function of its combination of political cultures. WAGNER'S LAW ''Law of increasing state activity'': as per-capita real income increases in particular nations, their governments will spend a higher proportion of national product than before. Assumed here is a logic of industrialization that pushes the development process in only one direction - forward. Wagner maintained that some investments require public funding because more capital is needed than private enterprise can or will provide (Olson says something very similar in Rise and Decline of Nations). Public intervention may be justified for ''public goods,'' services for which no market exists or is likely to emerge. The nature of what is considered a public good and the extent to which they are financed through user charges, of course, varies greatly from one society to another. WILENSKY'S LAW Makes arguments for an economic determinism underlying governmental growth, believing that such economic or ideological categories as capitalist/socialist, collectivist/individualistic are all but useless in explaining the origins and general development of the welfare state. According to Hinrich, two elements (structural change and ideological change) are involved in a growing government share of national income in the course of social mobilization. W and W come down on the side of ''ideological systems'' (values and practices) of a nation as an explanation for government growth. When it becomes necessary - either in times of adversity or because government grows faster than the economy - spending does not decline because the commitment to equality (a cultural factor) requires even greater governmental effort to maintain socialwelfare programs. MARXIST THEORIES According to Marxist accounts (as we have heard several thousand times by now), the state is merely and only the repressive arm of the capitalist class. Welfare programs in capitalist societies could be conceived of as a disguised form of oppression - buying off discontent by getting people used to living off the dole. There is a contradiction here, since such a program that helped the worst off

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could not be considered entirely exploitative. Capitalist contradiction arises from deficit spending and governmental growth in an attempt to increase welfare programming as the same time as the state seeks to increase the profits of capitalists. TAX HYPOTHESES To explain supply of public revenue, Peacock and Wiseman propose a ''displacement-effect hypothesis'': major crises expand public tolerance for higher levels of taxation, after which spending floods in to make up the difference between older and newer levels of revenue. Spending expands to use up available revenues. This hypothesis, however, does not explain ''why?''. On the subject of contradictions of capitalism, Goldscheid contends that capitalism created the ''tax state'' - in which government is dependent on taxes raised through the private sector. Therefore, the private sector exploited the public, which had to work for it. He would resolve the contradictions of capitalism by overcoming the state's alienation from property. According to Schumpter, the ''crisis of the tax state'' is that capitalism sets the stage for its own destruction because it is too successful. Increasing Affluence has the following effects: -supports sectarianism - groups who want government to do more but would not support it -leads to a downgrading of the profit motive on which productivity depends -leads to increasing social sympathies. Government improves welfare, eventually resulting in excessive taxation -leads to moral collapse as the bourgeoisie ceases to believe that capitalism is worth defending. This effect may be dampened by what is know as the ''fiscal illusion'' - basically, indirect taxation hides the total amount of taxes paid, so citizens are misled into paying more than they otherwise would pay. OLSON'S LAW AND OTHER POLITICAL HYPOTHESES Mancur Olson seeks to explain the growth of government not for its own sake, but as a part of a larger theory accounting for the rise of nations to economic prominence and their fall from that lofty estate. He contends that a gradual but pervasive cause of economic decline in the political organizational mechanisms of modern democracy arising from the entrenchment of interest groups which seek benefits favorable to themselves, but which slow down economic growth. What is important is determining national differences in governmental spending (esp. on welfare) is not dominance of ''right'' or ''left'' factions of a particular country's political spectrum, but the range of attitudes represented on that spectrum (esp. the presence of a strong anti-statist party). The range of the

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political spectrum minimized economic and technological factors and instead focuses on different ways of life - this is what is meant by political culture. Theories of interest groups politics suggest that the cumulative effect of a large number of interest groups is a multicentered system of government composed of many islands of decision dominated by promoters of those activities. An interest group that opposes another may either seek to override the individual islands of its opponents through direct governmental channels such as through legislative means, or it may create its own island dominated by interests it favors. This latter option is more prevalent and adds to government in order to pit the parts a group control against the parts it opposes. This is a better explanation of why government spending does not decline than of why it goes up in the first place. A pattern of incremental growth does help explain why certain programs are larger than others - they are older and have had more opportunity to build up increments. Demographic changes are not a convincing explanation for the growth of government, since an increasing in certain items (eg. more medical care for an aging population) does not explain why other items are not reduced to maintain a desired proportion of spending to the size of the economy. W and W return to the issue of what political culture desires to more toward equality of results (which is a guiding value behind growth on welfare). They believe that hierarchy justifies inequality deriving from specialization and division of labor that is beneficial on the societal level. Hierarchy is, therefore, animated by a sacrificial ethic where by the parts are supposed to sacrifice for the whole. W and W conclude that it is the rise of sectarian political cultures with their passion for equality of condition that best explains the continuous increase in the size of government. Applying Cultural Theory W and W compare US and Canada: Canada (with strong markets and hierarchies) follows a public policy that is more egalitarian and redistributive than does the US (which has strong market and weak hierarchies). They contend that the ideological differences between these two nations is responsible for the differences in welfare state development - and thus a support of cultural theory. Peltzman's Law, or Culture Reconsidered An empirical test of cultural theory would have to demonstrate the temporal priority of cultural determinants - increased inequality would have to precede government growth. Peltzman's law states the ''reduced inequality of income stimulates growth of government.'' The idea is that people who are doing o.k. economically are not going to favor redistributive spending (which will tend to benefit others more than themselves). The general argument is that the size of government responds to the articulated interests of those who tend to gain or lose from politicization on the allocation resources. W and W would like to broaden this notion to say that cultural change precedes and dominated

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budgetary change: the size of that state today is a function of its political culture yesterday. Is the Deficit in the Budget or in Society? With the exceptions of the US and Iceland, no Western nations set a great value on attaining rough budget balance. For them budget imbalance is regarded as a positive good for managing the economy or redistributing income. W and W believe that the discussions concerning deficits are really surrogates for other issues: size (role and extent of government), equity (who shall pay and benefit), and effectiveness (whether and to what extent governments can govern). Once the techniques were developed to allow for balancing the budget (modern accounting systems, etc), they were quickly joined to an egalitarian social premise - balance gave way to imbalance, including the modulations of economic swings for the benefit of the entire society. Saving money by budgeting gave way to protecting citizens against adversity (which is where the money went). Budgetary Balance as a Function of Regime The following table summarized the most important aspects of this section: [In the original, this is a 2x2 table] Table 24: Budgetary Strategies Under Political Regimes Regime: Slavery Slaves cannot manage expenditure or revenue Strategy: (1) Do nothing. Balance: Spending equals revenue by imposition from above Regime: Hierarchy Can manage revenues but not expenditures. Strategy: (3) Maximize revenue. Balance: Spending marginally exceeds revenue with both at high levels. Regime: Market Can manage both expenditure and revenue at low levels.S Strategy: (5) Minimize expenditure and revenue. Balance: Deficit varies at low levels. Regime: Sect Can manage expenditure but not revenue. Strategy: (2) Redistribute resources at high levels of expenditure and low levels of revenue Balance: High expenditure greatly exceeds low revenue. This table is generated by combining the ways in which the government can manage spending in relation to their management of resources and projecting the appropriate strategy for the regime.

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUDGETARY NORMS

Budgetary norms of balance, annularity, and comprehensiveness have been inherited from the 18th and 19th centuries as the epitome of rational budgeting. They initially evolved in order to balance budgets at what would today be low levels of spending. They, however, stand in the way of steadily increasing expenditures that characterize contemporary government. From the more current perspective of governmental growth, it is better to have to justify budgets that are unbalanced, noncomprehensive, and continuous. The value previously placed on a balanced budget has been replaced by strategic imbalance of Keynesian economic theory - spending for purposes mandated by a public as a source of economic stability. Likewise the norm of comprehensiveness is no longer practicable in modern governmental economics. Fragmentation of jurisdiction over spending and complicated mechanisms of spending have turned modern budget into shreds and patchwork. Rather than having the government spend its revenue directly, there are a wide variety of expenditure mechanisms outside the direct control or close supervision of the government: taxpayers may be provided funds to be used for governmentally approved purposes; loan guarantees which appear in the budget only if there should be a default; avenues variously called ''entitlement,'' ''backdoor financing,'' or ''mandatory items'' which appear in the budget only as estimated outlays; as well as off-budget corporations. Taken as a whole these extra-budgetary developments constitute a drastic move away from comprehensiveness. Control of spending has declined with the norm of comprehensiveness, since the government cannot maximize simultaneously in opposing directions. The norm of annularity still seems fairly intact, although with each passing year even this seems less certain. Pervasive uncertainties regarding expenditures and revenues have led to repetitive budgeting - ie. budgeting is continuously reformulated. With the expectation of annularity comes a fiscal predictability or periodicity. Certainty motivates agencies to cooperate with central controllers, so that the mutual understanding is that because the treasury promises to pay the amount passed in the budget, agencies will exercise restraint in requests and try to stay within the allocated amounts. Once this implied contract is broken (ie. the norm of annularity fails) and the treasury cannot guarantee the allotted amount, agencies enter into more harsh competition with each other for uncertain governmental funds. They employ a variety of means (including backdoor spending and other extra-budgetary routes) to acquire as great a share of available funding as possible. With the demise of the rule of limiting aspirations for spending the initial bids made by agencies are unreliable and of little use in trying to coordinate the budget. Disaggregative and continuous budgeting both contribute toward and fit in with unbalanced budgets - serving to disguise amounts of total spending. Budgets

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that are unbalanced, continuous, and disaggregated are meant to be larger than budgets that are balanced, annual, and comprehensive. Changing budgetary norms help to account for governmental growth in a way consistent with the cultural theory advocated by W and W. Balanced Budgets and Unbalanced Regimes In one respect the past is relevant to the present state of budgetary development, since it is the result of decades of incremental change. On the other hand, the ideas (norms) that animated past revenue and expenditures seem to be out of synch with present conditions. Current discourse focuses on the deficit as a structural problem. ''Structural'' here means that built-in spending is expected to exceed built-in revenue. By posing the issue in this way, the implication is that governmental spending is out control. And if there is a structural defect/imbalance, then it must be eliminated by restoring balance. One possible solution often discussed in America is the imposition of expenditure limits to balance the budges (eg. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill). These global spending limits are intended to (re)introduce the norms of comprehensiveness and balance by law rather than custom. One result of such approaches is ''the fiscalization of the public policy debate'' - where programs are rarely considered solely on their substantive or political merit, but instead on their contribution to the deficit. By aggregating totals and converting them into symbols of which regime is ahead or behind, this way of budgeting highlights conflict, making differences increasingly difficult to resolve. Budgeting does not determine political alignments; rather, because budgeting is a subsystem of politics, political cultures shape budgeting. So, in the long run people must alter their ways of life before altering budgetary outcomes in any significant and relatively lasting manner. It is interesting to note that the ''solutions'' currently being offered to the budgetary crisis all depend on increasing the size of the government. W and W project that in the balanced budget arena, a struggle between sectarian and hierarchical regimes would lead to higher imbalances as they compete for credit over who has provided the most benefits. Further, they believe that it is likely that the more cohesive hierarchies will defeat sects and, without challenge, impose greater balance at a cost of reducing liberty. CLAUS OFFE ''CHALLENGING THE BOUNDARIES OF INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SINCE THE 1960'S'' Since the 1970's there has been a fusion of the political and nonpolitical spheres of social life. This opinion is based on 3 phenomena: 1.) the rise of ''participatory'' moods and ideologies, which lead people to exercise the repertoire of existing

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democratic rights more extensively; 2.) the increased use of noninstitutional or nonconventional forms of political participation, such as protest, demonstrations, and unofficial strikes, and 3.) political demands and conflicts concerning issues that used to be considered moral or economic. Thus, the conflicts and contradictions of advanced industrial society can no longer be meaningfully resolved through etatism, political regulation, and the inclusion of ever more issues on the agendas of bureaucratic authorities. New social movements seek to politicize civil society in ways that are not constrained by representativebureaucratic political institutions and thereby to reconstitute a civil society independent from increasing control and intervention. The differences between ''old'' and ''new'' politics can be summarized along the lines of issues, values, modes of action, and actors, as seen in the following chart (73): OLD PARADIGM Issues: economic growth and distribution; military and social security; social control Values: freedom and security of private consumption and material progress Modes of action: external: pluralist or corporatist interest intermediation, political party competition, majority Actors: socioeconomic groups acting as groups (in the group's interest) and involved in distributive conflict NEW PARADIGM Issues: preservation of the environment, human rights, peace, and unalienated forms of work Values: personal autonomy and identity, as opposed to centralized control Modes of action: external: protest politics based on demand formulated in predominantly negative terms Actors: socioeconomic groups acting not as such, but on behalf of ascriptive collectivities ''Old'' politics reigned from 1945-1970. During this time, there was a sharp separation between organization representing societal interests and the political parties concerned with winning votes and office. Collective bargaining and representative party government were the exclusive mechanisms for resolving political and social conflict. ''New'' politics identifies with issues that are neither public or private and its space of actin is noninstitutional politics. New Social Movements (NSM) insistence on the nonnegotiability of their concerns provokes angry reactions from political forces still operating within the old paradigm. They are seen as irrational and politically incompetent, with tactics that are counterproductive. The NSMs cannot negotiate because they do not have anything to offer in exchange for concessions, as with negotiations with labor unions, for example. The movements lack some of the properties of formal organizations, or a coherent set of

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ideological principles. The most striking characteristic of the NSM actors is that they do not rely for self-identification on either established political codes (left wind, liberal, conservative, etc.) or on socioeconomic codes. Instead, they classify political conflict in categories taken from their issues, such as gender or age. NSMs consist of 3 segments of the social structure: the new middle class, elements of the old middle class, and those people outside the labor market or peripherally involved (students, housewives, etc.). There are 2 approaches to analyzing the NSMs: Psychological Approach: - emphasizes ''push'' of new values and preferences (''rising demands'') - major independent variables: formation of motives - research methods: survey research, neutral outside observer; emphasis on attitudes The most famous of these theories is Smelsner's Collective Behavior theory. This portrays activists as uprooted, alienated, and irrational. However, the participants of NSMs are generally economically secure, well-educated, and rational. Note: Inglehart also belongs to this approach because he suggests the spread of value changes as the major variable in the rise of new politics. Offe criticizes this approach as being high unspecific and contingent on the age cohort that experiences prosperity and security. Structural Approach: - emphasis on perception of and knowledge about events and developmental tendencies: ''pull'' of interpreted facts - formation of cognitions and cognitive competence -participant observer, exploring interaction between events and understanding This argument is favored by those who see the NSMs in terms of their potential for structural change rather than their ''political deviance.'' This approach traces the origin of issues to circumstances, changes, and events that take place ''outside the actors.'' Three important aspects of the postindustrial society are: 1. Broadening: the negative side effects of the established modes of economic and political rationality are no longer concentrated and class specific; they are disperse in time, space, and kind so as to affect virtually every member of society in a variety of ways. 2. Deepening: there is a qualitative change in methods of domination, making their efforts more comprehensive and inescapable, and disrupting even those spheres of life that so far have remained outside the realm of rational and explicit social control.

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3. Irreversibility: both political and economic institutions have lost any selfcorrective or self-limiting capacity; they are caught within a vicious circle that can be broken only from outside the official political institutions. Impact of NSMs: Survival: In contrast to formal organizations, which can exist for a while even if nothing is happening, NSMs are directly dependent on events in their social environments to provide a catapult for action; this puts them in a precarious position. To overcome this problem, NSMs have defined certain occasions for collective action (e.g., Black Solidarity Day, National March on Washington for Gay Rights, etc.). Conscious reliance on a common cultural background also provides a way to make up for lack of formal organization. Success: Substantive success - positive or negative decision made by political elites that conforms to the demands of a new social movement (e.g., a protested construction project is stopped). Procedural success - changes on the mode of decision making (e.g., referenda are permitted). Political success - recognition and support are granted by institutional actors such as political parties or the media. Alliances: Whether the forces representing the new paradigm transcend their marginal power position depends on how the inconsistencies that exist between the members and the old middle class within the NSMs can be resolved. Offe argues that only an alliance between the NSM and the traditional left (unionized working class, elements of the new middle class) can lead to an effective and successful challenge of the old paradigm of politics. SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 2nd ed. London: Verso, 1983. Bellah, Robert, et al. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, chs. 1-3, 7. Berger, Peter, and Thomas Luckman. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Anchor, 1967. Bourdieu, Pierre. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambaridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, chs. 2 ('Structures and the Habitus'), 4 ('Structures, Habitus, Power: Basis for a Theory of Symbolic Power').

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Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. New York: Free Press, 'Introduction'; book 1, ch. 1 ('Definition of Religious Phenomena and of Religion'); book 2, ch. 7 ('Origin of the Idea of the Totemic Principle of Mana'); 'Conclusion.' Foucault, Michel. History of Sexuality. Vol. 1. New York: Pantheon, 1978. Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. 1930. Garfinkle, Harold. 'Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities.' In Studies in Ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity Press, [1967] 1984, ch. 2. Geertz, Clifford. 'Religion as a Cultural System' and 'Deep Play: Notes on a Balinese Cockfight.' In The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973, ch. 15 (pp. 412-53). Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor, 1959, pp. 1-76. Hirsch, Paul M. 'Processing Fads and Fashions: An Organization Set Analysis of Culture Industry Systems.' American Journal of Sociology 77 (1972):639-59. Marx, Karl. (1) The German Ideology, including the 'Theses on Feuerbach.' (2) 'Preface' to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,' in TS, pp. 136-38. Simmel, Georg. In Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms, ed. Donald N. Levine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ch. 9 ('Sociability'), ch. 16 ('Subjective Culture'). Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.' American Sociological Review 51 (1986):464-81. Swidler, Ann. 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.' American Sociological Review 51 (1986):273-86. Turner, Victor. 'Hidalgo: History as Social Drama.' In Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974, pp. 98-155. _________. 'Liminality and Communitas.' In The Ritual Process: Structure and AntiStructure. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, pp. 94-130 Weber, Max. (1) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. (2) 'The Social Psychology of World Religions.' In TS. (3) 'Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy.' In The Methodology of the Social Sciences, ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch.

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Williams, Raymond. 'Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory.' New Left Review 82 (November/December 1982). Willis, Paul. Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs. New York: Columbia University Press, [1977] 1981, chs. 2, 8. Wuthnow, Robert. 'State Structures and Ideological Outcomes.' American Sociological Review 50 (1985):799-821.* Zerubavel, Eviatur. 'Easter and Passover: On Calendars and Group Identity.' American Sociological Review 47 (1982):284-89.

BENEDICT ANDERSON IMAGINED COMMUNITIES CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Nationality, nation-ness, and nationalism are cultural artifacts whose creation toward the end of the 18th C was the spontaneous distillation of a complex ''crossing'' of discrete historical forces; but that, once created, they became ''modular,'' capable of being transplanted to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a variety of political and ideological constellations. Theorists of nationalism have encountered three paradoxes: (1)The objective modernity of nations in the eye of the historian vs. their subjective antiquity in the eye of nationalists. (2) The formal universality of nationality as a sociocultural concepts vs. the particularity of its concrete manifestations. (3) The political power of nationalism vs. its philosophical poverty. In order to address some of these problems, Anderson proposes the following definition of nationalism: it is an imagined political community that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because members will never know most of their fellow-members, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. It is limited because it has finite, though elastic boundaries beyond which lies other nations. It is sovereign because it came to maturity at a stage of human history when freedom was a rare and precious ideal. And it is imagined as a community because it is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. CHAPTER 2: CULTURAL ROOTS Nationalism has to be understood not in relation to self-consciously held political ideologies, but the the large cultural systems that preceded it. Nationalism arose at a time when three other cultural conceptions were decreasing in importance. First, there were changes in the religious community. Nationality represented a

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secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning. The unselfconscious coherence of religion declined after the Middle Ages because of the effects of the explorations of the non-European world and the gradual demotion of the sacred language itself. The older communities lost confidence in the unique sacredness of their languages (the idea that a particular script language offered privileged access to ontological truth), and thus lost confidence in their ideas about admission to membership in the religious community. Second, there were changes in the dynastic realm. In the older imagining, states were defined by centers, borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded with one another. However, in he 17th C, the automatic legitimacy of the sacral monarchy began its decline and people began to doubt the belief that society was naturally organized around high centers. Third was a conception of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable. In the Middle Ages, time was thought to be simultaneous; the modern idea was of homogeneous, empty time. They idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily through history. These three changes lead to a search for a new way o linking fraternity, power, and time together. CHAPTER 3: THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS The preceding elements set the conditions for a new form of cultural consciousness. The reason this consciousness took the form of nationalism is due to the half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity. Capitalism was especially important because the expansion of the book market contributed tot he revolutionary vernacularization of languages. This was given further impetus by three extraneous factors: a change in the character of Latin the impact of the Reformation, which led to the mass production of Bibles the spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralization. Print languages laid the foundation for national consciousness in three ways: they created unified fields of exchange and communication they gave a new fixity to language they created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative vernaculars However, the concrete formation of contemporary nation-states is not isomorphic with the determinate reach of particular print languages, one must also look at the emergence of political entities on the world stage. CHAPTER 4: CREOLE PIONEERS

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Anderson is concerned with determining why it was Creole communities (those formed and led by people who shared a common language and common descent with those against who they fought) that developed early conceptions of their nation-ness well before most of Europe. There are 6 factors of Creole history that contributed to this: the tightening of Madrid's control on these areas the spread of the liberalizing ideas of the Enlightenment the improvement of trans-Atlantic communication the willingness of the ''comfortable classes'' to make sacrifices in the name of freedom the ability of the administrative units to create meaning through the religious pilgrimage (refer to Victor Turner) and the internal interchangeability of mean and documents which helped created a unified apparatus of power the rise of the newspaper which implies the refraction of events, even ''world events'' into a specific imagined world of vernacular readers The failure of the Spanish-American experience to generate a permanent Spanish-American-wide nationalism reflects both the general level of development of capitalism and technology in the late 18th C and the ''local'' backwardness of Spanish capitalism and technology in relation to the administrative stretch of the empire. The Protestant, English-speaking people to the north were much more favorably situated for realizing the idea of ''America.'' CHAPTER 5: OLD LANGUAGES, NEW MODELS The close of the era of successful national liberation movements in the Americas coincided with the onset of the age of nationalism in Europe. These ''new nationalisms'' were different in two respects: 1.) national print languages were of central ideological and political importance, and 2.) the nation became something capable of being consciously aspired to from early on due to the ''models'' set forth by the Creole pioneers. Vernacular print capitalism is important to class formation, particularly the rise of the bourgeoisie. Prior to this, solidarities were the products of kinship, clientship, and personal loyalties. The bourgeoisie, however, achieved solidarities on an imaginary basis through print capitalism. That is, they didn't know one another because of marriage or proper transactions, but because they came to visualize others like themselves through print. The nobility then were potential consumers of the philological revolution. As soon as the events of the Americas reached the European nobility through print, the imagined realities of nation-states became models for Europe. CHAPTER 6: OFFICIAL NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM From about the middle of the 19th C there developed ''official nationalism'' in Europe. they were responses by power groups threatened with exclusion from popular imagined communities (e.g., Russia, England, and Japan). They were a means for combining naturalization with retention of dynastic power. The model

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of official nationalism was also followed by states with no serious power pretensions, but whose ruling classes felt threatened by the world-wide spread of nationally imagined communities (e.g., Siam, Hungary). CHAPTER 7: THE LAST WAVE The last wave of nationalism was the transformation of the colonial-state to the national state. This was facilitate by three factors: the increase in physical mobility increasing bureaucratization the spread of modern-style education It was a response to the new-style global imperialism made possible by the achievements of industrial capitalism. The paradox of official nationalism was that it brought the idea of ''national histories'' into the consciousness of the colonized. In addition, this last wave arose in a period of world history in which the nation was becoming an international norm and in which it became possible to ''model'' nationness in a more complex way that before. CHAPTER 8: PATRIOTISM AND RACISM Nation-ness is ''natural'' in the sense that it contains something that is unchosen (much like gender, skin color, and parentage). It has an aura of fatality embedded in history. It is not, however, the source of racism and anti-Semitism. Racism erases nation-ness by reducing the adversary to his/her biological physiognomy. Nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations whose origins lie outside of history. The dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than those of nation. CHAPTER 9: THE ANGEL OF HISTORY Revolutions, such as those in Vietnam, Kampuchea, and China, are contemporary exhibits of nationalism, but this nationalism is the heir of two centuries of historic change. Nationalism has undergone a process of modulation and adaptation, according to different eras, political regimes, economies, and social structures. As a result, the ''imagined community'' has spread out to ever conceivable contemporary society. CHAPTER 10: CENSUS, MAP, AND MUSEUM These three institutions of power profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion. The census created ''identities'' imagined by the classifying mind of the colonial state. The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one, and only one, extremely clear place. The map also worked on the basis of a totalizing classification. It was designed to demonstrate the antiquity of specific, tightly bounded territorial units. It also served as a logo, instantly recognizable and visible everywhere, that formed a

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powerful emblem for the anticolonial nationalism being born. The museum allowed the state to appear as the guardian of tradition, and this power was enhanced by the infinite reproducibility of the symbols of tradition. CHAPTER 11: MEMORY AND FORGETTING Awareness of being embedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of continuity, yet of ''forgetting'' the experience of this continuity, engenders the need for a narrative of ''identity.''

BELLAH, MADSEN, SULLIBAN, SWIDLER, AND TIPTON

HABITS OF THE HEART CHAPTER 1: THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS The book opens with a small set of short bio's taken from the large body of interviews that constituted a major component of the research project from which this book originated. Below is just a brief account of some of the relevant points concerning American cultural values that the authors extracted from these accounts. -American cultural traditions define personality, achievement and purpose of human life in ways that leave the individual in isolation. -Values and priorities are not justified by any wider framework of purpose or belief; what is good is what one finds rewarding -Ethical values as justified as matters of personal preference value system. -People pursue their own interests as long as it doesn't interfere with others. -Solving conflicts is treated as a technical, rather than a moral problem. -Emphasis is placed on honesty and communication. -There is a vague idea of what makes up a set of values; it always seems to return to a matter of personal preference (which can change over time). -Some seek a return to older, traditional, small town values of the past. This is, however, an unrealistic objective since it consists of subjective values rather than a true reflection of the past. Small town values can also lead to narrow notions of social justice. -Many express the idea that the most important thing in life is doing what you chose to do as well as you can - living up to a set of personal values. The happiness of a fulfilling life cannot be won without the willingness to make the effort and pay the costs. -Each person is ultimately responsible for her/his own life - accepting responsibility for yourself. -Some seem to have a much clear idea of what they are against than what they are for.

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Different voices in a common tradition: The central issue of the book is to gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which Americans use private and public life to make sense of their lives - how the resources our transition provides (or fails to provide) for enabling us to think about the kinds of moral problems we currently face as Americans. All of the cases the authors addressed, despite the different traditions they draw from, share a common moral vocabulary - the ''first language'' of American individualism. There is something arbitrary in the goals of a good life. The authors believe that this difficulty in justifying the goals of a morally good life displayed by many of those interviewed is a characteristic problem of American culture. Success: In small town/business America of the past, requirements of economic success were more easily reconciled with understandings of success in family and civic life. In the present-day corporate/hierarchical workplace it is hard to relate those qualities necessary for economic success with other aspects of life. Freedom: Perhaps the most resonant American value is freedom, which in some ways defines the good in public and private life. Implied here is a freedom from having other peoples' values, styles, way of life forced upon you. This issue of what you are supposed to do with freedom once you have it is a harder thing for American's to define. Freedom can tend to become an end in itself with little or no actual content. Since everyone has the right to be free from the demands of others, it can be hard to forge bonds of attachment/cooperation with others - this would imply an obligation that impinges on one's freedom. Under the influence of modern psychological ideals, to be free is not just to be left alone but to be your own person and to define who you are, what you want from others apart from demands of conformity. A problem is that freedom from provides no vocabulary by which Americans can easily address common conceptions of the ends of a good life of ways to coordinate cooperative action with others. An image of the self-sufficient individual is implicit here. Common ties are made fragile by a freedom of each person to live where, do what, believe what, s/he wants and to do whatever possible to improve his/her material conditions. The American ideal of freedom leaves us with a stubborn fear of acknowledging structures of power and interdependence in a technologically complex society dominated by giant corporations and an increasingly powerful state. Justice: The common conception of justice is that of equal opportunity (guaranteed by fair laws and political procedures applied in the same manner to all)for every individual to pursue their own personal ideal of happiness. This formulation of

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justice, however, does not tell us what the distribution of goods/wealth would look like in a society where all persons had equal opportunity to pursue their interests. This raises the issue, for example, of whether equal opportunity is enough where some individuals are disadvantaged to start with. Our available moral traditions do not give us as rich resources to think about distributive or substantive justice as it provides for procedural justice. CHAPTER 2: CULTURE AND CHARACTER - THE HISTORICAL CONVERSION Variations in our individualistic ideal can be found in our cultural tradition something often overlooked in our forward-facing, future-oriented society. By cultural tradition the authors mean the symbols, ideals, and ways of life of a people that express the meaning of the destiny its members share. The themes of success, freedom, and justice are all present (although take different meanings) in the three central strands of our cultural heritage - biblical, republican, and modern individualistic ideals. BIBLICAL STANDARDS Biblical religion has long been cited as an important influence in America from its earliest colonization - by Tocqueville, among others. The Puritans (and the authors primarily cite the views of Winthrop as the standard here) although prone to viewing material property as a sign of God's approval, did have as their primary criterion for success a community in which a quality ethical and spiritual life could be lived. The Puritan settlements were, in a sense, the first of many attempts in America to create utopian communities. Freedom in the sense relevant here is not a ''natural freedom'' (do-what-you-want), but a moral freedom where one has the liberty to do only that which is good, just, and honest in the context of a the covenant between God and humanity. Authorities were expected to live up to the ideal. Justice was a matter more of substance than procedure - moderation in sanction was the tendency. Administration of justice was often subjective. REPUBLICAN IDEALS This ideal is typical of a call to service for the good of your community - eg. Washington, Adams, Jefferson. The authors cite Jefferson as their example of republican thinking. The notion of equality in this tradition does not mean that all humans are created equal in all respects, but is a fundamental political equality. Although this is a universal principle, it is only effective politically under certain conditions - ie. in a republic with citizen participation. The republican ideal embraces the idea of a self-governing society of relative equals in which all participate. Jefferson, for instance, believed that this was possible in America because it was not divided into a small powerful aristocracy and a povertystricken mass. The ideal was embodied in the idyllic independent farmer and cities and manufacture were feared because they would bring inequality of class and corrupt the morals of the people.

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Freedom was the freedom of the individual from arbitrary state action and the freedom of press. the best defense of freedom was an educated people actively participating in government. Formal freedom and procedural freedom were important, but there was also a higher justice in the form of ''the laws of nature and God.'' UTILITARIAN AND EXPRESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM Ben Franklin was the epitome of the poor kid made good. This ideal places emphasis on success through hard work and careful calculation - utilitity-modifed Christian virtues (Poor Richard's Almanac, etc.). Franklin gave classic expression to what many felt (and still feel) to be the most important thing about America: the chance for an individual to get ahead on her/his own initiative. Although he never espoused it per se, Franklin was influential in the development of utilitarian individualism in its pure form: in society where each vigorously pursues his/her own interest, the social good would automatically emerge. The mid-19th Cent. saw a reaction against this utilitarian individualism. Writers of the ''American Renaissance'' (Melville, Emmerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, etc) put aside the search for wealth in favor of deeper cultivation of the self. Walt Whitman, for example, viewed a life of strong feeling as above all a successful life. Freedom here is that to express oneself against all constraint. Despite his unconventionality, an element of the republican tradition was strong in Whitman's work. The ultimate use of American independence was to cultivate and express the self and explore its vast social and cosmic identities. EARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN CULTURE HECTOR DE CREVECOUR LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER Believed that Americans acted with greater personal initiative and self-reliance than Europeans and tended to be unimpressed by social rank and long usage. His sketch of the American approximated the rational individual concerned with personal welfare, the model of Enlightenment thought - thought that was at the time receiving renewed emphasis from the writings of political economists like Adam Smith. The idea here is rational self-interested humanity - ''Economic Man'' so-called. Crevecour focused almost exclusively on this single aspect of American life, ignoring other important issues - eg. religion, republican political culture. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA Visited American in the 1830s and sought to understand the mature of the democratic society - exemplified by America. A particular concern of his was whether democratic society could maintain free political institutions or whether it

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would break up into some new kind of political despotism. He recognized the commercial/entrepreneurial spirit emphasized by de Crevecour, but found it to have ambiguous and problematic implications for the future of American freedom. While physical circumstances of the U.S. contributed to maintenance of the democratic republic, laws have contributed more, and mores most of all. For Tocqueville, mores are loosely defined as ''habits of the heart''; notions, opinions, and ideas that shape mental habits; the sum of moral and intellectual dispositions of individuals of society. These involve not only ideas and opinions, but also habitual practice - things like religion, political participation, and economic life. Stressed here is an isolated individualism along the vein of Franklin. Tocqueville thought that this isolation to which America tended left it prone to despotism. He was particularly interested in the ways that mores draw individuals into social community. Active Civic organizations are key to democracy and overcome isolation. Associations and decentralized local administration mediate between individuals and the central state. Tocqueville also stresses the widely shared Protestant Christianity as a general cohesive factor in American culture. The Independent Citizen 19th Cent. individual initiative in service of common good strengthened moral life of the community and simultaneously increased material welfare and nourished public spirit. The authors employ the term representative character: a public image that helps define, for a given group of people, just what kind of personality traits it is good and legitimate to develop. For Tocqueville the representative character was the independent citizen - who held strongly to biblical religion; knew duties and rights of citizenship; especially a self-made ''man.'' Representative characters are not an abstract ideals or social roles, but are realized in the lives of those who fuse their individual personality with public requirements of those roles. They are often the mainstay of myths and popular feeling, important sources of meaning for people in a particular culture. RC's are also focal points at which society encounters its problems as interpreted though a specific set of cultural understandings. Although the focus of the new American democratic culture was on male roles, this achievement was sustained by a female-shaped moral ecology/environment (cf. Republican Motherhood). Male and female roles were seen as unequal in power ad prestige but largely complementary in rural America. With the increase of urbanization, however, women were more and more deprived of an economic role and the nature of their inequality became more visible and pronounced. The Entrepreneur Tocqueville saw two dangers in Jacksonian democracy: 1) the slave society of the South, which degraded both blacks and whites 2) the industrial system of the Northeast - rise of an industrial aristocracy Between the Civil War (or ''The War Between the States,'' as they say in the South) and WWI America underwent a transformation from which it emerged a

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new national society. New technologies (esp. transportation, communication, and manufacture) drew previously semi-autonomous local societies into a vast national market - a process carried out primarily by private individuals and financial groups. This period saw the rise of the business corporation as a new powerful social form. Old local government organization and earlier social and economic ways of life (ie. small town) lacked the capacity to deal with problems that were increasingly national in scope. New politics of interest developed with powerful economic interests of corporations, banks, and eventually the labor movement pitted against old regional, ethnic, and religious interests. The most distinctive aspect of 20th Cent. American society is the division of life into separate functional sectors: home/workplace, work/leisure, white/blue collar, public/private. These divisions suited the needs of bureaucratic industrial corporations. With the industrialization of the economy, working life became specialized, organization tighter, and functional sectors of the economy more interdependent than before. With these changes, major problems of life seemed to be essentially individual matters - negotiating a reliable, harmonious balance among an individual's various sectors of life. The concept of ''peer'' also underwent a change in meaning; those who share some specific mix of activities - occupational and economic position, but also attitudes, tastes, and style of life. The Manager Despite the importance of the self-made entrepreneurs as a continuing feature and symbol in American life, it has not represented the dominant direction of economic and social development. Bureaucratic organization of the business corporation has been the dominant force in the 20th C. and its crucial factor is the professional manager. The manager's task is to organize human and nonhuman resources available to an organization so to improve that organization's position in the marketplace - according to the various criteria of effectiveness set by the market, supervisors, and the owners of the organization. The public/private split becomes more pronounced and correlates with the split between utilitarian and expressive individualism. With the coming of managerial society, the organization of work, place of residence, and social status came to be decided by criteria of economic effectiveness - criteria which further facilitated growth of national mass marketing and expanded consumer choice and styles of consumption. The Therapist (cf. the manager) The therapist is specialized in mobilizing resources internal to the individual for all effective action, with effectiveness measured by the elusive criteria of personal satisfaction. At the center of the culture of the manager and therapist is the autonomous individual, presumed to be able to choose the role s/he will play and commitment s/he will make. The moral language and images of this culture of utilitarian and expressive individualism influences the lives of most in modern society. The therapeutic orientation seeks a cure for the discontinuity between

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organization of the self and organization of work/interest/meaning in such a way that it enables a person to think of commitments as enhancements of a sense of individual well-being rather than as moral imperatives. The new culture provides a way for the individual to develop techniques for coping with the contradictory pressures of public and private life, but in doing so extends the calculating managerial style into areas of life formerly governed by norms of moral ecology. SOME RECENT INTERPRETATIONS ROBERT AND HELEN LYND A STUDY OF MUNCIE, IND. of the 20s and 30s sought to identify the effects of industrialization and the accompanying social changes (using 1890 as a base-line). They found evidence of a split between a dominant business class and a worker class. They also saw a decline of cultures of the independent citizen with its strong religious and republican elements in the face of a rising business (manager) class with an ethos of utilitarian individualism. RIESMAN THE LONELY CROWD (1950) the old independent, ''inner directed'' American was being replaces by new ''other-directed'' corporate personality types. There are four types of character: transition-directed, inner-directed, other-directed, and autonomous character (this individualistic type of character seems to be becoming increasingly more important in post-war America. VARENNES AMERICANS TOGETHER (1977) stresses the dominance of utilitarian and expressive individualism as modes of modern character and cultural interaction. Especially emphasized is the delicate balance between them and their mutual dependence. In American culture today, the authors state that there is a strong rejection of the managerial-therapeutic ethos, in which we can see not only the discontents of the present economic and social order, but also remainders of the continuing importance of the biblical and republican cultural traditions in American politics. CHAPTER 3: FINDING ONESELF

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Self Reliance This value goes all the way back to the earliest periods of the American nation and is evident in all of the traditions examined in Ch 2. In the case of biblical and republican ideal self-reliance is a communal value, while for utilitarian and expressive individualism it is an individualistic value (big surprise). Leaving Home Issues of separation, individuation, and leaving home are recurrent themes in American life - but only the last is unique to American culture as an expected part of the life course/development. John Locke fostered some influential views on child rearing: The father should exercise authority firmly in the early years of a child's life with a view to the child's developing the self-discipline that will allow independence later on. By adolescence, the parents should abandon coercive authority and treat the child as a self-governing friend. The ideal of self-reliance, like other core elements in our culture, is nurtured within families, passed-on from parent to child, and binds American culture together. Leaving Church This may not literally involve leaving the church of one's parents, but there is an expectation that at some point in adolescence or early youth a person will decide what church s/he wants to belong to. One must defend one's views and choice as uniquely one's own, not one's parent's (this is a traditional Protestant ideal). Liberalized versions of biblical morality, however, tend to subordinate themes of divine authority and human duty, while under importance of human choice and freedom and the possibility of self acceptance. Often, rejection of institutional religion itself is a by-product in a personally determined set of values. The notion that one discovers one's deepest beliefs in and through tradition and community (institutionalized religion) is not every congenial to Americans. The irony of the strong emphasis placed on self-reliance and -determination is that here, too, just when we think we are most free, we are most coerced by the dominant belief of our own culture. Work The demand to ''make something of yourself'' through work is one that most Americans coming of age hear as often from themselves as from others. This encompasses several different notions of work: -job: making money/a living; economic success and security -career: broader type of success where one traces progress through life by achievement and advancement in an occupation with increase of social standing and prestige as the objective -calling: work as practical ideal of activity and a characteristic that makes a person's work inseparable from his/her life; a calling links a person not only to work but also to a larger community where the calling of each contributed to the good of all The idea of a calling has been largely attenuated in the modern industrial economy in favor of a private job/career. The absence of calling means the loss of

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a sense of moral meaning; but when not found in a calling people tend to search for it through expressive individualism, through the ties of the lifestyle enclave. A person will also tend to focus on family and friends around mid-life where her/his career trajectory flattens out and advancement (and therefore fulfillment) in work becomes more difficult or impossible. The Lifestyle Enclave ''Lifestyle'' is linked closely with leisure and consumption, usually unrelated to the world of work; it brings together those who are socially, economically, or culturally similar. Rather than a community (which attempts to be an inclusive whole, celebrating the interdependence of public and private life), the authors believe that lifestyle as an enclave essentially celebrates the narcissistic and is segmental - explicitly involving a contrast with others who do not share their lifestyle. The lifestyle enclave is an important outgrowth of the sectoral organization of American life as resulting from emergence of industrialization and the national market, with the associated renewal of the importance of social class and status. The authors tend to view lifestyle enclaves as a form of collective support in an otherwise radically individuating society. Grounding the Self The big Q: If the self is defined by its ability to choose its own values (which is what the authors believe), on what grounds are these values based? A: One's own idiosyncratic preferences are their own true justification because they define the true self A: the right act is simply the one that yields the agent the more exciting challenge or most good feeling about the self. Against the possibility of individualistic self-knowledge arises the issue of how to be sure that our own feelings are not compromised by those of others and are truly independent of their values. The modern conception of the self is one of a series of experiences imprinted on a blank slate - expressed in its most extreme form by the work of Goffman, there is no self at all. Modern attempts to escape radical individualism such as a belief in universally felt (perhaps biological) needs or the belief that all persons are part of a cosmic whole, are all rooted in nonsocial, non-cultural conceptions of reality that provide little guidance beyond private life and intimate relations. The Meaning of the Life Course The authors contend that despite contemporary popular thought on the subject, the idea of a life course must be set in a larger generational, historical, and probably religious (as opposed to individualistic) context if it is to provide any richness of meaning. The authors further believe that despite the radical individualism that has achieved hegemony in universities and middle class life, and which is based on and supported by inadequate social science, impoverished philosophy, and vacuous theology, all of our activities go on in relationships, groups, associations, and communities ordered by institutional structures and interpreted by cultural patterns of meaning.

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CHAPTER 7: GETTING INVOLVED

Rather than being automatically included in social relations that impose obligations externally, Americans are expected to get involved - choosing for themselves to join social groups, generally because of self interests or a felt affinity for certain others. The Free and Independent Township (more Tocqueville) Although individual self interest initially led people to participate in local civic associations, the experience of local self-government transformed them. It gives an understanding of republican responsibility that transcends individual selfinterest and turns them into ''orderly, moderate, and self-controlled citizens.'' The Town Father Like a contemporary incarnation of the ideal of the independent citizen. In the end, however, the town father advocates ideals that are unable to guide him/her through the maze of economic interdependence and political conflict that defines the modern social world. In its economic aspect, the town father advocated a certain way of doing business: the ''personal way''; stressing honesty and hard work with incentives to work efficiently; business prospects should be linked to the well-being to the town. The town government should provide an efficient framework within which self-reliant individuals can earn their livelihood by providing useful things to other persons and the community. In the town father's vocabulary, the ''public good'' is defined in terms of the long-term ability to individuals to get just what they have paid for in terms of time and taxes - no more, no less. From Town to Metropolis Due in part to the separated demands of work, family and community in the modern world, and in part due to the rise of lifestyle enclaves, the associational life of the modern metropolis does not generate the kinds of bonds or second language of social responsibility in the same way as the independent townships (of the past). The Concerned Citizen: some people feel the need to get involved in politics especially when their privated sanctuaries are threatened; such participation is perceived in self-sacrificial terms, rather than as a matter of duty. Urban Cosmopolitanism: a view generally held by those whose backgrounds give them the opportunity for social mobility; a sophisticated person is thought of as one who tolerates or enjoys diversity, and used reason rather than passion to resolve conflicts. Modern professionals, who tend to move from position to position and cultivate complicated radial networks of friends, are prime examples.

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Civic-Minded Professional: believe that public decisions concerning competing claims should be resolved peacefully on the basis of neutral technical solutions that are beyond debate, since this perspective contends that a valid decision cannot be made on the basis of goal-values, interests, or opinions. Careful research into the consequences of different courses of action is needed - this implied a rational, utilitarian standpoint. This peace via neutral technical solution rests on 2 assumptions: 1) interests of parties are not fundamentally incompatible, and 2) technical expertise incontestably qualifies one to be a leader. The Professional Activist: a variation of the civic-minded professional dedicated to political action in the interest of more radical forms of social change; believe that a fair chance can only come about when all groups have equal power, so they favor special initiatives to support the disadvantaged. They view the community as a context in which a variety of interests should be expressed and adjudicated. From Volunteer to Citizen: involves a sense that the public good is based on the responsibility of one generation to the next and holds the idea that short-term interests are often detrimental to our society in the long-run. This outlook primarily develops through a pattern of volunteer work and the network of emotional ties it creates with a variety of people in different circumstances. The key is a generosity of spirit as the ability to acknowledge our interconnectedness - our debt to society.

PETER BERGER AND THOMAS LUCKMAN THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY INTRO: ''THE PROBLEM OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE'' Reality is socially constructed and the sociology of knowledge must analyze the processes in which this occurs -- ''the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality.'' The sociology of knowledge is concerned with the relationship between human thought and the social context in which it arises. Scheler had a ''relative-natural world view'' for the sociology of knowledge, which was a moderate statement that claimed that society determined the presence but not the nature of ideas. On the other hand, Mannheim held the more ''radical'' view that with the general concept of ideology the sociology of knowledge is reached -- the understanding that no human thought is immune to the ideologizing influences of its social context. Mannheim also had the concept of 'relativism' - that knowledge always comes from a certain position, and that the object of thought becomes progressively clearer with this accumulation of different perspectives on it. Merton also contributed to the study of the sociology

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of knowledge with his concept of manifest function - intended conscious functions of idea - and latent functions - the unintended, unconscious functions of ideas. ''Common-sense,'' everyday knowledge, rather than ''ideas'' must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge. Durkheim argued that we must consider social facts as things. Weber claimed that the object of cognition was the subjective meaning complex of action. Society has a dual character: objective facticity and subjective meaning. This is reality sui generis. Berger asks, how do subjective meanings become objective facticities? How is it possible that human activity should produce a world of things? An adequate understanding of the ''reality sui generis'' of society requires an inquiry into the manner in which this is constructed. This is the task of the sociology of knowledge. CHAPTER 1: ''THE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE IN EVERYDAY LIFE'' 1) THE REALITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE Phenomenological Analysis is the method best suited to clarify the foundations of knowledge in everyday life -- it is a purely descriptive method. Consciousness is capable of moving through different spheres of reality. We are conscious of the world as consisting of multiple realities. Reality pare excellence is the reality of every day life as an ordered reality. Phenomena are prearranged in patterns that seem to be independent of our apprehension of them and that impose themselves on it. Things are pre-designated. Common sense knowledge is the knowledge ''I'' share with others (''inter subjective'') in the normal, self-evident routines of everyday life. The problem is the translation of ''non-everyday'' finite spheres of reality. More important for this analysis is the temporal structure of every day life. Temporality is an intrinsic property of consciousness. The temporal structure of every day life is exceedingly complex - because the different levels of empirically present temporality must be ongoingly correlated. This same temporal structure determined much of our own situations in the world of everyday life. 2) SOCIAL INTERACTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE In relations between people, there are face-to-face situations and all other cases are derivative of them. In face-to-face relations, the other's subjectivity is available to ''me'' through a maximum of symptoms. Reflection about ''myself'' is typically occasioned by the attitude toward me that the other exhibits. While it is comparatively difficult to impose rigid patterns on face-to-face interaction, even it is patterned from the beginning if it takes place within the routines of everyday life. The social reality of everyday life is apprehended in a continuum of typifications which are progressively anonymous as they are removed from the ''here and now'' of the face-to-face situation. Social structure is

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the sum total of these typifications and of the recurrent patterns of interaction established by means of them, social structure is an essential element of the reality of everyday life. 3) Language and knowledge in everyday life Signs are objectivations in the sense of being objectively available beyond the expression of subjective intentions ''here and now.'' Language is the most important sign system of human society. The common objectivations of everyday life are maintained primarily by linguistic signification. The detachment of language lies in its capacity to communicate meanings that are not directly expressions of subjectivity ''here and now.'' Language is an objective repository of vast accumulations of meaning and experience, it crystallizes subjectivity, and it typifies (i.e. everybody knows what the connotations of ''She had to go to the doctor for 'female trouble' are, etc.). Any significative theme that spans spheres of reality may be defined as a symbol, and the linguistic mode my which such transcendence is achieved is by symbolic language. Interaction with others in everyday life is constantly affected by our common participation in the available stock of knowledge. An important element of the knowledge of everyday life (often transmitted by language) is the knowledge of the relevance structure of others. Yet knowledge in everyday life is socially distributed. We don't know everything known to our fellow man, etc. Thus, the knowledge of how the socially available stock of knowledge is distributed is an important element of that same stock of knowledge (where to turn for certain types of knowledge, what to hide from whom, i.e. ask a U of C professor about the social construction of reality, but then don't go to a whine and cheese party and tell them you just snuck back stage at an Urge Overkill concert to meet Nash). CHAPTER 2: ''SOCIETY AS OBJECTIVE REALITY'' 1) INSTITUTIONALIZATION a) Organism and activity Man's relationship to his environment is characterized by world openness. In the ''process of becoming,'' man takes his place in an interrelationship with the environment. Humannes is socio-culturally variable. The self cannot be adequately understood apart from the particular social context in which it was shaped. Man's specific humanity and his sociality are inextricably intertwined. World openness is always pre-empted by social order, which is a product of human activity. (The inherent instability of the human organism makes it imperative that man himself provide a stable environment for his conduct.) b) Origins of institutionalization Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors. Institutions control human action by

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setting up patterns of conduct -- social control. The process of institutionalization starts with reciprocal institutionalization. Then the DofL and other innovations lead to new habitualizations. Institutions become crystallized and are experienced as possessing an objective reality of their own, which was originally humanly produced. A dialectical relation between man and the social world exists. There are three dialectical moments in social reality: 1) society is a human product 2) society is an objective reality 3) man is a social product Hence the product acts back on its producer. The institutional world requires legitimation, which is learned by the new generation during socialization. The new generation posits a problem of compliance, and its socialization into the institutional order requires the establishment of sanctions. The ''logic'' attributed to the institutional order is part of the socially available stock of knowledge and is taken for granted as such. Thus, institutions are integrated de facto through socially shared universes of meaning. Knowledge is borne out of experience and systematized as objective truth, then internalized as subjective reality, thus shaping the person. c) Sedimentation and tradition Experiences become sedimented in that they congeal in recollection as recognizable and memorable entities. Inter subjective sedimentation occurs when several individuals share a common biography, the experiences of which become incorporated in a common stock of knowledge. This sedimentation is social when it has been objectivated in a sign system -- when the possibility of reiterated objectification of the shared experiences arises. Language becomes the basis and the instrument of the collective stock of knowledge. It becomes the depository of a large aggregate of collective sedimentations. The objectivated meanings of institutional activity are conceived of as ''knowledge'' and transmitted as such. There is not a priori consistency of functionality between institutions and the forms of transmission of knowledge pertaining to them. The problem of logical coherence arises first on the level of legitimation and secondly on the level of socialization. d) Roles A segment of the self is objectified in terms of socially available typifications (the ''social self''). The actor identifies with the socially objectivated typifications of conduct in action, but reestablishes distance from them as he reflects about his conduct afterward. This distance between the actor and his action can be retained in consciousness and projected to future repetitions of the actions. In this way both acting self and acting others are apprehended not as unique individuals but as types, which are interchangeable. Institutions are embodied in individual experience by means of roles. Origins of roles lie in the same fundamental process of habitualization and objectivation as

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the origins of institutions. One must be initiated into the various cognitive and even affective layers of the body of knowledge that is directly and indirectly appropriated to a give role. This implies a social distribution of knowledge. The analysis of roles is of particular importance to the sociology of knowledge because it reveals the mediations between the macroscopic universe of meaning objectivated in a society and the ways by which these universes re subjectively real to individuals. e) Scope and modes of institutionalization If many or most relevance structures in a society are generally shared, the scope of institutionalization will be wide. If only a few relevance structures are generally shared the scope of institutionalization will be narrow. The relationship between knowledge and its social base is dialectical; knowledge is a social produce and is a factor in social change. Rates of change of institutions are differential. This simply created a greater need for legitimation. Both the institutional order as a whole and segments of it may be apprehended in reified terms. The objectivity of the social world means that it confronts man as something outside himself. Reification is an extreme step in the process of objectivation, whereby the objectivated world loses its comprehensibility as a human enterprise and becomes fixed as a non-human facticity. Roles may be reified in the same manner as institutions. The sector that has been objectified in the role is also apprehended as an inevitable fate, for which the individual may disclaim responsibility. 2) LEGITIMATION Legitimation explains the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity and normative dignity to its subjectivated meanings. Legitimation not only tells the individual why he should perform one action and not the other; it also tells him shy things are what they are. In fact, knowledge precedes values in the legitimation of institutions. With the development of specialized legitimating theories and their administration by full-time legitimators, legitimation begins to go beyond pragmatic application to become 'pure theory.' The next level of legitimation, beyond the are, the should, and the theory, is the symbolic universe. Symbolic universes are bodies of theoretical traditions that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order as a symbolic totality. The symbolic universe is conceived of as the matrix of all socially objectivation and subjectively real meanings. In the SU, the reflective integration of discrete institutional processes reaches ultimate fulfillment. A whole world is created. Institutional roles become modes of participation in a universe that transcends and includes the institutional order. Experiences belonging to different spheres of reality are integrated by incorporation in the same, overarching universe of meaning. The nomic function of the SU allows one to return to the reality of everyday life. The SU provides the ultimate legitimation of the institutional order by bestowing upon it the primacy in the hierarchy of human experience. It assigns ranks to various phenomena in a hierarchy of being, defining the range of the social within

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this hierarchy and integrates all discrete institutional processes. It makes sense of the entire universe. In the process of externalization, man projects his own meanings into reality. SUs which proclaim that all reality is humanly meaningful and call upon the entire cosmos to validate human existence, constitute the farthest reaches of this projection. b) Conceptual machineries of universe maintenance If the institutional order is to be taken for granted in its totality as a meaningful whole, it must be legitimated by ''placement'' in a symbolic universe. It becomes necessary to legitimate symbolic universes by means of conceptual machineries of universe maintenance when the SU has become a problem. This happens when socialization challenges the SU. This calls for the repression of these groups, through various conceptual machineries designed to maintain the 'official universe.' The SU is not only legitimated by also modified by the conceptual machineries constructed to ward off the challenge of heretical groups within a society. The conceptual machineries of universe maintenance are themselves products of social activity, which can be variable. The conceptual machineries that maintain symbolic universes always entail the systematization of cognitive and normative legitimations. Mythology is a conceptual machinery which in closest to the naive level of the SU. It was developed to reintegrate inconsistencies in peoples' environments. There are actually four types of conceptual machineries: mythology, theology, philosophy, and science. Unlike mythology, the other three historical forms of conceptual machinery became the property of specialist elites, whose bodies of knowledge were increasingly removed from the common knowledge of society at large. The lay person no longer knows how his universe is to be conceptually maintained, although he still knows who the specialists of universe maintenance are presumed to be (i.e. the 'experts'). There are two applications of universe-maintaining machinery: therapy and nihilation. Therapy resocializes the deviant individual into the objective reality of the symbolic universe of the society. Nihilation liquidates conceptually everything outside the SU, by denying the reality of those external objects. The ultimate goal here is to incorporate. The negation of one's own universe is subtly changed to an affirmation of it. External terms must be translated into more 'correct' terms. If the symbolic universe is to comprehend all reality, nothing else can be allowed to remain outside its conceptual scope. Its definitions of reality must encompass the totality of being. c) Social organization of universe maintenance Reality is socially defined. concrete individuals and groups serve as definers of social reality. Some members of society become experts at being full-time legitimators (priests, politicians). These experts can conflict with each other and with lay people on definitions of reality. There will always be a social-structural base for competition between rival definitions of reality; the outcome of the rivalry will be affected by the development of this base.

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The distinctiveness of ideology is that the same overall universe is interpreted in different ways, depending on the concrete vested interests within the society in question. Frequently an ideology is taken up by a group because of specific theoretical elements that are conducive to its interests. Modern societies have become pluralistic and there is little outright conflict between ideologies. Pluralism occurs in conditions of rapid change and is inherently subversive of traditional reality. Yet theories are created to legitimate social institutions. Nonetheless, social institutions are also changed to fix existing theories and to make them more legitimate. Hence the process is a dialectic. Definitions of reality have a self-fulfilling prophecy. Theories can be realized in history. Social change must always be understood as standing in a dialectic between changes in theories to match institutions and vice-versa. All symbolic universes and all legitimations are human products; their existence has its base in the lives of concrete individuals and has no empirical status apart from their lives. CHAPTER 3: ''SOCIETY AS SUBJECTIVE REALITY'' 1) INTERNALIZATION OF REALITY a) Primary socialization Society exists as both objective and subjective reality. These aspects receive their proper recognitions if society is understood in terms of an ongoing dialectical process composed of the three moments of externalization, objectification, and internalization. The individual also simultaneously externalizes his own being into the social world and internalizes it as objective reality. To be in a society is to participate in its dialectic. The individual is not born a member of society, but becomes a member through a temporal sequence. The individual internalizes the outside world. Individuals mutually identify with each other and participate in each others' beings. The self is a reflected identity. Primary socialization involves translating the roles and attitudes of specific others to roles and attitudes in general, or those of the ''generalized other.'' Primary socialization involves learning sequences that are socially defined. When the generalized other has been crystallized in one's consciousness, a symmetrical relationship is established between objective and subjective reality. At this point, primary socialization ends. b) Secondary socialization Secondary socialization becomes necessary with the D of L and the distribution of knowledge. It is the internalization of institutional ''sub worlds'' and the acquisition of role-specific knowledge -- roles directly and indirectly rooted in the D of L. Whatever new contents are to be internalized in secondary socialization must be superimposed on the already present reality (from primary socialization). To establish maintained consistency, secondary socialization presupposes conceptual procedures to integrate different bodies of knowledge. There is a formality and anonymity in relationships in secondary socialization as

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opposed to those close (especially child-parent) relationships in primary education. c) Maintenance and transformation of subjective reality Since socialization is never complete and the contents it internalizes face continuing threats to their subjective reality, every viable society must develop procedures f reality maintenance (legitimation) to safeguard a measure of symmetry between objective and subjective reality. The more artificial character of secondary socialization makes the subjective reality of its internalization even more vulnerable to changing definitions of reality because their reality is less deeply rooted in consciousness and thus more susceptible to displacement. Reality is maintained by the accumulation and consistency of casual conversation which can afford to be casual because it refers to the routines of a taken-forgranted world. In conversation, the objectifications of language become objectifications of individual consciousness. Subjective reality is thus always dependent on specific plausibility structures, i.e. the specific social base and social processes required for its maintenance. There are specific social sanctions against reality disintegrating doubts, such as ridicule. In other words, an individual is made to reel ridiculous for raising doubts about the reality structure. In crises, reality confirming procedures need to be explicit and intensive. For collective or individual crises, society has certain procedures (funeral rites, etc) Subjective reality can be transformed. To be in society already entails an ongoing process of modification of subjective reality. Alternation requires re-socialization, which must radically reassign reality accents and resembles primary socialization by replicating the strongly affective identification with role models. Successful alternation requires social and conceptual conditions such as new significant others with whom the individual can identify, and a new legitimating apparatus. 2) INTERNALIZATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The micro-sociological or the social psychological analysis of the phenomena of internalization must always have as its background a macro-sociological understanding of their structural aspects. Successful socialization is the establishment of a high degree of symmetry between objective and subjective reality. Maximal success in socialization is likely to occur in societies with very simple D of L and minimal distribution of knowledge. Yet socialization is very often unsuccessful. Unsuccessful socialization could be the result of heterogeneity in the socializing personnel (mother and father each have different effects on child). The need for therapeutic mechanisms increases in proportion to the structurally given potentiality for unsuccessful socialization. Unsuccessful socialization may also result from the mediation of acutely discrepant worlds by significant others during primary socialization. A child may be raised partly by parents from one social class and partly by a nurse from another social class. Hence the child is presented with a choice of profiled identities and can have two different 'selves.' The possibility of 'individualism' is directly linked to the possibility of unsuccessful socialization. The 'individualist'

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emerges as a type who has the potential to migrate between a number of available worlds and who has deliberately constructed a self out of the 'material' provided by a number of different identities. Discrepancies between primary and secondary socialization can also result in unsuccessful socialization. Secondary socialization may not match with primary. Then, the subjectively chosen identity becomes objectified in the individual's consciousness as his 'real self.' Individuals play at what they are and are not supposed to be (Goffman). Such a situation cannot be understood unless it is ongoingly related to its socio-structural context, which follows logically from the necessary relations between the social D of L and the social distribution of knowledge. 3) THEORIES ABOUT IDENTITY

Identity is a key element of subjective reality and is dialectical. Identity is formed by social process, and then these identities (attached to people, of course) react back on society. Hence, identity emerges from the dialectic between the individual and society. Psychological theories serve to legitimate the identitymaintenance and identity repair procedures established in the society, providing the theoretical linkage between identity and the world, as these are both socially defined and subjectively appropriated. these theories may arise because the old ones no longer adequately explain the empirical phenomena at hand. 4) ORGANISM AND IDENTITY

The organism continues to affect each phase of man's reality-constructing activity and the organism, in turn, is itself affected by this activity. Another dialectic here: the organism and soeity mutually limit each other. the social channeling of activity is the essence of institutionalization, which is the foundation for the social construction of reality. Social reality then acts back to influence activity. In the dialectic between nature and the socially constructed world, the human organism itself is transformed. Man produces reality and thereby produces himself. CONCLUSION: THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

There is a dialectical relationship between structural realities and the human historical enterprise of constructing reality. The sociology of knowledge understands human reality as socially constructed reality. Sociology must be carried out in a continuous conversation with both history and philosophy or loose its proper object of inquiry. This object is society as a part of a human world made by men and making men in ongoing historical process.

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PIERRE BOURDIEU OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE

CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE AND THE HABITUS Habitus: systems of durable, transposable dispositions. It is the principle of generation and structuring of practices and representations. Structure: is conceived as the structure of the consequences of human practices. It should not be reified. On the other hand, because of the existence of the habitus, actors are not as free-will actors. The habitus produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generating principle. As both a cognitive and a motivating structure. Habitus or dispositions are, in some sense, the internalization of the objective structure. The causal relationship is: the habitus, as a product of history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history. Habitus and structure mutually produce each other, and the dispositions and the social positions are mutually congruent, the dialectic relations. As an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted, the habitus engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others. Chapter 4: Structures, habitus, power: basis for a theory of symbolic power The system of classification of practice: ages, sexes, occupations, different time, space, under the recognized appropriateness, tempo, moments, and rhythms of life. The order of practices tends to naturalize its own arbitrariness by this classification. Out of which arises the sense of limit, and the sense of reality. The system of classifications reproduces the objective classes and the corresponding power relations by securing the misrecognition, and hence the recognition of the arbitrariness on which they are based. Doxa: when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization (as in ancient societies), the natural and social worlds appear as self-evident ----this is called doxa, so as to distinguish it from orthodox and heterodox which imply the awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs. Against Durkheim: it is erroneous to consider only the cognitive or speculative functions of mythico-ritual representations (because they the system of classification), these mental structures, a transfigured reproduction of the structures constitute a mode of production and a mode of biological and social reproduction, contribute at least as efficaciously as the provisions of custom, through the ethical dispositions they produce, such as the sense of honour or

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respect of elders and ancestors. The theory of knowledge is a dimension of political theory because the specifically symbolic power to impose the principles of the construction of reality - in particular, social reality - is a major dimension of political power. The world of doxa: conditions of existence are very little differentiated, the dispositions (little differentiated) are confirmed by institutions, collective consciousness such as language, myth and art, self evidence, collective attested, authority. Objective world conforms to the myth....no disenchantment...goes without saying... The field of opinion, the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses whose political truth may be overtly declared or may remain hidden, critique, breaking the fit between subjective structure and the objective structures, raise the question of social facts. The drawing of the line between fields of doxa and opinion is the struggle for the imposition of the dominate systems of classification. Then, comes the overt opposition between the right, or orthodoxy, and the wrong, the heterodoxy, which limit the universe of possible discourse. Symbolic Capital in the forms of prestige, honours, etc. is readily convertible back into the economic capital and is perhaps the most valuable form of accumulation where the natural environment is severe. The restrictive definition of the economic interest is the historical product of capitalism. The unthinkable, unnamable, disinterested interest. It is a transformed and thereby disguised form of physical ''economical'' capital, produces its proper effect when it conceals the fact that it originates in ''material'' forms of capital. Mode of domination: the most successful ideologies are those which have no needs of words. The dominating class justify themselves no only by ideology, but by it practical functioning. Gentle, hidden exploitations, symbolic violence is in the gentle, hidden form, when the overt form is impossible.

MICHEL FOUCAULT THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY Background Info: From Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, 1991 Foucault rejects the equation of reason, emancipation, and progress of modern theory and argues that an interface between modern forms of power and knowledge has served to create new forms of domination. His project is to write a ''critique of our historical era,'' to write about subjects that seem natural but that are contingent on sociohistorical constructs of power and domination. Systematizing methods of study produce reductive social and historical analyses; knowledge is perspectival in nature, requiring multiple viewpoints to interpret a heterogeneous reality. Modern theories see knowledge as neutral and objective

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(positivism) or emancipatory (Marxism), but Foucault emphasizes that knowledge is indissociable from regimes of power. Power is ''a multiple and mobile field of force relations where far-reaching, but never completely stable effects of domination are produced.'' It is plural, fragmentary, differentiated, indeterminate, and historically and spatially specific. He rejects the idea that power is anchored in macrostructures or ruling classes and is repressive in nature. Power is dispersed, indeterminate, heteromorphous, subjectless, and productive, constituting individuals' bodies and identities. It operates through the hegemony of norms, political technologies, and the shaping of the body and soul. In this book, Foucault argues that power operates not through the repression of sex, but through he discursive production of sexuality and subjects who have a ''sexual nature.'' PART I: WE ''OTHER VICTORIANS'' Repression is a sentence to disappear, an injunction to silence, an affirmation of nonexistence, and by implication, an admission that there was nothing to say about such subjects. Repression has been seen as the fundamental link between power, knowledge, and sexuality since the classical age and nothing less than a transgression of laws, a lifting of prohibitions, an irruption of speech, a reinstating of pleasure within reality, a whole new economy in the mechanisms of power will be required to free ourselves from it. If sex is repressed, then the mere fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. It has been argued that repression coincides with the development of capitalism. Sex is repressed because it is incompatible with a general and intensive work imperative. However, according to Foucault, the essential thing is not the economic factor, but the existence of a discourse in which sex, the revelation of truth, the overturning of global laws, and the promise of a new felicity are linked together. Foucault's objective is to define the regime of power-knowledgepleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality. PART II: THE REPRESSIVE HYPOTHESIS CHAPTER 1: THE INCITEMENT TO DISCOURSE The 17th C was an ''age of repression.'' But since that time there has been a steady proliferation of discourses concerned with sex. Christianity played a large role in this by emphasizing the importance of confession and of verbalizing sexual matters. In the 18th C, sex became a ''police'' matter, not in the repression of disorder, but in an ordered maximization of collective and individual forces. It was deemed necessary to regulate sex through useful and public discourses. These discourses on sex did not multiply apart from or against power, but in the very space and as a means of its exercise. Mechanisms in the areas of economy, pedagogy, medicine, and justice incited, extracted, distributed, and institutionalized sexual discourse. A wide dispersion of devices were invented for speaking about it, for having it spoken about, for inducing itself to speak, for

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listening, recording, transcribing, and redistributing what is said about it. Rather than massive censorship, there has been a regulated and polymorphous incitement to discourse. CHAPTER 2: THE PERVERSE IMPLANTATION Has increased discourse been aimed at constituting a sexuality that is economically useful and politically conservative? Foucault doesn't know if this is the ultimate objective. But reduction has not been the means employed for achieving it. The 19th and 20th C have been an age of multiplication: a dispersion of sexualities, a strengthening of their disparate forms, a multiple implantation of ''perversions.'' the discursive explosion of the 18th and 19th C led to an emphasis on heterosexual monogamy and a scrutiny of ''unnatural'' forms of sexual behavior. These polymorphous conducts were drawn out, revealed, isolated, and incorporated by multifarious power devices. The growth of perversions is the product of the encroachment of a type of power on bodies and their pleasures. It is through the isolation, intensification, and consolidation of peripheral sexualities that the relations of power to sex and pleasure branched out and multiplied, measured the body, and penetrated modes of conduct. PART III: SCIENTIA SEXUALIS While there has been a proliferation of discourse on sex and an increase of awareness of a multiplication of sexual conducts, it nonetheless seems that by speaking of it so much, one was simply trying to conceal it: a screen discourse, a dispersion-avoidance. One also claimed to be speaking about it from the rarefied and neutral viewpoint of science, a science subordinated to the imperative of a morality whose division it reiterated under the guise of the medical norm. Throughout the 19th C sex has been incorporated into two distinct order of knowledge: a biology of reproduction and a medicine of sex. There was no real exchange between them, no reciprocal structuration. This disparity indicates that there was no aim to state the truth but to prevent its very emergence. Historically there have been two great procedures for producing the truth of sex. Many societies endowed themselves with ars erotica (erotic art), whereby truth is drawn from pleasure itself. Western society, however, has scientia sexualis, procedures for telling the truth of sex which are geared to a form of knowledgepower found in confession. In confession, the agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks, but in the one who questions and listens. How did this immense and traditional extortion of the sexual confession come to be constituted in scientific terms? through a clinical codification of the inducement to speak through the postulate of a general and diffuse causality through the principle of a latency intrinsic to sexuality

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through the method of interpretation through the medicalization of the effects of confession Thus, 19th C society did not confront sex with a fundamental refusal of recognition. On the contrary, it put into operation an entire machinery for producing true discourses concerning it. It set out to formulate the uniform truth of sex. It created a new kind of pleasure: pleasure in the truth of pleasure. *** A hypothesis of a power of repression exerted by our society on sex for economic reasons is inadequate for explaining the proliferation of discourse, the solidification of the sexual mosaic, and the production of confessions and an establishment of a system of legitimate knowledge and of an economy of manifold pleasures. PART IV: THE DEPLOYMENT OF SEXUALITY CHAPTER 1: OBJECTIVE The aim of this inquiry is to move less toward a ''theory'' of power than toward an ''analytics'' of power, i.e., toward a definition of the specific domain formed by relations of power, and toward a determination of the instruments that will make possible its analysis. This analytics can be constituted only if it frees itself completely from a certain representation of power called ''juridico-discursive.'' This power is characterized by the negative relations between power and sex, the insistence of the rule, the cycle of prohibition, the logic of censorship, and the uniformity of the apparatus. Foucault wants to get rid of a juridical and negative representation of power, and cease to conceive it in terms of law, prohibition, liberty, and sovereignty. Instead he wants to advance toward a different conception of power through a closer examination of an entire historical material - the history of sexuality. CHAPTER 2: METHOD The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the overall unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes. Power must be understood as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization. Power's condition of possibility is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. Propositions of Power: Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations. Relationships of power are

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not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relations (economic, knowledge, sexual), but are immanent in the latter. They re not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly productive role, whenever they come into play. Power comes from below (I'm not quite sure what he means by this); i.e., there is no binary and allencompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations. Power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective. They re imbued with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. Where there is power, there is resistance and yet this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. One must analyze the mechanisms of power in the sphere of force relations. As far as sex is concerned, the important question, then, is: In a specific type of discourse on sex, in a specific form of extortion of truth, appearing historically and in specific places, what were the most immediate, the most local power relations at work? We must immerse the expanding of production of discourses on sex in the field of multiple and mobile power relations. There are four rules to follow in order to carry this out: Rule of immanence: one cannot assume that there exists only a certain sphere in sexuality to be studies. instead, one must start an inquiry with the ''local centers'' of power-knowledge. Rule of continual variation: Relations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are ''matrices of transformations.'' Rule of double conditioning: No ''local center'' or ''pattern of transformation'' could function if it did not eventually enter into an overall strategy. And inversely, no strategy could achieve comprehensive effects if it did not gain support from precise and tenuous relations serving as its prop and anchor point. Rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses: There exists a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. Discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a point of resistance, and a starting point for an opposing strategy. CHAPTER 3: DOMAIN Sexuality is a dense transfer point for relations of power: between men and women, young and old, parents and offspring, teachers and students, priests and laity, and an administration and population. Since the 18th C there have developed four strategic unities which formed specific mechanisms of knowledgepower centering on sex: a hysterization of women's bodies a pedagogization of children's sex a socialization of procreative behavior a psychiatrization of perverse behavior These strategies led to the production of sexuality. Relations of sex thus gave rise to two systems: the deployment of alliance (marriage, kinship, etc.) and the deployment of sexuality. The deployment of alliance is built around a system of

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rules defining the permitted and the forbidden, whereas the deployment of sexuality operates according to mobile, polymorphous, and contingent techniques of power. The deployment of alliance aims to produce the interplay of relations and maintain the law that governs them; the deployment of sexuality engenders a continual extension of areas and forms of control. The deployment of sexuality was constructed on the basis of a deployment of alliance. The family is the interchange of sexuality and alliance: it conveys the law and the juridical dimension in the deployment of sexuality, and it conveys the economics of pleasure and the intensity of sensations in the regime of alliance. Because of this interchange, the family became a major factor of sexualizatio CHAPTER 4: PERIODIZATION The chronology of the techniques relating to sex (i.e., in the fields of medicine, pedagogy, and demography) do not coincide with the hypothesis of a great repressive phase of sexuality in the 17th century. Rather there was a perpetual inventiveness, a steady growth of methods and procedures. In addition, it seems that the deployment of sexuality was not established as a principle of limitation of the pleasures of others by the ruling classes. Rather the first deployment of sexuality occurred within these upper classes. This is because the primary concern was not repression of the sexuality of the classes to be exploited, but rather the vigor, longevity, progeniture, and descent of the classes that ruled. It was a question of techniques for maximizing life. What was formed was a political ordering of life, not through the enslavement of others, but through an affirmation of self. Sexuality then is originally, historically bourgeois, and in its successive shifts and transpositions, it induces specific class effects. PART V: RIGHT OF DEATH AND POWER OVER LIFE Over time the ancient right to take life or let life was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death. Starting in the 17th C, the power over live evolved in two basic forms: an anatomo-politics of the human body (the body as a machine) and a bio-politics of the population (regulatory controls on the species body). Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. The politics of sex revolved around the fours issues outlined in chapter 3 because they were at the juncture of the ''body'' and the ''population.'' Thus sex became a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death. The blood relation long remained an important element in the mechanism of power; but slowly the symbolics of blood have been replaced with an analytics of sexuality. The mechanisms of power are addressed to the body and to life.

SIGMUND FREUD CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS CHAPTER I

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The ego - our feeling of our own self - appears to us as something autonomous, unitary and set off distinctly from everything else. This appearance is deceptive, however, because the ego actually continues inwards without any sharp delimitation into an unconscious mental entity - the id. The ego serves as a kind of facade for the id. Usually the ego appears to maintain clear and sharp lines of demarcation, but sometimes (being in love, for instance) the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt away. In general, Freud sees pathology as a kind of condition where boundary lines between the ego and the external world become uncertain or in which they are actually drawn incorrectly. With the recognition of an external world (external to the ego, that is) the tendency arises to separate from the ego everything that can become a source of unpleasure, to throw it outside and to create a pure pleasure-ego which is confronted by a strange and threatening 'outside.' This process of distinguishing what is internal and what emanates from the outer world is one of the first steps towards the introduction of the reality principle that dominates future development of the individual. Freud, if nothing else, cannot be faulted for ignoring the importance of developmental phenomena. In fact he launches on a big example (a couple pages worth) of what it would be like if the city of Rome kept on growing without tearing down old buildings to make room for the new. His point is that unlike physical processes or entities, only in the mind (a psychical entity) is a preservation of all earlier stages along with the final (or current) form possible. Ie. we carry around our old baggage with us. In the opening of the chapter Siggie mentions that a friend to his had described religious feeling as having some kind of ''oceanic''(a cosmic or eternal) quality. If such a thing is actually felt by all humans (or 'men' as the 'big S' would say), Freud thinks that is actually derives from an early phase of ego-feeling. So, the origin of the religious attitude can be traced back in clear outlines as far as the feeling of infantile helplessness and the concomitant need for the father's protection. CHAPTER II Religion provides a system of doctrines and promises which on the one hand explains the riddles of the world with enviable completeness, and on the other assures humanity and a careful Providence will watch over people's lives and compensate them in a future existence for frustrations suffered in the present. Freud contends (surprise, surprise) that ''the common man cannot imagine this Providence otherwise than in the figure of an enormously exalted father.'' Life, however, is hard and brings with it pain and difficulties. Therefore, we tend to construct palliative measures to help us cope. He cites three: powerful deflections that cause us to make light of our misery; substitutive satisfactions which diminishes misery; and intoxicating substances, which make us insensitive

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to it. Freud then brings up the big question: ''What is the meaning of life?'' Luckily he doesn't really try to answer it (and I don't think I would want to hear his answer if he had one). But he does address the question of what people themselves show by their behavior to be the purpose and intention of their actions. Freud believes that we all obviously strive after happiness. This endeavor has both a positive side (experiencing strong feelings of pleasure) and a negative side (absence of pain and unpleasure). What decides the purpose of life is the programme of the pleasure principle, but there is in reality no possibility of its being carried - all of the regulations of the universe run counter to it (presumably Freud is an expert on all of the physical and mathematical laws of the universe). More specifically, we are threatened with suffering from three directions: our own bodies, the external world, and our relations to other persons. There are a wide variety of ways in which we can deal with these pressures. We may choose to isolate ourselves from others to avoid any unhappiness that may flow from others, but on the other hand but might choose to become a member of the human community. This latter option might allow us to take part in the subjugation of nature to human will through techniques guided by science. A more internal strategy might be an attempt to control our instinctual impulses. Displacement of the libido, for instance, shifts instinctual aims in such a way that they cannot come up against frustration from the external world. A more extreme rejection of the external world would be the attempt to gain satisfaction through illusions (a hermit's attempted ideal recreation of the world and religions of mankind as mass-delusions of humanity are both counted among this strategy). Others pursue a way of life that makes love the center of everything. Sexual love, according to Freud, has given us our most intense experience of an overwhelming sensation of pleasure and has thus furnished us with a pattern for our search for happiness. Although some may exhibit an aesthetic attitude, Freud believes that 'beauty' and 'attraction' are originally attributes of the sexual object. {A little tidbit of Freudian wisdom: ''it is worth remarking that the genitals themselves, the sight of which is always exciting, are nevertheless hardly ever judged to be beautiful; the quality of beauty seems, instead, to attach to certain secondary sexual characters.''} Although the pleasure principle in its pure form is unattainable, we do adopt a sort of reality principle according to which we seek to gain as favorable a balance of happiness as we can by a combination of experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain. People tend to hedge their bets, however, and seldom look for the whole of their satisfaction from a single aspiration. CHAPTER III Freud believes that we basically resign ourselves to the fact that the external environment and our bodies are inevitable as potential sources of suffering. We, however, tend to refuse to admit that our relations with other people should not actually be a protection and a benefit. According to this latter contention, what

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we call our civilization is largely responsible for our misery and we should be much happier is we gave it up and returned to primitive conditions - ie. an attitude of hostility toward civilization. For instance, people have observed that since the Industrial Revolution, the newly-won power over space and time, the subjugation of the forces of nature (which is the fulfillment of a longing that goes back thousands of years) has not increased the amount of pleasurable satisfaction which they may expect from love and has not made them feel happier. By civilization, Freud means the whole sum of the achievements and the regulations which distinguish our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serve two purposes - to protect people against nature and to adjust their mutual relations. An early stage of the process of civilization recognizes as cultural all activities and resources (ie. tools) which are useful to people for making the each serviceable to them, for protecting them against the violence of the forces of nature, etc (ie. the notion of cultivation). With every tool humanity prefects its own human organs, whether motor or sensory, or is removing the limits to their functioning. At the risk of wasting time and killing trees, I thought I would share this jag Freud goes off on about fire and its importance to civilization. This should give you a pretty good indication about why I think this guy is for the most part full of shit. This quote is taken from one of the footnotes (where he tries to sneak in his really outlandish stuff) - I might have to put on my hip-waders for this one: It is as though primal man had the habit, when he came in contact with fire, of satisfying an infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine. The legends that we possess leave no doubt about the originally phallic view taken of tongues of flame as they shoot upwards. Putting out fire by micturating ... was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition. The first person to renounce this desire and spare the fire was able to carry it off with him and subdue it to his own use. By damping down the fire of his own sexual excitation, he had tamed the natural forces of fire. This great cultural conquest was thus the reward of his renunciation of instinct. Further, it is as though woman had been appointed guardian of the fire which was held captive on the domestic hearth, because her anatomy made it impossible for her to yield to the temptation of this desire. Call me crazy, but I kinda doubt that this was how human civilization got off the ground. Another general (and early) characteristic of the process of civilization is the tendency to create ideal conceptions of omnipotence and omniscience which are embodied as gods. These gods are cultural ideals in the sense that peoples attribute to them everything that seemed unattainable to their wishes, or that were forbidden to them. Among the other requirements of civilization, Freud stresses: beauty which we recognize and value in nature, and seek to (re)create

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in our handiwork; cleanliness - dirtiness of any kind seems incompatible with civilization; and order - establishing once and for all a set ways of doing things. Freud feels that perhaps the best feature to characterize civilization is its esteem and encouragement of mankind's higher mental activities - intellectual, scientific, and artistic achievements - and the leading role that it assigns to ideas in human life. If we assume quite generally that the motive force of all human activities is a striving towards the two confluent goals of utility and a yield of pleasure, we must suppose that this is also true of the manifestations of civilization. The final characteristic feature of civilization that Freud addresses is the manner in which the relationships of persons to one another - ie. their social relationships - are regulated. Human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes together which is stronger than any separate individual and which remains united against all separate individuals. The power of this community is then set up as 'right' in opposition to the power of the individual, which is condemned as 'brute force.' Members of a community restrict themselves in their possibilities of satisfaction, whereas the individual knows no restrictions. Building upon justice as a requisite of civilization, there should develop a rule of law to which all community members have contributed by a sacrifice of their instincts and which leaves no one at the mercy of brute force. The development of civilization imposes restrictions on individual liberty and justice demands that no one shall escape those restrictions. CHAPTER IV Once primitive humans discovered that they possessed the ability to improve their lot by working, other humans came to acquire value as fellow-workers with whom it was useful to live together. Freud believes that the communal life of human beings had a two-fold foundation: 1) the compulsion to work with was created by external necessity; and 2) the power of love, which made the man unwilling to be deprived of his sexual object (ie. the woman), and made the woman unwilling to be deprived of the part of herself which had been separated off from her (ie. her child). Although love is important here as a source of satisfaction, it can be powerful source of suffering as well. Therefore, people make themselves independent of their object's acquiescence by displacing what they mainly value from being loved on to loving; they protect themselves against the loss of the object by directing their love, not to single objects but to all man (ie. mankind) alike; and they avoid the uncertainties and disappointments of genital love by turning away from its sexual aims and transforming the instinct into an impulse with an inhibited aim. Both sensual (ie. sexual) and aim-inhibited (non-sexual) love extend outside the family and create new bonds with people who before were strangers. A prominent character of the civilization process is a progressive increase of restrictions placed on sexual relations - in terms of who you can do it with and who you can't. This takes the form of narrowing circles of potential

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sexual partners across the developmental stages of civilization, ranging anywhere from polymorphous perverse bisexuality to heterosexual monogamy. CHAPTER V Neurotics, who cannot tolerate the frustrations they experience their sexual lives, create substitutive satisfactions for themselves in their symptoms. These symptoms wither cause suffering in themselves or become sources of suffering by raising difficulties in relations with the environment and society. Freud traces the difficulty of cultural development to the inertia of the libido. the antithesis between civilization and sexuality can be derived from the circumstance the sexual love is a relationship between two individuals in which a third can only be superfluous or disturbing, whereas civilization depends on relationships between a considerable number of individuals. Civilization summons up aim-inhibited libido on the largest scale to strengthen the communal bond by relations of friendship. In the context of a discussion of the concept of ''love thy neighbor as thyself'' Freud has the occasion to relate a little passage originating with a writer named Heine. It goes a little like this: ''Mine is a most peaceable disposition. My wishes are: a humble cottage with a thatched roof, but a good bed, good food, the freshest milk and butter, flowers before my window, and a few fine trees before my door; and if God wants to make my happiness complete, hew will grant me the joy of seeing some six or seven of my enemies hanging from those trees. Before their death I shall, moved in my heart, forgive them all the wrongs they did me in their lifetime. One must, it is true, forgive one's enemies - but not before they have been hanged.'' So what is the moral of the story? Freud believes that ''men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness.'' This inclination to aggression is the factor which disturbs our relations with our neighbors and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure of energy to prevent the disintegration of civilized society. One technique for managing this aggression (particularly in smaller cultural groups) is directing outward in the form of hostility against intruders. CHAPTER VI Freud seeks to the concurrent existence of Eros (a libidinal instinct) with a death instinct, which he believes act in opposite directions but are difficult or impossible to distinguish as discrete items in reality. Freud thinks that the most fruitful way of conceptualizing the death instinct is as being directed toward the external world, so that it comes to light as an instinct of aggressiveness and destructiveness that can be directed at some external object rather than the individual (ego). The death instinct when directed inward cannot usually be

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isolated - the exception would be when it is alloyed with Eros and turns up in something like masochism. Freud believed that the evolution of civilization amounts to the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species; it can be described as the struggle for life of the human species. CHAPTER VII What means does civilization employ in order to inhibit the aggressiveness which opposes it? Aggressiveness is introjected, internalized; it is sent back to where it came from - that is, it is directed towards the individual's own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of 'conscience,' is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals. The tension between the harsh super-ego and the ego that is subjected to it, is what we call a 'sense of guilt' - this expresses itself as a need for punishment. Guilt comes from the intention of a deed of doing something 'bad.' Obviously the issue of right/wrong is a complicated one. Freud believes that there is an influence extraneous to the individual at work in determinations of good/bad. The individual's motive in submitting to this extraneous influence is a fear of loss of love, a consequence of that person's helplessness and dependence on other people. The larger human community constitutes this extraneous influence, an authority which is eventually internalized through the establishment of a superego. The guilt arising from fear of the super-ego (ie. fear of loss of love) is particularly persistent since even after renunciation of a forbidden wish, this wish still persists and cannot be hidden from the super-ego. In formation of the superego and the emergence of a conscience, innate constitutional factors (biological/genetic) and influences from the real environment act in combination. And of course he wouldn't be Freud if he didn't say ''We cannot get away from the assumption that man's sense of guilt springs from the Oedipus complex and was acquired at the killing of the gather by the brothers banded together.'' {This last bit is apparently something he went into a lot of detail about in Totem and Taboo, but is basically referred to as a primordial symbolic thing here} ''It was the same act of aggression whose suppression in the child is supposed to be the source of his sense of guilt.'' In response to the remorse felt after the act of aggression against the primal father, the super-ego is set up by identification with the father. Agency is given to the father's power as though a punishment for the deed of aggression against the father, and also created are restrictions intended to prevent a repetition of the deed. Chapter VIII

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Freud contends that the sense of guilt is the most important problem in the development of civilization and it shows that the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt. In the end guilt is a form of anxiety. Remorse is the general term for the ego's reaction in a case of sense of guilt. It contains sensory material of the anxiety which is operating behind the sense of guilt; it is itself a punishment and can include the need for punishment. Owning to the omniscience of the super-ego, the differences between an aggression intended and an aggression carried out looses its force. When an instinctual trend undergoes repression, its libidinal elements are turned into symptoms, and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt. Freud makes explicit a connection that implicitly runs through much of the book: the process of human civilization and the development or educative process of individual human beings are very similar in nature, if not the very same process applied to different kinds of objects. The development of the individual seems to be a product of the interaction between two urges: the urge towards happiness - egoistic urge; and the altruistic urge toward union with others in the community. The analogy between the process of civilization and individual development can be extended in an important respect, by asserting that the community also evolved a super-ego under whose influence cultural development proceeds. Ethics can be regarded as a therapeutic attempt, an endeavor to achieve by means of a command of the super-ego something that has not been achieved by any other cultural activities.

HAROLD GARFINKLE STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY CHAP. 2 ''STUDIES OF THE ROUTINE GROUNDS OF EVERYDAY ACTIVITIES'' From the point of view of sociological theory the moral order consists of the rule governed activities of everyday life. A society's members encounter and know the moral order as perceivedly normal courses of action - familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life known in common with others and with others taken for granted. Garfinkel is concerned with the activities of everyday life and that which is taken for granted, he is interested in how things are perceived and defined. He wishes to explore it as a topic and as a methodology. Sociologists commonly overlook the socially standardized and standardizing, ''seen but unnoticed'' expected background features of everyday life. This is a glaring oversight because the member of society uses background expectancies as a scheme of interpretation. Garfinkel bases his arguments and conclusions

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concerning ethnomethodology on a series of 'breaching' experiments, in which students deliberately breech the understood, but unspoken, rules of everyday encounters. These experiments are not really experiments, but more like demonstrations. We begin first by exploring common understandings. Understandings cannot possibly consist of a measured amount of shared agreement among persons on certain topics. Garfinkel illustrated this point with an example of conversation between two people. When one examines the exchange, one realizes that there are many things that are understood between two people, especially those who have a standing relationship, than are actually mentioned. Also, many understood matters were understood on the basis of what was unspoken, the temporal series of utterances determined what was understood, and matters that were understood in common were understood only in and through a course of understanding work that consisted of treating an actual linguistic event as document or representation of some other real, experienced event. Of course, understanding also hinges on prior relationships and events, as well as the form of conversational interaction. Sometimes what is said is specifically vague and what is expressed may only be understood through further exchange. Garfinkel argues that all of these realizations about conversation point to underlying properties of conversational exchange and the rules which govern them in daily life. Persons require these properties of discourse as conditions under which they are themselves entitled and entitle others to claim that they know what they are talking about, and that what they are saying is understood and ought to be understood. To test his hypotheses, Garfinkel sent forth a legion of students to conduct conversational breaching experiments. Students were instructed to question everything they were being told by asking what was meant. Example: (S) I had a flat tire. (E) What do you mean you had a flat tire? When these experiments were conducted, the students often received responses of puzzlement, anger, concern, and frustration. Such responses demonstrated the importance of shared knowledge and understanding, as well as the rules which govern exchanges in conversation. Other experiments and their conclusions included the following. In no one experiment was student participation 100%. There were also some variations in responses in all cases. - Undergraduate students were asked to spend 15 mins. - 1hr. in their homes viewing its activities as if they were boarders with no history in the household. Persons, relationships, and activities were described without respect for their history, for the place of the scene in a set of developing life circumstances, or for he scenes as texture of relevant events for the parties themselves. Students were surprised to see how personal the interactions and treatments of others were, and how formal manners and protocol were often disregarded. Family

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members were confused, angered and often hurt by students' formal behavior. Students were often relieved when the experiment was over. Conclusion: Background understandings (mutually recognized texture) are necessary for adequate recognition of commonplace events. - In a variant, students were asked to act as boarders in their own homes for the same length of time. They were supposed to be formally polite, and again unassuming in regards to relationships, common patterns of behavior, and the set up of the household. Familial response again involved anger, suspicion, frustration, and the like. In most cases, families vigorously sought to make the strange actions intelligible and to restore the situation to normal appearances. Explanations by family members were sought in previous, understandable motives of the student: overwork, sickness, personal troubles. When offered explanations by family members went unacknowledged, there followed withdrawal by the offended member, attempted isolation of the culprit, retaliation and denunciation. At the end of the experiment, students filled their families in on the little experiment, and while he families were forgiving, many were not very happy about playing the role of the guinea pig. Unlike the first experiment, relief was often only partial, and anticipatory fears were low. Conclusion: This too supports the idea that background knowledge is important and is understood as such when it is shared. Background understanding has important social affects, but he role that a background of common understandings plays in the production, control, and recognition of these affects, however, is terra incognita. The existence of a definite and strong relationship between common understandings and social affects can be demonstrated and some of it features explored by the deliberate display of distrust, a procedure that produced highly standardized effects for Garfinkel. Distrust was chosen because on the everyday level, to treat a relationship under a rule of doubt requires that the necessity and motivation for such a rule be justified. Another experiment was in order: Students were instructed to engage someone in conversation and to imagine and act on the assumption that what the other person was saying was directed by hidden motives which were the real ones. Most students tried this with friends or families, and reported little embarrassment, but many hurt feelings on the part of the interactants. The two students who interacted with strangers were unable to complete the interaction. Enough with the experiments for awhile, Garfinkel returns to the theory behind ethnomethodology. The possibility of common understanding does not consist in demonstrated measures of shared knowledge of social structure, but consists instead and entirely in the enforceable character of actions in compliance with the exigencies of everyday life as a morality. Common sense knowledge of the facts of social life for the members of the society is institutionalized knowledge of the real world. Common sense knowledge acts in the manner of self-fulfilling prophecy, the features of the real society are produced by persons' motivated compliance with these background expectancies.

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Garfinkel extends this reasoning to claim that the firmer a societal member's grasp of What Anyone Like Us Necessarily Knows, the more severs should be his/her disturbance when the 'natural facts of life' are impugned for him as a depiction of the real circumstances. This is what the breaching experiments are intended to test. Individuals are presented with events that can only be understood by changing the objective structure of the familiar, they cannot be understood in terms of the understood background structure. Presumably, individuals will tend to try to normalize any incongruities. Background knowledge often requires assumptions. Garfinkel refers to Schutz and his theories on assumptions, which can easily be compared to Goffman. According to Schutz, the person assumes, assumed that the other person assumes as well, and assumes that as he assumes it of the other person, the other person assumes it of him. (With all this going on, who has time to interact? - JPG) The actual assumptions made center around such things as the 'facts', what is said and what is meant, affectivity of objects or interactions, and various other interactive affects of objects and social structure. Only when one makes all of these assumptions, and the event has for the witness all of enumerated determinations, is it an events in an environment of common knowledge. Such attributions are features of witnessed events that are seen without being noticed. Now, back to the experiments. Garfinkel came up with a new set of experiments designed to breach common understandings and produce confusion. All of the experiments satisfied 3 conditions: the person could not turn it into a joke or deception of any kind, the person could not 'leave the field' or have sufficient time to redefine the real circumstances, and the person would be deprived of consensual support for an alternative definition of social reality. One experiment was: - Medical students were interviewed under the pretense of discovering why a med school interview was such a stressful situation. The interviewer posed as a rep from a prestigious school. During the 3 hour interview, the interviewer would play for each student a recorded interview with someone who had bad manners, was pompous and rude, and all in all a general 'bad interview', but the interviewer would act as if the recorded interview was ideal. The med students were then asked for their opinions and analysis. Results: Almost all students fell for the line. They often asked what others thought and after initial derogatory opinions, they worked hard to reconcile their previous statements with the interviewer's positive view of the recorded tape. 22 of 28 students felt marked relief when the experiment was explained to them afterwards. Garfinkel is very critical of previous studies which treat individuals as cultural dopes who simply reproduce society without being aware of it. Such studies treat common sense rationalities of judgment as epiphenomenal. To test the idea of people being judgmental dopes, another experiment:

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- Garfinkel sent out 120 students to stores where they were required to pick an item and offer to pay a price other than the one that was marked on the item. Most trial were conducted by offering a lower price for either an item under $2 or an item over $50. Most students found the most tense part of the experiment to be the anticipation phase, before they approached a sales person for the first time. Anticipatory fears declined for those with multiple trials. There was less discomfort in bargaining for high-priced merchandise, and more results of price negotiation. Sales persons can be dismissed as either having been dopes in different ways than current theories of standardized expectancies provide, or not dopes enough. A few showed anxiety, occasionally one got angry. Such findings suggest that one can make the member of the society out to be a cultural dope by portraying individuals as those who follow rules when in actuality they have anticipatory fears of alternate situations, by overlooking the practical and theoretical importance of mastering fears, or if upon arousal of troubled fears, an individual strives to avoid the very situations in which they might learn about their fears. The more important the rule, the greater the likelihood that knowledge is based on avoided tests. In standardized theories, persons may also be made out to be dopes by either over-formalizing, or over-simplifying the effects and texture of the environment, or by portraying routine actions as those governed by prior agreements, and by making the likelihood that a member will recognize deviance depend upon the existence of prior agreements. IN CONCLUSION: The study of common sense knowledge and common sense activities consists of treating as problematic phenomena the actual methods whereby members of a society, lay or professional, make the social structures of everyday activities observable.

CLIFFORD GEERTZ ''DEEP PLAY:'' NOTES ON A BALINESE COCKFIGHT.'' OF COCKS AND MEN Balinese men identify with their fighting cocks to a great extent. Their cocks represent their masculine identity and they take immaculate care of them, spend much time grooming them and training them, etc. The cock symbolizes maleness, the penis, as well as being a hated animal (the Balinese find all animals repugnant) and an object of fascination. THE FIGHT

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The rules of the cock fight are passed form generation to generation as part of the general legal and cultural tradition of the villages. The cock fight can be viewed as a sociological entity. The people who watch cock fights are not a ''group'' or a ''crowd,'' but a ''focused gathering'' of people -- persons engrossed in a common flow of activity and relating to one another in terms of that flow. There is a connection between Balinese collective life and this sport. ODDS AND EVEN MONEY It is the formal asymmetry between balanced center bets (bets central to the game) and unbalanced side ones (bets made on the side lines of the game and not between players) that poses the critical analytical problem for a theory which sees cock fight wagering as the link connecting the fight to the wider world of Balinese culture. It also suggests the way to go about demonstrating the link. The center bet, with so much riding on it, makes the ''depth'' of the game (Jeremy Bentham). The Balinese attempt to create an interesting, ''deep'' match by making the center bet as large as possible so that the cocks matched will be as equal and as fine as possible, and the outcome as unpredictable as possible. The question of why such matches are interesting takes us out of the realm of formal concerns into more broadly sociological and social psychological ones, and to a less purely economic idea of what ''depth'' amounts to. PLAYING WITH FIRE Bentham's concept of ''deep play'' is play in which the stakes are so high that, from a utilitarian stand point, to play is irrational. Nonetheless, men do engage in such play both passionately and often, even in the face of the law (it is against the law in Bali to engage in cock fights). In deep Balinese cock fights, much more is at stake than material gain : status. The more money one risks, the more status one risks. The big players are the focusing element in these focused gatherings. These men generally dominate and define the sport as they dominate and define the society. What makes the Balinese CF deep is thus not the money itself, but what the money causes to happen: the migration of the Balinese status hierarchy into the body of the cock fight. The CF is a representation of the complex fields of tension set up by the controlled, ceremonial, deeply felt interaction of male (narcissistic) selves in the context of every day life. The CF is deliberately made to be a simulation of the social matrix, the involved system of cross-cutting, overlapping, highly corporate groups - - villages, kin, etc. -- in which its devotees live. There is a pattern of tiered hierarchy of status rivalries between highly corporate but variously - based groupings. The cockfight is fundamentally a dramatization of status claims. for instance:

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Men never bet against a cock owned by a member of their own kin group Men involved in highly institutionalized hostility relations will bet against each other Men avoid betting when loyalties are split Men involved in the center bet are typically leading members of their group (village, kin group) The Balinese are fully aware of the symbolism in their cock fights. The more a match is between near-status individuals, the deeper the match. The deeper the match, the closer the identification of cock and man. the greater emotion and absorption in the match, the higher the betting, the less an economic and more a status view, and the ''solider'' the citizens will be who will be gaming. FEATHERS, BLOOD, CROWDS AND MONEY Like any art form, the cock fight renders ordinary experience comprehensible by presenting it in terms of acts and objects which have had their practical consequences removed and reduced to the level of sheer appearances, where their meaning can be more powerfully articulated. The CF puts a construction on death, masculinity, rage, pride, chance, etc. the function of the CF is a means of expression neither to assuage social passions nor to heighten them, but to display them. The importance of the CF is not, as functionalist sociology would have it, that it reinforces status discriminations, but that it provides a methodological social commentary upon the whole matter of assorting human beings into fixed hierarchical ranks and then organizing the major part of collective existence around that assortment. Its function is interpretive. SAYING SOMETHING OF SOMETHING Reading cultural practice as text: the Balinese, by attending a CF, learns what his cultures ethos and his private sensibility look like when spelled out externally in a collective text; that the two are near enough alike to be articulated in the symbolics of such a text; and -- the disquieting part -- that the text in which this revelation is accomplished consists of a chicken hacking another mindlessly to bits. Not only does the CF bring the assorted experiences of everyday life into focus, but it creates the paradigmatic human event -- one that tells us less what happens than the kind of thing that would happen if life were art and could be freely shaped by styles of feeling. Yet art regenerates the very subjectivity it pretends to display. CF's are positive agents in the maintenance of such a sensibility. (WAIT!!! I THOUGHT GEERTZ SAID THE COCK FIGHT SHOULDN'T BE VIEWED FROM A FUNCTIONALIST STAND POINT!???!! -EA). Anyhow, one way to look at the symbolic forms of the culture of a people is as an ensemble of texts. To ''say something of something'' to someone is at least to open up the paths of analysis which attend to their substance.

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''RELIGION AS A CULTURAL SYSTEM.'' I. The culture concept to which Geertz adheres denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life. II. A paradigm consists of sacred symbols which function to synthesize a people's ethos -- the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style -- and their world view. A paradigm is presented as representing/accommodating an actual state of affairs. It objectivizes moral and aesthetic preferences by depicting them as the imposed conditions of life implicit in a world with a particular structure. It supports received beliefs about the world's body by invoking deeply felt moral and aesthetic sentiments as experiential evidence for their truth. How does religion tune human actions to an envisaged cosmic order and project images of cosmic order onto the plane of human experience? Religion is a system of symbols which acts to establish a powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. ''A system of symbols which acts to...'' A symbol is used for any object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for a meaning. Cultural patterns are social events. The symbolic dimension of social events is itself theoretically abstractable from these events as empirical totalities. Culture patterns are extrinsic sources of info. They are models ''for'' and ''of''. They have an intrinsic double aspect: they give meaning to social and psychological reality both by shaping themselves to it and by shaping it themselves. Symbols can also be models ''of'' and models ''for''' Two dispositions are motivated by religious activity: motivation and moods. Motivation is a persisting tendency, a chronic inclination to perform certain sorts of acts and experience certain sorts of feelings. Motivations are directional. Moods go nowhere. they vary only as to their intensity and they are induced by sacred symbols. We interpret motives in terms of their consummations, but we interpret moods in terms of their sources. ''By formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and...'' Religion must affirm something. Man depends on symbol systems with a dependence so great as to be decisive for his ''creatural viability,'' and as a result, his sensitivity to even the remotest indication that they may prove unable to cope with one or another aspect of experience raises within him great anxiety.

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First of all, men seek out lucidity and experience anxiety when empirical phenomena don't make sense. The conviction that ''the odd'' can be accounted for must be sustained. Second, there is the problem of suffering. The question is HOW to suffer. Religion on one hand anchors the power of our symbolic resources for formulating analytic ideas in an authoritarian conception of the overall shape of reality; on the other hand it anchors the power of our resources for expressing emotions. This helps humans resist the challenge of emotional meaninglessness from pain. Third, religion helps men deal with evil. Our symbolic resources provide us with a workable set of ethical criteria and normative guides to govern our action. It responds to the disquieting sense that one's moral insight is inadequate to one's moral experience. The problem of evil is in essence the same sort of problem as bafflement or suffering -- NO ORDER. The religious response to each case is the formulation, by means of symbols, of an image of such a genuine order of the world which will account for the ambiguities of human experience. The effort behind religion is not to deny the undeniable, but to deny the inexplicable, through symbols. ''And clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that...'' How is it that the denial mentioned above comes to be believed? Religious belief involves a prior acceptance of authority which transforms that experience. The religious perspective is ''he who would know must first believe.'' This perspective differs from the common sense perspective in that it moves beyond the realities of everyday life to wider ones which correct and complete them, and its defining concern is not action upon those wider realities , but of acceptance and faith in them. The religious perspective differs from the scientific perspective in that it questions the realities of every day life in terms of non-hypothetical truths. It differs from the aesthetic perspective in that it deepens concern with fact and seeks to create an aura of actuality. It is in ritual - consecrated behavior - that the conviction that religious directives are sound is generated. It is in ceremonial form that moods and motivations which sacred symbols induce in men and the general conceptions of the order of existence which they formulate -- reinforce one another. Religious acts for participants are enactment's, materializations of religion -- not only models of what they believe, but also models for the believing of it. The acceptance of authority that underlies the religious perspective that the ritual embodies flows from the enactment of the ritual itself. ''that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic'' Religion is sociologically interesting not because, as vulgar positivism would have it, it describes the social order, but because it shapes it. The movement back and forth between the religious perspective and the common sense perspective is actually often ignored by social anthropologists. Religious belief in the midst of ritual, where it engulfs the total person and as a remembered reflection of that experience in the midst of everyday life are distinct. Religion alters the whole landscape presented to common sense, alters it in such a way that the moods

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and motivations induced by religious practice seem themselves supremely practical, the only sensible ones to adopt given the way things ''really'' are. Hence, religion changes man and his common sense perspective. It is the particularity of the impact of religious systems upon social systems which renders general assessments of the value of religion in either moral or functional terms impossible. III. Religious concepts spread beyond their specifically metaphysical contexts to prove a framework of general ideas in terms of which a wide range of experiences can be given a meaningful form. A set of religious beliefs is a gloss (makes them graspable) and a template (shapes them) for the mundane world of social relationships and psychological events Tracing the social and psychological role of religion is a matter of understanding how it is that men's notions of the ''real'' induce in them and color their sense of the practical and the moral. The anthropological study of religion is two -stage: 1)analysis of the system of meanings embodied in the symbols which make up religious power 2)the relating of these systems to social structural and psychological processes. Only when we have a theoretical analysis of symbolic action comparable in sophistication to what we now have for social and psychological action, will we be able to cope effectively with those aspects of social and psychological life in which religion (or art, science, or ideology) plays a determinant role.

IRVING GOFFMAN: PRESENTATION OF THE SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE ''INTERACTION RITUAL'' Goffman is concerned with the study of social interaction; that is, the countless patterns and natural sequences of behavior occurring whenever persons come into one another's immediate presence. This is not the study of the individual and his/her psychology. Rather, it is the syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one another. CHAPTER 1: ON FACE-WORK A line is a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which a person expresses his/her view of a situation and his/her evaluation of the participants, including him/herself. Face is the positive social value a person effectively claims for him/herself by the line others assume s/he has taken during a particular contact. It is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes. A person becomes attached to his\her face (Goffman actually uses the word ''cathects'') and

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therefore s/he considers participation in any contact with others a type of commitment. To have, to be in, or to maintain face means a line a person effectively takes presents an image of him/her that is internally consistent and supported by other participants. To be in wrong face occurs when a person's social worth cannot be integrated into the line that is being sustained for him/her. To be out of face means a person participates in a contact with others without having ready a line of the kind participants in such situations are expected to take. both of these situations usually cause the person to feel ashamed or inferior. Poise is the capacity to suppress and conceal any tendency to become shamefaced during encounters with others. An expressive order is an order that regulates the flow of events so that anything that appears to be expressed by them will be consistent with the person's face. A person is not only expected to have self-respect by maintaining his/her own face, s/he is also expected to sustain a standard of considerateness during an encounter with another person to save the feelings and face of that other person. The maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, not its objective. To study face-saving is to study the traffic rules of social interaction; one learns about the code a person adheres to in his/her movement across the paths and designs of others, but not where s/he is going, or why s/he wants to get there. Face-work means the actions taken by a person to make whatever s/he is doing consistent with face. All members of society are expected to have some knowledge of face-work and some experience in its use. This is called tact, savoir-faire, diplomacy, or social skill. Goffman distinguishes between two basic kinds of face-work: 1) The avoidance process: to prevent threats to his/her face, a person simply avoids contacts in which these threats are likely to occur. 2) The corrective process: when a person fails to save face, s/he is likely to try to correct for the effects of this incidence. An interchange is a sequence of acts set in motion by an acknowledged threat to face. There are four elements in an interchange: a) the challenge: participants call attention to the misconduct b) the offering: the offender is given a chance to correct for the offense and reestablish the expressive order c) acceptance: the persons to whom the offering is made can accept it as a satisfactory means of reestablishing the expressive order d) sign of gratitude: the forgiven person is thankful to those who have given him/her the indulgence of forgiveness

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Sometimes an encounter between people is less a scene of mutual considerateness in maintaining face-work, but rather a contest whose purpose is to preserve everyone's line from inexcusable contradictions while at the same time scoring as many points as possible against one's adversaries (e.g. digs, snubs, bitchiness, etc.). Often when face has been threatened, people cooperate to do face-work and thereby save the situation. Resolution of the situation to everyone's apparent satisfaction is the first requirement; correct apportionment of blame is typically a secondary consideration. Examples of this cooperation are social etiquette, polite hints, and reciprocal self-denial (when the person compliments others first to get attention temporarily away from him/herself). THE SELF: Goffman uses a double definition of self: the self as an image pieced together from the expressive implications of the full flow of events in an undertaking; and the self as a kind of player in a ritual game. The rules of social interaction rely on a system of checks and balances by which each participant tends to be give the right to handle only those matters which he will have little motivation for mishandling. The rights and obligations of an interactant are designed to prevent him/her from abusing his/her role as an object of sacred value. Spoken Interaction: There is a functional relationship between the structure of the self and the structure of spoken interaction. A person determines how s\he ought to conduct him\herself during an occasion of talk by testing the potentially symbolic meaning of his/her acts against the self-images that are being sustained. In doing this, s/he incidentally subjects her/his behavior to the expressive order that prevails and contributes to the orderly flow of messages. His/her aim is to save face; his/her effect is to save the situation. The person's orientation to face is the point of leverage that the ritual order has in regard to him/her; yet a promise to take ritual care of his/her face is built into the very structure of talk. HUMAN NATURE: Societies everywhere must mobilize their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters. One way of doing this is through ritual. A person is taught to be perceptive, to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed through face, to have pride, honor, and dignity, to have considerateness, to have tact and a certain amount of poise. These elements of behavior which must be built into the person if practical use is to be made of him/her as an interactant constitute a universal human nature. A person becomes a kind of construct, built up form moral rules that are impressed upon him/her from outside, from social encounters. CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF DEFERENCE AND DEMEANOR

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In this chapter, Goffman tries to reformulate a version of Durkheim's social psychology mentioned in the Elementary Forms of Religious Life. He explores the ways in which a person in our urban secular world is allotted a kind of sacredness that is displayed and confirmed by symbolic acts. Durkheim wrote that the individual's personality can be seen as one apportionment of the collective mana, and that rites performed to representations of the social collectivity will sometimes be performed to the individual him/herself. Two examples of these rites are deference and demeanor. Goffman uses data collected from observations of mental patients to elaborate on these points. Rules: A rule of conduct is a guide of action that is suitable or just. Attachment to rules leads to a constancy and patterning of behavior. Rules of conduct impinge upon the individual in two ways: directly as obligations, establishing how s/he is morally constrained to conduct him/herself; and indirectly, as expectations, establishing how others are morally bound to act in regard to him/her. When an individual becomes involved in the maintenance of a rule, s/he tends to become committed to a particular image of self. An act that is subject to a rule of conduct is a communication, for it represents a way in which selves are confirmed. Rules of conduct transform both action and inaction into expression. There are two classes or rules of conduct: 1) symmetrical: a rule that leads an individual to have obligations or expectations regarding others that these others have in regard to him/her. 2) asymmetrical: rule that leads others to treat and be treated by the individual differently from the way s/he treats and is treated by them Goffman also distinguished between two types of rules: 1) substantive: rules that guide conduct in regard to matters felt to have significance in their own right 2) ceremonial: rules that have primary importance as a conventionalized means of communication by which people express their character or convey their appreciation to other participant in the situation. Deference and demeanor are two basic components of ceremonial rules. They illustrate how the self is in part a ceremonial thing, a sacred object which must be treated with proper ritual care and must be presented to others in proper light. Deference functions as a symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed to a recipient of this recipient. It has two forms: 1) avoidance rituals: forms of deference which lead the actor to keep at a distance from the recipient and not violate what Simmel has called the ''ideal sphere'' that lies around the recipient. 2) presentational rituals: acts through which the individual makes specific attestations to recipients concerning how s/he regards them (e.g. salutations, invitations, compliments)

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Demeanor is conveyed through deportment, dress, and bearing and serves to express that the person is of certain desirable or undesirable qualities. The individual creates an image of him/herself for others. Conclusion: Deference and demeanor are examples that the Meadian notion that the individual takes toward him/herself the attitude of others is an oversimplification. Rather the individual must rely on others to complete the picture of him/her of which s/he is allowed only to paint certain parts. The urban secular world is not so irreligious as we might think. The individual him/herself remains a deity of considerable importance.

PAUL HIRSCH PROCESSING FADS AND FASHIONS: AN ORGANIZATION-SET ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL INDUSTRY SYSTEMS I think this is a paper on the organization of the culture industry, rather than a paper on organizational culture. However, it does link up nicely with dudes like Hebdige, and provides a distinctly different perspective on the production of cultural objects than does, say, Geertz. Organizations engaged in the production and mass distribution of ''cultural'' items are often confronted by highly uncertain environments at their input and output boundaries. They develop three adaptive coping strategies to deal with this uncertainty: the deployment of ''contact men'' to organizational boundaries, overproduction and differential promotion of new items, and cooptation of mass media gatekeepers. Hirsch thinks analysis of innovation has focussed too little on the throughput sector, consisting of orgs which filter the overflow of information and materials intended for consumers. From an organizational perspective, two questions pertaining to any innovation are logically prior to its appearance in the marketplace: 1) by what criteria is it selected for sponsorship over available alternative? and, 2) might certain characteristics of its organizational sponsor, such as prestige or size of an advertizing budget, substantially aid in explaining the ultimate success or failure of a new product or idea? Entrepreneurial orgs in cultural industries confront a set of problems interesting to students of interorganizational relations: goal dissensus, boundary-spanning role occupations with nonorganizational norms, legal and value constraints against vertical integration, and, hence, dependence on autonomous agencies (esp mass media gatekeepers) for linking the org to its consumers. For Hirsch, a cultural organization is a profit-seeking firm producing cultural products for national distribution (ie, Virgin Records, but not the NEA). The cultural industry system is comprised of all orgs engaged in the process of

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filtering new products and ideas as they flow from creative personnel in the technical subsystem to the managerial, institutional and societal levels of organization (these org levels are from Talcum Powder's work on orgs). Artist and mass audience are linked by an ordered sequence of events: the object dee art must 1) succeed in competition with others for selection and promotion by entrep. orgs and 2) then succeed in receiving mass media coverage in such forms as book-reviews, radio air play, and films criticism. Cultural organizations constitute the managerial subsystems of the industry systems in which they operate. Cultural industries' technical subsystems are organized along craft lines (from Stinchcombe: location of professionals in the technical subsystem and administrators in the managerial one), and this organization is a function of demand uncertainty and cheap technology. Demand uncertainty is caused by shifts in consumer tastes, legal and normative constraints on vertical integration, and widespread variability in the selection criteria employed by mass media gatekeepers. Competitive advantage for a cultural org firm lies with firms best able to link available input to reliable and established distribution channels. The mass distribution of cultural items requires more bureaucratic organizational arrangements than the administration of production. The organizational separation of producers of cultural items from their dissemenators places definite restrictions on the forms of power cultural orgs can exercise over gatekeepers; autonomous gatekeeps present the org with the control problem of favorably influencing the probability that a given new release will be selected for exposure to consumers. The mass media constitute the institutional subsystem of the cultural industry system. The diffusion of particular fads and fashions is either blocked or facilitated at this strategic checkpoint. Organizations at the managerial level of cultural industry systems are confronted by 1) constraints on output distribution imposed by gatekeeps and 2) contingencies in recruiting ''raw materials'' for organizational sponsorship. To minimize dependence on these elements of their task environments, the three strategies noted above have developed. 1.Contact men. Professional agents on the input boundary (eg, editors who woo authors) must be allowed a great deal of discretion in the activities on behalf of the cultural org, and thus, though essential and duly highly rewarded, pose a control problem. Cultural orgs deploy additional contact men at their output boundaries, linking the org to retail outlets and surrogate consumers in massmedia orgs. A high ratio of promotional personnel to surrogate consumers (contact men to disk jockeys, for instance) appears to be a structural feature of any industry system in which goods are marginally differentiated, producers' access to consumer markets is regulated by independent gatekeepers, and large scale direct advertising campaigns are uneconomical or prohibited by law.

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2. Differential promotion of new items, in conjunction with overproduction. Overproduction is a rational org response in an environment of low capital investment and demand uncertainty. It is more efficient to produce many failures for each success than to sponsor fewer items and pretest each on a massive scale to increase media coverage and sales. Cultural orgs maximize profits by mobilizing promotional resources in support of volume sales for a small no. of items. These resources are not divided equally among a firm's new releases. The strategy of differential promotion is an attempt by cultural orgs to buffer their technical core from demand uncertainties by smoothing out output transactions. 3. Cooptation of institutional regulators. For instance, hit records are featured by radio stations in order to sell advertising. Goal conflict and value dissensus between cultural orgs and gatekeepers are reflected in frequent disputes over the legitimacy and legality of promoters' attempts to acquire power of the decision autonomy of surrogate gatekeepers. Cultural orgs struggle to control gatekeepers to the extent that coverage for new items is 1) crucial for building consumer demand and 2) problematic (eg. Donnie Osmond's new album). Cultural orgs are less likely to deploy boundary agents or sanction high pressure tactics for items whose sale is less contingent on gatekeepers actions (eg, classical music).

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