Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1971, Vol. 18, No.

2, 173-188

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND VALENCE OF OUTCOME IN RELATION TO INITIAL CONFIDENCE AND SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF SELF AND OTHER1
N. T. FEATHER 2 AND J. G. SIMON Flinders University of South Australia Male and female subjects in like-sex pairs first worked at 5 practice anagrams and then at IS test anagrams. For both practice and test anagrams, difficulty level was manipulated so that one-half of the subjects did well and one-half did poorly. After the practice items the subjects announced the number of anagrams they had solved. Before beginning the test items, the subjects rated the degree of confidence about passing the test both for self and other. After the subjects were told if they had passed or failed, they rated the degree to which they felt performance was due to ability (internal attribution) or luck (external attribution) for both self and other. They also provided recall measures and satisfaction ratings for self and other. Results indicated that before they began the test items, the subjects were more confident of the success of the other than of their own success. For both self and other, the unexpected outcome was more often attributed to variable environmental factors (good or bad luck) than the expected outcome. Other's success was more often attributed to ability than own success, while other's failure was more often attributed to bad luck than own failure. There was a positivity bias in recall, favoring the other. Contrast effects occurred for satisfaction ratings. As usual, task performance was a dominant factor influencing confidence and satisfaction ratings. Results are discussed in terms of models involving Heider's principle of balance and his analysis of the causes of action, in terms of positivity biases in social perception, and as indicating effects of the social context of performance upon attribution and valence.

When a person succeeds or fails at a task, the degree to which he attributes responsibility for the outcome to ability or luck depends upon his initial expectations of success. In a recent study (Feather, 1969), subjects worked anonymously at an anagrams test consisting of 10 items of approximately 50% difficulty, each presented for 30 seconds, They were told that to pass the test they would have to solve S anagrams or more; otherwise, they failed. Before commencing they rated the degree to which they were confident that they could pass the test. These ratings were taken as measures of their initial expectations of success. On completing the test and noting success or failure, subjects rated the degree to which they felt their peri This study was conducted as an honors project
by the second author under the supervision of the first author (Simon, 1969). a Requests for reprints should be sent to N. T. Feather, Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, Flinders University of South Australia, Bedford Park, South Australia S042.

formance was due to ability (internal attribution) or luck (external attribution). The results of the study provided clear evidence that attribution of responsibility for the outcome was a function of subjects' initial expectations of success at the task. If they were initially confident, then they tended to attribute success to ability and failure to bad luck. But if they were initially unconfident, then they tended to attribute success to good luck and failure to lack of ability. However, cotnplete attribution of responsibility for success or failure either to internal or external factors was the exception rather than the rule, Most subjects attributed their performance to a mixture of ability and luck. The results also indicated that scores close to the passing mark were more likely to be attributed to external factors (good or bad luck) than were scores at either extreme. ^ b interpreted? Two HQW ft J ^ models were proposed, each based upon the seminal contributions of Heider (1958). The

173

174

N. T. FEATHKK AND J. G. SIMON and effort. For example, the person might consider his chances to be high because he feels lucky and/or because he intends to exert himself more than usual. But these factors are more variable in contrast to the relatively stable dispositional properties of ability and task difficulty, and their role would seem to be more in explaining outcomes (see below) than in influencing expectations. It was assumed in the second model that when a person's expectation of success is confirmed by an outcome, his assumptions about all the causes of the outcome will also be confirmed. But when the person's expectation of success is strongly disconfirmed by an outcome, then he is more likely to appeal to specific variable factors such as luck and/or effort to explain the outcome, since the other properties that underlie performance (ability and task difficulty) are assumed to be relatively stable (dispositional). The assumption that these two factors are stable would be justified under conditions where the estimate of ability was rooted in a consistent pattern of past performance, and where information about task difficulty was veridical and the task was not altered. In the case of an unexpected outcome, therefore, success or failure would be attributed either to an increase or decrease in effort over the normal requirement, to good or bad luck, or to a mixture of both effort and luck. Although the study described above did not obtain information concerning effort or lack of it (it assumed that normal effort was expended), the results were certainly consistent with the implication that the unexpected outcome would be more likely to be attributed to variable factors such as good or bad luck than the expected outcome. The two models described above should not be taken as mutually exclusive approaches to the understanding of the process of attributing responsibility for outcome. On the contrary, conceptual demarcations between the two models are by no means clear-cut in this area of research, consisting often of little more than differences in emphasis or terminology. The balance model relates the direction of attribution to certain preferred or balanced states, and enables one to predict the conditions under which success or failure will be seen as owned or disowned by the self

first model invoked the familiar principle of balance to predict that good outcomes (success) would be attributed to the self when there was positive self-evaluation, but would be disowned (attributed to external factors) when there was negative self-evaluation. In contrast, bad outcomes (failure) would be attributed to the self when there was negative self-evaluation, but would be disowned (attributed to external factors) when there was positive self-evaluation. This balance model was represented in terms of signed digraphs (see Feather, 1969, p. 130). The results of the study described above fit this model if it is assumed that the self-evaluation as represented in the model is self-evaluation with respect to the particular task to be performed, that high expectations of success connote positive self-evaluation, and that low expectations of success connote negative self-evaluation with respect to that task. The second model employed Heider's (1958, Ch. 4) naive analysis of action, in which the outcome of an action is related to factors that reside in the person and factors that reside in the environment, and where these factors may be stable (dispositional) or variable (see also Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1971). It was assumed that on the basis of his own past experience, a person comes to develop a relative!}' stable estimate of his own ability in regard to tasks of a particular type. Inferences about ability would develop over occasions that permitted variations in the situational context of performance and where, despite these variations, the person's performance evidenced a certain consistency in regard to objective criteria, that is, when it is possible to rule out environmental causes of variations in outcomes (see also Kelley, 1967). A person's specific expectation of success at a task would be largely a function both of this relatively stable estimate of ability and of his perception of task difficulty. Information about task difficulty may be conveyed by obvious situational characteristics (e.g., complexity) and/ or by the performance of others (e.g., the percentage of people able to reach a certain criterion). His expectation of success could also be affected by other factors that influence an outcome, such as opportunity, luck,

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND VALENCE OF OUTCOME (internal versus external attribution). The balance model also implies that one could create tension by setting up conditions that produce unbalanced structures (e.g., by making it difficult for a person with a high expectation of success to attribute failure to external circumstances). If this were done, one would expect the person to react in such a way as to restore balance. The model based upon the naive analysis of action is rather more general and less concerned with motivational processes than is the balance model. Its important contribution is its classification of the causes of action into those that are personal or internal versus those that are environmental or external, and those that are stable or dispositional versus those that are variable. The person is assumed to engage in a sort of cognitive induction in assigning the causes of action. Both models were supported by the results of the study described above. The investigation which is the focus of the present report extended the analysis of attribution to situations involving another person, that is, both self- and other-attributions were investigated. Very little research has been conducted on how a person attributes the causes of another person's success or failure. What sorts of differences might one expect in attributions made for self and other in relation to success or failure at a task? A recent investigation by Jones and his colleagues (Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968) indicated that some self-other differences (e.g., primacy and recency effects of information about task performance) might depend upon the fact that one has more information on which to base attribution when it applies to one's own behavior rather than to the behavior of another person. In addition, other investigations have indicated pervasive positivity biases in social perception. For example, De Soto and Kuethe (1959) showed that in the absence of any information about another person, the subjective probability that that person would be liked was greater than ,50. A number of studies concerning the learning and recall of balanced and unbalanced structures have indicated that positive relations have an advantage over negative relations (see Feather, 1970). It is possible that such biases might

175

also operate when attributions are made in regard to another person. For example, one might be more ready to see another person's success as due to positively regarded factors such as ability and/or effort than as due to good luck or an easy task. And one might excuse the other person's failure as due to bad luck or a difficult task than as due to negatively valued factors such as inability and/or lack of effort. It is also possible that positivity biases might act to distort upward a person's recall of another's performance relative to the other's recall of that performance. These speculations were explored in the present study, which focused upon attributions related to self and other as a function of performance outcome (success or failure) and initial expectation of success. The study was based upon the two models presented in the Feather (1969) paper and described above. The same type of prediction was made with respect to initial expectation of success, namely, that for both self and other, the unexpected success and the unexpected failure would be more likely to be attributed to variable factors such as good or bad luck than would the expected success and the expected failure. The present study, however, enabled a comparison to be made between attributions concerned with subjects' own performances and those related to the performance of others. Finally, in contrast to the earlier study, a deliberate attempt was made to manipulate success and failure at the task experimentally, rather than to rely upon subject self-selection as before. Selective control involves the risk that unknown factors may be confounded with success and failure, though the results of the previous study were sufficiently strong to render alternative interpretations of the obtained differences unlikely (see Feather, 1969, Footnote 6). While the primary focus of the present study was on attribution behavior, information concerning the valence of the outcome (attractiveness and repulsiveness of success and failure) was also collected. The main predictions here were quite straightforward, namely, that successful outcomes will be more attractive than unsuccessful outcomes, that successful outcomes will be more attractive when initial expectations of success are low

176

N, T. FEATHER AND J. G. SIMON Performance Task

Induction of expectations: Practice Hems. The first five anagrams were designated as practice anagrams, and each anagram was printed on a separate page of a small booklet. Subjects were told that they had to rearrange each group of letters so that they made a meaningful English word. They were given 30 seconds to work at each anagram. The difficulty level of these practice items was experimentally manipulated, so that half of the subjects did well on the items and the other half did poorly. The experimental manipulation was achieved by using two different booklets, one containing easy items (EVOLTR, WITHNI, POLIEC, WADNET, DAMAEc) and the other containing difficult or insoluble items (NARCEN, HITGKN", UFTRUE, MORBEP, GGAWiL). All of the different possible combinations of success and failure at the practice items were allowed for in the experimental design. Both members of a pair could succeed at the practice items, both members of a pair could fail at the practice items, or one member could succeed and the other fail at the practice items. These experimental manipulations were assumed to induce widely different expectations of success at the task, with prior success determining a high expectation and prior failure a low expectation. Manipulation of outcome: Test items. After completing the practice booklet, subjects were instructed to count the number of anagrams they had solved in the time allowed. Each member of the pair then stated his score aloud. Hence, each subject knew how many practice items the other subject had correctly solved. Each subject was then given a set of 25 white cards, each card with 1 anagram printed in the center. They were told that each had the same set of 25 anagrams, that the anagrams varied widely in difficulty, and that the deck had been randomly shuffled. They were then told that they were required to attempt 15 of the total of 25 anagrams in the deck and that they would have 30 seconds to work on each anagram. At the end of 30 seconds, each subject was to hand his card to the experimenter when it would be checked and the result for each subject (correct or incorrect) announced. After that, each subject would turn over his next card, work at the next anagram for 30 seconds, hand it to the experimenter for checking and announcement of result, etc., for the full set of 15 anagrams. Subjects were told that if they solved 8 or more anagrams, then they passed the test; if they scored 7 or less, then they failed the test. In fact, two different decks of cards were employed, although the subjects were led to believe that each had the same deck randomly shuffled. One deck was heavily weighted with easy anagrams to induce success at the task. The other deck was weighted with difficult and insoluble items to induce failure at the task. 4 The decks were distributed so that half of the subjects succeeded at the task and the other half failed. Again, all of the different possible combinations of success and failure were allowed for in
4 Copies of the test anagrams can be obtained from the first author,

than when they are high, and that unsuccessful outcomes will be more repulsive when initial expectations of success are high than when they are low. These predictions are consistent with a valence-difficulty model presented in Feather (1969) and with the results of other previous research (Feather, 1963, 1967, 1968b). The design of the present study also afforded the opportunity of studying the valence of one's own outcome in relation to the performance of the other person. Thus, how attractive one finds one's own success or how repulsive one finds one's own failure might be influenced by whether the other person succeeds or fails at the task, METHOD Subjects and Basic Procedure
The subjects were 130 students (66 male, 64 female) in the introductory psychology course at Flinders University of South Australia. They were tested during a 2-week period in April-May 1969. One pair of male subjects was eliminated because a member of this pair expressed suspicion about the experimental manipulations. Subjects were tested in like-sex pairs and worked independently and simultaneously at a set of 20 anagrams. They were seated side by side at separate small desks facing the experimenter. 3 They were told that the experiment was designed to study the performance of university students under test conditions, and that only limitations of time prevented individual testing. Each session took approximately 30 minutes. Expectations of success at the task (high versus low) were experimentally manipulated by varying the difficulty level of the first 5 "practice" anagrams. The outcome on the last 15 "test" items (success or failure) was similarly manipulated by varying the difficulty level of the anagrams. Ratings of initial confidence were collected after the S practice items. Ratings of attribution and valence and a measure of recall were obtained after the 15 test items had been completed. Since there were two levels of induced expectation of success (high or low) for both self and other, and two levels of performance outcome (success or failure) for both self and other, there were 16 different experimental conditions altogether. For example, one of these conditions involved a successful person with a high expectation of success paired with an unsuccessful other with a low expectation of success, etc. Sixty-four male and 64 female subjects were randomly assigned to the 16 experimental conditions in like-sex pairs, with four pairs (two male pairs, two female pairs) being assigned to each condition.
3

The experimenter was John Simon.

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND VALENCE OF OUTCOME

the experimental design. Both members of a pair could pass the test, both could fail, or one member could pass and the other fail the test. The reasons for using 25 anagrams of which only 15 were attempted by subjects were twofold: to increase the credibility of the deception involved in the task situation and to increase the salience of the luck/ opportunity factor relative to task difficulty. Initial confidence. As the subjects read the instructions, the experimenter ostentatiously shuffled the anagram decks and placed each deck, face down in front of the subject. Before they began the test, the subjects were asked to rate "how confident you are that you can pass the test." They indicated this by putting a cross on a S-inch scale with the statement, "Not confident at all" at one extreme, "Very confident" at the other extreme, and "Moderately confident" in the middle. Next they were asked to rate "how confident you are that the other person can pass this test," again by placing a cross on an identical 5-inch scale. These ratings were made privately and were assumed to reflect the subjects' expectations of success both for self and for other. It was assumed that these expectations would be influenced by knowledge of one's own and other's performance on the practice items, success determining relatively high confidence, and failure determining relatively low confidence. Subjects were given no other information regarding the difficulty of the anagrams test other than that ostensibly provided by the practice items. The expectation ratings for self and other were scored from 0 to 10 in the direction of increasing confidence. This score will be referred to as the initial confidence score. After subjects had provided their confidence ratings, they commenced working on the 15 test anagrams. At the end of each 30-second trial, cards were collected from each pair in counterbalanced order, and the result of each item (correct or incorrect) for each subject was announced aloud by the experimenter. After the fifteenth anagram, the experimenter publicly informed each subject of his overall result on the test ("You have passed/failed the test"), but the subject's actual number of items correct was not announced.

177

of letters largely by chance. Or they arc lucky enough to select a lot of very easy anagrams from their deck in the first place. If they were to repeat a similar test, they might not do so well. At the other extreme there are people who succeed because they have the skill and ability. Good luck isn't really involved for these people. If they were to repeat a similar test, they would probably do just as well because they have the ability. Consider your own performance on the test. In your case, do you consider that your performance was mainly clue to good luck, mainly due to skill and ability, or reflected some mixture of good luck and ability? Subjects put a cross on a 5-inch scale, with the statement, "Mainly due to good luck" at one extreme of the scale, the statement, "Mainly due to ability" at the other extreme, and the statement, "50% luck, 50% ability" in the middle. These ratings were assumed to reflect external (good luck) versus internal (ability) attribution for the self and were scored 0-10 in the direction of external attribution. Next, subjects in the pass-pass condition were instructed as follows: Now consider the other person's performance on the test. In his/her case do you consider that his/ her performance was mainly due to good luck, mainly due to skill and ability, or reflected some mixture of good luck and ability? Subjects put a cross on a 5-inch scale identical to that described above. These ratings were assumed to reflect internal versus external attribution for the other, and were scored as for self-attribution. If both subjects failed the test (the fail-fail condition), the instructions were as follows: How a person does at tasks like the one you have just completed depends upon a number of factors. At the one extreme there are some people who are just not lucky enough to get the right combination of letters in the time allowed. Or they are unlucky enough to select a lot of very difficult anagrams from their pack in the first place. Their failure is mainly due to bad luck. If they were to repeat a similar test, they might do better. At the other extreme are people who fail because they lack the necessary skill and ability. Bad luck isn't really involved for these people. If they were to repeat a similar test, they would probably do just as poorly because they lack the necessary ability. Consider your own performance on the test. In your case do you consider that your performance was mainly due to bad luck, mainly due to lack of skill and ability, or reflected some mixture of bad luck and lack of ability? Subjects put a cross on a 5-inch scale, with the statement, "Mainly due to bad luck" at one extreme of the scale; "Mainly due to lack of ability" at the other extreme; and the statement, "50% bad luck,

Postperjormance Questionnaire
Attribution ratings. After each subject's overall result (pass or fail) was publicly announced, the subjects were required to answer a postperformance questionnaire which took one of four forms corresponding to the outcomes of self and other on the test, namely, pass-pass, pass-fail, fail-pass, and failfail. For example, if both subjects passed the test (the pass-pass condition), the instructions were as follows: How a person does at tasks like the one you have just completed depends upon a number of factors. At the one extreme there are some people who are just lucky enough to get the right combination of letters quickly in the time allowed. They happen to bit upon the right combination

178

N. T. FEATHER AND J. G. SIMON

Valence of outcome. Subjects were also asked in each of the four postperformance questionnaires to rate how satisfied they were with their own score on the anagrams test and how satisfied they thought the other person would be with his/her score on the anagrams test. They answered each question by putting a cross on a 5-inch scale, with the statement, "Not satisfied at all" at one extreme of the scale; the statement, "Moderately satisfied" in the middle; and the statement, "Extremely satisfied" at the other extreme. Satisfaction ratings were scored 0-10 in the direction of increasing satisfaction with performance. Finally, subjects were asked to write down any prior information and any comments they had concerning the experiment. On the basis of these comments, one pair of male subjects was excluded from the analysis because one member of the pair indicated strong suspicion of the manipulations.

TABLE 1 MEAN INITIAL CONFIDENCE SCORES FOR MALES AND FEMALES IN RELATION TO INDUCED EXPECTATION OF SUCCESS
Males Induced expectancy for self Induced expectancy for other Confidence ratings Self Females Confidence ratings Self Othcr

Other
6.31

High High Low Low Column

High Low High Low M

S.13 6.69 2.00 2.00

3.95

4.44 6.56 3.44 5.19

3.88 5.38 3.00 3.19 3.86

6.19 4.00 7.31 4.44 5.49

Note.K = 16 for all conditions. Initial confidence was scored in the positive direction.

Form of Analysis
50% inability" in the middle. These ratings were assumed to reflect external (bad luck) versus internal (inability) attribution for the self, and were scored 0-10 in the direction of external attribution. Next, subjects in the fail-fail condition were instructed as follows: Now consider the other person's performance on the test. In his/her case do you consider that his/ her performance was mainly due to bad luck, mainly due to lack of skill and ability, or reflected some mixture of bad luck and lack of ability? Subjects put a cross on a 5-inch scale identical to that described above. These ratings were assumed to reflect internal versus external attribution for the other and were scored as for self-attribution. Instructions for subjects who were successful in the presence of an unsuccessful other (the pass-fail condition) were identical to those for self-rating when both subjects passed and other-rating when both subjects failed, except for minor variations in the opening statements. These subjects also put crosses on the appropriate 5-inch scales ("good luckability" for self; "bad luck-lack of ability" for other). Instructions for subjects who were unsuccessful in the presence of a successful other (the fail-pass condition) were identical to those for selfrating when both subjects failed and other-rating when both subjects passed, except for minor variations in the opening statements. These subjects also put crosses on the appropriate S-inch scales ("bad luck-lack of ability" for self; "good luck-ability" for other). All ratings were scored from 0 to 10 in the direction of external attribution. Recall of performance level. In each of the four postperformance questionnaires, the subjects were asked, "Approximately how many anagrams did you correctly solve?" They were also asked, "Approximately how many anagrams did the other person correctly solve?" They answered each question by putting a circle around one numeral in a row of numerals from 1 to 15. Initial confidence scores, attribution scores, and valence scores were separately analyzed using a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance with sex, own outcome (success or failure), other outcome (success or failure), own expectancy induction (high or low), other expectancy induction (high or low), and rating (self or other) as factors in the analysis, and repeated measures on the last factor (Winer, 1962). Because of the complexity of these analyses, complete analysis of variance tables are not presented, but the relevant significant effects will be abstracted.

RESULTS Analysts of Initial Confidence Scores Table 1 presents the mean initial confidence scores for males and females (selfrating and other-rating) in relation to induced expectation of success for self and other. Table 1 indicates that taken overall, subjects were more confident of the success of the other than of their own success. The main effect of rating (self versus other) was highly significant (F = 70.71, df = 1/96, p < .001). In addition Table 1 shows that the experimental inductions influenced ratings of initial confidence. In particular, there was a highly significant Own Expectancy X Rating interaction (F = 73.84, df = 1/96, p < .001). The expectancy induction for self affected the initial confidence scores for self but not for other. In a corresponding way the Other Expectancy X Rating interaction was highly significant (F = 95.80, df = 1/96, p < .001). The expectancy induction for other affected the initial confidence scores for other but not

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND VALENCE OP OUTCOME

TABLE 2 MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES FOR MALES AND FEMALES IN RELATION TO INDUCED EXPECTATION or SUCCESS AND PERFORMANCE OUTCOME Males
Induced expectancy for self Induced expectancy for other Performance outcome for self Performance outcome for other Attribution ratings Self Females Attribution ratings Self
6.25

179

Other
3.00

Other
3,75

High High High High High High High High

High High High High

Low Low Low Low

High High High High

Low Low

Low Low Low Low Low Low

Low Low Low Low

Success Success Failure Failure Success Success Failure Failure Success Success Failure Failure Success Success Failure Failure

Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure

4.SO

6.2S 4.75 4.75 4.50 4.50 6.50 5.00 5.75 8.75

.75

7.50 4.75 5.50 5.00 4.25 5.50 4.25 4.00 8.75

4.50 5.75 4.00 3.75 1.50

6.75 5.25 5.00 3.00 5.00

5.75 4.50 4.00 4.75 4.25 6.25 3.75 6.25 6.25 5.00 3.25 5.75 5.75 3.50 5.25

7.25 3.50 5.00 4.75 4.75 6.00 3.75 3.50 6.75 2.75 6.50 5.00 5.75 3.00 5.25

Note. = 4 for all conditions. Attribution was scored in the external direction.

for self. Thus, the experimental manipulations that were designed to produce differences in initial confidence were successful. Ratings of initial confidence were higher when the person being rated (self or other) had done well at the five practice anagrams than when he had done poorly, but subjects tended to be more confident of other's success than own success when ratings were averaged over all conditions. Females did not have generally lower initial confidence scores than males as they did in the previous study (Feather, 1969). The main effect of sex was not significant. However, the Sex X Own Expectancy interaction was significant (^=12.80, d}=l/96, p<.001). The confidence ratings were higher for males than for females when the experimental procedure was designed to induce a high expectation of success for self, but lower for males than for females when it was designed to induce a low expectation of success for self. Analysis of Attribution Scores Table 2 presents the mean attribution scores for males and females (self-rating and other-rating) in relation both to induced expectation of success for self and other and performance outcome for self and other.

The results emerging from the analysis of variance that were most relevant to predictions were a significant Own Outcome X Own Expectancy X Rating interaction (F = 4.44, df = 1/96, p < .05) and a significant Other Outcome X Other Expectancy X Rating interaction (F = 11.59, df - 1/96, p< .001). The basis of the former interaction is shown in Figure 1; the basis for the latter interaction is shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 presents the attribution results from the previous study (Feather, 1969). Figure 1 shows that if a person succeeded at the task, attribution ratings for one's success were more external when the procedure was designed to induce a low expectation of success than when it was designed to induce a high expectation, that is, one's own unexpected success was more likely to be attributed to good luck than one's expected success. If a person failed at the task, however, attribution ratings for one's failure were more external when the procedure was designed to induce a high expectation of success than when it was designed to induce a low expectation, that is, one's own unexpected failure was more likely to be attributed to bad luck than one's expected failure. These results are consistent with those of the previous study,

180
External 7-00

N. T. FEATHER AND J. G. SIMON

Own Success Own Attribulion Rating Own Failure Own Attribution Rating Own Success Other Attribution Rating Failure Other Attribution Rating

6'00

CD

on

5'00

UJ

4'00

Internal 3 oo _
I
HIGH LOW

INDUCED

EXPECTANCY

FOR SELF

FIG. 1. Mean attribution scores (own and other) in relation to own outcome and induced expectancy for self,

although, in contrast to the previous results, there was little difference in attribution ratings for one's success and failure when initial expectations of success could be assumed to be highboth means were close to S, implying neither internal nor external attribution (see Feather, 1969, and Figure 3 for compariExternol 7^00 A 4 A \ A s^A

son). When initial expectations of success could be assumed to be low, however, one's success was attributed to good luck and one's failure to lack of ability. The same trends were evident (though less strong) when attribution ratings for other's outcomes were considered in relation to own
i Other -A Other AOther Mother Success - Other Attribution Rating Failure Other Attribution Rating Success - Own Attribution Rating Failure Own Attribution Rating

z o
CD

P 6-00

\ \

5-00
2 UJ

Internal 3^00
1
HIGH

1
LOW

INDUCED

EXPECTANCY

FOR

OTHER

FIG. 2. Mean attribution scores (own and other) in relation to other outcome and induced expectancy for other.

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND VALENCE OF OUTCOME External 7-00

. Own Success Own Attribution Rating Own Attribution Rating

181

2 O
H- 6-00

Own Failure

S a:
< 5'00

(N=36)

LU
4'00

_
J_ HIGH

(N=44) LOW

Internal

INITIAL

CONFIDENCE

FOR SELF

FIG. 3. Mean attribution scores in relation to own outcome and initial confidence for self (adapted from Feather, 1969).

expectancy induction and own performance outcome (see Figure 1). Thus, the results imply that when a subject's own outcome on the test items was unexpected, he was more likely to attribute the outcome to good or bad luck than when the outcome was expected. These results were in line with prediction, Figure 2 shows that if the other person succeeded at the task, attribution ratings for other's success were more external when the procedure was designed to induce a low expectation of success for other than when it was designed to induce a high expectation; that is, another's unexpected success was more likely to be attributed to good luck than another's expected success. If the other person failed at the task, however, attribution ratings for other's failure was more external when the procedure was designed to produce a high expectation of success for other than when it was designed to induce a low expectation; that is, another's unexpected failure was more likely to be attributed to bad luck than another's expected failure. These results are in line with prediction, although it should be noted that there was little difference in attribution ratings for another's success when initial expectations of success could be assumed to be lowboth means were slightly less than 5, implying a slight tendency toward internal attribution. When initial expectations of success could be assumed to be high,

however, another's success was attributed to ability and another's failure to bad luck. Opposite trends were evident when attribution ratings for one's own outcomes were considered in relation to other expectancy induction and other performance outcome (see Figure 2 ) , but these effects were not very strong. Thus, the results imply that when another's outcome on the test items was seen to be unexpected, the other's outcome was more likely to be attributed to good or bad luck than when it was seen as expected. These results are also in line with prediction. Consideration of Figure 1 and Figure 2 separately could miss an important effect which is evident in Figure 4. This figure considers attribution ratings for self only in relation to own expectancy induction and own outcome and attribution ratings for other only in relation to other's expectancy induction and other's outcome. Figure 4 shows quite clearly that when the other person succeeded at the task, there was a greater tendency to attribute his success to internal factors (ability) than when one's own outcome was success. But when the other person failed at the task, there was a greater tendency to attribute his failure to external factors (bad luck) than when one's own outcome was failure. These effects were independent of the level of induced expectancy. For both levels of expectancy, the attribution

182
External T O O

N. T. FEATHER AND J. G. SIMON

Q Q A \A 0 Own Success-Own Attribulion Rating Q Own Failure Own Attribution Rating A Other S u c c e s s O t h e r Attribution Rating Bother Failure O t h e r Attribution Rating

2 6-00

o
5-00
< UJ
400

Internal 3-00 _^
HIGH LOW

INDUCED EXPECTANCY FOR SELF OR OTHER FIG. 4. Mean attribution scores (own or other) in relation to own or other outcome and induced expectancy for self or other.

ratings for other's success were more internal than the attribution ratings for one's own success. And for both levels of expectancy, the attribution ratings for other's failure were more external than the attribution ratings for one's own failure. In the analysis of variance, the following interactions relevant to the above differences were significant or approached significance: Own Outcome X Rating (F = 3.18, dj = \/ 96, p < .10) and Other Outcome X Rating (F = 42.76, df - 1/96, p < .001). In regard to the former interaction, subjects tended to rate their own success more externally than their own failure, in comparison to other-ratings. With regard to the latter interaction, subjects tended to rate another's success more internally than another's failure, in comparison to self-ratings. Finally, in contrast to the results of the previous study (Feather, 1969), females did not have higher attribution scores than males, that is, they were not more external in their attributions than were males. The main effect of sex was not significant. In summary, therefore, the analysis of attribution ratings indicated that two sorts of effects occurred in the social situation under consideration. As predicted for both self and other, the unexpected outcome was more likely to be attributed to external factors

(good or bad luck) than the expected outcome. But overlaying this effect was another new finding of considerable interest. Success for the other person was more likely to be seen as reflecting ability (internal attribution) than success for oneself; failure for the other person was more likely to be seen as reflecting bad luck (external attribution) than failure for oneself. Analysis oj Performance Recall Scores Table 3 presents the mean performance levels on the test items for subjects in the various outcome conditions and the mean performance recall scores on the test items for the person given both by himself and by the other for the various outcome conditions. Over all outcome conditions, there was a tendency for the person to distort recall of his own performance downward and for the other to distort recall of the person's performance upward. The former tendency was strongest when the person's outcome was success, the latter, when his outcome was failure. Table 3 also presents the results of t tests applied to the recall data. Individual comparisons between the recall scores given by the person and the corresponding recall scores given by the other reveal that except for the successfail condition, mean recall scores of the other

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND VALENCE OP OUTCOME TABLE 3

MEAN PERFORMANCE LEVELS FOR PERSONS, MEAN RECALL PERFORMANCE LEVELS FOR PERSONS GIVEN BY SELF AND OTHER, AND INDIVIDUAL COMPARISONS BETWEEN MEAN RECALL SCORES
Outcome condition Mean performance level for person 10.98 Mean recall score of person for person 10.41 9.88 Mean recall score of other for person 10.91 10.59 11.19
t.

183

All successful persons Success (self )-succcss (other) Success (self )-fail (other) All unsuccessful persons Fai 1 (self )-success (other) Fail (self)-fail (other) All persons

10.44 11.53 4.11 3.84 4.38 7.55

2.56** 2.55**

10.94 4.03 3.81 4.25 7.22

4.92 5.09 4.75 7.91

.99
5.39*** 6.05*** 2.11* 5.40***

All tests were one-tailed and for correlated samples. * t < .025. **p < .01. *** p < .0005.

were significantly greater than those of the person.5 Analysis of Valence Scores Table 4 presents mean ratings of satisfaction with performance outcome for males and females (self-rating and other-rating) in relation to both induced expectation of success
As in previous studies conducted by the first author (e.g., Feather, 1968a), performance on the test items tended to be lower following initial failure on the practice items (M = 7.03) than following initial success (M = 8.06). This effect occurred irrespective of whether or not the person passed or failed the test items.
5

for self and other and performance outcome for self and other. The analysis of variance indicated that the main effect of own outcome (F 49.44, dj - 1/96, p< .001) and the main effect of other outcome (F 87.67, dj 1/96, p < .001) were statistically significant. Subjects' ratings of satisfaction over all conditions were higher when one succeeded (M = 4.69) than when one failed (M 3.13), and higher when other succeeded (M = 4.9S) than when other failed (M = 2.88). Of more interest, however, were the significant Own Outcome X Other Outcome (F = 15.94, dj = 1/96, p < .001),

TABLE 4 MEAN SATISFACTION RATINGS FOR MALES AND FEMALES IN RELATION TO INDUCED EXPECTATION OP SUCCESS AND PERFORMANCE OUTCOME Males
Induced expectancy for self Induced expectancj' for other Performance outcome for self Performance outcome for other Satisfaction ratings Self Other Females Satisfaction ratings Self Other

High High High High High High High High

High

Low Low Low Low Low Low

Low Low

High High High Low Low Low Low High High High High

Low Low

Low Low

Success Success Failure Failure Success Success Failure Failure Success Success Failure Failure Success Success Failure Failure

Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure

5.00

4.25 2.50 1.75 6.50 6.00 2.25 1.50 4.50 6.00 1.50 2.00 5.25 5.25 2.00 1.25

4.50 3.50 7.00 1.50 5.25 3.00 7.25 2.25 5.50 2,25 8.25 1.75 5.50 1.25 6.00 3.75

5.50

7.25 1.50 1.50 5.50 6.75 1.00 4.50 7.50

6.50 1.25

7.50 1.50 5.25

.75 .75

.50 .25

8.75

1.75 4.25 7.00 1.00

.75

5.75 2.00 9.50 2.25 5.25 1.50 7.50 1.75

Note.ft = 4 f o r a]j conditions. Satisfaction was scored in the positive direction.

184
8-00

N. T. FEATHER AND J. G. SIMON

.t 0O O- j Moles - Own Satisfaction Rating 0 Males Other Satisfaction Rating Q Fr""1'" r""" Satisfaction Rating -O Females - Other Satisfaction Rating

o
6-00

2
$ 4-00

2 < UJ S 2-00

SUCCESS OWN

FAILURE OUTCOME

Fig. 5. Mean satisfaction scores for males and females in relation to own outcome.

Own Outcome X Rating (7? =167.55, df = 1/96, p < .001), and Other Outcome X Rating interactions (F - 152.37, df = 1/96, p < .001). The first of these interactions was due to the fact that ratings of satisfaction tended to be especially high when both self and other succeeded (M = S.28), and especially low when both self and other failed (M = 1.66). Ratings for the own-success-other-failure condition (M 4.09) and the own-failure-othersuccess condition (M = 4.61) were intermediate.
8-00
\

The significant Own Outcome X Rating interaction was due to the fact that whereas a person rated his own satisfaction with outcome higher when he succeeded than when he failed, the effects on the ratings of the other person's outcome were in the reverse direction: satisfaction ratings for the other's outcome were higher when self failed than when self succeeded. Similarly, the significant Other Outcome X Rating interaction was due to the fact that whereas a person rated other's satisfaction with outcome higher when the other succeeded than when the other failed, the effects on one's own ratings were in the reverse direction: satisfaction ratings for one's own outcome were higher when other failed than when other succeeded. These effects were magnified for females when compared to males. The Sex X Own Outcome X Rating interaction (F = 5.95, df = 1/96, p < .05) and the Sex X Other Outcome X Rating interaction (F = 14.36, df - 1/96, p < .001) were both statistically significant. These unusual effects are indicated in Figures 5 and 6. They suggest that a complex process of social comparison occurred in the experimental situation, that subjects tended to displace satisfaction ratings for others' outcomes away from their own when self had succeeded or failed, that subjects tended to displace satisfaction ratings for their own outcomes away

QM.. i ,3 Males Own Satisfaction Rating g --- 9 Males Other Satisfaction Rating QI Q Females Own Satisfaction Rating
e \ O --- O Females Other Satisfaction Rating

6-00
CO CO

4'00

iK^

UJ

\\
2-00
D

SUCCESS OTHER

FAILURE OUTCOME

FIG. 6. Mean satisfaction scores for males and females in relation to other outcome.

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND VALENCE or OUTCOME from those for others' outcomes when other had succeeded or failed, and that these effects were more likely to occur among females than among males. Figures 5 and 6 also show that females were more responsive to the success and failure experiences: the effect of own success and own failure on own ratings was greater for females than for males; and the effect of other success and other failure on other ratings was greater for females than for males. None of the predicted effects involving expectation of success occurred. Satisfaction ratings were not higher when success was associated with a low initial expectation of success than with a high initial expectation of success. Nor were satisfaction ratings lower when failure was associated with a high initial expectation of success than with a low initial expectation of success. The dominant factor influencing satisfaction ratings was outcome, and expectancy effects were submerged. DISCUSSION The results presented above replicate those of the previous study (Feather, 1969) since, in line with prediction, a person was more likely to attribute an unexpected outcome to variable, environmental factors (good or bad luck) than an expected outcome. This result occurred both in relation to self and other. It is important to note, however, that the results of the present study did not fully support the stronger hypothesis, that the unexpected outcome would be attributed to external factors (good or bad luck) and the expected outcome to internal factors (ability or lack of ability). Mean attribution ratings for expected success and unexpected failure were close to S (a mixture of ability and luck) when attributions concerning own outcome in relation to own expectancy were considered (see Figure 1 when own expectancy was high). Mean attribution ratings for expected failure and unexpected success were slightly below 5 when attributions concerning other outcome and other expectancy were considered (see Figure 2 when other expectancy was low). In both of these cases, there was no clear tendency for scores to move toward the internal or external poles of the scale; ratings tended

185

to be intermediate. When own expectations were low, however, and other expectations were high, attribution ratings diverged, and the stronger hypothesis was supported. The stronger hypothesis would be consistent with the implications of the balance model. In terms of the model, good outcomes (success) would be attributed to self when there was positive self-evaluation (high expectancy), but would be disowned when there was negative self-evaluation (low expectancy); bad outcomes (failure) would be attributed to self when there was negative self-evaluation (low expectancy), but would be disowned when there was positive self-evaluation (high expectancy). The results of the previous study, which did not involve a coacting partner, were fully consistent with these implications (see Figure 3), but the results of the present study were not consistent with these implications when own expectations were high and other expectations were low. Hence, the present results are not altogether compatible with the balance model, although the former results are. In view of these findings, it may be necessary to supplement the balance model by making allowance for other forms of cognitive bias that may be elicited in a social situation, for example, the positivity bias noted in the present study. The requirements of the naive action model are not as stringent as those of the balance model. The naive analysis of action predicts that when a person's expectation of success is disconfirmed by an outcome, then he will tend to appeal to variable factors (luck and/or effort) to explain the outcome, since the other possible causes of outcomes (those involving ability and task difficulty) are assumed to be stable. Hence, the weaker hypothesis, that the unexpected outcome will be more likely to be attributed to variable factors than the expected outcome, follows from this analysis, and this weaker hypothesis was supported by the results of both studies so far conducted. Both sets of results, then, are essentially compatible with the implications from the naive action formulation. A further variable factor that might be considered as influencing the outcome when an expectation is disconfirmed is effort. Whereas luck may be considered as a variable en-

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N. T. FEATHER AND J. G. SIMON

vironmental factor, however, effort can be the social context discovered in the present classified as a variable personal factor (see study. Weiner et al, 1971). Future studies might also The difficulty with the above argument, include measures of the perceived amount of however, is that the self-other effects occurred effort expended, since subjects might account even though attribution ratings were not pubfor unexpected outcomes not only in terms of licly announced in the presence of the other. good or bad luck, but also in terms of an in- But the ratings were public, in the sense that crease or decrease in the amount of effort ex- they would be seen by the experimenter, and pended in relation to the average effort nor- it is this regard that a more adequate explanation of the self-other results suggests itself. mally required. The important contribution of the present Thus, it is possible that subjects were intent study, however, is the firm indication that the upon gaining the approval of the experimenter social context of performance has marked and were conscious that their behavior was effects on attribution behavior. A person was being evaluated by the experimenter, that is, more likely to attribute another's success to that there was some degree of evaluation ability than his own success, and was more apprehension in the situation (Rosenberg, likely to attribute his own failure to inability 1965). By this reasoning, subjects tended to than another's failure. Moreover, there was a respond in ways that they thought would be strong and pervasive tendency for the recall socially acceptable to the experimenter (huscore given by another to exceed the cor- mility, generosity). responding score given by oneself. FurtherThe remaining self-other results might also more a person was more optimistic about the be explained in terms of the subject's concern chances of success for the other than for him- with self-presentation. A subject who rates self (see Table 1). In this sense the present himself as very confident about succeeding data are consistent with those of other studies might also run the perceived risk of being which have indicated positivity efforts in so- labeled as boastful and cocksure, and he might cial recall, interpersonal attraction, etc. (De therefore tend to reduce his estimate when Soto & Kuethe, 19S9; Feather, 1966, 1970). other people are present, particularly when an Presumably, the presence of a coacting experimenter is perceived to be evaluating partner and the public announcement of re- that estimate. No such risks are involved when sults on both the practice items and the test one rates another's chances. In this case a items created a situation in which social high estimate could be taken to mean that comparison could occur and where social mo- one has magnanimous faith in the other's tives were elicited. A person might feel that ability. The tendency for subjects to distort attributing success to ability would be boast- recall of their own performance downward and ful and that attributing failure to bad luck another's performance upward may be interwould involve "making excuses," that a bet- preted in a similar manner. Again, the other ter self-presentation would occur if one tended person is upgraded, the self, devalued, and to devalue one's success and to admit to one's the subject presents himself to the experifailure when another was present. In contrast, menter as being characterized by modesty and one might be more willing to acknowledge the generosity. success of another as due to ability, since this The social context was also important in would imply approval of the other, and to ex- influencing how subjects rated their own and cuse the failure of another as due to bad luck, the other's satisfaction with outcome. Satissince this reaction would avoid negative criti- faction ratings for the other's outcome were cism of the other (one does not like to be higher when self failed than when self sucaccused of lack of ability). Hence, it might be ceeded; satisfaction ratings for own outcome argued that a desire to create and maintain were higher when the other failed than when positive relationships with the other by react- the other succeeded. These results remind one ing to own and other outcomes in a manner of the contrast effects frequently obtained in designed to win the approval of the other was studies of social judgment (Sherif, Sherif, & a general motivation underlying the effects of Nebergall, 196S). There was no evidence that

ATTRIBUTION OP RESPONSIBILITY AND VALENCE OF OUTCOME the unexpected success was rated as more satisfying than the expected success or that the unexpected failure was rated as more repulsive than the expected failure. Perhaps the predicted relationships between expectation and valence failed to appear because the expectations themselves were based upon performance on the practice items, and subjects may have reacted to performance on both practice and test items in making their satisfaction ratings. In fact, the satisfaction ratings were relatively low in the low-expectation-failure conditions where maximal failure occurred, and were relatively high in the highexpectation-success conditions where maximal success occurred (see Table 4). Thus, it appears that task performance overshadowed other factors in influencing satisfaction ratings. The dominant effect of sheer frequency of success and failure in influencing subjects' ratings of satisfaction or disappointment with outcome has been noted before (Feather, 1965). The results of the present study indicated that females were rather more responsive to success and failure experiences than were males, in that their satisfaction ratings were higher following success and lower following failure when they rated with respect to own outcome and when they rated with respect to other outcome (see Figures 5 and 6). In the previous study (Feather, 1969), females who failed rated themselves as less satisfied with their performance than did males who failed (p < .05), but there was no significant difference between males and females in the ratings following success. Also, in the former study, females had lower initial confidence scores than did males and higher external attribution scores than did males. These two sex differences did not occur in the present study. The failure to find lower expectancy estimates in females than in males is especially puzzling, since this difference has been found in other studies as well (e.g., Crandall, 1969; Feather, 1968a). In the Feather (1969) study it was argued that this sex difference, together with the higher external attribution scores and the higher feelings of inadequacy scores that were also found among females, may indicate the way females conceive of the

187

feminine role, that is, that the female should appear modest and dependent, and that assertiveness and self-confidence are masculine traits. But this conclusion was based upon the results of studies where males and females worked at the same task in a large mixed group under conditions that could be perceived as competitive. Under such conditions the motive to avoid success ("fear of success") may be elicited among females (Horner, 1969), and this motive could be associated with lower confidence estimates and higher external attribution.0 In the present study, however, only like-sex pairs were involved in task performance, and fear of success may not have been an important factor, since females could not see themselves as in competition with males. If this interpretation is correct, it implies that the former differences would be obtained in a competitive situation where the pairs of subjects involve a male and a female, and where subjects realize that their results will be made public. More generally, it would be of interest in future studies to vary the degree of competition involved in the performance situation. Under competitive conditions the positivity biases noted above might not occur. Instead, one might attempt to upgrade the self and to devalue the other person when one is in competition with him. In conclusion, the results of the present study have advanced our understanding of attribution and valence in two main ways. In the first place, they underline the need for careful analysis of the social context of performance in future studies of attribution and valence. Furthermore, they strengthen the generalization that it is the unexpected outcome rather than the expected outcome that tends to be attributed to variable factors (both external and internal) which may underlie performance.
Werner and Kukla (1970) have argued that subjects high in resultant achievement motivation (high motive to achieve success, low motive to avoid failure) will be more likely to attribute success in achievement-oriented situations to themselves than subjects classified as low in resultant achievement motivation (low motive to achieve success, high motive to avoid failure).
6

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REFERENCES HEIDER, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations, New York: Wiley, 1958. HORNER, M. Fail: Bright women. Psychology Today, 1969, 3, 36-62. JONES, E. E., ROCK, L., SHAVER, K. G., GOETHALS, G. R., & WARD, L. M. Pattern of performance and ability attribution: An unexpected primacy effect. Journal oj Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 10, 317-340. KELLY, H. H. Attribution theory in social psychology. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1967, 15, 192-240. ROSENBERG, M. J. When dissonance fails: On eliminating evaluation apprehension from attitude measurement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 28-43. SHERIF, C. W., SHERIF, M., & NEBERGALL, R. Attitude and attitude change: The social judgmentinvolvement approach. Philadelphia: Saunders, 1965. SIMOX, J. G. Attribution of responsibility for own and other's task outcome in relation to expectation of success and task outcome for self and other. Unpublished honors thesis, Flinders University of South Australia, 1969. WEINER, B., FRIEZE, I., KUKLA, A., REED, I., REST, S. A., & ROSENEAUM, R. M. Perceiving the causes of success and failure. In E. E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior. New York: McCaleb-Seiler, 1971, in press. WEIXER, B., & KUKLA, A. An attributional analysis of achievement motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 15, 1-20. WINER, B. J. Statistical principles in experimental design. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. (Received May 25, 1970)

CRANDAIX, V. C. Sex differences in expectancy of intellectual and academic reinforcement. In C. P. Smith (Ed.), Achievement-related motives in children. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969. DE SOTO, C. B., & KUETHE, J. L. Subjective probabilities of interpersonal relationships. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, 59, 290-294. FEATHER, N. T. Mowrer's revised two-factor theory and the motive-expectancy-value model. Psychological Review, 1963, 70, 500-515. FEATHER, N. T. Performance at a difficult task in relation to initial expectation of success, test anxiety, and need achievement. Journal of Personality, 196S, 33, 200-217. FEATHER, N. T. The prediction of interpersonal attraction: Effects of sign and strength of relations in different structures. Human Relations, 1966, 19, 213-237. FEATHER, N. T. Valence of outcome and expectation of success in relation to task difficulty and perceived locus of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 7, 372-386. FEATHER, N. T. Change in confidence following success or failure as a predictor of subsequent performance. Journal of Personality mid Social Psychology, 1968, 9, 38-46. (a) FEATHER, N. T. Valence of success and failure in relation to task difficulty: Past research and recent progress. Australian Journal of Psychology, 1968, 20, 111-122. (b) FEATHER, N. T. Attribution of responsibility and valence of success and failure in relation to initial confidence and task performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 13, 129-144. FEATHER, N. T. Balancing and positivity effects in social recall. Journal of Personality, 1970, 38, 60262S.