You are on page 1of 26

DJHS Debate

Contents

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 1 of 26

US Successful On Terror ____________________________________________________________________ 3


US has a successful record of foiling terror plots _______________________________________________________3

Al-Qaeda is Being Destroyed ________________________________________________________________ 4


Al-Qaeda May Be Headed to Defeat _________________________________________________________________4 Death of Bin Laden Will HURT Al-Qaeda _____________________________________________________________4 Groups often pldege allegiance to OBL, not al-Qaeda ___________________________________________________5 Damage Primarily in More Centralized areas __________________________________________________________6 "Finding and killing Osama bin Laden is a huge blow to al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, because it shows they're vulnerable even inside Pakistan," says Kori Schake, a defense analyst at West Point and the Hoover Institution. "It will have less effect on al-Qaida cells in Yemen and the Horn of Africa, which seem to operate independently." _________________________________________________________________________________6 Al-Qaeda Isn t Suceeding In Its Attacks ______________________________________________________________6 Al-Qaeda is Being Weakened ______________________________________________________________________6

Al Qaeda is Weaker _______________________________________________________________________ 7


Recruiting is Down _______________________________________________________________________________7

We are Killing Terrorist Leaders ______________________________________________________________ 8


We Must Kill Leaders to Defeat al Qaeda _____________________________________________________________8 Killing Leaders Has Worked in the past to Weaken Terror Groups _________________________________________8 Other Studies of the Success of Killing Leaders Are Flawed Success is Bigger _______________________________8 Killing Leaders Increases Probability of Terrorist Failure by 27% ___________________________________________9

Drone Strikes Good _______________________________________________________________________ 11


Drones Important in Fighting Terror ________________________________________________________________11 Number of Strike Casualties Exaggerated ____________________________________________________________11 Civilian Casualties Minimal Mostly Militants Killed___________________________________________________11 As number of drone strikes has increased, number of civilian deaths has decreased _________________________12

Lower Threat of Terrorism _________________________________________________________________ 13


Counter Terror Efforts Have Decreased Threat, But it Still Exists__________________________________________13

Assists US Mission in Middle East ___________________________________________________________ 14


Killing Bin Laden Makes Taliban Cooperation Easier ___________________________________________________14 Easier to End War in Afghanistan __________________________________________________________________15

Al-Qaeda Will Not Have Huge Retaliation ____________________________________________________ 16


No New Terrorist Attacks That Wouldn t Have Happened Anyways _______________________________________16

DJHS Debate

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 2 of 26

Blowback Theory: No Increase in Al Qaeda Membership _______________________________________________16

Countries Have Still Gone Nuclear ___________________________________________________________ 17


Countries Go Nuclear for Strategic Advantage ________________________________________________________17 Numerous Failures to Prevent Nations from Pursuing Nukes ____________________________________________18 Peaceful Nuke Program = Stepping Stone to Nuclear Power ___________________________________________19

NPT is ineffective ________________________________________________________________________ 20


Too Weak and Inflexible Cannot Easily Be Amended w/ Teeth __________________________________________20 Countries Can Still Get Building Blocks Of Nukes Even Following Treaty ___________________________________20 NPT can be used as a cover _______________________________________________________________________20 Nuclear Smuggling Has Increased __________________________________________________________________21 Easier to Steal if More Countries Have Weapons ______________________________________________________21 Terrorists Can Easily Obtain HEU ___________________________________________________________________21 It is more likely that terrorists could obtain the key ingredient for making a nuclear bomb, plutonium (Pu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU). While producing a weapon with Pu is a relatively complex task, there is consensus in the scientific community that it would not be difficult for a terrorist group to produce an explosive device similar to the one used on Hiroshima, with as little as 50 pounds of HEU.The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated in its 2007 report that there are 1,400-2,000 tons of HEU, enough for some 56,000-80,000 nuclear weapons, spread around the world. Much of the HEU is in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, known to have weak security regulations and widespread corruption. _____________________________________________________21 NPT enforcement is really, really slow ______________________________________________________________21 NPT effectiveness has decreased __________________________________________________________________22 Russia Has Loose Nukes __________________________________________________________________________22 Nuclear Material Could Reach Terrorists through Smuggling ____________________________________________23 Terrorists Target Russian Nuclear Stockpiles _________________________________________________________23 Protection of Russian Nuclear Arsenals Are Flimsy ____________________________________________________23

Number of Nukes Irrelevant ________________________________________________________________ 24


There are still thousands ofactive nuclear weapons in existence _________________________________________24 The Defense Department Misplaces Missile Components_______________________________________________24

Accidental Nuclear War ___________________________________________________________________ 25


Even the best and the brightest can accidentally cause nuclear war! ______________________________________25

Bioweapons are a HUGE Threat ____________________________________________________________ 26


Bioweapons are Readily Available _________________________________________________________________26

DJHS Debate
US Successful On Terror
US has a successful record of foiling terror plots

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 3 of 26

McNeill et al. 11.[Jena Baker McNeill, James Jay Carafano, and Jessica Zuckerman.Analysts, Heritage Foundation.Heritage
Foundation. May 20, 2011. Accessed July 17, 2011."39 Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: Examining Counterterrorism s Success Stories. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/39-terror-plots-foiled-since-911-examining-counterterrorisms-successstories]http://www.jewishjournal.com/cover_story/article/a_response_the_case_against_the_islamic_center_20100922/]

Sincethe terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, at least 39 terror plots against the United States have been foiled thanks to domestic and international cooperation, as well as efforts to track down terror leads in local communities. Such a successful track record of preventing terror attacks should garner the attention of policymakers around the countryas both Congress and the Administration wrestle with the difficult decision of where to best spend
precious security dollars. The death of Osama bin Laden serves as a reminder that the war on terrorism is not over, and as a call to focus on strategies that have made the nation a harder target for terrorism, while examining which reforms are still necessary.

DJHS Debate
Al-Qaeda is Being Destroyed
Al-Qaeda May Be Headed to Defeat

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 4 of 26

Rollins 11.[John Rollins. Specialist in Terrorism and National Security, Congressional Research Service.Congressional Research
Service. May 5, 2011. Accessed July 20, 2011. Osama bin Laden s Death: Implications and Considerations. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41809.pdf]
While some experts argue that OBL s limited ideological appeal and operational role in AQsuggest that the implications of his death will also be limited, senior U.S. counterterrorism officials view the death of OBL as the possible beginning of the end of AQ. In a press briefing at the White House on May 2, 2011 an unnamed senior administration official offered the following assessment of the significance of OBL s death and the prospect of continued threats to the nation: Without a doubt, the United States will continue to face terrorist threats. There s

also no doubt that the death of Osama bin Laden marks the single greatest victory in the U.S.-led campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda. It is a major and essential step in bringing about Al Qaeda s eventual destruction. Although Al Qaeda may not fragment immediately, the loss of Osama bin Laden puts the group on a path of decline that will be difficult to reverse. Obama 11.[Barack Obama, President of the United States. Office of the President. June 28, 2011. Accessed July 17, 2011. National Strategy for Counterterrorism.http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf] In the decade since those attacks, we have significantly strengthened our defenses and built a steadfast international coalition. In the past two and a half years, we have eliminated more key al-Qa ida leaders in rapid succession than at any time since 2001, including Usama bin Laden, the only leader that al-Qa ida has ever known. As a
result, we now have the opportunity to seize a turning point in our effort to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat al-Qa ida. As President I have no greater responsibility than protecting the American people. Though there are many potential threats to our national security, it is the terrorist threat from al-Qa ida that has loomed largest since September 11, 2001. And yet today, we can say with growing confidence and with certainty about the outcome that we have put al-Qa ida on the and mindful of the challenges still ahead, we will not rest until the job is done.

path to defeat.With an unrelenting focus on the task at hand,

Death of Bin Laden Will HURT Al-Qaeda


Mendelsohn 11.[Barak Mendelsohn. Assistant Professor, Haverford College, and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research
Institute.The New York Times. May 24, 2011. Accessed July 17, 2011 A Devastating Blow. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/02/the-war-on-terror-after-osama-bin-laden/a-devastating-blow-to-al-qaeda]

Osama bin Laden s death is a devastating blow to Al Qaeda, but it is not the end of jihadi terrorism. While it is demoralizing for the whole jihadi camp, it will not eliminate the motivation to attack the U.S. and is likely to trigger revenge attacks. But from a strategic point of view, Bin Laden s death could mark a critical juncture in the process of demilitarizing the war on terrorism and the beginning of the end for the U.S. presence in Afghanistan Although his operational role has greatly diminished since 9/11, he was still vital for Al Qaeda s existence. He devised the group s strategy, and was a unique symbol of resistance. Others may prove to be better strategists but no individual, including his lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, possesses a similar aura of invincibility and appeal among jihadists. Bin Laden s demise also puts the future of the broader Al Qaeda network in doubt. Groups that swore allegiance to bin Laden himself may not accept the authority of his successor. The leadership of Al Qaeda s branch in the Arabian Peninsula, which in the past couple of years eclipsed the central organization, may even present a direct challenge to the leadership in South Asia and vie for leadership of the jihadi movement In the
longer run, Bin Laden s death improves the prospects of ending the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. He was a liability for the Taliban who have much greater interest in regaining control over Afghanistan than waging a global jihad. The Taliban will now have an easier time distancing itself

DJHS Debate
from Al Qaeda and reasserting its authority over its remnants. With Bin

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 5 of 26

Laden gone, the global war on terrorism can take another step away from its earlier focus on the battlefield and toward dealing with terrorism through intelligence and police work. Barno 11.[David Barno. US Army Lieutenant General (Ret.) and Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security.The New York
Times. May 2, 2011. Accessed July 17, 2011. A New Kind of Defense. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/02/thewar-on-terror-after-osama-bin-laden/a-new-kind-of-defense]

The death of Osama bin Laden marks the most significant U.S. victory to date in the war on terrorism. Its full consequences may not be known for months or even years, but the violent death of Al Qaeda s leader in Pakistan during a U.S. strike is without s importance came not from his daily direction of Al Qaeda cells around the world, but from the inspiration that his iconic leadership has provided. His image, words and videos have all served to motivate and energize a growing franchise of like-minded, deadly groups. Bin Laden alive could feed and nurture that demand; Bin Laden dead cannot. His death unravels that critical motivational thread, and one that is unlikely to be replaced. Al Qaeda is a brand built on one man s personality and apocalyptic vision, and has just suffered a blow that, over time, may well prove lethal. For now, it remains a deadly, diffused organization -- but
its end may now be more imaginable. question a "game changer."Bin Laden

AFP 11.[AFP. AsiaOne News. June 19, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. Weak Al-Qaeda Could Splinter: Gates.
http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/World/Story/A1Story20110619-284921.html]
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Sunday that Al-Qaeda had been seriously degraded and could split into a set of regional terror groups now

they have been significantly weakened. There's just no two ways about it," Gates told CNN's "State of the Union" program, explaining that bin Laden was not the only Al-Qaeda figure to have been killed recently. "We have taken a real toll on them over the last, particularly the last two years," he said. Al-Qaeda on Thursday named long-time number two Ayman al-Zawahiri as its new leader after bin Laden was killed by US commandos in the dead of night in a May 2 raid on his hideout in Pakistan.Zawahiri has been portrayed by US officials as a pale imitation of bin Laden, someone, they say, who lacks his predecessor's charisma and leadership skills and is also a divisive figure who could fracture Al-Qaeda. "The question is whether Zawahiri, the new leader taking bin Laden's place, can hold these groups together in some kind of a cohesive movement, or whether it begins to splinter, and they become essentially regional terrorist groups that are more focused on regional targets. And we just don't know that yet," Gates said. Nichols 11. [Tristan Nichols. Defence Reporter, British Forces News. British Forces News. May 10, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011.
Petraeus: Al Qaeda Weakened by Bin Laden death. http://bfbs.com/news/afghanistan/petraeus-al-qaeda-weakened-bin-ladendeath-47411.html]
Gen Petraeus said bin Laden's death may make it easier for the Taleban to renounce al Qaeda, a condition for reconciliation talks set by Nato and the Afghan government.Bin Laden's

that Osama bin Laden was gone."First of all,

demise might weaken al Qaeda from within, Gen Petraeus said, because bin Laden's personality and aura were a key for raising money for the world jihad group, and without him, the group's worldwide network might fall apart under his successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri. "Ayman al-Zawahiri is no Osama bin Laden," Gen Petraeus said.

Groups often pldege allegiance to OBL, not al-Qaeda


BBC 2006.[BBC. September 13, 2006. Al Qaeda Issues France Threat . http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5345202.stm] A radical Algerian Islamist group known as the GSPC pledged its allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and vowed to pursue jihad in Algeria, according to a statement posted on the internet on Thursday."We pledge allegiance to sheikh Osama bin Laden... We will pursue our jihad in Algeria. Our soldiers are at his call so that he may strike who and where he likes," said the
statement signed by Abu Mossaab Abdelwadud, the emir of the group.

DJHS Debate
Damage Primarily in More Centralized areas

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 6 of 26

Greenblatt 2011.[Alan Greenblatt. May 3, 2011. GOVERNING Correspondent.NPR. Without Bin Laden, How Dangerous is al
Qaeda? http://www.npr.org/2011/05/03/135953238/without-bin-laden-how-dangerous-is-al-qaida]

"Finding and killing Osama bin Laden is a huge blow to al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, because it shows they're vulnerable even inside Pakistan," says Kori Schake, a defense analyst at West Point and the Hoover Institution. "It will have less effect on al-Qaida cells in Yemen and the Horn of Africa, which seem to operate independently."

Al-Qaeda Isn t Suceeding In Its Attacks


Jacobsen 10.[Anna Jacobsen. Contributing Editor, The Los Angeles Times. The Los Angeles Times. November 8, 2010. Accessed July
18, 2011. Has Al-Qaeda Become the Weak Horse? http://backstory.latimesmagazine.com/2010/11/has-al-qaeda-become-theweak-horse.html]

Five plots to wreak havoc with explosives in the United States have failed spectacularly or been thwarted intelligently in a little over a year. The Christmas Day underwear bomber s weapon fizzled midair on a Delta flight over Detroit.
Then Faisal Shahzad s explosive-packed SUV failed to detonate in Times Square. In February, Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi pled guilty to trying to kill New York subway travelers in a 9/11 anniversary attack. Just last month, two bombs headed from Yemen to Chicago in airplanes wired and set to explode were located before they blew up. All this makes Al Qaeda look not just weak but lame. Is Al Qaeda worried would-be terrorists are shying away? Given the degree to which they have upped their propaganda campaign of late, it appears so. It is not just Gadahn, aka Azzam al-Amriki, who has appeared in high-profile terrorist videos and audio messages in recent days. The American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki on the run from a U.S. presidential kill-or-capture order recently made a recruiting video urging that Americans be killed. (The head of England s MI5 called al-Awlaki the Western world s public enemy number one.) And Al Qaeda s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released an audiotapecalling on Muslims to seek revenge for the U.S. court sentencing of Pakistani scientist Aafia Siddiqui.

Al-Qaeda is Being Weakened


Jenkins 11. [Brian Michael Jenkins. Senior Advisor to the President, RAND Corp. Testimony before the House. June 2011. Accessed
July 19, 2011. Al-Qaeda After Bin Laden: Implications For US Strategy. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT365.pdf]

We have made considerable progress in the past ten years. Al Qaeda s operational capabilities clearly have been degraded. Its leadership has been decimated, its tiny army scattered. It has not been able to launch a major terrorist operation in the West since 2005. But we have not dented its determination to continue its campaign.The death of
bin Laden does not end al Qaeda s global terrorist campaign. The reported elevation of Ayman al-Zawahiri as al Qaeda s leader suggests that bin

likely to be even more decentralized, its threat more diffuse. While he was alive, bin Laden was able to impose aunanimity of focus on his inherently fractious enterprise. No successor will speak with bin Laden s authority. Al Qaeda could become a collection of autonomous field commands, presided over by a central command, united only in its beliefs.

Laden s focus on attacking the United States will continue after his death.Al Qaeda after bin Laden is

DJHS Debate
Al Qaeda is Weaker
Recruiting is Down

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 7 of 26

Greenblatt 2011.[Alan Greenblatt. May 3, 2011. GOVERNING Correspondent.NPR. Without Bin Laden, How Dangerous is al
Qaeda? http://www.npr.org/2011/05/03/135953238/without-bin-laden-how-dangerous-is-al-qaida]

Al-Qaida may now not only be less organized but less able to recruit new members, suggests Richard Fontaine,
a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

DJHS Debate
We are Killing Terrorist Leaders
We Must Kill Leaders to Defeat al Qaeda

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 8 of 26

Hoffman 08. [Bruce Hoffman. Professor, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, and Senior Fellow, US Military s Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Foreign Affairs Magazine. May/June 2008. Accessed July 20, 2011. Th Myth of Grassroots Terrorism. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63408/bruce-hoffman/the-myth-of-grass-roots-terrorism?page=show]
Defeating al Qaeda will require analysis grounded in sound empirical judgment and not blinded by provocative theories, seductive methodologies, or wishful thinking. Moreover, the United States and its allies must refocus their attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al Qaeda began to collapse after 9/11 but has now regrouped. And they must recognize that al Qaeda cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success

will require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities -- that is, continuing to kill or capture senior al Qaeda leaders -- and breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among Sageman's radicalized "bunches of guys." Only by destroying the organization's leadership and disrupting the continued resonance of its radical message can the United States and its allies defeat al Qaeda.

Killing Leaders Has Worked in the past to Weaken Terror Groups


Johnston 11. [Patrick Johnston. Research Fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.Belfer Center. July 2011. Accessed July 25, 2011. Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency Claims. http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/decapitation.pdf]
This consensus is premature. Cumulative knowledge on the e ects of leader removalremains both scant and inconclusive. Contrary to claims

that removing leaders never works, one can point to numerous examples where the imprisonment or death of key militants appears to have played an important role in weakening or defeating militant organizations: The 1992 capture of Shining Path leader Abimeal Guzman, for example, crippled the group s bid for power in Peru; the 1999 capture of Abdullah Ocalan precipitated the decline of the PKK in Turkey; and the collaboration of captured Red Brigades leaders with Italian authorities during the late 1970s led the organization to implode. Moreover, contrary to Pape s assertions, scholars conducting large-N studies have recently found evidence that interstate wars may be more likely to end when leaders are removed. In a study of national leader assassinations between
1952 and 1997,Iqbal and Zorn (2008) nd evidence of a conditional relationship between assassination,leadership succession, and political stability; particularly noteworthy is their ndingthat assassination has had the strongest e ect on political turmoil in countries whoseleadership succession processes or procedures are informal or unregulated. Similarly,a study by Jones and Olken concludes that there is weak evidence that successfulassassination attempts, compared to failed assassination attempts, tend to hastenthe end of intense wars (i.e., wars with greater than 1,000 battle deaths). However,Jones and Olken s results suggest that although the e ect is quite large in magnitude,it is only marginally signi cant; they nd that it is insigni cant when case selectionis restricted to the post World War II period and note that the post-war resultsare di cult to interpret because there were few intense wars after 1946 in theirsample (Jones and Olken, 2009). Likewise, Mannes analysis of terrorist leadershipdecapitation suggests some indication that decapitation strikes can be e ective inreducing terrorist group incidents (2008, 43-44). However, these ndings were neitherstatistically signi cant nor consistent across di erent speci cations.Finally, in amicro-level study of Israeli highvalue targeting during the Second Intifada, MohammedHafez and Joseph Hat eld conclude that Israel s strategy has met with decidedlymixed results: Hafez and Hat eld nd no conclusive evidence that high-value targetinghas either increased or decreased Israel s counterterrorism e ectiveness (Hafez andHat eld, 2006, 371).Taken together, these studies

provide preliminary evidence that leadership decapitation can be e ective. However, there are reasons to believe that leadership decapitation might be even more e ective than these studies suggest. Three primaryreasons are delineated below.

Other Studies of the Success of Killing Leaders Are Flawed Success is Bigger
Johnston 11. [Patrick Johnston. Research Fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.Belfer Center. July 2011. Accessed July 25, 2011. Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency Claims. http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/decapitation.pdf]

DJHS Debate

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 9 of 26

However, there are reasons to believe that leadership decapitation might be even more e ective than these studies suggest. Three primary reasons are delineated below. First, almost every study of leadership decapitation in the security studies literature rests on a no-variance research design.By only examining cases where opposing leaders were captured or killed, these studies cannot by de nition make precise, quali ed inferences about the general e ectiveness of decapitation or the importance of leaders in war. Second, previous research has set the bar unrealistically high for decapitation to be considered a success. Leadership removals have generally been coded as failures unless they led to quick victories or the immediate collapse of insurgent or terrorist organizations. While this may be a reasonable way of assessing the proximate impactof leadership removals, it threatens to lead scholars to neglect leadership decapitation s impact on key factors such as militant organizations cohesion, capacity, morale, and strategies. Third, previous studies have not addressed important methodological issues that stem from the non-random assignment of leadership decapitation in war. Enemy leaders tend to be targeted at key moments of wars, when governments are either more or less likely to win (Fearon and Laitin 2008, 39-42; Jones and Olken 2009).A host of inferential threats, including selection bias and confounding factors, arise from this non-randomness. Failing to account for these issues threatens our ability to identify leadership decapitation s causal e ects.
This article addresses each of these challenges. I employ a data-driven approach tounderstand whether leadership decapitation in uences the dynamics and outcomes ofcounterinsurgency campaigns. This approach is oriented to identifying decapitation scausal impact. To do this, I analyze a large number of cases in which governmentsattempted, successfully or unsuccessfully, to remove top insurgent leaders. Analyzingthe success or failure of attempts to decapitate insurgencies is part of a researchstrategy to use instances of failure to control for successes.Successful and failedattempts are not pre-determined. Attempts fail more often than they succeed, andoften for unforeseen or idiosyncratic reasons. This variation is exploited to constructplausible counterfactual scenarios that enable me to study di erences in the politicaland military outcomes that follow successful and failed attempts.The results

of my analysis demonstrate that removing insurgent leaders has an important impact on counterinsurgency outcomes. In brief, decapitating insurgencies appears to (1) increase the chances of speedy war terminations; (2) enhance the probability of campaign outcomes favorable to the counterinsurgent; (3) reduce the intensity of violent con ict; and (4) reduce insurgent-initiated attacks, such as armed attacks and kidnappings.

Killing Leaders Increases Probability of Terrorist Failure by 27%


Johnston 11. [Patrick Johnston. Research Fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.Belfer Center. July 2011. Accessed July 25, 2011. Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency Claims. http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/decapitation.pdf] The results displayed in Table 3 suggest that campaigns are more likely to end after leadership decapitation. The estimate shown in Column 1 suggests that leadership decapitation increases the probability of war termination by 27 percentage points,with a standard error of 0.079, and the result is signi cant at the one percent level.This result is
robust: The estimates displayed in Columns 2, 3, and 4 range from0.249 to 0.290, and all of the speci cations are signi cant at the one percent level.Moreover, in each speci cation, the lower bound of the 95 percent con dence intervalof the estimate is above zero. These change little when attempt type or region xede ects are included. They are also robust to non-parametric modeling; in each of thenon-parametric speci cations, the results are signi cant at the one percent level.

DJHS Debate

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 10 of 26

DJHS Debate
Drone Strikes Good
Drones Important in Fighting Terror

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 11 of 26

Katrandijan 11.[Olivia Katrandijan. Staff Writer, ABC News. ABC News. June 4, 2011. Accessed July 20, 2011. Al Qaeda Leader Reported Killed By US Missile Attack in Pakistan.
If true, it would be another giant coup for U.S. intelligence. Unlike bin Laden, who was hiding in a compound, U.S. officials say, Kashmiri was actively involved in plotting and directing attacks.According to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who is in the region, the American drone-fired missile strikes have played a crucial role in the war on terror. "First of all it has to be acknowledged that these drones have played a significant role in taking a lot of Taliban leaders and trainers off the table," Gates told ABC News.

Number of Strike Casualties Exaggerated


Williams 11. [Brian Glyn Williams. Associate Professor of History, University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth.Combating Terrorism Center. March 1, 2011. Accuracy of the U.S. Drone Campaign: The Views of a Pakistani General. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/accuracy-of-the-u-s-drone-campaign-the-views-of-a-pakistani-general]
In all of the above cases, those citing high civilian casualties have not explained their methodology for accumulating data, and they have only pointed to confidential Pakistani government statements. Yet a careful analysis

of the Pakistani media s own accounts of drone strikes reveals a striking contradiction. In most specific cases when a drone strike occurs, Pakistani sources describe the majority of victims as militants, not civilians. A case-by-case analysis of Pakistani and Western reports of drone strikes by this author and two colleagues at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth found that a mere 5% of the victims of drone strikes were described as civilians in press accounts.[9] A study by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann at the New America Foundation similarly found that in 2010 approximately 6% of those killed in drone strikes were listed as civilians in media reports.[10] Research completed by The Long War Journal on drone strikes from 2004-2011 indicates thatapproximately 108 civilians were killed in drone strikes while 1,816 Taliban and al-Qa`ida extremists were killed their study also relied on press reports.

Civilian Casualties Minimal Mostly Militants Killed


Williams 10. [Brian Glyn Williams. Associate Professor of History, University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth.The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor. November 11, 2010. New Light on the Accuracy of CIA s Predator Drone Campaign in Pakistan.http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37165&cHash=225c88ad12] According to our database, as of June 19, 2010, there have been a total of 144 confirmed CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, killing a total of 1,372 people. Of those killed, only 68 (or 4.95%) could be clearly identified as civilians, while 1,098 (or 80%) were reported to be militants or suspected militants (see Figure 4). As these terms are used somewhat interchangeably by the Pakistani press, we simply classified all of them as suspected militants. This category of suspected militants includes 50 high value targets that is, al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, whether local commanders or senior militant chiefs. The status of the remaining 206 (or 15% of) individuals killed in drone strikes could not be ascertained, and consequently they were assigned to the category unknown. The inclusion of this
indeterminate category is admittedly frustrating but unavoidable given the limited and sometimes contradictory reports emanating from the

It is important to stress, however, that even if every single unknown is assumed to in fact be a civilian, the vast majority of fatalities would remain suspected militants rather than civilians indeed, by more than a 4:1 ratio. [3] On the more precise count of civilians (leaving unknowns aside), we found an even more imbalanced ratio of approximately 16.5 suspected militant fatalities for each civilian death. [4] Equally striking, we found a 1.36 to 1 (or close to 1 to 1) ratio of civilians to high value target fatalities (in stark contrast with
inaccessible tribal areas. Mir s 49 to 1 report). Finally, in contrast to Mir s report of 123 civilian casualties in January 2010 (with only 3 al-Qaeda targets killed), we found 0

DJHS Debate
civilians, 85 suspected militants and 16 unknowns killed in that month.

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 12 of 26

We also wanted to be careful to address any concerns that Western papers, including those of record like the New York Times and the Washington Post, might be underreporting civilian casualties, and that by relying at times on their stories we were introducing a downward bias into that element of our data. We therefore ran a second analysis, applying the same categories and criteria solely to the Pakistani news sources (specifically,

We found reports of 1,061 suspected militants killed, 48 civilians, and 251 unknowns, for a ratio of 22.1:1:5.2. Although some ambiguity is suggested by the slightly higher number of unknowns, the lower absolute number of civilians in the Pakistani data along with the higher proportion of suspected militants to civilians indicates that, if anything, leading Western news sources are leaning towards over-reporting the number of civilian casualties and underreporting suspected militants killed, at least in relation to representative local news sources. At any rate, we take this result based solely on Pakistani data to reinforce our main finding of a surprisingly high reported rate of suspected militant fatalities to civilians, particularly in the light of a number of widely circulated stories sharply to the contrary.
Dawn, The Daily Times and The News). The results were even more striking.

As number of drone strikes has increased, number of civilian deaths has decreased
Williams 10. [Brian Glyn Williams. Associate Professor of History, University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth.The Jamestown
Foundation Terrorism Monitor. November 11, 2010. New Light on the Accuracy of CIA s Predator Drone Campaign in Pakistan.http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37165&cHash=225c88ad12]

Our data also revealed that despite a substantial intensification of the Predator strikes starting in 2008 and accelerating through 2009 into 2010, and the broadening of target categories to include low level Pakistani Taliban, the ratio of suspected militant to civilian fatalities has remained steadily high and has gradually (if unevenly) improved. [6] After incremental increases in attacks from one in 2004 and three in 2005, 2006 and 2007, strikes escalated drastically to 33 in 2008, 54 in 2009 and 30 in the first three months of 2010 alone (See Figure 3). Still, far from showing a reduction of accuracy as the campaign has accelerated, our data shows that the ratio of suspected militant to civilian deaths has improved from the approximate 6:1 and 7.8:1 ratios that characterized 2004 and 2006 respectively, to 13:1 in 2005 and 14.067:1 in 2008, peaking in 2007 and 2010 (up to June 19) when no confirmed civilian deaths were reported (see Figure 2). [7]

DJHS Debate
Lower Threat of Terrorism
Counter Terror Efforts Have Decreased Threat, But it Still Exists

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 13 of 26

Clarke 10. [Richard A. Clarke. Former US National Security Advisor.The Washington Post.May 9, 2010. Accessed July 17, 2011. The
Times Square Bomb Failed. What will we do when the next bomb works? http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR2010050702257.html]
On Christmas Day, a 23-year-old Nigerian engineering student allegedly tried to destroy an airplane flying into Detroit. One week ago, an American citizen of Pakistani origin allegedly attempted to detonate a car bomb in New York's Times Square. Neither effort succeeded -- not because U.S. authorities intercepted the attackers, but because the bombmaking skills of the wannabe terrorists were lacking. In both instances, much of the subsequent debate has centered on how the attacks were able to get as far as they did. The unfortunate fact is thatsuch cases

represent a kind of terrorism that is virtually impossible to disrupt. These attempts will continue, and from time to time one of them will succeed, with many dead and injured. The more relevant question, therefore, is: How will we respond when that car bomb does go off? Third,it is an objective and undeniable fact that U.S. counterterrorism efforts have reduced the overall threat from what it was a few years ago. So we must not assume that a successful attack indicates that our antiterrorism efforts have, on balance, failed. We will hold on to what is working and be agile in response to evolving threats.

DJHS Debate
Assists US Mission in Middle East
Killing Bin Laden Makes Taliban Cooperation Easier

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 14 of 26

Nichols 11. [Tristan Nichols. Defence Reporter, British Forces News. British Forces News. May 10, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011.
Petraeus: Al Qaeda Weakened by Bin Laden death. http://bfbs.com/news/afghanistan/petraeus-al-qaeda-weakened-bin-ladendeath-47411.html]
The US military commander in Afghanistan says the killing of Osama bin Laden may weaken al Qaeda's influence on the Afghan Taliban.But

General David Petraeus warned that Afghanistan is still a potential refuge for international terror groups, and al Qaeda is just one of
those.He also warned that the April 29 US raid that killed the al Qaeda leader in his Pakistani compound did not spell the end of the Nato battle in Afghanistan.The mission began one month after the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington with the aim of wiping out al Qaeda and bin Laden.Nato officials have said they do not intend to speed up their withdrawal just because al Qaeda's leader is gone, but the military feels it may bring the Taliban closer to negotiations with the Afghan government.Gen Petraeus said the strong link between al Qaeda and the Taliban was personal, not organisational. "The deal between the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda was between Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, not the organisations," he said as he visited US troops in eastern Afghanistan. Gen Petraeus said bin Laden's death may make it easier for the Taleban to renounce al Qaeda, a condition for reconciliation talks set by Nato and the Afghan government.

Fisher 11.[Max Fisher. Associate Editor, The Atlantic. The Atlantic. May 2, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. How Bin Laden s Death
Could Help End the Afghan War. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/how-bin-ladens-death-could-helpend-the-afghan-war/238191/]
Though Obama appears determined to end the Afghan War, as of 24 hours ago he still faced two significant obstacles: a U.S. political and cultural dynamic unready to declare an end to hostilities with the Taliban, and a Taliban that may have been ideologically incapable of breaking with alQaeda's mandate for endless, existential war against the U.S. and accepting peace.Both sides of the conflict understand the general framework of peace -- government participation for the Taliban, persistent if lower-scale U.S. presence, and breaking the Taliban from al-Qaeda -- but are restrained by their own domestic politics. Bin Laden's death will loosen those restraints and make both the U.S. and Taliban more able to sell their people on peace. The Taliban may not be a democratic organization, but, like all insurgencies, it is utterly dependent on the active support and participation not just of its fighters but of their communities and the communities of Afghan villages on and off the front lines. That grassroots support is largely incumbent on expelling foreign militaries and reclaiming Islamist governance in Kabul -- issues that have nothing to do with al-Qaeda's global mission -but the Taliban could not maintain their support if they crossed bin Laden.The al-Qaeda leader has been an inspiring and galvanizing force for Afghan fighters since in the 1980s Soviet invasion, long before the Taliban even existed, and remains a crucial recruiting tool in the ongoing war. But bin Laden would never have accepted peace, which means the Taliban was unable to sell many of its rank-and-file on a negotiated settlement.

Bin Laden's death could "free up" the Taliban's options in Afghanistan, says al-Qaeda expert and former Australian counterterrorism official Leah Farrall. "Bin Laden's profile has been so much higher than anyone else's in al-Qaeda, so with him gone, that organization will continue but it's going to have a bit of strategic uncertainty. And that just gives the Taliban some space. It also gives them some deniability as well." With alQaeda's most high-profile leader gone, and the Taliban's closest link to the group severed, the Taliban leadership will have a much easier time claiming whatever ideological guidance from al-Qaeda it wants. "I think the Taliban's very much got the withdrawal date in its sight, and that's what directs their action."
"They're not going to condemn or publicly disassociate themselves from al-Qaeda in a way that challenges al-Qaeda's legitimacy," Farrall says, but "having Bin Laden out of the way does them give them a little bit more room for maneuver." Bin Laden's hard line against the U.S. and against peace made it difficult for the Taliban to justify."I do think they were fenced in" by bin Laden, "and the

one that's always come out about bin Laden, particularly with regards to the Taliban, is that no one could control him."

DJHS Debate

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 15 of 26

Rogin 2011.[Joshua Rogin. Staff Writer, Congressional Quarterly. Foreign Policy. May 4, 2011. Clinton: Taliban more likely to
negotiate after bin Laden death. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/04/clinton_taliban_more_likely_to_negotiate_after_bin_laden_death]
"In Afghanistan, we have to continue to take the fight to al Qaeda and its Taliban allies. Perhaps now they will take seriously the work that we are doing on trying to have some reconciliation process that resolves the insurgency," Clinton said on Wednesday to a conference of editorial writers at the State Department. "So our message to the Taliban hasn't changed; it just has even greater resonance today. They can't wait us out, they can't defeat us; they need to come into the political process and denounce al Qaeda and renounce violence and agree to abide by the laws and

that bin Laden's death would make al Qaeda and the Taliban more likely to strike a deal in Afghanistan because they will have no grand leader to rally around."Well, a lot of people say, well, [bin
Laden's deputy Ayman] al-Zawahiri will step into it. But that's not so clear. He doesn't have the same sense of loyalty or inspiration or track record," she said. "I mean, bin Laden was viewed as a military warrior. He had fought in Afghanistan. He wasn't an intellectual. He wasn't just a talker. He had been a fighter, so he carried with him a quite significant mystique." "The Taliban did not give up al Qaeda when President Bush asked them to after 9/11, because ofMullah Omar's

constitution of Afghanistan."Clinton said

personal relationship with bin Laden. That's gone, so I think it opens up possibilities for dealing with the Taliban that did not exist before."

Easier to End War in Afghanistan


Reuters 11. [Reuters News.Thomson Reuters Foundation. May 3, 2011. Accessed July 20, 2011. Bin Laden May Hasten Afghan
Settlement. http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-bin-laden-death-may-hasten-afghan-settlement/]

Osama bin Laden's death helps clear the way for a political settlement in Afghanistan by making it easier for the Taliban to sever ties with al Qaeda. But many other obstacles remain in reaching a negotiated end to the Afghan war, including regional rivalry and competing demands of different groups inside Afghanistan."Things are falling into their correct place," said one Pakistani official, who declined to be named. "Osama bin Laden's killing may lead us towards an end-game." "...it will be easier for the Taliban to distance itself from al Qaeda after bin Laden's death," Gilles Dorronsoro wrote in a post at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In a report which has acquired new relevance after bin Laden's death, international experts at The Century Foundation said in March one way to make the break would be for the Taliban to declare an end to the more than 30 years of jihad in Afghanistan which began with the Soviet invasion in 1979. In a post on The Century Foundation website, foreign policy specialist Jeffrey Laurenti said the death of bin Laden, with whom Mullah Omar had shared personal ties, made that easier. "The Taliban inner circle has long debated the wisdom of the movement's alignment with al Qaeda, but the high esteem in which the Taliban 'commander of the faithful', Mullah Mohammed Omar, was said to hold bin Laden as a pious Muslim warrior has long been decisive in squelching any talk of a divorce," he said. "We cannot know if Mullah Omar's determination not to betray bin Laden will prove as fierce for any successor."

DJHS Debate
Al-Qaeda Will Not Have Huge Retaliation
No New Terrorist Attacks That Wouldn t Have Happened Anyways

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 16 of 26

Jenkins 11. [Brian Michael Jenkins. Senior Advisor to the President, RAND Corp. National Journal.May 12, 2011. Accessed July 19,
2011. Al-Qaeda After Bin Laden. http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/12/NJ.html]
Al Qaeda will seek to carry out some dramatic act of revenge eventually to demonstrate to its foes, and more importantly its followers that bin Laden's death does not end the terrorist campaign. But al Qaeda would be doing exactly the same thing had bin Laden not been killed.Meanwhile,

take longer to prepare. Al Qaeda operates at capacity, attacking when it can. It has no terrorist reserves waiting to be ordered into battle. For now, al Qaeda's warnings of revenge will remain the realm of rhetoric. Whatever it eventually succeeds in doing will be labeled as retaliation, but there will be no new terrorist attack that otherwise would not have occurred.

bin Laden's death may inspire spontaneous attacks by self-proclaimed jihadists anywhere in the world, but planned terrorist attacks

Blowback Theory: No Increase in Al Qaeda Membership


Sanger 10. [David E. Sanger. Chief Washington Correspondent, The New York Times. The New York Times. June 30, 2010. Accessed
July 26, 2011. New Estimate of Strength of Al Qaeda is Offered. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/world/asia/01qaeda.html]

Michael E. Leiter, one of the country s top counterterrorism officials, said Wednesday that American intelligence officials now estimated that there were somewhat more than 300 Qaeda leaders and fighters hiding in Pakistan s tribal areas, a rare public assessment of the strength of the terrorist group that is the central target of President Obama s war strategy. Taken together with the recent estimate by the C.I.A. director, Leon E. Panetta, that there are about 50 to 100 Qaeda operatives now in Afghanistan, American intelligence agencies believe that there are most likely fewer than 500 members of the group in a region where the United States has poured nearly 100,000 troops. Silverstein 06.[Ken Silverstein. Washington Editor, Harper s Magazine. Harper s Magazine. July 5, 2006. Accessed July 26, 2011.
The Al-Qaeda Clubhouse: Members lacking. http://harpers.org/archive/2006/07/sb-al-qaeda-new-members-badly-needed1151963690]
Two years ago, I interviewed Jack Cloonan, a 25-year veteran of the FBI who,

between 1996 and 2002, served on a

joint CIA FBI task force that tracked bin Laden.

How many members of Al Qaeda do you think there are? he asked me. Cloonan

laughed when I pegged its membership at several thousand. The real numbers, he said, are miniscule.

Documents discovered by the joint task force, Cloonan said, showed that Al Qaeda had 72 members when it was founded in 1989. Twelve years later, the task force got its hands on an updated membership list after a CIA Predator destroyed a building near Kabul during the American invasion of Afghanistan. The membership list was discovered in the rubble, along with dozens of casualties, including Mohammed Atef, one of bin Laden's closest aides. It showed that bin Laden had a grand total of precisely 198 sworn loyalists. (Hirsh's Newsweek article said that the intelligence
community generally agrees that the number of true A-list Al Qaeda operatives at the time of 9/11 probably between 500 and 1,000, most of them in and around Afghanistan.)

A lot of people went through Al Qaeda training camps over the years, said Cloonan, but that doesn't mean they have sworn allegiance to bin Laden or taken part in terrorist acts.

DJHS Debate
Countries Have Still Gone Nuclear
Countries Go Nuclear for Strategic Advantage

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 17 of 26

Katz 07. [J.I. Katz. Professor of Physics, Washington University in St. Louis.Washington University in St. Louis. November 12, 2007.
Accessed July 19, 2011. Lessons Learned From Nonproliferation Successes and Failures. http://wuphys.wustl.edu/~katz/ctbt.pdf]
Two facts from this table are apparent. One is that each country that went nuclear did so for strategic reasons, either because it was afraid (withgreater or lesser justi cation) of an adversary or because it wished to use thepower of nuclear weapons for strategic advantage. There is, of course, a greyarea between these two motives. There is no evidence that weapons testing or development by powers that are not perceived as adversaries has any e ect on proliferation. Nor is it plausible that further weapons development by great powers with large arsenals and technically mature programs would have any e ect on a perceived need to develop a modest number of probably technically primitive weapons by a country whose strategic imperatives are local or regional. O cial

1998 the Indian Foreign O ce stated It is because of the continuing threat posed to India by the deployment, overtly or covertly, of nuclearweapons in the lands and seas adjoining us that we have been forced to carryout these tests. Pakistan s Foreign Secretary stated The fact of our existence as the neighbour of an expansionist and a hegemonistic power taughtus...that we must search for security...The answer lay in credible deterrence. Even North Korea defended its test It will contribute to defending the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the area around it. Each ofthese statements is, of course, a completely one-sided description of the political situation, but each is also frank acknowledgement that the purposeof developing nuclear weapons was to strengthen their possessor against itsrivals and enemies.The second striking fact is that there is no evident correlation between the dates at which countries obtained
their rst bombs and the USA/UK/Russia test moratorium (amounting to a de facto CTBT) beginning in 1992 or the adherence of France and China

statements from proliferators support this conclusion. For example, in

The second roundof Indian tests in 1998 (India, rather dubiously, claimed that its 1974 testwas not of a bomb, though one wonders what else to call a device that isbelieved to have yielded about 12 Kilotons) followed the adherence to themoratorium of its strongest strategic adversary and preceded the tests of itsother major adversary. Pakistan s only round of tests was clearly in responseto India s, which it followed by weeks, and its rst bomb preceded those testsby an uncertain period of time, perhaps a decade.
to the moratorium in 1996.

Joffe 11.[Josef Joffe. Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations, Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Foreign Affairs.
January/February 2011. Accessed July 20, 2011. Less than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble. http://www.ipw.unisg.ch/org/ipw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/News+2011+Davis+Joffe+FOREIGN+AFFAIRS/$FILE/LTZfinal.pdf]
After China's decision, however, the "bad example" theory of proliferation explains only part of the story at best. India, the next official nuclear

effort was not mere competitive emulation of China's nuclear status; it was also designed to offset China's conventional military superiority. Second, it was driven by concerns over India's rivalry with Pakistan, with which India had fought three wars since 1947. A similar regional military calculus lay behind Pakistan's decision to go nuclear in 1998. Israel may have been practicing "proportional deterrence" against the Soviet Union during the Yom Kippur War -- hence then Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's purported quip that "it is just as far from Tel Aviv to Moscow as from Moscow to Tel Aviv" -- but the principal purpose of Israel's bomb was to neutralize the Arabs' superior strength on the conventional battlefield.Saddam Hussein's Iraq was staring firmly at Iran when it embarked on its nuclear weapons program. The shah laid the groundwork for an Iranian program by ordering four German nuclear power reactors in 1975 -- with an eye on his neighbors, especially Iraq. Nuclear weapons offered Iran a nice shortcut to regional primacy, which is the most important reason the shah's successors in the Islamic Republic have continued his efforts -- to dominate the Arab states, deter (or destroy) Israel, and devalue the conventional superiority of the United States. Did Pyongyang reach for the bomb because Moscow and Washington had thousands of them? More likely, dreams of intimidating local rivals such as South Korea and Japan came first and foremost. Then, North Korea learned
an interesting lesson: the mere process of proliferation was laden with wondrous profits. A reactor here and a fizzled nuclear explosion there paid

power, was surely eyeing Beijing. But the Indian nuclear

DJHS Debate
economic gain.The main focus

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 18 of 26

huge dividends, and North Korea, as a nuclear "rogue state," garnered the solicitous attention of many other powers. Washington's bribes of oil and food deliveries were flanked by its offers of civilian nuclear assistance; never has nuisance value been parlayed so profitably into political and

of all proliferators since China, in short, has been regional. As the Duelfer report, based on the debriefing of captured Iraqi officials following the Iraq war by the Iraq Survey Group, revealed, Saddam had not armed against Israel, let alone against any of the official nuclear powers: "Saddam's rationale for the possession of [weapons of mass destruction] derived from a need for survival and domination . . . particularly regarding Iran."

Numerous Failures to Prevent Nations from Pursuing Nukes


Katz 2007. [Jonathon I. Katz. Professor of Physics at Washington University.Washington University Department of Physics.
November 12, 2007. Lessons Learned From Nonproliferation Successes and Failures . http://wuphys.wustl.edu/~katz/ctbt.pdf]
There have been a number of nonproliferation successes (Germany, Iraq, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Libya, Syria) and failures

(USSR, France, China, India, Pakistan, probably Israel, North Korea [DPRK]), and at least one potential proliferator (Iran) whose future is uncertain. The successes are heterogeneous: some resulted from direct military or paramilitary
action, while others followed changes in the political situation that removed the strategic rationale for or the willingness to pay the economic and political price of proliferation. The failures have in common a proliferator that perceived a compelling strategic need for nuclear weapons. Such countries resist outside pressures, and may reap the benefits of proliferation even if their weapons are untested.

Younger 2009.[Stephen M. Younger. Staff Writer, WallStreet Journal. Wall Street Journal. January 10, 2009. Taming the Nuclear
Dragon .http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123154631955669739.html]
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970, signed by 190 countries, was intended to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and ultimately create a bomb-free world. It will come up for review next year and it is in serious danger of unraveling.North Korea has done a masterful job of stalling the reversal of its weapons program, and Iran steadfastly refuses to allow inspectors into its nuclear facilities. Pakistan celebrated its 1998 nuclear test as a demonstration of an "Islamic Bomb," a frightening prospect given the current violence in Gaza. Never has nuclear proliferation -- and the treaty that for nearly four decades has kept it in check -- been a more serious issue on the world agenda.

The most important element of the NPT is the promise by nations without nuclear weapons not to develop them. In exchange, they receive assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology for energy, medicine and industry. The existing nuclear states -- the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China -- agreed to "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Only

India, Israel and Pakistan declined to participate. (North Korea signed, but then withdrew in 2003 and conducted a nuclear test in 2006.) Many countries are now capable of creating their own bombs and some believe that they need them to deter attacks from neighbors. Toon 07.[Owen B. Toon. Professor at the University of Colorado. March 2, 2007. Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts .http://bilge.pyrate.mailbolt.com/20070313ConsequencesOfRegionalNuclearConflicts.pdf] Eight nations are known to have nuclearweapons. In addition, North Korea may havea small, but growing, arsenal. Iran appears tobe seeking nuclear weapons capability, butit probably needs several years to obtainenough fissionablematerial. Of great concern, 32 other nations includingBrazil, Argentina, Japan, South Korea, andTaiwan have sufficient fissionable materials to produce weapons. A de factonuclear arms race has emerged in Asiabetween China, India, and Pakistan, whichcould expand to include North Korea, SouthKorea, Taiwan, and Japan. In the Middle East, a nuclear confrontation between Israeland Iran would be fearful. Saudi Arabia andEgypt could also seek nuclear weapons tobalance Iran and Israel. Nuclear arms programs in South America, notably in Braziland Argentina, were ended by several
treaties in the 1990s. We can hope that theseagreements will hold and will serve as amodel for other regions, despite Brazil s new,large uranium enrichment facilities.

DJHS Debate
Peaceful Nuke Program = Stepping Stone to Nuclear Power

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 19 of 26

Alger 09. [Justin Alger. Researcher and Administrator, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance. Centre for International Governance
Innovation. September 2009. Accessed July 26, 2011. From Nuclear Energy to the Bomb: The Proliferation Potential of New Nuclear Energy Programs. http://www2.carleton.ca/cctc/ccms/wp-content/ccms-files/Nuclear_Energy_Futures-6.pdf]
Pakistan was highly dependent on outside knowledgeand assistance while building a nuclear device. india,likewise, received training and technology from the usand Canada, including a research reactor that was usedto produce the material for india s 1974 nuclear test. France supported Israel s nuclear program by providing technology and equipment during the 1950s, leading tothe eventual development of the Israeli nuclear bomb.Further, North Korea received assistance from the sovietunion, which included a research reactor, and was latersupplied clandestinely by Pakistan which led to its eventual detonation of a nuclear device in 2006. in addition,south Africa received a research reactor and the highenriched uranium required to fuel it from the unitedstates, an act viewed as the genesis of its nuclear program.Every case of

successful nuclear weapons development since the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into effect in 1970 occurred under the guise of apeaceful nuclear program with the assistance of nuclearsupplier states.Most transfers of nuclear technology, however, do notinvolve sensitive fuel cycle technology. importing reactorsand the knowledge to build
and operate them is notsufficient for a state to move into weapons development.The state must acquire an independent enrichment orreprocessing capability, or obtain weapons grade fissile material from another source. Pakistan, israel and NorthKorea all had the benefit of assistance with sensitive fuelcycle technologies from a nuclear supplier.india, on theother hand, used nuclear technology and expertisegained from American and Canadian assistance prior to1974 to autonomously develop a reprocessing capability.The indian and south African cases demonstrate that evenwithout direct assistance with enrichment or reprocessingtechnology, a state can use an otherwise peaceful nuclearinfrastructure to simplify its path towards a nuclear device.The scientific knowledge,

expertise and infrastructure required for a peaceful nuclear energy program can provide an opportunity for a state to develop enrichmentand reprocessing technologies. in the context of latentproliferation, a peaceful nuclear energy program isbest characterized as a stepping stone to acquiring thewherewithal for a nuclear device.

DJHS Debate
NPT is ineffective
Too Weak and Inflexible Cannot Easily Be Amended w/ Teeth

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 20 of 26

Sokolski 10. [Henry Sokolski. Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. May 2010. Accessed July 19, 2011. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty s Untapped Potential to Prevent Proliferation.
Finally, in the practical world, the NPT hardly admits of modification and is far too easy for violating states to withdraw from. Under Article X, treaty members are free to leave the NPT with no more than 3 months notice merely by filing a statement of the extraordinary events [relating to the subject matter of the treaty] it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. As North Korea demonstrated with its withdrawal from the NPT, these slight requirements are all too easy to meet. As for amending the treaty, it is nearly impossible. Not only must a majority of NPT members ratify any proposed amendments, but every member of the IAEA government board and every NPT nuclear weapons state member must ratify the proposal as well, and this is only to get amendments for consideration by those states that have not yet ratified the NPT. Ultimately, any state that chooses

not to so ratify is free to ignore the amendment, and the treaty

is functionally unamendable.

Countries Can Still Get Building Blocks Of Nukes Even Following Treaty
Sokolski 10. [Henry Sokolski. Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. May 2010. Accessed July 19, 2011. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty s Untapped Potential to Prevent Proliferation. seen effectively as a legal instrument that enables nations to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Former President George W. Bush highlighted this in a February 2004 nuclear nonproliferation speech in which he argued that the NPT had created a loophole in promoting all aspects of civilian nuclear technology including nuclear fuel making. This allowed proliferating states to cynically manipulate the treaty to develop and acquire nearly all the technology and materials they needed to make nuclear weapons. President Bush attempted to shore up the NPT by calling on
the world s nonweapons states that have not yet developed nuclear fuel making to foreswear such activities and to allow more intrusive civilian nuclear inspections in exchange for their assured access to nuclear fuel from those states now producing enriched uranium. Bush s appeal, however, was hardly successful: Australia, Canada, South African, For all of these reasons, the NPT is not just seen as being weak against violators and difficult to improve, but it is

Iran, and Argentina, among other states, were unwilling to give up their right to make nuclear fuel. Then, in September 2007, Israel bombed a covert Syrian nuclear reactor that was under
construction. This act of violence, which followed months of intelligence consultations with the United States, was a clear vote of no confidence in the IAEA nuclear inspections system.

Litman 06.[Leah Litman. Supreme Court Clerk, Justice Anthony Kennedy. Harvard International Review. May 6, 2006. Accesed July
20, 2011. Dirty Bombs and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. http://hir.harvard.edu/development-and-modernization/cleaninghouse?page=0,1]

Other NPT loopholes allow for supply-side proliferation, namely the sale of radioactive materials to other states for defense purposes. This is the justification Russia uses in its current arms sales to Iran, in particular the recent agreement, totaling US$7 billion in defense transactions toward the establishment of a defensive missile system. Russian President Vladimir Putin defended the sale in an Iran Times article by stating, Iran has a right to defend itself. Russia has also sold Iran laser enrichment technology for the alleged purpose of nuclear power experimentation. This enrichment technology has the potential to convert non-radioactive elements into radioactive material that could be used in dirty bombs.

NPT can be used as a cover


Scheinman 2005.[Lawrence Scheinman.Top Arms Control Official in the Clinton administration.Council on Foreign Relations. January 27, 2005. Iran, North Korea, and NPT s Loopholes. http://www.cfr.org/iran/scheinman-iran-north-korea-nptsloopholes/p7661]

DJHS Debate
Lawrence Scheinman, a top arms control official in the Clinton administration, says he is concerned that Iran is is more serious, he says, because it raises a question about whether a country can use a

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 21 of 26

using the cover of the 35-year old Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to develop nuclear weapons. Scheinman
says an NPT review conference in May will likely focus on Iran s program, though participants will also discuss North Korea as well. The Iranian case

civil cover in order to acquire all the technology necessary from outside to put together a comprehensive fuel cycle, claiming that it s for civil purposes, and then exercise the right of withdrawal under the treaty and say, Sorry, things have changed and we re going to use this for weapons, thank you.

Nuclear Smuggling Has Increased


Jones 2002. [Gary L. Jones. Director of the Natural Sources and Environment Department.Government Accountability Office. July 30, 2002. Nuclear Nonproliferation: US Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling . http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02989t.pdf]
The threat presented by nuclear smuggling is serious and poses national security concerns. Illicit trafficking

in or smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials occurs worldwide and has reportedly increased in recent years. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as of December 31, 2001, there have been 181 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials since 1993. A significant number of cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material a dirty bomb to spread contamination over a wide area. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across a country s
border through a variety of means: they can be hidden in a car; train; or ship; carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an unprotected border.

Easier to Steal if More Countries Have Weapons


Allison 2007. [Graham Allison. Director of Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.Council on Foreign
Relations. How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack On the United States? http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likelynuclear-terrorist-attack-united-states/p13097]
We should ask ourselves every day: Are nuclear materials that could fuel a terrorist s bomb more or less secure than they were a year ago? Thanks to initiatives like the Nunn-Lugar program, highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia are far safer from theft today than they were in the

will buy or steal nuclear material from a rogue state increases as more countries acquire the ability to produce weapons-usable material. Therefore it is vitally important to roll back North Korea s
nuclear program and to constrain Iran before it reaches its enrichment finish line. By becoming a nuclear-armed state, each will trigger a cascade of proliferation in its neighborhood

early 1990s. But the risk that terrorists

Terrorists Can Easily Obtain HEU


Gard 2008.[Lt. Gen. Robert Gard. Senior Military Fellow. Center For Arms Control and Nonproliferation. May 10,2008. Nuclear
Terrorism is a Likely Event . http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/nuclear_terrorism_likely_event/]

could obtain the key ingredient for making a nuclear bomb, plutonium (Pu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU).While producing a weapon with Pu is a relatively complex task, there is consensus in the scientific community that it would not be difficult for a terrorist group to produce an explosive device similar to the one used on Hiroshima, with as little as 50 pounds of HEU.The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated in its 2007 report that there are 1,400-2,000 tons of HEU, enough for some 56,000-80,000 nuclear weapons, spread around the world.Much of the HEU is in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, known to have weak security regulations and widespread corruption.

It is more likely that terrorists

NPT enforcement is really, really slow

DJHS Debate

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 22 of 26

Pollack 10.[Joshua Pollack. Consultant to the United States Government.Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. June 2, 2010. Accessed July 20, 2011. What nonproliferation diplomacy can and can t achieve. http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/joshuapollack/what-nonproliferation-diplomacy-can-and-cant-achieve]
It goes without saying that the process takes patience and commitment. But it has taken a special brand of patience to create an effective sanctions regime in response to Iran's noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) opened

its investigation of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear activities in late 2002, but not until September 2005 PDF did the IAEA Board of Governors formally declare Iran to be in noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards and place the matter on the docket of the U.N. Security Council. Even then, the better part of another year elapsed before the Security Council adopted itsfirst resolution PDF on Iran's nuclear program, demanding the suspension of all activities related to enrichment or reprocessing. Faced with Iran's refusal to accept the demand as legitimate, the Security Council adopted three additional resolutions over three consecutive years (i.e., 2006 PDF, 2007 PDF, 2008 PDF) imposing limited sanctions. In September 2008, the Security Council, divided over the merits of additional penalties, adopted a fifth resolution PDF that merely affirmed what had come before. Progress has been slow by any standard. After many delays, the Security Council is only now approaching a fourth round of sanctions. The draft resolution PDF recently agreed upon by the permanent members of the
Security Council does not threaten any of the oil and gas or nuclear power deals that Iran has arranged with its trade partners, but authorizes new interdiction measures and creates new obstacles for imports of conventional arms, missile tests, and the financing of proliferation. Meanwhile,

Iran shows no inclination to meet the demands of the Security Council, insisting that it enjoys an unconditional right to enrichment and reprocessing under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). So why, despite Iran's record of
concealment and intransigence, has it been this difficult to reach a consensus on sanctions?

NPT effectiveness has decreased


World at Risk 08[Commission on thePrevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction of Proliferation and Terrorism. 2008. World at
Risk: Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism. http://www.preventwmd.org/world_at_risk_nuclear_proliferation_and_terrorism/]

Among the other tests facing the IAEA is the inherent difficulty of reliably detecting dangerous illicit nuclear activities in a timely fashion. Some of these difficulties such as detecting military diversions from nuclear fuel cycle activities are not likely to be remedied no matter how much the IAEA s resources are increased. In the past 20 years, while the amount of safeguarded nuclear material usable for weapons (highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium) has increased by a factor of 6 to 10, the budget for safeguards has not kept pace and there are actually fewer inspections per safeguarded facility than before. In addition to limited resources, the IAEA lacks clear authority to secure nuclear material and install near-real-time surveillance at the sites it inspects, or to conduct the wide-area surveillance needed to monitor activities under the Additional Protocol. Dysfunctional and nontransparent national accounting practices and national procedures for inventorying nuclear materials further limit the IAEA s effectiveness, especially when coupled with the agency s increasing inability to meet its timely detection goals.

Russia Has Loose Nukes


CFR 06.[Center on Foreign Relations. January 2006. Loose Nukes .http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-terrorism/loose-nukes/p9549]

collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 27,000 nuclear weapons and enough weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to triple that number. Since, severe economic distress, rampant crime, and widespread corruption in Russia and other former Soviet countries have fed concerns in the West about loose nukes, underpaid nuclear scientists, and the smuggling of nuclear materials. Security at Russia s nuclear storage sites remains worrisome. The former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan where the Soviets based many of their nuclear warheads safely returned their Soviet nuclear weapons to post-communist Russia in the 1990s, but all three countries still have stockpiles of

Mainly in Russia.Before its

DJHS Debate

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 23 of 26

weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Ukraine and Kazakhstan also have nuclear power plants the byproducts of which cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb but might tempt terrorists trying to make a dirty bomb a regular explosive laced with lower-grade radioactive material.
Some experts also worry about Pakistan, a relatively recent nuclear power with untested security systems, dozens of nuclear weapons, and no shortage of Islamist militants. The United States recently offered to help Pakistan improve its nuclear security measures, an offer which Pakistan has tacitly accepted since November 2001.

Nuclear Material Could Reach Terrorists through Smuggling


CFR 06.[Center on Foreign Relations. January 2006. Loose Nukes .http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-terrorism/loose-nukes/p9549]
There have been no confirmed reports of missing or stolen former-Soviet nuclear weapons, but there is

ample evidence of a significant black market in nuclear materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported more than a hundred nuclear smuggling incidents since 1993, eighteen of which involved highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient in an atomic bomb and the most dangerous product on the nuclear black market.

Terrorists Target Russian Nuclear Stockpiles


CFR 06.[Center on Foreign Relations. January 2006. Loose Nukes .http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-terrorism/loose-nukes/p9549]
Yes. Russian authorities

say that in the past three years alone they have broken up hundreds of nuclear-material

smuggling deals. In October 2001, shortly after the World Trade Center attacks, a Russian nuclear official reported having foiled two separate incidents over the previous eight months in which terrorists had staked out a secret weapons storage site. In the 1990s, U.S. authorities discovered several al-Qaeda plots to obtain nuclear materials, and former CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Osama bin Laden had sought to acquire or develop a nuclear device.

Protection of Russian Nuclear Arsenals Are Flimsy


CFR 06.[Center on Foreign Relations. January 2006. Loose Nukes .http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-terrorism/loose-nukes/p9549]
The United States protects its nuclear weapons with barriers, guards, surveillance cameras, motion sensors, and background checks on personnel.

s security measures are flimsier. Guards at nuclear weapons facilities have gone unpaid for months at a time, and even basic security arrangements such as fences, doors, and padlocks remain inadequate in many locations. Futhermore, while U.S. nuclear weapons are
engineered with built-in security mechanisms, we know very little about what sort of built-in safeguards there may be on Russia s or Pakistan s nuclear arsenals to prevent unauthorized detonations.

Several other nuclear powers though not all take similar precautions. Russia

DJHS Debate
Number of Nukes Irrelevant
There are still thousands ofactive nuclear weapons in existence

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 24 of 26

Starr 11. [Steven Starr, Director of Clinical Laboratory Program, University of Missouri Columbia.Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. February 7, 2011. Consequences of a single failure of nuclear deterrence. http://www.nuclearweaponswarcrimes.org/Consequences_of_a_Single_Failur.pdf]
Those who actively support nuclear deterrence are trained to believe that deterrence cannot fail, so long as their doctrines are observed, and their weapons systems are maintained and continuously modernized. They insist that their nuclear forces will remain forever under their complete control, immune from cyberwarfare, sabotage, terrorism, human or technical error. They deny that the short 12-to-30 minute flight times of nuclear missiles would not leave a President enough time to make rational decisions following a tactical, electronic warning of nuclear attack. The U.S.

and Russia continue to keep a total of 2000 strategic nuclear weapons at launch-ready status ready to launch with only a few minutes warning. Yet both nations are remarkably unable to acknowledge that this high-alert status in any way increases the probability that these weapons will someday be used in conflict. How can strategic nuclear arsenals truly be safe from accidental or unauthorized use, when they can be launched literally at a moment s notice? A cocked and loaded weapon is infinitely easier to fire than one which is unloaded and stored in a locked
safe. The mere existence of immense nuclear arsenals, in whatever status they are maintained, makes possible their eventual use in a nuclear war. Our best scientists now tell us that such a war would mean the end of human history. We need to ask our leaders: Exactly what political or national goals could possibly justify risking a nuclear war that would likely cause the extinction of the human race?

The Defense Department Misplaces Missile Components


Stanley 08. The Stanley Foundation.July 2008. Avoiding an Accidental Nuclear
War .http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=498&article=1]
Finally, three disturbing lapses in US nuclear weapons safety and security reduce confidence that the overall US nuclear weapons infrastructure remains well-managed and under strict command and control. Last August, a B-52 bomber was accidentally loaded with six nuclear warheads and flown from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The bomber was supposed to transport nonnuclear cruise missiles. Then, in March 2008, Defense Department officials learned and subsequently acknowledged that they had 18 months prior mistakenly

Defense Department review commissioned by Secretary Gates to study security of the US nuclear weapons complex concluded that the US military cannot locate hundreds of sensitive nuclear missile components. "According to previously undisclosed details obtained by the Financial Times, the investigation also concluded that the Air Force could not account for many sensitive components previously included in its nuclear inventory. One official said the number of missing components was more than 1,000." While none of these incidents directly indicates an increased danger of accidental launch, they do indicate an overall
erosion of system robustness making accidents more prone to occur. Again, due to the reality that most of the world s nuclear weapons remain under the control of the US and Russia, the likelihood is that if a serious accidental incident occurred, it would be within this legacy construct.

shipped four nuclear missile fuses to Taiwan. Finally, an internal

DJHS Debate
Accidental Nuclear War
Even the best and the brightest can accidentally cause nuclear war!

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 25 of 26

Schram 08. [Martin Schram. Columnist, Scripps Howard News Service.The Washington Times. February 5, 2008. Accessed July 18, 2011. India-Pakistan Nuclear Risk? http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/05/india-pakistan-nuclearrisk/?page=all#pagebreak]
Once again, world leaders need to recall the frighteningly candid words of a former Pakistan army general who explained to me years ago how in a conventional

weapons clash between India and Pakistan, even a well-intentioned, highly trained general such as he was could inadvertently start a nuclear war. And how the initial nuclear launch would not only be responded to but would instantly escalate tenfold a catastrophe that would not only obliterate the region but would have severe global consequences. The warning spoken by retired Brig. Gen. Feroz Khan in my interview with
him in 2002 reads like a warning call today. We spoke at a time when India and Pakistan seemed headed toward yet another ground war over the disputed bucolic region of Kashmir after Pakistan-based guerrillas of Lashkar-i-Taiba attacked India s Parliament. Now India says last month s

Once the conventional war breaks out, the fog of war sets in, Gen. Khan said then. And during war you have deceptions. You have misperceptions. You have communications breakdowns. Things get heated up. The retired
Mumbai murderers were trained inside Pakistan by the same militant group, which is linked to elements of Pakistan intelligence. general noted that nuclear weapons are normally kept in peacetime, or even during the crisis, under a certain set of conditions where safety is more important than effectiveness. But he said that as

the military situation worsens, these nuclear weapons could be made available to generals for battle deployment, adding: You are now moving the safety coefficient lesser and lesser in favor of battle effectiveness. And that can cause what Gen. Khan called the danger of inadvertence. Time can be the ultimate enemy in a war between nuclear next-door neighbors, because missiles are launched just minutes from their targets. And nuclear decisions sometimes need to be made instantly by generals in the field not civilian leaders in the capitals. The former Pakistan general cited three scenarios in which a general in combat might have to issue an order to retaliate without having enough time to know for sure whether the enemy has actually attacked with a weapon carrying a nuclear warhead.
Scenario One: India launches a missile that Pakistan knows is nuclear-capable - but this missile only has a non-nuclear warhead. It hits its Pakistani target. It may or may not be a nuclear explosion, but it could be perceived . as if a nuclear strike has already taken place. A Pakistan general might order a nuclear strike he thinks is retaliatory - but he has actually triggered a nuclear first strike. Scenario Two: In a conventional attack, a weapon hits a nuclear target, causing a radioactive plume. Now, nobody knows whether a nuclear weapon was fired or the nuclear asset was blown up on the ground. The instant field report calls it a nuclear attack. Headquarters orders a retaliatory strike - but it is really the first nuclear strike. Scenario Three: A conventional attack takes out the command center. Commanders perceived it as a decapitating attack intended to knock out one side s nuclear weapons. And they would then say, Look, before my weapon goes out, I d better use it or lose it. So a nuclear weapon is launched. In each case, the nuclear exchanges escalate tenfold.

DJHS Debate
Bioweapons are a HUGE Threat
Bioweapons are Readily Available

[CON Card File] NDF 2011 Page 26 of 26

CDC 2000.Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.April 21, 2000. Biological and Chemical Terrorism:Strategic Plan for
Preparednessand Response . http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr4904.pdf]

Terrorist incidents in the United States and elsewhere involving bacterial pathogens(3 ), nerve gas (1 ), and a lethal plant toxin(i.e., ricin) (4 ), have demonstrated that theUnited States is vulnerable to biological and chemical threats as well as explosives.Recipes for preparing homemade agents are readily available (5 ), and reports ofarsenals of military bioweapons (2 ) raise the possibility that terrorists might have accessto highly dangerous agents, which have been engineered for mass dissemination assmall-particle aerosols. Such agents as the variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox,are highly contagious and often fatal. Responding to large-scale outbreaks caused. Because the initial
detection of a covert biological or chemical attack will probablyoccur at the local level, disease surveillance systems at state and local healthagencies must be capable of detecting unusual patterns of disease or injury,including those caused by unusual or unknown threat agents. Because the initial response to a covert biological or chemical attack will probablybe made at the local level, epidemiologists at state and local health agencies musthave expertise and resources for responding to reports of clusters of rare, unusual,or unexplained illnesses by these agents will require the rapid mobilization of public health workers, emergencyresponders, and private health-care providers. Large-scale outbreaks will also requirerapid procurement and distribution of large quantities of drugs and vaccines, which mustbe available quickly.