ART 420 Usero v.

Court of Appeals FACTS:Respondents build a concrete fence between their property and the property of the petitioners. Petitioners assailed the building of the said fence on the ground that the property was theirs. ISSUE: WON the space between the two properties is a private property or a public domain. HELD:The mere fact that there are water lilies on the space filled with water proves that there is a permanent stream of water or a creek there. The petitioners also failed to prove their claim of ownership. Art.420 The phrase "others of similar character" includes a creek which is a recess or an arm of a river. It is property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private ownership. Being public water, a creek cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual. Accordingly, the petitioners may utilize the rip-rapped portion of the creek to prevent the erosion of their property. No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, are owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one intended for public use. The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user s tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. 2.MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation must have members. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises all the powers of a corporation

Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals Facts: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque on the Airport Lands and Buildings it administers. The City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer,then issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. Paranaque s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of GOCCs upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. And that an international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, Paranaque asserts that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax. MIAA s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic; that it is a property of public dominion. Elementary is the rule that the government cannot tax itself. Issue: WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and as such are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws. Held: 1. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.

Held: Yes, the portion of the city street was withdrawn from public use such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. Art. 422: "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." The Supreme Court said that Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.

ART 421 De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals Facts: De la Cruz was claiming that he was the true owner and actual possessor of a lot located at San Jose, Bulacan; that he has been there for more than 30 years. However the Ramoses Brothers claimed that they have better right over the property being the successor-in-interest of the previous possessor of that land. On 1973, the land became the subject of an application for registration under the Land Registration Law. At first it was denied on the ground that it remained a forest reserve but shortly thereafter the brothers pursued the reclassification of land and were granted the ownership. Dela Cruz filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against the brothers contending that he was the actual possessor of the land now owned by Ramoses, that he has better right over the lot on which he devoted an abundance of time, effort and resources in fencing and cultivating the same. Issue: Is Dela Cruz vested with the better right over the property? Ruling: No. Petitioner possessed the land after it has been declared by the government as part of forest reserve. In fact, the land remained part of the forest reserve until such time that it was reclassified into alienable and disposable land at the behest of the Ramoses. There is no disposable land to speak of prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith by the petitioner. The property occupied by him remained to be classified as forest and could not be acquired by prescription. His lengthy occupation of the land can t be counted in his favor because it is part of the patrimonial property of the state which is inalienable and indisposable. Art 422 Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles Facts: The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. Subsequently, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. Petitioner being the highest bidder was awarded with the said lot. Thus, the Acting City Mayor executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual. Issue: WON the portion of the city street intended for public use can be disposed?

ART 423, 424 In the Matter of Reversion/Recall of Reconstituted Oct No. 0116 Decree 3999 of Lot 4239,etc. Facts: Herein petitioners are claiming to be descendants of the alleged original pioneers/settlers of the piece of land being disputed in this case since 1843. They are asserting that in 1910, officials of the Municipal Government of Paniqui, headed by MaximoParazo, ordered the occupants of the land to vacate their property so that the municipality could build thereon a school, a public market, and a cemetery. Furthermore, the petitioners claim that their ascendants were not given the chance or opportunity to appear or answer and present their side at the cadastral proceedings involving the subject properties. Issue: Whether or not herein petitioners have the right of ownership over the land. Held: The SC decided against the petitioners on the grounds that: 1. Properties of local government units under the Spanish Civil Code were limited to properties for public use and patrimonial property. The same is still true under the 1950 Civil Code which governs us today. The principle has remained constant: property for public usecan be used by everybody, even by strangers or aliens, in accordance with its nature; but nobody can exercise over it the rights of a private owner. In the case at bar, schools, public markets and cemeteries are what were built on the subject property, which all the more shows that the same is a patrimonial property, and the Municipality may have the same registered in its name. 2. The claim of petitioners had already been barred by laches. Laches is defined as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The recent discovery by petitioners of their supposed right to the disputed property notwithstanding, petitioners alleged ascendants should have instituted an action against the Municipal Government of Paniqui or against MaximoParazo for the allegedly unlawful taking of the property way back in the 1920s.

ART 425 Register of Deeds v. China Banking Corp. FACTS: Mr. And Mrs. Pangilinan executed of Deeds of Transfer covering a parcel of land in favour of CBC. The deed is intended to settle the civil liability of Alfonso Pangilinan which arose from qualified theft. The Register of Deeds refused to register the Deeds because of the constitutional provision prohibiting foreign corporations from acquiring lands in the Phils. ISSUE: WON the Bank can acquire ownership of the land. HELD: That the constitutional prohibition under consideration has for its purpose the preservation of the patrimony of the nation cannot be denied, but appellant and the amici curiae claim that it should be liberally construed so that the prohibition be limited to the permanent acquisition of real estate by alienswhether natural or juridical persons. This, of course, would make legal the ownership acquired by CBC by virtue of the deed of transfer mentioned heretofore, subject to its obligation to dispose of it in accordance with law, within 5 years from the acquisition date. We cannot give agree to this contention, in view of the fact that the constitutional provision in question is absolute terms. Note: A foreign corps. Have no right to acquire any public or private agricultural, commercial, residential lands. Director of Lands v. IAC Facts: 1. Pacific Farms Inc. applied for registration of land but was denied because the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the constitution from acquiring alienable lands of public domain 2. Pacific Farms changed applicant to J. Antonio Araneta and was granted 3. Petitioners contend that the change in application is a circumvention of the law Issue: WON the change in application is a circumvention of the law Held: Yes, application was denied. The constitution prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of public domain except in lease. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly w/in private ownership are presumed to belong to the state therefore positive act of the government is still needed to reclassify forest land to alienable land for agricultural and other purposes. Halili v. Court of Appeals Facts: Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. Helen executed a deed of quitclaim transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon. David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to EmilianoCataniag. Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the

latter and EmilianoCataniag - and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621 5 of the Civil Code. Issues: 1. 2.

Was the transfer of property from Helen to david unconstitutional because david is an alien? Do petitioners have the right of redemption?

Ruling: 1. Yes. But defect was cured when it was passed to Cataniag, a Filipino citizen. 2. No. Land is Urban therefore no right of redemption. Under article 1621, both lands - that sought to be redeemed and the adjacent lot belonging to the person exercising the right of redemption - must be rural. If one or both are urban, the right cannot be invoked.

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds Facts:Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residentiallot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December1941.Pubic Land Act No.2874: allowed aliens to own or lease lands (prior to enactment of Consti). He was not able to register the landbecause it was war time then. After the war, hetried to register the land however both theRegister of Deeds Manila and the Court of FirstInstance refused the registration. Issues: WON an alien is entitled to acquire a residential land in our country? Held: No.Affirmed. * Residential Lands: neither mineral nor timber, they must be classified as agricultural -not because it s actually used for agricultural purposes but because it can be used for that purpose - IbanezdeAldecoav.Insular Government *Commonwealth Act No. 141 used to allow aliens to own land by reciprocity, meaning if their country of origin allows Filipinos to own lands, then they can be allowed to own lands here too. However, after the Constitution was promulgated, even acquisition by reciprocity was not allowed. Art. XIII Sec. 1 Constitution, All agricultural,timber & mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization shall be limited to the citizens of the Philippines or to corporations orassociations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or assoc. qualified to acquire and hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. closes only means of aliens to acquire land in the country; applies prohibition of alien acquisition of both public & private agricultural lands.

ART 428 Ayala Land v. Ray Burton

Fajardo v. Freedom to Build FACTS: Freedom To Build, Incorporated, an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing, sold to petitioner-spouses, a house and lot of the De la Costa Homes in Barangka, Marikina. The Contract to Sell executed between the parties, contained a Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions on easements, upward expansion and front expansion. The controversy arose when petitioners, despite repeated warnings from respondent, extended the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly above the original front wall. (I assume parang balcony?)Respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 261, Pasig City, an action to demolish the unauthorized structures. Later, the judgment was rendered against the petitioners. (affirmed by CA) The latter also assail the personality of private respondent to question the construction which have effectively relinquished its ownership, right or interest over the subdivision upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the individual homeowners. ISSUE: WON the prohibitions imposed are restrictions on the use of one s property. HELD: The restrictive covenants in this case are VALID stipulations. Restrictive covenants are subject to limitations: they should be reasonable, not contrary to public policy, or to law, and not in restraint of trade. There appears to be no cogent reasons for not upholding restrictive covenants aimed to promote aesthetics, health, and privacy or to prevent overcrowding. Tayag v. Lacson Respondents Angelica TiotuycoVda.deLacson,band her children were the registered owners of three parcels of land located in Mabalacat, PampangaThe properties, which were tenanted agricultural lands,were administered by Renato Espinosa for the owner. On March 17, 1996, a group of original farmers/tillers individually executed in favor of the petitioner (TAYAG) separate Deeds of Assignment6 in which the assignees assigned to the petitioner their respective rights as tenants/tillers of the landholdings possessed and tilled by them for and in consideration of P50.00 per square meter. The said amount was made payable "when the legal impediments to the sale of the property to the petitioner no longer existed." The petitioner was also granted the exclusive right to buy the property if and when the respondents, with the concurrence of the defendants-tenants, agreed to sell the property. In the interim, the petitioner gave varied sums of money to the tenants as partial payments, and the latter issued receipts for the said amounts. On July 24, 1996, the petitioner called a meeting of the defendants-tenants to work out the implementation of the terms of their separate agreements.However, on August 8, 1996, the defendants-tenants, through Joven Mariano, wrote the petitioner stating that they were not attending the meeting and instead gave notice of their collective decision to sell all their rights and

interests, as tenants/lessees, over the landholding to the respondent because they lost their trust. Tayag (petitioner) filed a complaint with RTC against the defendat-tenants as well as the respondents, for the court to fix a period within which to pay the agreed purchase price of P50.00 per square meter to the defendants, as provided for in the Deeds of Assignment. The petitioner also prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants and the respondents therein.Petitioner was entitled to injuctive relief given by RTC. Respondenta appeal to the CA stating the the Deed of Assignments were contrary to par. 13 PD 27 and Sec. 70 of RA 6657, hence it is null and void. Also, this exclusive and absolute right given to the assignee shall be exercised only when no legal impediments exist to the lot to effect the smooth transfer of lawful ownership of the lot/property in the name of the ASSIGNEE. Furthermore, that they(respondents) are not parties to the DAhence they are not bound by the terms of the said deeds. . The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction would restrict and impede the exercise of their right to dispose of their property, as provided for in Article 428 of the New Civil Code. They asserted that the petitioner had no cause of action against them and the defendants-tenants. The CA ruled in favor of the respondets. Hence this petition. Issue: WON the writ of preliminary injunction must be granted to the petitioner against the respondent. Ruling: For the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioner was burdened to establish the following: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.36 Thus, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. Where the complainant s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests. It is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.37 We have reviewed the pleadings of the parties and found that, as contended by the respondents, the petitioner failed to establish the essential requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the respondents comment/motion as well as their motion for reconsideration. First. The trial court cannot enjoin the respondents, at the instance of the petitioner, from selling, disposing of and encumbering their property. As the registered owners of the property, the respondents have the right to enjoy and dispose of their property without any other limitations than those established by law, in accordance with Article 428 of the Civil Code. The right to dispose of the property is the power of the owner to sell, encumber, transfer, and even destroy the property. Ownership also includes the right to recover the possession of the property from any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such property, by the appropriate action for restitution, with the fruits, and for indemnification for

damages.38The right of ownership of the respondents is not, of course, absolute. It is limited by those set forth by law, such as the agrarian reform laws. Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the respondents may enter into contracts covering their property with another under such terms and conditions as they may deem beneficial provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good conduct, public order or public policy. The respondents cannot be enjoined from selling or encumbering their property simply and merely because they had executed Deeds of Assignment in favor of the petitioner, obliging themselves to assign and transfer their rights or interests as agricultural farmers/laborers/sub-tenants over the landholding, and granting the petitioner the exclusive right to buy the property subject to the occurrence of certain conditions. The respondents were not parties to the said deeds. There is no evidence that the respondents agreed, expressly or impliedly, to the said deeds or to the terms and conditions set forth therein. Indeed, they assailed the validity of the said deeds on their claim that the same were contrary to the letter and spirit of P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657. The petitioner even admitted when he testified that he did not know any of the respondents, and that he had not met any of them before he filed his complaint in the RTC. He did not even know that one of those whom he had impleaded as defendant, Angelica Vda. deLacson, was already dead.

an accionpubliciana (recovery of possession) and that in an action for unlawful detainer, the only essential element is the issue of material possession and not the issue of ownership. The respondents did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming ownership over the properties. The petitioners only sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. They did not claim ownership over the parcels of land which would have deprived the MTC of jurisdiction. An ejectment case, just like the one involved here, is an action for recovery of possession which the MTC has jurisdiction. It is not the same as a recovery of ownership where it is the RTC which has the original jurisdiction.

ART 429 German Management & Services Inc v. Court of Appeals Grand Union Supermarket Inc v. Espino Jr. FACTS: Jose Espino Jr. was shopping with his wife at Grand Union Supermarket's store in Makati. He picked up a small "rat tail" file from the display with the intention of buying it. On the way to the counter, he placed it in his shirt pocket with a portion of the file protruding. After paying for the goods his wife had bought, they proceeded to leave the store. Espino was apprehended by the security guard at the entrance because of the "rat tail" file, which he had forgotten to pay for. He was accosted to the store's management and fined for "shoplifting". In the course of the arguing whether or not he shoplifted, many onlookers stared and Espino claimed this caused him much shame and dishonor. Espino filed an action for damages against Grand Union for all the trouble. The lower court denied the petition of Espino. The CA reversed, hence Grand Union Supermarket raised the issue to the Supreme Court primarily asserting their right to the defense of property based on Art. 429. ISSUE: WON Grand Union was validly exercising its right to the defense of property under Art. 429 in apprehending and causing embarrassment to Espino HELD: YES. The SC exempted Grand Union from paying exemplary damages because Grand Union acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their property, a right which the law accords to them. Under Article 429, New Civil Code, the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has a right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof and for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. And since a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office exempts him from civil or criminal liability, petitioner may not be punished by imposing exemplary damages against him. We agree that petitioners acted upon probable cause in stopping and investigating private respondent for taking the file without paying for it BUT, the SC concluded that based on the totality of facts, Espino had absolutely no intention to steal the file. SC affirmed the CA and granted the award of moral and compensatory damages to Espino against Grand Union, but not exemplary damages.

Ross Rica Sales Center v. Sps. Ong Facts: Petitioners allege that they own parcels of land previously owned by respondents and currently occupied by them. Petitioners wrote respondents asking them to vacate the premises as they intend to use the same but respondents refused. Petitioners allege that the respondents are unlawfully withholding possession of said lots. The MTC and RTC ruled in favor of petitioner but the CA reversed these decisions because according to the CA, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case because the complaint does not constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC. The CA based this decision on 2 grounds, namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer. Issue: Whether the complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC. Decision: CA s decision reversed and set aside. Ratio: It is not the existence of a contract that qualifies the case as one of unlawful detainer. What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. A simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case. (How the case is related to Art. 428) Respondents claim that RTC and not the MTC has jurisdiction over the action it being an accionreivindicatoria (recovery of ownership). The SC disagrees. They explained that the action is