The Army's Stryker Vehicle - A Costly Mistake RASSER

The Armys Stryker Vehicle: A Costly Mistake
By Martijn Rasser May 3, 2005
RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake
The Stryker light armored vehicle is the centerpiece of the Interim Brigade Combat Team envisioned in current Army transformation plans. This paper analyzes the procurement decision behind Stryker, assesses the theoretical suitability of the vehicle for its declared use, and investigates the actual performance of the vehicle in Operation Iraqi Freedom. I begin by placing Stryker in the context of the Armys ambitious transformation plan that culminates in the fielding of the Objective Force. The Stryker-equipped
brigades are designed to serve as an interim force that is readily deployable, survivable and lethal. The decision by Army leaders to procure Stryker generated significant
controversy with detractors decrying the vehicles deficiencies in armor, durability, maneuverability, and questionable transportability by C-130 aircraft I conclude, after
weighing these criticisms and assessing Strykers performance and use in Operation Iraqi Freedom, that these vehicles are not warfighting platforms. Procuring Stryker for the centerpiece of the Interim Brigades is a costly mistake. What Stryker Is Stryker is the third generation version of an 8-wheel light-armored vehicle (LAV-III) manufactured by a consortium of General Motors Defense of Canada and General Dynamics Land Systems of the United States (GM/GDLS). The vehicle is named after two eponymous Medal of Honor winners. The United States Army will deploy two major variants of the vehicle: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) and the Mobile Gun System (MGS) armed with a 105 mm cannon. The ICV, equipped with a remotecontrolled 12.7 mm machine gun, features a two-man crew and the space to transport nine fully equipped troops.1
LAV-III to Provide Army with Rapid-response Capability, Janes, July 9, 2001. Accessed at http://server2.janes.com/press/pc010709_1.shtml 1
Sub-variants of the ICV are a mortar carrier, reconnaissance vehicle, anti-tank guided missile vehicle, fire-support vehicle, engineer support vehicle, command-andcontrol vehicle, medical-evacuation vehicle and the nuclear/biological/chemical weapons (NBC) reconnaissance vehicle. 2 All variants are powered by a Caterpillar 3126 diesel engine producing 350hp, propelling the vehicle to over 60 mph. The vehicle has a range of approximately 300 miles on a full 53-gallon tank. Standard equipment includes a hydro-pneumatic suspension, a central tire-inflation system, a fire-detection and firesuppression system, passive night vision and a winch.3 The vehicles are thus designed to travel significant distances at higher speeds and greater comfort than tracked vehicles. Army Transformation and the Interim Force On October 12, 1999 Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki and Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera announced their vision for a transformed Army for the 21st century, a force more strategically responsive, agile, deployable, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations.4 The transformation plan calls for force modernization in three areas: upgrading the legacy force of current equipment, fielding of an interim force to fill the near to mid-term capabilities gap, and the development of the Objective Force (now termed Future Force), the future Army.5 In Shinsekis words, the purpose of this transformation is to [prepare] this Army for its future warfighting responsibilities, technologically, materially and professionally.6
Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle, Global Security.org. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/iav.htm 3 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle USA, Janes Defence Weekly, February 19, 2003. 4 Objective Force, Global Security.org. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/objective-force.htm 5 Ibid. 6 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Transformation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000. 2
Shinseki viewed the medium-force interim combat brigades as filling a critical gap in the Armys bifurcated structure of easily deployed light units and slow-to-deploy heavy units. In Congressional testimony Shinseki, referring to the plight of the heavily outgunned 82nd Airborne Division during Desert Storm, emphasized the urgency and need for the procurement of these new vehicles: My requirement is an operational capacity that keeps us from having to leave another airborne brigade sitting in the desert waiting for a heavy division to come. That is what Im trying to fill here.7 In other words, the Army needs a robust force designed for use in a range of contingencies that can be deployed as quickly as light forces yet have the firepower comparable to heavy forces. Army leaders subsequently formally codified the primary purpose and use of the interim brigade. According to the 2003 Army Modernization Plan, Strykers are
designed and optimized primarily for employment in SSCs (smaller scale contingencies) in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end to midrange threats that may combine both conventional and asymmetric qualities.8 I will analyze Strykers attributes and performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom in the context of this mission statement. Cold War-era platforms and equipment will nevertheless remain Army combat mainstays for at least 15 years. Shinseki intended the interim force to fill the gap between light early-entry forces and heavier follow-on forces and serve as a steppingstone to the ultimate Objective Force with a planned initial operational deployment
Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Transformation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000. 8 Department of the Army, 2003 Army Modernization Plan: p. 27. Accessed at http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2003/MP03Mainweb100.pdf 3
capability in 2015.9 The interim force should be agile, lethal and mobile enough to dominate combat during that interval.10 A major goal for the interim force is to place brigade combat teams anywhere in the world with 96 hours after liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days.11 A main criterion for the interim force armored vehicle is air portability by C-130 transport planes. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded that fielding of the IBCT also serves to test and validate the concepts, doctrine and training the Objective Force may ultimately adopt.12 Senator Lieberman (D-CT), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, raised concerns during a Congressional hearing, however, whether General Shinseki had formulated new operational concepts for the interim brigade, and an overlying vision for transformation and its end-goal Objective Force. Shinseki did not answer his question directly, merely citing desirable features agility, versatility and lethality the Objective force should have.13 Shinseki described a plan to better prepare the Army for a variety of contingencies, not a fundamentally new concept of joint warfare.
Chuck Vinch, Black Berets Will Become Armys Standard Headgear, Stars and Stripes, October 19, 2000. Accessed at http://www.pstripes.com/ed101900c.html 10 United States Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force, not dated. Accessed at http://www.army.mil/features/WhitePaper/ObjectiveForceWhitePaper.pdf; also see: Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), Global Security.org. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm 11 Gerry J. Gilmore, Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki, Federation of American Scientists website. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991013shinvis.htm 12 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-02-96, Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges (November 2001): p. 23. 13 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Transformation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000. See also remarks by COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA, Should the U.S. Army Lighten Up? Cato Institute Policy Forum, December 18, 2000. 4
Choosing the IAV The IAV selection process for the interim brigade proved contentious. General Shinseki desired to equip the Interim Combat Brigades with a single vehicle to reduce the logistics footprint upon deployment. Senator Lieberman questioned whether Army leadership gave enough consideration to the various vehicle options available and asked whether it was wise to forgo a mix of platforms and capabilities. Shinseki proclaimed an immediate operational requirement for a robust, rapidly deployable force to be composed of a single platform featuring off-the-shelf technologies.14 The Army had three main options to consider for its interim vehicle: procuring the Marine LAV, upgrading its existing C-130 air portable armored vehicles like the M113 or procuring a new platform. Ultimately Army leaders formally compared 4 vehicles in the final evaluation round: the existing M113, and the new LAV-III, Pandur 6x6 LAV, and Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle (see Table 1).
Table 1: Comparison of Possible and Actual Candidates for Army Interim Armored Vehicle
M113 a A3 Variant MTVL b Variant Powerplant Power (horse power) Wheels/Tracks Top Speed Combat Weight (lbs) Primary Armament C-130 Transportable Turning Radius IAV Candidate
14
Marine c LAV Detroit Diesel 6V53T 275 8 wheels 62 mph 28,000 M242 25mm chain gun Yes 25.5 ft* No
Detroit Diesel 6V53T 275 Tracks 41 mph 27,000 .50 cal MG
Detroit Diesel 6V53T 400 Tracks 41mph 40,000 M242 25mm chain gun Yes Pivot (20 ft circle) Yes
LAV-III (Infantry Carrier d Vehicle) Caterpillar 3126B diesel 350 8 wheels 60 mph 36,000 .50 cal MG
Pandur II 6x6 Cummins ISC 350 diesel 285 6 wheels 68 mph 28,600 12.7 mm MG Yes 29.5 ft. Yes
Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle f Type 25 Detroit Diesel DDC 6V 92TA 475 Tracks 43 mph 50,705 M242 25 mm chain gun Yes Pivot (19.3 ft. circle) Yes
Yes Pivot (17 ft. circle) No
Yes 58 ft. Yes
Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Transformation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000. 5

a: M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier, Global Security.org: Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113a3.htm b: MTVL, Janes Defence Weekly, September 20, 2000 and c: Light Armored Vehicle-25 Specifications, Global Security.org: Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/lav-25-specs.htm d: LAV Gen III, Federation of American Scientists. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/lav-gen3.htm e: Austrian Pandur APC, accessed at http://www.d-2-128.org/armorid/pandur.html and Pandur WAV, accessed at http://www.armytechnology.com/projects/pandur/ f: Bionix IFV Technical Specifications. Accessed at http://www.one35th.com/bionix/bi_spec.htm
Option 1: Acquire the Updated Marine LAV The United States Marine Corps took delivery of its first LAV in November 1984.15 The program to develop the LAV commenced in 1980, originally as an Army-Marine Corps venture, though the Army backed out in 1983 stating the vehicle did not fit their needs at that time.16 Designed as a versatile, expeditionary warfare vehicle, the USMC LAV weighs only 14 tons and is readily air transportable by C-130, C-141, and C-5 aircraft and CH-53E helicopters.17 The vehicle is also capable of amphibious operations, which the LAV-III/Stryker is not. A Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), largely completed by 2001, ensured the LAVs would remain in service until at least 2015. The objectives of SLEP were to improve survivability, sustainability, lethality and mobility, improve the readiness of the LAV Family of Vehicles and reduce Fleet Operation and Sustainment (O&S) costs. 18 COL Thomas M. Lytle, USMC, program manager for the Marine LAV, outlined substantial enhancements to the turret and gun as well as mechanical and electrical improvements to the auto-hull in a presentation at the 1998 Combat Vehicle Conference. He also indicated the Army showed interest in the upgraded vehicle for its own use.19
15
General Dynamics Land Systems Canada LAV (8x8), Janes Military Vehicles and Logistics, January 17, 2005. 16 Harold Kennedy, Marine Corps Sprucing Up Its Light Armored Vehicles, National Defense, September 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=257 17 Ibid. 18 Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), Global Security.org. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/lav.htm 19 COL Thomas M. Lytle, USMC, LAV Program Update, presented at National Defense Industrial Association, Tank-Automotive Division Combat Vehicles Section, 1998 Combat Vehicles Conference, Fort 6
The Marine vehicle should have been an obvious candidate for the Armys consideration. Engineers designed the LAV largely for the types of operations Army leaders envisioned. With the addition of a 25mm chain gun the vehicles carry reasonable firepower. The decision by Marine Corps leaders to upgrade and maintain the vehicle for at least an additional decade and a half is a testament to the durability of the vehicle. The LAV is truly an off-the-shelf option, reducing procurement costs. Since the vehicle is already a part of the Marine inventory, an additional advantage is parts commonality with the USMC fleet, thereby reducing the Armys operations and maintenance costs. Option 2: Update the Deployed M113 Armored Personnel Carrier The M113 is a tracked armored vehicle manufactured by United Defense LP of Arlington, VA and was first deployed in the 1960s. The recent A3 variant contains a 275hp engine capable of speeds up to 41mph. At a combat weight of less than 14 tons and with small dimensions it is readily transportable by the C-130 Hercules, even when using unimproved airstrips.20 The newest variant, Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light
(MTVL), sports a 400hp engine capable of 41 mph, allowing heavier payloads and more armor protection. It features greater internal volume than the LAV and LAV-III despite significantly smaller external dimensions. MTVL was one of four finalists under
consideration for the interim armored vehicle.21 Upgrading the M113 is the most cost-effective option. The Army already owns at least 24,000 of these vehicles, many sitting unused in storage. Upgrade costs per unit
Knox, Kentucky, September 22, 1998. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod101/sys/land/docs/lytle.pdf 20 M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, Global Security.org. Accessed at http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113.htm 21 Harold Kennedy, Armys New Combat Vehicle To Undergo Additional Tests, National Defense, December 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Dec/Armys_New.htm 7
would be approximately $210,000 and up to $500,000 if a hybrid-electric drive is installed.22 A rapidly deployable M113-based force in fact already exists. The United States Army Europe (USAREUR) created an Immediate Ready Force (IRF), composed of light, medium and heavy companies. The light force is deployable within 24 hours and can be quickly reinforced by the M113-equipped Medium Ready Company via C-130 aircraft belonging to USAF Europe.23 The M113 is a battle-proven vehicle already employed in a manner mirroring Shinsekis vision. Since the Army owns thousands of these vehicles there is no need to procure additional ones unless they decided to augment the fleet with the MVTL. Option 3: Acquire a New Vehicle Platform Three of the four finalist candidates for IAV selection were new vehicle platforms. In addition to the deployed M113, the other primary contenders included the wheeled LAVIII, the wheeled Pandur 6x6 LAV made by Steyr-Daimler Puch (now owned by General Dynamics) of Austria and the tracked Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle produced by Singapore Technologies Kinetics.24 These vehicles are well-regarded in international defense circles and are able and durable. The downside in procuring a new vehicle is the long-term vehicle delivery schedule, the greater costs involved and a lack of parts commonality with other vehicles in the U.S. armed forces.
22
Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Approves Fifth and Sixth Stryker Brigades, Defense Week, Volume 24, Number 50, December 22, 2003. 23 MAJ Paul Swiergosz, USA, USAREURs Ready Force, November 2001: Accessed at http://www.army.mil/soldiers/nov2001/pdfs/lariat.pdf 24 Harold Kennedy, Army Approaches Decision on Interim Combat Vehicle, National Defense, September 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Sep/Army_Approaches.htm 8
Selecting the LAV-III/Stryker The selection process for the Army IAV remains tainted by controversy. The four challengers for selection faced stringent testing in June 2000 at Fort Knox. Army
officials tested each vehicle for a range of abilities including being C-130 deployable, onand off-road capabilities and overcoming obstacles such as barricades and chain-link fences. Testing officials released no publicly accessible data on each vehicles
performance but many industry analysts expected the LAV-III to come out on top.25 The fact that units at Fort Lewis, Washington trained with Canadian Army-supplied LAV-IIIs in September before an official decision was announced in November hints that Army leaders had already made up their minds.26 LG Paul J. Kern, military deputy assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology announced the official selection for the IAV on November 17, 2000.27 GM/GDLS won a contract to build 2,131 LAV-IIIs over 6 years at an initial estimated cost of nearly $4 billion.28 On December 22, 2003 the Pentagon announced final approval for the Army to fund two additional Stryker Brigade Combat Teams for a total of six brigades to be procured. The total cost for the vehicles was revised upwards to $7.2 billion.29
25 26
Ibid. Ibid. 27 LG Paul J. Kern, USA, Special Briefing on the Army Interim Armored Vehicle Program, DefenseLINK News, November 17, 2000. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/t11172000_t117army.html 28 Army Unveils Interim Armored Vehicles, Army Logistician, Mar/Apr 2001, Vol. 33 Issue 2: p. 1. 29 Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Approves Fifth and Sixth Stryker Brigades, Defense Week, Volume 24, Number 50 (December 22, 2003) 9
General Kern refused to divulge source selection criteria during his presentation claiming that information is protected by the federal acquisitions regulations.30 There is no public information as to why Army procurement officials selected the LAV-III over the other contenders. He did highlight several key attributes of the LAV-III: C-130 transport plane transportability; 14.5mm armor providing all-around protection as the vehicle rolls of the plane, 60mph-sustained speeds; a reduced logistics footprint; fuel economy and reliability.31 United Defense LP, manufacturer of the M113, protested the award decision, asserting that the evaluation and resulting cost-technical tradeoff were inconsistent with the evaluation scheme set forth in the [request for proposal] and were otherwise unreasonable.32 The GAO denied the protest but many Stryker detractors still accuse Army testers of questionable performance evaluations for the vehicles, as we will see below. More importantly, the GAO decision contains evidence that Army acquisition officials may have turned a blind eye to shortcomings in GM/GDLS ability to meet the criteria of the contract. The GAO decision states the awardees schedule for deploying [the mobile gun system (MGS) variant] were very disadvantageous and evaluation did not fully reflect certain disadvantages with respect to ammunition storage in awardees MGS.33 Army officials apparently de-emphasized the immediate and urgent need34 for the vehicles emphasized in the proposal request to be able to award the full contract to GM/GDLS.
30
LG Paul J. Kern, USA, Special Briefing on the Army Interim Armored Vehicle Program, DefenseLINK News (November 17, 2000): Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/t11172000_t117army.html 31 Ibid. 32 United States Government Accountability Office, Decision in Matter of United Defense LP, File B286925 et al., (Washington, DC: GAO, April 9, 2001): p. 2. 33 Ibid: p. 1. 34 Ibid: p. 2. 10
Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA) attempted to intervene by sponsoring the 2001 defense authorization bill mandating a comparative test between the LAV-III and the M113, which is manufactured in Santorums home state. The tests were held in 2002. Prior to the evaluation, an unnamed Army Major General said it wont prove anything.35 The Army apparently already made its decision: Wed rather spend the test money on something else.36 The GAO deemed these tests sufficient, although GAO representatives only witnessed and analyzed one half of the tests and exercises, and their results.37 Budget Concerns The Armys ambitious transformation strategy raised significant concerns about its funding soon after General Shinsekis October 1999 announcement. Not only would the Army procure and field a large interim force and spend billions on research and development for its objective force, the Army planned to sustain, re-capitalize and modernize most its legacy force until 2032. Even in 2000, the infancy stages of the transformation plan, the service had only 68 percent of the funds necessary to recapitalize current weapons systems.38 Lawmakers voiced concerns about budget shortfalls during Shinsekis testimony to the AirLand subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2000.
35
Sandra I. Erwin, Army Confident About Move to Wheeled Combat Vehicle, National Defense, (September 2001): Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2001/Sep/Army_Confident.htm 36 Ibid. 37 United States Government Accountability Office, Military Transformation, Armys Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison (May 2003) 38 Chuck Vinch, Black Berets Will Become Armys Standard Headgear, Stars and Stripes, October 19, 2000. Accessed at http://www.pstripes.com/ed101900c.html 11
Shinseki acknowledged he required substantial additional monies to achieve his goals.39 A May 2001 GAO study identified substantial challenges ahead in realizing Army transformation plans and concluded Army leadership would face significant investment trade-offs.40 GAO analysts reached these conclusions before significant cost overruns dramatically raised the price tag of the Stryker contract. When Army officials first unveiled its selection for the IAV, the average price per vehicle was $1.87 million.41 The most recent budget figures indicate the average unit cost of a Stryker vehicle variant to be over $2.85 million (see Table 1), while the average acquisition cost (includes military construction, and research, development, test & evaluation) per vehicle exceeds $4 million.42
Table 2: Procurement Funds for Stryker Vehicle Previous FY03* FY04* FY05* Years 1583.6 742.4 962.7 1524.2 (754) (281) (371) (576) FY06* 878.4 (240) FY07* 719.5 (130) FY08* 549.2 (87)
Stryker
Source: Department of the Army FY 2006-2007 Budget Estimates, February 200543 *Figures in millions of dollars. Number in parentheses reflects total number of vehicles procured that year.
Prior to General Shinsekis accession as Army Chief of Staff Army budget planners never allocated a penny to an interim armored force so they needed to review all budget allocations to find money to fund it. As GAO analysts predicted, Army leaders faced difficult trade-offs. Budget officials cancelled and downsized several systems to release
39
Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Transformation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000. 40 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-31, Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges (May 2001): p. 12. 41 Based on the announced contract of $4 billion for 2,131 vehicles as stated in Army Unveils Interim Armored Vehicles, Army Logistician, Mar/Apr 2001, Vol. 33 Issue 2: p. 1. 42 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-31, Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges (August 2004): p. 13. 43 Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006-2007 Budget Estimates: Weapons and Tracked Vehicles, Army, February 2005. Accessed at http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY0607/pforms/wtcv.pdf 12
funds for transformation programs. process balanced modernization.44
Recent Army Modernization Plans termed this
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld worried about the trade-offs and intervened on several occasions. He forced the Army to kill the Crusader artillery system and Rumsfeld seriously
demanded steep cuts in the Comanche helicopter program.
considered slashing funding for Stryker, though he ultimately spared the program.45 Army leaders eventually cancelled the Comanche program in February 2004.46 Despite these efforts, recent Army budgets still faced substantial shortfalls. Modernization programs for the legacy forces were cut 16% for the Armys FY04 budget. It terminated 24 systems, including upgrades to M-1 Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles to free up R&D funds for the Future Combat System.47 These are precisely the platforms proving so effective and important in Operation Iraqi Freedom.48 Yet even in wartime Army leaders prioritized transformation programs over improving vehicles with a demonstrated relevance today. Criticizing Stryker The Armys choice of a wheeled armored vehicle for its interim brigades remains a controversial issue. Detractors point out several weaknesses of the Stryker and wheeled vehicles in general. The primary deficiencies identified by critics are insufficient armor protection for the troops riding in the vehicle, the inferior performance of wheeled
44
Department of the Army, 2002 Army Modernization Plan, Accessed at http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2002/wMP_mainv03b.pdf 45 John Hendren, Army Holds Its Ground in Battle With Rumsfeld, Los Angeles Times, November 29, 2002. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/021129-sbct.htm 46 Army Cancels Comanche Helicopter Program, Government Services Administration, February 23, 2004: Accessed at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0204/022304cdpm2.htm 47 Extra $3B for Army, But That Wont Be Enough, Army Times, February 10, 2003. Accessed at http://www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-1554345.php 48 Alex Berenson, Fighting the Old-fashioned Way in Najaf, New York Times, August 29, 2004. Accessed at www.nytimes.com/2004/08/29/weekinreview/29bere.html 13
vehicles in off-road situations, and the questionable deployability of Strykers in C-130 aircraft. Insufficient Armor Protection A significant concern raised by critics of the Styker is the lack of sufficient armor and its vulnerability to common weapons like rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), a weapon of choice for Iraqi insurgents. Tom Christie, the Pentagons director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, in fact recommended not sending the vehicles to Iraq precisely due to their susceptibility to attacks with RPGs and other explosives. 49 This vulnerability is striking since Shinseki himself cited RPG survivability as an important feature for the new IAV.50 To remedy this shortcoming the Army is installing a cage of ballistic steel slat armor around the vehicle. While the cage does offer
protection against RPGs it also adds an additional 2.5 tons in weight51, impairing maneuverability, off-road performance, speed, fuel efficiency and C-130
transportability.52 Furthermore, the top of the vehicle and the shoulder-height wheel wells remain exposed and vulnerable. Each upgrade adds $300,000 to the cost of the vehicle.53 The rationale behind lightly armored vehicles playing significant combat roles is the notion that superior access to information offers the United States military distinct battlefield advantages. As MG Robert Scales, USA (Ret.) observes, Perhaps the only
49
Jon E. Dougherty, Controversy Surrounds Armys Stryker, NewsMax.com (January, 28, 2004): Accessed at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/1/28/151543.shtml 50 Heike Hasenauer, Reaching the Army Vision, Soldiers (June 2000): Accessed at http://www.army.mil/soldiers/jun2000/features/ausa1.html. 51 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legion: The Army and the Future of Land Warfare, (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 14, 2004): p. 51. 52 Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus the Reality of War (A report written for Congressman Jim Saxton), August 22, 2003: p. 58. 53 Ibid: p. 11. 14
way to achieve the desired degree of self-protection for lightly armored vehicles will be to replace reliance on heavy armor with an indirect form of protection, achieved through superior situational awareness. If the enemy can be identified, tracked, and destroyed will outside the enemys lethal range, then substantial self-protection from heavy armor might no longer be necessary.54 This vision proved attainable and successful in combat situations like Desert Storm and the major combat period of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The problem, however, lies in fighting in rough mountainous terrain like Afghanistan or urban combat like the Fallujah and Najaf uprisings in Iraq. Strykers, and the fighting style Stryker brigades are designed for, are ineffective in these situations because that is where the long-range sensors cannot see, where smart weapons are dumbfounded, where air strikes are impaired, and where ground troops are essential.55 Even heavily armored vehicles prove vulnerable under persistent attack in asymmetrical warfare. To-date Iraqi insurgents have knocked a staggering number of 69ton M1A1 Abrams tanks out of the fight using low-tech improvised explosives and rocket-propelled grenades by targeting the thinner armor at the sides and top of the vehicles. At least 80 Abrams were so heavily damaged they were shipped back to the United States.56 Nevertheless, the heavy tanks have the lowest casualty rates of all deployed vehicles in Iraq despite their heavy use and frequent attacks they sustain. They remain the platform of choice for fighting insurgents.57
54
Robert H. Scales, Jr., Yellow Smoke: the Future of Land Warfare for Americas Military (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003): p. 151. 55 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., The Long March, The National Journal, Vol. 36, No. 5, January 31, 2004: p. 34. 56 Steven Komarow, Tanks take a Beating in Iraq, USA Today, March 29, 2005. Accessed at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-03-29-abrams-tank-a_x.htm 57 Steven Komarow, Tanks Adapted for Urban Fights they Once Avoided, USA Today, March 29, 2005. Accessed at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-03-29-tank-inside_x.htm 15
Wheels vs. Tracks The debate over the relative benefits of wheeled and tracked armored vehicles is decades old. COL Donald Schenk of the Armys Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) declared in the performance area to date, there is no remarkable benefit for either wheels or tracks in straight, technical performance.58 Wheeled vehicles are in fact quicker and quieter in on-road situations and more comfortable for the troops inside, the main reasons they are the platforms of choice for peacekeeping and paramilitary operations. The issue at hand, however, is whether wheeled armored vehicles are effective warfighting platforms. Douglas MacGregor, a retired Army colonel and author of
Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation under Fire, put it bluntly: A tank, or any armored track vehicle for that matter, is vastly superior to a wheeled vehicle as a warfighting platform.59 Victor OReilly, a defense analyst, cites a January 2000 study conducted by the United Kingdom Defence Procurement Agency (DPA)/United States Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) program reaching these same conclusions. OReilly claims Shinseki ignored the findings and terminated the joint program.60 There are three primary critiques of wheeled armored vehicles. First, their offroad performance is poor compared to tracked vehicles. Tracked vehicles excel in muddy conditions where wheeled vehicles tend to get stuck, in part due to their better weight distribution. Tires tend to wear quickly on hard ground and are not as durable as tracks.
58
Harold Kennedy, Army Approaches Decision on Interim Combat Vehicle, National Defense, September 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Sep/Army_Approaches.htm 59 COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA Ret, email correspondence with the author, March 8, 2005. 60 Victor OReilly, Preventable Deaths (A report written for Congress), December 16, 2003. Accessed at http://www.combatreform.com/ppd43.pdf: p. 63. 16
Tracked vehicles also feature a lower center-of-gravity because ground clearance is not a significant issue in non-wheeled vehicles. The Stryker in particular is purportedly prone to rollovers in off-road environments.61 If as a result of poor off-road performance Strykers employed in combat situations primarily stay on roads their effectiveness may be significantly reduced.62 Enemy fighters could mine the roads and then seek refuge in roadless areas. A second criticism is the inferiority of a wheeled vehicles maneuverability, which is especially important in urban combat situations. While the Stryker has a turning radius of 58.5 feet (wider than many city streets), a tracked vehicle can pivot steer by turning on its axis. The Stryker is vulnerable to being blocked or trapped in an urban setting by enemy fighters. A wheeled vehicle like the Stryker is unlikely to successfully negotiate rubble without puncturing at least one tire, impacting its speed and mobility. Tracked vehicles easily traverse rubble-strewn areas and can surmount substantially higher vertical obstacles (24 for the Stryker vs. 36 for the MTVL).63 A third criticism of wheeled vehicles is that they cannot carry additional weight from up-armoring, other improvements and load-carrying without significantly degrading off-road performance. Tracks distribute the overall weight of the vehicle much better. Wheels tend to sink in soft surfaces or wet ground.64
61
Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus The Reality of War (A report written for Congressman Jim Saxton), August 22, 2003: p. 20. 62 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legion: The Army and the Future of Land Warfare, (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 14, 2004): p. 51. 63 COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA, unpublished information provided in correspondence with the author, April 27, 2004. See also Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus the Reality of War (A report written for Congressman Jim Saxton), August 22, 2003: pp. 22-23. 64 Victor OReilly, Preventable Deaths (A report written for Congress), December 16, 2003: pp: 64-64, 68. Accessed at http://www.combatreform.com/ppd43.pdf 17
Tracked vehicles do fall short in certain areas of performance. Wheeled vehicles are faster and quieter on paved roads and dry unpaved roads.65 They typically also feature better fuel efficiency. Shinseki displayed a preference for wheeled vehicles for these reasons. During his speech announcing Army Transformation in October 1999 he observed heavy tracked vehicles like armored personnel carriers and tanks could be phased out by lighter, faster, more fuel-efficient wheeled vehicles during the next century.66 In another speech he asked: Can we, in time, go to an all-wheeled vehicle fleet, where even the follow-on to todays armored vehicles come in at 50- to 70 percent less tonnage? I think the answer is yes, and were going to ask the questions and then go where the answers are.67 [Authors emphasis] C-130 Transportability A primary justification and selling point for the IAV was the capability to deploy a brigade in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.68 To meet this goal, according to the Armys IAV solicitation from April 2000, the vehicle should have the capability of entering, being transportable in, and exiting a C-130 aircraft under its own power and be capable of immediate combat operations.69 [Authors emphasis] Furthermore, vehicle weight should not exceed 38,000 lbs.70
65
Dan Gour and Kenneth Steadman, Medium Armor and the Transformation of the U.S. Military, Lexington Institute Paper, September 2004: p. 9. 66 Gerry J. Gilmore, Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki, Federation of American Scientists website. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991013shinvis.htm 67 As quoted in: Harold Kennedy, Armys New Combat Vehicle to Undergo Additional Tests, National Defense, December 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Dec/Armys_New.htm 68 See Gerry J. Gilmore, Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki, Federation of American Scientists website. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991013shinvis.htm 69 As quoted in Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus The Reality of War (A report written for Congressman Jim Saxton), August 22, 2003: p. 62. 70 Ibid. 18
Soon after the selection of the LAV-III/Stryker as the IAV, critics charged the vehicle was too heavy and too large for C-130 deployment.71 While the original LAV-III was light enough, various add-ons and upgrades to the vehicle caused Strykers weight to balloon significantly. Army officials themselves admitted in early 2002 that certain Stryker variants exceeded the weight limit, the MGS variant by as much as 3,000 lbs.72 Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich criticized the Stryker and sent several emails to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilian leaders in September and October 2002 urging him to cancel the program.73 In an effort to silence critics, Army officials organized a demonstration for senior Army leaders, government officials and journalists at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. After a C-130 taxied to a stop, an 11-man squad retrieved a Stryker from the plane and prepared the vehicle for combat operations in eight minutes. The Air Force required a special waiver to fly the vehicle on the plane, however, as it was heavier than the official cargo capacity limit.74 Army officials also backtracked from their original specifications that the vehicle be combat ready upon arrival. They never envisioned the Stryker to roll off a C-130 with guns blazing, but rather be capable of conducting combat operations after a short period of preparation.75
71
See for example Benjamin C. Works, The U.S. Armys Light Armored Vehicle, Strategic Issues Research Institute, Report issued May 19, 2001. Accessed at http://www.siri-us.com/backissues/2001/SITRep%2001-05-19%3B%20armyveh.txt 72 Frank Tiboni, Most New Armored Vehicles Exceed U.S. Armys Medium-Weight Needs, Defense News (March 4-10, 2002): p. 6. 73 Sean D. Naylor, Digging in on Stryker, Army Times (November 4, 2002): Accessed at http://www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-1232529.php 74 Joe Burlas, Stryker Demo Debunks Critics, Army News Service, October 25, 2002. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/10/mil-021025-usa01.htm
75
Ibid. 19
A 2002 RAND study concluded the 96-hour deployment window for a Stryker brigade (about 366 vehicles) was unfeasible76, delivering another blow to the deployability argument. GAO reported in June 2003 that five to 14 days, depending on destination, with a huge commitment of Air Force resources, was a more realistic figure.77 A December 2004 memorandum from TRADOC chief Gen. Kevin Burns to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Schoomaker again raised concerns over the weight of the vehicle. A stripped down version of Stryker still tips the scales at 24 tons, far short of Army leaderships stated goal of 20 tons and straining the carrying capacity of a C-130. According to the memo, it would take four to six hours per vehicle to reload them with the fuel, ammunition and other supplies necessary for combat.78 Byrnes further noted that even at 24 tons it is doubtful that the Army will meet its survivability requirements on most of the eight vehicle variants.79 Stryker advocates like Dan Gour of the Lexington Institute, a defense polity think tank, admit that the vehicles cannot be airlifted into a contested area as a result.80 From Theory to Practice: Stryker in Combat in Iraq 2003-present The true test for Strykers capabilities is how the vehicle performs in actual combat situations. According to General Schoomaker the Stryker Brigades have proven their
76
Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options, (Santa Monica, Calif.:RAND, 2002). 77 Ray Rivera and Hal Bernton, Stryker Readiness Questioned, Seattle Times, September 6, 2003. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030906-stryker01.htm 78 Megan Scully, U.S. Armys FCS: Too Heavy for C-130? DefenseNews.com, January 31, 2005. Accessed at http://www.defensenews.com/sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20050131/atpc16154722.sgml 79 Ibid. 80 Dan Gour and Kenneth Steadman, Medium Armor and the Transformation of the U.S. Military, Lexington Institute Paper, September 2004: p. 11. 20
worth.81
He recently hailed their extraordinary performance in Operation Iraqi
Freedom.82 A careful analysis of unclassified sources will determine the merits of his claim. The 3rd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division (3/2 SBCT) from Fort Lewis, Wash. was the first Stryker Brigade deployed to Iraq. The unit arrived in Kuwait in November 2003 and entered Samarra, Iraq in December. Subsequent a month of operations in Samarra the unit was reassigned to Mosul in northern Iraq. A GAO study conducted prior to deployment identified several weaknesses in the brigades performance. Among the findings, GAO analysts highlighted operational
weaknesses in the unit, primarily due to insufficient training. Army officials conducted additional training to address this issue before deploying the unit to Iraq.83 Two issues with long-term, potentially deadly implications were not addressed for the 3/2 SBCT or the currently deployed brigade. One concern is the survivability and mobility of the reconnaissance squadron operations officer. Currently this person is assigned to a HMMWV.84 These vehicles, even the up-armored version, have proven very susceptible to enemy fire and explosives, unnecessarily endangering the lives of critical members of the Stryker brigade.85
81
Ann Roosevelt, Strykers Turning in Extraordinary Performance, Schoomaker Says, Defense Daily, January 18, 2005: p. 7. 82 Ibid. 83 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-188 Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades (December 2003): p. 33. 84 Ibid: p. 34. 85 Numerous reports have cited the vulnerability of HMMWVs. See for example Craig Gordon, Troops seen vulnerable in Humvees, Boston Globe, December 18, 2003. Accessed at http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2003/12/18/troops_seen_vulnerable_in_humvees/ 21
The second issue of significant concern is that only half of the Stryker vehicles were equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment.86 FBCB2 is the information system providing soldiers with real-time and near real-time battle command information.87 Half of the Stryker vehicles deployed in December 2003 thus did not have the very tools to master situational awareness that Army leaders, including Shinseki, 88 touted would offer combat advantage on the battlefield and negate the effects of reduced armor protection. A further difficulty Stryker brigades face is that, in trying to come as close as possible to the desired 96-hour deployment goal, they had to shed critical elements. The brigade gave up its heavy armored vehicles, helicopters, long-term logistical support, and even lacked adequate staff to coordinate with Air Force squadrons. It appears the lone Stryker brigade first deployed in Iraq had to supplement its headquarters with 100 additional personnel.89 Currently a Stryker brigade cannot be self-sufficient and air deployable, undermining the entire rationale for procuring the vehicles in the first place. As a result, Strykers have not been airlifted inside Iraq.90 The C-130 transportability requirement may in fact be dropped altogether.91 The 3/2 SBCTs Strykers and other vehicles arrived in Kuwait City on November 12, 2003. Ironically the vehicles were not transported via strategic airlift but by ship. Two USN supply ships departed the Port of Tacoma on October 19 for the three-week
86 87
Ibid. Federation of American Scientists tutorial accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod101/sys/ac/equip/docs/A2C2S_Tutorial_RevA1a/sld010.htm 88 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Transformation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000. 89 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., The Long March, The National Journal, Vol. 36, No. 5 January 31, 2004: p. 36. 90 Jefferson Morris, C-130 not used by Stryker Brigades for In-theater Movement, PM says, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Vol. 212, No. 44 (December 3, 2004): p. 4. Accessed through Lexis Nexis. 91 Ibid. 22
voyage. Logistics crews needed an additional two days to unload the ships and prepare the fleet for the long drive to Samarra.92 From there the 3/2 Brigade was reassigned to the northern city of Mosul as the insurgency in central Iraq grew more violent in early 2004. Analysis of Stryker Brigade Accidents, Attacks and Casualties (to May 2, 2005) The following data are compiled from a variety of official Pentagon reports as well as newspaper articles. The compiled incidents include only those where the Stryker vehicle itself was attacked or involved in an accident. I did not include attacks on Stryker Brigade soldiers once they had disembarked from the vehicles while on patrol or in battle. It is important to note, though, that this method of fighting greatly limits the utility of Stryker Brigades in close combat situations when lacking heavy firepower for backup. Dismounted light infantry stand to suffer significant casualties in penetration attacks on defended urban areas.93 Any damage sustained to the vehicle is reported when available, though this information is usually lacking in official Pentagon news releases. The list is incomplete as well. According to Lt. Col. Gordie Flowers, commander of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, over 50 percent of his Strykers were hit with RPGs and IEDs during his twelve month deployment.94 I only listed incidents, however, for which I obtained reliable and specific details.95
92
Michael Gilbert, Last of 5,000 Stryker Soldiers due in Kuwait as Brigade Gears up for Forward Deployment, The Tacoma News Tribune, November 16, 2003. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/3872881p-3466602c.html 93 COL Douglas MacGregor, USA (Ret.), Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, July 15, 2004. 94 As quoted in Lisa Burgess, Army Looks to Give Stryker a Facelift, Stars & Stripes, December 22, 2004. Accessed at http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_122204_Stryker,00.html 95 Blogs often cite news of incidents but rarely provide reliable sourcing. For example, see Minstrel Boys account of a 4 April 2005 IED attack on a Stryker in Mosul: http://minstrelboy.blogspot.com/2005/04/securing-scene-of-damaged-stryker-hit.html 23
RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake Table 3: A Compilation of Stryker Vehicle Attacks and Accidents, and Resulting Casualties.
Date
12/08/2003 12/13/2003 12/16/2003 12/20/2003 01/31/2004 02/01/2004 02/20/2004
Location
Duluiyah (near Samarra) Samarra Not specified Samarra Mosul Mosul Not specified
Incident Type*
Rollover IED Rollover IED RPG RPG Rollover
Description
Two Strykers plunge into a canal. One Stryker destroyed after secondary explosion. One Stryker rolls into irrigation pond. Explosion knocks left front wheel off one Stryker. RPG attack inflicts vehicle damage. RPG attack inflicts minor vehicle damage. One Stryker swerves to avoid collision. Undisclosed damage to vehicle One Stryker rolls over during off-road maneuvers. An unspecified vehicle (possibly a Stryker) hit by an IED during a patrol. An unspecified vehicle (possibly a Stryker) hit by RPG during a patrol. One Stryker swerves to avoid collision, rolls over down embankment. One Stryker swerves to avoid collision. One Stryker disabled (broken transmission) due to heavy RPG fire during a rescue mission. A military vehicle (not specified, possibly a Stryker) was hit by an IED during a patrol. A car bomb detonated alongside a Stryker convoy. Stryker vehicle attacked during convoy operations. A convoy of 4 Strykers was ambushed by a car bomb during an attack on a Stryker Brigade outpost A Stryker patrol came
Casualties
3 killed 1 injury. 1 suffers minor injuries Driver suffers broken foot No serious injuries. No serious injuries. Undisclosed
Sources#
1, 2, 3, 4 2, 24 1 2, 24 22, 23 22 1
03/28/2004 04/04/2004 04/28/2004 07/14/2004 07/15/2004 09/04/2004
Not specified Mosul Mosul Not specified Not specified Tal Afar (near Mosul) Mosul
Rollover IED RPG Rollover Rollover RPG
2 suffer unspecified injuries 1 killed, 1 injured 1 killed 2 killed 3 suffer unspecified injuries No major injuries. 1 killed
1 3, 21 3, 20 1, 3 1 26
09/21/2004
IED
3, 19
10/11/2004 12/04/2004 12/30/2004
Mosul Mosul Mosul
VBIED Unspecifi ed enemy fire. VBIED
1 killed, 9 injured 2 killed 15 wounded
3, 17, 18 3, 14 8, 12, 13
01/04/2005
Mosul
RPG
1 killed, 2
3, 15, 16
24
RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake under RPG and small wounded arms fire. 01/13/2005 Mosul VBIED A car bomb exploded 1 killed 3, 11 alongside a military vehicle (likely a Stryker) while on patrol 02/03/2005 Mosul IED A roadside bomb was 1 killed, 1 3, 7 detonated near a Stryker injured vehicle while on patrol. 02/12/2005 Mosul RPG A Stryker vehicle was No reported disabled during a battle injuries. near a Mosul mosque. 02/16/2005 Mosul VBIED A car bomb detonated 1 killed, 3 3, 5 near a Stryker vehicle injured while on patrol. 02/17/2005 Tal Afar (near IED An explosive device was 1 killed, 1 3, 6 Mosul) detonated near a Stryker injured on patrol. 03/13/2005 Tal Afar (near IED A Stryker was hit by an 5 injured 10 Mosul) explosive device while on patrol. 03/18/2005 Mosul VBIED A suicide bomber 6 injured, 1 9 detonated explosives seriously. alongside a Stryker on patrol. 04/06/2005 Tal Afar (near IED An explosive device was 2 wounded 27 Mosul) detonated near a Stryker on patrol. 04/23/2005 Mosul VBIED A bomb-laden car crashes 1 killed 28 into a Stryker. 04/30/2005 Tal Afar (near IED A Stryker was hit by a 4 killed, 2 29 Mosul roadside bomb while on wounded patrol. * The abbreviations used are: RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade), IED (Improvised Explosive Device), VBIED (Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device - a car bomb) # See Appendix 1 for key to sources.
Strykers are primarily used as infantry transport vehicles. Michael Gilbert, a Tacoma News-Tribune reporter embedded with the 3/2 SBCT from December 2003 to May 2004, witnessed several operations firsthand. Generally the vehicles would move the infantry close in to the line of departure. Once the troops dismount the gunner on the vehicle would provide fire support. Typically the vehicles would stay on the highway and cover the backs of the infantry.96
96
Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005. 25
In Samarra the 3/2 SBCT was divided into two company-sized battalions of approximately 20 vehicles and 170 men. The Brigade would receive intelligence and targeting information from the 4th Division stationed there. A battalion would then move rapidly into town, but the infantry would run a few blocks to the target.97 The infantry is thus exposed to enemy fire protected only by Kevlar vests and helmets. The first month of the Stryker Brigades deployment in Samarra was marred by two rollovers and two IED attacks. According to Gilbert, the Brigade Commander prohibited his soldiers to take Strykers off-road near water subsequent the second rollover incident98, thus greatly limiting the areas of operation for the vehicles in this wellirrigated area. This also means that the patrol routes for Strykers becomes more
predictable to observant insurgents. The IED attacks demonstrated that Strykers are indeed vulnerable to such attacks and probably contributed to the decision to redeploy the 3/2 SBCT to Mosul in January 2004. The Kurd-dominated area in northern Iraq was relatively peaceful at the time and required little more than stabilization forces. Gen. Larry Ellis, head of the U.S. Army Forces Command, requested more Strykers be put in the field around this time to offset the general lack of armor in Iraq. A Newsweek magazine article cites sources claiming that Army leadership in Washington was hesitant to approve this. The rubber-tire Strykers are thin-skinned and dont
maneuver through dangerous streets as well as the fast-pivoting, treaded Bradley. According to a well-placed Defense Department source, the Army was so worried about the Strykers vulnerability that most of the 300-vehicle brigade was deployed up in the
97 98
Ibid. Ibid. 26
safer Kurdish region around Mosul. Any further south and the Army were afraid the Arabs would light them up, he said.99 Even in Mosul during early 2004 limits were placed on where Strykers could be used despite the comparative tranquility. According to Gilbert, Strykers were not
allowed in the old section of the city during his time there. The streets are quite narrow, and the vehicle could not turn around in the event of an ambush. Fears of grenade attacks from above and behind were also major concerns.100 Again the operational area for the Stryker Brigade was curtailed, offering insurgents opportunities to establish a safe haven. The 3/2 SBCT experienced two RPG attacks in late January and early February 2004. In the first attack the grenade impact just above the slat armor cage, causing minor damage. The grenade wedged into the slat armor in the second attack and exploded away from the body of the vehicle, thus working as advertised. It is unclear whether the RPG and IED attacks of April 2004 involved Strykers. There were 4 rollover accidents during the February-July 2004 time frame, one during off-road maneuvers and three when swerving to avoid collisions. Michael Gilbert noted that, in addition to these rollovers, Strykers were also involved in many accidents with Iraqi civilian vehicles. The 3/2 SBCT commander offered financial compensation to the victims families as a gesture of goodwill.101 There are no further reports of rollovers and the number of accidents decreased after the Brigade Commander ordered his soldiers
99
Melinda Liu, John Barry and Michael Hirsh, The Human Cost, Newsweek (May 3, 2004). Online version accessed at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4825948/ 100 Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005. 101 Ibid.
27
to reduce their patrol speed.102 The Army also changed its training for Stryker drivers in response to the frequent accidents.103 Whether the Stryker is more prone to roll-overs than other military vehicles, particularly with the addition of slat armor, is still an open question. COL Peter Fuller, program manager for the Stryker vehicle program, claims they are not.104 Michael Gilbert indicated that Stryker drivers he spoke with determined the main issue with the slat armor was not so much that the vehicle was more top-heavy, but that the vehicle was more unwieldy due to its greater width and length. The added weight also greatly increased the stopping distance.105 The official report on the roll-over accidents
conducted by the U.S. Army Safety Center is not yet available for public release.106 In April 2004 3/2 SBCT participated in operations in Najaf and Kut. Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker touted the operational agility of a Stryker battalion citing an operation where the Army moved a Stryker battalion 420 miles through Iraq in 48 hours, all the while maintaining situational awareness and conducting battle planning on the move.107 Gilbert noted a similar operation where a battalion-size task force moved from Najaf to Kut as part of Operation Danger Fortitude. The Stryker battalion covered over
102 103
Ibid. Jefferson Morris, Army Taking Steps to Solve Stryker Rollover Problem, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Vol. 212, No. 44 (December 3, 2004): p. 4. Accessed at Lexis Nexis. 104 Michael Gilbert, Army Defends Strykers after at Least Seven Rollovers, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 21, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/story/4617218p4288984c.html 105 Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005. 106 Michael Gilbert, Army Defends Strykers after at Least Seven Rollovers, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 21, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/story/4617218p4288984c.html 107 Megan Scully, The Squeeze on Transformation, Army Times, February 21, 2005. Accessed at www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-649239.php 28
300 miles in 14 hours while its commanders conducted operational planning en route.108 While the distance traveled is noteworthy and the fact that operational planning on the road took place is convenient, Strykers still served only as troop transports. The soldiers involved in the Najaf and Kut battles dismounted their vehicles well outside of town to join up their fellow soldiers. The latter half of 3/2 SBCTs deployment in Mosul witnessed relatively few additional incidents, though they were very violent. One Stryker was targeted and
heavily damaged by a car bomb in October 2004. Reports on the 3-hour battle in Tal Afar on September 4, 2004 following the downing of a Kiowa helicopter is one of the few detailed accounts of the 3/2 SBCT in action.109 That morning insurgents attacked two Kiowa helicopters with RPGs, hitting one in the engine. A Scout Platoon consisting of 4 Strykers was within 1000 meters of the crash site and arrived on site in less than 5 minutes. Soldiers dismounted from the vehicles at 75 meters from the Kiowa and set up a perimeter. One of the two pilots was carried to the Stryker medical evacuation vehicle. The perimeter meanwhile came under heavy RPG and small arms fire and the defenders were outnumbered and in danger of being overrun. Bravo Company, another Stryker patrol, was 1500 meters west of the crash site, but faced a hostile urban jungle of blind alleyways and two- and three-story buildings.110 Bravo Company crept along a road heading toward the crash site under heavy fire erupting from seemingly every doorway and window, including at least 15 RPGs. One
108 109
Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005. The described sequence of events is based on Matthew Cox, They Werent Going to get this Bird, Army Times, November 22, 2004. Accessed at http://www.armytimes.com/print.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER452676.php; and Bill Hutchens, Helicopter Heroes, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 12, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4552351p-4264302c.html 110 Cox, They Werent Going to Get this Bird. 29
slammed into one of the leading vehicles, damaging the transmission. The column grounded to a halt a few hundred meters later when the damaged Stryker could go no further. The soldiers had to hook up the disabled vehicle to another with a tow bar under enemy fire to continue on. An overhead UAV monitored the evolving battle continuously and its controllers observed a new influx of insurgents armed with RPGs and machine guns heading toward the area. Another determined group of insurgents also placed themselves between Bravo Company and the crash site. Basically what I did then was call in the Air Force, according Lt. Col Reed, commander of the forces in battle.111 Two F-16s provided close air support and targeted the insurgents with JDAMs. Bravo Company was able to link up with Scout Patrol at the Kiowa crash site in the ensuing lull in fighting but again came under heavy mortar fire, puncturing Strykers tires. The pinned down soldiers repeatedly returned to their vehicles for additional ammunition and launched two TOW missiles to slow the attack. It was not until an F-16 strafed the area, however, that the Stryker troops could dismantle the helicopter and depart the area in relative safety. This battle highlights two shortcomings of Stryker-centered brigades. First is the vehicles primary use as an infantry transport/paramilitary vehicle, as opposed to a warfighting platform. The troops must dismount the vehicle to effectively fight, thereby exposing themselves to enemy fire. While such tactics are effective in situations like riot control, the predicament of the Scout Platoon clearly shows the inadequacy of this approach in close urban combat as they were pinned down by heavy enemy small arms and RPG fire.
111
As quoted in Hutchens, Helicopter Heroes. 30
Second is the Brigades heavy reliance on airpower for effectiveness and survival in the face of determined insurgent attacks.112 The soldiers were only able to extract themselves after multiple close air strikes on the opposing forces. Blasting their way out in their Strykers was clearly not an option, even though the insurgents were relatively lightly armed with small arms, RPGs and 60mm mortars. The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (1/25 SBCT) relieved the 3/2 SBCT in November 2004 at a time when the security situation in the area deteriorated significantly. There appears to be an alarming trend of insurgents deliberately targeting Stryker convoys with IEDs and RPGs. From December 2004 through March 2005 the 1/25 SBCT suffered at least 199 such attacks113, some with deadly consequences, at a time when overall attacks on coalition forces dropped across the rest of Iraq. The brigade suffered at least 3 deadly attacks in April 2005, killing 5 and wounding 4 soldiers. This is a worrying development since it is clear Strykers are not well-equipped to withstand such large explosions. A recent incident in Mosul demonstrates another use for Stryker: that of a pursuit vehicle. Insurgents there recently began launching attacks on Iraqi government building and Iraqi and American troops from cars. The car enables them to attempt a quick getaway, often seeking shelter in the narrow alleys of the old city. On several occasions soldiers of the Stryker Brigade pursued insurgents in their Stryker vehicles, though there is no indication that any chase yielded results. The pursuit on March 12 ended when a
112
See COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA (Ret.), Army Transformation, Washington Times, February 11, 2005: p. 20. 113 Albert Eisele, Improvised Explosives Becoming more Common in Iraq, The Hill, March 28, 2005. Accessed at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Frontpage/032305/explosives.html 31
Stryker ground to a halt due to a broken axle, though the soldiers were able to destroy one insurgents vehicle when he doubled back through the area a few minutes later.114 In the midst of this influx in attacks on Strykers, the Washington Post leaked details of an internal Army Report completed in December 2004.115 The report, entitled Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul Iraq (3/2 SBCT), chronicles numerous complaints about Stryker drawn from confidential interviews with 3/2 SBCT soldiers. Among the more important findings are shortcomings in the slat armor, situational awareness system and the remote weapon system. Army investigators found the slat armor cages to be effective only against 50% of total rocket-propelled grenade attacks, and not effective at all against anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades.116 The additional weight of the armor seriously impacted vehicle handling and performance in wet conditions and muddy terrain, caused significant tire wear, and made the central tire inflation system, used to adjust tire pressure according to terrain, inoperable.117 The FBCB2 battlefield information system proved ineffective in battle. The commanders heads-up display, a helmet-mounted display used to access the tactical battlefield intelligence computer, was rarely used because it was too large and difficult to use inside the vehicle and caused blind spots to its wearer in urban environments. It was used effectively, however, during long convoy movements.118
114
Monte Morin, In Mosul, Insurgents Have Become Road Warriors, Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2005. Accessed at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fgmosul13mar13,1,2134295.story?coll=la-iraq-complete&ctrack=1&cset=true 115 R. Jeffrey Smith, Study Faults Army Vehicle, The Washington Post, March 31, 2005: p. A01. 116 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq: p. 48. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/iir-mosul-ops_strykerbde_21dec2004.pdf 117 Ibid: pp: 50-1, 53. 118 Ibid: p. 55. 32
The computer providing situational awareness requires numerous improvements itself. Its processor is too slow, the computer locks up when multiple vehicles attempt to access the system while moving at high speed and many of the overhead photos were outdated.119 Additionally, soldiers complained that the digital systems overheated easily. The reports authors conclude air conditioning units will have to be installed in all Strykers120. This will impact the vehicles fuel efficiency, acceleration and add additional weight. Strykers remote weapon system, its main armament, also suffers significant deficiencies. A lack of stabilization for the gun and sight makes it extremely difficult to hit targets while moving, the lack of a color display makes it difficult to identify specific targets (e.g. a car of a particular color), and the slow slewing of the guns turret impairs the gunners ability to quickly engage a target. The gun is only marginally effective at night even when standing still because the thermal sensors used for firing accuracy dont work well then.121 While the remote weapon system serves as an effective area
suppression weapon when standing still122, its shortcomings underline Strykers lack of effective firepower in combat. In an apparent response to these problems, the Army Engineering School will soon outfit the 1/25 SBCT with a new radio-frequency kit to allow soldiers to detonate mines from as far as several kilometers away. The units, called Matrix, are designed to work with Claymore antipersonnel mines that feature a lethal radius of 50 meters. Matrix
119 120
Ibid: p. 56. Ibid. 121 Ibid: p. 58. 122 Ibid. 33
can also be paired with a non-lethal version of the mine for crowd control purposes.123 This emphasis on static, stand-off defenses nevertheless underscores Strykers liabilities in close-quarter combat. Despite the spate of incidents and the negative internal Army report, soldiers of the deployed Stryker Brigade remain enthusiastic supporters of the vehicle124, often citing the vehicles speed, safety and quietness: Being quiet is an advantage because [the insurgents] dont know where were at. If they attack us, we can circle around behind without hearing us, because the firefights are loud. You cant even notice us driving up.125 According to Lt. Col Michael Kurilla of the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment in urban combat, no better vehicle exists for delivering a squad of infantrymen to close in and destroy the enemy.126 Indeed, Stryker is useful as an infantry transport vehicle. It is, however, not suitable for combat in urban and complex settings it was intended for as described in the 2003 Army Modernization Plan. Conclusions Stryker is not a warfighting platform. They are inherently unsuitable for the small-scale contingencies, particularly urban operations, they were designed and optimized for.127 Stryker has not proven particularly agile or versatile in its missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom. My analysis of operations in Iraq indicates that, in reality, the vehicles are used only for paramilitary missions like patrols and light infantry transport.
123
Michael Peck, Stryker Brigade will Protect Bases with Remote-controlled Mines, National Defense, March 2005. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Mar/UFStryker_Brigade.htm 124 Robert Burns, Stryker has Proven its Worth, Associated Press, April 21, 2005. Accessed at http://www.usarpac.army.mil/news/xform/ap_042105.asp 125 Edward Harris, Soldiers Hail New Army Troop Transport, The Associated Press, April 5, 2005. Accessed at http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0405/218502.html 126 Michael Kurilla, Stryker Gets the Job Done, The Washington Post, April 5, 2005: p. 22. 127 Department of the Army, 2003 Army Modernization Plan: pp. 26-27. Accessed at http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2003/MP03Mainweb100.pdf 34
The vehicles lack adequate firepower for fast-paced and close-quarter urban combat. In the one well-documented case where Stryker Brigades were drawn into serious urban combat the troops were not able to dominate the battlefield until after the bulk of the opposing force had been wiped out by strong displays of air power. An internal Army report also raised serious concerns about the deficiencies of its main armament. Strykers inadequate armor and large exposed wheel wells make them unnecessarily vulnerable to weapons like rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices commonly employed in guerilla tactics and urban combat situations American troops face daily in Iraq. The vehicles large turning radius hinders its
maneuverability on narrow city streets. Off-road mobility has proven problematic as well, especially with the additional weight of appliqu armor. Due to restrictions on use off-road around Samarra and in the narrow streets of Mosuls old quarter, large areas became relatively safe havens for insurgents and Stryker areas of operation became predictable. Worryingly, Stryker patrols in Mosul now appear to be specifically targeted by insurgents using improvised explosive devices. The ability of Stryker Brigades to perform independently at the higher end of the combat spectrum is limited as well. A root cause of this miscalculation is the underlying assumption of the battlefield advantage of situational awareness. We simply do not possess the technological capabilities to achieve a clear picture of enemy movement and intentions. The edge in information superiority our forces currently do enjoy is generally negated in close-quarter urban combat. Transport by C-130 within the theater, a primary reason for procuring the vehicle, has proven entirely unrealistic. Even Strykers stripped down to the bare essentials are
35
only just light enough for air transport but require an unacceptable amount of time to prepare for operations upon landing. It is telling the 2/3 SBCT drove to Najaf rather than be flown there.128 TRADOC analysts concluded a Stryker unit is capable of winning decisively in major combat operations (MCO) only with significant augmentation.129 In other words, Stryker brigades would need accompaniment of a heavy division to be truly effective, undermining the utility of being C-130 transportable.130 General Shinseki was right to emphasize the need for rapidly deployable, lethal, and survivable brigades. He got it wrong by insisting on equipping them with wheeled LAVs. Transformation does not necessarily necessitate a new platform or new It often means employing the tools you have in a different manner.
technologies.
Pursuing Stryker as the platform for the all-purpose Interim Brigade was a costly mistake. Policy Implications In light of the preceding analysis I propose the following five policy changes: Cancel the Stryker Program The Department of Defense should terminate the Stryker program after FY2005. Restricting procurement of additional vehicles frees up $2.1 billion131 for upgrades to and new purchases of existing platforms, as well as additional funds for body armor, ammunition and vehicle maintenance. An average per unit cost of nearly $3 million for a new platform used only for paramilitary missions is a poor use of resources. The United
128
Megan Scully, The Squeeze on Transformation, Army Times, February 21, 2005. Accessed at www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-649239.php; and Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005. 129 As quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legion: The Army and the Future of Land Warfare, (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 14, 2004): p. 52. 130 Ibid. 131 Based on estimated budget figures outlined in Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006-2007 Budget Estimates: Weapons and Tracked Vehicles, Army, February 2005. Accessed at http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY06-07/pforms/wtcv.pdf 36
States military already owns a fleet of highly-capable, and less expensive, vehicles for this purpose in the Marine LAV. There is, however, a considerable political hurdle to be dealt with when canceling the Stryker as they provide significant economic benefits to the areas where they are based.132 It is not a coincidence that the Stryker Brigades are located in or near the districts of powerful members of Congress. Three brigades are to be based in Fort Lewis, Wash., in the district of Representative Norm Dicks (D-WA), a senior member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. One unit is based at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, represented in Congress by Representative Don Young, 3rd ranking Republican Member of the House, and Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), a commanding force in the upper chamber. The fifth U.S.-based brigade will be at Oahus Schofield Barracks just outside the district of Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI), ranking member of the House Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee. Taking on their vested interests in
maintaining all five U.S.-based Stryker Brigades will undoubtedly be difficult, but a compelling argument must be made. Upgrade Existing Fleet of M113s133 The Army can achieve its goal of forming rapidly deployable, robust brigades by upgrading its current fleet of C-130 transportable M113 armored vehicles and augmenting them by procuring the MTVL variant. These vehicles are much better suited
132
Stryker-related projects such as construction of roads and training facilities on Oahu and the Big Island alone will cost nearly $700 million through 2010, with much of these funds benefiting the local economy. Gregg K. Kakesako, Stryker Projects On, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, May 1, 2005. Accessed at http://starbulletin.com/2005/05/01/news/ 133 See Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Approves Fifth and Sixth Stryker Brigades, Defense Week, Volume 24, Number 50, December 22, 2003 and Victor OReilly Preventable Deaths (A report written for Congress): December 16, 2003. Accessed at http://www.combatreform.com/ppd43.pdf 37
for the asymmetric challenges posed during urban warfare and stability operations.134 The M113 A3 is significantly lighter and smaller than a Stryker for greater maneuverability in tight urban quarters. As a tracked vehicle it provides superior offroad capabilities. The Army currently has over 11,000 M113s in storage and could be up-armored and updated to the specifications of the A3 for under $500,000.135 This policy recommendation has two precedents. First is the aforementioned existence of a rapid reaction force centered on the M113. Second, LG Thomas Metz, US Army ground force commander in Iraq, requested hundreds of M113s be sent to Iraq earlier this year because it was more useful, cheaper and easier to transportthan Stryker.136 General Casey, commander of multinational forces in Iraq, approved the request. The newlydeployed M113s received armor upgrades to better withstand RPG attacks.137 Augment the Interim Brigades with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle No light armored vehicle can withstand large-caliber tank fire. Outfitting the Interim Brigade solely with lightly armored vehicles, therefore, greatly limits the operational scope of the unit. The Army should enhance the firepower and survivability of its Interim Brigades with a mechanized task force.138 I propose the Interim Brigades be reconfigured by adding M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. The M2 has armor protection similar to that of an M1 Abrams tank and can
134
BG David Grange, USA (Ret), interview with Lou Dobbs, CNN. Broadcast April 26, 2004. Transcript accessed at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0404/26/ldt.00.html. 135 Jack Kelly, Newly Armored Humvees Still Fail to Protect, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 29, 2005. Accessed at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05029/449831.stm 136 Joseph L. Galloway, Army to send Older Armored Personnel Carriers to Iraq After Upgrading Armor, Stars and Stripes, January 4, 2005. Accessed at http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_010405_Armor,00.html 137 Ibid. 138 The authors of the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report for Operation Iraqi Freedom allude to such a solution. See: Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2003: p. 88. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf 38
withstand 30mm projectiles on all sides (compared to 14.5mm only on top, the rear and the sides above the wheel wells for an up-armored Stryker).139 Continue Research & Development of Combat Survivability Technology The quest for better combat survivability is more imperative than ever. Army scientists should continue to research advanced technologies but be realistic about the timeframe for development and the shortcomings of such new technology.140 One promising arena is finding light-weight substitutes for steel armor. Ceramic armor, such as silicon
carbide, features many desirable attributes but its current cost is prohibitive. Another important shortcoming is that ceramic armor tiles are thicker the lighter they are, thus impacting the size and interior space of the vehicle sporting it.141 Other interesting avenues of research include active defenses and electronic countermeasures. Scientists at the Tank-Automotive Research Development and
Engineering Center (TARDEC) believe applying a set of such defenses could contribute to the goal of manufacturing lighter but durable armored vehicles.142 Reevaluate the Objective Force Senator Lieberman (D-CT) presciently questioned the wisdom of centering the vehicular components of the Objective Force on a single platform in early 2000.143 Army leaders are beginning to articulate this point of view now as well. According to BG David Fastabend, a senior officer responsible for long-range planning at the Armys Future
139
M2 and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems, Global Security.org. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m2.htm 140 Sandra Erwin, Future Combat Systems Technologies Not Keeping Pace with Expectations, National Defense, October 2004. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/oct/Future_Combat.htm 141 Ibid. 142 Sandra Erwin, Survival in Combat Zones Requires Layers of Protection, National Defense, December 2004. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Dec/SurvivalInCombat.htm 143 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Transformation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000. 39
Center, the answer to complexity, volatility and uncertainty is always diversity.144 Both the major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ensuing insurgency point to the value of maintaining a mix of capabilities in fire power, armor protection and speed. As such, Army leaders should revisit its Transformation plans and objectives and conduct an earnest reassessment of the Objective/Future Force concept in light of the lessons learned to-date in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
144
As quoted in Greg Jaffe, As Chaos Mounts in Iraq, U.S. Army Rethinks its Future, Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2004: p. 1. Accessed in Lexis Nexis. 40
Appendix 1: Key to Sources for Table 2

1. Michael Gilbert, Army Defends Strykers after at Least Seven Rollovers, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 21, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/story/4617218p4288984c.html 2. Matthew Cox, Stryker Brigade Weathers Tests of Combat Zone, Army Times, December 29, 2003: Accessed at http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-2492918.php 3. CENTCOM Casualty Report. Accessed at http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/casualties.asp 4. Michael Gilbert, Capsized in the Canal, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 20, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4615495p-4287442c.html 5. Michael Gilbert, Gentle Giant from Fort Lewis Killed in Iraq, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 18, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4609446p4282923c.html. 6. Michael Gilbert, Stryker Soldier Dies in Bombing, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 19, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4611643p-4284950c.html 7. Michael Gilbert, Bombing Kills Fort Lewis Soldier in Iraq, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 5, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4521127p-4243613c.html 8. Michael Gilbert, Stryker Soldier a Casualty at 19, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 1, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4392736p-4168759c.html 9. Sgt. John Franzen, Iraqi Citizens Killed by Suicide Bombers, Task Force Freedom Press Release, March 18, 2005. Accessed at http://www.gulf1.com/military/all/mosul/index.asp 10. Sgt. John Franzen, Insurgents Launch Another Attack from Mosque, Task Force Freedom Press Release, March 13, 2005. Accessed at http://www.gulf1.com/military/all/mosul/index.asp 11. Michael Gilbert, Stryker Soldier Remembered as Leader, Friend, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 15, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4457542p4199935c.html 12. Michael Gilbert, He Gave his Life to Save his Buddies, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 8, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4419076p-4187313c.html 13. Michael Gilbert, Suicide Attack Injures 15 Troops, The Tacoma News Tribune, December 30, 2004. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4386408p-4159710c.html 14. Department of Defense, DOD Identifies Army Casualties, News Release, December 6, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041206-1779.html. 15. Department of Defense, DOD Identifies Army Casualty, New Release, January 6, 2005. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050106-1933.html. 16. Michael Gilbert, Slain Fort Lewis Soldier Named, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 7, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4413447p-4185447c.html 17. Michael Gilbert, Fort Lewis Soldier Killed, Nine Injured in Suicide Bombing, The Tacoma News Tribune, October 12, 2004. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4109109p-3875437c.html
41
RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake 18. Department of Defense, DOD Identifies Army Casualty, New Release, October 12, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041012-1384.html 19. Department of Defense, DOD Identifies Army Casualty, News Release, September 23, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040923-1318.html 20. Department of Defense, DOD Identifies Army Casualty, News Release, April 29, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040429-1167.html 21. Department of Defense, DOD Identifies Army Casualty, News Release, April 5, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040405-0513.html 22. Michael Gilbert, Stryker Battalion Stays Active during VIP Visit by Deputy Defense Secretary, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 2, 2004. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/3872810p-3466934c.html. 23. Michael Gilbert, Pair of Stryker Vehicles Come Under Fire in Iraq, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 31, 2004. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/3872814p3466663c.html 24. Michael Gilbert, Bomb Injures Three Fort Lewis Troops, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 22, 2004. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/3872826p-3467035c.html 25. Four Dead after U.S. Convoy Attacked near Mosul, USA Today, February 13, 2005. Accessed at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-02-13-iraq-mosul_x.htm 26. Bill Hutchens, Helicopter Heroes, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 12, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4552351p-4264302c.html 27. Steve Fainaru, Large Blast Hits Bus Carrying Iraqi Soldiers, Washington Post, April 6, 2005. Accessed at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28309-2005Apr5.html 28. Michael Gilbert, Fort Lewis Soldier Dies in Bombing, The Tacoma News Tribune, April 26, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/story/4808207p-4422593c.html 29. Michael Gilbert, Stryker Brigade Soldiers Killed in Iraq, The Tacoma News Tribune, May 2, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/updates/story/4827235p-4436988c.html
42
WORKS CITED
INTERVIEW Michael Gilbert, Interview with the Author, March 2, 2005. MILITARY PRESS: NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES Army Unveils Interim Armored Vehicles, Army Logistician, Mar/Apr 2001, Vol. 33 Issue 2: p. 1. Lisa Burgess, Army Looks to Give Stryker a Facelift, Stars & Stripes, December 22, 2004. Accessed at http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_122204_Stryker,00.html Joe Burlas, Stryker Demo Debunks Critics, Army News Service, October 25, 2002. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/10/mil-021025-usa01.htm Matthew Cox, They Werent Going to get this Bird, Army Times: November 22, 2004. Accessed at http://www.armytimes.com/print.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-452676.php ____, Stryker Brigade Weathers Tests of Combat Zone, Army Times, December 29, 2003: Accessed at http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-2492918.php Sandra I. Erwin, Army Confident About Move to Wheeled Combat Vehicle, National Defense, (September 2001): Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2001/Sep/Army_Confident.htm ____, Future Combat Systems Technologies Not Keeping Pace with Expectations, National Defense, October 2004. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/oct/Future_Combat.htm ____, Survival in Combat Zones Requires Layers of Protection, National Defense, December 2004. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Dec/SurvivalInCombat.htm Extra $3B for Army, But That Wont Be Enough, Army Times, February 10, 2003. Accessed at http://www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-1554345.php Joseph L. Galloway, Army to send Older Armored Personnel Carriers to Iraq After Upgrading Armor, Stars and Stripes, January 4, 2005. Accessed at http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_010405_Armor,00.html Heike Hasenauer, Reaching the Army Vision, Soldiers (June 2000): Accessed at http://www.army.mil/soldiers/jun2000/features/ausa1.html Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Approves Fifth and Sixth Stryker Brigades, Defense Week, Volume 24, Number 50, December 22, 2003. Harold Kennedy, Marine Corps Sprucing Up Its Light Armored Vehicles, National Defense, September 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=257 ____, Army Approaches Decision on Interim Combat Vehicle, National Defense, September 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Sep/Army_Approaches.htm
43
RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake ____, Armys New Combat Vehicle To Undergo Additional Tests, National Defense, December 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Dec/Armys_New.htm Jefferson Morris, C-130 not used by Stryker Brigades for In-theater Movement, PM says, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Vol. 212, No. 44 (December 3, 2004): p. 4. Accessed through Lexis Nexis. Sean D. Naylor, Digging in on Stryker, Army Times (November 4, 2002): Accessed at http://www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-1232529.php Michael Peck, Stryker Brigade will Protect Bases with Remote-controlled Mines, National Defense, March 2005. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Mar/UFStryker_Brigade.htm Ann Roosevelt, Strykers Turning in Extraordinary Performance, Schoomaker Says, Defense Daily, January 18, 2005 Megan Scully, U.S. Armys FCS: Too Heavy for C-130? DefenseNews.com, January 31, 2005. Accessed at http://www.defensenews.com/sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20050131/atpc16154722.sgml ____, The Squeeze on Transformation, Army Times, February 21, 2005. Accessed at www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-649239.php Frank Tiboni, Most New Armored Vehicles Exceed U.S. Armys Medium-Weight Needs, Defense News (March 4-10, 2002): p. 6 Chuck Vinch, Black Berets Will Become Armys Standard Headgear, Stars and Stripes, October 19, 2000. Accessed at http://www.pstripes.com/ed101900c.html POPULAR PRESS: NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES, TV NEWS Alex Berenson, Fighting the Old-fashioned Way in Najaf, New York Times, August 29, 2004. Accessed at www.nytimes.com/2004/08/29/weekinreview/29bere.html Robert Burns, Stryker has Proven its Worth, Associated Press, April 21, 2005. Accessed at http://www.usarpac.army.mil/news/xform/ap_042105.asp Albert Eisele, Improvised Explosives Becoming more Common in Iraq, The Hill, March 28, 2005. Accessed at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Frontpage/032305/explosives.html Steve Fainaru, Large Blast Hits Bus Carrying Iraqi Soldiers, Washington Post, April 6, 2005. Accessed at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28309-2005Apr5.html Four Dead after U.S. Convoy Attacked near Mosul, USA Today, February 13, 2005. Accessed at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-02-13-iraq-mosul_x.htm Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., The Long March, The National Journal, Vol. 36, No. 5, January 31, 2004 Michael Gilbert, Army Defends Strykers after at Least Seven Rollovers, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 21, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/story/4617218p4288984c.html ____, Capsized in the Canal, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 20, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4615495p-4287442c.html
44
____, Stryker Soldier Dies in Bombing, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 19, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4611643p4284950c.html ____, Gentle Giant from Fort Lewis Killed in Iraq, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 18, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4609446p4282923c.html. ____, Bombing Kills Fort Lewis Soldier in Iraq, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 5, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4521127p4243613c.html ____, Stryker Soldier Remembered as Leader, Friend, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 15, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4457542p4199935c.html ____, He Gave his Life to Save his Buddies, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 8, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4419076p4187313c.html ____, Slain Fort Lewis Soldier Named, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 7, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4413447p4185447c.html ____, Stryker Soldier a Casualty at 19, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 1, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4392736p-4168759c.html ____, Suicide Attack Injures 15 Troops, The Tacoma News Tribune, December 30, 2004. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4386408p4159710c.html ____, Fort Lewis Soldier Killed, Nine Injured in Suicide Bombing, The Tacoma News Tribune, October 12, 2004. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4109109p-3875437c.html ____, Stryker Battalion Stays Active during VIP Visit by Deputy Defense Secretary, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 2, 2004. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/3872810p-3466934c.html ____, Pair of Stryker Vehicles Come Under Fire in Iraq, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 31, 2004. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/3872814p3466663c.html ____, Bomb Injures Three Fort Lewis Troops, The Tacoma News Tribune, January 22, 2004. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/3872826p3467035c.html ____, Last of 5,000 Stryker Soldiers due in Kuwait as Brigade Gears up for Forward Deployment, The Tacoma News Tribune, November 16, 2003. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/3872881p-3466602c.html ____, Fort Lewis Soldier Dies in Bombing, The Tacoma News Tribune, April 26, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/story/4808207p-4422593c.html ____, Stryker Brigade Soldiers Killed in Iraq, The Tacoma News Tribune, May 2, 2005. Accessed at
45
RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/updates/story/4827235p-4436988c.html Craig Gordon, Troops seen vulnerable in Humvees, Boston Globe, December 18, 2003. Accessed at http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2003/12/18/troops_seen_vulnerable_in_hu mvees/ BG David Grange, USA (Ret), interview with Lou Dobbs, CNN. Broadcast April 26, 2004. Transcript accessed at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0404/26/ldt.00.html. Edward Harris, Soldiers Hail New Army Troop Transport, The Associated Press, April 5, 2005. Accessed at http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0405/218502.html John Hendren, Army Holds Its Ground in Battle with Rumsfeld, Los Angeles Times, November 29, 2002. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/021129-sbct.htm Bill Hutchens, Helicopter Heroes, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 12, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4552351p-4264302c.html Greg Jaffe, As Chaos Mounts in Iraq, U.S. Army Rethinks its Future, Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2004: p. 1. Accessed in Lexis Nexis. Gregg K. Kakesako, Stryker Projects On, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, May 1, 2005. Accessed at http://starbulletin.com/2005/05/01/news/ Jack Kelly, Newly Armored Humvees Still Fail to Protect, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 29, 2005. Accessed at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05029/449831.stm Steven Komarow, Tanks Take a Beating in Iraq, USA Today, March 29, 2005. Accessed at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-03-29-abrams-tank-a_x.htm ____, Tanks Adapted for Urban Fights they Once Avoided, USA Today, March 29, 2005. Accessed at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-03-29-tank-inside_x.htm Lt. Col. Michael Kurilla, Stryker Gets the Job Done, The Washington Post, April 5, 2005: p. 22. Melinda Liu, John Barry and Michael Hirsh, The Human Cost, Newsweek (May 3, 2004). Accessed at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4825948/ COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA (Ret.), Army Transformation, Washington Times, February 11, 2005: p. 20. Monte Morin, In Mosul, Insurgents Have Become Road Warriors, Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2005. Accessed at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fgmosul13mar13,1,2134295.story?coll=la-iraq-complete&ctrack=1&cset=true Ray Rivera and Hal Bernton, Stryker Readiness Questioned, Seattle Times, September 6, 2003. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030906-stryker01.htm R. Jeffrey Smith, Study Faults Army Vehicle, The Washington Post, March 31, 2005: p. A01. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONIES AND OTHER PRESENTATIONS & BRIEFINGS Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Transformation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000.
46
RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake LG Paul J. Kern, USA, Special Briefing on the Army Interim Armored Vehicle Program, DefenseLINK News, November 17, 2000. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/t11172000_t117army.html COL Thomas M. Lytle, USMC, LAV Program Update, presented at National Defense Industrial Association, Tank-Automotive Division Combat Vehicles Section, 1998 Combat Vehicles Conference, Fort Knox, Kentucky: September 22, 1998. COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA, Remarks: Should the U.S. Army Lighten Up? Cato Institute Policy Forum, December 18, 2000. ____, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, July 15, 2004. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS Army Cancels Comanche Helicopter Program, Government Services Administration, February 23, 2004: Accessed at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0204/022304cdpm2.htm United States Government Accountability Office, Decision in Matter of United Defense LP, File B286925 et al., (Washington, DC: GAO, April 9, 2001). ____, GAO-03-31, Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges (May 2001). ____, GAO-02-96, Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges (November 2001). ____, GAO-03-671, Military Transformation, Armys Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison (May 2003) ____, GAO-04-188 Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades (December 2003) ____, GAO-03-31, Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges (August 2004) UNITED STATES MILITARY PUBLICATIONS Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq: p. 48. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/iir-mosul-ops_strykerbde_21dec2004.pdf CENTCOM Casualty Report. Accessed at http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/casualties.asp Department of the Army, 2002 Army Modernization Plan, Accessed at http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2002/wMP_mainv03b.pdf ____, 2003 Army Modernization Plan: pp. 26-27. Accessed at http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2003/MP03Mainweb100.pdf ____, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006-2007 Budget Estimates: Weapons and Tracked Vehicles, Army, February 2005. Accessed at http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY0607/pforms/wtcv.pdf Department of Defense, DOD Identifies Army Casualty, New Release, January 6, 2005. Accessed at
47
RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050106-1933.html ____, DOD Identifies Army Casualties, News Release, December 6, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041206-1779.html ____, DOD Identifies Army Casualty, New Release, October 12, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041012-1384.html ____, DOD Identifies Army Casualty, News Release, September 23, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040923-1318.html ____, DOD Identifies Army Casualty, News Release, April 29, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040429-1167.html ____, DOD Identifies Army Casualty, News Release, April 5, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040405-0513.html Sgt. John Franzen, Iraqi Citizens Killed by Suicide Bombers, Task Force Freedom Press Release, March 18, 2005. Accessed at http://www.gulf1.com/military/all/mosul/index.asp ____, Insurgents Launch another Attack from Mosque, Task Force Freedom Press Release, March 13, 2005. Accessed at http://www.gulf1.com/military/all/mosul/index.asp Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2003. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf United States Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force, no date. Accessed at http://www.army.mil/features/WhitePaper/ObjectiveForceWhitePaper.pdf BOOKS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS General Dynamics Land Systems Canada LAV (8x8), Janes Military Vehicles and Logistics, January 17, 2005. Dan Gour and Kenneth Steadman, Medium Armor and the Transformation of the U.S. Military, Lexington Institute Paper, September 2004. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legion: The Army and the Future of Land Warfare, (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 14, 2004) LAV-III to Provide Army with Rapid-response Capability, Janes, July 9, 2001. Accessed at http://server2.janes.com/press/pc010709_1.shtml Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle USA, Janes Defence Weekly, February 19, 2003. Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus the Reality of War (A report written for Congressman Jim Saxton), August 22, 2003 ____, Preventable Deaths (A report written for Congress): December 16, 2003. Accessed at http://www.combatreform.com/ppd43.pdf Robert H. Scales, Jr., Yellow Smoke: the Future of Land Warfare for Americas Military (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003)
48
RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake MAJ Paul Swiergosz, USA, USAREURs Ready Force, November 2001: Accessed at http://www.army.mil/soldiers/nov2001/pdfs/lariat.pdf Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options, (Santa Monica, Calif.:RAND, 2002) INTERNET-BASED RESOURCES Jon E. Dougherty, Controversy Surrounds Armys Stryker, NewsMax.com (January, 28, 2004): Accessed at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/1/28/151543.shtml Federation of American Scientists tutorial accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod101/sys/ac/equip/docs/A2C2S_Tutorial_RevA1a/sld010.htm Gerry J. Gilmore, Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki, Federation of American Scientists Website. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991013shinvis.htm Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), Global Security.org. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/lav.htm M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, Global Security.org. Accessed at http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113.htm M2 and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems, Global Security.org. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m2.htm Objective Force, Global Security.org. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/objective-force.htm Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), Global Security.org. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle, Global Security.org. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/iav.htm Benjamin C. Works, The U.S. Armys Light Armored Vehicle, Strategic Issues Research Institute, Report issued May 19, 2001. Accessed at http://www.siri-us.com/backissues/2001/SITRep%2001-05-19%3B%20armyveh.txt
49

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The Armys Stryker Vehicle: A Costly Mistake

By Martijn Rasser May 3, 2005

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

Detroit Diesel 6V53T 275 Tracks 41 mph 27,000 .50 cal MG

Yes Pivot (17 ft. circle) No

Yes 58 ft. Yes

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

funds for transformation programs. process balanced modernization.44

Recent Army Modernization Plans termed this

demanded steep cuts in the Comanche helicopter program.

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

He recently hailed their extraordinary performance in Operation Iraqi

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

03/28/2004 04/04/2004 04/28/2004 07/14/2004 07/15/2004 09/04/2004

Rollover IED RPG Rollover Rollover RPG

10/11/2004 12/04/2004 12/30/2004

Mosul Mosul Mosul

VBIED Unspecifi ed enemy fire. VBIED

1 killed, 9 injured 2 killed 15 wounded

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

As quoted in Hutchens, Helicopter Heroes. 30

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

Ibid: p. 56. Ibid. 121 Ibid: p. 58. 122 Ibid. 33

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

Appendix 1: Key to Sources for Table 2

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

RASSER Stryker: A Costly Mistake

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The Army's Stryker Vehicle - A Costly Mistake RASSER

The Army's Stryker Vehicle - A Costly Mistake RASSER