Dimensions of Conflict Resolution in Ethnopolitical Disputes Author(s): Frederic S. Pearson Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No.

3, Special Issue on Conflict Resolution in Identity-Based Disputes, (May, 2001), pp. 275-287 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/425001 Accessed: 22/07/2008 03:02
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O 2001 Journalof PeaceResearch, vol.38, no. 3, 2001, pp. 275-287 Thousand Oaks, SagePublications (London, CAand New Delhi) [0022-3433(200105)38:3;275-287; 018286]

Dimensions of Conflict Resolution in Ethnopolitical Disputes*

FREDERIC S. PEARSON
Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Wayne State University
In this introduction to the special issue, the various dimensions of approachesto conflict resolution in identity disputes are explored.The implementation of existing peace accords in countries troubled by domestic fighting turns out to be a knottier policy problem than expected and subject to lingering distrust and miscommunication. The role of two sets of factors in bringing about agreement and/or implementation is explored: grass-rootsversus elite initiatives and the identity versus instrumental nature of the negotiations. Factorssuch as the degree of preliminarydialogue and pre-bargaining,the involvement of officials versus civic representatives, concern about fear and distrust may be weighed against the more usual calculations of power balances, exhaustion, and stalemate in accounting for peaceful settlements. The interplaybetween these categorieshas a great deal to do with the prospects and outcomes of conflict managementapproachesand is the subjectof the articlesto follow.The studies were designed to test, utilizing a comparativecase-studyframework,which dimension, if any, turns out to be most influential in a series of local violent ethnopolitical disputes. Findings, while varied, point to the importance of grass-rootsparticipationin the negotiation process.

Introduction
In a December 1999 address, Ambassador George Mitchell, US envoy to the Northern Irish peace talks, explainedhis technique for overcomingdeadlockin the implementation of the 1997 accords. The parties had been unable to resolve their differing interpretations of provisions on 'decommissioning' Irish RepublicanArmy (IRA) weapons prior
* The articles this specialissueoriginated a conference in at entitled'Mediation Theoryand IdentityDisputes:Lessons fromRegional EthnicConflicts' WayneStateUniversity's at Programon MediatingTheory and DemocraticSystems and Center for Peaceand Conflict Studiesin Detroit, 2 February1998. Fundingwas generouslyprovidedby the William and FloraHewlett Foundation. The contributors and issueeditorareextremely to grateful MarieL.Olsonfor her efficienteditorialassistance. editorcan be reached The or by email at ab3440@wayne.edu via the website at http://www.mtds.wayne.edu.

to the formation of a joint Northern Irish executive (cabinet). Mitchell (1999) noted that despite the two-year-oldagreementthe negotiatorswere hardlyable to tolerate each other'spresencein the same room and would barelyspeak to each other. Though such hostilities had been seen in prior peace talks, most notably between Egyptian PresidentAnwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David, this is not the type of rapport one would hope for in implementing existing peace accords. One would have presumed that thosewho could agreeto peaceprovisions would: (1) at least have developed working relationswith eachother,and (2) at leastagree on what was agreedto in the accords.Here, however,the partiesdisagreedabout whether was called for on the part prior disarmament

275

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volume / number / may2001 38 3 agreementinto actualpractice.As more such agreements are hammered out in various global troublespots, often in the aftermathof tragic killing and tragically delayed international response, impediments to peace
implementation could indeed become one of

of one or both sides, and the level of mutual distrust was such that AmbassadorMitchell despaired of dealing with concrete issues. Instead he asked the parties merely to sit down and mutually discuss their 'hopes and fears' for the future. He reasoned that they had never been through such a venting, visioning, and listeningprocess,and that only of throughan icebreaker this sort could a perof common concern and trust begin ception to seep into their relationship. At least for the short term, the process worked, as the Unionists and Nationalists were able to devise a face-savingformula to the effect that the IRA and its supportersand associates would consent to beginning discussions regarding decommissioning while the joint executive took office. The Unionists, in turn, vowed to revisitthe issue within three months to determine reasonable progress.This in a sense allowed for more time, for a more flexible approach to each side's main needs and demands, and for a symbolic means to address insecurities. Weapons themselves had become a symbol for political viability;after decadesof armed struggle,an organizationsuch as the IRApresumablywould have felt that it was giving in at the outset by disarmingin the face of its traditional foes. At the same time, if the executivecouncil got underwaywith reasonable success, the Unionists might be convinced to accept the benefit of the doubt and extend the period of disarmament discussions. Then again, the whole framework could blow up in disillusionmentif political dealingsprovedfractiousor if extremistsand rejectionistsresortedto force and terrorism.1 This example affords important insights regarding the difficulties of ethnopolitical peace negotiations and particularly the complicated endgame of translating rough
1 Subsequently, the agreement had to be suspended until a new formula was devised to allow third-party inspection of IRA arms caches to verify that they were not readily available for use.

the primary challenges of the new century. Such 'snafus'would haunt otherwise seemor ingly reasonable, at least tentativelyviable, peace plans. Yearsinto the Bosnian peace process, for example, armedinternationalsentrieskept a formalceasefire going, but therewas precious little implementationof the Dayton Accords' provisions regarding a common Bosnian political authority,joint security forces, and refugee resettlementin hometowns and villages. In Kosovo, it remaineduncertainhow long NATO forceswould have to occupy the country and what success they might have encouraging Serbs to stay in a province increasingly dominated by Albanians but purportedly slated for continued adherence to Serbia. After belated entry into East Timor, in which overconfidence about Indonesian acceptance of a UN-sponsored referendum resulted in a bloodbath, UNsanctioned peace forces helped implement Timorese autonomy in the ruins of the capital, Dili. Partof the difficultyin implementationin these cases might have related to the speed/delay of internationalresponseand to the 'quality' of the accords themselves, i.e. whether they made sense from a social, geographic,or politicalperspective,and whether sufficient heed was paid to danger signs and warningsignals.Partof the problemcentered on the parties' readiness to accept the accords, which in turn appearedrelated to where the parties were in their own attitudinal development as well as in their pursuit of interests.Attitudes seem particularly resistant where the conflict has witnessed a long history of mutual attack and atrocity (e.g. Ireland, Sri Lanka, Palestine,

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Rwanda) or where nationalistic and xenophobic leadershavewhipped up considerable emotion (e.g. the Balkans,Rwanda,Ireland). According to Ambassador Mitchell, the Ulster talks foundered on the lack of meaningful trust among the parties. An ad hoc processhad to be devised to make up for the failure to break down previous communicationbarriers, particularly focus to and on the parties'understandingof each other's aspirations and insecurities. Previously implacable enemies can, given the right circumstances of exhaustion or stalemate, raise hopes by initial agreementsor concessions and by forthcoming statements, as when hardened IRA and Unionist fighters apologized for past transgressionsin 1997. Yetbitternessand fearsremainabout the ultimate motives of those enemies, especiallyin the political context where group leaders must convince theirconstituentsto acceptan accord. As in many negotiated settlements, the Northern Irish peace process stemmed from earlier intergovernmental or elite-level accords- in this casethe Anglo-Irishaccords. These negotiations, themselves arguably a product of new incentivesin the evolution of the European Union, opened the way for for power-sharingarrangements, the devolution of authority to a joint local parliament, and for the involvement of local political parties and factions in further dialogue and negotiation. In other words, the processwas largelyexogenous,originatingfrom above,in rather remarkable intergovernmental talks that were extended downward to the local level. Therefore, whether because of unmet suspicion or the exogenous elite structureof negotiations, the groundworkfor local negotiations might have been deficient despite widespread public support for the process, since the peace process did not originate locally. Of course, given the tenor of conflict in Ulster and the traditions of British-Irish suspicion, there may have been little choice

but to begin negotiationsat the international level if one expected progress in the short term. Conflict resolution arrangements and peace agreements might or might not be craftedto meet the sociopolitiappropriately cal conditions of the area,and they might or might not be palatable for the local actors affectedby the struggle (these are, of course, mutually relatedfactors).It is a trickycalculus to know when support extends deeply enough at the grassroots or involves enough relevantactors,since just a few extremistscan at least temporarilydisrupt peace processes through acts of terrorismand sabotage. The Northern Irish pattern contrasts,for example,with the Israeli-Palestinian process devised through the Oslo talks, where local parties,having sufferedthrough yearsof the Intifada, evolved quiet understandings (sometimes externally facilitated) and then relativelysecret negotiations, with only the assistance of outside governments. There would be less possibility that the parties themselveswere unprepared dialogueand for for the ongoing trialsof the negotiation and implementation processes.While there was lingering bitterness in the Israeli-occupied territoriesand among Palestiniansin exile, and indeed while there was significantdelay in implementingterritorial provisions,in the later talks no one had to have the parties'get to know each other' the way Ambassador Mitchell felt obliged to do in Ulster. Still, when it came time for Israelitroop withdrawalsfrom additional territoryin the West Bank in late 1999, agreement stalled over whether Palestinianscould have a significant say in which territories would be turned over. A sense of mutual accommodation had not yet emerged;the partieswere not spontaneously reaching out to each other to make the process work toward an agreed-upongoal. Difficult additional talks were needed, with intensive US mediation, trying to hammerout specificagreementson

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volume / number / may2001 38 3 know whether various styles, combinations, and forms of pre-negotiation, negotiation, mediation, and facilitation help build the foundations upon which agreements are reached and fully implemented, or whether that depends on factorsof political bargaining, powerbalances,available resources,issue or outside pressure. content, Process Dimensions Aside from whether agreements cover all relevantissues and aspectsof a civil dispute, two key structuraldimensions would appear to affect the probability of reaching and implementingpeace terms. One is the extent to which the peace process encompassesindepth treatment of what might be called 'identity'as opposed to 'instrumental'issues. In the words of Ted Robert Gurr (1994:
365),

which land would be returned. Complications related to political pressuresinside the home countries, to the difficulty of bringing enough relevantgroups into agreement at the mass and elite levels, to the symbolic and practicalimportanceof issuessuch as Jerusalemand refugees, and to differing interpretations of acceptable security and resource guarantees. Thus, despite the greatermutual familiarityamong the negotiators, and perhapsbecause of the differing roles of majorpowers, the Israeli-Palestinian talks proved less amenable than the Irish negotiations to formal agreement, and thus peace implementation efforts were further delayed. Perhaps these difficulties related to the densely populated and polarized nature of the occupied territories,with political pressures from disgruntledsettlers and villagers. Perhaps they related to political posturing and the looming struggle for control of Jerusalem, the fate of refugees, and the sharing of resources (e.g. water) in 'final status talks'. Perhapsthose at the grass-roots levels were insufficiently consulted. Or perhapsthe partieshad yet to internalizethe peace terms to the extent of making forthcoming offers to each other that would go beyond the bareand begrudgedminimum in order to win adherence to a larger lasting peace. In other words, despite significant improvements the overall relationship had not been deeply transformed.2 Thus, the pattern of how peace processes unfold, with what structural foundationsand subsequent buy-ins, appears crucial to the outcome and the chance for success. In reviewingthe Irishand Palestinianquestions, it is clear that negotiations and accordswith quite different origins and structure can founder in stalemate and recrimination at certain stages. It is important, therefore, to
DifficultIsraeli talkswith Syriaand Lebanonmight also have affected the pace of progressin Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
2

conflictsare fought not just Ethnopolitical or aboutresources power, aboutprotecting but group status,culture,and identity.Identity and beliefare non-negotiable. the other On hand,the meansby whichtheyareprotected can be and havebeen the subjectof creative
compromises.

Even Gurr, however,may underestimatethe extent that identity and belief, reflecting deeply held values, while 'non-negotiable', might have to be addresseddirectly and in depth beforeand duringformalnegotiations. It is not simply the instrumentalmodalities of protection that must be determined, though surelythey must, but also the mutual understandingand acceptanceof each side's concerns about survival, status, legitimacy, and culturaland politicalrights.Of course,as in devisingmeans to protect minority rights, instrumental and identity concerns are not necessarily separable. Reassuring parties about their security and access to key resourcesor ancestralhomelandscan address many concerns relatedto identity. Still, it is useful to highlight the two types of issuesin

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order to illustrate the consequences of emphasizingone over the other. A second important dimension of peace would appearto concernwhether agreements they originatedand proceededin a basically top-down' as opposed to 'bottom-up' fashion. Ambassador Mitchell raised the important question of trust;obstaclesof distrustcan ariseeven if the main negotiatorsget beyond their mutual hostilities and suspicions. Negotiators claim to representconstituents, but the constituents themselves might not buy into the bargainif they have not been consulted, prepared,and reconciled to the situation. It has been argued that a failureto open peace processesto earlygrassroots participation, i.e. the participation of

elements of the local population, means that there will be difficultiesselling the outcome to those who ultimately must abide by it if not internalizeits relevantprovisions(Byrne, 2001).3 While Mitchell called upon party officials in Ulster to discuss their mutual hopes and fears (or those of their purported constituents), elite negotiatorsoften are seen as out of touch with the concerns of the masses or the 'streets'.Disgruntled factional leaderscan sabotagepeace accords,and as in trade unions where the rank-and-filefail to ratify proposed labor contracts, political accords also can run afoul of distrust at the mass level. Depending upon the conflict scenario,of course, the degree of elite and community participationand polarizationcan be complicatedand extensive(asseen in both the Ulster and Palestiniancases). Some scenarios,such as those in the Balkans,Indonesia,and Africa, requirea regionalapproachto peacemaking,
3 Weede & Muller (1998) make the point that 'elite rebellions' are best explained from a 'rational decision-making' perspective, while 'mass rebellions' stem from a 'deprivation' perspective. Joseph (1999) has coined the term 'warlord insurgencies' for the type of entrenched fighting among rival pretenders seen in states such as Liberia and Somalia. Hence one might expect solutions for one variety of rebellion to differ from those required for another type.

taking into account the views of villagers, local militia or 'warlords', major powers and the IGOs, and the statessurrounding conflict zone. Even on relatively isolatedislands,such as Ireland, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka, regional actors have been drawn intimately into the drama- as in India'sabortive1989 Sri Lanka militaryinterventionand Turkeyssomewhat more lastingCyprusintrusion. Clearly,such regional influences are not necessarily benign, as seen in the extreme polarization of Congolese factional fighting in the late 1990s, featuring gun-running, outside intervention, and asylum provision for varioussidesin that internationalized civil war. Thus, both elite-based and mass-based machinations and back-stabbing, whether from within the disputed area or from the surrounding states, often accompany peace talks, leading to repeated ceasefire failures and the violation of paperagreements.Peacekeeping forces often have had to accommodate the ambiguities of failing or partially failed accords just to keep the processes going, the deaths down, and the options open. As seen illustratively Figure1, it is conin to ceivablefor eitherelite or massparticipants such as water discusseitherinstrumentalities, and electricityservice to a besieged city, or identity concernssuch as the parties'mutual hatred or suspicion. On the instrumentalidentity dimension, peace processes might lack supportand encountermore obstaclesin implementationif parties'psycho-socialconcerns are not sufficiently addressed.Then again, in some disputesthe settlementof outstandinginstrumentalissues,such as regional economic investment or water rights, is vital to relievingintergrouptension and suspicion. On the elite-mass dimension, agreements might lack resonance in the affected communities if they do not mesh with locally defined needs, norms, and perceptions. However,some conflictshave been settled, or at least significantly relieved, by executive

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volume / number / may2001 38 3 powers engaged with local power brokers such as Yugoslavia's Slobodan Milosevic or the Kosovo LiberationArmy (KLA) representativesto hammerout maps and working agreements to separatethe parties and formulate at least a symbolic political accord. Elites working on identity concerns have accords been noted in the Palestinian-Israeli and to a certain extent in Cyprus (Fisher, 2001). Diplomats and civil servants can come to know each other over a relatively extended period of informal private discussions and formal workshops conducted by group process experts such as Herbert Kelman (1990). Community groups have met at times for dialogue on both instrumental and identity type concerns in Israelioccupied territories (see Kriesberg, 2001)

decisions to work with community leaders and grant local autonomy within negotiated frameworks (Gurr, 1994: 366). A further complication is the difficulty of addressing mass-basedemotive concerns through such means as dialogue; the logistics of creating enough mutual discussion could be daunting. Nevertheless, it would appear that a good balanceof elite and communal involvement is likely to be necessaryfor peace formulae to evolve into conflict resolution. Examplesof peaceprocessestakingone or the other tack come to mind. Bosnian and Kosovar accords appear to have involved mainly elite negotiators,at least at the outset. Facilitated community dialogues also have taken place, but mostly in exile situations in Europe or North America. Major foreign
Figure 1.

Conflict Process Dimensions in Example Cases of Negotiation Issues Instrumental Bosnia Cyprus India
Israel-Palestine

Identity

Indonesia Elite Kosovo Russia

Mexico

NorthernIreland

SriLanka

Participation

Cyprus Israel-Palestine Mass Latvia Lebanon Russia

Bosnia Israel-Palestine NorthernIreland Rwanda SouthAfrica

Note: At various phases a given case can have more than one type of process under way.

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and in South Africa (see Bremner, 2001), especially in multicultural towns such as Israel's Neve Shalom. Northern Irish youth have been brought together in small-scale projects for ecumenical dialogue and joint

to center primarily on inter-ethnic (identity) relations within countries (even if involving international concerns, as in Russia'srelations with the newly independent Baltic states). Of these, 11, involving mainly Palestinian, activities. Northern Irish, Baltic, and Tajik concerns, were judged to show 'some progress toward Joseph Montville, a former U.S. Foreign resolution' (some, as in Israeli-Palestinian Service officer . . . coined the term 'track-two issues, involving more than one intervention diplomacy' to denote unofficial, nonstructured interaction between members of adver- attempt). Among the more resistant to sarialgroupsor nations that is directedtoward progress were the Cyprus and Sri Lankan disconflict resolutionthroughaddressingpsycho- putes (Fisher, 1997: 189-191). logical factors. Thus there are some grounds for thinking Montville broadenedhis definition to include that repeated exercises in informal discussion interactions that develop strategies, affect might pay dividends in the slow step-by-step public opinion, or mobilize resources to progress toward reconciliation among support conflict resolution. (Fisher, 1997: warring groups. Of course, official govern117) mental level talks also were occurring in some In some circumstances, then, so-called of these instances, so that one cannot track-two approaches can entail informal or attribute 'progress' or lack thereof to track unofficial discussions that engage the masses two alone. It would indeed be important to as well as, or through, the leaders. The know, however, in what circumstances track approach might involve mass communities two efforts are successful either alone or in only indirectly, as in efforts to influence conjunction with track one (or other tracks public opinion 'to reduce the sense of victimidentified by scholars of multitrack diplohood, to rehumanize the image of the adver- macy, including such considerations as econsary, and to support leaders in making omic remedies). It appears that most of the conciliatory moves' (Fisher, 1997: 117). specific workshops involved in these proHowever, grass-roots organizations themcesses consisted of'influentials' and 'informal selves sometimes have been directly involved policy advisors', while a few (about 10%) in major peace accords. Confessions and involved 'preinfluentials', i.e. 'younger, less frank exchanges in South Africa's 'truth and politically connected individuals', such as reconciliation' process appear to have graduate students, young professionals, or brought elite- and mass-based participants low-level political activists (Fisher, 1997: (perpetrators and victims) into productive if 192-193). The question of true mass-level painful confrontation. Youth summer camps involvement remains open. for war-weary participants from Palestine, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other troubled zones ComparativeCase Studies have begun a process of grass-roots discussion of identity concerns. Such concerns also have While studies of ethnic conflict management been dealt with to a certain extent for many approaches have dealt with one or the other years in local minority or inter-ethnic counof the dimensions in Figure 1, there has been in Kosovo. cils in Russian provinces and little effort as yet to relate such perspectives In one study of some 24 major interactive systematically to the prospect of lasting conflict resolution attempts of the track two peace settlements. In this special issue of the variety between 1965 and 1995, 17 appeared Journal of Peace Research, several case studies

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volume38 / number / may 2001 3 know all too little about 'what works' in specific types of circumstances. In particular, will be especiallyuseful to it determinewhether extensivepre-negotiation dialogue entailing identity as well as instrumental concerns,at the elite or even down to the mass level, leads to readier and more lasting agreementsto suspend fighting and resolve underlying issues than do strictly positional elite-bargainingapproaches.The ARIA model, for example, consists of stages of 'antagonism, resonance, invention, and action'. These move from the open verbal expression of mutual hostilities, to parties' effective self-criticism and reflective commentary on the conflict and their roles in it, then on to the invention of new approaches, framesof reference,and solutions, and finally to implementation of such remedies. In a sense, then, we askeda set of conflict analysts to judge the relativeeffectivenessof bargaining with and without preliminarydialogue and treatment of parties' underlying needs and insecurities. This should allow some conclusions about the ultimate benefits of employing more extensive (identity-based) versusmore focused bargainingapproaches. The cases selected represented various global regionsand were those in which mediation, conciliation, or negotiation of various sorts were attempted. We asked the authors to list the main efforts along the dimensions outlined above and to look at the degree of success, both short and long term, derived from these attemptswherepossible,as well as the local conditions that affected the outcomes. This will begin to get us beyond the raw statistics of 'success' or 'failure'to the reasons behind the outcomes, and to the question of whether traditional forms of intervention are sufficient or effective. The aim is to inform mediation theory for those
attempting intervention in regional identity

are presentedwhich highlight strengthsand deficiencies in one or the other approach, and which appear indicative of the type of outcomes one might expect from varying combinations of tactics. This is meant as a suggestive initial approach to theory development about the necessary foundations for ethnopolitical peace accords, a first step in learningmore about the complications and potential of approaches along the two dimensions. The premiseof the organizingconference from which the papers emerged was to explore the circumstances under which various conflict resolution interventions are more or less effectivein domestic ethnopolitical conflicts. One question under consideration was the added benefit or pitfalls of treating identity issues, as in the ARIA process proposed by Rothman (1997). The proliferationof domestic ethnic conflictsand violence since the end of the Cold War has sparkedconsiderationof the role of mediation and negotiation in promoting interim and long-term settlements. Scholarssuch as Rothman have labeled a large subset of such disputes as identity disputes, arising from groups'concern over their survival,accessto resources,and influence in divided societies. Such identity-basedconflicts, often entailing ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious aspects, have been among the most persistent, intractable, and destabilizing for the regions in which they occur. A set of responsesto this type of dispute has arisen in the dispute management field, ranging from early-warningdata collection and reporting to third-party intervention, both militaryand diplomatic.The responses have tended to be of an ad hoc nature, conflict devisedon the spot for the particular either by unilateral or multilateral intervenors. Unfortunately,due to a lack of systematic theoreticaldevelopment to compare outcomes of both pre-dispute and crisis management approaches, policymakers

disputes. In the ARIA process, the following specific questions can be asked:

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To what extent in micro-interventions (workshops etc.) has it been possible/ effective to start with antagonism per se in mutual discussion? To what extent were parties able to become reflexive,that is, look criticallyat their own conflict orientation and that of adversaries? Were cultural, historical, social, political, and contextual interpretationssharedand heardeffectively? If and when the parties invented new remediesor solutions, did they focus on mutual underlyingneeds and values?Or were such motivational concerns somewhat muted as negotiationsbecame primarilyinterest-focusedand technical? Finally,were plans for change and action (implementationofthose plans) consistent with the precedinganalytical work or dominated by political expediency?

intervention attempted - including the type of parties involved (elite- or massbased) and type of mediator/intervenor (partisan or 'neutral';major or minor power) and their relationshipwith the parties. Entailed here are forms of multilateralor 'minilateral' intervention - open or covert, diplomatic only, or diplomatic in combination with sanctions or payments, facilitativeor directive.

Among the concepts considered in each presentation,therefore,were the following: * Conditions preceding peacemaking interventions - including the relevant conflict history and issues in dispute, adequacy of early warning, the battlefield situation (questions of'stalemate' and 'ripeness'),balance of forces, arms flows, and the parties' receptivity to
intervention.

* The employment of various forms of conciliation and tailored innovations such as agreementsfor ceasinghostilities versusagreementsto repatriate displaced persons or agreementsto arresthuman rightsviolators.In the process,we could consider the viability of agreementsand innovations such as 'truth and reconciliation' machinery, shared decisionmaking, shared jurisdictions, 'local autonomy', and repatriation provisions. Throughout the discussion,we askedparticipants to considerwhich forms of mediation and conciliation 'worked'(either in the short or long term, for cessationof hostilities or reconciliation of interests) and which failed, or about which the verdict is still pending. Instrumental issues more or less amenableto varioussortsof conflict management (issues such as reparation, resource distribution, territorial allocation, security were to be identified.During the guarantees) conference, it became apparent that some initiatives involved more grass-rootsparticipation than others, and this too became a defining characteristic for assessment of success. Not all studies could answerall the questions, but we did seek to apply a common comparativeframework.

Extent and types of pre-negotiation meetings and efforts to initiate better mutual understandingand joint agendas prior to or during actual negotiationsor mediation. The political/social/economic conditions affectingthe prospectof effective mediation or negotiation - including conditions in the dispute-ridden territory, and conditions inside the countries attempting mediation/intervention(e.g. Clarification ethnic kinship, geographic proximity, Conceptual political intrigues,budgetaryproblems). In writing about interpersonal disputes, Type of mediation or peacemaking Wilmot & Hocker (1998: 54-81) pose a

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volume / number / may2001 38 3 Christians, and Muslims, with variations amounting to subtle gradationswithin the interconnectedhuman community. The notion of identity tends to intersect with interests,resourceconcerns, and representational needs in political disputes. Ethnicity itself might or might not be the primary factor motivating people to fight. Often it appearsnot to be. It has long been argued that ethnic rivalry and resentment tend to become inflamed under the stressof harsh economic conditions or in the heat of battle for power among rivalpolitical leaders or parties. Indeed the type and degree of ethnic hostility or extent of ethno-nationalism are likely also to vary according to the country's political structure or economic conditions. In countries suffering 'state breakdown',as in the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,Liberia, Lebanon, and Somalia, ethnic rivalry appears likely to emerge in bloody pitched battles. Militarization of groups increasesas the state loses the 'monopoly of force'.On the otherhand, wherestate and societal institutions are intact and well entrenched, as in Canada for example, they may themselves become the 'battleground' for inter-ethnic competition. Rather than street and communal fighting, the struggle, utilizing means such as protests and plebiscites,insteadis overlanguagelaws, representation in schools, control of trade unions, dominance in the armedforces,land claims, and power in parliament.Certainly, such struggles,if unresolvedand prolonged, can spill over into brutalviolence (as seen in placessuch as Indiaand Syria)and ultimately might threaten the survival of the state or escalationto civil war. Such escalation might be more likely in stateswhereethnic groupslive mainly in separate enclaves that can serve as territorialor war-makingbases, primal areasto defend or attack, as in Lebanon for example. Confessional and ethnicallysegregatedschools and

categorization of negotiation interests entitled CRIP,in which 'content' goals are distinguished from 'relational', 'identity', and 'process'goals. This same arraycan apply to political negotiations at the group and governmentallevel. One can discuss 'objective' content concerns, such as the timing of IRA disarmament. However, we have seen that these might not be separablefrom discussion of relational and identity issues. How are parties to get along relationally in a joint executive if they have never come to terms with their mutual identity fears of living in a society ruled by the other party? concerns might loom large in Finally,process how one gets from point A to determining point B in peacemaking (for example, when to implement the joint executive and what to say about weapon decommissioning). Care must, of course, be taken when translating interpersonal concepts such as identity to the group level. Group consciousness is an elusive notion. However, it becomes more concrete as elites addressand in some cases instigate social consciousness and in-group/out-group antagonism. The idea of what it means to be 'a Jew', 'a Palestinian', 'an Ulster Unionist', 'a Tutsi', 'an has African-American' undergone, and continues to undergo,changesacrosstime. Since ethnic-related notions such as race and religion are generally socially constructed (the concept of'Christian' as applied to Irish factions, for example), there is bound to be a great deal of latitude in the realization of identity, including struggles over whom to include or exclude. While identity can boil down to what one claims to be, or is seen to be at a given time, there often also are traditional myths, customs, practices, norms, and expectationssurroundingwhat we know as 'culture' which clarify distinctions. Of course clarity can be elusive, since myths, customs, etc. also are shared across population groups, such as South Asian Hindus,

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institutionsalso evidentlycontributeto communalviolence potential. Of course,civil war can erupt in fairly integratedstates as well, i.e. those with significantcross-ethnicbridges in marriageand workplaces,as in Bosnia. It might indeed take separationagreementsto quell the fighting in such circumstances. Often it appears that ruthless leaders and foreign powers play a particularrole in destabilizing such societies and tearing them apart (Kaufman,1996). Thus it becomes all the more importantto take a case-by-caselook at the combinations of social and political circumstancesunderlying more or less effective forms of conflict resolution in varioustypes of ethno-political disputes.We seek to know more about what forms of conflict management- those from above or below, those dealing with concrete day-to-day accommodations or deeper psycho-social needs - appearmost effective in various sorts of conflicts and structural situations,i.e. more or less disruptedsocieties and polities. Therefore,we have deriveda set from of casesreflectingvariedcircumstances, the local township to the nationallevel, from claims of autonomy or independence to struggles for institutional control and representation. Because the cases are diverse, generalizationacrosscasesis difficult;instead we use this opportunity to raise important theoreticalquestionsand suggestivefindings. We presentindicationsabout the type of conflict in each study and the adaptabilityand suitability of various conflict resolution approaches, singly or in combination, in differentcircumstances. Among the studies are Jay Rothman & of MarieOlson's(2001) generalextrapolation the ARIA model and preliminaryempirical assessmentof relatedapproachesin improving conflict resolution effectivenessin representative types of cases.Noteworthy here is a comparison of various counts of conflict resolution success and interactive conflict

management in identity- and nonidentity-baseddisputes.While the data were not alwaysamenableto clearcutconclusions, indication of successthrough interactivediscussion was found in both identity and nonidentity disputes, though other approaches also seemedto work in identitydisputesettlement. This is followed by a series of specific case-studies involving the dimensions outlined here and looking in many cases to assess identity-based frameworks ex post facto in specific contexts. Ronald Fisher (2001) assessesinformal identity-basedconflict mediation techniques as against official forms of mediation/negotiation in the Cyprusdispute. He finds some limited indication of improved prospects utilizing the former techniques, but cites the need for more sustained efforts. Sean Byrne (2001) particularlyfocuses on the trade-off of elite versus grass-roots approaches in various Northern Irishpeace initiatives.Contrasting 'consociationaland civic society' models, he accounts for the difficulties encountered by noting the insufficient involvement of mass local participation.PerryMars (2001) takes a similarlook at the potential for conflict resolution techniques in episodic civil unrest in

the context of a developing state in Guyana. The interplay of class, race, and politics in conflict resolution initiatives, including those of political notables, is highlighted in the process. Louis Kriesberg(2001) details the respective roles of formal and informal mediation, at the elite and mass levels, in the gradual de-escalation of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This case affordsan opportunity to evaluate elite and rank-and-fileapproaches, and instrumental and identity concerns, against the backdrop of varied mediation attempts, many of which proved insufficiently comprehensive. Davin Bremner (2001) takes us to the township level in South Africa to discuss contrastingeffective

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Mediation and the Escalationof an IdentityBased Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse', Journalof PeaceResearch 38(3): 307-326. Gurr,Ted Robert, 1994. 'PeoplesAgainst States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System',International StudiesQuarterly 38(3): 347-377. Joseph, Richard, 1999. 'Negotiating for Peace in Liberia:Conclusions and Recommendations', in Timothy D. Sisk, ed., 'New Approachesto International Negotiation and Mediation: Findings from USIP Sponsored Research', Peaceworks 30. Washington, DC: United StatesInstitute of Peace (28-32). Kaufman,Stuart, 1996. 'Spiralingto Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War', International Security 21 (Fall): 108-138. Kelman, Herbert, 1990. 'Interactive ProblemSolving: A Social-PsychologicalApproach to Conflict Resolution',in John Burton & Frank Duke, eds, Conflict:Reading in Management and Resolution. New York: St. Martin's (199-215). Kriesberg, Louis, 2001. 'Mediationand the Transformation of the Israeli-PalestinianConflict', Journalof PeaceResearch 38(3): 373-392. Mars, Perry,2001. 'Ethnic Politics, Mediation, and Conflict Resolution:The GuyanaExperience', Journal of Peace Research 38(3):
353-372.

and ineffective local dialogue and negotiation processes over both identity and instrumental concerns. Local concerns become both symbolic and instrumental interests, and innovative reframing of disputes, necessitated by crisis and killing, turns out to be very instructive about what works and what fails. Some of the findings indicate that elite approaches become most effective when supplemented by or combined with lower-level sustained contacts and discussions. This might include informal meetings by private citizens such as those that paved the way for of leadership-level Israeliresumption Palestinian talks in the mid-1990s (Kriesberg, 2001). Insights are afforded on the importance of timing, identity of mediators, and the audience for specific initiatives and informal processes - aimed, for example, at journalists, teachers, officials, armed forces, or laborers. We are fortunate at least in being able to contrast the effect of varied approaches in industrial, post-industrial, and developing states and in varied regional cultural contexts. More of this type of comparative analysis will be necessary to determine the proper mix of strategies appropriate for various levels and intensities of disputes.

Mitchell, George, 1999. Address to annual References meeting of the CranbrookPeace Foundation, Bremner, Davin, 2001. 'South African ExperiSouthfield, MI, 9 December. ences with Identity and Community Con- Rothman,Jay,1997. Resolving ConIdentity-Based flicts', Journal of Peace Research 38(3): flicts in Nations, Organizations) Communiand 393-405. ties. San Francisco,CA: Jossey-Bass. Byrne, Sean, 2001. 'Consociational and Civic Rothman, Jay & Marie L. Olson, 2001. 'From Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Intereststo Identities:Towardsa New EmphaNorthern Ireland',Journal of Peace Research sis in InteractiveConflict Resolution',Journal 38(3): 327-352. of PeaceResearch 38(3): 289-305. Carment, David & Patrick James, 1998. 'The Weede, Erich& EdwardN. Muller, 1998. 'RebelUnited Nations at 50: ManagingEthnic Crises lion, Violence and Revolution: A Rational Past and Present',Journal of Peace Research Choice Perspective', Journal of Peace Research 35(1): 61-82. 35(1): 43-59. Fisher,RonaldJ., 1997. Interactive Resolu- Wilmot, William W. & Joyce L. Hocker, 1998. Conflict tion. Syracuse,NY: SyracuseUniversityPress. Interpersonal Conflict,5th edn. Boston, MA: Fisher, Ronald J., 2001. 'Cyprus:The Failureof McGraw-Hill.

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FREDERIC S. PEARSON, b. 1944, PhD in International Relations, Political Science (University of Michigan, 1971); Professorof Political Science and Director, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Wayne State

University (1990- ); previously Professor at University of Missouri-St. Louis (1969-89). Most recent book: Arms and Ethnopolitical (Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming Warfare 2001), with John Sislin.