Article III Reviewer

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 1 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.
ARTICLE III: BILL OF RIGHTS

y y Constitutional limits on governmental power The totality of governmental power is contained in three great powers: POLICE POWER, POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, and POWER OF TAXATION. These belong to the very essence of government and without them no government can exist. y Restrictions found in the Bill of Rights, as constitutional law, are directed against the state.
POLICE POWER
y Has been characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. y Chief Justice Shaws classic statement: Police power is the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. y Police power rests upon PUBLIC NECESSITY and upon the right of the state and of the public to SELF-PROTECTION (US vs. Toribio). For this reason, its scope expands and contracts with changing needs. y The only areas, however, where the use of police power has shown significant development and change in Philippine jurisprudence are the areas of LABOR, AGRICULTURAL TENANCY, AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION. The direction of change has been away from laissez faire. y Vast as the power is, however, it must be exercised within the limits set by the constitution. In the words of the leading case of US vs Toribio, the legislative determination of what is a proper exercise of its police power is NOT FINAL or CONCLUSIVE, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. y The exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to the JUDICIAL INQUIRY. (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motels Operators) And the principal yardsticks against which such exercise must be measured are the DUE PROCESS clause and the EQUAL PROTECTION clause.
EMINENT DOMAIN
y The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be the ultimate right of the sovereign power to APPROPRIATE, not only the PUBLIC but the PRIVATE PROPERTY of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, for PUBLIC PURPOSE. (Justice Story in the leading case of Charles River Bridge vs Warren Bridge) y Private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation have their origin in the recognition of a necessity for restraining the sovereign and protecting the individual. y The exercise of the power of eminent domain is by tradition lodged with the executive arm of the government (Visayan Refining case) It is, however, evident from the same authority that the power is dormant until the Legislature sets it in motion. y Once authority is given to exercise the power of eminent domain, the matter ceases to be wholly legislative. The executive authorities may then decide whether the power will be invoked and to what extent. y The power of eminent domain may also be conferred upon municipal governments and other government entities. The Court said in City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila: The power of the Legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts The scope of such delegated power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and must be sought in terms of the delegation itself. y In the hands of the legislature, the power of eminent domain is an INHERENT POWER. In the hands of government agencies, local governments and public utilities, however, eminent domain is only DELEGATED POWER. Importance of

distinction: legal consequences with respect to the scope of the power and scope of judicial review of the exercise of the power. y In the hands of Congress the scope of the power is, like the scope of legislative power itself, PLENARY. It is as broad as the scope of police power itself. It can thus reach every form of property which the State might need for public use. It can reach even private property already dedicated to public use or even property devoted to religious worship. y The DELEGATED POWER of eminent domain of local governments is strictly speaking not a power of eminent but of inferior domain---a share merely in eminent domain. Hence, it is only as broad as the eminent authority would allow it to be. A clear case in point is City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila. (refer to the explanation in Bernas book)
CASES *** CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO JR. FACTS:

y Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court. y MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. y the said Ordinance is entitledAN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. y PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)
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of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. y
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PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Petitioners asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units.
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance.

ISSUE: W/N the questioned ordinance is invalid and unconstitutional RULING: Yes. The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra
vires and therefore null and void.
RATIO:
y For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. (Must pass the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency). y Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. y
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Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.
The ordinance contravenes the Constitution: The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
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The ordinance infringes the due process clause: There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, o
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and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power.
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There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice,
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and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power.
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The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.
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The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.52 This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.
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Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is
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rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. o
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The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
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Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met: To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only (1) must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2) the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.
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The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;
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and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably
accomplish the desired end. y It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property. y LIBERTY as discussed in City of Manila vs. Laguio Jr case: o Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from

physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."
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In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all
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lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. o While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognizedas essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. (Roth v. Board of Regents) o Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone it is the most comprehensive of rightsis the beginning of all freedom and the right most valued by civilized men. (Morfe vs. Mutuc) o The ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause: Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.99 The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."100 It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. o Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
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The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: o o o o
MODAY VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

y The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." y Private respondents contention: The Municipality of Bunawan filed a petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday. It contended that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property. y Petitioners contention: Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the legality of the condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality. According to petitioners, the expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there being other municipal properties available for the purpose.
ISSUE: W/N a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan

RULING: Yes. RATIO: y
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.
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It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to

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the State, private property for public use or purpose.
Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of

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eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities.
For the taking
of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. y The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code Section 9 of said law states: Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose. y The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property. y The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that (1) the use must be public, (2) compensation must be made and (3) due process of law must be observed.
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in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated.
The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy

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of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. choose what private property should be taken.
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has ruled that the
Government may not capriciously
ROXAS V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

y Petitioner owns 3 haciendas, which were taken by the government in pursuance of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Before the effectivity of such law, petitioner has voluntary offered to sell one of its haciendas and the other two haciendas were placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.
HELD: The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent
that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
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But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess
of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." process of law. property.
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The Bill of Rights provides that "[n]o person shall be
The CARL was not intended to take away property without due
The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private
LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE VS. CITY OF BUTUAN FACTS:

y The Regional Trial Court (Branch 2) of Butuan City held that the authority to register tricycles, the grant of the corresponding franchise, the issuance of tricycle drivers' license, and the collection of fees therefor had all been vested in
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the Local Government Units ("LGUs"). Accordingly, it decreed the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction against LTO, prohibiting and enjoining LTO, as well as its employees and other persons acting in its behalf, from (a) registering tricycles and (b) issuing licenses to drivers of tricycles. The Court of Appeals, on appeal to it, sustained the trial court. y Respondents Contention: Respondent City of Butuan asserts that one of the salient provisions introduced by the Local Government Code is in the area of local taxation which allows LGUs to collect registration fees or charges along with, in its view, the corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles. o Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments. (Sec. 5, Art X) y Petitioners Contention: Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.
ISSUES:W/N RULING: No. RATIO:

y
under the present set up the power of the Land Registration Office ("LTO") to register, tricycles in particular, as well
as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has likewise devolved to local government units.
Registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO while franchising and regulatory responsibilities had been vested in the LTFRB. Under the Local Government Code, certain functions of the DOTC were transferred to the LGUs: Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Transportation and Communications, regulate the operation of tricycles and grant franchises for the operation thereof within the territorial jurisdiction of the city.
LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. o "To regulate" means to fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws. o A franchise is defined to be a special privilege to do certain things conferred by government on an individual or corporation, and which does not belong to citizens generally of common right.
The newly delegated powers pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers theretofore exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of LTO under R.A. No. 4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or operated on or upon any public highway" in the country.
Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share with local government units by delegation given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a public purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The basic aim of police power is public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses an the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many respects, the grant of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other.
The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(8)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the Local Government Code must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R.A. 4136.
SAINT LUKES MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. NLRC FACTS:

y Petitioner Maribel S. Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of private respondent St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) on October 13, 1984. She is a graduate of Associate in Radiologic Technology from The Family Clinic Incorporated School of Radiologic Technology. y On April 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the "Radiologic Technology Act of 1992." Said law requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology. y On March 4, 1997, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a final notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos requiring the latter to comply with Republic Act. No. 7431 by taking and passing the forthcoming examination scheduled in June 1997; otherwise, private respondent SLMC may be compelled to retire her from employment should there be no other position available where she may be absorbed. y On January 6, 1999, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC again issued a "Notice of Separation from the Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective February 5, 1999 after the latter failed to present/ submit her appeal for rechecking to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) of the recent board examination which she took and failed. y On March 2, 1999, petitioner Maribel S. Santos filed a complaint against private respondent SLMC for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits. She likewise prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner Santos was illegally dismissed by private respondent SLMC on the basis of her inability to secure a
certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology.
RULING: No. RATIO:

y While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The most concrete example of this would be in the field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has been closely regulated by the State. It has long been recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. The same rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and x-ray technology. y The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are recognized as an exercise of the State's inherent police power. It should be noted that the police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, educations, good order, safety or general welfare of the people. The state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray technicians and/or any other professions connected with the health and safety of its citizens. Respondent-appellee being engaged in the hospital and health care business, is a proper subject of the cited law; thus, having in mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter cannot close its eyes and [let] complainant-appellant's private interest override public interest. y No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of petitioner Santos was undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute. It is undeniable that her continued employment without the required Board certification exposed the hospital to possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to operate. Certainly, private respondent could not be expected to retain petitioner Santos despite the inimical threat posed by the latter to its business.
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y While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. y The fact that another employee, who likewise failed to pass the required exam, was allowed by private respondent to apply for and transfer to another position with the hospital does not constitute unlawful discrimination. This was a valid exercise of management prerogative, petitioners not having alleged nor proven that the reassigned employee did not qualify for the position where she was transferred. In the past, the Court has ruled that an objection founded on the ground that one has better credentials over the appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the position.
UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION VS. CITY MAYOR FACTS:

y On 11 November 1997, the Municipal Council of Paraaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 entitled, "An Ordinance Prescribing the Comprehensive Land Use Plan & Zoning of the Municipality of Paraaque Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 and Other Pertinent Laws." Sections 11.5 and 11.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, reclassifying El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Paraaque from residential to commercial areas. y Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Sections 11.5, 11.6, 15,8 17,9 and 19.610 of Municipal Ordinance No. 9708. y Petitioners Contention: Petitioners alleged that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Paraaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it amounts to impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Paraaque and the lot buyers. Petitioners cited the annotation on the lot buyers titles which provides that "the property shall be used for residential purposes only and for no other purpose." Petitioners assert that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Paraaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it impairs the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Paraaque and the lot buyers. y Public Respondents Contention: Public respondents alleged that the passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Paraaque and that such ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations entered into by the petitioners and the developer.
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ISSUE: W/N Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power RULING: Yes. RATIO:
y Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is reasonable and not discriminating or oppressive with respect to BF Homes Paraaque. As held by the Court of Appeals, the increasing number of homeowners in BF Homes Paraaque necessitated the addition of commercial areas in the subdivision to service the needs of the homeowners. y The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. y
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In Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., the Court held that contractual restrictions on the use of property could not prevail over the reasonable exercise of police power through zoning regulations. o while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially

inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. o As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance Company v. City of Davao, et al., police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more emphatic in Vda. De Genuino v. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: "We do not see why the public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the states exercise of its police power."
LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY

y The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word person includes aliensPrivate corporations, likewise, are persons within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. (Smith, Bell and Co. vs. Natividad?)
LIBERTY y
The right to liberty guaranteed by the constitution includes that RIGHT TO EXIST and the RIGHT TO BE FREE from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties to which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are as are necessary for the common welfare.
Not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up children and to worship God according to the dictates of conscience (Meyer vs. Nebraska)
PROPERTY y
Protected property has been deemed to include vested rights such as a perfected mining claim, or a perfected homestead, or a final judgment. It also includes the right to WORK, and the right to EARN A LIVING. Ones employment, profession, trade, or calling is protected property. A license to operate a cock-pit, however was NOT considered protected property, It was deemed merely a PRIVILEGE withdrawal when PUBLIC INTEREST required its withdrawal.
Even a privilege may evolve into some form of property protected by the Constitution, as for instance when a holder of an export quota, has been enjoying it for so long and has put in substantial investment making the business the source of employment for thousands (American Inter-Fashion Corp. vs. Office of the President).
It has also been asserted that PUBLIC OFFICE IS NOT PROPERTY but a public trust or agency. This is not to say, however, that the right to office is not a protected right. As the court has asserted, due process may be relied upon by public officials to protect the security of tenure which in the limited sense is analogous to property (Morfe vs. Mutuc).
LIFE y
The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection of the right to be alive or to the security of ones limb against physical harm. The right to life is also the right to a good life. The importance of the quality of living now finds stronger emphasis in Article XIII, on social justice, and even the life of the unborn finds protection in the 1987 Constitution.
CASES: AMERICAN INTER FASHION CORPORATION V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-197 SCRA 409 FACTS: Glorious Sun was found guilty of misdeclaration of imported raw materials resulting in dollar salting abroad and thus, the GTEB cancelled its export quotas. The export quota was then awarded to 2 newly-formed corporationsDe Soleil and American Inter-Fashion Corporation.

HELD: The cancellation of the export quotas of the private respondent was a violation of its constitutional right to due process by GTEB. Before the cancellation in 1984, private respondent had been enjoying export quotas as early as 1977. In effect, the private respondents export quota allocation which was initially a privilege evolved into some form of property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly confer it to another. While it is true that such allocations were mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, the privileges have been accorded to private respondent for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially since not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of private respondent but also the livelihood of its workers.
CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO FACTS:

y In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). y Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines. o As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit, certificate of registration or MR) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence. However, the Chief, Philippine National Police may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under conditions as he may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearms outside of residence. y Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.
ISSUES:
y y y (1) W/N the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional right? (2) W/N the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of his right to property?; (3) W/N the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power?
RULING: y y y RATIO:
y First Issue: o A provision commonly invoked by the American people to justify their possession of firearms is the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which reads: "A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." o It pertains to the citizens "collective right" to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens "individual right" to own and possess arms. o The Supreme Court interpreted the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment as referring to the collective right of those comprising the Militia a body of citizens enrolled for military discipline. It does not pertain to the individual right of citizen to bear arm. (US vs. Miller) o It is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon the American people the right to bear arms. In a more explicit language, the United States vs. Cruikshank decreed: "The right of the people to keep and
28
(1) No. (2) No. (3) Yes.

bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any way dependent upon that instrument." o The right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Our Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second Amendment. o Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation. What then are the laws that grant such right to the Filipinos? "SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal protection, or for use in hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition therefor, shall make application for a license to possess such firearm or firearms or ammunition as hereinafter provided (Act No. 1780). The foregoing provision was restated in Section 887 of Act No. 2711 that integrated the firearm laws. Thereafter, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1866. It codified the laws on illegal possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition of firearms, ammunitions or explosives and imposed stiffer penalties for their violation. R.A. No. 8294 amended some of the provisions of P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the imposable penalties. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. y Second Issue: o In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that "a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right." In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: "Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution." o "Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not arise whenever a person has only an abstract need or desire for, or unilateral expectation of a benefit. x x x Rather, they arise from legitimate claims of entitlement defined by existing rules or understanding that stem from an independent source, such as state law. (Erdelyi vs. OBrien) o Similar doctrine was announced in Potts vs. City of Philadelphia, Conway vs. King, Nichols vs. County of Sta. Clara,
39 37 38 34 33 32 31
and Gross vs. Norton. These cases enunciated that the test whether the statute creates a
40
property right or interest depends largely on the extent of discretion granted to the issuing authority. o In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that "the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence." Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. o Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co,
42 43 41
held: "The correlative power to revoke or

recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable." y Third issue: o Assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the States police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare. o The test to determine the validity of a police measure: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. o It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general. o The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them. o Laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

y Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on July 15, 1995. The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law. y The respondent ARCO-Phil. assailed Section 2(g) and (i), Section 6 subsection (a) to (m), Section 7(a) to (b), and Section 10 paragraphs (1) and (2), quoted as follows: (g) THE STATE RECOGNIZES THAT THE ULTIMATE PROTECTION TO ALL MIGRANT WORKERS IS THE POSSESSION OF SKILLS. PURSUANT TO THIS AND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, THE GOVERNMENT SHALL DEPLOY AND/OR ALLOW THE DEPLOYMENT ONLY OF SKILLED FILIPINO WORKERS. y Respondents Contention: o The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 and Article XV,
6 5

Sections 1 and 3(3) of the Constitution. As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad. According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters. o The grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional. y Petitioners Contention: o o The assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, The law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State.
7 8
RATIO:
y In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the issue of the extent of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling vis--vis the equal protection clause and the non-impairment clause of the Constitution were raised and we held, thus: o A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. o Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others. o In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. o The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.
25
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO VS. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC FACTS:

y Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation. y Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with coemployees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. y The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employees employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position" or preparation for employment outside the company after six months. y Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area. y In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecsons superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was performing his job well. y Petitioners Contention: Glaxos policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees right to marry. y Respondents Contention: o Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause; and that Tecsons reassignment from the Camarines NorteCamarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area does not amount to constructive dismissal. o Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict with their responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having personal or family interests in any competitor company which may influence their actions and decisions and consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its secrets, procedures and policies. o It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes existing or future relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause. It maintains that considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based on valid grounds.
7 3
ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor
companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
RULING: No. RATIO:

y Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative. y Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

y The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. y While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. y As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case, it is a legitimate business practice to guard business confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or employees who are married to a competitor. y The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct. Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee. y Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.
27 29 25 24
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA FACTS:

y Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. y On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became effective on December 28, 2001. y Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society. y Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. y However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." y Petitioners contention: Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
13 3 2
HELD:
y The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city."> One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has
20

the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., we stated the reason for this: o These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. y The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack delayed.
25 21
on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

y Its essence was expressed by DANIEL WEBSTER as a law which hears before it condemns.
CASES/DOCTRINES: BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA FACTS:

y This action was instituted by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila.
DOCTRINE:
y Due process of law requires that the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of process within the State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon the question of his personal liability. y The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by any form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign country. y As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. y If the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is rather from tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the opportunity for a hearing shall not be lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume that form. y It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary. y It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in some way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences.

y If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process upon the constructive notice, then our statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative declarations, without either force, or meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction of the court, no personal judgment can be rendered, and if the judgment cannot operate upon the property, then no effective judgment at all can be rendered, so that the result would be that the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen against a nonresident. Such a result would be a deplorable one. y The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings. y The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed.
BAUTISTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACT:

y The Court of Appeals find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court in denying petitioners motion for postponement and declaring them as having waived their right to present evidence.
DOCTRINES:
y In Gohu v. Spouses Gohu, we ruled that, far from being tainted with bias and prejudice, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the courts duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party. y Petitioners contention that they were denied due process is not well- taken. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee. y Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. y We cannot make a finding of grave abuse of discretion simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather than postpone the hearing to another day, because of the absence of a party. That the absence of a party during trial constitutes a waiver of his right to present evidence and cross-examine the opponents witnesses is firmly supported by jurisprudence. To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness.
10
RURAL BANK OF BUHI, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS HELD/DOCTRINES:

y Republic Act No. 265 (proceedings upon insolvency)

y It will be observed from the foregoing provision of law, that there is no requirement whether express or implied, that a hearing be first conducted before a banking institution may be placed under receivership. On the contrary, the law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and to appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities. They are: (a) an examination made by the examining department of the Central Bank; (b) report by said department to the Monetary Board; and (c) prima facie showing that the bank is in a condition of insolvency or so situated that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors. y It has long been established and recognized in this jurisdiction that the closure and liquidation of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. Such exercise may, however, be subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust or a denial of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution (Central Bank vs. CA). y The evident implication of the law, therefore, is that the appointment of a receiver may be made by the Monetary Board without notice and hearing but its action is subject to judicial inquiry to insure the protection of the banking institution. Stated otherwise, due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community. y It has likewise been held that resolutions of the Monetary Board under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, such as: forbidding bank institutions to do business on account of a "condition of insolvency" or because its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors or creditors; or appointing a receiver to take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities, or determining whether the bank may be rehabilitated or should be liquidated and appointing a liquidator for that purpose, are under the law "final and executory" and may be set aside only on one ground, that is "if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith" (Salud vs. Central Bank, supra).
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACT:

y Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
HELD/ DOCTRINES:
y From the reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. y The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. y Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing regulations.

FABELLA VS. CA FACTS:
y Secretary Cario filed administrative cases against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations. y Teachers were dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether private respondents were denied due process of law. HELD/DOCTRINE:
y y SC agrees with the Court of Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of law. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. y The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers' organization and a supervisor of the division. y In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. y Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents.
LAO GI VS. CA DOCTRINE:

y Before any alien may be deported upon a warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration, there should be a prior determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground as charged against the alien (Sec.37 of the Immigration Act). y After appropriate charges are filed in the CID the specific grounds of which he should be duly informed of, a hearing should be conducted, and it is only after such a hearing by the CID that the alien may be ordered deported. y The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.
1

y Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. y The charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.
GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY FACTS:

y Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." y Respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in their respective courses is "the latter's participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.
HELD/DOCTRINES:
y Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." y Under the Education Act of 1982, the petitioners, as students, have the right among others "to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations." Petitioners were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted." This Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute, to declare illegal this act of respondents of imposing sanctions on students without due investigation. y The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and crossexamination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. y There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
9 8 7 6 5 3
PEOPLE VS. CAROL PEOPLE VS. CAROL DELA PIEDRA DOCTRINES:

y Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning. y As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. (People vs. Nazario) y An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith."
21 20
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS y

The clause must be understood to guarantee not just forms of procedure but also the VERY SUBSTANCE OF LIFE, LIBERTY, and PROPERTY. The due process must be interpreted both as a procedural and as substantive guarantee. It must be a guarantee against the exercise of arbitrary power even when the power is exercised according to proper forms and procedure.
CASES: UNITED STATES VS. TORIBIO FACTS:

y the appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. y The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen.
DOCTRINES:
y It is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . . y Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. y The restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of the

exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be detrimental to the public welfare. y The right of EMINENT DOMAIN---the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. y The power we allude to is rather the POLICE POWER, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. y The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power. y It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. y To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear: That the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and That the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT FACTS:

y No carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos (Executive Order No. 626). y The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. y The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
DOCTRINES:
y The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. y Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. y This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions.

y Previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. y The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. y The justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. y In this case, the reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. y We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. y In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. y In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. y In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
OPLE VS. TORRES FACTS:

y Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
DOCTRINES:
y AO 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone."
29
In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,
30
the United States
Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. y The right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution---Sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 17. y The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. y A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.

y It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. y It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. information. y The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. This threatens the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. y The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) Whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. case determine the reasonableness of the expectation.
68 67 58
Well to note, the computer linkage
gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of
The factual circumstances of the
However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. y As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. That may be true. However, court should tread daintily on the field of social and economic experimentation lest they impede or obstruct the march of technology to improve public services just on the basis of an unfounded fear that the experimentation violates one's constitutionally protected rights. y Requirements: It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused intrusions.
86 85
and a compelling interest justify such
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to
prevent unconstitutional invasions. AO 308 lacks these safeguards.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW y

The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the Equality of the Person. The equality it guarantees is LEGAL EQUALITY or, as it is usually put, the equality of all persons before the law, Under it, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he possesses.
The equality guaranteed, however, is not a disembodied equality. It does not deny to the state the power to recognize and act upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify.
Classification in American jurisprudence, the Court said, with the end in view of providing diversity of treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based UPON SOME REASONABLE GROUND AND NOT BE A MERE ARBITRARY SELECTION.
CASES: PEOPLE VS. CAYAT FACTS:

y Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
DOCTRINES:

y It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable: (1) Must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class. y Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." y That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the nonChristian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization. y The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. y That the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application. y Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. y Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated, or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS. QUISUMBING FACTS:

y The School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. y The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires.
DOCTRINES:
y The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. y There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

y While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. y In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL VS. ORMOC CITY FACTS:

y The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."
1
DOCTRINES:
y In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) It is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) These are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) The classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) The classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. y A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. y The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
5
LIM VS. PACQUING DOCTRINE:

y On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare.
DE GUZMAN JR. VS COMELEC FACTS:

y Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.
DOCTRINES:
y The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

y In Lutz vs. Araneta, it was held that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none". This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. y To require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration of voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC. y The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.
TIU VS. CA FACTS:

y Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted there to special privileges. y Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present "fenced-in former Subic Naval Base" only. It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
HELD/DOCTRINES:
y We rule in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, than we find real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification. y The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. y We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries. Why the seeming bias for the big investors? Undeniably, they are the ones who can pour huge investments to spur economic growth in the country and to generate employment opportunities for the Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for such conversion. The classification is, therefore, germane to the purposes of the law. And as the legal maxim goes, "The intent of a statute is the law." y It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws.
13 6
As long as there are
actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause.
PEOPLE VS. MERCADO FACTS:

y Accused-appellants argue that Republic Act No. 7659 denies equality before the law. They cite studies here and abroad allegedly showing that "the death penalty has most often been used against the poor."

DOCTRINES:
y Anyone, regardless of his economic status in life, may commit a crime. While there may be perceived imbalances in the imposition of penalties, there are adequate safeguards in the Constitution, the law, and procedural rules to ensure due process and equal protection of the law. y "The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of all persons before the law. Under this guarantee, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he possesses. y "Apparently, as it should be, the death penalty law makes no distinction. It applies to all persons and to all classes of persons - rich or poor, educated, or uneducated, religious or non-religious. No particular person or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be exclusively imposed."
FARINAS VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS:

y Petitioners contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
DOCTRINES:
y The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. y The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. y Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. y Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. y Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
PARRENO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT FACTS:

y Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioners monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650. Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.
DOCTRINES: y
The retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous in nature. They are not similar to pension plans where employee participation is mandatory, hence, the employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension which forms part of the compensation. y The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class. y There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial difference between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country, such as petitioner in the case before us. The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render personal and military service necessarily includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need arises. y Petitioners loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. y Petitioner will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he reacquire his Filipino citizenship since he will again be entitled to the benefits and privileges of Filipino citizenship reckoned from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. There is no legal obstacle to the resumption of his retirement benefits from the time he complies again with the condition of the law, that is, he can receive his retirement benefits provided he is a Filipino citizen.
FIFTH AMENDMENT GRAND JURY, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, SELF-INCRIMINATION, DUE PROCESS No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - RIGHTS GUARANTEED PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENSHIP, DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S CASES AND DOCTRINES RE: DUE PROCESS, MORE PARTICULARLY, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (AS MENTIONED IN DEAN BAUTISTAS LECTURE) LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 198 U.S 45

FACTS: Bakeshop Act is being assailed as unconstitutional for prohibiting bakeshop workers to work for more than 10 hours a day. HELD: Fourteenth Amendment protected an individual's "general right to make a contract in relation to his business." MEYER V. STATE OF NEBRASKA - 262 U.S 390 FACTS: A teacher of a parochial school was convicted of violating a law prohibiting the teaching of the German language to a child who had not attained and successfully passed the 8th grade. The law provides that no person shall teach any person in any language than English. It may only be taught once the student passed the 8th grade. Anyone who violates the aforementioned law will be guilty of a misdemeanor and maybe fined or imprisoned. HELD: It is a violation. The 14th amendment, which says that no one shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, doesnt only encompass freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, etc. PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS - 268 US 510 FACTS: A law entitled Compulsory Education Act has been challenged by appellees in this case. The said act requires children between 8 to 16 years of age to attend schooling in a public school. The manifest purpose is to compel general attendance to public schools by normal children, between 8-16, who have not attended 8th grade. HELD: The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize the children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state, those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. BUCK V. BELL 274 U.S 200 FACTS: State Sterilization Act: wherein the State is authorized to sterilize sexually mental defectives like imbeciles. HELD: We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT 381 U.S 479 FACTS: A state law provides Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.' HELD: (1) The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion. (2) The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by

several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. BOWERS V. HARDWICK 478 US 186 FACTS: After being charged with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with another adult male in the bedroom of his home, respondent Hardwick (respondent) brought suit in Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. HELD: Any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable. Indeed, the Court's opinion in Carey twice asserted that the privacy right, which the Griswold line of cases found to be one of the protections provided by the Due Process Clause, did not reach so far. STANLEY V. GEORGIA 394 US 557 FACTS: During a search of appellants home, obscene materials were seized and he was charged for illegal possession of them. HELD: Mere categorization of these films as obscene is insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, it is not thought that they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. The whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds. ROE V. WADE 410 US 113 FACTS: The constitutionality of Texas statute criminalizing abortion is being assailed. HELD: (1) Right of personal privacy or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy does exist under Constitution, and only personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty are included in this guarantee of personal privacy; the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage. (2) Constitutional right of privacy is broad enough to encompass woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, but the woman's right to terminate pregnancy is not absolute since state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards and in protecting potential life, and at some point in pregnancy these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of factors that govern the abortion decision. (3) Where certain fundamental rights are involved, regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest and the legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only legitimate state interests at stake. (4) Word person as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA VS. CASEY 505 US 833

FACTS: At issue are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, which requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed; which mandates the informed consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but provides a judicial bypass procedure; which commands that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband; which defines a medical emergency that will excuse compliance with the foregoing requirements; and which impose certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services. HELD: (1) To protect the central right recognized by Roe while at the same time accommodating the State's profound interest in potential life, see id., at 162, 93 S.Ct., at 731, the undue burden standard should be employed. An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. (2) Roe's rigid trimester framework is rejected. To promote the State's interest in potential life throughout pregnancy, the State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is informed. Measures designed to advance this interest should not be invalidated if their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the right. (3) As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion, but may not impose unnecessary health regulations that present a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion. (4) Adoption of the undue burden standard does not disturb Roe's holding that regardless of whether exceptions are made for particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability. (5) Roe's holding that subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother is also reaffirmed.
SECTION 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon PROBABLE CAUSE to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. WHEN IS A SEARCH A REASONABLE SEARCH? CASES VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA FACTS:
y On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining

peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
1
Petitioners Contention: o Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. o Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. o Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
HELD:
y The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. y Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. y The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. y Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. y True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
4
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA HELD:

y It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. y Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and drug abuse have become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunition have become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is at an all time high. Whether or not effective as expected, checkpoints have been regarded by the authorities as a security measure designed to entrap criminals and insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade.

y No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected. y For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. y Vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Again, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court o Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office. Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct 1302 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543,45 S Ct 280, 39 ALR 790 (1925). The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have 'reasonable or probable cause to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search
REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT ALVAREZ VS. CFI OF TAYABAS FACTS:

y The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. y The Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at nay time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. y With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of several articles. y The search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the documents. y The attorney for the petitioner filed another petition alleging that the search warrant issue was illegal and that it had nit yet been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to the petitioner, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority.
HELD: First Issue

y A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95, General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). y While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis principles of government (People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).
Second Issue
y The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom he considered reliable. y Provisions require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant ands the witnesses he may produce. y In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined asan outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law Dictionary). y The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause (U. S. vs. Tureaud,) y The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused (State vs. Roosevelt Country) y The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. y What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. y It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
Third Issue
y Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared illegal and cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued unless it be supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be presented necessity by him. y If the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. y When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude,

therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
Fourth Issue:
y One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be seized. Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining whether probable cause exist and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with. y BUT where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather generally, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284; People vs. Kahn, supra). y The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." y Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
Fifth Issue
y The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him for violation of the Anti-usury Law. y The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself. y Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.
PEOPLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

y On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. y The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. y On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.

y Private respondents submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible).
ISSUE: W/N search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing,
or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.
RULING: No. RATIO:

y The place they had in mind the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" was not what the Judge who issued warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant. y However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the warrant which directs that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. y The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. y It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. y The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. y The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. y There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that "any evidence obtained in violation **(inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
PEOPLE VS. VELOSO FACTS:

y The building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club. y The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the

Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date abovementioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door. y Nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house.
HELD:
y The organic act provides "that the right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." It further provides "that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." y It was always necessary to express the name or give some description of a party to be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank, and without other designation of the person to be arrested, it was void. y This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose name is unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be arrested is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other circumstances by which he can be identified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40.). y It is undeniable that the application for the search warrant, the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." y It is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty. y John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. y The search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority. y The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was a member of the House of Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this allegation in relation with the facts as an aggravating circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly.
MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS. MAXICORP, INC. FACTS:

y National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. ("NBI Agent Samiano") filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants against Maxicorp. y Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorps premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants. y Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants."

y The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and computer technician Felixberto Pante ("Pante"). The three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using petitioners products. y Par. C- Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION; y Par. E- Computer hardware, including central processing units including hard disks, CD-ROM drives, keyboards, monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying machines and other equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal and unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and their manuals, or which contain, display or otherwise exhibit, without the authority of MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any and all Microsoft trademarks and copyrights.
ISSUES: (1) W/N THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS; (2) W/N THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE "GENERAL WARRANTS." HELD:
First Issue: y Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. y The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to "the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." y The applicant must have personal knowledge of the circumstances. "Reliable information" is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses. y The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition. y The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. y "Probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. y No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. y Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. Second Issue y A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a
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protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed. y Under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant shall issue "in connection with one specific offense." The articles described must bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is issued. Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must state that the articles subject of the search and seizure are used or intended for use in the commission of a specific offense. y Cases cited by CA INAPPLICABLE: Maxicorp is not a licensed distributor of petitioners. (1) In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering the seizure of "television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners x x x" were found too broad since the defendant there was a licensed distributor of video tapes. (2) (3) In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the warrants because they authorized the seizure of records pertaining to "all business transactions" of the defendant. And in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court quashed the warrant because it merely gave a list of articles to be seized, aggravated by the fact that such appliances are "generally connected with the legitimate business of renting out betamax tapes."
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y
y
Paragraph E is ok. However, Paragraph C lacks particularity. The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the description covers property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in copyright infringement or unfair competition.
No provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant.
BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF FACTS: y

Concerns the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
HELD:
1. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the

team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. 2. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit: Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property: [a] Property subject of the offense; [b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and [c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants. 3. It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. 4. Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
CORRO VS. LISING FACTS:

y Respondent Regional Trial Court judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the search and seizure of 1. Printed copies of Philippine Times; 2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times; 3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times; 4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners; 5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes

which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime of inciting to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1835 y The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several issues of the Philippine Times: ... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the government of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities, defined and penalized by Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1835; (p. 22, Rollo) and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others ... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending to incite distrust and hatred for the Government of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted authorities.
DOCTRINES:
y The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. They can not serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of the existence of probable cause. y The search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable. y An application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive materials published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. y "Mere generalization will not suffice." A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed, that abuses may not be committed.
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
DOCTRINES:
y What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. y Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. y Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
LIM, SR. VS. JUDGE FELIX ISSUE: May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying solely on the certification
or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?
DOCTRINES:
y The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.

y The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination. y Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the PRELIMINARY INQUIRY which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor. y We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. . . . y In Peo vs. Delgado, eliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it. y If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion. y We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
YAO VS. PEOPLE DOCTRINES:

y A search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for search warrant means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched. y The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. The applicant or his witnesses must have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense being complained of. Reliable information is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses. y It should be borne in mind that the determination of probable cause does not call for the application of the rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As the term implies, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. y The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any

designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. y Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officers prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had been issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the compound described in the affidavit. y A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. y While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or specie would suffice. y The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrants is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized. Hence, even if, as petitioners claimed, the properties seized belong to MASAGANA as a separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the search warrants is still valid.
SUMMERVILLE GENERAL MERCHANDISING VS. CA DOCTRINE:

y The law permits the seizure of a personal property if the same is the subject of the offense, fruit of the offense, or used or about to be used in committing an offense.
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES CASES: PAPA VS. MAGO FACTS:

y Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone.
DOCTRINES:
y The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and

customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. y As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. y The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. y The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests,
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and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may
be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. y He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. y Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.
PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING FACTS:

y The Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an evaluation of the information thus received, a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the suspected syndicate. y As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia. y Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to escape. The operatives disembarked from their car, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage compartment. y Contraband goods were found
DOCTRINES:
y y That search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view.
3

y The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused. y "It is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." y In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
PEOPLE VS. EVARISTO FACTS:

y Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of the Philippine Constabulary, indicates that on the day in question, a contingent composed of Romeroso and Vallarta, together with a Sgt. Daniel Maligaya, also of the Philippine Constabulary, and two (2) members of the Integrated National Police, were on routine patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. y At or about 5:50 in the afternoon, successive bursts of gunfire were heard in the vicinity. Proceeding to the approximate source of the same, they came upon one Barequiel Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air. y y Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue him. As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo's permission to scour through the house, which was granted. In the sala, he found, not Rosillo, but a number of firearms and paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms, all of which, thereafter, became the basis for the present indictment against Evaristo.
DOCTRINES:
y For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. y Amongthese exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted by this jurisdiction from the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Harris vs. U.S. and Coolidge vs. New Hampshire. Thus, it is recognized that objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence. y The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officer's purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent and even accidental. y With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly of the firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
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(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. y For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by which a warrantless arrest may be undertaken is applicable. For, as disclosed by the records, the peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate the matter. This incident may well be within the "offense" envisioned by par. 5 (b) of Rule 113, Rules of Court. y "an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF.
MALACAT VS. CA DOCTRINES:

y The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same.
31
The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a
32
validly issued warrant,
subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . . y A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. y Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; a "stop and frisk. y In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.
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(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;
and (6)
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made
the process cannot be reversed. y At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. y Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. y In Terry case, while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"
40
it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. y a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:

(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
PEOPLE VS. DE GRECIA FACTS:

y Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. y The surveillance, which actually started on the night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. y A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. y y As they passed by the group, then only six meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team. As a consequence, a searching team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building.
HELD/DOCTRINES:
y It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time.
15
The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the
RAM. y Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. y The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. y In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
18
The courts in the
surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. y Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. y Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the
19
Under such urgency and

rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.
PEOPLE VS. JOHNSON FACTS:

y That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
DOCTRINES:
y There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellants invocation of Art. III, 12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person. y The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. y Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. y Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. y There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. y The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.
DAVID VS. ARROYO DOCTRINES:

y The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
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The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that
searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. y Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; y y Not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble. "Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required. y Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge. y Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.
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The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When
a persons right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.
PEOPLE VS. NUEVAS FACTS:

y PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling (Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had received information that a certain male person, more or less 54" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. y While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from a motor vehicle. They accosted Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers. y Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos. y On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip from Famis informant, conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not included in the list of persons under surveillance. y Cabling restated that Nuevas had voluntarily submitted the plastic bag he was holding and that after Nuevas had been informed of the violation of law attributed to him, he admitted his willingness to cooperate and point to his other cohorts.

DOCTRINES:
y Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence); 2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. y incidental to lawful arrests. y A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. y In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." y y Neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine. An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. y y On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevass case was made with his consent. Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
39 36 35
The Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception, warrantless searches
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE. CASE:

MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS VS. NATIVIDAD DOCTRINES:
y There is no question that, upon the pleadings in the case, Sarreal has an interest in the books and documents in question, that they are material and important to the issues between him and petitioners, that justice will be better served if all the facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before the trial court. y The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will not be violated, because the trial court has power and jurisdiction to issue the order for the production and inspection of the books and documents in question in virtue of the constitutional guarantee making an express exception in favor of the disclosure of communication and correspondence upon lawful order of a court of justice.
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS CASES: IN RE: UMIL V. RAMOS - 187 SCRA 311 (MAIN) FACTS:
These are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus wherein the petitioners allege that they were unlawfully arrested as they were arrested without any warrant. The petitioners were arrested for being members of the New Peoples Army and other Communist parties.
HELD:
(1) An arrest without warrant is justified when the person is arrested in flagranti delicto, in theact of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrestedcommitted it. (2) The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. Any person arrested for these crimes may be arrested without warrant as it could be said that when he was arrested, he was actually committing the offense.
IN RE: UMIL V. RAMOS - 202 SCRA 251 (MR) FACTS: HELD:

Personal knowledge of the facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
HARVEY VS. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO FACTS: Petitioners were among the suspected adult pedophiles that were apprehended after close surveillance by CID agents. Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes. HELD: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not. PEOPLE V. MENGOTE - 210 SCRA 174 FACTS: Information was given about three suspicious looking persons. A surveillance team was then deployed. Upon seeing that the men were looking side-by-side and one holding his abdomen, the policemen approached the group and the latter tried to run away. The suspects were then searched

wherein a handgun and fan knife was seized. It was found later on that the handgun was part of those stolen from a house wherein a robbery was staged. HELD: A person may not be stopped and frisked in broad daylight on a busy street on mere unexplained suspicion. POSADAS V. OMBUDSMAN - 341 SCRA 388 FACTS: A member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity was killed in one of the rumbles between his fraternity and another. The Chancellor of UP asked for the help of the NBI in apprehending those involved in the rumble and subsequent killing of the student. On the basis of positive identification of 2 eyewitnesses, NBI officers tried to arrest 2 students who were members of another fraternity and allegedly involved in the rumble. They resisted arrest since there wasnt any arrest warrant. This prompted the NBI chief to file charges for obstructing the apprehension and prosecution of the criminal offenders. HELD: (1) Where the police officers only had the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, the same is insufficient to justify an arrest without warrant (2) The law authorizes police officers or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime, otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officer the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. US CASES AND DOCTRINES RE: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (AS MENTIONED IN DEAN BAUTISTAS LECTURES) KATZ V. US 389 US 347 FACTS: Accused was found guilty of violating a statute penalizing the wire transmission of bets and wagers. HELD: (1) What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. (2) What a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected under Fourth Amendment. (3) Fourth Amendment protects people, not simply areas, against unreasonable searches and seizures, and its reach cannot depend upon presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. (4) Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording defendant's words spoken into telephone receiver in public telephone booth violated the privacy upon which defendant justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a search and seizure within Fourth Amendment, and fact that electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth could have no constitutional significance. CALIFORNIA V. GREENWOOD 486 US 35 FACTS: Investigators searched trash thrown by Greenwood on the curb of his house to find evidence of drug use on suspected drug trafficking and use. HELD: Under the Fourth Amendment, no warrant was necessary to search the trash because Greenwood had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Although Greenwood had hidden the trash from view by

putting in opaque plastic bags and expected it to be on the street only a short time before it would be taken to the dump, the Court believed it to be common knowledge that garbage at the side of the street is readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. CALIFORNIA V. CIRAOLO - 476 US 207 FACTS: Accused was suspected of planting marijuana in his backyard. An aircraft was used to take pictures of the marijuana plants planted in the backyard. HELD: The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in [unrestricted airspace at an altitude in compliance with FFA regulations] to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye. OLIVER V. US 466 US 170 FACTS: Police officers acted on a tip that accused was growing marijuana on his property. Upon walking near his property and sighting the crops, the accused was found guilty of drug offenses. HELD: Open fields doctrine: an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home...The [Fourth] Amendment reflects the recognition of the Framers that certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interference. MINNESOTA V. OLSON 495 US 91 FACTS: Olson was suspected to be the driver of a getaway car in a robbery-murder. After knowing that he was staying with 2 women in a house, police surrounded the house. They called the women and asked Olson to come out. Upon knowing that he was in the house, police barged in and arrested him. HELD: The status as an overnight guest is alone sufficient to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. All citizens share the expectation that hosts will more likely than not respect their guests' privacy interests even if the guests have no legal interest in the premises and do not have the legal authority to determine who may enter the household. MINNESOTA V. CARTER 525 US 83 FACTS: Carter and his companions were found packing cocaine together with the lessee of a ground-floor apartment. They were arrested and found guilty of state drug offenses. HELD: Property used for commercial purposes is treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes than residential property, and expectation of privacy in commercial premises is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home. PAYTON V. NEW YORK 445 US 573 FACTS: A NY statute authorizing police officers to enter private residences without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to conduct routine felony arrest. HELD: (1) It is basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside home without warrant are presumptively unreasonable, and that search or seizure carried out on suspect's premises without warrant is per se unreasonable unless police can show that it falls within one of carefully designed set of exceptions based on presence of exigent circumstances.

(2) Exigent circumstances: a. Prevent imminent destruction of evidence b. Prevent harm to persons c. Searching in hot pursuit MARYLAND V. BUIE - 494 US 325 FACTS: Following the robbery wherein one of the suspects was identified wearing a red running suit, arrest warrants were issued for Buie and his companion. Upon arrest of Buie in his basement, police saw in plain view a red running suit. It was seized and used as evidence. HELD: The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. CHIMEL V. CALIFORNIA 395 US 752 FACTS: Following the robbery of a coin shop, arrest warrant was issued for Chimel. Upon the arrival of police officers into the home, the wife allowed them to come in. Chimel was arrested when he arrived and his house was searched wherein the evidence was obtained. HELD: Arresting officer may search person arrested, in order to remove any weapons and to seize evidence on arrestee's person, and area into which arrestee might reach in order to grab weapon or evidentiary items. Arrest does not justify routinely searching any rooms other than that in which arrest occurs or searching through desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in room itself. ILLINOIS V. LAFAYETTE 462 US 640 FACTS: In the process of booking and inventory of his possessions after he was arrested for disturbing the peace, amphetamine pills were found. He was charged with violating Controlled Substances Act. HELD: It is reasonable for police to search the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine administrative procedure at a police station incident to booking and jailing the suspect. The justification for such searches does not rest on probable cause, and hence the absence of a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the search. ARIZONA V. HICKS 480 US 321 FACTS: A bullet was fired through the floor, which resulted to injury of some. Police inspectors inspected the building to locate the shooter, for other victims and weapons. They chanced upon a room with suspicious radio and equipment that seemed to be stolen. The police officer jotted down the serial numbers and found out that they were stolen. This led to the arrest of the room owner. HELD: (1) The policeman's actions come within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. The mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a seizure since it did not meaningfully interfere with respondent's possessory interest in either the numbers or the stereo equipment. However, the moving of the equipment was a search separate and apart from the search that was the lawful objective of entering the apartment. The fact that the search uncovered nothing of great personal value to respondent is irrelevant. (2) The search was invalid because, as the State concedes, the policeman had only a reasonable suspicion- i.e., less than probable cause to believe-that the stereo equipment was stolen. Probable cause is required to invoke the plain view doctrine as it applies to seizures. CALIFORNIA V. ACEVEDO 500 US 565

FACTS: Accused was seen by policemen living his house, carrying with him a brown bag, which was known to carry with it marijuana. The accused drove his car and he was stopped and the bag seized, wherein they found the marijuana. HELD: Police, in a search extending only to a container within an automobile, may search the container without a warrant where they have probable cause to believe that it holds contraband or evidence. TERRY V. OHIO 392 US 1 FACTS: While patrolling the premises, a police officer chanced upon to see Terry and his companion. He was suspicious on the movements and looks of the latter. He stopped Terry and his companion and found from Terry a concealed weapon. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. HELD: When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. HOFFA V. US 385 US 293 FACTS: Accused was found guilty of attempting to bribe jurors in a case involving violations of the TaftHartley Act. One of the witnesses used was a government informer under federal indictment. HELD: (1) Use of government informer, who was under federal indictment, as government witness in criminal prosecution did not violate due process clause of Fifth Amendment. (2) Neither bugged nor unbugged informer constitute a search under the fourth amendment.
SECTION 3: (1) The PRIVACY of COMMUNICATION and CORRESPONDENCE shall be inviolable except upon LAWFUL ORDER of the court, or when PUBLIC SAFETY or ORDER requires otherwise as PRESCRIBED by law. (2) Any EVIDENCE obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be INADMISSIBLE for any purpose in any proceeding.
CASE (EXCLUSIONARY RULE): PEOPLE VS. MARTI FACTS:

The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities.

ISSUE: an accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been
violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
DOCTRINES:
y In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. y It was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals. y The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action. y The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. y The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. y If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. y In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS SPOUSES VEROY VS. LAYAGUE HELD/DOCTRINES:

y Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. y Warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search Warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants. y A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms.
OKABE VS. GUTIERREZ HELD/DOCTRINE:

y Considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case, the records show that a warrant was issued by the
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respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure her provisional liberty. Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal of the RTC of Quezon City approved the bond and issued an order recalling the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration.
ANTI-WIRETAPPING ACT NAVARRO VS. CA FACTS: There was a heated exchange between the accused and the victim inside a police station. Accused hit and caused the
death of the victim. Jalbuena, the victims companion, incidentally recorded the verbal exchange prior to the assault.
HELD/DOCTRINES:
y Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described (RA No. 4200). y The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
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SALCEDO-ORTANEZ VS. CA FACTS:

y Private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. y Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. y Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. y Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
PRIVACY OF BANK ACCOUNTS MARQUEZ VS. DESIERTO DOCTRINES:

y We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. y In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION ROXAS VS. ZUZUAREGUI DOCTRINES:

y Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
SECTION 4: No LAW shall be passed abridging the freedom of SPEECH, of EXPRESSION, or the PRESS, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. PRIOR RESTRAINT EASTERN BROADCASTING FACTS:
y The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs.
DOCTRINES:
y All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test (Primicias v. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71], American Bible Society v. City of Manila [101 Phil. 386], Cabansag v. Fernandez [102 Phil. 152], Vera v. Arca [28 SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA 931], Imbong v. Ferrer [35 SCRA 28], Badoy v. Commission on Elections [35 SCRA 285], People v. Ferrer [48 SCRA 382], and the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189]. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553]. y All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. y Why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out. y The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE

TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE - 235 SCRA 630 FACTS: It is contented by petitioner that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions involving printing, publication, importation, or sale of newspapers, RA 7716 has singled out the press or sale of newspapers, RA 7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media favored treatment. HELD: The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemptions, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press but this is not the case. Furthermore, there is reasonable classification and different treatment between print media and broadcast media. The press is taxed on printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. Thus, there is a reasonable basis for classification. CHAVEZ VS. GONZALEZ FACTS:
y Respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.
DOCTRINES:
y The cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied almost verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights, free speech. y For freedom of expression is not an absolute,
42 25
were considered the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of
nor is it an "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use
of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom." y Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society. The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. y Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech.
44 43
We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene
speech, as well as "fighting words" are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized. y Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated;
48
(b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard

49
when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. y Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication;
53 54
(3) freedom of access to information;
and (4) freedom of circulation.

y Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or censorship. constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts. y it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against. y Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with. y When the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. A contentbased regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. y The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in the United. States. There, broadcast radio and television have been held to have limited First Amendment protection,
75 73 60 57 56
Any law or
official that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made, commits an infringement of the
or (2)
61
a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.
and U.S. Courts have excluded broadcast
media from the application of the "strict scrutiny" standard that they would otherwise apply to content-based restrictions y According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print medium may be limitless];
77
(b) its "pervasiveness" as a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children. Because cases involving
79
78
broadcast media need not follow "precisely the same approach that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media," nor go "so far as to demand that such regulations serve compelling government interests," they are decided on whether the
80
"governmental restriction" is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest," intermediate test. y
or the
The need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT PEOPLE VS. PEREZ DOCTRINES:

y Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.

y The attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. y The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. y Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
GONZALES VS. COMELEC FACTS: Congress passed a law shortening the campaign period for elections and prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates. HELD: (1) The speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint to the communication of views or subsequent punishment unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has the right to prevent. (2) Freedom of expression may be limited using the Clear and Present Danger Test and the Dangerous Tendency Test. In the first, the danger must be extremely serious and imminent. In the second, it is sufficient that there be a rational link between the prohibition and the substantive evil that the legislature seeks to prevent.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS SANIDAD VS. COMELEC FACTS: In connection to the plebiscite for the establishment of the CAR, COMELEC issued a resolution. One of the provisions of said resolution is a prohibition on columnists, commentators, and announcers during the plebiscite campaign period to use their columns or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issue. DOCTRINES: y
y Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
ADIONG VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
y Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."
DOCTRINES:
y he posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive. y It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away. y y The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." y The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance. y When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas.
ABS-CBN VS. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the COMELEC resolution prohibiting petitioner and other groups from conducting exit polls. HELD: (1) The general interest of the State in insulating voters from outside influences is insufficient to justify speech regulation. (2) A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the State has the right to prevent. (3) Overbreadth doctrine: even though the governments purpose are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
SWSv VS. COMELEC FACTS: COMELEC issued a resolution enjoining the publication of election surveys for national candidates 15 days before the
election and surveys for local candidates 7 days before the election.

DOCTRINES:
y The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien:[A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if
the expression falls within one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
12
thus:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality
LIBEL BORJAL VS. CA

Wenceslao was elected as the Executive Director of the newly organized First National Conference on Land Transportation. In connection to this, Borjal published in his editorial column in the Philippine Star about certain anomalous activities of an organizer of a conference. This prompted Wenceslao to file a complaint against Borjal and Soliven. HELD: (1) Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. (2) The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. It must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion, which closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-determination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that is protective solely of self-expression which makes it appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political culture.
OCAMPO VS. SUN STAR PUBLISHING

FACTS: Judge Ocampo filed a complaint for libel against Sun Star Daily on account of two articles published by it regarding graft charges filed against the judge. HELD: (1) Generally, every defamatory information is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following instances: a. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceeding which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.the subject articles are under this exemption. (2) While the administrative nature of proceedings before us allows the protection of the personal and professional reputation of our colleagues in the profession of law and justice against baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants, the criminal nature of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act doesnt allow the same protection to our brethren in the judiciary, who are placed on the same level, without distinction, as other government employees. y Confidentiality rule---malpractice against lawyers (case does not fall here for its not administrative in nature) OBSCENITY AND INDECENCY PITA VS. CA FACTS: In pursuance to the Anti-Smut Campaign of the City of Manila, publications which were deemed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent were confiscated from vendors, stand owners and peddlers and the said confiscated publications were burned later in public. HELD: Miller test (3 Test) (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest. (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Classification of materials as obscene is essentially a judicial question, to be resolved on a caseto-case basis. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE COURTS IN RE: EMIL JURADO - 243 SCRA 299 FACTS:
Ma. Angela Leonor Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests and Doctrines Page 49 of 116
Atty. Emil Jurado was a member of the bar and at the same time a journalist. He wrote for the Manila Standard. He wrote several blind items already about some judges who allegedly accept bribes, fixes cases, or are involved in graft and corrupt practices. . Because of the article, there were made calls for impeachment of the justices, or for their resignation. HELD: Right to private reputation. Judges are commonly and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private persons. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The

knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection. PEOPLE V. GODOY - 243 SCRA 64 FACTS: Judge cited Reynoso for contempt based on the latters article in the newspaper (allegedly libelous to said judge). HELD: (1) Theres a need to make a distinction between adverse criticism of the court's decision after the case is ended and "scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt. Contempt proceedings dismissed. Such comments may constitute a libel against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in contempt of the court's authority. (2) In case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances: a. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or b. Where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded. And this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually resorted to as a defense in contempt proceedings. IN RE: RESOLUTION A.M. 98-7-02 SC - SEPTEMBER 29, 1998 FACTS: There was a resolution prohibiting demonstrations within a radius of 200 meters from the boundary of any hall of Justice. Valid? HELD: The Court, it would seem, has the power to promulgate rules concerning conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of the courts to assure the people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice. It was anchored on Art. VIII Sec. 5 (5) IN RE: RESOLUTION A.M. 98-7-02 SC - SEPTEMBER 29, 1998 FACTS: There was a resolution prohibiting demonstrations within a radius of 200 meters from the boundary of any hall of Justice. Valid? HELD: The Court, it would seem, has the power to promulgate rules concerning conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of the courts to assure the people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice. It was anchored on Art. VIII Sec. 5 (5) RE: RADIO/TV COVERAGE OF ESTRADA TRIAL - JUNE 29, 2001 FACTS: Can the trial of Estrada in the Sandiganbayan or any other court be broadcasted in TV or radio? (Answer is no.) HELD: An accused has a right to a public trial, but it is not synonymous with a publicized trial. Freedom of the press and the accuseds protection from a possible prejudicial publicized trial must be taken into consideration. And unless there are safety nets to prevent this event, broadcast media cannot be allowed to publicize the trial. ASSEMBLY AND PETITION PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO - 80 PHIL 71 FACTS:

The mayor of Manila refused to issue a permit to the petitioner to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. Due to such refusal, petitioner files for mandamus. HELD: (1) A statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. (2) In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion , to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant.
NAVARRO VS. VILLEGAS Petitioner applied for a permit and Mayor expressed willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda at days he designated, when it wouldnt cause unnecessary great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has offered the Sunken Gardens as alternative to Plaza Miranda. HELD: The Mayor cannot be compelled to issue the permit. A permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no change was made.
JBL REYES VS. MAYOR BAGATSING FACTS: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally from Luneta park to the gates of the US Embassy. The mayor refused to issue the required permit due to the possible damages that may be caused by subversists. He recommended the use of Rizal Coliseum instead. HELD: (1) The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. (2) If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. (3) Application for permit should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant but at another place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. (4) Decision of the licensing authority must be transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity.

MIRRIAM COLLEGE VS. CA MIRIAM COLLEGE V. COURT OF APPEALS - 348 SCRA 265 FACTS: The members of the editorial board of the students publication wrote and published sexually explicit material in the school paper, which resulted to being sanctioned by the school administration. They were being asked for explanation but they didnt file any, for they alleged that the schools disciplinary committee didnt have jurisdiction over them. Without receiving any explanation, the school administration resorted to deciding the matter ex parte and expelling the students. HELD: (1) The right of the students to free speech in school premises is not absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while the court upheld the right of the students to free expression in these cases, disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others were not ruled out. (2) The school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such articles materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
JACINTO VS. CA JACINTO V. COURT OF APPEALS - 281 SCRA 657 FACTS: Petitioners were public school teachers who incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then staged. That given the return-to-work orders issued by the then DECS Secretary, they still refused to return to work, they were then suspended and later on dismissed from service. HELD: Where public school teachers absent themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in mass protest, their absence ineluctably results in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they are responsible, and they may be penalized not for their exercise of their right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances but for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. FIRST AMENDMENT: RELIGION, SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY, PETITION Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble; and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. INCOMPLETE

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CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 1 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

ARTICLE III: BILL OF RIGHTS

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 2 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

CASES *** CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO JR. FACTS:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 3 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power.

and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power.

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 4 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 5 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

The classification must, as an

MODAY VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 6 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to

the State, private property for public use or purpose.

Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of

For the taking

in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated.

The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy

has ruled that the

Government may not capriciously

ROXAS V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

The Bill of Rights provides that "[n]o person shall be

LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE VS. CITY OF BUTUAN FACTS:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 7 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

ISSUES:W/N RULING: No. RATIO:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 8 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

SAINT LUKES MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. NLRC FACTS:

RULING: No. RATIO:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 9 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION VS. CITY MAYOR FACTS:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 10 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 11 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO FACTS:

(1) No. (2) No. (3) Yes.

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 12 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

held: "The correlative power to revoke or

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 13 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 14 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO VS. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC FACTS:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 15 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

RULING: No. RATIO:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 16 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA FACTS:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 17 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

CASES/DOCTRINES: BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA FACTS:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 18 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

BAUTISTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACT:

RURAL BANK OF BUHI, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS HELD/DOCTRINES:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 19 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACT:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 20 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

LAO GI VS. CA DOCTRINE:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 21 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY FACTS:

PEOPLE VS. CAROL PEOPLE VS. CAROL DELA PIEDRA DOCTRINES:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 22 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS y

CASES: UNITED STATES VS. TORIBIO FACTS:

CONSTI2 REVIEWER 1E 23 DE MATA, Annamarie Junel G.

YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT FACTS: