Francisco vs Onrubia 46 Phil 327 FACTS: In November 1922, Onrubia was driving his car in Calle Ascarraga, Manila

and he overrun the 9 year old son of Francisco which led to his son s death. Francisco sued Onrubia for homicide through reckless imprudence. The lower court acquitted Onrubia as it ruled that Onrubia did not deprive the automobile he was operating at an exaggerated or unreasonable speed, was not responsible for any imprudence, fault, carelessness or negligence whatsoever, and did not violate any regulation in connection with said death. Now Francisco filed a separate civil suit for damages against Onrubia for P4.5k. Onrubia assailed the civil suit arguing that Francisco did not reserve the right to file a separate civil case against him. Francisco grounded the civil suit on Article 1902 which states that Any person who by an act or omission causes damages to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done. ISSUE: Whether or not Onrubia is civilly liable. HELD: No. In order to establish the civil liability in a criminal case, it is necessary that the same spring from, or be a consequence of, the criminal liability, and, therefore, if a defendant is acquitted of a crime, a judgment, sentencing him to pay a determinate indemnity by reason of the same crime is not possible. A person not criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor cannot be civilly liable. The full and complete acquittal of Onrubia necessarily implies his innocence of, and freedom from responsibility for, the crime of which he was accused. Though there is another provision of the Civil Code (Article 1093) which states that Those arising from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by law shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter Second of Title Sixteen of this book. , and said chapter contains Article 1902, it is necessary that the negligence or fault in question be not punished by law. This is not the case in the case at bar; the negligence complained of in this case is punishable by law, however, said negligence does not exist on the part of Onrubia.

Vergara v. CA Facts: A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-residence of private respondent Amadeo Azarcon, causing damage assessed at P53,024.22. The trial court rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Traveller s Insurance and Surety Corporation, the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. The insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict Held: It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. The fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff." According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.

FGU Insurance Corp. v. CA Facts: On April 21, 1987, a car owned by private respondent FILCAR Transport Inc., rented to and driven by Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, swerved into the right and hit the car owned by Lydia Soriano and driven by Benjamin Jacildone. Dahl-Jensen did not possess a Philippine driver s license. Petitioner, as the insurer of Soriano s car, paid the latter P25,382.20 and, by way of subrogation, sued FILCAR, Dahl-Jensen, and Fortune Insurance Corporation, FILCAR s insurer, for quasi-delict. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to substantiate the claim for subrogation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, but on the ground that only Dahl-Jensen s negligence was proven, not that of FILCAR. Hence, this instant petition. Issues: (1) Whether an action based on quasi-delict will prosper against a rent-a-car company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle (2) Whether the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo is applicable in the case at bar Held: (1) We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . ". To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter. (2) Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that case, the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused injuries to several persons and damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability, the corporation raised the defense that at the time of the collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another; and, that the driver was not its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was

nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the burdens and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this finding and affirmed the declaration of joint and several liability of the corporation with its driver.

Elcano vs Hill GRN L-24803 FACTS: Reginald Hill accidentally killed the son of Elcano. He was acquitted from the criminal case due to the efense of minority. Elcano filed a civil case alleging damages against Reginald and his father from whom the latter was receiving subsistence. Hills moved to dismiss the case on the ground that case was barred by res adjudicata and that the father was relieved from guardianship of the defendant through emancipation by marriage. The case was dismissed thus this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case. RULING: Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal law while civil negligence is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. It results that the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Likewise, emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.

Andamo vs IAC November 6, 1990 NATURE: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to review the decision of the then IAC FACTS: y The Missionaries of Our Lady of Law Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built, through its agents, waterpaths and contrivances including an artificial lake, on a parcel of land which it owned.

y However, said constructions allegedly inundated an adjacent land owned by petitioner spouses Andamo. The inundation allegedly caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers, among other damages. y July 1982 -- Petitioners then instituted a criminal action before the RTC of Cavite against the officers and directros of the corporatio, for destruction by means of inundation under Art 325 of RPC. y February 22, 1983 Petitioners filed a civil for damages against same corporation. y April 26, 1984 -- Upon corporation s motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related criminal case. y August 27, 1984 Upon motion of corporation, trial court dismissed the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. y IAC affirmed decision of TC. Motion for recon denied.
ISSUE: WON a corporation, which has built, through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the CC on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case HELD: Yes. RATIO:

y Dismissal of the civil case is erroneous considering that it is predicated on a quasi-delict. y A careful examination of the petitioners complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the CC on quasi-delicts.
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present: damages suffered, fault or negligence of defendant and causal connection between the two, such that if proven would make a clear case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

y Article 2176, whenever it refers to fault or negligence , covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligence.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. (See Castillo v CA)

y As held by the SC in Azucena v Potenciano, in quasi-delicts the civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case accdg to Articles 33 and 2177.
To subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal porsecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injuncttion in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

US v. Barias Facts: On November 2, 1911, defendant Segundo Barias, a motorman for the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, was driving his car along Rizal Avenue and stopped at an intersection to take on some passengers. He looked backward, presumably to be sure that all passengers were aboard, and then started the car. At that moment, Fermina Jose, a 3-year old child, walked or ran in front of the car. She was knocked down and dragged at some distance to death. Defendant knew nothing of this until his return, when he was informed of what happened. He was charged and found guilty of homicide resulting from reckless negligence. Issue: Whether the evidence shows such carelessness or want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant as to amount to reckless negligence Held: Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. The evidence shows that the thoroughfare on which the incident occurred was a public street in a densely populated section of the city. The hour was six in the morning, or about the time when the residents of such streets begin to move about. Under such conditions a motorman of an electric street car was clearly charged with a high degree of diligence in the performance of his duties. He was bound to know and to recognize that any negligence on his part in observing the track over which he was running his car might result in fatal accidents. He had no right to assume that the track before his car was clear. It was his duty to satisfy himself of that fact by keeping a sharp lookout, and to do everything in his power to avoid the danger which is necessarily incident to the operation of heavy street cars on public thoroughfares in populous sections of the city. At times, it might be highly proper and prudent for him to glance back before again setting his car in motion, to satisfy himself that he understood correctly a signal to go forward or that all the passengers had safely alighted or gotten on board. But we do insist that before setting his car again in motion, it was his duty to satisfy himself that the track was clear, and, for that purpose, to look and to see the track just in front of his car. This the defendant did not do, and the result of his negligence was the death of the child. We hold that the reasons of public policy which impose upon street car companies and their employees the duty of exercising the utmost degree of diligence in securing the safety of passengers, apply with equal force to the duty of avoiding the infliction of injuries upon pedestrians and others on the public streets and thoroughfares over which these companies are authorized to run their cars. And while, in a criminal case, the courts will require proof of the guilt of the company or its employees beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless the care or diligence required of the company and its employees is the same in both cases, and the only question to be determined is whether the proofs shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to exercise such care or diligence was the cause of the accident, and that the defendant was guilty thereof. Standing erect, at the position he would ordinarily assume while the car is in motion, the eye of the average motorman might just miss seeing the top of the head of a child, about three years old, standing or walking close up to the front of the car. But it is also very evident that by inclining the head and shoulders forward very slightly, and glancing in front of the car, a person in the position of a motorman could not fail to see a child on the track immediately in front of his car; and we hold that it is the manifest duty of a motorman, who is about to start his car on a public thoroughfare in a thickly-settled district, to satisfy himself that the track is clear immediately in front of his car, and to incline his body slightly forward, if that be necessary, in order to bring the whole track within his line of vision. Of course, this may not be, and usually is not necessary when the car is in motion, but we think that it is required by the dictates of the most ordinary prudence in starting from a standstill.

Gan v. CA Facts: Petitioner Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard on July 4, 1972. There were 2 vehicles parked on the right side of the road. As the petitioner approached the place where the vehicles were parked, a vehicle from the opposite direction tried to overtake another vehicle and encroached the lane of her car. To avoid collision, the petitioner swerved to the right and hit a pedestrian. The pedestrian was pinned to the rear of the parked jeepney, and died on arrival to the hospital. Petitioner was found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence by the trial court. The Corut of Appeals modified the decision and found her guilty of homicide through simple imprudence. Issue: Whether the petitioner is negligent as to hold her guilty for the death of the pedestrian Held: We reverse. The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence." Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to others. The appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.

Jarco Marketing Co. v. CA Facts: Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.

On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter structure. She was crying and shouting for help. He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died after 14 days. She was 6 years old. Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was Zhieneth s act of clinging to it. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was defective, unstable and dangerous. It also ruled that the child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this decision. Issues: (1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence (2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises Held: (1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in determining the existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to negligence. (2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base. Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured. CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

City of Manila v. Meralco Facts: On June 8, 1925, there occurred a collision between a car owned by Meralco and driven by Sixto Eustaquio, and a truck belonging to the City of Manila. Eustaquio was prosecuted and found guilty of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was sentenced to pay P1788.27 plus fine of P900 and costs, with subsidiary imprisonment. Not being able to collect from the convict, the City of Manila proceeded against Meralco for subsidiary liability. Meralco set up the defense of a good father of a family. The trial judge thought it unnecessary to present the witnesses offered by the fiscal, and took cognisance of the records of the criminal case. Issues: (1) Whether the trial court may rely on the records of the criminal case to render judgment on the civil case (2) Whether Meralco should be absolved from the liability Held: (1) The first error plainly has merit. As a general rule, a record in a criminal action cannot be admitted in evidence in a civil action except by way of inducement or to show a collateral fact. The very obvious reason is that the parties and the issues in a criminal action and a civil action are not the same. It is rudimentary that due process must be followed in the trial of all causes. No man or entity may be condemmed without a day in court. Manila Electric Company was not a party at the trial of the criminal case. By a coincidence, Attorney Carrascoso was both counsel for the defendant in the civil action. But there is lacking any proof showing that the Manila Electric Company supplied the lawyer for the accused in the criminal action and so is concluded by the judgment there rendered. It is our ruling that prejudicial error was committed in the admission by the trial court of Exhibits A to F, but that since the plaintiff made the proper offer to present its witnesses, the case should be remanded for a new trial. (2) The Penal Code authorizes the imposition of subsidiary liability in default of the persons criminally liable. Article 20 of the Penal Code provides that this subsidiary liability shall "apply to masters, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies and misdemeanors committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties." It is under this provision that the City of Manila is attempting to collect damages from the Manila Electric Company. In connection with the Penal Code, there must be taken into view certain provisions of the Civil Code. It is provided in article 1903 that the obligation imposed for the damage to another caused by fault or negligence is enforcible against those persons for whom another is responsible. But it is added that "The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage." Art. 1902 provides "Civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code." Manresa, speaking of article 1092 of the Civil Code, offers the following comment: The Civil Code refers to the Penal Code as the rule applicable in the first place, since the latter determines and punishes the acts giving rise to said obligations, or creates said obligations, thereby determining their existence and is, therefore, for that reason of preferential application. But, then, as the Penal Code is concerned with, and is interested only in determining how the civil obligation it creates comes into existence and develops under the

influence of the illicit character, it lays down only those rules inspired by those motives; and once the connection of that obligation with the criminal liability is established in its provisions, with the consequences that may be inferred from the fact that the former is based on the latter; and after an effort has been made, within the sphere of that civil responsibility, toward making the indemnification coextensive with the effects of the crime, and a special necessity, which is characteristic of punishment and is the subject matter of the Penal Code, has been shown in the provisions regulating said liability, the Penal Code, could not, without going beyond its one sphere, give all the rules relative to said obligations, nor did it have any necessity for doing so, because once the peculiar nature of said obligations is saved by its provisions, the essence thereof common to the other obligations must, as in the latter, be defined by the civil law, which will thus become an important source, although suppletory, of those derived from crime. While the Civil Code, in its article 1092, simply makes reference to the Penal Code, yet, it is beyond doubt that by this reference it means those rules of a general nature which regulate the civil liability arising from the particular crimes or misdemeanors therein mentioned, and that, in connection therewith, they shall have the preferential application which this article recognizes in favor of the Penal Code. With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or ommision not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would premit the master to escape scot-free by allging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action or misdemeanor. In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be set aside, and the record remanded to the lower court for a new trial.

Fores v. Miranda Facts: Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive speed, the driver lost control, and the jeepney swerved to the bridge wall. Serious injuries were suffered by the defendant. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. Petitioner denies liability for breach of contract of carriage, contending that a day before the accident, the jeepney was sold to a certain Carmen Sackerman. Issues: (1) Is the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same? (2) To what damages is the respondent entitled? Held: (1) Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of Appeals answered the query in the affirmative. The ruling should be upheld. The provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any part thereof of the owner or operator of the public service Commission. The law was designed primarily for the protection of the public interest; and until the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the records of the Commission which the public has a right to rely upon. (2) The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of First Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of Appeals to only P2,000, on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial court's appraisal, since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare statement that his expenses and loss of income amounted to P20,000. On the other hand, "it cannot be denied," the lower court said, "that appellee (respondent) did incur expenses"' It is well to note further that respondent was a painter by profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the amount of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be excessive. The attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 also awarded to the respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of First Instance did not provided for the same, and since no appeal was interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly error for the Court of Appeals to award them motu proprio. Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it is just and equitable. We see no reason to alter these awards. Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation. Where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute of justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals.

Cervantes v. CA Facts: On March 27, 1989, private respondent PAL issued to herein petitioner Nicholas Cervantes a round trip ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los AngelesHonolulu-Manila, which is valid until March 27, 1990. On March 23, 1990, petitioner used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles, he immediately booked a flight to Manila, which was confirmed on April 2. Upon learning that the plane would make a stop-over in San Francisco, and because he would be there on April 2, petitioner made arrangements to board in San Francisco. On April 2, he was not allowed to board due to the expiration of his ticket. He filed a complaint for damages. It was not given due course by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Issues: (1) Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket extended the period of validity of petitioner's ticket (2) Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper Held: (1) From the facts, it can be gleaned that the petitioner was fully aware that there was a need to send a letter to the legal counsel of PAL for the extension of the period of validity of his ticket. Under Article 1898 11 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification. (2) An award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to show that PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to allow him to board its plane in San Francisco. In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he could not use the subject ticket, so much so that he bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be a finding of bad faith, we are of the opinion that it should be on the petitioner. What the employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No injury resulted on the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to accommodate him with the use of subject ticket.

Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of damages is imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, and the existence of bad faith is established. The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. Here, there is no showing that PAL acted in such a manner. An award for attorney's fees is also improper.

Calalas v. CA Facts: Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage. Issues: (1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case (2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of carriage (3) Whether moral damages should be awarded Held: (1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. (2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. (3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO. Facts: Plaintiffs husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendants train was passing by and blew its siren. Plaintiffs husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiffs husband was injured and died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband. Issue: WON the plaintiff can recover damages. Ruling: Complaint Dismissed Ratio: A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the apperance of a train, is guilty of crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results. The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiffs husband and she was not allowed to recover.