REALISM AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE: POWER, POLARISATION AND PRUDENCE BY VINCE A.M.

KLSTERS

BACHELOR THESIS AMERICAN STUDIES RADBOUD UNIVERSITY, NIJMEGEN DR. T.W. GIJSWIJT JUNE 2011

Table of Contents

1. Introduction 2. Unipolarity and the Bush Doctrine: The Debate 2.1 Unipolarity and Its Critics 2.2 The Bush Doctrine 3 Classical Realism and the Bush Doctrine 3.1 A Brief (Pre-)History of Political Realism 3.2 Morgenthau's Six Principles of Political Realism 3.3 Morgenthau and the Balance of Power 3.4 Conclusion: hubris in foreign policy 4 Structural Realism and the Bush Doctrine 4.1 Structural Realist Theory 4.2 Waltz and the Constraints of Structure 4.3 The Unipole and Rational Foreign Policy 4.4 Conclusion: shaping the inevitable 5 Offensive Realism and the Bush Doctrine 5.1 Between Defence and Offence 5.2 The Offensive Turn 5.3 The Unipole and Power Projection 5.4 Conclusion: helping others help yourself 6 Conclusion 6.1 The Inadequacy of Political Realism 6.2 The Irrationality of the Bush Doctrine Bibliography

2 4 4 7 10 10 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 27 28 28 30 32

1. Introduction

The strength of a structure is highly dependent upon the quality of the blueprint and whether the blueprint was accurately followed during construction. As with buildings, states' strength is also based on the materials they are made of and how these materials are used. 1 At the end of the Cold War, a window of opportunity opened for the United States to enjoy its unipolar moment to the fullest and reinvent its foreign policy blueprint at will. A bipolar world order, wherein the US and USSR were locked in an ideologically laced power struggle, gave way to a world where the US was bound to be the sole superpower. No single country had a realistic chance of catching up anytime soon, nor was forming a coalition of states to curb US primacy a realistic endeavour, though this conclusion is more easily reached in hindsight. Only the United States was capable of projecting its power across all oceans in places of its own choosing, thereby influencing millions across the globe. The blueprints for the usage of power varied over time as more options in foreign policy became available to US policymakers. Optimism also arose about liberal democracy's supposed victory over its competitors, as prominent philosopher Francis Fukuyama deemed Western democracy to be the final stage of mankind's ideological evolution. And while it is easily argued that liberal democracy is a flawed system, its competitors deserve even less merit.2 This window of opportunity, or unipolar moment, gave the US the chance to exert its power in order to reshape and reconstruct the world to its own preferences. In other words, ideological elements often merely used as window-dressing could now have a more prominent role in deciding what kind of foreign policy to construct. The Bush Doctrine is one of these ideologically loaded influences in recent American foreign policy conduct. Many arguments can readily be found in favour of such sculpturing and even more cases can be made against it. Organising this debate along theoretical lines will contribute to placing the widely-felt effects of the Bush Doctrine in perspective. Also, a theoretical analysis is needed in order to effectively categorise and analyse these arguments without arbitrary presuppositions. By way of several political realist analyses, this paper will attempt to gauge the effect of the Bush Doctrine on the status of the United States as the tallest and strongest

The term "state" is a neutral term to avoid oversimplifying every state as being a nation, as some are divided between different nations. It does not refer to the constituents of a federal union. 2 See Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, The Myth of the Authoritarian Model, Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): 68-84.

building on the block.

As the sun rose over what some would have termed a second

American century, many other buildings were overshadowed by the Bush administration's ideological supplements to its towering construct. Some of these, like fighting the Al Qaeda threat, carried over from the Clinton administration, while others were specifically prioritised by the Bush administration. These goals might have had their merits in different moral frames of reference, but a political realist perspective will shed light on how they affected, and still affect, the rational interests of the US as a state among others. This thesis will attempt to structurally elucidate the Bush Doctrine's effect on the US' position of primacy by way of classical realist, structural realist, and offensive realist analyses, respectively. These various political realist theories have different nuances and will focus on different aspects of the Bush Doctrine's effects. Classical realism has its roots in ancient Greece, and was developed by Hans J. Morgenthau to facilitate the formulation of correct behaviour for states in the international system. Structural realism, pioneered by Kenneth N. Waltz, analyses the state from a systemic perspective, as it is a mere agent in the structure of the international system. Other forms of realism, culminating in John J. Mearsheimer's offensive realist theories, shed light on various geopolitical aspects and the role of perception in relations of power. The prescriptive nature of these theories is present throughout the three consecutive chapters, and the level of description is limited. Most forms of realism cannot adequately explain the Bush Doctrine, as the Doctrine often seems to fall outside the bounds of rational foreign policy. Theories of international relations, such as realism, might not explain the actual construction of foreign policy, but they can indicate what the blueprints for this construction should be. Deviating from this blueprint will lead to a faulty structure, with the inevitable consequence of a devastating collapse, possibly crushing the neighbourhood along with it. Ad hoc corrections of deviations might still be possible, but they will merely extend the structure's life. The chapters with political realist analyses and their foundational blueprints form the bulk of this paper, whilst the concluding chapter will take a brief look inside the black box of US foreign policy construction, after which the key points of the political realist analyses shall be reviewed to answer what the effect of the Bush Doctrine was, and will be, on the US' position of power among its fellow states in the past, and in the future. Firstly, however, the two main concepts of unipolarity and the Bush Doctrine will be discussed in order to lay the groundwork for the realist analyses.

"Bush" refers to George W. Bush, unless mentioned otherwise.

2. Unipolarity and the Bush Doctrine: The Debate

The theoretical concepts used to analyse real-world events and policies need to be defined first in order to pave the way for a clear, unambiguous frame of reference. The separate political realist theories which will be applied will be expanded upon in their separate chapters, but the basic concepts used in this paper and the discussions surrounding them will be elaborated upon in this chapter. These concepts will be problematised in order to do justice to the discord between real world and the models or ideals they represent.

2.1 Unipolarity and Its Critics The perception of a victory of liberal democracy empowered US values and shifted the definition of globalisation towards Americanisation. No other ideology could credibly claim the universalism that liberal democracy could after the Cold War, and Fukuyama befittingly states that even the non-democracies will adopt the language of democracy to legitimise their deviation from this dominant standard.4 Charles Krauthammer, the political commentator who first coined the above-mentioned unipolar moment, stated that Fukuyama's work was "bold, lucid, [and] scandalously brilliant."5 Unsurprisingly, after the end of the Cold War, many predicted that the US would reign supreme. These ideological elements are often closely entangled with the relations of power between various states. Not only would American ideology reign supreme, but America's power would eclipse that of all its competitors, as Krauthammer distanced himself from the idea that the immediate post-Cold War world would be multipolar in his article on the unipolar moment. No single country or coalition would be able to challenge US primacy, thus giving rise to a moment wherein only a single state has the amount of power to form a significant pole along which power flows. He considers the US the sole first-rank power, capable of being "a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself."6 Such involvement should then serve to reshape the world for the sake of stability.7 This evangelical idealism would later be part of the Bush administration's foreign

4 5

Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 2006): 45. "End of History and the Last Man," accessed 29 Mar 2011, http://books.simonandschuster.com/9780743284554. 6 Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1991): 24. 7 Ibid., 29; Robert Jervis, Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective, World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 205; Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion, International Security 17, no. 4 (1993): 33.

policy, albeit in a more ideologically charged form.8 With Krauthammer as with Bush, one of the major threats to this unipolarity is the proliferation of WMD.9 Parallel to this, Krauthammer already foresaw the Bush administration's employment of coalitions of the willing by stating that only the United States, backed by any volunteers, can tackle threats of such magnitude.10 Thus, he gives the unipole an almost paragon-like status above other states, shaping the world for the sake of stability as long as its moment of glory lasts. He only briefly touches upon the idea that other states might not like being actively eclipsed by a towering United States. As such, many have developed a critique of this idea and definition of unipolarity, which is riddled with normative judgements. Some of Krauthammer's critics argue that a clearer definition is needed to make it workable. To this end, Samuel P. Huntington modifies Krauthammer's definition by reformulating it as the uni-multipolar system. It comes down to the same thing, but with more responsibilities and capabilities attributed to other major powers. He also implicitly makes the distinction between the actual existence of unipolarity and the perception of its existence.11 This seems to be an indirect outgrowth of the Thomas theorem; if the US perceives itself to be the sole superpower, it will act as such. Nevertheless, Huntington concludes that although the US indeed resembles Albright's indispensable nation, other nations are certainly not dispensable. Many other actors in the international system consider the US to be something quite different than the indispensable nation it often purports itself to be.12 This may stir, in the uni-multipolar world, a coalition of states which will attempt to balance against the US. As there is a significant debate on whether balancing is actually occurring,13 it is sufficient to observe that not all major states are satisfied with the US' foreign policy conduct and that certain US actions may fuel this dissatisfaction. Different interpretations of the so-called polarity of the system will lead to different predictions for states' behaviour. A truly unipolar system would favour everyone following the unipole's
8

United States Government, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (White House Office, September 2002): 3, 13-16. See the next section on the Bush Doctrine. 9 Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," 30; "National Security Strategy," 6. 10 Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," 32. 11 Samuel P. Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (1999): 37. 12 Ibid., 42; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," 46; Kenneth N. Waltz, America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective, PS: Political Science and Politics 24, no. 4 (1991): 669. 13 See, for example, Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, Waiting for Balancing, International Security 30, no. 1 (2005); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Hard Times for Soft Balancing, International Security 30, no. 1 (2005); Robert A. Pape, Soft Balancing against the United States, International Security 30, no. 1 (2005); T.V. Paul, Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy, International Security 30, no. 1 (2005).

lead, whilst a multipolar system would feature widespread competition and balancing behaviour. The main issue here is which definition of unipolarity will be used as a backdrop to the political realist analyses. With Huntington's added insights, unipolarity will merely be defined as the situation in which there is a single superpower, with no other state having the power and concurrent realistic interests to directly challenge this primacy. Aside from this, there is a significant collective action problem which prevents states from forming a balancing coalition against the US.14 Such a definition purposely does not include the broader ideological aspects as included in some definitions of hegemony and the various judgements on what goals the unipole should have, as it merely describes the degree of US primacy. 15 True unipolarity would require the absence of other states with any capacity to act in the international system. The rising great powers still have the capacity to successfully deter the unipole in their own region, thus giving them some sort of minor pole along which power flows. As long as power flows along various other actors in the international system, it is not fully unipolar. Unipolarity will simply be used throughout this paper, because achieving true unipolarity is practically impossible and adding various prefixes and disclaimers would be redundant. Also, this definition by itself does not say anything about the durability of unipolarity, as various political scientists predict different futures, but most agree that significant global competitors will come in time or are already present.16 Based on these observations, it is beyond doubt that the United States enjoys a position of superior power compared to its peers, even today. In addition, states often pretend to be or aspire to become liberal democracies, even as talk of Asian values arose. These norms have a prominent position in the political discourse, even as they are proclaimed by the unipole, which empowers them to the point that they can constrain the unipole itself.17 These strongly backed norms also inspire peoples around the world to actually pursue the goal of implementing them, as we have seen in the Maghreb and Middle

14

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World out of Balance (Princeton: University Press, 2008): 3637; Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment Revisited, The National Interest, no. 70 (2002): 8-9; William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 25. 15 This definition is in line with Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth's definition as put forth in G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences, World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 3. 16 Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," 23; Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion," 45; Christopher Layne, US Hegemony in a Unipolar World: Here to Stay or Sic Transit Gloria?, International Studies Review 11, no. 4 (2009): 784-787. 17 Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).

East, though not everyone supports these norms.18 Still, the only relatively plausible assumption used is that the US is currently the most powerful state in the world with no single realistic challenger or challenging coalition.

2.2 The Bush Doctrine Our world as it is conceptualised here thus consists of various great powers with influence in their own region and interdependence with various other states in the international system, with most of the power flowing along the unipole. This implies that the unipole is not invincible, and that the degree of unipolarity can, and often will, slowly shift towards a system wherein another pole gains sufficient power to tilt the system towards bi- or multipolarity. Various great powers (especially the PRC) are balancing internally and are exerting themselves beyond their respective regions, which indicates that such a shift is presently occurring and that the relative amount of power flowing along the unipole is decreasing.19 The basic definition of the Bush Doctrine entails pursuing global dominance, preventing the rise of threats in the form of rogue states and terrorists, and spreading democracy to prolong US supremacy. These goals seem both rational and idealistic, but the pursuit of these goals is not without its side-effects. The following definition and contextualisation of the Bush Doctrine will lay the groundwork for further political realist analyses of the Doctrine's effects on (the acceleration) of the shifts in power surrounding US preponderance. Historically, the US has never wished to entangle itself in regions far from its shores, but this sentiment often clashed with idealistic outgrowths of a manifest destiny for the United States as its power, and concurrent interests, grew.20 As Bush has reportedly stated, "[w]e have an opportunity to restructure the world toward freedom, and we have to get it right."21 However, if restructuring the world means burning the fuel for power while polluting everyone's perception of oneself, it is better to save such fuel for strengthening the foundation of one's place in the international system as the dominant power. Nonetheless, such restructuring is inherently part of the Bush Doctrine.
18 19

Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 202. Also, most other (potential) great powers are located near their rivals, making their potential rise to superpower status a case of delicate strategy infused with miscalculations. See the debate on balance of threat in Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited, International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 15, 20-22. 20 As George Washington so succinctly stated in his 1796 Farewell Address: "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." 21 Quoted in Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 206.

In order to narrow the scope sufficiently, the Bush Doctrine's definition will be further distilled from the rhetoric employed by the Bush administration. This rhetoric is embedded into the 2002 National Security Strategy, as well as George W. Bush' speeches. The two tenets of democratisation and (unilateral) pre-emption must be closely scrutinised to make a correct political realist analysis possible. George W. Bush already laid down a key component of his doctrine prior to the tragic events of 9/11. As with the aforementioned coalitions of the willing, Krauthammer correctly predicted that an important element of the Bush Doctrine would be unilateralism in US foreign policy.22 Concurrently, Bush' perception of America's position in the world is in line with Krauthammer's idea of unipolarity. This unilateralism might be used to support movements for freedom abroad and the US expects everyone to fulfil their obligations in fighting terrorists, which are other key aspects of preemption.23 Projecting liberal democratic norms upon the world, Bush also states that "freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation," implying a willingness to participate in regime change for the sake of freedom. 24 The position of superior power which the US enjoys also makes it easier for it to decide on "tackling" countries harbouring terrorists, prioritising those on the verge of acquiring WMD.25 Of course, such a normatively loaded quasi-Manichean worldview is not susceptible to nuance. These means all serve to attain the goal of preventing new threats from arising, for such threats could not only endanger human lives, but also encroach upon American national interests.
26

Minimising threats to human lives is, by most definitions, a good thing, but

employing preventive strikes against potential threats begs the question on where the line must be drawn between an actual and a potential threat. On the geopolitical level, as manifested in the third tenet of preserving dominance, the Bush Doctrine promotes the forward deployment of US forces to show commitment to

22

Charles Krauthammer, "In American foreign policy: a new motto: Don't ask. Tell.," CNN insidepolitics, 28 February 2001, accessed 27 March 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2001/03/05/doctrine.html. 23 "National Security Strategy," 3-4, 7. 24 George W. Bush, "The State of the Union" (speech delivered before Congress on 28 January 2003, Washington, D.C.), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/2003012819.html. 25 "National Security Strategy," 5-6; George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (speech delivered before Congress on 20 September 2001, Washington, D.C.), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html 26 "National Security Strategy," 14; George W. Bush, "West Point Graduation Speech," (speech delivered at the US Military Academy on 1 June, 2002, West Point, NY), http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html.

friends and determination to foes.27 Together with unilateralism, this forward deployment is one of the enabling conditions for attaining the ideological goals (i.e. democratisation) of the Bush Doctrine. Promoting the fundamental right of freedom, combating terrorists and ensuring the non-proliferation of WMD are thus key ideological elements of the foreign policy rhetoric under George W. Bush. To be fair, many of the Doctrine's ideological goals are praiseworthy, as many would like to enjoy the rights laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Aside from this, the primary strategic goal seems to be in line with most political realist expectations of a rational egoist great power, as US forces must be strong enough to dissuade others' "hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."28 Most elements of the Bush Doctrine were lauded by supporters of the Project for the New American Century, including Krauthammer and Fukuyama, who saw the three tenets as being a significant contribution in maintaining American dominance.29 The US being the sole first-rank power, however, means that such elements in foreign policy are not always fruitful in a situation of unipolarity. Whether the means employed succeeded in dissuading others from challenging the US will be the key subject of analysis in this paper, as the main question is whether the Bush Doctrine was counterproductive in maintaining unipolarity. To facilitate a focused analysis, the political realist critique on the above-stated definition of the Bush Doctrine will be supplemented by examples drawn from the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The US legitimised this intervention by appealing to one of the Bush Doctrine's key tenets, halting the spread of WMD, combined with an appeal to UN Security Council resolution 1441 in a speech that Colin Powell considers to be a "blot on his record."30 A coalition of the willing joined under these auspices to secure Iraq, even while the weapons inspection commission failed to find evidence of WMD present.31 No WMD were found after the occupation by this coalition. Neither was there any evidence of Iraq supporting members of the terrorist network Al Qaeda, and it is questionable whether the Iraqi human rights situation improved after the

27 28

"National Security Strategy," 29. Layne, "Unipolar Illusion Revisited," 13; Quote is from "National Security Strategy," 30. 29 William Kristol, et al., "Letter to President Bush on the War on Terrorism," Project for the New American Century, 20 September 2001, accessed 18 June 2011, http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm. 30 Quoted in "Powell calls pre-Iraq U.N. speech a 'blot' on his record," USA Today, 8 September 2005, accessed 15 March 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09-08-powell-iraq_x.htm. 31 Hans Blix, "Presentation on the inspection effort in Iraq" (speech delivered before the UN Security Council on 7 March 2003), http://articles.cnn.com/2003-03-07/us/sprj.irq.un.transcript.blix_1_inspection-effort-unmovicunscom?_s=PM:US.

10

invasion, as millions of people were displaced from their homes.32 Regime change has been achieved and democracy has been brought to Iraq, but the durability of stable democracy in Iraq is widely contested.33 The efforts under the War on Terror had a mixed success at best, and cost the US nearly one and a half trillion dollars, which could also have been invested in strengthening its lagging education system or cutting its deficit spending, arguably leading to a more solid position among its competitors.34 A political realist scrutiny will contribute to determining where it all went wrong, what should have been and what can be done about it.

3. Classical Realism and the Bush Doctrine

Political realism has a rich and diverse history, even though it has only been developed as a distinct theory in the twentieth century. It is often associated with an inherently negative worldview, assuming that conflict is inevitable as interests collide. Though it is relatively easy to formulate the independent core of this school, there have been several influential authors who have (re-)shaped perceptions of international and domestic politics by contributing to the political realist canon. This chapter will mainly focus on applying contemporary classical realist theory to the Bush Doctrine and gauging whether a state following classical realist guidelines would have done the same. However, in order to understand the nature of contemporary classical realism, a brief history will be presented first to provide an overview of various realist insights.

3.1 A Brief (Pre-)History of Political Realism A key premise of political realism is that power matters. Everything, from ideology to diplomacy, revolves around the implicit or explicit use of power. Without a significant measure of power, an actor in the international system will have less freedom of action, as
32

Kevin M. Woods, et al., "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents," Federation of American Scientists Iraqi Perspectives Project, November 2007, accessed 15 March 2011, http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/iraqi/index.html; "Iraq: No Let-up In the Humanitarian Crisis," International Committee of the Red Cross, March 2008, accessed 15 March 2011. http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ icrc-iraq-report-0308-eng.pdf. 33 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied (Columbia: University Press, 2003): 167-170; Bruce E. Moon, Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq, International Security 33, no. 4 (2009): 137-143; Julia Schofield and Micah Zenko, Designing a Secure Iraq: A US Policy Prescription, Third World Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2004):681-683; Moon 137-143; 34 Roger C. Altman and Richard N. Haass, American Profligacy and American Power, Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010); Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (Congressional Research Service, 29 March, 2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.

11

the ancient Greek historian Thucydides so saliently stated in the oft-cited Melian Dialogue: "[Q]uestions of justice only arise when there is equal power to compel: in terms of practicality the dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they must." 35 This phrase has often been (re-)formulated as "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." In contrast to normative international relations theories, realism deals with the world as it would rationally operate, and does not say anything about the moral desirability of such actions. According to Hobbes and Machiavelli, the strong simply have more to say about what justice exactly is, and therefore, the definitions of 'good' and 'evil' are relative, as good arms precede the capacity to formulate good laws.36 The nature of power is also inherently zero-sum in most political realist theories, which gives rise to major uncertainties about others' motivations. Because the power calculus is zero-sum, "he who is the cause of another man's greatness, is himself undone."37 In international politics (or: inter-citystate politics in Machiavelli's time), there is so much at stake that it is crucial to depend on worst-case scenarios of others' motivations, hence: trust is scarce and fleeting. Such distrust inhibits free cooperation, even if both parties would gain from a transaction. This element of international relations stems from the realist perception of the world as lacking a hierarchic structure. In a situation of anarchy, Thomas Hobbes' statement that "every man is Enemy to every man" can be safely extrapolated to the global level. As Hobbes proclaims, the fruits of (mutually) divided labour are uncertain, 38 and cooperation will only form out of self-interest, with the agreement being regulated by the parties' relative power. These developments lead to the key terms of political realism: that everything is dependent upon power and the world is rife with uncertainty, and that man is wont to pursue his self-interest driven by power. Whether such a situation is desirable is irrelevant, this is the world as it is, and realism tries to provide a framework for dealing with it. The first political realist perspective combines the brief history of thoughts into guiding principles for political conduct, and still leaves some room for a broad definition of power.

35 36

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Martin Hammond (Oxford: University Press, 2009): 302. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Dover, 2006): 29; Niccol Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. N.H. Thompson (New York: Dover, 1992): 35. 37 Machiavelli, The Prince, 8. 38 Hobbes, Leviathan, 70.

12

3.2 Morgenthau's Six Principles of Political Realism Hans J. Morgenthau's classical realist work Politics Among Nations is a seminal work in the evolution of political realism. Written after a devastating Second World War, it lays down the basic principles on which future realists have mostly based their prescriptions on what a rational state's behaviour would be in order to avoid total war. Of course, Morgenthau is well known for his criticism regarding the Vietnam War, and the fact that many compare the war in Iraq to the war in Vietnam might make the general outcome of this analysis predictable, because the arguments used against the Vietnam War can be similarly employed against the Iraq War. However, his work provides a framework through which key errors in statesmanship can be identified. This makes the analysis more than simply concluding that the Bush Doctrine is "wrong." And while Morgenthau had not yet developed the modern structural idea of the international system, his principles of political realism can still be applied to measure the effect of the Bush Doctrine on the power base of the US, thus generating a conclusion on how its position of unipolarity was affected. Putting this in distinctly relative terms is left to structural realism. Morgenthau's "Six Principles of Political Realism" form the backbone of Politics Among Nations. These principles are present throughout his work, and can be summarised as follows. The first principle assumes the existence of objective, rational laws of politics which are grounded in human nature. Politics is an "autonomous sphere of action" in which interests collide and interact to shape the balance of power, according to the second principle (also embedded in the sixth principle). He purposely avoids focusing on motives: George W. Bush' motives in changing the Iraqi regime might well have been good, but good motives do not necessarily result in good policies, however these may be defined. The third principle defines power and interest as inherently dynamic. The content of these concepts can change over time, and the concurrent manifestations of power politics are dependent upon the entities exercising power in the international system.39 Thus, for Morgenthau, rational policies are better policies than those influenced by the ideological whims of man, because they most successfully pursue the state's interests.40 The first and third principles mainly lay down the assumptions of classical realism. The second principle can readily be applied to contemporary politics. However, as Morgenthau states, focusing on the motives and ideological aspects of the statesmen will lead
39 40

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006): 10-11. Ibid., 5-7.

13

us astray. Nevertheless, he also states that "statesmen [...] may well make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain popular support for them," which is not in line with rational approaches.41 Later in his work, he also states that the statesman's mind is different from the popular mind, and must be concerned primarily with longer-term rational goals. In the US, as he admits, this is far from easy due to the frequent elections which require a degree of (promises of) short-term satisfaction. Nevertheless, a statesman must distance himself from the whims of his own morality and those induced by PACs and lobby groups, as will be touched upon in the concluding chapter. Morgenthau prescribes a not wholly unexpected compromise as a solution: good foreign policy must not be sacrificed for the sake of pampering public opinion, but foreign policy can never be good if it is too far removed from popular opinion.42 Arguably, the Bush Doctrine was not entirely steered by public opinion, but it was substantially supported by it. The execution of the Doctrine used the incredible wave of sympathy in global public opinions and domestic popular voices after 9/11 to invade Afghanistan. The invasion of Iraq, however, was a bridge too far. After some time, the aforementioned lack of international legitimacy and domestic support had given rise to the Bush Doctrine's violation of the second part of the above-proposed compromise. Classical realism is not a consequential theory. As such, irrational foreign policy with positive consequences would still be unwise foreign policy. Thus, neither did the Doctrine entail following rational, long-term goals, as such it did not comprise "good" foreign policy, nor did it enjoy broad public support after the veil of sympathy disappeared. In classical realist terms this invariably leads to the conclusion that the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War are inferior to a rational foreign policy. These conclusions are not shocking, nor are they unexpected. However, Morgenthau also gives further clues on what constitutes good foreign policy. As implied above, such foreign policy must not include morality, for a statesman does not have the right to jeopardise his country for morals which are not fully accepted, according to the fourth principle.43 Therefore, only a simple mind would view the world in terms of absolute good and evil.44 Again, this is a major critique of the Bush Doctrine and its neoconservative benefactors. Bush not only stated that "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists," but such thinking was also embedded in the national
41 42

Ibid., 6. Ibid., 159-161. 43 Ibid., 12. 44 Ibid., 159.

14

security strategy.45 This policy also contrasts with the fifth principle, which dictates that no nation can credibly lay claim to the morality that governs the universe. By declaring those not on the side of the US to be enemies of freedom, Bush also violated this principle. If we were to focus on motives, we could approve of Bush' policies because of their potentially good intentions, but the policy effects were entirely different. The major error here is that US actions with political effects were imbued with moral judgements and became part of the National Security Strategy, inevitably affecting others who might not subscribe to this specific morality.

3.3 Morgenthau and the Balance of Power A more abstract level of political action, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, is also described by Morgenthau. He elaborates upon the existence of a balance of power, which all states seek to preserve in order to maintain stability and prevent the destruction of a multitude of states.46 The only relevant dyads of conflict are those between states, for they are the constituents of this balance of power. The Bush Doctrine contains elements of policy focused on incoherent non-state actors. Such terminology leads to incredibly complex problems of interpretation. As stated in the National Security Strategy, there would be no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbour them. Stability in the balance of power is thus subordinated to the fight against an incoherent foe, and no state could be certain that it was not (perhaps accidentally) "knowingly harbouring terrorists." Iraq was initially one of these states, but other states could not be certain as to whether they would eventually be labelled a rogue state. Such preventive war is not condemned by classical realism if it inhibits another great power from becoming a threat, but preventive war against incoherent non-state actors will only raise uncertainty about one's intentions amongst friends and foes alike,47 which is a key factor conducive to conflict. And, as implied before, the worldview as expressed in the 2002 National Security Strategy is an example of generalisation and polarisation, because it is easier to label the enemy as simply being evil, even while this does an incredible injustice to reality. As with the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War, these forms of terrorism are also expressions of a multitude of other sentiments

45 46

George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session"; "National Security Strategy," 3-4, 7. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 179-181. 47 Ibid., 216, 220.

15

such as nationalism and discontent.48 A balance of power "that favors freedom" is therefore a contradictio in terminis,49 and the Bush Doctrine is again irrational in failing to take into account the United States relative position among states instead of terrorist groups. Thus, invading Iraq not only caused unnecessary instability in the region and the international system as a whole, it also gave other groups and states further ammunition to discredit the United States. In fact, the Bush Doctrine has even enabled other states to forcibly remove thorns in their sides under the guise of combating "terrorism," thereby further incurring damage to its credibility and power base.50 In the end, as the structural realist analysis will show, the War on Terror might even have shifted the balance of power in favour of provoking conflicts, as the intentions of the lone superpower have become even harder to discern and other great powers have an increased incentive to revise the balance of power in the international system.

3.4 Conclusion: hubris in foreign policy The strategic errors in the Bush Doctrine, the primacy of morality in substituting rationality, and the disregard of international legitimacy by forming coalitions of the willing lead to a simple classical realist advice for future conduct: to act with prudence. An extension of the fourth principle states that alternative courses of action in international politics must be duly considered. As will be touched upon in the concluding chapter, this was not entirely the case. A state should protect its interests, and these interests are determined by the position of the state relative to others. It should therefore never forget the power-related consequences of moral actions. By following policies inspired by a self-proclaimed role as the paragon of freedom, the Bush administration violated the principles of classical realism and unnecessarily disturbed an already favourable balance of power.51 It induced further uncertainty towards allies and competitors alike, and its intervention in Iraq merely served to
48

Hans J. Morgenthau, "We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam," New York Times Magazine, 18 April 1965, accessed 25 March 2011, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/hans'.htm. 49 Cf. "National Security Strategy," 1; the balance of power is between states and can only favour stability or war 50 Matthew Forney, "China's New Terrorists," Time, 16 September 2002, accessed 25 March 2011, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,351276,00.html; "China 'crushing Muslim Uighurs'," BBC News, 12 April 2005, accessed 25 March 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4435135.stm; W. Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, "The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense," The American Journal of International Law 100, no. 3 (2006): 546. 51 Note that the "balance of power" has no fixed definition. Some structural realists define it as a fixed situation which is impossible under unipolarity, while Morgenthau sees it as permanently and dynamically extant.

16

cause further ambiguity about US regional intentions instead of securing a favourable balance of power. Classical realism does not look inside the black box which represents the state in realist theories, but even if it did, it would find grave tactical mistakes and the way in which post-war stable states (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) were to be formed.52 And while realism traditionally does not consider international institutions, the unilateralism practiced under the guise of the Bush Doctrine towards Iraq has severely damaged the US' national character. As a final judgement, Morgenthau considers this national character and parallel quality of government to be the most important and most elusive components of power. 53 Good statesmanship is essential in preserving such character and quality of government. Thus, under the definition of unipolarity proposed above, the Bush administration has undermined its own relative power position and given others an incentive to step up balancing efforts as US intentions are clouded in rhetoric. Other states' intentions might also have been unclear, but American global efforts simply have more significant effects because of the sheer power backing them. At its moment of unipolarity, the United States succumbed to hubris, which, according to classical realism, will negatively affect its power base due to the corrosion of national character caused by a lack of rational policies.

4. Structural Realism and the Bush Doctrine

Until the advent of structural realism, most realists extrapolated the rules of domestic politics to international politics. While Morgenthau defined international politics as an "autonomous sphere of action," he based his principles of realism on human nature. This indirectly led to the assumption that the dominant actors in international politics are states, as they are the most powerful entities in this autonomous sphere of action. While no realist would deny that states are the principal actors in the international system, there are those who attribute a lot of the enabling conditions to the structure of the international system. To represent this theoretical perspective, these realists are labelled structural realists. This chapter will scrutinise the way in which the US and its Bush Doctrine interacted with the

52

Critical errors were the small number of troops deployed and the way in which the Iraqi army was disbanded and allowed to keep its armaments. See Michael Gordon and Bernard Traior, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2004); Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq?," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (2004); D.L. Philips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (Boulder: Westview, 2005): 198-199. 53 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 215.

17

structure of the international system, and vice versa. Relevant aspects of one of the major contributors to structural realism will first be discussed to lay down the theoretical framework to focus this scrutiny. Towards the end of the chapter, the role of the US according to structural realism will be discussed in order to contrast the actual situation with the actions prescribed by structural realism.

4.1 Structural Realist Theory Many intricate mechanisms are at work in most structural realist theories. Kenneth N. Waltz first published Man, the State and War in 1959, which proposed three different levels of analysis in politics. The first and second level describe the realm of individual and domestic forces on international politics, respectively. They determine policy, but the effects of this policy on the state's international position cannot be understood without the third image. This is where Waltz departs from Morgenthau's insights. The third image, or the structure of international politics, contextualises and gives meaning to the forces of policy. Kenneth N. Waltz' Theory of International Politics is a groundbreaking work in the legacy of political realism, which expands upon this third, structural level. Published in 1979, it posited that the lack of an international government gives rise to the anarchic, amoral nature of this structure. Morgenthau would attribute the actions of states to human nature, while Waltz attributes these to the rational response of pressure from the international system.54 In Waltz' theory of international politics, the structure determines the outcomes which could rationally be expected if states would respond to systemic pressure. Usually, these incentives are so great that ignoring them would lead to thoroughly bad outcomes for the states themselves. The relationships between the actors constituting a structure also determine the structure's nature, and the structure simultaneously narrows down the range of favourable outcomes available to its constituents. There is also a kind of evolutionary logic to this system, as successful practices will be copied and states will be forced to act alike in order to survive. Not only are grand strategies copied, but institutional arrangements (such as liberal democracy) are imitated or feigned in order to follow in the footsteps of these best practices.55 As for a state's role in the international system, it would be unwise to specialise in a certain area, as it may be overrun by competitors in other areas. For Waltz, the only factor

54

Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959): 235-238; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland, 2010): 72. 55 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," 17.

18

differentiating states from one another is the amount of power they possess.56 Consequently, change in the international system is caused by a change of arrangement, which is caused by changes in relative power positions. The structural idea that the international system first entered a bipolar arrangement after the demise of the European powers in the post-WWII period and that it entered a unipolar phase after the collapse of the USSR is a descendant of Waltzian structural realism. This leads to the following implications of power in Waltz' theory: absolute power is determined by a state's domestic characteristics, whilst relative power is determined by its position in the international system. The former means that a state's demographic, economic and military characteristics and capacities determine the amount of power a state has. Such power is only meaningful when compared to the power of other states, which is where relative power comes in.57 States seek to preserve their position in the system in order to guarantee their security.58 In contrast to Morgenthau's classical realism, states do not strive to prevent the destruction of a multitude of units, instead they seek their own survival, and the structure of the system is maintained by these actions. Thus, the basic premise of Waltzian structural realism is that states seek to emulate each other's best practices in order to preserve their own relative position, while the polarity of the system is determined by the number of great powers.

4.2 Waltz and the Constraints of Structure Such a theoretical framework remains quite abstract and is not accurate in predicting specific foreign policy outcomes. Theories of foreign policy are needed to pin down the processes which determine the behaviour of states within the constraints set for them by the structure of the international system. Having determined earlier that the international system is currently unipolar, a safe conclusion can be made on the point of structural constraints acting on the US and its construction of foreign policy. Whereas dangers in a multipolar system entail an escalation of miscalculations in international affairs due to the many variables, and those in a bipolar system come down to a rigidified stalemate, the dangers of a unipolar system are caused by a lack of constraints on the unipole. 59 As Waltz himself proclaims, "one cannot assume that the leaders of a nation superior in power will always
56 57

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 74-76, 92. Ibid., 98. 58 Ibid., 126. 59 Ibid., 202-207; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 24.

19

define policies with wisdom."60 Waltz is in agreement with Morgenthau that the possession of great power is not always supported by the possession of great wisdom. This lack of wisdom means that the more powerful a state gets relative to its competitors, the more freedom of action it has in pursuing irrational and counterproductive foreign policy. The nature of power in structural realist theory resembles a game of Risk. States may have a huge stockpile of arms and effective means of deploying them. They may even be able to use these to conquer the world. The inherent goal of power is to deter or to destroy, if necessary. Moreover, too much power might even fail to deter and instead promote opposition. A state may use power to establish control over a territory, but establishing control within it is near-impossible.61 The US misconception that it could pacify Iraq and establish effective control was not only doomed by misconduct, 62 but it was bound to fail beforehand because being able to project power across the globe does not mean that it can be used constructively. The US could afford to act upon such perceptions, however, because of its immense superiority over its competitors.

4.3 The Unipole and Rational Foreign Policy These theoretical propositions lead to a simple conclusion on the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War. The implications are effectively formulated by Kenneth Waltz himself, as "states that enjoy a margin of power over their closest competitors are led to pay undue attention to minor dangers and to pursue fancies abroad that reach beyond the fulfilment of interests narrowly defined in terms of security."63 He applied this to the war in Vietnam, and it is equally applicable to the war in Iraq. A lack of constraints leads to room for reckless idealism in foreign policy.64 Whereas such endeavours would not have any significant domestic effects, other states might feel that these actions threaten their interests. Such a conclusion mirrors Morgenthau's insights, but the pressure on the US' competitors mainly arises from the structure in Waltzian realism. States feel that the unipole is exerting too much of its power and see a realistic chance of catching up. On a more regional level, even local powers might feel the need to counter the unipole as the regional power feels threatened by the unipole's caprices, evidenced by the persistent (nuclear)
60 61

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 201. Ibid., 187-188. 62 See fn. 52. 63 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 205. 64 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism," 24.

20

assertiveness of Iran.65 The unipole is the single most powerful state, but it is not omniscient, nor is it omnipotent. In addition to Waltzian insights, one could posit the notion that states join the American bandwagon, riding along freely as long as they have no realistic chance of catching up (which is the current state of unipolarity), but they will slowly shift to balancing efforts once they realise that they are gaining in relative power (which is a shift to bi- or multipolarity, arguably also occurring presently).66 However, in forming balancing coalitions, one plus one does not equal two, as much is lost in inefficiency and uncertainty. But in the end, either the sum of a potential coalition minus this inefficiency will surpass the threshold to start balancing, or a single state will do so. This leads to an added danger for the unipole in exercising power abroad, since other states' antagonism and mistrust will carry over into the new multipolar structure of the world.67 The small line in the National Security Strategy declaring that others should be dissuaded from surpassing US power leads to a paradox in which acquiring more visible power and attempting to prevent others from attaining it will lead to extra efforts by those others to balance against the US. For while the US might not feel pressured by the international system, others will feel this oftentimes overprotective ceiling pushing down on them, tempting them to push back before the ceiling starts depriving them of the space to move. Structural realism thus has an inclination against the unipolar system. Competitors will eventually arise and unipolarity will slowly shift into bi- or multipolarity. Building on the insights gained by classical realism, prudence should be exercised in foreign policy in order prevent unnecessary antagonisation of future peers. Structural realism prescribes a minimalist foreign policy in order to prolong the moment of unipolarity and to prevent a bias towards conflict once multipolarity dawns. Not only will exercising massive amounts of power lead to others free-riding and being antagonised at the same time, it will also accelerate the decline of unipolarity because the dominant state overpays for its security while others profit from it.68 Such security is arguably not even real, as it easily threatens others' interests and sets a precedent for future massive expenditures of power in endeavours across the globe. Regardless, the fact that the Bush Doctrine is a unilateral affair at times is less problematic

65

Jeremy Pressman, Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East, International Security 33, no. 4 (2009): 152, 165. 66 This is an extension of the argument put forward by Brooks and Wohlforth that balance-of-power theory does not apply to the US, see Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance, 23, 35-36. 67 Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," 46. 68 Ibid., 34; Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 195.

21

within structural realism than within classical realism. Unilateral interventions are supported by structural realist theory if they serve to maintain the relative power position of the state in question, whilst classical realism would abhor such actions if it entailed destabilising the system and destroying several states in the process. The unilateral part of the Bush Doctrine does not add anything, however. Unilateral action is only useful when a multilateral solution cannot be found, and when not acting at all would have negative consequences for the US' relative position. An intervention in Iraq, chasing figureheads of terrorist organisations while violating states' national sovereignty, and ramping up forward deployment without another pole to balance against arguably fall under the category of "fancies abroad" and do not serve to stabilise the US' position in the world. So what then? Will not the perils of domestic politics interfere too much in foreign policy conduct? Is not the demise of the US as the lone superpower a foregone conclusion? In a sense it is. But this realisation in itself can be a valuable tool in foreign and domestic policy conduct. Realism does not say anything about domestic specifics, but an inference can be made from its theoretical notions to suggest a course of action both abroad and at home. Instead of engaging in pre-emptive strikes against foreign threats which might never have materialised anyway, the US should engage in pre-emptive internal balancing. As Layne suggested nearly two decades ago, "redressing the internal causes of relative decline would be perceived by others as less threatening than a strategy of preponderance."69 This is the best broad advice that any realist could have given the Bush administration. Shifting resources from unnecessary foreign engagements has the added advantage that entanglements with foreign conflicts can be avoided as well. Therefore, maintaining the nation's security while focusing on internal development to preclude others from gaining a significant advantage is one of the key tenets of a rational foreign policy for the unipole in general.

4.4 Conclusion: shaping the inevitable Inevitability of structure does not mean inevitability of content. The nature of future bi- or multipolar relations will be shaped by the actions of the unipole in its contemporary circumstances. The Bush Doctrine has unnecessarily entangled the US in conflicts abroad, reduced investments in the foundation of its position in the international system, and has given others more cause to step up balancing efforts. These problematic aspects have already been briefly highlighted by classical realism, but the theoretical framework of structural
69

Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," 46.

22

realism adds a level of analysis which is capable of including systemic pressures and effects. Instead of spending huge amounts of economic and military resources on futile efforts abroad, the unipole should strengthen its foundations by investing in education, research, and a peaceful vision for the future. The latter is not so much a realist advice as it is an advice to use the bit of hierarchy induced in the international system to further everyone's concrete best interests. Such visions may encompass a range of issues, from tackling various difficult peace processes to further development in inspiring endeavours such as space travel and medicine. These precepts actually fit within the classical realist notion of national character, but fall outside of structural realism's definition of power. Further discussion on how the unipole might lead international cooperation falls within the sphere of Keohane's neoliberal institutionalism, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, advice for a rational foreign policy would merely contain the two elements of (1) not spending power on un- or even counterproductive endeavours, and (2) actually spending it on those quests which strengthen the state's position in the international system. Under classical realism, this would simply be known as prudence, and the latter point could be supplemented by investing in one's national character.

5. Offensive Realism and the Bush Doctrine

Between Morgenthau's publication of Politics Among Nations and the present, much has been added to the realist theoretical canon. Whereas Morgenthau left room for a broad definition of power, Waltz pinned down the elements of power to specific material aspects. Later theories have also modified the definition and purpose of power, whilst others have changed the content of balancing theory and the actors within it. The last political realist theory to be discussed is John J. Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism. While it is technically part of the structural realist category, it has some distinct characteristics which justify the new label of offensive realism. Waltz' structural realism would then be defined as a form of defensive realism. This chapter will briefly track some major developments in political realist theory until Mearsheimer's work, applying these to the contemporary situation where relevant. The documentation of these developments is by no means exhaustive, and merely serves to place Mearsheimer's perspective in context. The characteristics of Mearsheimer's offensive realism will be laid down in the sections thereafter, as Mearsheimer builds upon and reacts against these developments.

23

5.1 Between Defence and Offence The parsimonious nature of Waltzian structural realism makes for a clear theory, but it has its disadvantages, as a narrow definition of power automatically causes a narrow definition of international relations. Different measurements of power yield different predictions for patterns of behaviour in the balance of power. Under the narrow Waltzian definition, a balancing state or coalition against the US is highly probable as it is the superior power. However, a broader definition of power would delay such balancing. While these issues cannot be discussed in depth, it is imperative to be aware of the fact that definitions of power and purpose are not fixed.
70

Some theories, such as the balance of threat theory, add

extra elements to its predecessors. Stephen Walt posits that "states will ally with or against the most threatening power." From this perspective, perceptions of power matter. The implications for the current geopolitical situation are similar to those generated by Waltzian structural realism. States might bandwagon with the unipole in order to cope with a regional threat, but they will balance against it once they perceive it as being the greater threat.71 The effects are the same, but the extension of structural realism mentioned above stated that states would bandwagon because a balancing coalition was simply not realistic, while Walt bases his conclusions on the threat a state poses. Substituting the USSR for the US and Eastern Europe for the Greater Middle East makes Walt's conclusion eerily applicable to the Bush Doctrine, as periodic interventions and invasions increase threat to other great powers as they perceive US intentions to be increasingly threatening to their own.72 Walt's other conclusions mirror those discussed earlier, as the unipole has more freedom of action in engaging itself with various structurally irrelevant "distractions" and counterbalancing against it is more difficult in the face of such a dominant power.73 The balance of threat theory lends itself to predict a varying degree of conflict. It opens a wider range of options circumscribed by global peace and global war, depending on how states perceive their peers. Other realist influences attempt to include the offencedefence balance. They postulate that aggression and war are more likely when offensive actions are (or seem) more likely to be successful, and the effects of successful conquests are

70 71

For an overview, see Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance, 45-51. Stephen M. Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, International Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 8-9, 18; Stephen M. Walt, Alliances in a Unipolar World, World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 89. 72 Walt, "Alliance Formation," 37. 73 Walt, "Alliances," 94-99.

24

increasingly cumulative in gains.74 While this theory lacks empirical evidence at the level of the international system, it might help explain conflict dyads on a smaller scale, though this would remove it from the realm of structural realism.75 Nevertheless, the idea of the offencedefence balance could be embedded into a conception of power in future theories. Geography also plays a role in determining whether offensive actions are favourable, even though it may be surmounted if the only goal of an offensive is to deter or destroy.76 Such an offencedefence balance can be placed in the context of the perceived applicability of power projection. As stated above, George W. Bush saw an opportunity to restructure the world, which translated into several costly interventions abroad. Such offensive actions would not have been initiated if the US still suffered from a severe Vietnam or Somalia syndrome tipping the perceived balance towards defence, and it could be explained by the salience of perception of threat balance of threat-theory.77 And, as with earlier realist insights, Stephen Van Evera provides a valuable contribution from his own offence-defence theory, as the great powers' "greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence." Believing that security is scarce will lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy as aggressive policies incite further aggression.78

5.2 The Offensive Turn Mearsheimer took distinctive steps towards a separate theory on what states' goals are in an anarchic system, such as the international political sphere of action. Whereas Morgenthau attributes the relentless quest for power to human nature, and Waltz attributes states' balancing behaviour to the structure of the international system, Mearsheimer claims that a state's best course of action would be to maximise their relative power in order to be prepared for the worst. In Mearsheimer's view, more power means more security.79 In contrast to Waltzian realism, Mearsheimer sees all powers as being revisionist powers, seeking to revise the structure of the international system in their favour. The balance of power is always tipped in favour of war, as it is impossible for satisfied status quo powers to maintain peace and stability, because there are simply no status quo states. Even the unipole
74 75

Stephen Van Evera, Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War, International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 6, 8. Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z. Haftel, and Kevin Sweeney, Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 84-85. 76 Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," 19. 77 Ibid., 41. 78 Ibid., 43. 79 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2003): 21.

25

will relentlessly strive to gain as much power as possible to prevent others from acquiring it.80 A key aspect of Mearsheimer's theory is that he does not see the US as being a hegemon in the global balance of power. In fact, the existence of a global hegemon is nearly impossible, as it must be the sole power capable of deterring others without any retaliation. Instead of global hegemony, there is currently only a single regional hegemon, which has dominance over its own geographical region and is able to focus on global power projection. The lack of a global hegemon in Mearsheimer's theory might seem problematic when combined with our definition of unipolarity. However, Mearsheimer confirms that the US is one-of-a-kind when he asserts that it is the only regional hegemon in the world today. 81 This notion of unbalanced multipolarity comes close to our definition of unipolarity, as there are multiple regional great powers which cannot effectively balance against the sole regional hegemon. If they succeeded in attaining the status of regional hegemon, they would tip the system towards a bipolar or balanced multipolar version. In order to prevent this, the US would rather pass the buck to other states across the globe to let them balance against the strongest regional power; it will also act as an offshore balancer to contain the rise of potential hegemons, if necessary.82 Rational foreign policy in Mearsheimer's view entails helping others help yourself in order to stop competitors from attaining regional hegemony, thereby maximising power and security.

5.3 The Unipole and Power Projection More than any other realist theory, Mearsheimer focuses on the perils of great power competition. Morgenthau wants to prevent the destruction of a multitude of states, whilst Waltz seeks to preserve the stability of the system. According to Mearsheimer, the US should simply focus its attention on preventing regional hegemons from arising, thereby maximising its power. Combining the various realist insights, Mearsheimer's theory leads to an offensive foreign policy for the US. We must not forget, however, that there are other states which are affected by US foreign policy behaviour. Even assuming that the invasion of Iraq was successful and that it increased US power, it would only make sense in a bandwagoning world, where other members of the Axis of Evil would succumb to US pressure on order to

80 81

Ibid., 41-42. Ibid., 140-141. 82 Ibid., 156-162.

26

avert an American invasion. As an extension of balance-of-threat theory and Mearsheimer's advice to relentlessly strive for more power, however, these other states would have more incentive to step up their efforts to pursue WMD in order to deter the US from invading them. There is proof abound, as North Korea tested nuclear weaponry in 2009 and Iran has continued its nuclear programme. According to offensive realism, invading Iraq was counterproductive in stimulating other states to pursue policies favourable to the US' unique position of power. In reality, as already shown in the classical and structural realist chapters, the invasion of Iraq did not improve the US position of power amongst its peers. Offensive realism would only condone such actions if it prevented a regional hegemon from arising. Given the perilous circumstances in the Middle East, the rise of a regional hegemon is highly unlikely. Iran would be a primary candidate, but it is encircled by great powers and US allies alike. Should the US have the wish to invade Iran, it can easily cross the ocean by landing its troops in nearby allied states.83 The geopolitical priority for US foreign policy is to focus on China's aspirations and the geographical ring of balancers surrounding it. 84 Building upon earlier classical and structural realist insights, offensive realism emphasises the need to balance against the unipole even more. With the US entangled in the Iraqi (and Afghani) quagmire, other states have a window of opportunity to test its capabilities and patience on other threatening issues, as Mearsheimer implied in a separate article.85 It has fewer resources to counter other great powers' expansion, such as China's inroads into Siberia and Africa. Not only has the US decreased its relative power by spending resources on the invasion of Iraq, it has also decreased its capacity to counter other states from aspiring to become a regional hegemon. Following democratic peace logic, it could be wise to attempt the spread of democracy in order to promote peaceful international cooperation, and keep other states from attempting to compete with you. Democratic peace theory posits that democratic states conduct fewer wars with one another, and such a condition would also be favourable for the US. However, forcibly imposing democracy on states with little or no experience with the
83

Mearsheimer's main point is that great powers surrounded by water are less likely to be invaded. Overcoming this is a matter of landing troops in a neighbouring allied state to aid them. Effective land armies are the single most important tool in conquering and controlling other territories. See Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 114-120. 84 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 397-400. 85 John J. Mearsheimer, Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: realism versus neo-conservatism, openDemocracy.org, 18 May 2005, accessed 5 June 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracyamericanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp.

27

system is rarely successful in practice.86 There are many prerequisites for a stable and true democracy to form and hold, few of which can be effectively created by external intervention. These include the cultural background as well as the criterion of economic and educational development.87 Building upon insights mentioned in the concluding paragraph on classical realism, it would have been relatively easy to conclude beforehand that creating a stable democracy would have little chance of success. Even if a functioning democracy had been formed, there would be no guarantee that it would have benign intentions towards its (former) benefactor. According to Mearsheimer, offensive realists and other realists alike would rather have these facts of life changed, but reality is different. 88 An attempt to promote democracy in order to prevent a hostile state from arising simply has less chance of success in prolonging US primacy than attempting to curb the rise of other regional hegemons.

5.4 Conclusion: helping others help yourself Offensive realism, balance-of-threat theory and the offence-defence balance add extra layers of criticism towards the Bush Doctrine. Balance-of-threat theory centres on structural realism's confirmation that other states feel increasingly threatened by the unipole's erratic behaviour. Because they know that an offensive to counter US primacy is doomed to fail, they have more incentive to step up balancing efforts and acquire WMD in order to deter the US from invading them. Mearsheimer builds upon these insights in concluding that spreading liberal democracy is as unrealistic as it is noble. Resources invested in the War on Terror are only partially useful, at best, in countering the rise of other regional hegemons, as the US is distracted by its efforts in attempting to eliminate a diffuse threat which can never be wholly removed from existence. In fact, attempting to remove the terrorist threat and its associated dictators by forcibly replacing it with liberal democratic institutions might even give rise to further antagonism amongst the affected populace, as in Vietnam.89 Potential hegemons see a chance to catch up, not only due to structural power-related constraints, but also because the US cannot be everywhere at the same time. Still, offensive realism foresees a potentially brighter future for the US if it uses its power more wisely in the future. Mearsheimer takes
86

See fn. 37 and Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, The Failure of Democratic Nation Building (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 87 Samuel P. Huntington, Religion and the Third Wave, The National Interest, no. 24 (1991); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105. 88 Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau." 89 Ibid.

28

into account geographical factors which are not as prominently featured in other theories. The US is the sole superpower in its own hemisphere, whilst the Asian continent is filled with major powers such as India, Japan, Russia and especially China. If the US were to focus its efforts on offshore balancing and passing the buck to Asia's major powers to curb the rise of a potential hegemon (most likely China), it could prolong the global condition of unipolarity for some time to come. In contrast to this, Waltzian structural realism would prefer the sole rise of China, so that the system becomes more stable as it becomes bipolar. Such constructive engagement with China to facilitate this is not an option for Mearsheimer, as every power will become aggressive when it sees the option to maximise its power. In this respect, the Bush Doctrine has already given the world's major powers and potential hegemon(s) some leeway in expanding their spheres of influence at the US' expense.

6. Conclusion

6.1 The Inadequacy of Political Realism Of course, realism is a flawed theory and it cannot fully explain the world as it actually works. Irrationality is a part of man, man governs the state, and thus rational theories are irrational in not including mankind's natural irrationality. This makes realism an almost normative theory, describing an ideal world of rational, egoistic states following their selfinterest wherein patterns of behaviour are more predictable. Realism also cannot adequately explain why the Iraq War was waged or why the Bush Doctrine was formulated, which simply means that there are irrational forces at work that fall outside the bounds of political realist theory. It does not take into account the goings-on in the states themselves, and has little explanatory value regarding the non-state actors, which also respond to the invasiveness of the Bush Doctrine. What realism can do, however, is prescribe how to formulate foreign policy in the rational national interest. It is clear that such rational policies were not adequately formulated at the advent of the War on Terror. Various other explanations can be offered for the invasion of Iraq and the overarching War on Terror. In-depth neoclassical realist theories can help explain the various influences on foreign policy construction. These theories recognise the idea that the international system shapes pathways for states to follow, but they attempt to describe the ways in which states

29

find their different paths along these roads.90 In Waltzian terms, they describe the first and second levels of analysis, which focus on individual and domestic influences, respectively. We have already touched upon the evangelical idealism that characterises the dominant neoconservative government officials' thought in the Bush Administration. Blaming neoconservatism is too simple, however. Dina Badie posits that a process of groupthink can help explain the shift towards an aggressive policy regarding Iraq. She states that hawks in the administration suppressed dissenting views and intelligence in order to carry through more aggressive policies towards Iraq.91 This also explains why the administration did not adequately take into account the scientific insights on how troublesome and costly nationbuilding could be and why Morgenthau's fourth principle of considering alternatives was not adequately followed. Almost ironically, Morgenthau himself observed during the Vietnam War that often "a new policy has been decided upon, and intelligence must provide the facts to justify it."92 Unfortunately, such an observation still holds true in the present day. Stepping outside of his offensive realist paradigm, Mearsheimer concludes, together with Stephen M. Walt, that the Israel lobby also played a large role in instigating aggression towards Iraq.93 As Badie stated, there was little support for invading Iraq amongst the Bush administration's members before 9/11. The neoconservatives, supported by the Israel lobby, manipulated the intelligence presented to the administration and started a campaign of public relations to garner support for the invasion of Iraq. The Israeli state saw the invasion of Iraq as a tool to reshape the Middle East for the sake of Israel's safety. 94 Such policies are inherently irrational in terms of promoting the American national interest, but they are perfectly rational for an encircled state such as Israel. As Mearsheimer and Walt put it, it seems as if the "tail is wagging the dog" in the construction of US foreign policy.95 More generally put, there is more room for foreign and irrational influences to interfere with policymaking in the US. Avoiding a foreign policy of highly irrational elements is important in restraining the immense power that could be wielded for goals feigning to fall under the

90

Gideon Rose, Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 146147. 91 Dina Badie, Groupthink, Iraq and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq, Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 4 (2010): 293-295. 92 Morgenthau, "We Are Deluding Ourselves." 93 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby, London Review of Books, 23 March 2006, accessed 26 November 2010, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby: 33. 94 Ibid., 34-35. 95 Ibid., 25.

30

national interest.96 As George Washington stated during his 1796 Farewell Address, "Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellowcitizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government."

6.2 The Irrationality of the Bush Doctrine The fact that realism cannot explain the Bush Doctrine shifts the burden of irrationality towards the latter. The Bush Doctrine was inspired by influences which traditional realist theories do not take into account. Nevertheless, it is possible for foreign policy construction to be based on realist precepts, even though realism is inadequate in describing the real world, and no statesman could credibly pretend to be a perfectly rational leader. The different political realist theories emphasise various errors in the Bush Doctrine and would have inspired different courses of action, for their inadequacy in describing policy does not mean that it is inadequate in prescribing policy. Classical realism focuses on the subpar statesmanship that the Bush administration collectively displayed. By including morality into foreign policy by attempting to promote democracy across the globe and damaging its 'national character' by expending a massive amount of resources on unproductive efforts, the Bush Doctrine violated key premises of classical realism. Waltzian structural realism emphasises the uncertainty caused by the various interventionist policies amongst the US' competitors and compatriots alike, and criticises the lack of investments in the foundation of US power. Mearsheimer's offensive realism does not criticise such expenditures of power, but merely the choice of target of such expenditures. No potential hegemon was thwarted by the Bush Doctrine, and the resources spent on invading Iraq could also have been invested in halting the rise of a potential hegemon. Whether such hubris is inevitable in a situation of unipolarity is not clear, but all forms of political realism discussed here would have opted for more restraint towards a minimal threat such as Iraq and a diffuse threat such as terrorism. All in all, these various critiques indicate that the Bush Doctrine has hastened the decline of the United States' favourable position in the unipolar system. While the US is still the sole first-rank power, it has wasted enormous sums of money on unproductive efforts, thereby giving others the chance to start catching up. It could afford to add various irrational
96

Samuel P. Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997).

31

elements to its towering construct because of the relative advantage to its neighbours, but these elements have damaged the US' structural integrity and its capacity to keep ahead in the race to remain the tallest building on the block. These conclusions should by no means be entirely surprising, but the various political realist perspectives have provided advice on how to construct a rational foreign policy. The most meaningful international relations are manifested between the strongest powers on the planet and foreign policy should be tuned to that observation. Competitors now have more room to deter the US in their own region, and might one day pass the threshold of becoming a pole in the international system. This need not necessarily be a bad thing, but the nature of these relations is determined by the actions of the unipole in its contemporary circumstances, which shape precedents for future behaviour. The Bush Doctrine has not only caused its homeland's power and security to decline in its contemporary environment, it has also made future relations more conflict-prone as the irrational use of power has induced other states to prepare for the worst under an everlooming umbrella of contentious politics among nations.

32

Bibliography Altman, Roger C., and Richard N. Haass. American Profligacy and American Power. Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010): 25-34. Badie, Dina. Groupthink, Iraq and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq. Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 4 (2010): 277-296. Belasco, Amy. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11. Congressional Research Service, 29 March 2011. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. Blix, Hans. "Presentation on the inspection effort in Iraq." Speech delivered before the UN Security Council on 7 March 2003. http://articles.cnn.com/2003-0307/us/sprj.irq.un.transcript.blix_1_inspection-effort-unmovic-unscom?_s=PM:US. Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. Hard Times for Soft Balancing. International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 72-108. . World Out of Balance. Princeton: University Press, 2008. Bush, George W. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." Speech delivered before Congress on 20 September 2001, Washington, D.C. http://georgew bush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html. . "The State of the Union." Speech delivered before Congress on 28 January 2003, Washington, D.C. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-19.html. . " West Point Graduation Speech." Speech delivered at the US Military Academy on 1 June, 2002, West Point, NY. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html. "China 'crushing Muslim Uighurs'." BBC News. 12 April 2005. Accessed 25 March 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4435135.stm. Diamond, Larry. "What Went Wrong in Iraq?" Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (2004) Dodge, Toby. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. Forney, Matthew. "China's New Terrorists." Time. 16 September 2002. Accessed 25 March 2011. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,351276,00.html. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 2006.

33

Gordon, Michael and Bernard Traior. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Pantheon, 2004. Gortzak, Yoav, Yoram Z. Haftel, and Kevin Sweeney. Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 67-89. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. New York: Dover, 2006. Huntington, Samuel P. Religion and the Third Wave. The National Interest, no. 24 (1991): 29-42. . The Erosion of American National Interests. Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997): 28-49. . The Lonely Superpower. Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (1999): 35-49. Ikenberry, G. John, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth. Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences. World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 1-27. "Iraq: No Let-up In the Humanitarian Crisis." International Committee of the Red Cross. March 2008. Accessed 15 March 2011. http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ icrc-iraq-report-0308-eng.pdf. Jervis, Robert. Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective. World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 188213. Krauthammer, Charles. "In American foreign policy: a new motto: Don't ask. Tell." CNN insidepolitics. 28 February 2001. Accessed 27 March 2011. http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2001/03/05/doctrine.html. . The Unipolar Moment. Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1991): 23-33. . The Unipolar Moment Revisited. The National Interest, no. 70 (2002): 5-17. Kristol, William, et al. "Letter to President Bush on the War on Terrorism." Project for the New American Century. 20 September 2001. Accessed 18 June 2011. http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm. Layne, Christopher. The Unipolar Illusion. International Security 17, no. 4 (1993): 5-51. . The Unipolar Illusion Revisited. International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 7-41. . US Hegemony in a Unipolar World: Here to Stay or Sic Transit Gloria?. International Studies Review 11, no. 4 (2009): 784-787. Lieber, Keir A., and Gerard Alexander. Waiting for Balancing. International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 109-139.

34

Lipset, Seymour Martin. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105. Machiavelli, Niccol. The Prince. Trans. N.H. Thompson. New York: Dover, 1992. McFaul, Michael, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss. The Myth of the Authoritarian Model. Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): 68-84. Mearsheimer, John J. Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: realism versus neoconservatism. openDemocracy.org. 18 May 2005. Accessed 5 June 2011. http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp. . The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2003. Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. The Israel Lobby. London Review of Books, 23 March 2006. Accessed 26 November 2010. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby. Moon, Bruce E. Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq. International Security 33, no. 4 (2009): 115-148. Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006. . "We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam." New York Times Magazine. 18 April 1965. Accessed 25 March 2011. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/ hans'.htm. Pape, Robert A. Soft Balancing against the United States. International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 7-45. Paul, T.V. Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy. International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 46-71. Philips, D.L. Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco. Boulder: Westview, 2005. "Powell calls pre-Iraq U.N. speech a 'blot' on his record." USA Today. 8 September 2005. Accessed 15 March 2011. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09-08powell-iraq_x.htm. Pressman, Jeremy. Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East. International Security 33, no. 4 (2009): 149-179. Reisman, W. Michael and Andrea Armstrong. "The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense," The American Journal of International Law 100, no. 3 (2006): 525-550.

35

Reus-Smit, Christian. American Power and World Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. Rose, Gideon. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 144-172. Schofield, Julia, and Micah Zenko. Designing a Secure Iraq: A US Policy Prescription. Third World Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2004): 677-687. Somit, Albert, and Steven A. Peterson. The Failure of Democratic Nation Building. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Trans. Martin Hammond. Oxford: University Press, 2009. United States. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. White House Office, September 2002. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/ national/nss-020920.pdf. Van Evera, Stephen. Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War. International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 5-43. Walt, Stephen M. Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. International Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 3-43. . Alliances in a Unipolar World. World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 86-120. Waltz, Kenneth N. America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective. PS: Political Science and Politics 24, no. 4 (1991): 667-670. . Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. . Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 541. . Theory of International Politics. Long Grove: Waveland, 2010. Washington, George. Farewell Address, 1796. http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/farewell/. Woods, Kevin M., et al. "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents."Federation of American Scientists Iraqi Perspectives Project. November 2007. Accessed 15 March 2011. http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/iraqi/index.html.