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Difficulties in Afghanistan After the Death of Karzai's Half-Brother

July 12, 2011 | 1351 GMT

STR/AFP/Getty Images Ahmed Wali Karzai (R) in Kandahar, Afghanistan

Summary
Though the Taliban have claimed responsibility for the death of Afghan President Hamid Karzais half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, the identity of the attacker remains unclear. Nevertheless, it may be difficult to replace him due to his efforts in securing an array of support for the president in Kandahar province the birthplace of the Taliban. His death could weaken the presidents position among his support base and in terms of his negotiating position with the Taliban. It could also affect the U.S. drawdown of forces from Afghanistan.

Analysis
An assassin shot and killed Afghan President Hamid Karzais most influential half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, at his residential compound in Kandahar on July 12. The Taliban have claimed that one of their sleeper agents is responsible for the attack, while government officials maintain it was carried out by one of Ahmed Walis bodyguards. The possibility that the attacker could be both a Taliban agent and a bodyguard cannot be ruled out. The identity of the attacker notwithstanding, the death of Ahmed Wali has serious implications for the Karzai regime and, by extension, the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. President Karzai relied greatly on Ahmed Wali to maintain support among his own Pashtun ethnic community. Many Pashtuns have long viewed the Karzai administration, especially those within the security forces, as being dominated by elements of the former Northern

Alliance, the historic rivals of the Pashtuns, particularly the largest minority, the Tajiks. The Taliban have exploited this sentiment in their attempts to regain power since their ouster 10 years ago. As a result, Karzai has struggled to create a support base among his fellow ethnic Pashtuns, especially in the Taliban heartland (the Taliban movement represents the single largest group among the Pashtuns). Ahmed Wali played a critical role over the years in trying to mobilize Pashtun tribal support for the president. To a large degree, he was successful. Ahmed Wali went to great lengths to work with an array of elements tribal elders, warlords, clergy, drug dealers and organized crime bosses in establishing a sphere of influence in Kandahar, the province in which the Taliban movement was founded in 1994. Ahmed Walis efforts earned him immense notoriety, especially among the Karzai regimes principal patron, the United States. Indeed, the CIA worked with Ahmed Wali when other U.S. government agencies were critical of him, pressing the president to act against him something President Karzai resisted. Ahmed Wali is reported to engage in numerous shady dealings, and he was perceived by locals to be exceptionally corrupt particularly problematic for U.S. counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts. However, Ahmed Wali had the charisma, skills, connections, and Karzais trust, which makes him a very difficult man to replace. Critically, Ahmed Walis death will likely weaken the presidents position in his native south and by extension, in the entire country at a time when the Afghan leader is navigating the drawdown of U.S. forces, scheduled to be completed by the end of 2011. Karzai had intensified efforts to talk to the Taliban; the death of Ahmed Wali means he will be negotiating from a position of weakness and will, at the very least, make it negotiations difficult for the president. It will also likely aggravate tensions with Pakistan. While Karzai seeks a mutual understanding, many within Kabul are suspected of orchestrating highprofile attacks in Afghanistan. Pashtun tribal forces that have thus far been aligned with the president as a result of Ahmed Walis efforts will now be forced to re-evaluate that alliance, given that the Taliban have the upper hand in negotiations for a post NATO Afghanistan. Losing ground among his fellow Pashtuns could in turn weaken his position among his non-Pashtun partners, who are already wary of the Karzai administrations efforts to seek a political settlement with the Taliban. Washington, meanwhile, needs all anti-Taliban forces to be on the same page so they can serve as an effective counter to the Pashtun jihadist movement and facilitate an orderly drawdown of U.S. forces from the country.

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