DULAY v COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: While Benigno Torzuela was on duty as security guard of Big Bang sa Alabang, he shot

and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay after an altercation occurred between them in the premises of said establishment. The heirs of Dulay filed a complaint for damages under Article 2176 against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Secuirty Co., Inc. and/or Superguard Security Corp, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. In the complaint, Safeguard and Superguard were impleaded as alternative defedants for, while Safeguard appears to be the employer of Torzuela, Superguard impliedly acknowledged responsibility for his acts by extending sympathies to the plaintiffs. Meanwhile, an Information charging Torzuela with homicide was filed with RTC Makati. Superguard/Safeguard alleged that a complaint of petitioner for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 cannot lie because said article is applicable only to quasi-offenses. They alleged that Torzuelas act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), and he acted beyond the scope of his duty. Upon motion, TC judge dismissed the complaint against the alternative defendants on the ground that the complaint did not state facts necessary to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela. ISSUE: Won petitioner can sustain a valid cause of action under Article 2176 against the employer of Torzuela HELD:YES It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that Section 1. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is then the nature of petitioners action? there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the CC to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. Independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 so long as the crime is not the result of criminal negligence, as in the instant case. It having been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Because of the principle of vicarious responsibility, it is incumbent upon Safeguard and/or Superguard to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. The petitioners complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of Torzuela and Superguard and/or Safeguard. BUT WON the shooting was attended by negligence or actually done within the scope of Torzuelas duties; WON Superguard and/or Safeguard failed to exercise due diligence are matters that should be resolved after trial on merits. Regino v. Pangasinan College of Science and Technology In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. Khristine refused to pay for the tickets. On the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers -Gamurot and Baladad -- disallowed her from taking the tests ejected her from the classroom. In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents "inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;"33 as a result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester

of that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and "demoralization of unimaginable proportions" in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. Ruling: Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21. Baksh v CA 219 SCRA 115 Facts:. Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian enrolled in a medical school while Marilou Gonzales works in the cafeteria of said school. Marilou Gonzales alleged that petitioner courted her & because of his persuasive promise to marry her after the end of the school semester of the same year, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him. . Petitioner visited her parents to secure their approval to the marriage. No marriage came hence an action for breach of promise to marry Subsequently, petitioner forced her to live with him. Later, petitioner began maltreating her and during a confrontation before the barangay captain of Guilig, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and told her that he was married to someone in Bacolod City. Issue: WON an action for damages may prosper. Held: Yes, based on Article 21 Ratio: 1. Article 21, together with Articles 19 and 20, has broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs 2. the basis for the award was the fraud and deceit behind the promise to marry and the willful injury to her honor and reputation she had sex with him not because of lust but because of moral seduction mans promise to marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love his representation to fulfill that promise is the proximate cause of giving herself unto him in a sexual congress 3. cannot be held liable for criminal seduction because girl was above 18 ------------CEREZO VS TUAZON FACTS: Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle in Pampanga. The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the bus lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda. According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the proper lane. There was a "Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias summons was served upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor. In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action. ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages. HELD: Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based on criminal law but on quasi-delict under the Civil Code. The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Art. 103, RPC, or may give rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action. Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180: Employer's liability. Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's contention. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in action for quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer's liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separate for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer's liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong. The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another) without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against he author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Art. 103, RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-delict, which is separate and independent from an action based on a delict. Hence, there was no need to reserve the filing of a separate civil action. The purpose of allowing the filing the of an independent action based on quasi-delict against the employer is to facilitate the remedy for civil wrongs.