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China Security Kritik

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Chengxin Pan 04 > PhD in polisci from Australian Nat. Univ. The China Threat in American Self-Imagination: the Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5008295085> acc.6/28/11 In 1630, John Winthrop, governor of the British-settled Massachusetts Bay Colony, described the Puritan mission as a moral beacon for the world: "For wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies [eyes] of all people are uppon us." (26) Couched in a highly metaphoric manner, the "city on
the hill" message greatly galvanized the imagination of early European settlers in North America who had desperately needed some kind of certainty and assurance in the face of many initial difficulties and disappointments in the "New World." Surely there have been numerous U.S. constructions of "what we are," but this sense of "manifest

The affirmative engages in Ethnocentric assumptions of a necessary western superiority. These discursive constructions portray China as a threat. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of violence and competition.

destiny," discursively repeated and reconstructed time and again by leading U.S. politicians, social commentators, the popular press, and numerous school textbooks, has since become a pivotal part of U.S. self-consciousness. In 1992, Colin Powell, then chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote: America is a remarkable nation. We are, as Abraham Lincoln told Congress in December 1862, a nation that "cannot escape history" because we are "the last best hope of earth." The president said that his administration and Congress held the "power and ... responsibility" to ensure that the hope America promised would be fulfilled. Today ... America is still the last best hope of earth, and we still hold the power and bear the responsibility for its remaining so. (27) This sentiment was echoed by Madeleine K. Albright, the former secretary of state, who once called the United States "the indispensable nation" and maintained that "we stand tall and hence see further than other nations." (28) More recently, speaking of the U.S. role in the current war on terrorism, Vice President Dick

Cheney said: "Only we can rally the world in a task of this complexity against an enemy so elusive and so resourceful. The United States and only the United States can see this effort through to victory." (29) It is worth adding that Cheney, along with several other senior officials in the present Bush administration, is a founding member of the Project for the New American Century, a project designed to ensure U.S. security and global dominance in the twenty-first century. Needless to say,
the United States is not unique in ethnocentric thinking. For centuries, China had assumed it was the center of the world. But what distinguishes U.S. from Chinese ethnocentric self-identities is that while the

latter was based largely on the Confucian legacy, the former is sanctioned by more powerful regimes of truth, such as Christianity and modern science. For the early English Puritans, America was part of a divine plan and the settlers were the Chosen People blessed by covenant with God. (30) With the advent of the scientific age, U.S. exceptionalism began taking on a secular, scientific dimension. Charles Darwin once argued that "the wonderful progress of the United States, as well as the character of the people, are the results of natural selection." (31) The United States has since been construed as the
manifestation of the law of nature, with its ideas and institutions described not as historically particular but as truly universal. For example, in his second inaugural address in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson declared that

U.S. principles were "not the principles of a province or of a single continent. We have known and boasted all along that they were the principles of a liberated mankind." (32) In short, "The US is utopia achieved." (33) It represents the "End of History." (34) What does this U.S. self-knowledge have to do with the way in which it comes to know others in general and China in particular? To put it simply, this selfknowledge is always a powerful analytical framework within which other societies are to be known. By envisioning a linear process of historical development with itself at its apex, the United States places other nations on a common evolutionary slope and sees them as inevitably traveling toward the end of history that is the United States. For example, as a vast, ancient nation on the other side of the Pacific, China is frequently taken as a mirror image of the U.S. self. As Michael Hunt points out, we imagine ourselves locked in a special relationship with
the Chinese, whose apparent moderation and pragmatism mirror our own most prized attributes and validate our own longings for a world made over in our own image. If China with its old and radically different culture can be won, where can we not prevail? (35) Yet, in a world of diversity, contingency, and unpredictability, which is

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irreducible to universal sameness or absolute certainty, this kind of U.S. knowledge of others often proves frustratingly elusive. In this context, rather than questioning the validity of their own universalist assumptions, the people of the United States believe that those who are different should be held responsible for the lack of universal sameness. Indeed, because "we" are universal, those who refuse or who are unable to become like "us" are no longer just "others," but are by definition the negation of universality, or the other. In this way,
the other is always built into this universalized "American" self. Just as "Primitive ... is a category, not an object, of Western thought," (36) so the threat of the other is not some kind of "external reality" discovered by U.S. strategic analysts, but a ready-made category of thought within this particular way of U.S. self-imagination. Consequently,

there is always a need for the United States to find a specific other to fill into the totalized category of otherness. In the early days of American history, it was Europe, or the "Old World," that was invoked
as its primary other, threatening to corrupt the "New World." (37) Shortly after World War II, in the eyes of U.S. strategists, the Soviet Union emerged as a major deviance from, hence an archenemy of, their universal path toward progress via the free market and liberal democracy. And after the demise of the Soviet Union, the

vacancy of other was to be filled by China, the "best candidate" the United States could find in the post-Cold War, unipolar world. Not until the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington had
China's candidature been suspended, to be replaced by international terrorism in general and Saddam's Iraq in particular. (38) B.

Chengxin Pan 04 > PhD in polisci from Australian Nat. Univ. The China Threat in American Self-Imagination: the Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5008295085> acc.6/28/11 While the 1995-1996 missile crisis has been a favorite "starting point" for many pundits and practitioners to paint a frightening picture of China and to justify U.S. firm response to it, what is often conveniently overlooked is the question of how the "China threat" discourse itself had played a constitutive role in the lead-up to that crisis. Limits of space forbid exploring this complex issue here. Simply put, the Taiwan question was created largely as a result of widespread U.S. perceptions of China as a "Red Menace" in the wake of the "loss of China" and the outbreak of the Korean War. To thwart what it saw as an orchestrated Communist offensive in Asia, the United States deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait as part of its Cold War containment strategy, thereby effectively preventing the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. While the United States abandoned its containment and isolation policy toward China in the 1970s and the two countries established full diplomatic relations in 1979, the conventional image of the "Red Menace" lingered on in the United States. To manage such a "threat," the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act shortly after the normalization of U.S.-China relations, renewing U.S. commitment to Taiwan's defense even though diplomatic ties with the island had been severed. (73) This confrontational policy serves not only to shore up Taiwan's defense capabilities but also to induce its independent ambition and further complicate cross-strait relations. As former U.S. defense official Chas Freeman remarked, "U.S. arms sales to Taiwan no longer work to boost Taipei's confidence that it can work out its differences with Beijing. Instead, they bolster the view that Taiwan can go its own way." (74) For instance, amid growing sympathy from the Republicandominated Congress and the elite media as well as the expanded ties with the United States, Taiwan responded coolly to Beijing's call for dialogue in January 1995. In June 1995, Taiwan's flexible diplomacy, designed to burnish its independent image, culminated in its president Lee Teng-hui's high-profile visit to the United States. This in turn reinforced Beijing's suspicion that the real U.S. intention was to frustrate its reunification goal, leaving it apparently no other choice but to prepare militarily for what it saw as a worst-case scenario. All this constituted the major context in which the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile exercises took place. While not denying the potential

The perception of china as a threat has caused the U.S. to make dangerous and unintelligent foreign policy decisions, that have bred anti-U.S. sentiments within china.

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security repercussions of China's missile tests for the region, I suggest that the flashpoint of Taiwan says as much about the danger of this U.S. approach to China as about the threat of Beijing's display of force itself. "Had Bill Clinton projected a constancy of purpose and vision in China policy ... in 1993-1994," David M. Lampton argues, "he might not have been challenged in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996 with missile exercises." (76) Indeed, it was primarily in the context of this U.S. intervention that Zhongguo keyi shuo bu (China can say no), one of the most anti-U.S. books ever produced in China, emerged and quickly became a best-seller in the Chinese reading world. (77) Mean-while, some Chinese strategic thinkers were so alarmed by the U.S. show of strength that they told Helmut Sonnenfeldt, one of Henry Kissinger's close associates, that they were rereading the early works of George F. Kennan because "containment had been the basis of American policy toward the Soviet Union; now that the United States was turning containment against China, they wanted to learn how it had started and evolved." (78)

C. China threat discursive lead to massacre of 500,000 Clark, 06 (No Rest for 'China Threat' Lobby, Gregory Clark is vice president of Akita International University and a former
Australian diplomat) Japan Times, Jan. 7, 2006,

Then came the allegations that China was seeking footholds in Laos, northern Thailand and Myanmar -- all false. U.S., British and Australian encouragement for the 1965 massacre of half a million leftwing supporters in Indonesia was also justified as needed to prevent China from gaining a foothold there.

D.Western construction of security guarantees unending genocide and war Batur 7 (Pinar, Professor of Sociology Vassar College and Ph.D. University of Texas, Austin, The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War,
and Genocide, Handbook of the The Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, Eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-447) At the turn of the 20th century, the Terrible Turk was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony

Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the Oriental otherEastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific Occidental Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption . Post-Enlightenment
of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the Terrible Turk to that of the Barbaric Russian Bear. In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion.

It

racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no race. It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the right ideological and cultural framework. It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet other. Orientalisms global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims
and Islamic culture as to the inferior other. Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates. Exclusion

in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

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E.

Chengxin Pan 04 > PhD in polisci from Australian Nat. Univ. The China Threat in American Self-Imagination: the Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5008295085> acc.6/28/11 Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

The alternative is to reject the China Threat discursive and the aff itself in order to examine American discourse and dispel any vestiges of this etymology, and allow America to see the other as a neutral force instead of a threat to be contained and controlled.

Construction of China as a threat in American discourse lead to Chinese involvement in the Korean war.

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Clark, 06 (No Rest for 'China Threat' Lobby, Gregory Clark is vice president of Akita International University and a former
Australian diplomat) Japan Times, Jan. 7, 2006,

For as long as I have been in the China-watching business (more than 40 years now), there has always been a China "threat." It began with the 1950-53 Korean civil war, which initially had nothing to do with China. Even so, Beijing was blamed and, as punishment, the United States decided to intervene not only in Korea but also in China's civil war with Taiwan, and later threaten a move against China by sending troops close to China's borders with Korea. When China reacted to that move by sending in its own troops, the China-threat people moved into high gear.

Discursive construction of china as a threat misdirected American diplomatic efforts leading up to the war in Vietnam Clark, 06 (No Rest for 'China Threat' Lobby, Gregory Clark is vice president of Akita International University and a former
Australian diplomat) Japan Times, Jan. 7, 2006

The China-threat lobby moved into overdrive over Vietnam in the early 1960s. There a clearly nationalist-inspired civil war supported more by Moscow than by Beijing was denounced by Washington and Canberra as the first step in planned Chinese "aggression" into Asia. In Moscow in 1964, I had to accompany an Australian foreign minister, Paul Hasluck, in a foolish, U.S.-instigated bid to persuade the Soviet Union to side with the West against those aggressive Chinese. Hasluck gave up only after a bemused Soviet prime minister, Alexei Kosygin, told him point-blank that Moscow was doing all it could to help North Vietnam, would continue to give help, and that it would like to see Beijing doing a lot more.

Securitization is a precondition for genocide. Their advantage descriptions will be used to justify massive violence Friis 00 (Karseten, UN Sector Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths, Peace
and Conflict Studies, 7(2), http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.p df#page=2)

The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that

speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy.

What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital O). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the
Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of ontological security, which means ...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a

dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls strangers). This is because they ...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being

categorized, and does not threaten the community, ...but the possibility of ordering itself (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneurs mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: Over and over again we see that the liberals within a group conflict are the first ones to go. The
undergoing a mobilisation process for group

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liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Nortons (1988:55) words, The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self. Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of daily security. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the worldpicture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its innocent reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a natural necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total solution (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is

way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both

in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

The U.S. uses China as threat discourse to reverse blame for its own harmful actions. Dont let aff claim that the U.S. does not actively construct china as a threatening other.

Chengxin Pan 04 > PhD in polisci from Australian Nat. Univ. The China Threat in American Self-Imagination: the Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5008295085> acc.6/28/11 The Chinese say they have the right to use force to reclaim Taiwan because it belongs to them, and they regularly practice for an invasion. This threat of force is why on April 1st [2001], the U.S. Navy's EP-3 surveillance plane was in the area to monitor China's military preparations. (83) Yet it turned out that the EP-3 spy plane collided with a Chinese navy fighter jet that was tailing it over the South China Sea, some fifty miles from the coast of China's Hainan Province. The Chinese jet crashed into the waters below, while the crippled spy plane landed on Hainan island. Washington demanded immediate return of its crew and plane, while Beijing insisted that the United States bear the responsibility for the midair collision and apologize for the incident. Rather than reflecting on how their new containment policy might have contributed to this incident in the first place, many U.S. realist analysts hastily interpreted it as further objective proof of the long-suspected "China threat." As Allen S. Whiting put it, the collision "focused attention anew on Beijing's willingness to risk the use of force in pursuit of political objectives." (84) It was as if the whole incident had little to do with U.S. spying, which was seen as "routine" and "normal." Instead, it was the Chinese who were said to be "playing a dangerous game," without regard to the old spy etiquette formulated during the Cold War. (85)

Discursive construction of china as a threat continues despite Chinas peaceful and diplomatic actions. It is not chinas fault that it is labeled as the other.

Chengxin Pan 04 > PhD in polisci from Australian Nat. Univ. The China Threat in American Self-Imagination: the Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5008295085> acc.6/28/11

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In January 2002, China chose to play down an incident that a presidential jet outfitted in the United States had been crammed with sophisticated satellite-operated bugs, a decision that, as the New York Times puts it, "illustrates the depth of China's current commitment to cultivating better relations with the United States." (90) Also, over the years, China has ratified a number of key nonproliferation treaties and pledged not to assist countries in developing missiles with ranges that exceed the limits established under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). More recently, China has collaborated with the United States in the war on terrorism, including issuing new regulations to restrict the export of missile technology to countries usually accused by the United States of aiding terrorists. Indeed, as some have argued, by any reasonable measure China is now more responsible in international affairs than at any time since 1949. (91) And yet, the real problem is that, so long as the United States continues to stake its self-identity on the realization of absolute security, no amount of Chinese cooperation would be enough. For instance, Iain Johnston views the constructive development of China's arms-control policy as a kind of "realpolitik adaptation," rather than "genuine learning." (92) From this perspective, however China has changed, it would remain a fundamentally threatening other, which the United States cannot live with but has to take full control of.

Unstable and Unpredictable entities are automatically mislabeled as threats in current American discourse, causing a reaction that is disproportional to the threat presented.

Chengxin Pan 04 > PhD in polisci from Australian Nat. Univ. The China Threat in American Self-Imagination: the Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5008295085> acc.6/28/11 The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy." (50) And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." (51) Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result?" (52) Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger. (53)

A2 Schmidt: Us/them dichotomies are not natural or necessary. In fact these binary divisions essentialize the other as dangerous and unnatural. Their criticism is flawed and only the alt. solves the harms.

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Chengxin Pan 04 > PhD in polisci from Australian Nat. Univ. The China Threat in American Self-Imagination: the Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5008295085> acc.6/28/11 Some may suggest that there is nothing particularly wrong with this since psychologists generally agree that "individuals and groups define their identity by differentiating themselves from and placing themselves in opposition to others." (43) This is perhaps true. As the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure tells us, meaning itself depends on difference and differentiation. (44) Yet, to understand the U.S. dichotomized constructions of self/other in this light is to normalize them and render them unproblematic, because it is also apparent that not all identity-defining practices necessarily perceive others in terms of either universal sameness or absolute otherness and that difference need not equate to threat.

Current China threat discourse reduces china to a purely naive militarized unit.This is not an accurate representation of china or their legislators. Only by creating a world where violence is inevitable forces chinas hand.

Chengxin Pan 04 > PhD in polisci from Australian Nat. Univ. The China Threat in American Self-Imagination: the Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5008295085> acc.6/28/11

The (neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are

much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo)realist prism.

U.S. Key to chinas international relations Lubman, 04 (Stanley, "The Dragon As Demon: Images Of China On Capitol Hill" (March 4, 2004). Center for the Study of

Law and Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers. Paper 18., Stanley Lubman is Lecturer in Law and Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California ( Berkeley) http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4099x6f8

The relative calm in US- China relations, could create an opportunity for the US to formulate coherent policies toward China. Zakaria noted that how China integrates itself into the world depends on China, but more crucially on Washington, and beneath the current quiet there is no shortage of concern in Washington about the future direction of Chinas economic and military development and foreign policy. Brzezinski recalled that before September 11, 2001 some of the leading personalities on the public policy scene who are now prominent in the Bush administration had openly spoken of China becoming the number one threat to US security.

Discursive construction of china as a threat permeates American policy. Lubman, 04 (Stanley, "The Dragon As Demon: Images Of China On Capitol Hill" (March 4, 2004). Center for the
Study of Law and Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers. Paper 18., Stanley Lubman is Lecturer in Law and Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California ( Berkeley) http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4099x6f8

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These views cloud debate because they often caricature a complex society and foster unconstructive moralizing rather than analysis of the problems that they address. By demonizing China they obstruct the formulation and maintenance of a coherent American policy toward China and weaken Congress contribution to making US policy. This article examines only a highly specific component of US policy Congressional rhetoric, and does not address tactics that members use to affect that policy. No attempt is made to ascertain the extent to which Congressional utterances have been influenced by lobbies and campaign contributions.

China viewed as building power both economically and militarily Lubman, 04 (Stanley, "The Dragon As Demon: Images Of China On Capitol Hill" (March 4, 2004). Center for the
Study of Law and Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers. Paper 18., Stanley Lubman is Lecturer in Law and Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California ( Berkeley) http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4099x6f8

A quite different view of Chinas future argues that economic development will make China less reliant on the outside world generally and enhance its ability to exert economic pressure on other countries, especially in Asia. Moreover, increased trade and the promise of the China market will strengthen business lobbies that will try to limit the strategic options available to their governments in dealing with a China that may begin to act as a security threat to other nations. In this view, too, China is seen as building up its military strength in order to project it beyond Chinas borders, to threaten Taiwan, to become a military rival of the United States and reduce American military ability to counter Chinese aggressiveness in Asia. China could also use its growing power to buttress diplomatic efforts to build alliances, in Asia and beyond, to counter American hegemony.

Even revolutionary chinese are viewed as drawing from the U.S. (proves U.S. ethnocentrism in congress) Lubman, 04 (Stanley, "The Dragon As Demon: Images Of China On Capitol Hill" (March 4, 2004). Center for the
Study of Law and Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers. Paper 18., Stanley Lubman is Lecturer in Law and Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California ( Berkeley) http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4099x6f8

Tiananmen was invoked by some, such as Congressman Brown (D. Ohio): The men and women who gave their lives for freedom in Tiananmen Square in Beijing and those who are still languishing in Chinese prisons are in many ways the heirs to the legacy of our Founding Fathers. In the days leading up to their slaughter, they quoted Jefferson not Mao. Their source of inspiration was not Maos Little Red Book, but our Statue of Liberty. (145 Cong. Rec. H. 6412, July 26, 1999)

AFF ANSWERS China spies on the U.S. trying to delegitimize the threat of china

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Dunn (American thinker)11 <http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/06/chinas_espionage_threat.html>

China is undoubtedly the biggest espionage threat this country now faces. The Chinese, for cultural and historical reasons, don't view espionage, either purpose or technique, the way we do. Whereas Americans (and Russians too) think in terms of targets against which distinct operations are planned and carried out, the Chinese, according to Wise, view the process as putting together a mosaic, of gathering small pieces of information to construct an overall picture. What the Chinese do is send out thousands of tourists, officials, and agents to pick up whatever they can (Wise compares the process to analyzing the sands of a beach -- each returns to China with a single grain of sand). Needless to say, the PRC does not overlook ethnic Chinese who have settled in foreign countries, particularly the United States. The Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) constantly recruits in overseas Chinese communities, often pleading with potential recruits to "help" the mother country, which remains poor and vulnerable. These requests often don't match our preconceptions concerning "espionage" as such, comprising as they do the search for that one single sand-grain of information that will fill out the overall mosaic.

China is aggressively expanding, hoarding resources Enda Curran, Dow Jones Newswires, JUNE 27, 2011 (AUSTRALIAN THINK TANK WARNS OF CHINA WAR
THREAT AT SEA)<HTTP://ONLINE.WSJ.COM/ARTICLE/BT-CO-20110627-714166.HTML>

There are growing risks of war in Asia's seas stemming from a clash with China as governments in the region bristle over territorial waters rich with oil and gas reserves, Australian think tank The Lowy Institute said in a report Tuesday. Much of the tension is based in the South and East China seas, with the former claimed in whole or part by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia. On Monday, Beijing said it had reached a deal over its dispute with Vietnam, though Vietnamese officials didn't comment on the announcement. If a war did erupt it could quickly draw in the U.S. and other powers and spread across the wider Indo-Pacific region, the Lowy report warned. The U.S. navy is active in Asia's seas and is scheduled to hold naval exercises with both the Vietnam and the Philippines, having recently conducted exercises with Australia.

China is expanding its military and planning to building aircraft carriers LOUISA LIM 11 (npr correspondant, China's Growing Military Muscle: A Looming Threat?)< http://www.npr.org/2011/06/20/136901727/chinas-growing-militarymuscle-a-looming-threat>

Last week, PLA general Chen Bingde officially confirmed the existence of the carrier for the first time, saying, "The carrier is now being built. It's not completed." "They change Varyag day by day, hour by hour," says Andrei Chang from Kanwa Asian Defense, who's been tracking the work. "We've seen they've installed most of electronic warfare, radio antennas everything is done." He believes it will mainly be used for training purposes as China prepares to build its own carriers. Chinese aircraft carriers could ultimately change the balance of military power, threatening U.S. power projection in the Pacific.

Chinas military spending has been increasing for a long time Esther Pan 06 (The Scope of China's Military Threat) <http://www.cfr.org/china/scope-chinas-military-threat/p10824>

It depends whose figures you trust, experts say. Chinastarting from a relatively low level has increased its military spending each year for the last fifteen years. Beijing's

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official estimate of its military spending is currently between $30 billion and $35 billion dollars, which most experts say is lower than the actual figure. Many independent analysts put the real figure at $50 billion to $65 billion, including research and development. The Pentagon's estimates, however, range from $70 billion to a high of $105 billion per year. "It'd be very hard to find an independent analyst who believes that [$105 billion] figure is even remotely accurate," Carpenter says.

China is the largest threat to america Eli Lake

Chinas nuclear arsenal poses the most serious mortal threat to the United States among nation states, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the Senate on Thursday.

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