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Rev no 2 3
Detail of changes Rule 4.4.3 added to Appendix 2. Revisions to switching device and tie duration updated with Distributor feedback. Revised with Distributor comments.
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Purpose
Pupose of the document This document is a technical guideline which highlights the issues to be considered when paralleling Grid Exit Points (GXPs). If not managed appropriately, parallel connection of GXPs can compromise operation of the Grid Owners assets ie:protection systems, and can impact on the ability of the System Operator to maintain a secure Grid While this document it is not to be considered as expert technical advice, it does highlight the key issues that need to be considered at a technical level before a parallel connection is made. This document is to be read in conjunction with the document titled: Process for Assessment of Parallel Grid Exit Point Applications.
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Type 2: Parallel Connection between two GXPs - Network Tie In this figure, parallel paths are formed when GXP A and GXP B are connected via a local distribution network in addition to the normal grid path.
Path 1 - The Grid Point 1 Point 2
GXP A
GXP B B
This configuration enables the distributor to change its network configuration e.g. a section of network normally supplied from GXP A can be switched over to receive supply from GXP B. Health and Safety responsibilities The Distributors and the Grid Owner are responsible for ensuring the safe operation of their assets, and that assets are sufficiently protected. Before paralleling GXPs the Distributors and the Grid Owner need to assess any risks involved, to ensure they are managed appropriately. The document titled: Process for Assessment of Parallel Grid Exit Point Applications outlines the process that distributors and the Grid Owner can follow to assess these situations where necessary. How are they of interest to the Grid Owner and System Operator? Parallel connections can impact on the achievement of the System Operators PPOs, the Grid Owners AOPOs, and the operation of protection systems. The Grid Owner and System Operator, in conjunction with the distributor need to assess the impact of parallel connections to identify, any risks that may be involved, and plan to mitigate these as required.. The EGR requirements include: Distributors are obligated to agree the temporary or permanent connection of its assets with the System Operator when those assets become simultaneously connected to the grid at more than one point of connection (Rule ref. C3, Tech code A, 6). Each asset owner will ensure that it provides protection systems for its assets that are connected to, or form part of, the grid. Each asset owner must also ensure that such protection systems will support the System Operator in planning to comply, and complying, with the principal performance obligations and must be designed, commissioned and maintained, and settings must be applied, to achieve the following performance in a reliable manner (Rule ref. C3, Tech Code A, 4).
Refer to the appendix of this document for more EGR rule references.
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1. Supporting information
Switching Device In all circumstances suitably rated devices that are safe to use are required. Where large power angles, or voltage magnitude differences occur, the switching device must have the capability to make or break the resulting current flow that will occur. Where two grid exit points are being tied at supply bus and feeder voltage levels, if the switching device is not a circuit breaker then the respective asset owners should ensure that the switching device can safely make or break the expected current. This may require that additional parallel connections are made with suitably rated equipment. The parallel connection must include a switching device which is capable of removing any source of back feed should a fault occur in the Distributors or Grid Owners network while the parallel takes place. If the switching device switches phases one at a time then the asset owner should consider the impact this may have on the operation of sensitive earth fault protection equipment. Tie Duration The duration of any tie should be kept to a minimum. The tie duration should be less than 10 minutes. This allows sufficient time to manually operate a circuit breaker or disconnector. This also allows sufficient time to confirm equipment loading and protection systems are correct prior to the tie being broken and load transferred between GXPs.
For paralleling situations where protection operation may be uncertain or the tying time is longer than 10 minutes, the Distributors and the Grid Owner are to agree any measures that may be necessary to mitigate the risk. This could be achieved by minimising switching times and/or the use of temporary protection settings. The agreed measures are then noted as conditions in the agreement. Where there are sufficient protection systems in place, the switching time may be extended to a maximum of 30 minutes. Clearing Multiphase faults All multiphase faults on the grid owners HV system must be detected and cleared. HV faults are most likely to be detected and cleared by the Distributors protection at a point close to the tying CB, if discrimination/selectivity principles have been applied. The magnitude of the current may not be large, especially if there are intermediate transformers such as 33/11 kV step down and 11/33 step up transformers included in the current path. Such transformers are generally of high impedance so act as good fault current limiters. However, if the fault current is reduced too much, the grid owners feeder protection cannot be expected to operate. Protection installed in line with current practices, should be time graded away from the grid owners point of supply i.e. the protection should work more quickly, the further you move away from the grid owners site.
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It is likely the protection will become more sensitive the further away the move from the grid owners point of supply. The sensitivity should be such, as to detect any reduced fault level due to step up/down transformers in their normal system configuration and during the periods of tying. Assurances should be sought in advance that adequate protection is installed and set. This sort of information should be recorded in the notes for each tying procedure. A fault on the grid owners HV system will draw current from the Distributors network in addition to some/all of the grid owners transformer energising current and station load. The relevant Distributor infrastructure probably cannot support this type of load. A tripping in the Distributors system would be expected, rather than trippings being observed in the grid owners equipment for other than normal strong infeeds from the grid to the actual fault.
Fault Position 2
Bus D
Substations on a spur with an HV star winding Refer to Figure 1 above. An earth fault incident at fault position 1 will cause the transmission circuit protection at Bus B to operate in minimum time, leaving the transformer back energised from the Distributors network. Earth fault current flows between the transformer HV star point and earth at Bus A.
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The transformers earth fault protection would be expected to detect the fault, but will probably be set to a final time of 3 or 4 seconds. Phase current would be expected to increase in the Distributors network and a tripping to occur close to the tying CB. In any case, action should be taken to open the transformer LV CB in case the transformer Earth Fault protection is not sensitive enough to operate from the weak infeed or the Distributors protection does not clear the fault. The CB opening will be prompted by the operation of Bus B transmission circuit protection. Clearing Earth Faults contd Substations on a spur with an HV delta winding Refer to Figure 1. An earth fault incident at fault position 2 will be detected at Bus C by the transmission circuit protection and normal tripping will occur at Bus C. The Bus D transformer HV winding is a delta winding without an earth reference. Unless there is an intertrip from Bus C to Bus D or there is residual protection installed on Bus D, the fault will remain. This becomes a safety issue. The grid owner needs to be vigilant in situations like this, so that during the period of the tie, if the Bus C transmission circuit protection is seen to operate, the Bus D transformer LV CB is opened without delay. There is a chance that the back-energisation current requirements of the transformer at Bus D will cause the Distributor protection to operate near the tie, but this cannot be guaranteed. Substations in a mesh with an HV delta winding An earth fault incident at fault position 3 is less of a concern. There is another HV source of current infeed for faults. Fault current would be delivered by the healthy circuit to allow the fault to be cleared. There may as a consequence be a tripping of the Distributors assets but this is a risk the Distributor would have to manage. When the Distributor notifies they are going to tie feeders, ensure the bus has sufficient other circuits to develop fault current, or fall back to the fault position 1 scenario. Note, if Bus E faults and all of the incoming transmission circuits trip, the transformer LV CB will need to be opened manually. The bus fault will continue to be fed via the tie. Bus faults are rarer than transmission circuit faults but need to be considered. System Power Angle and Magnitude When assessing the option of paralleling two GXPs, the system power angle and magnitude will need to be considered. If the power system angle is large when tying, large active power flows will occur and a tripping is likely to occur in the Distributors network. This is where protection is most sensitive. Large reactive power flows can occur if the magnitudes of voltages are significantly different. The switching device that will be tying the two GXPs needs to be rated to make or break the expected currents that could flow. While it is unusual for a Distributor to want to tie two geographically distant sites, the electrical route between two points can still be great. Normally, as long as the shortest electrical route is healthy, the power system angle should be satisfactory. The Distributor should be satisfied their internal
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power system angle is within suitable tolerances. In some configuration cases, when a circuit trips it is highly likely the tie will trip also. This could be due to either a strong reactive current flow or some fault contribution being made. Reverse Power Flow The connection of two Grid Exit Points must not defeat metering. There is always a risk of a reverse power flow as a consequence of there being a tripping in the core grid during tying. There is also a possibility of reverse power flow where the Distributor has embedded generation in excess of the load. Another situation would be when one substation backfeeds another i.e. power is moved across the tie. If site metering is not programmed to be bi-directional, power delivered to the national grid ie: from embedded generation, will not be recognised. Backfeeds into a Grid fault must be cleared by either having backfeed protection installed or as described above. Normal operation of the Grid autoreclosing may be prevented, where synchronism check detects an uncleared out of synchronism back feed. The loss of auto reclosing affects Grid system security. Fault levels The fault levels at both the Grid exit point and the paralleling point must be considered before paralleling can take place. The following three impacts must be considered: The connected equipment must be able to withstand the possible fault current, and break this current if appropriate. The step and touch potential within the substation must be at safe levels and the earth mat design is one way of achieving this. The change in fault level may cause protection discrimination problems and protection operating times may be affected.
It is important when considering the increased fault levels at a grid exit point that the public must be protected from injury at all times. Parallel Paths When tying two grid exit points a parallel link will be created. If the impedance of this link is low enough it will share current flow with the grid. Larger than normal current flow through the distributors network may cause the protection in the distribution network to operate. The following template provides a method for Distributors to identify situations where GXPs can be tied, and at what voltage. This along with any necessary supporting technical information will form the basis for assessing applications to parallel GXPs which is detailed in the document: Process for Assessment of Parallel Grid Exit Point Applications EGR Obligations Appendices 1 & 2 provide a summary of EGR rule references highlighting the various parties responsibilities for managing parallel GXP situations.
Assessment Template
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No No No No No No No
No No No No No No
No No No No No 33kV 400V No No No No No No No No No
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Rule ref. Part C Schedule C4 86. Where, pursuant to rule 6 of technical code A of schedule C3 of part C, a distributor requests agreement of the system operator to connection of local networks in parallel with the grid, the system operator will require the distributor to provide the following: 86.1. Any information reasonably required by the system operator to evaluate the consequences and determine conditions that may apply (and the system operator will list on its website the type of information generally required) 86.2. Written evidence of the grid owners agreement to the simultaneous connection of those assets.
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